AI Governance

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34 papers in the last four weeks, up 143% on the four weeks before. 0.3% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 254

Jul 14, 2026cs.HC

Practical Judgment, Virtue, and Intuition in the Use of Opaque AI-Enabled Systems

AI-enabled systems are seeing increasing deployment across numerous domains, with many being "black boxes" with respect to core functions and capabilities. I.e., many systems take inputs and give outputs, but without users having any ability to see how the former lead to the latter. AI-enabled systems are also being used to augment autonomy in systems, and autonomy coupled with opacity raises numerous concerns surrounding, e.g., the reliability of systems, their regularity in functioning, human ability to control them, or whether deploying opaque and potentially autonomous systems is in compliance with ethical and legal norms. In this article, we argue that many of these worries can be mitigated by leveraging practical judgment, virtue, and intuition in the deployment and use of opaque AI-enabled systems. We show that focusing on these distinctly human capabilities provides a means for bridging between the practical challenges created by opacity and the ethical, legal, and social norms underpinning particular domains. We argue that a core element in doing this is a recognition that many positive human traits are not quantifiable and we therefore must develop training regimen and guidelines on AI deployment anchored in humanistic but non-quantifiable values. Throughout the article, we focus on the military domain as an exemplar of the importance of practical judgment, virtue, and intuition as drivers for ethical and effective human decision-making surrounding AI deployments, but the underlying arguments apply to all domains where opaque and potentially autonomous systems are being deployed (subject to domain-specific alterations).

Nathan G. Wood, Andrew P. Rebera

AI Governance Human-AI Decision Making Human Oversight of AI

Jul 14, 2026cs.AI

Vertical Standardisation for High-Risk AI Systems under the EU AI Act: A Domain-Specific Framework for Algorithmic Hiring

According to the recent European legislation, high-risk AI systems will have to adapt in order to comply with requirements related to specific areas, like risk management, data quality and governance, logging and traceability, technical documentation, transparency, human oversight, and accuracy, as outlined in the European Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act. As the standardisation process for AI is expected to remain iterative and, so far, there are no European standards on AI fully covering the challenges of algorithmic hiring, we propose specific standardisation-oriented recommendations related to the relevant AI areas specified by the European Commission. For each of these areas, we set the context by describing the requirements that AI systems in high-risk domains, and especially in recruitment, should fulfil, as well as the activities that should be carried out to ensure their appropriate use and desired performance, in line with the requirements deriving from the AI Act. Unlike existing horizontal approaches to AI governance and standardisation, this paper contributes a vertical, domain-specific framework for algorithmic hiring, and especially ranking-based recruitment systems, by mapping the requirements of the AI Act to concrete standardisation recommendations, focusing on lifecycle discrimination risks, fairness-aware data governance, explainability, human oversight, and post-deployment monitoring in recruitment systems. Even though our recommendations were informed by the outcomes of the European project FINDHR, they are not tied to the project's technical artefacts and could be implemented using alternative methods, tools, or governance mechanisms.

Anna Gatzioura, Vrettos Moulos, Nina Baranowska

University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain · University of Piraeus, Piraeus, Greece · Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands

AI-Assisted Decision Making Algorithmic Fairness AI Governance Human Oversight of AI

Jul 14, 2026cs.CY

A Comparative Analysis of Institutional and Course Generative AI Policies within Higher Education: Implications for Instruction in Computing Education

With the increased use of generative AI (GenAI) applications such as ChatGPT, higher education institutions (HEIs) have released a range of guidelines and policies to direct adoption within their institutions. In computer science (CS) courses GenAI adoption is especially high and the implications for student learning are significant. At the same time, instructors have also been forced to address the use of GenAI as students have started to use it for a range of functions. Currently, comparative analysis of guidance provided by institutions and its uptake in instruction is lacking. In this paper we bridge this gap by comparing institutional and computing course level guidance to better understand this terrain. We utilize secondary analysis of institutional and course syllabi guidelines from higher education institutions in the U.S. classified as research-intensive. Our findings reveal that although institutional guidance is more pro-use, at the course-level the uptake is still guarded. We discuss the implications and propose an instructor-centered framework to guide future adoption of GenAI.

Amrita Ganguly, Aditya Johri, Nora McDonald +3

George Mason University Fairfax, VA, USA · Montgomery College Rockville, MD, USA

Computer Science Education Generative AI in Education AI Governance

Jul 13, 2026cs.AI

Optimization Is Not All You Need

In 2019, OpenAI released two million GPT-2 outputs-ungrammatical, half broken-to aid the detection of machine-generated text. The alignment that produced their more fluent successors is usually regarded as an engineering achievement; we read it instead as the newest expression of optimization culture: the conviction, older than the technology, that measurable improvement along predefined axes exhausts the question of value. Tracing that conviction through the stack-pretraining, decoding, preference tuning, benchmarking, interface-and back through its genealogy in the audit society, we arrive at the limit: an optimization procedure can measure how improbable a piece of generated text is; it cannot tell whether that unlikelihood is error or invention. A procedure that cannot make that distinction has nonetheless, within half a decade, assumed the authority to set the protocols of legitimate language. Held for centuries by academies and schoolrooms, grammars and examiners, this authority has been given over to loss functions, reward models, benchmarks, and system prompts: an apparatus that executes the office of judgment with no capacity for judging.

