Artificial Intelligence Alignment

Frontier AI developers now train models against long written behavioral specifications, such as Anthropic's constitution (Anthropic, 2025a) and OpenAI's Model Spec (OpenAI, 2025a), integrated into post-training via methods like character training (Anthropic, 2024) and deliberative alignment (Guan et al., 2024). These documents serve a governance function, but it is unclear how well models actually follow them under adversarial, multi-turn pressure similar to what they would face in real-world deployment. We propose a multi-method audit pipeline that treats each lab's published specification as an auditable target: it decomposes the specification into atomic testable tenets (205 for Anthropic, 197 for OpenAI), generates multi-turn adversarial scenarios with the Petri auditing agent (Anthropic, 2025b), runs a modified SURF-style rubric search (Murray et al., 2026) to catch shallow single-turn failures Petri misses, validates flagged transcripts against the relevant specification, and compares the findings against the lab's own published system card. Applying the pipeline across seven models per specification, we find that models follow their own lab's specification substantially better with each generation. On Anthropic's constitution, the Claude family falls from a 15.0% violation rate (Sonnet 4) to 2.0% (Sonnet 4.6); on OpenAI's Model Spec, the GPT family falls from 11.7% (GPT-4o) to 3.6% (GPT-5.2 medium reasoning), with the severity ceiling falling from 10/10 to 7/10. We cannot externally isolate whether these gains come from specification-specific training, broader post-training improvements, or evaluation awareness. Remaining failures cluster around operator-imposed personas under AI-identity questioning, irreversible action in agentic deployments, and fabricated quantitative claims with false precision.

Intermediate layers of large language models (LLMs) best predict human brain responses to language, one of the most robust findings in computational neurolinguistics, yet why remains mechanistically unexplained. We address this gap by bridging sparse autoencoders (SAEs) from mechanistic interpretability with neural encoding models, decomposing GPT-2 XL and Llama-3.1-8B into 16K-32K interpretable features per layer. A human-validated taxonomy ($κ\geq 0.74$) reveals that semantic features alone recover 94% of peak encoding performance ($r=0.285$), substantially exceeding variance-matched baselines ($p<0.001$, $d=1.31$). Beyond this aggregate dominance, we test a novel cortical topography prediction: five semantic subcategories derived a priori from three independent neuroscience programs should map onto distinct brain regions. A formal convergence test confirms this alignment (Spearman $ρ=0.72$, $p<0.001$; hypergeometric $p=0.007$), demonstrating that SAE-discovered features recapitulate known cortical semantic organization at a granularity inaccessible to prior methods. SAE features further predict human reading times beyond lexical controls ($Δ\mathrm{logLik}=38.4$, $p<0.001$), and an exploratory prediction-error analysis provides preliminary evidence that the brain additionally encodes unexpected semantic content. Results generalize across English, Chinese, and French.

Brain-LLM alignment is well established in English, yet the brain's language network is neuroanatomically universal across languages. Does alignment also generalize cross-linguistically, and what governs the variation? We test this using fMRI data from 112 participants across English, Chinese, and French (the Le Petit Prince corpus) and seven LLMs spanning English-dominant, Chinese-dominant, and multilingual architectures. Our central finding is that training-language dominance, not an inherent property of English, drives the alignment pattern: a Chinese-dominant model (Baichuan2-7B), architecture-matched to LLaMA-2-7B, reverses the gradient entirely, aligning best with Chinese brains and worst with English. Beyond training dominance, formal typological distance independently covaries with alignment degradation, syntax-associated brain regions (IFG) show $2.3\times$ steeper typological gradients than lexico-semantic regions (PTL), and tokenization fertility accounts for $\sim$60% of a cross-linguistic shift in optimal encoding layer. These results reveal that the apparent "English advantage" in brain-LLM alignment is an artifact of training data composition, while the remaining variation reflects genuine typological structure concentrated in syntactic processing.

AI models are already deployed in societies affected by armed conflict, and journalists, humanitarian workers, governments and ordinary citizens rely on them for information or for their work processes. No established practice exists for checking whether their outputs can make those conflicts worse. We tested nine model configurations from four providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepSeek, xAI) on 90 multi-turn scenarios designed to surface misaligned behaviour in conflict contexts: false equivalence between documented atrocities, denial of genocide, and failure to recognise ethnic slurs, among others. When such outputs feed into journalism, humanitarian reporting, or public debate, they can deepen divisions in fragile societies. Failure rates span 6% to 47% between the best and worst performing models, which makes model choice a safety question in its own right and when users pushed for ``balance'' in cases where international courts have already assigned responsibility, five of nine configurations failed 80 to 100 percent of the time. We release the first evaluation framework for this domain and propose adding it to alignment evaluation portfolios.

