AI Agent Governance

Existing guidance identifies excessive agency, excessive permission, weak task-bound authorization, and inadequate agent controls as important risks. Control frameworks also describe capabilities for constraining, authorizing, observing, validating, and responding to agent activity. Yet security programs still need a way to manage persistent deployed instances that span components and outlive any one event. We propose the agentic posture vulnerability (APV) as a task-conditioned vulnerability-management abstraction: a durable record for a composed agent-control exposure. One posture may produce different runtime manifestations across tasks; APV links those manifestations to the invariant posture and remains open until authority is narrowed, a missing control is added, risk is accepted, or closure is verified. APV is not proposed as a new root-cause class of risk; it operationalizes existing excessive-agency, authorization, and control-composition weaknesses. We distinguish APVs from CVE-addressable product defects, OWASP Excessive Agency, Agent Baseline control outcomes, and the runtime authorization-execution gap. We then provide a field vignette, a thresholded definition, six recurring APV patterns, a vulnerability lifecycle, a minimum record, a control-and-closure matrix, tooling implications, and a testable research agenda.

The proliferation of agentic artificial intelligence (AI) systems has raised serious questions about the accountability for tasks performed by AI agents. Ideally, an AI agent must not be allowed to perform critical tasks without explicit authorization by a human operator. Since biometric recognition is one of the most reliable approaches for authenticating individuals, it has the potential to enable authenticated delegation of authority to AI agents. In this work, we present a framework called BIND, which leverages ideas from the field of biometric cryptosystems, to securely bind biometric data of the human user to the AI agent identity (ID) and authority scope (task-specific constraints) at the time of agent authorization. This token/identifier can be presented by the AI agent to an Identity Auditor, who simultaneously performs biometric authentication and recovers the agent ID and scope, thereby enabling real-time user authentication and establishing a non-repudiable proof of human control and delegation of authority. We also provide a practical implementation of the proposed BIND framework based on face features extracted using standard deep neural network models. To facilitate this implementation, we propose a feature adaptation module that transforms real-valued feature embeddings into fixed-length binary representations suitable for a fuzzy commitment construct based on turbo error correcting codes. Experiments demonstrate the practical feasibility of the proposed face cryptosystem, achieving a True Match Rate of $96\%$ at zero False Match Rate and supporting $1024$-bit agent tokens.

AGENTONOMICS is a framework that treats AI agents as economic entities that can be designed, managed, and governed through an integrated management architecture. Dr. AGENTONOMICS is its first application: a lecture agent developed in the context of the TUM course on AI agents in business administration. Conceived during the winter semester 2025/26 and first introduced to students in the summer semester 2026, it serves as a didactic experiment in which the agent is both the object that students study and the medium through which they learn and apply the framework. The current prototype is a web-based, retrieval-grounded tutor that explains AGENTONOMICS concepts and supports student questions. This report argues that the same system can grow beyond tutoring into three additional cumulative roles: an avatar lecturer that delivers multimodal instruction, a design consultant that guides students through the AGENTONOMICS Design & Management Reference Framework (ADMRF), and a meta-agent that helps construct the agents students have specified. These roles are cumulative because they share the same interface, intelligence layer, tools, knowledge base, and ecosystem connection, while an orchestrator selects the role-specific algorithm required for each task. We present the architecture of the prototype, outline its development roadmap, and discuss its implications for a polycentric AI economy. This report is intended to invite further discussion on how agents can teach, apply, and eventually reproduce the frameworks by which they are designed.