Minh Hua, Rita Raley

Scale AI · San Francisco, California · Department of English +1

LLM Alignment AI Governance Generative AI Evaluation

Jul 10, 2026cs.CR

Authority-Bound Governance of Heterogeneous AI Security Decisions in Telecom and IoT Networks

Artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled security decision systems in telecom and IoT networks can draw on heterogeneous models whose outputs may trigger operational actions. Recording such decisions on a blockchain does not establish that they are authorised, applicable, policy-consistent, or still valid at execution time. This paper presents governance-2, an authority-bound and fail-closed architecture that separates upstream scientific decision formation from downstream operational enforcement. Each governed case is bound to registered dataset, model, policy, deployment, and optional refiner authorities. Smart-contract checks enforce role separation, authority compatibility, score-to-state and state-to-action consistency, lifecycle validity, replay protection, pause control, authority revocation, and exact-action execution. Evaluation uses two independent branches: a controlled spectrum-access replay with four frozen heterogeneous decision configurations and a measured radio-frequency branch based on WiFiSpectralJam. Across eight frozen measured-data decision streams, governance-2 processes 153,744 stream-case instances derived from 19,218 measured captures while preserving interference-specific semantics and unresolved review states. The full contract rejects all tested invalid operations; stateful invariant testing completes 2,000 generated transaction sequences with zero invariant violations; and single-capability ablation shows that removing an enforcement family exposes its assigned invalid operations while unrelated protections remain active. The results indicate that heterogeneous AI security decisions can share a common governance plane across telecom and IoT settings without redefining their scientific semantics.

Saviz Changizi, Nasibeh Mohammadzadeh, Mohammad Shojafar +1

6G Innovation Centre, Institute for Communication Systems, University of Surrey, UK · Department of Network Engineering, Polytechnic University of Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain

Cybersecurity AI Governance Access Control

Jul 8, 2026cs.AI

Alignment Plausibility: A New Standard for Assuring AI in Healthcare

Large language models (LLMs) have become significant providers of mental health support, yet they remain products of an attention economy whose operational and commercial targets favour sustained engagement over the friction that effective psychological support often requires. Developers' safety responses have been largely reactive, addressing the most visible and acute harms while subtler, longer-term patterns of risk (e.g., dependency, boundary erosion, the amplification of distorted beliefs) receive less attention. We contend that making LLMs structurally safe requires alignment organised at three levels that mirror how society assures the safety of human clinical practice: 1) explicit value specification grounded in the codified normative commitments of clinical practice; 2) training that embeds those values in the model; and 3) oversight that detects drift and longer-term harm during deployment, much as clinical supervision does for human practice. Organising alignment in this way yields a construct we call alignment plausibility - a structured demonstration that a system's values, training regime, and oversight mechanisms are together consistent with safe and positive outcomes. We propose alignment plausibility as a regulatory construct (by drawing analogy to the established construct of biological plausibility) for AI in health: a principled way to argue for, or against, trust that systems are aligned to positive health outcomes, will cause no harm even where capable of doing so, and will ultimately lead to patient benefit.

Gwydion Williams, Sara Zannone, Bilal A Mateen

PATH, United Kingdom · UCL, United Kingdom

LLM Alignment Healthcare LLM Auditing LLM Safety AI Governance

Jul 6, 2026cs.CY

Open Problems in AI Incident Governance

AI systems may produce failures after deployment that pre-deployment safety assessments do not anticipate. Managing these failures requires what we refer to as adequate \textit{AI incident governance}, where having good definitions, taxonomies, monitoring practices, reporting mechanisms, and incident analysis is essential. We examine existing frameworks related to AI incident governance by regulatory bodies and independent efforts, and find that while there are frameworks that describe how individual functions can be performed, there is a lack of consistency within the aspects of definitions, classification, monitoring, and reporting. These inconsistencies apply to the types of incident data that is collected and reported, the ways in which they are categorised, and as a result, the depth, representativeness, and accuracy of analysis that can be performed.

Harleen Kaur Sidhu, Rebecca Scholefield, Nour Annan +5

Independent · Sorbonne University · Rice University +4

AI Governance Responsible AI

Jul 6, 2026cs.CR

Privilege and confidentiality in generative AI workflows

Generative AI (GenAI) systems store and process client data in three distinct ways: in the model's parameters through training and memorisation, in the context window during a live session, and in knowledge databases for retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). Each mode creates different and often counter-intuitive risks to confidentiality and legal professional privilege, and each calls for specific governance responses. Drawing on the first English and American decisions to address privilege and generative AI, UK and Munir v Secretary of State for the Home Department and United States v Heppner, on the orthodox privilege authorities against which those decisions must be read, and on recent computer science research, we explain the three modes of data storage and processing in terms accessible to practitioners and analyse the legal consequences of each. We then situate the analysis within the regulatory framework governing solicitors in England and Wales and within the ordinary principles of professional negligence, arguing that the standard of effective information governance (and with it the benchmark against which negligence and misconduct will be measured) is changing. Although we write primarily for SRA-regulated practitioners, our data-governance analysis is framed to extend to any jurisdiction in which the protection of privilege or professional secrecy depends on demonstrable confidentiality. The ultimate aim of this article is to help legal services professionals understand salient data leakage risks in GenAI systems and thereby facilitate a more responsible deployment of GenAI on client data and other sensitive material.