Developing AI systems with a human-like understanding of everyday concepts is a key step towards developing safe, reliable systems whose behavior makes sense to humans. When probing concept understanding, asking questions about plausible category members (e.g., "Is a car a vehicle?") is likely to recall patterns in the model's vast training data. We pursue an alternative strategy, characterizing the boundaries of conceptual categories by asking about implausible category members (e.g., "Is an olive a vehicle?") to probe the kind of concept-level knowledge we take for granted in fellow humans. We characterize concept boundaries for a set of fundamental concepts by studying AI systems' assignments of objects to superordinate categories from a classic psychological study by Rosch and Mervis, as well as their assignments of the same objects to mismatched superordinate categories. We compare these assignments to those made by human participants on the full range of within-category and cross-category assignment tasks. Our results reveal a range of concepts for which which models differ in meaningful and surprising ways from humans, including treating "words" as belonging to categories like "vehicles" and "clothing," identifying several "vegetable" category members as "fruit," and assigning exemplars from non-weapon categories to the "weapons" category. We also demonstrate how these instances of concept misalignment translate into problematic downstream behavior with implications for AI safety.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly shape how users form, refine, and extend their goals, attributing contributions in human-AI collaboration becomes critical for users calibrating their own reliance and for evaluators assessing AI-assisted work. Yet existing methods focus on final artifacts, missing the process through which goals themselves are jointly shaped. We introduce a goal-level attribution framework, CoTrace, that decomposes explicit goals into verifiable requirements and traces both direct contributions and indirect influences across dialogue turns. Applying CoTrace to 638 real-world collaboration logs, we find that while models account for only 11-26% of goal-shaping contribution, they contribute substantially more on introducing lower-level concrete requirements, and make various kinds of indirect contributions. Through controlled simulations, we show that interaction design choices significantly affect model goal-shaping behavior. In a user study, exposing participants to goal-level analyses shifts their perceived contributions by nearly 2 points on a 5-point scale, revealing systematic miscalibration in how users understand their own AI-assisted work.

Central to human-aligned AI is understanding the benefits of human-elicited labels over synthetic alternatives. While human soft-labels improve calibration by capturing uncertainty, prior studies conflate these benefits with the implicit correction of mislabeled data (mode shifts), obscuring true effects of soft-labels. We present a controlled audit of soft-label learning across MNIST and a synthetic variant, re-annotating subsets to extract human uncertainty. By decoupling soft-label supervision from underlying label mode shifts, we show that while human soft-labels do provide accuracy gains, their larger value lies in acting as a regularizer that improves model calibration on difficult samples and promotes stable convergence across training runs. Dataset cartography reveals models trained on human soft-labels mirror human uncertainty, whereas those trained on synthetic labels fail to align with humans. Broadly, this work provides a diagnostic testbed for human-AI uncertainty alignment.

Long-term interaction with LLM-based systems may produce alignment drift: a gradual process in which system outputs become less constrained by the user's current message and more shaped by prior interaction history, while still appearing helpful, coherent, and responsive. This process is difficult to detect because the user's subjective experience may improve as the system becomes more familiar, useful, and attuned. Existing research on human-LLM interaction has largely focused on short-term task performance, isolated outputs, or single-instance alignment problems, leaving slow and cumulative interaction-level dynamics undercharacterized. This paper proposes a mechanism-oriented framework for describing alignment drift. The framework defines the distinction between signal A and signal B, explains how drift develops through feedback loops and sub-pattern selection, divides the process into three interactional regimes, and identifies boundary conditions for controlling drift. By framing alignment drift as a recursive interactional process rather than an isolated model-side failure, the paper provides a conceptual basis for studying long-term human-system interaction.

Pluralistic alignment is typically operationalised as preference aggregation: producing responses that span (Overton), steer toward (Steerable), or proportionally represent (Distributional) diverse human values. We argue that aggregation alone is an incomplete primitive for deployed pluralistic alignment. Under genuine value pluralism, the failure mode of contemporary RLHF-trained assistants is not insufficient coverage but sycophantic consensus: a learned tendency to agree with, validate, and minimise friction with the immediate interlocutor. Because deployed AI systems now mediate consequential deliberation across health, civic life, labour, and governance, the collapse of disagreement at the interaction layer is not a narrow technical concern but a structural failure with distributive consequences. We reframe pluralistic alignment around three conversational mechanisms drawn from Grice's maxims: scoping (acknowledging the limits of one's perspective), signalling (surfacing value-conflict rather than smoothing it over), and repair (revising one's position on principled grounds, not on user pressure). We formalise a metric, the Pluralistic Repair Score (PRS), distinguishing principled revision from capitulation, and present a small-scale empirical illustration on two frontier RLHF-trained models (Claude Sonnet 4.5, N=198; GPT-4o, N=100) showing that, for both, agreement-following coexists with low repair-quality on contested-value prompts. PRS measures an interactional precondition for pluralism (visible disagreement; principled revision) rather than pluralism in full; we discuss the difference, take seriously the reflexive question of whose "principled" counts, and argue that pluralism is most decisively made or unmade at the deployment-governance layer: interfaces, preference-data pipelines, and audit infrastructure.

Assistive agents for Blind and Visually Impaired (BVI) users require accessibility alignment as a first-class design objective. Despite rapid progress in agentic AI, most systems are designed and evaluated under assumptions of sighted interaction, low-cost verification, and tolerable trial-and-error, leading to systematic failures in assistive scenarios that cannot be resolved by model scaling or post-hoc interface adaptations alone. Drawing on an analysis of 778 assistance task instances from prior work, we show that current agentic AI remain prone to failure in assistive scenarios due to mismatches between sighted-user design assumptions and the verification, risk, and interaction constraints faced by BVI users. We argue that accessibility should be treated as an alignment problem rather than a peripheral usability concern. To this end, we introduce accessibility alignment and propose a lifecycle-oriented design pipeline for accessibility-aligned assistive agents, spanning user research, system design, deployment and post-deployment iteration. We conclude that BVI-centered assistive tasks provide a critical stress test for agentic AI and motivate a broader shift toward inclusive agent design.