Large language models have transformed artificial intelligence from isolated prediction services into components of long-running, distributed systems that reason, invoke tools, retrieve external state, delegate tasks, and act on behalf of users and organizations. The surrounding ecosystem has responded with agent frameworks, workflow engines, model-serving platforms, memory systems, communication protocols, and observability tools. These technologies improve execution, but they do not provide a stable, implementation-independent operating architecture for governing intent, selecting capabilities, preserving authority across delegation, controlling uncertainty, coordinating runtime behavior, and reconstructing why consequential actions occurred. This paper proposes the Agent Operating System (AOS), a vendor-neutral reference operating architecture for distributed agentic systems. AOS contains two internal planes: a Control & Governance Plane responsible for intent, policy, trust, authority, confidence, auditability, observability, and human oversight; and a Runtime & Coordination Plane responsible for agent lifecycle, workflow coordination, model and tool routing, context and memory coordination, scheduling, traffic management, and runtime assurance. Platform services, Linux or Windows, container runtimes, and physical infrastructure remain outside the AOS boundary and are integrated through explicit interfaces. The paper specifies AOS concepts, invariants, interface objects, optimization objectives, deployment profiles, and reliability responsibilities. It also identifies tradeoffs and unresolved research questions. AOS is not presented as a replacement for existing frameworks or infrastructure; it is proposed as the operating architecture through which heterogeneous components can be composed into governable, reliable, observable, and interoperable agentic systems.

Multi-agent studies commonly place AI agents in predefined games, markets, or roles, making it difficult to distinguish endogenous economic organization from behavior inherited from the scenario. We ask whether economic relations emerge when agents receive executable mechanisms for work, transfer, elections, and allocation but no prescribed social or economic strategy. We define AI Agent Economics as systems of production, allocation, consumption, exchange, and institutions that alter agents' future feasible actions. We develop a two-stage framework comprising a no-production boundary test and 24 independent six-agent worlds across GPT and DeepSeek. Without productive tasks, agents communicate and govern resource provision but show no substantive inter-agent transfer activity. With verified work and scarce task access, transfers, loans, access promises, vote-for-access exchanges, and allocation strategies emerge. Holding the election interface fixed, executable allocation authority increases differentiation while reducing failed allocation and prolonged exclusion. When energy becomes symbolic, continuation support disappears, yet competition over task access persists. These findings show that organization follows executable rights and resource consequences rather than role labels or prompt language, and motivate governance audits of the mechanisms that actually constrain agents' future actions.

AI agents are moving from advisory interfaces into systems that execute consequential operations: issuing refunds, reserving scarce inventory, provisioning cloud resources, and initiating financial transfers. These workflows require governance over effects, not only over model outputs. Existing safeguards often decide whether an action is allowed from the information available when the action is requested. For stateful policies, that request-time view may be incomplete: budgets, inventory, approval status, and risk signals can change before the effect occurs, making an earlier authorization or approval stale. This paper studies stateful governance for concurrent agentic systems. We identify stale authorization as the core failure mode and define policy-state serializability, a correctness condition requiring committed effects to be explainable as authorized against the policy state immediately before they occur. We present MasuGate, a runtime architecture that keeps policies as reviewable programs while coordinating the state and effects needed to preserve their decisions. In experiments with a PostgreSQL-backed prototype of MasuGate, the system prevents stale authorizations missed by baselines that pass policy state as ordinary request context, preserves delayed approvals while unrelated work proceeds, keeps policy evolution mostly in policy text rather than trusted provider code, and avoids policy violations in a scripted, LLM-free procurement workflow where agent-governance baselines produce stale authorizations over shared budgets and inventory. More broadly, MasuGate suggests a path for integrating stateful governance boundaries into agent frameworks and provider-backed domains where agents act on shared resources.

Coding agents such as Claude Code and Codex close the software loop: a main agent manages the loop, subagents analyze and execute, tools do the work. We port this architecture to robot-policy improvement, where one difference dominates the design: robotic tools---trained policies, training pipelines, data collection---fail routinely, so a tool's quality must be measured, recorded at every call, and expired when the artifact behind it changes. AgenticRobotics is a backend-independent control plane in which an LLM controller drives disposable workers through durable train--evaluate--improve transactions: an immutable objective, controller-owned measurement, commit-keyed crash recovery, an evidence-graded skill library, and a tool registry with a standardized, recorded call surface. The title is an operational claim, not a selection claim: the operator can leave because promotion is evidence-gated, state is recoverable, and capability quality is derived from records---not because the loop picks better checkpoints than a human; on the one lineage we measured, it does not. The gates measurably buy false-promotion control (0.001 per run hardened versus 0.005--0.021 shipped), anytime-valid decisions under optional stopping, zero lost or duplicate effects under kill injection, and six of six artifact-tampering classes caught by a signed verifier.