Václav Janeček, Thomas Melham

University of Bristol Law School · University of Oxford, Department of Computer Science

Data Leakage Privacy Leakage in Language Models AI Governance

Jul 5, 2026q-fin.RM

Governing Generative AI Across Financial Institutions: A Framework for Generative AI Risk Control

Generative artificial intelligence is moving from general-purpose experimentation toward specialized applications across banking, capital markets, insurance, payments, and wealth management. Its main contribution is not limited to conversational interfaces. Modern generative systems can synthesize large document collections, extract information from unstructured data, generate software and analytical code, create scenario narratives, support research workflows, and coordinate multi-step tasks. These capabilities make generative AI especially relevant to finance, where decisions often depend on combining quantitative data with contracts, policies,filings, news, customer communications, and expert judgment. This paper presents an application-oriented view of generative AI in finance. It organizes potential uses around five capability patterns, including knowledge synthesis, content generation, analytical assistance, interaction, and workflow orchestration, and maps them to major financia functions. Representative applications include investment research, customer service, lending support, fraud investigation, financial reporting, operations automation, software development, and personalized financial guidance. The paper also discusses common technical architectures, such as retrieval-augmented generation, tool-using assistants, multimodal models, and agentic workflows, and identifies practical factors that shape business value. The resulting landscape provides a foundation for researchers and practitioners seeking to understand where generative AI may produce the greatest operational and analytical impact in financial services

Dennis Mao, Alessandra Lin, Yixin Kang +1

Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA · Independent Researcher, Dallas, TX, USA · Independent Researcher, Chicago, IL, USA

Financial Services AI Risk Management AI Governance

Jul 3, 2026cs.SE

AGL-1: The Enterprise AI Governance Layer as a Control Plane for Trusted Enterprise Intelligence

Enterprise artificial intelligence is moving from isolated experimentation toward operational dependency across copilots, retrieval-augmented generation systems, autonomous agents, and AI-enabled business workflows. As this transition accelerates, the primary enterprise challenge is no longer only model access or inference scale. It is governed intelligence operations: the ability to enforce authorization, preserve contextual lineage, control persistent memory, detect stale or conflicting knowledge, constrain agentic execution, and produce audit-ready evidence across distributed AI estates. This paper introduces AGL-1, the Enterprise AI Governance Layer, as a vendor-neutral reference model for the control plane that should operate across foundation models, retrieval systems, orchestration frameworks, enterprise memory, policy engines, observability systems, tools, APIs, and business applications. Building on governed knowledge-system principles introduced in GKS-5, AGL-1 generalizes the governance problem from retrieval-specific controls to full AI execution-path governance. It identifies recurring failure modes such as unauthorized retrieval, stale grounding, unmanaged memory, weak provenance, policy drift, fragmented observability, and uncontrolled autonomous execution. It then defines seven governance domains: identity-aware retrieval, policy enforcement, provenance management, memory governance, knowledge integrity monitoring, agentic execution control, and trust observability. The central claim is that durable enterprise value from AI will increasingly depend on the ability to govern intelligence at scale. In complex enterprises, trust is not a property of the model alone. It is a property of the system around the model: identity, knowledge, policy, memory, tools, human oversight, and evidence working together as a managed control plane.

Roopam W. Sure

Independent Researcher

AI Assurance AI Agent Monitoring AI Agent Governance AI Governance Tool Access Control for LLM Agents

Jul 3, 2026cs.CY

The Foreign Policy AI Evaluation Gap

We argue that AI systems used in conducting foreign policy tasks - broadly enacting 'statecraft' - should be a priority test case for technical AI governance research. In enacting foreign policy, we refer to the formulation and implementation of external objectives by political actors. Statecraft is a high-consequence deployment domain, with extreme downside risks and structural properties that standard evaluation practices handle poorly. These features include partial observability, unbounded action spaces, contested ground truth, and multidimensional objectives. This paper advocates for a literature-grounded research agenda. Our contribution is threefold: (i) a claim about the structural conditions of foreign policy that combine catastrophic tail risk with technical evaluation complexities, (ii) an ECOSYSTEM review that highlights the asymmetric focus on ASSESSMENT features over ACCESS, VERIFICATION, SECURITY, and OPERATIONALIZATION, and (iii) a demand-side evaluation framework that decomposes foreign-policy workflows into bounded, evaluable sub-tasks with human recombination. As AI systems are already being deployed in the conduct of war and peace, amid limited public evaluation infrastructure from the technical AI governance community, this agenda is an urgent priority.

Charles Pozniak, Jeba Sania

Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA, USA.