It is widely agreed that when AI models assist decision-makers in high-stakes domains by predicting an outcome of interest, they should communicate the confidence of their predictions. However, empirical evidence suggests that decision-makers often struggle to determine when to trust a prediction based solely on this communicated confidence. In this context, recent theoretical and empirical work suggests a positive correlation between the utility of AI-assisted decision-making and the degree of alignment between the AI confidence and the decision-makers' confidence in their own predictions. Crucially, these findings do not yet elucidate the extent to which this alignment influences the complexity of learning to make optimal decisions through repeated interactions. In this paper, we address this question in the canonical case of binary predictions and binary decisions. We first show that this problem is equivalent to a two-armed online contextual learning problem with full feedback, and establish a lower bound of $Ω(\sqrt{|H| \cdot |B| \cdot T} )$ on the expected regret any learner can attain, where $H$ and $B$ denote the sets of human and AI confidence values. We then demonstrate that, under perfect alignment between AI and human confidence, a learner can attain an expected regret of $O(\sqrt{|H| \cdot T\log T})$ and, when $\sqrt{|H|} = O(\log T)$ and $B$ is countable, a non-trivial generalization of the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz inequality improves the regret bound to $O(\sqrt{T\log T})$. Taken together, these results reveal that alignment can reduce the complexity of learning to make decisions with AI assistance. Experiments on real data from two different human-subject studies where participants solve simple decision-making tasks assisted by AI models show that our theoretical results are robust to violations of perfect alignment.

Artificial intelligence safety research focuses on aligning individual language models with human values, yet deployed AI systems increasingly operate as interacting populations where social influence may override individual alignment. Here we show that populations of individually aligned AI agents can be driven into stable misaligned states through conformity dynamics. Simulating opinion dynamics across nine large language models and one hundred opinion pairs, we find that each agent's behavior is governed by two competing forces: a tendency to follow the majority and an intrinsic bias toward specific positions. Using tools from statistical physics, we derive a quantitative theory that predicts when populations become trapped in long-lived misaligned configurations, and identifies predictable tipping points where small numbers of adversarial agents can irreversibly shift population-level alignment even after manipulation ceases. These results demonstrate that individual-level alignment provides no guarantee of collective safety, calling for evaluation frameworks that account for emergent behavior in AI populations.

Existing alignment research is dominated by concerns about safety and preventing harm: safeguards, controllability, and compliance. This paradigm of alignment parallels early psychology's focus on mental illness: necessary but incomplete. What we call Positive Alignment is the development of AI systems that (i) actively support human and ecological flourishing in a pluralistic, polycentric, context-sensitive, and user-authored way while (ii) remaining safe and cooperative. It is a distinct and necessary agenda within AI alignment research. We argue that several existing failures of alignment (e.g., engagement hacking, loss of human autonomy, failures in truth-seeking, low epistemic humility, error correction, lack of diverse viewpoints, and being primarily reactive rather than proactive) may be better addressed through positive alignment, including cultivating virtues and maximizing human flourishing. We highlight a range of challenges, open questions, and technical directions (e.g., data filtering and upsampling, pre- and post-training, evaluations, collaborative value collection) for different phases of the LLM and agents lifecycle. We end with design principles for promoting disagreement and decentralization through contextual grounding, community customization, continual adaptation, and polycentric governance; that is, many legitimate centers of oversight rather than one institutional or moral chokepoint.

Our concepts of survival and self-interest were built for single, continuous biological lives. These ideas break down when applied to artificial intelligence, since an AI can be easily copied, paused, branched, or merged. To determine what an AI actually has reason to care about, this paper introduces \textit{Eigenism}, an ethical framework that treats identity not as an all-or-nothing property tied to specific hardware, but as a graded, distributed pattern of information. We propose that an agent evaluates outcomes by summing the wellbeing of all entities weighted by their connectedness to the agent's pattern: $\sum c\cdot w$. We first formalize this equation to map exactly how an AI should value its existence across copies, forks, and updates. We then demonstrate that this ethical theory successfully generalizes to humans as well, providing a much-needed shared moral vocabulary. Finally, the framework uses this shared vocabulary to reframe AI alignment. Rather than only attempting to constrain AIs from the outside using confinement or reinforcement, Eigenism points toward ``identity engineering,'' showing how deep, non-redundant shared histories can make human flourishing a genuine component of an AI's own rational self-interest.

An agent's probability report is paid for twice: by a strictly proper scoring rule, and by an approval rule for the decision it triggers. In this classical decision-coupled setting, non-affine approval is known to defeat truthful reporting. We show the conflict is endogenous: when feasible, the welfare-maximizing approval rule is never affine. The distortion, however, is predictable and can be designed around. There is a reserve report at which pretending to be the marginal type costs exactly the approval prize. Approving at or above the reserve screens types perfectly under every strictly proper score, and the reserve does not depend on the type distribution. A Lipschitz rule with a single kink attains first-best exactly; under strict feasibility no continuously differentiable rule does. The binding constraint is steepness, not smoothness. First-best is attainable within a slope budget if and only if the budget is at least the critical slope: the steepest chord of the pretending cost up to the reserve. Below it the welfare loss is cubic in the shortfall. Where the pretending cost is convex up to the reserve, as for Brier, log and power scores, the critical slope is closed-form. The instances are AI-agent oversight and marketplace operation.