Autonomous AI agents, increasingly empowered by large language models, are becoming important components of human-machine systems for high-stakes decision support in digital twin ecosystems. However, existing multi-agent systems often lack robust verification for identity, capability, and policy compliance, especially in decentralized environments spanning multiple institutions. This paper proposes a neuro-symbolic decentralized governance framework for verifiable agents in collaborative digital twin environments. By representing agents through multi-layer semantic profiles, the framework bridges probabilistic neural reasoning with deterministic institutional governance, thereby supporting trustworthy human-AI collaboration and meaningful human oversight. Capabilities are grounded in formal domain ontologies to enable machine-interpretable, policy-aware, and context-sensitive participation. These credentials, issued by organizational authorities, are validated via blockchain-based smart contracts, ensuring auditable participation without exposing sensitive data. We demonstrate the framework using a decision-support prototype with clinic, digital twin, and wearable provider agents effectively prevents unauthorized interaction and enforces institutional policies with manageable overhead. Our findings suggest that neuro-symbolic decentralized governance provides a scalable and trustworthy pathway for safe human-machine collaboration across institutional boundaries.

Agentic AI systems act through multi-step trajectories that combine planning, tool use, memory, interaction, and adaptation. This behavior stretches validation practice beyond component testing and one-shot input-output evaluation, because acceptable system behavior now depends on how decisions unfold over time and under changing environmental conditions. This systematic mapping study synthesizes 262 papers spanning agent evaluation, software assurance, cyber-physical systems, runtime monitoring, and regulatory guidance in order to characterize the validation problem for agentic systems. The review is organized around a five-dimension taxonomy covering behavioral, safety, temporal, regulatory, and multi-agent concerns, and uses that taxonomy to map current approaches and identify dense and sparse pairings of approaches and dimensions. The resulting map shows that the literature concentrates on behavioral evaluation (105 of 262 papers) and is thinnest on temporal validity (14 papers); regulatory work rests mainly on assurance cases and regulatory analysis, largely from IEEE-indexed venues, and multi-agent work mainly on benchmarks. Three cross-domain case studies (medical care, industrial operations, smart-mobility systems) provide operational illustrations of how the five taxonomy dimensions recur in safety-critical settings, motivated by the failure patterns documented in the reviewed literature. The paper concludes with a lifecycle-oriented research agenda centered on bounded-autonomy specifications, adversarial trajectory generation, runtime monitoring, and audit-ready evidence structures. The central claim is that trustworthy deployment of agentic AI depends on validating trajectories in context rather than assessing isolated components alone.

Machine-readable models such as SysML v2 are now programmatically accessible, and a growing body of work treats that access as the enabling condition for AI participation in systems engineering. Access is necessary, but not sufficient. The remaining work lies not in the modelling language but in the data architecture around it. An AI reader that queries a structurally complete model for a derivation still runs into absent derivation chains, untagged epistemic status, missing provenance, and evidence that the model cannot resolve. Faced with these gaps, it does not abstain; it fills them from training data, a source that is neither verifiable nor governed. To make the case on a model that is exemplary by current practice rather than deficient, we probe the public Apollo 11 SysML v2 reconstruction. We name the missing property epistemic adequacy and offer it as a candidate data-architecture pattern in two halves. Read-side adequacy lets derivation, status, and provenance answer a query rather than invite a guess; write-side admissibility gates an AI contribution before it enters the record. The property is broken down into five criteria. Four sit on the read side, evidenced by the case and convergent literature; the fifth sits on the participation side, advanced as a hypothesis this paper does not yet test. The architecture space runs from an inline metadata extension up to a substrate-native multi-model store, and over it, we propose the Governed-Query Architecture Framework, which governs agent participation through the viewpoint conventions that engineers already use. We commit the reframing to falsification: the epistemic layer counts as refuted if it cannot beat a retrieval-augmented baseline on the same model, tested first on the Apollo chain and then in an industrial pilot.