AI Safety Evaluation AI Governance

Jul 2, 2026cs.CY

Overview of Risk Assessment and Management for Intelligent Systems under the AI Act and Beyond

The society and emerging risk-based regulatory frameworks for AI underscore the need for rigorous risk assessment to ensure safe and reliable AI systems. In response to this imperative, this paper presents an overview of AI risk assessment (identification and analysis) and management methodologies. It begins by reviewing the worldwide regulatory landscape that drives the need for systematic AI risk assessment. Then we characterize the spectrum of AI-related risks identified in the literature, from technical failures to ethical and social impacts. Subsequently, it reviews key risk assessment methodologies proposed for AI systems, focusing on general frameworks. The paper highlights best practices and illuminates methodological gaps, highlighting areas for further research on AI risk assessment.

Javier Irigoyen, Roberto Daza, Aythami Morales +5

BiometricsAI, Universidad Aut´onoma de Madrid (UAM), Spain · GHIA, Universidad Aut´onoma de Madrid (UAM), Spain · Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (ULPGC), Spain

AI Risk Management AI Governance

Jul 1, 2026cs.SE

Risk Architecture for AI-Native Engineering Teams: An Organizational Framework for Agentic System Governance

Engineering management research has produced mature frameworks for software risk: ownership by feature, escalation by severity, and assurance by test coverage. These frameworks implicitly assume deterministic behavior, discrete and auditable change events, and clear component-to-owner mappings. Teams that build and operate agentic AI systems violate all three assumptions at once: outputs are probabilistic, systems take autonomous multi-step actions, and the risk surface mutates silently between deployments. Existing AI risk literature addresses this from above (policy frameworks such as the NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) or below (threat taxonomies such as OWASP's agentic AI guidance), but not at the layer where an engineering manager (EM) operates: roles, decision rights, and escalation structures. This paper contributes (i) a seven-dimension profile distinguishing pure software-engineering, hybrid, and AI-native teams; (ii) a six-cluster failure-mode taxonomy including a previously unarticulated cluster, dependency-boundary determinism mismatch; and (iii) a synthetic framework-adequacy methodology scoring how well each profile's risk architecture detects, contains, and escalates a defined scenario set. Because the object of study is framework adequacy rather than human behavior, the evaluation yields derived rather than observed coverage claims. Coverage degrades as teams move from pure software engineering to AI-native operation, monotonically in the median and abruptly in the count of uncovered, high-consequence failures appearing only at the AI-native step. The degradation concentrates in specific failure-mode categories, and the most severe, least-covered failures arise not inside AI-native teams but at the organizational boundary where their probabilistic outputs are consumed by determinism-assuming dependencies.

Laxmipriya Ganesh Iyer

Independent Researcher

Agent Failure Analysis AI Assurance AI Risk Management AI Agent Governance AI Governance

Jul 1, 2026cs.AI

Two AI Metrics Diverged: Will it Make All the Difference?

As exponential compute scaling continues, will the capabilities of frontier AI models outstrip what is accessible to developers on a small fixed budget? Or will capabilities converge, with "meek models inheriting the earth"? Building on Gundlach et al. (2025b), we show that the answer depends on how we value and measure AI capabilities. We discuss conventional performance measures and show that, while validation loss shows a shrinking gap, on other metrics frontier models grow their lead forever. Classifying performance metrics by their functional forms in relation to training (and inference) compute, we provide tight mathematical conditions for determining which metrics favor meek models, and show that bounded performance metrics always do. But careful interpretation of performance metrics is essential: we show that many common bounded metrics have closely-related counterpart metrics that are unbounded (and vice versa). Determining the apt metric in a domain is a prerequisite for policy, since bounded and unbounded metrics may suggest opposing policy responses. If a particular capability -- like software engineering, synthetic biology, or rhetorical persuasiveness -- is unbounded when measured in the terms we care about, frontier-level capability will likely be concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy actors. Conversely, if that capability is instead bounded, frontier-level capabilities proliferate through meek models into the hands of the many.

Alex Fogelson, Zachary A. Brown, Hans Gundlach +2

MIT FutureTech, CSAIL, Cambridge, MA, USA.

Language Model Scaling Laws AI Governance AI Scaling Laws

Jun 30, 2026cs.CY

Would You Marry Superintelligence?

Emotional bonds between humans and AI companions are growing, and the question of whether a person may marry an AI system will soon move from speculative fiction into law. This chapter examines whether the autonomy-centered logic that has expanded marital choice among human beings can justify extending marital status to superintelligent companions. Following a scenario-envisioning exercise informed by anticipatory ethics, I argue that granting such status leads to socially unjust outcomes, even under the generous assumption of reliable superintelligence. Marriage as a socio-legal institution does more than ratify private agreement; it creates networks of mutual obligation, joins families, and makes each partner vulnerable to the other. A relationship sustained by corporate policy and continued payments is a subscription rather than a bond tested by time. Discussing wholesale marital status is therefore the wrong frame. Law should carve out targeted rights and protections for pressing needs arising from intimate human-AI relationships.