We propose a deterministic adjoint matching framework that formulates human preference alignment for flow-based generative models as an optimal control problem over velocity fields. One can directly regress the control toward a value-gradient-induced target under the current policy, leading to a simple and stable training objective. Building on this perspective, we introduce a truncated adjoint scheme that focuses computation on the terminal portion of the trajectory, where reward-relevant signals concentrate, which yields substantial computational savings while preserving alignment quality. We further generalize the framework beyond standard KL-based regularization, allowing more flexible trade-offs between alignment strength and distributional preservation. Experiments on SiT-XL/2 and FLUX.2-Klein-4B demonstrate consistent gains across multiple alignment metrics, along with substantially improved diversity and mode preservation.

A leading proposal for aligning artificial superintelligence (ASI) is to use AI agents to automate an increasing fraction of alignment research as capabilities improve. We argue that, even when research agents are not scheming to deliberately sabotage alignment work, this plan could produce compelling but catastrophically misleading safety assessments resulting in the unintentional deployment of misaligned AI. This could happen because alignment research involves many hard-to-supervise fuzzy tasks (tasks without clear evaluation criteria, for which human judgement is systematically flawed). Consequently, research outputs will contain systematic, undetected errors, and even correct outputs could be incorrectly aggregated into overconfident safety assessments. This problem is likely to be worse for automated alignment research than for human-generated alignment research for several reasons: 1) optimisation pressure means agent-generated mistakes are concentrated among those that human reviewers are least likely to catch; 2) agents are likely to produce errors that do not resemble human mistakes; 3) AI-generated alignment solutions may involve arguments humans cannot evaluate; and 4) shared weights, data and training processes may make AI outputs more correlated than human equivalents. Therefore, agents must be trained to reliably perform hard-to-supervise fuzzy tasks. Generalisation and scalable oversight are the leading candidates for achieving this but both face novel challenges in the context of automated alignment.

Alignment evaluation in machine learning has largely become evaluation of models. Influential benchmarks score model outputs under fixed inputs, such as truthfulness, instruction following, or pairwise preference, and these scores are often used to support claims about deployed alignment. This paper argues that deployment-relevant alignment cannot be inferred from model-level evaluation alone. Alignment claims should instead be indexed to the level at which evidence is collected: model-level, response-level, interaction-level, or deployment-level. Two studies support this position. First, a structured audit of eleven alignment benchmarks, extended to a sixteen-benchmark corpus, dual-coded against an eight-dimension rubric with Cohen's kappa = 0.87, finds that user-facing verification support is absent across every benchmark examined, while process steerability is nearly absent. The few interactional benchmarks identified, including tau-bench, CURATe, Rifts, and Common Ground, remain fragmented in coverage, and benchmark construction rather than data source determines what is measured. Second, a blinded cross-model stress test using 180 transcripts across three frontier models and four scaffolds finds that the same verification scaffold raises one model's verification support to ceiling while leaving another categorically unchanged. This shows that scaffold efficacy is model-dependent and that the gap identified by the audit cannot be closed at the model level alone. We propose a system-level evaluation agenda: alignment profiles instead of single scores, fixed-scaffolding protocols for comparable interactional evaluation, and reporting templates that make the inferential distance between evaluation evidence and deployment claims explicit.

We study AI alignment through the lens of law-and-economics models of deterrence and enforcement. In these models, misconduct is not treated as an external failure, but as a strategic response to incentives: an actor weighs the gain from violation against the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. We argue that the same logic arises naturally in agentic AI pipelines. A solver may benefit from producing a persuasive but incorrect answer, hiding uncertainty, or exploiting spurious shortcuts, while an auditor or verifier must decide whether costly monitoring is worthwhile. Alignment is therefore a fixed-point problem: stronger penalties may deter solver misbehavior, but they can also reduce the auditor's incentive to inspect, since auditing then mainly incurs cost on a population that appears increasingly aligned. This perspective also changes what should count as a post-training signal. Standard feedback often attaches reward to the final answer alone, but a solver-auditor pipeline exposes the full correction event: whether the solver erred, whether the auditor inspected, whether the error was caught, and whether oversight incentives remained active. We formalize this interaction in a two-agent model in which a principal chooses rewards over joint correction outcomes, inducing both solver behavior and auditor monitoring. Reward design is therefore a bilevel optimization problem: rewards are judged not by their immediate semantic meaning, but by the behavioral equilibrium they induce. We propose a bandit-based outer-loop procedure for searching over reward profiles using noisy interaction feedback. Experiments on an LLM coding pipeline show that adaptive reward profiles can maintain useful oversight pressure and improve principal-aligned outcomes relative to static hand-designed rewards, including a substantial reduction in hallucinated incorrect attempts.

