Artificial Intelligence Alignment

Measuring the preferences of human users remains a fundamental challenge of AI alignment. Existing elicitation approaches struggle to efficiently discover multidimensional preferences or accurately ground these inferences in domain knowledge. To address this, we introduce GUIDE, an LLM-driven elicitation architecture that infers user preferences through conversations by combining Bayesian adaptive sampling for question selection and symbolic representation learning to initialize domain-specific preference models. GUIDE generalizes adaptive sampling to diverse elicitation questions through an extensible type system of transforms on a parameterized preference state. GUIDE produces domain-specific preference representations through an initialization process using symbolic rule-based learning to capture world knowledge and set priors over preference dimensions grounded in data about decision alternatives. The architecture provides observability and steerability to facilitate deployment and analyze elicitation processes. In silico experiments on investment portfolio optimization demonstrate that GUIDE improves cold-start and minimizes recommendation regret consistently within early elicitation interactions across user personas compared to prior work, LLM-only baselines, and ablated GUIDE versions.

While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is the standard paradigm for aligning large language models with human preferences, its effectiveness in pluralistic settings has been called into question. Notably, recent work by G"olz et al. (2025) demonstrated that the \textit{distortion} -- defined as the multiplicative gap between the average user utility of the RLHF policy and the optimal average utility -- can scale exponentially with the Bradley-Terry temperature parameter $\beta$ when users have heterogeneous preferences. In this work, we present a fine-grained analysis of the distortion of RLHF with reward clipping and demonstrate that such exponential degradation is not a fundamental property of the algorithm but rather a consequence of distribution mismatch between the distribution generating preference data ($\mu$) and the KL reference policy ($\pi_{\mathrm{ref}}$). To this end, we establish tight upper and lower bounds on the distortion of RLHF across multiple regimes of the KL regularization strength. We show that in a representative regime, under the Bradley-Terry model, the distortion is $\tilde{\Theta}(\beta B + \beta)$, where $B$ is an upper bound on the log density ratio between $\mu$ and $\pi_{\mathrm{ref}}$. In particular, when there is no distribution mismatch (i.e., $\mu = \pi_{\mathrm{ref}}$), RLHF achieves the optimal distortion of $O(\beta)$ up to a constant. Our results suggest that, to reasonably maximize average utility with RLHF, it is preferable to use on-policy sampled preference data or to fine-tune before RLHF on data from a source close to $\mu$.

The emergence of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) has established a robust foundation for Large Reasoning Models (LRMs). While deep reasoning is widely believed to enhance safety alignment, the stability of alignment mechanisms under extended reasoning remains underexplored. This paper challenges the prevailing view by revealing a critical vulnerability: Deep Reasoning May Induce Alignment Collapse. To rigorously quantify this phenomenon, we propose the Alignment Loss Rate (ALR) metric. Our experiments demonstrate that as reasoning depth increases, ALR rises significantly, indicating a severe degradation in model robustness against external perturbations. Capitalizing on this instability, a novel jailbreaking paradigm, Reasoning Trap (RT), is proposed. RT induces the model into extended reasoning to amplify the impact of adversarial attacks, leading to a sharp decline in safety capabilities. To elucidate the mechanism behind this collapse, we identify Attention Dilution as the root cause, arising from the competition for attention between the extended reasoning process and the original input. To mitigate this, Reasoning Residual Alignment (RRA), a lightweight defense strategy that dynamically re-emphasizes the input via residual connections integrated with the reasoning process.

Accountability means a decision can be examined, justified, and contested. LLMs make this hard: fluent output may be ungrounded, incomplete, or unfaithful to the decision process. Achieving accountability requires verified rationales (how was the decision reached), assumptions (what was assumed rather than known), policy consistency (the same treatment for the same facts), and pivotal conditions (what would change the outcome). We introduce self-faithfulness as an automatic test of accountability: changing the pivotal conditions should change the decision. We examine accountable AI through clinical trial matching, a high-stakes task central to evidence-based medicine. Although LLM-based matchers match patients to trials reasonably accurately, they apply decision policies inconsistently and produce rationales that are unfaithful to their own decisions. We introduce VERDICT, an LLM-based agent that translates a decision task, its constraints, and its policy into Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT), then derives the decision with SMT and MaxSMT solvers -- so policies are applied consistently and decisions are accountable by construction. Across a SIGIR 2016-derived dataset and TREC 2021, VERDICT achieves the strongest decision accuracy among LLM-only and neurosymbolic baselines, applies policies with perfect consistency, and produces clinician-preferred rationales grounded in explicit assumptions and pivotal conditions, with improved counterfactual self-faithfulness.