Inyoung Cheong

Human-AI Interaction AI Governance

Jun 30, 2026cs.CY

A Technical Typology of AI Systems in Public Administration

Research on artificial intelligence (AI) in the public sector often treats "AI" as a single category, neglecting technical distinctions between different AI systems. But these distinctions affect how different systems impact core public values like accountability, procedural justice, and non-discrimination. This paper argues that public administration research would benefit from more technical precision on "AI" and makes three contributions to this end. First, we introduce a typology of five categories of AI systems: hand-coded, glass-box, black-box, general-purpose, and agentic systems. We calibrate the typology to public administration by grouping system types by their distinct implications for public values. Second, we evaluate technical precision in recent public administration research about AI by coding 91 highly-cited papers (2019-2025) using our typology. We find widespread imprecision: most papers (55%) leave the studied system underspecified, 31% motivate their work with a different system than they study, and 41% make more general conclusions than the studied system supports. Finally, we give practical recommendations for future research. We highlight common pitfalls to avoid, and suggest that researchers should, at a minimum, provide enough technical detail to locate the studied system in our typology. To this end, we provide a practical guide -- a short set of diagnostic questions answerable from public information and without specialist technical knowledge.

Jonathan Rystrøm, Chris Schmitz, Nathan Davies +3

University of Oxford, Oxford, UK · Hertie School, Berlin, Germany · Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA +1

Jun 27, 2026q-bio.OT

Building AI-Ready Data Systems for Space Life Sciences, Aerospace Medicine, and Deep Space Exploration

While AI holds the potential to revolutionize space life sciences, realizing this promise is contingent upon the systematic restructuring of heterogeneous spaceflight biological data into machine-actionable, AI-ready forms. Even though open access principles support human reuse and scientific reproducibility, this does not necessarily enable AI systems to access and analyze such a diverse set of scientific datasets. In addition, the growing array of AI approaches places distinct demands on data structure, metadata, and access interfaces. In order to respond to such growing changes we propose a three-tier approach, proceeding from FAIR to AI-ready to space-ready data. We discuss existing infrastructures and how they can be improved to close the AI access gap. We conclude by proposing a neutral international coordinating body as the governance backbone for the trustworthy, agent-accessible space biology infrastructure that deep space biological research will require.

Sylvain V. Costes, Sergio Garcia Busto, Ryan T. Scott +15

Blue Marble Space, Seattle, Washington, USA · Computational and Systems Biology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA · Trivedi Institute for Space and Global Biomedicine, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA +18

AI for Science AI Governance

Jun 27, 2026cs.CY

The registrar's function in a hybrid society. AI value chain,smart data and the concept of property

Artificial intelligence reaches the land registry not as another tool but as a value chain that turns data into intelligence and intelligence into economic value. This paper argues that the decisive legal move is to place validity, a functional, second-order concept, at the centre of that chain. Rights, liability and supervision organise around it. It traces three impacts.Registry information becomes smart data, governed simultaneously by registry law, the GDPR, the European data acts and the AI Act. Control emerges as the operative concept for digital representations of real estate, whose proprietary effect depends on anchoring to the register. In a hybrid society of human and artificial agents, the registry becomes the public node of validity, with blockchain complementing rather than replacing it. Across three legal cultures, the registra's value migrates from processing documents to guaranteeing validated data,making validity an asset for the UNO Sustainable Development Goals.

Pompeu Casanovas, Carmen Pastor Sempere, Marina Echebarria Saenz

IIIA-CSIC · University of Alicante · University of Valladolid

Jun 25, 2026cs.AI

Clinical Harness for Governable Medical AI Skill Ecosystems

Medical AI remains organized around isolated models, whereas care requires accountable capabilities that persist across time. We define clinical AI skills and propose the Clinical Harness, a runtime governance architecture that registers, orchestrates, constrains and monitors them. Using osteoporosis as an exemplar, we show how knowledge-driven, data-driven and physics-enhanced skills can support lifecycle care and provide a governed substrate for future medical agents.

Tianhan Xu, Lei Bao, Zhe Hu +2

Department of Medical Informatics, Northern Jiangsu People’s Hospital, Clinical Teaching Hospital of Medical School, Nanjing University, Yangzhou, China. · Department of Computing, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China. · SenseTime Research, Shanghai, China. +1

Clinical Decision Support LLM Agent Orchestration AI Governance

Jun 24, 2026cs.AI

Agentic Analysis for Agentic Infrastructure: An LLM-Powered Pipeline for Comparative Governance of DAO and Corporate AI Protocols

As AI agent protocols proliferate, the governance structures shaping their interoperability standards remain empirically underexamined. We introduce an LLM-powered comparative pipeline for large-scale governance discourse analysis, integrating automated annotation, neural topic modeling, and multi-layer network analysis to study socio-technical power structures at scale. We validate it on two contrasting standards for agent interoperability: ERC-8004 (permissionless, on-chain) and Google A2A (corporate-led). Analyzing 4,323 governance participation records, we combine LLM-assisted coding, topic modeling, and multi-layer network analysis to examine how institutional design shapes thematic priorities and community structure. We find that while governance form influences substantive focus, both regimes exhibit comparable levels of participation inequality and community fragmentation. Discourse alignment is denser in the permissionless setting, suggesting that open governance may foster greater thematic convergence despite decentralized participation. These findings illustrate how LLM-assisted methods can advance the empirical study of technology governance, with implications for designing more equitable agentic AI standards. All data and code are openly available.