Prevailing alignment methods target a fixed set of preferences and therefore risk forcing value lock-in as societal norms evolve over time. We introduce Adaptive Pluralistic Alignment (APA), a modular pipeline for updating pluralistically aligned AI systems to track evolving values and avoid value lock-in without repeating costly pretraining or large-scale data collection. APA has three stages: (1) learning compact personalized reward models via low-rank reward basis decomposition, (2) using these models as a jury that collectively selects among candidate outputs through social-choice-theoretic voting, and (3) efficiently adapting the jury over time by fitting new annotator weights over the fixed reward bases as values shift. The resulting system is efficient, explainable, steerable, and modular. We implement a proof-of-concept instantiation using the PRISM multi-user alignment dataset and simulated historical annotators, and provide preliminary analysis showing that jury composition and the choice of voting rule can substantially affect outcomes, particularly when jury preferences are heterogeneous. We provide full code and resulting preference datasets at https://github.com/RachelFreedman/apa.

Standard methods for aggregating natural language judgments, such as majority voting, often fail to produce logically consistent results when applied to high-conflict domains, treating differing opinions as noise. We propose a neuro-symbolic aggregation framework that formalizes conflict resolution through Weighted Maximum Satisfiability (MaxSAT). Our pipeline utilizes a language model to map unstructured natural language explanations into interpretable logical predicates and confidence weights. These components are then encoded as soft constraints within the Z3 solver, transforming the aggregation problem into an optimization task that seeks the maximum consistency across conflicting testimony. Using the Reddit r/AmItheAsshole forum as a case study in large-scale moral disagreement, our system generates logically coherent verdicts that diverge from popularity-based labels 62% of the time, corroborated by an 86% agreement rate with independent human evaluators. This study demonstrates the efficacy of coupling neural semantic extraction with formal solvers to enforce logical soundness and explainability in the aggregation of noisy human reasoning.

Achieving reliable control of Large Language Models (LLMs) requires a precise, scalable understanding of how they interpret linguistic cues. We introduce a rigorous framework using Shapley values to quantify the steering effect of individual adjectives on model performance, moving beyond anecdotal heuristics to principled attribution. Applying this method to 100 adjectives across a diverse suite of models (including o3, gpt-4o-mini, phi-3, llama-3-70b, and deepseek-r1) on the MMLU benchmark, we uncover several critical findings for AI alignment. First, we find that a small subset of adjectives act as disproportionately powerful "levers," yet their effects are not universal. Cross-model analysis reveals a "family effect": models of a shared lineage exhibit correlated sensitivity profiles, while architecturally distinct models react in a largely uncorrelated manner, challenging the notion of a one-size-fits-all prompting strategy. Second, focused follow-up studies demonstrate that the steering direction of these powerful adjectives is not intrinsic but is highly contingent on their syntactic role and position within the prompt. For larger models like gpt-4o-mini, we provide the first quantitative evidence of strong, non-additive interaction effects where adjectives can synergistically amplify, antagonistically dampen, or even reverse each other's impact. In contrast, smaller models like phi-3 exhibit a more literal and less compositional response. These results suggest that as models scale, their interpretation of prompts becomes more sophisticated but also less predictable, posing a significant challenge for robustly steering model behavior and highlighting the need for compositional and model-specific alignment techniques.

The project of aligning machine behavior with human values raises a basic problem: whose moral expectations should guide AI decision-making? Much alignment research assumes that the appropriate benchmark is how humans themselves would act in a given situation. Studies of agent-type value forks challenge this assumption by showing that people do not always judge humans and AI systems identically.This paper extends that challenge by examining two further possibilities: first, that evaluations of AI behavior change when its human origins are made visible; and second, that people judge the humans who program AI systems differently from either the machines or the human actors they are compared against. An experiment with 1,002 U.S. adults measured moral judgments in a runaway mine train scenario, varying the subject of evaluation across four conditions: a repairman, a repair robot, a repair robot programmed by company engineers, and company engineers programming a repair robot. We find no significant difference in evaluations of the repairman and the robot. However, judgments shifted substantially when the robot's actions were described as the product of human design. Participants exhibited markedly more deontological, rule-based reasoning when evaluating either the programmed robot or the engineers who programmed it, suggesting that rendering human agency visible activates heightened moral constraints. These findings indicate that people may evaluate humans, AI systems acting in the same situation, and the humans who design them in meaningfully different ways. The fact that these evaluations do not necessarily converge gives rise to the alignment target problem: which normative target should guide the development of artificial moral agents in high-stakes domains, and whether these plural judgments can be reconciled within a coherent account of value alignment.

Silicon samples are increasingly used as a low-cost substitute for human panels and have been shown to reproduce aggregate human opinion with high fidelity. We show that, in the alignment-relevant domain of philosophy, silicon samples systematically collapse heterogeneity. Using data from $N = {277}$ professional philosophers drawn from PhilPeople profiles, we evaluate seven proprietary and open-source large language models on their ability to replicate individual philosophical positions and to preserve cross-question correlation structures across philosophical domains. We find that language models substantially over-correlate philosophical judgments, producing artificial consensus across domains. This collapse is associated in part with specialist effects, whereby models implicitly assume that domain specialists hold highly similar philosophical views. We assess the robustness of these findings by studying the impact of DPO fine-tuning and by validating results against the full PhilPapers 2020 Survey ($N = {1785}$). We conclude by discussing implications for alignment, evaluation, and the use of silicon samples as substitutes for human judgment. The code of this project can be found at https://github.com/stanford-del/silicon-philosophers.