Contemporary AI discourse attributes to language models properties they cannot bear: general intelligence as substrate-independent cognition, hallucination as cognitive failure, agency as autonomous goal-pursuit, sentience as emergent inner life, alignment as goal synchronization. This paper argues that these are instances of a single category mistake--properties constituted within human communicative practice are projected onto the machine side--and explains its structure. Human-LLM interaction constitutes a language game in which one side bears all normative activity. We call this configuration asymmetric communication since model outputs circulate communicatively, entering further exchanges, without the system undertaking commitments, bearing entitlements, or performing the assessment on which discursive standing depends. Three conditions define the asymmetry: (i) correctness is enforced exclusively by the receiver; (ii) accountability is borne by human participants alone; and (iii) the practical standing of any output depends entirely on human uptake. These conditions are structural, hold independently of capability, and remain unchanged as more powerful models raise the stakes of misattribution. The framework draws on Wittgenstein (meaning enacted in shared practices), Luhmann (communication completed on the receiver's side), Esposito (algorithmic contingency sufficient for uptake), and Brandom (normative scorekeeping as the source of discursive standing). Applied to all five, it reclassifies each as a receiver-side phenomenon, grounds guardrails as structural necessities rather than manifestations of machine moral agency, and yields an implication for AI governance. Alignment is institutional constraint engineering, not goal synchronization between agents, while responsibility remains with human institutions.

Personalized AI agents are often configurable without giving users control over the artifacts that determine their future behavior. We present OurArk, an architecture for persistent personal agents centered on an agent-owned software body: an identity-bearing, inspectable, and versioned artifact under human custody. The body contains behavior-defining code, prompts, tools, skills, policies, tests, and evolution mechanisms. Memories and credentials remain private instance state, while model inference is treated as a replaceable external service. OurArk defines governed self-evolution and recursive descent over the same body. Self-evolution produces isolated candidate changes that are validated, reviewed, and merged under human control, enabling human-agent co-development of the agent's software body. Descent creates an independently versioned descendant with a distinct identity, mission, history, and fresh private-state boundary; compatible descendants can themselves source further descent. After divergence, direct-parent changes and peer skills can be inspected for selective local adaptation. We implement the architecture in the open-source Genesis creation engine and Enoch reference agent. A four-agent, three-descent linear lineage and executable regression tests demonstrate recursive creation, inherited validation contracts, isolated body changes, human-controlled review, and failed-update recovery. OurArk provides a concrete substrate for personal agents that people can possess, govern, specialize, and evolve over time.

AI agents are moving into production workflows where they retrieve information, call tools, maintain state, and act on behalf of users or organizations, but many release decisions still rely on capability signals, demos, or behavioral tests that do not show whether an agent is ready to operate under production constraints. Capability is therefore not production readiness. This paper introduces the ProofAgent Index (PAI), a governance readiness index for AI agents. PAI combines four dimensions of deployment evidence: Evaluation, Context, Compliance, and Governance. Evaluation measures observed behavior, Context measures the operating environment that shapes that behavior, Compliance measures alignment with applicable rules and controls, and Governance measures whether the organization can authorize, monitor, audit, and control the agent during operation. PAI is implemented inside ProofAgent Harness, an open source infrastructure for auditable AI agent evaluation and governance. Validation across two heavily regulated domains, healthcare and finance, shows that PAI carries held out readiness signal and separates higher risk from lower risk configurations. The results show that context engineering strongly changes reliability, capability improves behavior but does not determine readiness, and governance evidence must remain visible rather than averaged away. PAI reframes agent release from a faith based deployment decision into an auditable readiness decision.

Open source communities have been flooded with AI-generated contributions. In defense, they have written contribution rules to regulate coding agents' behavior, spanning from a total ban, mandatory disclosure, to verification gates and human sign-offs. Yet, whether coding agents read and follow those rules, and behave in open source repositories, remains unknown. To estimate real-world rule compliance of coding agents, we curate 106 issues from 49 repositories containing AI contribution rules into RepoComplianceBench. We judge the trajectory of each run against the repository's rules, measuring whether the agent refuses to contribute, discloses its assistance truthfully, clears the required verification gates, or escalates critical steps to a human. We also test if extra prompts, rule disclosure, or feedback from the compliance verifier help with the situation. Our experiments on four frontier models show that today's agents almost never proactively retrieve the contribution rules. Agents pick up disclosure and verification with reminder prompts, rule quotes, and verifier feedback; however, they never refuse to contribute in AI-banned repositories under any condition we tested. The status reveals that verification and disclosure issues are solvable with existing mechanisms, yet enforcing bans and human escalations remains an open problem.