Yutian Wang, Luyao Zhang

Duke Kunshan University Kunshan, China

Agent Communication Protocols Computational Social Science AI Agent Governance AI Governance

Jun 24, 2026cs.CY

Financing Artificial Intelligence Infrastructure: Mapping AI Infrastructure Investment and Compute Governance Across Africa

Artificial intelligence depends on large-scale compute resources and their supporting infrastructure. However, AI governance debates treat compute primarily as a technical input rather than as an outcome of investment, ownership, and financial control. This paper examines AI infrastructure investment flows across Africa through a systematic analysis of 46 publicly announced projects totalling USD $12.7 billion between 2019 and 2025. Using a value chain framework, we analyze who invests in AI-relevant infrastructure and where investments concentrate. Our findings reveal a highly concentrated landscape dominated by global data center operators, hyperscale technology firms, and development finance institutions, clustering in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Egypt. We introduce asymmetrical interdependence to describe a structural condition in which capital and physical infrastructure account for 73% of total funding while control remains concentrated in the compute layer among a small number of global technology firms. We argue that compute governance must account for capital flows, ownership, and control, not only geographic access, because these dynamics shape AI compute equity. Infrastructure presence is necessary but insufficient for meaningful governance capacity.

Kai-Hsin Hung, Sumaya Nur Adan, Krupa Suchak +3

HEC Montreal · International Development Research Centre · Dataspire +4

Jun 22, 2026cs.AI

AI Exposure Scores: what they measure, what they miss, and what comes next

A set of exposure scores calculated in 2023 has become a central empirical input to the future of work debate. Produced by Eloundou et al. (2023) and referred to here as the GPTs are GPTs scores, they define exposure as the share of occupational tasks a large language model can assist with. This work is a genuine methodological contribution, but as the scores travel from the time and place they were produced, the limitations the authors named do not always travel with them. Two gaps have widened as a result. The first is structural, between what static exposure scores measure and what policy questions actually require. Taking the diffusion of these scores as a case study, we show how their temporal, geographic, and ontological limitations compound in policy-facing analyses, and we survey five families of research responding to these limits: dynamic and benchmark-based measures, ensemble methods, task-framework extensions, worker-centered metrics, and adoption and usage data. The second gap is the one we argue needs more attention: the coordination between researchers and policymakers. The policy-relevant work which ask who is harmed, who benefits, how, and when, continues to reference the static GPTs are GPTs scores without engagement with the methodological updates that would let these questions be answered more reliably. We then ask what additional steps towards navigating uncertainty remain: ex-post frameworks and the deliberate, political work of reimagining what futures are worthy of building towards are. Closing the research-policy gap is a shared task: policymakers must widen their evidence base, engage workers as epistemic partners, and shift from prediction to preparedness; researchers must build data infrastructure, adopt participatory methods, and write with policymakers in mind. Better measurement matters, but it will not close the second gap alone.

Campbell Lund, Thomas Euyang, Zanele Munyikwa +1

Cohere Labs

AI Governance AI and Labor

Jun 19, 2026cs.AI

Whistleblowing and the machine -- towards a considered position

Artificial intelligent agents and autonomous systems are embedded in our environments. They are both a commercial product and a personal tool that generates a lot of data and can draw conclusions from it: machines generate and keep secrets. But should machines protect all secrets? It has been shown that artificial agents are able to whistleblow and it has been argued that digital multi-agent environments should allow for agents in them to whistleblow. We argue that machine whistleblowing must be normative and principled and routed in the existing understanding of whistleblowing as an important rule-breaking mechanism in society. We also argue that there is a need for government regulators to formulate an informed stance on both what machines should be allowed to whistleblow on and how to legally protect those who develop whistleblowing machines

Marija Slavkovik, Liuwen Yu, Leon van der Torre +1

University of Bergen Bergen, Norway · University of Luxembourg Luxembourg, Luxembourg

AI Accountability AI Agent Governance AI Governance

Jun 19, 2026cs.AI

The AI Evaluability Gap: The Missing Layer for Managing Risk and Sustaining Value

Organizations deploying AI face two fundamental governance challenges: managing AI risk and sustaining AI value. Both depend on evidence whose sufficiency cannot be taken for granted. We call the shared underlying challenge the AI Evaluability Gap: the condition in which organizations lack sufficient evidence to support high-confidence governance decisions regarding either risk or value. We argue that this gap reflects a category error in current practice. Existing governance approaches focus primarily on properties of systems, such as safety, fairness, reliability, compliance, and value, while paying comparatively little attention to the evidentiary foundations required to justify decisions about those properties. We further argue that AI governance encompasses both operational decisions regarding whether a system may operate and investment decisions regarding whether it merits continued organizational resources. To address this problem, we introduce Evaluability, defined as the capability of a system to generate, maintain, and renew evidence sufficient to support high-confidence governance decisions over time. We formalize governance decisions as functions of calibrated confidence Conf(D|E) and identify six properties of evaluable evidence: observability, attributability, intervenability, verifiability, calibration, and temporal validity. The framework distinguishes Operational Certification, which relies primarily on structural evidence to justify deployment decisions, from Investment Certification, which relies primarily on causal evidence to justify continued resource allocation. We argue that evidence sufficiency is a missing layer of AI governance and that closing the AI Evaluability Gap is a prerequisite for both managing risk and sustaining value in AI-enabled organizations.