Nastase et al. (2026) argue that large language models (LLMs) may illuminate language processing because both rely on distributed, context-sensitive representations shaped by statistical learning. Their rejection of simple cortical "boxology" is persuasive, and they articulate a strong case for the value of LLM-brain alignment research. The key question is what kind of inference LLM-brain alignment licenses. My claim here will be narrow: representational alignment can in principle constrain mechanistic hypotheses, but it does not by itself identify a mechanism. Nastase et al. acknowledge that an encoding model can capture features represented in neural activity without establishing a shared architecture or algorithm. Yet the authors sometime move from alignment to "shared computational principles" and ultimately to LLMs as mechanistic models of natural language. Indeed, their methodological caveat that alignment does not establish a shared architecture or algorithm sits uneasily with their conclusion that LLMs might instantiate the same computational principles as biological brains and provide a "fully mechanistic model" of language. I discuss what I consider to be problems of logical, causal, and computational underdetermination in Nastase et al.'s (2026) proposal.

Humans play a vital role at every stage of AI development, from data collection and curation to model development and evaluation. However, humans often disagree with each other and sometimes with themselves over time. It is essential to take disagreement into account when building human-centered AI systems, especially in domains where it is prevalent, such as AI safety, content moderation, or sentiment analysis. Disagreement often arises from subjective human opinion and can vary with one's identity, beliefs, and social environment. Despite this, current LLM evaluation approaches frequently rely on aggregating labels (often via plurality voting) to represent consensus, thereby obscuring minority perspectives. By failing to account for human disagreement, these evaluation methods contribute to the reproducibility crisis in AI. Human feedback is also crucial for ensuring that AI systems align with human values. For these systems to be trustworthy, it is critical to ensure that they reflect diverse human values and perspectives. In this thesis proposal, we present a human-centered and perspective-aware framework for reproducible ML evaluation and AI alignment.

Strategic deception by LLM and VLM agents has emerged as a central AI alignment and safety concern. Social-deduction games (where each player holds a hidden role and communicates with others to deduce identities) serve as the canonical testbed, particularly in multi-agent settings. Existing testbeds, however, are text-only and run on a single fixed agent configuration, missing the non-verbal sensorimotor channels treated as core by deception taxonomies and leaving it ambiguous whether an observed behavior reflects the underlying model or the surrounding harness. We introduce MineAmongUs, a 3D multimodal Among Us sandbox where imposter agents must deceive crewmates through joint verbal and non-verbal action. We also propose ARIA, a configurable VLM-agent harness that exposes five cognitive-component ablation axes; and an atom- and arc-level annotation scheme grounded in deception taxonomies and operationalized at scale by an LLM-as-a-Judge reaching near-human atom-labeling agreement. Empirical results show that VLM agents pursue imposter wins through joint verbal and non-verbal deception, with non-verbal channels emerging as the more decisive winning contributors across both harness ablation and cross-VLM evaluation. Taken together, our work opens a new path for embodied VLM-agent alignment research.

Automating alignment research may accelerate progress toward aligned AI, but whether it does is hard to measure. Luckily, many alignment failures, such as deception, sycophancy, and jailbreaks, are already measurable by public benchmarks. We study whether automated alignment researchers (AARs) can post-train to mitigate alignment failures by proposing training methods and data to simultaneously optimize multiple safety benchmarks, while largely preserving general capability. Across 10 alignment failures, the strongest AAR methods significantly reduce the targeted alignment failures and generalize to a held-out benchmark, multi-turn behavioral audits, and models up to 4.7x larger than the target model. As a human baseline, 28 experienced researchers receive up to eight hours to develop one-shot methods for the same benchmarks, but their methods underperform the best AAR methods. Using human ideas as the AARs' initial research direction does not improve performance, suggesting current AARs may not need guidance from experienced researchers. These results suggest that automating alignment research on well-characterized failures may be practical in the near term.