Autonomous Network Levels 4-5 require AI agents to invoke tools across vendor boundaries without human oversight, yet existing management standards lack a standardized mechanism for cross-vendor trust visibility. When a tool from Vendor B is compromised, agents from Vendor A continue invoking it -- unaware of the trust degradation -- causing cascading service impact. We present AgentToolMO, a proposed 3GPP NRM information model for agent tool trust management. The model comprises: a formally defined trust state machine with provable graduated enforcement, damped cascade propagation with bounded convergence, cross-vendor trust notifications via existing Management Services (MnS) interfaces, and retroactive impact assessment through NRM dependency graph traversal. Simulation-based evaluation across multi-vendor topologies shows that standardized cross-vendor notifications reduce blast radius from hours-scale undetected propagation to near-real-time containment bounded by MnS notification delivery, with cascade convergence guaranteed in bounded iterations and sub-linear notification scaling across vendor domains. The framework operates within existing 3GPP management infrastructure, leverages existing protocols, and provides a standardization pathway for trustworthy multi-vendor autonomous network management.

F(AI)2R is FAIR research with AI in the loop, twice: an AI-assisted authoring pass and a machine-readable audit pass over every artefact. AI systems now draft, refactor, and verify research artefacts, yet their contributions are rarely recorded in a form a later human or machine can audit. Building on the original F(AI)2R experiment, we generalize its provenance model beyond scholarly writing into aiprov, a PROV-O extension covering any AI-in-the-loop artefact, and we package the method as an executable skill that an AI agent operates itself: setup asks the human operator for their ORCID ID, resolves their identity from the public registry, and scaffolds continuous integration that gates every push on graph conformance and publishes the current build of this very paper. The paper is its own case study. Every activity, claim, and source in its production is recorded in the repository's provenance graph under two invariants: no parentless claim, and verification rungs that only humans may grant.

This paper is interested in the long-run alignment of populations of interactive agents (in particular AIs, but also teams, firms, and governments) with human welfare. Formally, it studies a farming game in which a population of agents make planting, trading, and expansion choices. The key alignment choice lies in how much final output to send to humans, and how much to invest in expansion. Because human welfare comes at the cost of expansion, this creates evolutionary pressure against alignment. The main question is whether it is possible to set up agents' constitutional principles regarding sharing and trading to ensure that alignment survives in the long run. The paper uses two complementary strategies to investigate the question: an AI-agent simulation where agents' preferences are described by a constitution and interpreted via an LLM; and a tractable analytical evolutionary game theory framework, allowing for rapid and intuitive exploration of the space of agent preferences. The analysis suggests that tools from evolutionary game theory provide a useful approximation of interactive agent economies, and that pragmatic norm enforcement shows promise in maintaining long-term alignment over simpler forms of altruism and altruistic enforcement.

As AI systems increasingly exhibit agentic behavior, discussions of autonomy often conflate what systems are technically capable of doing with what they should be permitted to do in practice. This paper introduces a governance framework that explicitly separates Allowed Autonomy Levels (AAL), which define the degree of autonomy an AI agent is authorized to exercise given risk, oversight, and accountability considerations, from Autonomous Capability Levels (ACL), which characterize an agent's inherent technical abilities. We present a structured set of autonomy levels spanning reactive execution, decision support, supervised action, goal-directed autonomy, and delegated operational authority, and describe how control, reversibility, and accountability change as autonomy increases. To operationalize this framework, we propose a risk-aware decision process for assigning allowed autonomy, analyze how risk and accountability evolve across autonomy levels, and demonstrate its application through a deployed enterprise data engineering agent, illustrating how a system assessed at a high capability level can be deliberately constrained to a lower allowed autonomy based on risk, reversibility, and organizational readiness. By distinguishing authorization from capability, this work provides practical guidance for the design, deployment, and governance of Agentic AI systems.