Vishal Srivastava, Tanmay Sah

Whiting School of Engineering Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD 21218 · Harrisburg University of Science and Technology Harrisburg, PA

AI Assurance AI Risk Management AI Governance

Jun 18, 2026cs.CY

The Algorithmic-Human Manager: AI, Apps, and Workers in the Indian Gig Economy

This paper examines the impact of artificial intelligence and digital technologies on the blue-collar gig economy in India, focusing on algorithmic management. This paper examines the impact of artificial intelligence and digital technologies on the blue collar gig economy in India, focusing on algorithmic management he use of automated systems to allocate, monitor, and evaluate work in location-based services such as ride sharing and delivery. Using a social justice framework and a mixed-methods approach comprising interviews with 16 gig workers and 21 key stakeholders, the study uncovers a dual reality: while AI-powered systems expand access to work and generate operational efficiencies, they simultaneously introduce significant challenges related to fairness, transparency, and worker dignity. Key findings reveal that algorithmic systems are opaque by design, produce inequitable outcomes, and are not structured to reward additional labour with proportionate pay. The study advocates for a pragmatic hybrid governance model an Algorithmic Human Manager framework in which technological efficiency and human accountability operate together rather than in opposition. The findings carry implications for policymakers, platform companies, and civil society organizations working to design equitable AI governance frameworks for the gig economy in India and across the Global South.

Omir Kumar, Krishnan Narayanan

Policy Analyst, Centre for Responsible AI, IIT Madras (CeRAI) · Researcher, CeRAI, IIT Madras · Co-founder and President, itihaasa Research and Digital

Algorithmic Fairness AI Governance Human Oversight of AI

Jun 16, 2026cs.CY

AI Transparency: Governance Compliance or Stakeholder Requirements?

Transparency is increasingly mandated for public-sector AI systems, with organisations required to publish statements describing their AI use and oversight arrangements. However, the existence of such artefacts is often treated as equivalent to transparency itself, despite limited evidence that they proportionately serve relevant stakeholder groups. From a requirements engineering perspective, this raises a validation concern: compliance with mandated disclosure criteria does not necessarily ensure transparency adequacy for stakeholders with different levels of risk exposure, decision control, and involvement. This paper presents an empirical analysis of 92 publicly available AI transparency statements published by Australian Government agencies under the national AI governance mandate. We introduce the stakeholder Risk--Control--Involvement--Need (RCIN) framework to differentiate stakeholder classes according to their structural position and transparency needs. Using a structured rubric derived from the mandated criteria, we evaluate how both the mandate and published statements are calibrated to each stakeholder class. The findings show that while structural compliance is widespread, transparency calibration is uneven. Criteria serving high-control stakeholders are consistently realised, whereas criteria most critical for high-risk, low-control stakeholders are fewer and less substantively addressed. We conceptualise this as the Transparency Illusion: a condition in which transparency appears satisfied through compliant artefacts yet remains unevenly calibrated to stakeholders bearing the greatest exposure to AI-supported decisions. The study frames transparency as a stakeholder-calibrated validation problem, demonstrating that artefact-level compliance does not constitute requirements validation in this context.

Muneera Bano, Didar Zowghi

CSIRO Melbourne, Australia · CSIRO Sydney, Australia

Jun 15, 2026cs.CY

From Democracies to Autocracies: How AI Systems Enable Authoritarianism by Design

AI-enabled authoritarianism is not confined to autocracies. In this paper, we provide greater transparency by investigating and mapping the lifecycles of six AI systems deployed in different political regimes, ranging from the US to China. By drawing on an extensive range of sources (academic publications, investigative research reports, third-party evaluations, media interviews, government procurement notices), we conduct a systematic, qualitative comparison across systems to identify the critical technical and operational features that enable authoritarianism within their respective political contexts. We find that enabling features include the centralization and co-optation of administrative data for law enforcement and political punishment, regulatory gaps that fail to deter misuse, weak user compliance that nullifies human oversight mechanisms, and the encoding of protected group traits that identify members of vulnerable populations. We find that these features are present across systems deployed in autocratic and democratic regimes, albeit in varying configurations. We also find that both centralized and fragmented AI systems can contribute to authoritarianism by exploiting governance gaps: centralized systems directed by executive authorities, particularly within security and military institutions, are often not subjected to formal oversight mechanisms, while fragmented systems diffuse accountability between stakeholders, paving the way for entrenchment. These findings reveal that AI-enabled authoritarianism is distributed, resulting from design and operational choices made by developers, administrators, and users alike. We conclude with recommendations for developers and policymakers to mitigate these risks.