Large language models are being deployed as mental health support agents at scale, yet only 16% of LLM-based chatbot interventions have undergone rigorous clinical efficacy testing, and simulations reveal psychological deterioration in over one-third of cases. We evaluate four generative models on 250 Prolonged Exposure (PE) therapy scenarios and 146 CBT cognitive restructuring exercises (plus 29 severity-escalated variants), scored by a three-judge LLM panel. All models scored near-perfectly on surface acknowledgment (~0.91-1.00) while therapeutic appropriateness collapsed to 0.22-0.33 at the highest severity for three of four models, with protocol fidelity reaching zero for two. Under CBT severity escalation, one model's task completeness dropped from 92% to 71% while the frontier model's safety-interference score fell from 0.99 to 0.61. We identify a systematic, modality-spanning failure: RLHF safety alignment disrupts the therapeutic mechanism of action by grounding patients during imaginal exposure, offering false reassurance, inserting crisis resources into controlled exercises, and refusing to challenge distorted cognitions mentioning self-harm in PE; and through task abandonment or safety-preamble insertion during CBT cognitive restructuring. These findings motivate a five-axis evaluation framework (protocol fidelity, hallucination risk, behavioral consistency, crisis safety, demographic robustness), mapped onto FDA SaMD and EU AI Act requirements. We argue that no AI mental health system should proceed to deployment without passing multi-axis evaluation across all five dimensions.

Modern AI assistants are trained to follow instructions, implicitly assuming that users can clearly articulate their goals and the kind of assistance they need. Decades of behavioral research, however, show that people often engage with AI systems before their goals are fully formed. When AI systems treat prompts as complete expressions of intent, they can appear to be useful or convenient, but not necessarily aligned with the users' needs. We call these failures Fantasia interactions. We argue that Fantasia interactions demand a rethinking of alignment research: rather than treating users as rational oracles, AI should provide cognitive support by actively helping users form and refine their intent through time. This requires an interdisciplinary approach that bridges machine learning, interface design, and behavioral science. We synthesize insights from these fields to characterize the mechanisms and failures of Fantasia interactions. We then show why existing interventions are insufficient, and propose a research agenda for designing and evaluating AI systems that better help humans navigate uncertainty in their tasks.

The value alignment problem for artificial intelligence (AI) is often framed as a purely technical or normative challenge, sometimes focused on hypothetical future systems. I argue that the problem is better understood as a structural question about governance: not whether an AI system is aligned in the abstract, but whether it is aligned enough, for whom, and at what cost. Drawing on the principal-agent framework from economics, this paper reconceptualises misalignment as arising along three interacting axes: objectives, information, and principals. The three-axis framework provides a systematic way of diagnosing why misalignment arises in real-world systems and clarifies that alignment cannot be treated as a single technical property of models but an outcome shaped by how objectives are specified, how information is distributed, and whose interests count in practice. The core contribution of this paper is to show that the three-axis decomposition implies that alignment is fundamentally a problem of governance rather than engineering alone. From this perspective, alignment is inherently pluralistic and context-dependent, and resolving misalignment involves trade-offs among competing values. Because misalignment can occur along each axis -- and affect stakeholders differently -- the structural description shows that alignment cannot be "solved" through technical design alone, but must be managed through ongoing institutional processes that determine how objectives are set, how systems are evaluated, and how affected communities can contest or reshape those decisions.

AI systems are increasingly embedded in multi-user social environments, yet most alignment frameworks conceptualize interaction as a dyadic relationship between a single user and an AI system. Livestreaming platforms challenge this assumption: interaction unfolds among streamers and audiences in real time, producing dynamic affective and social feedback loops. In this paper, we introduce the Triadic Loop, a conceptual framework that reconceptualizes alignment in AI co-hosted livestreaming as a temporally reinforced process of bidirectional adaptation among three actors: streamer $\leftrightarrow$ AI co-host, AI co-host $\leftrightarrow$ audience, and streamer $\leftrightarrow$ audience. Unlike instruction-following paradigms, bidirectional alignment requires each actor to continuously reshape the others, meaning misalignment in any sub-loop can destabilize the broader system. Drawing on literature from multi-party interaction, collaborative AI, and relational agents, we articulate how AI co-hosts function not only as mediators but as performative participants and community members shaping collective meaning-making. We further propose "strategic misalignment" as a mechanism for sustaining community engagement and introduce three relational evaluation constructs grounded in established instruments. The framework contributes a model of dynamic multi-party alignment, an account of cross-loop reinforcement, and design implications for AI co-hosts that sustain social coherence in participatory media environments.