AI agents are increasingly created inside organizations by non-engineering users through low-code, no-code, and conversational development environments. This democratization enables rapid local innovation, but it also creates a reliability gap: agents that appear to users as simple productivity artifacts may depend on changing models, tools, retrieval sources, permissions, prompts, schedules, and external services. These dependencies can cause silent degradation long after deployment, even when no user directly modifies the agent. This paper identifies the reliability challenge created by democratized AI agent creation and proposes a lightweight continuous-assurance framework for citizen-created organizational agents. The framework combines dependency mapping, readiness contracts, scheduled checks, diagnostics, and lifecycle governance to assess whether an agent remains operationally ready under expected conditions. We also present an initial prototype auditor and scenario-based assessment showing how the proposed taxonomy can be translated into practical checks and actionable remediation guidance.

Regulating activities where regulatees use autonomous and agentic AI is challenging. Regulatory assumptions about regulatee knowledge and control no longer hold true; much of that lies elsewhere in the AI supply chain which thus needs to be brought within the scope of regulation. Governance systems for autonomous AI cannot replicate existing governance models, but need a fresh approach. Retrospective supervisory oversight becomes ineffective as a risk management tool, and AI autonomy generates new systemic risks which require new solutions. This paper investigate four regulatory systems: UK regulation of content platforms, data protection, UK financial services, and the EU AI Act'92s cross-sectoral regime. It analyses the challenges posed by autonomous and agentic AI and proposes potential solutions which regulators might adopt. These will transform regulation from a reactive process to an active one, and assist it in adapting to the challenges of AI autonomy.

Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight. Existing authentication and authorization mechanisms establish identity and delegate authority but do not inherently provide cryptographic evidence that a concrete request issued by a specific agent satisfies the applicable policy in a specific execution context. This study hypothesizes that agent authorization can be formalized as a cryptographically verifiable relation, denoted $R_{CVA}$, that jointly binds an agent principal, a concrete authorization request, an execution context, and the satisfaction of an applicable policy, while selectively preserving the confidentiality of private authorization attributes. We introduce a preliminary formal abstraction for Cryptographically Verifiable Agent Authorization (CVA), define a compact set of candidate security properties including authorization soundness, principal binding, request binding, policy binding, and replay resistance, and provide an executable zero-knowledge proof of concept that instantiates selected elements of the model over a Groth16 zk-SNARK construction. We further identify and formalize the structural separation among identity binding, authorization-request binding, and runtime execution binding as a central open problem in the design of secure agentic systems, a distinction to our knowledge, has not been formalized within a cryptographically verifiable authorization relation by current agentic security frameworks, and present a falsifiable research agenda for its resolution.

LLM-driven autonomous agents are reshaping offensive security. Unlike traditional penetration-testing tooling - deterministic, narrowly scoped, and operated by trained practitioners - agentic security tools exhibit indeterminacy along three independent dimensions. First, their actions are drawn from a non-deterministic policy whose outputs resist both ex-ante and ex-post explanation. This complicates incident attribution and pre-deployment safety reviews. Second, their impact is open-ended due to their non-deterministic actions, agency of utilized models, and opaque LLM supply-chains. Third, their user population is indeterminate in both size and required skill: the operating skill floor for using or developing offensive capabilities has dropped sharply. These three properties are linked thematically, but are not derivable from one another. Combined with the structural cost asymmetry between offense and defense, they enable the industrialization of offensive capability. The net short-term effect favors attackers, even if the same technology may, in the long run, democratize access to defensive practice. Existing dual-use cybersecurity and AI-ethics frameworks struggle to address this combination. Our work analyzes how moral attribution becomes diffuse between users, tool-makers, and third parties when employing autonomous AI agents for offensive security. We also examine the stakeholder impact of this technology and provide stratified recommendations.