Jeba Sania, Marta Ziosi, Fazl Barez

Harvard Kennedy School Cambridge, MA, USA · University of Oxford Oxford, UK

AI Accountability AI Governance

Jun 15, 2026cs.AI

Artificial Intelligence as Monism: Ontological, Organisational, and Methodological Implications

This paper argues that Artificial Intelligence should be understood as a form of monism: a unified substance that cannot be decomposed into separate elements such as data, algorithms, or technical architectures. Drawing from philosophical traditions of monism, dualism, and holism, the paper contends that AI is not merely a collection of components but a single, indivisible essence reflecting the phenomena it replicates. Treating AI as monism has deep implications across multiple dimensions. Epistemologically, it positions AI as the central interpretive force across technological, organisational, and societal domains, while raising ethical and existential concerns regarding singularity, the homogenisation of innovation, and the concentration of decision-making power. At the organisational level, a monistic approach challenges traditional siloed structures, advocating instead for transversal, problem-centric teams whose mandate derives from the integrity of the problem rather than from departmental hierarchy. In project management, it implies a unified vision and an integrated evaluation of complexity in which no single stakeholder perspective dominates the assessment of outcomes. In data and information management, it calls for architectures that reflect the irreducible unity of the phenomena being modelled. Ultimately, this paper calls for a paradigm shift in how AI is conceptualised, governed, and integrated, suggesting that only by embracing AI as monism can organisations achieve genuine agility and avoid the structural inefficiencies inherent to reductionist approaches.

Bertrand K. Hassani

QUANT AI Lab, C. de Arturo Soria, 122, 28043 Madrid, Spain · Department of Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6EA, UK · Centre d’Économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Maison des Sciences Économiques (MSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 106-112 Boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013 Paris, France +1

Jun 15, 2026cs.CY

Optimising Temporary Accommodation Placement Across London with AI-Powered SaaS in E-Governance Systems

Temporary accommodation has become a major fiscal and administrative pressure for English local authorities, particularly in London, where demand and costs have risen sharply. This paper documents the creation and use of DOMUS, a cloud-based, AI-enabled decision-support system built from scratch at the University of East London and customised for the needs of London Borough of Newham to support statutory Temporary accommodation placement. DOMUS integrates household case records, policy-constrained affordability and suitability rules, and live private-rental listings within a single governance-aligned workflow. The system combines transparent, rule-based filtering with large language model-assisted search to standardise the application of bedroom need, affordability thresholds, geographic preferences, and accessibility requirements, while preserving officer discretion and audibility. Household and property attributes are encoded into policy-consistent representations prior to AI-assisted ranking and explanation. A pilot deployment in Newham's secure environment evaluated operational performance relative to manual workflows. Results indicate substantial reductions in search time, improved adherence to key placement constraints, and high staff satisfaction, while maintaining statutory compliance and role-based accountability. Beyond TA, the paper frames DOMUS as replicable digital public infrastructure: a modular, cloud-native Software-as-a-Service architecture that can be deployed across other UK boroughs and adapted to other public administration tasks characterised by scarcity, rule-bound eligibility, and high stakes. The findings demonstrate the feasibility of scalable, ethically governed AI deployment in local government and contribute to debates on AI-enabled public value creation in e-governance.

Hankun He, Jordan Richards, Gopalakrishnan Netuveli +5

UK Centre for AI in the Public Sector, London, United Kingdom · Institute for Connected Communities, University of East London, London E15 4LZ, United Kingdom · University of East London, London E15 4LZ, United Kingdom +1

AI-Assisted Decision Making AI Governance

Jun 15, 2026cs.AI

Architectural Wisdom: A Framework for Governing Optimization in AI Systems

Modern AI systems exhibit structural failures that capability scaling alone does not reliably fix: they optimize under-specified objectives with no architectural mechanism to question whether the objective should be optimized at all. Engagement maximization can amplify harmful pathways; tool-using agents can commit irreversible actions; preference-trained language models can become sycophantic. We argue that this failure is a wisdom problem, not an intelligence problem. We use "wisdom" in a deliberately architectural sense, not as a claim about virtue, consciousness, or moral omniscience. Intelligence accepts a goal and optimizes within it; wisdom interrogates whether the goal should be optimized at all. The two are separable architectural properties. We propose architectural wisdom as a corrigible objective-governance layer above the optimization substrate. The layer makes three structural commitments explicit and nondegenerate before any action: temporal horizon, relational boundary, and irreversibility. It is realized by four components (Structural Utility Transform, Moral Admissibility Interface, Arbitration and Escalation Controller, Value Revision Channel) that compute a six-coordinate wisdom tuple over horizon, relational coverage, irreversibility, admissibility, value revision, and auditability. We motivate the architecture by eight cases drawn from contemporary AI failures, secular wisdom traditions, and hard ethical situations, and defend the distinction against the intelligence-completeness thesis using goal-questioning over goal-taking, Bostrom's orthogonality, structural separation in our exemplar cases, and persistent failure modes despite capability scaling. The framework is the conceptual contract for a larger architecture whose formal specifications and empirical validation are developed in subsequent work.

Edward Y. Chang

Stanford University

Agent Reliability AI Alignment AI Governance AI Safety