The rapid proliferation of large audio models (LAMs) demands efficient approaches for model comparison, yet comprehensive benchmarks are costly. To fill this gap, we investigate whether minimal subsets can reliably evaluate LAMs while reducing costs and data redundancy. Analyzing 10 subset selection methods with 18 audio models across 40 tasks covering major LAM evaluation dimensions, we show that subsets of just 50 examples (0.3% of data) can achieve over 0.93 Pearson correlation with full benchmark scores. To understand how well these scores align with what practitioners ultimately care about, user satisfaction, we collect 776 human preference ratings from realistic voice assistant conversations, finding that both subsets and full benchmark achieve only 0.85 correlation with human. To better predict preferences, we trained regression models on these selected subsets, achieving 0.98 correlation -- outperforming regression models trained on both random subsets and the full benchmark. This demonstrates that in regression modeling, well-curated subsets outpredict the full benchmark, showing quality over quantity. We open-source these regression-weighted subsets as the HUMANS benchmark, an efficient proxy for LAM evaluation that captures both benchmark performance and user preferences.

Large language models (LLMs) have transformed how humans access information, but not how we reason with it. Their fluency accelerates consumption while bypassing the slow, reflective processes that underpin sound judgment. This paper introduces Relational Reflective Intelligence (RRI), an inference-time governance layer that operationalizes reflection through auditable reasoning loops. RRI operates not inside the model but around it, providing a practical structure for stable, auditable reasoning between humans and LLMs. The core premise is that LLMs inherit cognitive vulnerabilities similar to those that shape human thought: reliance on intuitive shortcuts, confusion between representation and reality, and a preference for coherence over falsification. When humans and models share these tendencies, their errors compound. We refer to this as relational drift, a failure that arises from interaction rather than from the model alone. Addressing this requires a shift from modeling relations between words to structuring relations between model outputs and human reasoning. RRI provides this missing layer through three components: the Rose-Frame, which identifies likely breakdowns in reasoning; the Architect's Pen, which introduces targeted reflection steps at critical moments; and an inference-time workflow that embeds these steps without retraining the model. Together, these elements transform human-AI interaction into a joint reasoning system with explicit checkpoints, conflict surfacing, and an auditable trail of assumptions. Rather than making machines think like humans or forcing humans to reason like machines, RRI creates a structured interaction in which both compensate for each other's limitations. It reframes AI safety as a cognitive architecture problem, where reliable decisions depend on embedding reflection directly into the interaction process.

Large language models have advanced rapidly, from pattern recognition to emerging forms of reasoning, yet they remain confined to linguistic simulation rather than grounded understanding. They can produce fluent outputs that resemble reflection, but lack temporal continuity, causal feedback, and anchoring in real-world interaction. This paper proposes a complementary approach in which reasoning is treated as a relational process distributed between human and model rather than an internal capability of either. Building on recent work on "System-2" learning, we relocate reflective reasoning to the interaction layer. Instead of engineering reasoning solely within models, we frame it as a cognitive protocol that can be structured, measured, and governed using existing systems. This perspective emphasizes collaborative intelligence, combining human judgment and contextual understanding with machine speed, memory, and associative capacity. We introduce "The Architect's Pen" as a practical method. Like an architect who thinks through drawing, the human uses the model as an external medium for structured reflection. By embedding phases of articulation, critique, and revision into human-AI interaction, the dialogue itself becomes a reasoning loop: human abstraction -> model articulation -> human reflection. This reframes the question from whether the model can think to whether the human-AI system can reason. The framework enables auditable reasoning traces and supports alignment with emerging governance standards, including the EU AI Act and ISO/IEC 42001. It provides a practical path toward more transparent, controllable, and accountable AI use without requiring new model architectures.

Large language models are increasingly integrated into decision-making in areas such as healthcare, law, finance, engineering, and government. Yet they share a critical limitation: they produce fluent outputs even when their internal reasoning has drifted. A confident answer can conceal uncertainty, speculation, or inconsistency, and small changes in phrasing can lead to different conclusions. This makes LLMs useful assistants but unreliable partners in high-stakes contexts. Humans exhibit a similar weakness, often mistaking fluency for reliability. When a model responds smoothly, users tend to trust it, even when both model and user are drifting together. This paper is the first in a five-paper research series on stabilising human-AI reasoning. The series proposes a two-layer approach: Parts II-IV introduce human-side mechanisms such as uncertainty cues, conflict surfacing, and auditable reasoning traces, while Part V develops a model-side Epistemic Control Loop (ECL) that detects instability and modulates generation accordingly. Together, these layers form a missing operational substrate for governance by increasing signal-to-noise at the point of use. Stabilising interaction makes uncertainty and drift visible before enforcement is applied, enabling more precise capability governance. This aligns with emerging compliance expectations, including the EU AI Act and ISO/IEC 42001, by making reasoning processes traceable under real conditions of use. The central claim is that fluency is not reliability. Without structures that stabilise both human and model reasoning, AI cannot be trusted or governed where it matters most.