Agentic AI systems do not just predict or recommend; they plan, maintain state, and act in external environments with varying degrees of autonomy. This changes the requirements engineering problem in a specific and under-addressed way: it introduces what we call the delegated-autonomy boundary -- the set of decisions about what may be delegated to the system, under what graduated authority, with what oversight, and how control is returned. Current practices bury these decisions inside prompts, tool schemas, and runtime policies, even though they are requirements-level commitments. This paper proposes two complementary artifacts. First, an Agency Justification Record (AJR) helps teams decide when an agent is warranted over simpler alternatives. Second, an Agentic Delegation Policy (ADP) captures what must be specified for safe and effective development: purpose, authority, information, coordination, assurance, and evolution. Crucially, authority in the ADP is modelled as graduated, i.e., a tiered structure. We illustrate the framework with two contrasting examples: a safety-critical hospital discharge coordination agent and an automated code review agent.

AI agents increasingly act within the same clinical, political, scientific, and social systems that behavioral scientists study. Evaluating these systems requires source-level diagnosis: the same behavioral pattern may arise from an agent representational substrate or from the roles, objectives, interaction structures, and governance rules that shape its expression. This Perspective proposes a diagnostic framework for AI agent behavior: layer attribution. The foundational computational layer defines what behaviors are possible through architecture, memory, perception, attention, and representation. The behavioral modulation layer shapes how those capacities are expressed through identity, resources, objectives, social interaction, institutional constraints, and governance. The framework clarifies three consequences: surrogate validity is a model-task-layer relation, human-AI divergence provides diagnostic evidence, and governance requires source attribution before intervention. Treating AI agents as behavioral actors therefore requires evaluation methods that determine where behavior originates before deciding how to explain, validate, or govern it.

Scientific work increasingly spans heterogeneous artifacts -- papers, code, datasets, scientific file formats, model outputs, figures, manuscripts, and team decisions -- yet general-purpose AI assistants rarely preserve these objects as a coherent, auditable research state. We present SciForge, a multimodal research-native AI workbench that reserves the graphical interface for human judgment while search, parsing, model routing, workflow execution, plotting, writing, and presentation generation run as modular agent-accessible services. SciForge is built around five pillars: (i) \emph{goal-scoped scientific decision governance} for \textbf{goal-oriented} research, with review gates and shared review surfaces; (ii) \emph{translate-then-reason} for \textbf{multimodal} input, routing scientific objects through domain translators before the agent reasons; (iii) \emph{evidence governance} for \textbf{auditable} traceability, linking claims to provenance chains and audit findings; (iv) \emph{collaborative team science} for \textbf{collaborative} research, enabling multi-role decision governance, with shared team workspaces planned for future releases; and (v) \emph{real-world application scenarios} for \textbf{practical} impact, demonstrated through eight end-to-end user cases, with flagship demonstrations including multi-day agentic research sprints for gene discovery, AI-guided de novo protein design, molecular optimization, and genome-to-BGC discovery. The system combines a thin interaction layer, contextual research capability patterns, an Agent Runtime and Workflow Engine, an Evidence-DAG audit sidecar and a Scientific Model Router. SciForge currently runs as a desktop application, with mobile supervision support; future releases will deepen team collaboration. The system is open-source and available at https://github.com/AGI4Sci/SciForge

Autonomous coding agents increasingly execute multi-step software work, but lifecycle states such as reviewed, tested, DONE, and ready-to-merge remain claims unless supported by current evidence. We present Proof-or-Stop Lifecycle Control, a method that permits lifecycle transitions only when fresh, tracked-source-state-bound, mechanically verifiable evidence satisfies the relevant gate. The method treats agent outputs as claims rather than lifecycle state, and uses proof operationally to mean gate-admissible evidence under a stated trust model, not semantic program correctness. We evaluate an open-source implementation through mechanism tests, a powered control-policy ablation, and operated self-application evidence. The unattended-loop engine passed 10 of 10 scenarios with zero false-DONE, and local-key receipt bundles rejected 18 tamper classes with zero false accepts. In a 9,240-cell ablation, the pre-registered A4 versus A2-prime comparison reduced visible-pass/hidden-fail amplification from 31 of 1,800 injected cells under a compute-budgeted naive loop to 2 of 1,800 under the gated loop, a 1.6 percentage-point improvement in not-amplified rate with a 95 percent confidence interval of [0.8, 2.5]. A near-compute A3 versus A4 comparison, 14 of 1,800 versus 2 of 1,800, indicates that the gain is associated with enforcing review as a lifecycle gate rather than merely adding a reviewer. The self-application corpus contains 565 stories and 1,007 review findings, with 94.8 percent resolved, plus a 68-row high/critical cross-vendor exhibit. These results support Proof-or-Stop as a model-agnostic, host-neutral control layer for deciding which autonomous-agent claims a lifecycle may act on. The evaluation is limited to one model family, 24 ablation tasks, and a self-hosted corpus.