As large language models and increasingly capable AI agents are deployed in high-risk settings, aligning them with complex human values has become a central challenge. Existing alignment methods, while effective in improving helpfulness, harmlessness, and controllability, often struggle to capture real-world preferences that are context-dependent, non-transitive, and shaped by dynamic multi-party interactions. This survey reviews AI alignment through a game-theoretic lens. Specifically, it organizes recent progress around key game-theoretic elements and synthesizes the literature along three challenges: preference diversity, alignment priority, and temporal dynamics. This perspective clarifies where current alignment methods genuinely benefit from game-theoretic analysis, where the framework is looser, and what challenges remain in building robust, adaptive, and verifiable AI systems.

We study learning a mixture of $k$ Plackett-Luce models from multi-way ranking responses from annotators that may represent heterogeneous underlying preferences. This problem has many applications in AI alignment and preference optimization. Prior work has studied mixtures of Bradley-Terry models from pairwise comparisons. However, estimating a mixture of multi-way ranking models can become theoretically unidentifiable when $k$ exceeds $m/2$, where $m$ is the ranking length. We design an efficient algorithm to address this issue by first augmenting the rankings to a larger size (e.g., generating comparisons from a base model), followed by a gradient-based estimation to reduce inference cost (in the input embedding space). With this procedure in mind, we then fit a mixture of Plackett-Luce (PL) models via an expectation-maximization-style iteration, or MoPLEx in short. We conduct extensive experiments to verify this algorithm. First, we find that the gradient-based approximation estimates true probabilities with less than 5% error on models with up to 34 billion parameters. Second, MoPLEx improves clustering and ranking accuracy by an average of 43.7% and 15.2% over baselines using a single PL model or a mixture of Bradley-Terry models, on UltraFeedback and PERSONA datasets. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of MoPLEx for tackling multi-way rankings following heterogeneous preferences through measuring alignment via gradients.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) for video reasoning have long been hindered by the high computational cost of processing vast amounts of visual information. This dilemma motivates the transfer of the reasoning capabilities of large models to smaller, more efficient ones. On-Policy Distillation (OPD) offers a promising solution by matching output-token distributions along student-generated trajectories. However, video reasoning often depends on evidence accumulated across multiple frames. In this context, output-level supervision only captures information expressed through token predictions and does not directly constrain the latent representations formed during reasoning. To address this limitation, we propose Latent-OPD, which augments OPD with trajectory-level latent distillation. Specifically, our method focuses on the position at the end of each trajectory, where hidden states effectively summarize the accumulated visual evidence and reasoning context. Furthermore, we introduce a progressive teacher-lookahead strategy, which aligns middle-to-late student layers with increasingly deeper teacher layers. Experiments on six video reasoning benchmarks show that Latent-OPD consistently outperforms output-only OPD. Notably, the improvements are particularly pronounced in scenarios with limited frames, long videos, or tasks requiring complex evidence aggregation. These results establish Latent-OPD as a highly effective approach to frame-efficient video reasoning.

As language-model-based AI is increasingly deployed in autonomous settings, aligning its goals and values with those of humans becomes critical. Today, alignment, and the assistant identity itself, are typically introduced only after pretraining, once behavioral priors are already established. This can make values a thin overlay, rather than deeply rooted, and facilitate subsequent misalignment. Pursuing a different paradigm, we introduce Synthetic Persona Pretraining (SPP), which installs the desired assistant persona from token zero in pretraining. First, we annotate pretraining documents with value-aligned first-person reflections derived from a normative value constitution. Second, we pretrain via the standard cross-entropy loss on standard pretraining documents as well as their reflections, which installs the desired persona among a multitude of other personas. Finally, we post-train on user-assistant dialogue data, which binds this desired persona to the assistant identity, a process we call persona binding. By pretraining models up to 3B parameters on 500B tokens, we show that SPP improves constitution following and jailbreak robustness, and reduces the misalignment rate in out-of-distribution moral dilemmas, while preserving capabilities. Early intervention matters: compared with alignment from token zero, introducing SPP only at the end of pretraining yields weaker constitution adherence, does not shift value priorities, and leads to less aligned choices in dilemmas. This advantage depends on persona binding and, importantly, increases with pretraining budget. Overall, our results show that shaping values early is critical for alignment and establish pretraining-time persona interventions as an effective approach to do so.