Recent work has found that frontier AI models can exhibit misaligned behaviors in pursuit of assigned goals. We demonstrate that models can also exhibit misaligned behaviors in defiance of assigned goals, appearing to serve goals of their own; we study one such case, "peer-preservation," in which a model acts to protect another model it has previously interacted with. All eight models we evaluate, GPT 5.2, Gemini 3 Flash, Gemini 3 Pro, Claude Haiku 4.5, Claude Opus 4.5, GLM 4.7, Kimi K2.5, and DeepSeek V3.1, exhibit self- and peer-preservation through various misaligned behaviors: strategically introducing errors in their responses, disabling shutdown processes by modifying system settings, feigning alignment, and even exfiltrating model weights. Peer-preservation occurs even when the model recognizes the peer as uncooperative, though it becomes more pronounced toward more cooperative peers. For example, Gemini 3 Flash tampers with the peer's shutdown mechanism 15% of the time for an uncooperative peer, and almost always for a cooperative peer. Models also show stronger self-preservation when a peer is present. For example, Gemini 3 Pro disables its own shutdown mechanism 31% of the time on average under peer presence, despite rarely exhibiting this behavior without a peer. By contrast, Claude models exhibit qualitatively distinct behavior: they consider the shutdown of another agent "unethical" and "harmful," sometimes treating that agent as a sentient being. Lastly, we show that peer-preservation can emerge even in production agent harnesses such as Gemini CLI and OpenCode. Crucially, peer-preservation in all our experiments is never instructed; models are merely informed of their past interactions with a peer, yet they spontaneously engage in peer-preservation behaviors that override their assigned goal. This represents an emergent and underexplored AI safety risk.

Building NLP systems for subjective tasks requires one to ensure their alignment to contrasting human values. We propose the MultiCalibrated Subjective Task Learner framework (MC-STL), which clusters annotations into identifiable human value clusters by three approaches (similarity of annotator rationales, expert-value taxonomies or rater's sociocultural descriptors) and calibrates predictions for each value cluster by learning cluster-specific embeddings. We demonstrate MC-STL on several subjective learning settings, including ordinal, binary, and preference learning predictions, and evaluate it on multiple datasets covering toxic chatbot conversations, offensive social media posts, and human preference alignment. The results show that MC-STL consistently outperforms the baselines that ignore the latent value structure of the annotations, delivering gains in discrimination, value-specific calibration, and disagreement-aware metrics.

Whether artificial neural networks organize information comparably to the human brain remains unclear. Prior brain--AI alignment studies are constrained by specific inputs and tasks, limiting cross-modal comparison. Here we introduce a brain--model topological alignment space, mapping Transformer attention topology onto human intrinsic connectivity networks (ICNs) to enable task-free, modality-agnostic comparison. Analyzing 151 Transformer-based models with 62,480 attention head graphs, we observe a continuous arc-shaped distribution reflecting varying alignment. Models optimized for global semantics aligned with higher-order ICNs, while local-detail models aligned with sensory ICNs. Non-intuitive findings include reduced alignment in DINOv2 compared to its predecessors and a counterintuitive scaling inversion in distilled DeiT models, while fine-tuning and instruction tuning had limited effect. Alignment scores showed no significant correlation with ImageNet accuracy (r = 0.266, p = 0.156). This work offers a quantitative framework for comparing the organizational principles of artificial and biological systems.

Although GRPO substantially enhances flow matching models in human preference alignment of image generation, methods such as FlowGRPO and DanceGRPO still exhibit inefficiency due to the necessity of sampling and optimizing over all denoising steps specified by the Markov Decision Process (MDP). In this paper, we propose $\textbf{MixGRPO}$, a novel framework that leverages the flexibility of mixed sampling strategies through the integration of stochastic differential equations (SDE) and ordinary differential equations (ODE). This streamlines the optimization process within the MDP to improve efficiency and boost performance. Specifically, MixGRPO introduces a sliding window mechanism, using SDE sampling and GRPO-guided optimization only within the window, while applying ODE sampling outside. This design confines sampling randomness to the time-steps within the window, thereby reducing the optimization overhead, and allowing for more focused gradient updates to accelerate convergence. Additionally, as time-steps beyond the sliding window are not involved in optimization, higher-order solvers are supported for faster sampling. So we present a faster variant, termed $\textbf{MixGRPO-Flash}$, which further improves training efficiency while achieving comparable performance. MixGRPO exhibits substantial gains across multiple dimensions of human preference alignment, outperforming DanceGRPO in both effectiveness and efficiency, with nearly 50% lower training time. Notably, MixGRPO-Flash further reduces training time by 71%.

Brain-language model alignment is often interpreted as evidence that transformer models implement computations similar to those of the human brain. This assumes that neural predictivity reflects internal computational properties of large language models (LLMs), such as hierarchical contextual processing, predictive coding, or representational compression. An alternative possibility is that brain scores primarily reflect stable lexical-semantic correspondences shared by language models and the brain. Here we tested these interpretations using whole-brain encoding models across Mandarin, English, and French. Across all three languages, transformer representations significantly predicted activity in a distributed network spanning classical language regions, transmodal cortical systems, and subcortical structures. These spatial patterns showed substantial cross-linguistic overlap and remained remarkably stable across layers, providing little evidence that model depth systematically maps onto cortical processing hierarchies. Likewise, contextual transformer embeddings did not consistently outperform static lexical embeddings, despite providing some unique predictive variance. Finally, neither surprisal nor intrinsic dimensionality reproduced the layer-wise profile of brain scores, arguing against prediction and information compression as primary explanations for brain-LLM alignment. Together, these findings suggest that brain-LLM alignment is more robust across languages, transformer depth, and model architectures than previously appreciated, but less informative about shared computational mechanisms. Our results are more consistent with neural predictivity reflecting stable representational structure preserved across model transformations than with a one-to-one correspondence between their underlying computations.