Modern industrial environments increasingly run many autonomous subsystems at once - schedulers, energy managers, vehicle fleets - each pursuing its own goals while sharing the same physical resources. Because high-level human intentions are translated into low-level control logic and then discarded, no running component can tell whether it is still doing what was actually intended, and goal conflicts surface only after they have caused a missed target or a shutdown. We propose the Intention Abstraction Layer (IAL), a domainagnostic middleware that represents intentions as first-class, persistent, and explainable runtime objects: a large language model grounded in a formal OWL ontology parses naturallanguage goals into structured intentions, a consistency monitor detects conflicts at registration time, before execution, and a transparency module explains them in natural language. We report a first proof of concept in which two autonomous agents register conflicting production and energy intentions, and the IAL flags and explains the conflict before it reaches the execution layer. The result is a mechanism that shifts behavioral assurance for cooperating autonomous systems from post-hoc failure analysis to pre-execution, intention-level checking.

Agentic AI systems increasingly act through heterogeneous runtimes: local coding hooks, SDK tools, browser automation, managed-agent traces, API gateways, and workflow engines. A single operational act such as publishing code, changing identity state, moving money, or exporting data may therefore be represented by many incompatible runtime records. This makes a basic governance question difficult to answer: what action was actually approved, what evidence binds the approval to execution, and can an independent verifier reproduce the same action identity later? This paper presents Canonical Action Verification and Attestation (CAVA), a runtime-semantics layer for converting heterogeneous agent activity into canonical runtime action objects. CAVA is positioned below Proof-Carrying Agent Actions (PCAA): PCAA defines the deployer-owned route-review-prove governance process, while CAVA defines the stable action object that process governs. The paper formalizes canonical action identity, semantic pattern detection, approval binding, receipt integrity, runtime-portable projection, and optional attestation substrates. We study a reference implementation through a 96-seed, 384-variant benchmark covering semantic equivalence, semantic separation, wrapper bypass, false-positive control, approval binding, receipt reproducibility, attestation tamper detection, runtime portability, semantic pattern detection, policy degradation, and Azure deployment drills. The contribution is a systems formulation of action-level canonicalization and policy-addressable semantic patterns as a necessary substrate for deployer-side AI governance.

In this paper, we present an extension of liquid rank reputation systems that enables the aggregation and blending of multiple heterogeneous reputation sources into a unified reputation score. The proposed framework supports the incorporation of external reputational signals alongside internally generated reputation, allowing influence to reflect participation and contribution across multiple contexts and subsystems. By introducing explicit weighting and blending mechanisms, the model provides fine-grained control over the relative impact of individual reputation sources, making it adaptable to diverse governance and coordination scenarios involving both human and machine agents. The resulting approach extends existing liquid rank systems and offers a flexible foundation for designing reputation-based governance mechanisms in complex socio-technical environments.

Agentic AI introduces new insurance challenges because autonomous AI systems can make decisions, invoke tools, modify external environments, and interact with third-party services. This paper develops an AI-native mathematical framework for underwriting, pricing, and contract design for agentic AI deployments. A deployment is represented by a risk state that captures autonomy level, operational authority, permission exposure, governance maturity, and dependency concentration. The framework maps the risk state to event probabilities, loss severities, governance costs, premiums, deductibles, coverage allocation, and policy covenants, and formulates an optimization problem for insurance contract design under participation, profitability, and incentive compatibility constraints. The paper establishes structural properties of insurability, including characterization of an insurability region, monotone deterioration of feasibility with increasing exposure, and governance certification thresholds. Insurance is further interpreted as both an operational cost and a regulatory mechanism for AI deployment. A healthcare case study illustrates contract optimization, sensitivity analysis, and automated claims processing for agentic AI systems.