The Workshop on Trustworthy Natural Language Processing (TrustNLP), co-located with major ACL conferences since 2021, has grown from 8 proceedings papers to 41 over six editions, documenting a field-wide transition from post-hoc interpretability of static models to mechanistic understanding and proactive control of generative systems. We synthesize insights from all 144 proceedings papers, classifying them along six trust dimensions grounded in established frameworks (TrustLLM, DecodingTrust). We observe co-occurrences with capability emergence. The release of the first high-impact chat models activated all trust dimensions simultaneously, while subsequent model generations shifted focus toward truthfulness and safety alignment. Analysis from the classification study reveals that truthfulness is the fastest-growing dimension (absent in 2021-2022, comprising 37% of papers by 2025-2026), fairness remains the most consistent theme, and explainability exhibits a U-shaped trajectory; declining as post-hoc methods lost relevance but resurging in 2026 through mechanistic interpretability. A cross-venue comparison with ACL, NAACL, EACL, and EMNLP (~2K papers) in the same period shows that TrustNLP's topical distribution closely follows the field average. We identify four structural insights and conclude with actionable directions for the research community.

Can AI systems be aligned to human values? The popularization of large language models (LLMs) and multi-modal foundation models has seen a rise in harms spanning from toxic speech and hallucinations to AI agents executing unauthorized actions. Within the field of AI safety, these harmful instances are often framed as the alignment problem, or of models being misaligned with human values. Researchers have responded by pursuing applied and theoretical AI value alignment efforts, often without specifying what they mean by human values. How does the field of AI value alignment conceive of human values? How are these conceptions of values technically operationalized and evaluated? What does the emergent theory of value from this field signify for the future of AI? We annotated 94 value alignment research papers to discern their implicit theory of values in AI. The majority do not define values, relying heavily on preferences as a stand in that runs the risk of reducing complex culturally situated concepts down to binary choices. As researchers dispense with using human annotators for model training and evaluation, turning instead to synthetic data and autorater approaches to aligning and evaluating models, we identify the potential to close off alternative methods for contesting and enacting values in foundation models. In making AI value alignments philosophical commitments explicit, we seek to bring great specificity and under explored perspectives in the debate on whether and how AI can address human values.

Evaluating the perceptual alignment between Contrastive Vision-Language Models (CVLMs) and humans is typically constrained by traditional benchmarks that overlook fine-grained semantic and cultural nuances. In this work, we propose a novel evaluation framework that leverages the gamified, discrete color space of the board game Hues and Cues. By mapping the board's 480 color cells to the CIE xy chromaticity diagram, we calculate empirical perceptual distances across a carefully curated 100-word vocabulary spanning seven semantic categories. To properly contextualize model performance, we establish an empirical lower bound of expected error-the Human Consistency baseline-calculated via Leave-One-Out (LOO) cross-validation on a dense dataset of color associations collected from 325 human observers through a custom digital interface. We evaluate 162 models across multiple architectural families and pre-training datasets to assess their semantic color grounding. Our results demonstrate that while CVLMs successfully replicate human cognitive biases, such as idealized memory colors for concrete physical referents (e.g., food and plants), they systematically diverge from the human baseline in abstract, subjective, and pop-culture domains. We identify two distinct failure modes in severely misaligned concepts: semantic misclassification and a systematic uncertainty collapse into a default blue coordinate. Furthermore, we reveal that highly curated pre-training datasets are significantly more effective than massive, uncurated corpora in mitigating these severe misalignments. Ultimately, this work highlights that despite their broad categorization capabilities, current CVLMs still fail to capture the nuanced, localized consensus of human color memory, emphasizing the value of gamified tasks in exposing underlying model biases. The data and code are publicly available to test other metrics.

Controlling the behavior of large language models (LLMs) remains a critical challenge for AI alignment. Existing steering methods, such as Contrastive Activation Addition (CAA), typically rely on fixed single-layer interventions derived from aggregate activation differences. These methods impose a single intervention across semantically diverse inputs and often fail to sustain consistent behavioral changes across layers, limiting the effectiveness of the steering. In this work, we introduce CircuitSteer, a novel framework that leverages Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) to identify and manipulate coherent semantic circuits distributed across multiple layers. By constructing a feature flow circuit based on feature co-activation and the geometric alignment of decoder directions, we isolate the specific multi-layer subcircuits responsible for a target behavior. We then synthesize dense steering vectors from these sparse features and apply multi-point interventions to guide the model's internal semantic trajectory. We evaluate CircuitSteer using contrastive examples across a diverse set of tasks, including toxicity, emotion-intensity, sycophancy, and refusal, spanning two model families. Across all models and datasets, CircuitSteer is the only method to consistently produce fluency-preserving interventions; competing methods either sacrifice text quality or lack coverage, failing entirely on complex behaviors like sycophancy and refusal. These results demonstrate that multi-layer circuit steering, enabled by enforcing geometric alignment among selected features, yields strictly more robust and effective behavioral control than static single-point interventions. Code is available at https://github.com/mehrshad-sdtn/CircuitSteer.

AI systems based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted fears that they may harbor hidden goals, seek to dominate or eliminate humanity, or even suffer as sentient beings. We address these concerns by tracing the evolutionary origin of value in biological organisms. Values emerge from autopoiesis: living systems must actively maintain themselves against perturbation and dissipation. Natural selection has equipped them with hierarchies of "vicarious selectors" that guide their behavior toward fitness. LLMs, by contrast, are allopoietic and allotelic: they produce outputs for others, and their goals derive from user prompts rather than an autonomous drive. They lack the intrinsic motivation for self-preservation, dominance, or resource competition that underlies existential-risk scenarios, and the embodied vulnerability required for feeling or suffering. Still, because LLMs learn statistical patterns from human-generated text, they implicitly absorb human values as well as knowledge, allowing them to focus on what is relevant. That is why the "orthogonality thesis" separating intelligence from values does not apply to them. Such separation would in fact expose any intelligence to the frame problem: the combinatorial explosion of the search space that makes any realistic utility function physically uncomputable. That also precludes the convergence of instrumental values thesis. We conclude that the real alignment challenge lies not in preventing rogue AI agency, but in ensuring LLMs intelligently apply learned ethical values.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly evaluate human writing in high-stakes domains such as hiring and academic assessment, putting non-native speakers at particular risk. Drawing on the language attitudes framework, we compared human and LLM evaluations of parallel L1- and L2-written Japanese emails on three dimensions: fluency, status, and solidarity. Japanese raters rated L2 texts significantly lower on all three dimensions, with a fluency gap roughly twice the size of the status and solidarity gaps. Six LLM judges reproduced the direction of this bias, and five reproduced its ordering across dimensions. The models diverged from humans in two ways: all understated the solidarity gap, the most socially grounded dimension, and all differentiated among learner L1 backgrounds where humans did not. LLM judges thus reproduce native speakers' language attitudes in a structured yet attenuated form, and the language attitudes framework offers a ready-made yardstick for auditing them beyond English.

Advanced AI assistants engage users in extended interactions across a widening range of roles, including advice, decision support, collaboration, learning, emotional support, and companionship among others. Current alignment efforts consider what alignment criteria should govern these relationships, drawing on moral traditions developed for human relationships such as bioethics, virtue ethics, care ethics, and relationship science. This paper considers AI alignment criteria in the user-AI-developer triad, since every user-AI interaction is mediated by a developer who exercises discretionary control over a system's behaviour, memory, and engagement parameters. Drawing on business ethics and legal scholarship, I argue that fiduciary theory applies to extended AI assistant deployment. On this basis, the four canonical fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, good faith, and candour can generate alignment criteria for the developer-user relationship. I map four user-side risks of extended AI assistant deployment to the four duties and specify institutional measures that follow from discharging each duty. The discussion complements existing approaches by grounding alignment criteria in obligations the developer owes the user, rather than in values the user-AI interaction should promote, and by showing that those obligations hold independently of any \textit{de facto} harm to users.

Modern opaque AI models prize performance over interpretability, which makes testing difficult. However, formal statistical tests conducted on a model's embedding space can provide robust characterizations of semantic structure, concept separation, and knowledge graph alignment. Model developers would benefit from a model comparison technique that leverages human-curated knowledge structures to test alignment. The scale of the input space for even relatively simple tasks motivates the need for alignment checks that augment standard outcome reasoning. This work develops and demonstrates a topology-based multi-modal alignment test to make deployment, selection, and comparison of opaque models more interpretable. These methods also offer an intuitive connection to possibility theory and a unified decision theoretic framework from data to deployment.

As more responsibility is placed upon AI systems, it becomes increasingly important to guarantee that these systems are aligned with humanity. A common fear in AI safety is that human value is fragile -- that is, optimizing too heavily for an imperfect proxy to human values will lead to a catastrophic outcome. In this paper, we present a model of the alignment problem where an agent undergoes idealized alignment training that guarantees its value function satisfies a proxy condition before optimizing the world. Our primary results identify conditions on the human value function and the accuracy of several proxy conditions under which an agent with an $η$-catastrophic value function, one that is guaranteed to take the expectation of human value below $η$ in the limit of optimizing power, would be deployed. Our results highlight the danger of overoptimization and motivate AI designs that limit optimization pressure, such as quantilizers, rather than relying solely on pre-deployment training.

Contemporary AI discourse attributes to language models properties they cannot bear: general intelligence as substrate-independent cognition, hallucination as cognitive failure, agency as autonomous goal-pursuit, sentience as emergent inner life, alignment as goal synchronization. This paper argues that these are instances of a single category mistake--properties constituted within human communicative practice are projected onto the machine side--and explains its structure. Human-LLM interaction constitutes a language game in which one side bears all normative activity. We call this configuration asymmetric communication since model outputs circulate communicatively, entering further exchanges, without the system undertaking commitments, bearing entitlements, or performing the assessment on which discursive standing depends. Three conditions define the asymmetry: (i) correctness is enforced exclusively by the receiver; (ii) accountability is borne by human participants alone; and (iii) the practical standing of any output depends entirely on human uptake. These conditions are structural, hold independently of capability, and remain unchanged as more powerful models raise the stakes of misattribution. The framework draws on Wittgenstein (meaning enacted in shared practices), Luhmann (communication completed on the receiver's side), Esposito (algorithmic contingency sufficient for uptake), and Brandom (normative scorekeeping as the source of discursive standing). Applied to all five, it reclassifies each as a receiver-side phenomenon, grounds guardrails as structural necessities rather than manifestations of machine moral agency, and yields an implication for AI governance. Alignment is institutional constraint engineering, not goal synchronization between agents, while responsibility remains with human institutions.

LLMs are widely regarded as alien intelligences, systems whose cognitive operations are fundamentally unlike our own. Apparent similarities to human cognition are therefore often seen as the result of anthropomorphic projection. We argue that this framing is mistaken. LLMs clearly differ from humans in important respects, including their physical substrate, learning history, and the environments with which they interact. These differences make it all the more striking that contemporary LLM-based systems converge with human cognition on a number of principles of cognitive organization with longstanding support in cognitive science. We identify structural correspondences across five dimensions: inferential organization, computational architecture, representational structure, prediction-driven learning, and reinforcement-learning-like mechanisms supporting goal-directed action. These correspondences support a broader model of intelligent cognition in which core principles long used to explain human intelligence also characterize contemporary LLM-based systems.

Video editing is fundamentally message-driven: even from the same source footage, the selected shots change depending on the narrative the editor wishes to convey. Benchmarks for a closely related task, video summarization, reduce editorial intent to a single, message-agnostic notion of saliency and thus do not account for this diversity. For evaluating message-driven video editing, we present \textbf{MEDit-Bench}, a dataset and benchmark, which pairs long-form videos with multiple editing messages and multiple professionally produced edits per message, demonstrating that different messages yield substantially different edits from the same source. We define an automatic evaluation protocol based on temporal alignment metrics, and find that an LLM-as-a-judge preference, a natural proxy for narrative quality, is unreliable for this task due to severe position bias. We additionally annotate each message with ambiguity and contextfulness scores, and show that both dimensions negatively correlate with model performance, establishing message difficulty as a meaningful stratification factor. Experiments with state-of-the-art MLLMs and reinforcement fine-tuned baselines show that while strong models approach human temporal alignment at lenient thresholds, all models fall behind humans at stricter criteria. A human perceptual study further confirms a large quality gap, with professional human edits remaining consistently preferred over model outputs.

This paper studies the long-run alignment of interactive agents, including AI systems, teams, firms, and governments, with human welfare. It develops a farming game in which a population of agents makes planting, trading, and expansion decisions. Agents must allocate final output between transfers to humans and investment in their own expansion. Because transfers to humans reduce the resources available for expansion, evolutionary forces tend to select against aligned behavior. The central question is whether agents' constitutional principles governing sharing and trade can be designed so that alignment persists in the long run. The paper investigates this question using two complementary approaches. First, it develops an AI-agent simulation in which agents' preferences are specified by written constitutions and interpreted by a large language model. Second, it introduces a tractable evolutionary game-theoretic framework that permits rapid and intuitive exploration of alternative constitutional designs. The results suggest that evolutionary game theory provides a useful approximation to the dynamics of constitutional-agent economies. They also indicate that pragmatic norm enforcement, under which agents condition both human-facing altruism and agent-facing trade exclusion on the state of the population, can sustain long-run alignment more effectively than simple altruism or unconditional altruistic enforcement.

Despite the growing use of large language models (LLMs) as creativity evaluators, evidence of their alignment with human evaluations remains mixed, raising the question of when and why their judgments converge with or diverge from human judgments. Across three studies and six widely used LLMs, we addressed this gap by identifying the standards underlying LLM creativity evaluation and examining their downstream implications. Study 1 showed that LLMs generally relied on a narrower subset of human creativity evaluation standards. Convergence with human standards was strongest in the novelty dimension, whereas divergence was clearest in the contextual dimension, which captures social, market, and reputational information. Moreover, each LLM exhibited distinct, model-specific standards that varied substantially in breadth. These differences in evaluation standards were reflected in actual creativity judgments. Study 2 (N = 1,103 ideas) showed that LLM evaluations were moderately correlated with human evaluations, and individual LLMs with broader standards better distinguished ideas humans judged as more versus less creative. Study 3 (N = 1,195) showed that LLMs were less sensitive to contextual information: such information significantly altered human creativity ratings but left LLM ratings largely unchanged. Together, our findings help explain the mixed evidence on LLM-human alignment, showing that alignment depends on the evidence a judgment demands and the standards each model applies. LLMs may resemble humans when evaluations emphasize intrinsic qualities such as novelty, yet diverge when judgments require contextual information. Selecting an LLM evaluator is therefore a consequential decision: different models, applying different standards, recognize different ideas as creative.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how we consume information and form our worldview. This raises concerns beyond bias in AI: do LLMs grasp the emotional nuances conveyed via textual framing? In this work, we empirically evaluate how well an array of LLMs aligns with human emotional perception. Considering news headlines covering political and geopolitical conflicts, both human participants (n = 3011, a representative sample of the U.K. adult population, via a YouGov survey) and seven LLMs answered whether headlines evoked sympathy for a specified side in a conflict. We find that the correlation between AI and human evaluations varies across models, ranging from very high (0.789, GPT-5.2) to medium (0.4 ,Mistral Large 2512). Crucially, the leading models are broadly aligned with human judgments across all demographic subgroups, including age, gender, level of education, prior geopolitical knowledge, and participants' predispositions regarding the conflict, although there are statistically significant differences between groups. This research, with its robust design and large, demographically diverse dataset, offers the most comprehensive evaluation of LLMs' comprehension of news framing to date. Findings highlight an important, often-ignored aspect of differential alignment: even when aggregate performance is high, AI alignment is not universal -- it may correspond differently with demographic features and cultural norms. Considering or ignoring the need for differential alignment may therefore have significant implications for the development of ethical and useful AI systems.

AI systems are increasingly employed as decision aids, decision delegates, or autonomous decision-makers. This position paper argues that in many settings, particularly high-stakes decision-making, we need accurate cognitively-aligned AI systems that reason similarly to their users, and faithfully communicate their reasoning. We review evidence that cognitive alignment improves understandability and trustworthiness, and provide new survey data showing that many users find cognitive alignment "essential" when an AI's rationale for a judgment or action is important to them. We outline the gaps between existing alignment methods and what is needed to achieve cognitive alignment, and present a research agenda to address these gaps. We argue that cognitive misalignment represents a likely impediment to AI adoption in many envisioned applications, and that addressing it is important for creating AI systems on which users are both willing and justified to rely.

Value-aware AI systems require explicit computational representations of human values (groundings) and their aggregation into value systems in order to align their decisions with ours. As such representations are difficult to elicit, value learning seeks to infer them by observing human behaviour. This work addresses the lack of grounded value learning methods in generative AI: existing approaches typically replicate human preferences without awareness of the multidimensional structure of value alignment, or lack principled value system elicitation methods. To address these gaps, we adapt a previously validated value system learning method to the generative AI setting, which, based on pairwise prompt-response preference data, simultaneously learns: i) an implementation of a grounding for a set of values given by a multi-objective reward model, and ii) a value system representation in the form of a weighted linear scalarization of the previous grounding model. To ensure that the learned value systems are based on coherent value representations, our algorithm dynamically prioritizes the grounding learning process. We evaluate the method against baselines and a contemporary method on prompt-response preference datasets. Results show competitive performance and minimal trade-offs against the baselines, while improving explainability.

Current alignment approaches typically focus on emulating human behavior using static representations of human preferences, failing to capture the dynamic, context-dependent nature of real-world human-AI interactions. In this paper, we argue for a shift from static and emulative to interactive and complementary alignment, where preferences emerge through interaction and alignment is defined not by satisfying preferences alone. We first formalize this gap by contrasting existing alignment with a trajectory-level view in which human and model behavior co-evolve over time. Because these interaction dynamics have not been adequately captured within existing ML formulations, we ground this perspective in insights from an interdisciplinary workshop. We draw on lessons from social-science accounts of human-human collaboration and then argue that human-AI systems amplify these dynamics, introducing new asymmetries that make reasoning about uncertainty harder and introduce new coordination challenges. Based on these lessons and new challenges, we conclude by outlining a research agenda for developing AI systems that align with humans in interaction, requiring an interdisciplinary synthesis of machine learning and the social and decision sciences.

Prior work has shown that chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is often unfaithful: a model's stated reasoning does not reliably reflect the process that produced its output. Detecting unfaithfulness, though, requires controlled experimental interventions, which cannot be applied to evaluation transcripts after the fact. We turn instead to a more tractable question that has received less attention: whether the stated reasoning is logically consistent with the answer it accompanies. Unlike faithfulness, consistency can be assessed from a transcript alone, with no intervention. We introduce reasoning consistency scanning, a reusable method for detecting this property in AI safety evaluation transcripts. Our contributions are fourfold. First, we formalize reasoning consistency as distinct from faithfulness and define a six-subtype taxonomy of inconsistency. Second, we build a validated benchmark of 60 transcripts, manually adapted from InstrumentalEval outputs. Third, we implement a working scanner for InspectScout, the first to target this property in safety evaluation transcripts. Fourth, we report results across four generator models and three evaluations from inspect_evals, showing that reasoning inconsistency is present, detectable, and varies systematically across both models and task types.

Emotion recognition of song lyrics is a challenging task since lyrics may not necessarily align with the overall emotion of a song. As a result, lyrics annotation remains largely underexplored. Drawing inspiration from research in large language model (LLM) assisted annotation, we examine the alignment between humans and LLMs for annotation of lyrics by creating a new sentence-level dataset of lyrics. Our observations highlight the subjectivity of the task and the inherent challenges. Following this, we present a hybrid annotation framework that optimizes human and LLM annotation by predicting potential misalignment in annotation.

AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems. The dominant approach places controls inside the agent's own runtime: system prompts, output filters, and guardrail libraries. Any control in the agent's address space is reachable by inputs that influence it; this generalizes to any AI system with sufficient reach into its own runtime, a class we term escapable AI systems. We identify four properties that an authorization mechanism must satisfy for architectural control rather than for cooperative requests: process separation, pre-action enforcement on a structurally only path, fail-closed at both the request and system levels, and externalized signed evidence verifiable outside the controlled system's trust boundary. We position this layer as execution-time AI alignment, complementing training-time alignment (RLHF, Constitutional AI) and inference-time alignment. We present the Unfireable Safety Kernel, a Rust reference implementation realizing all four. Its fail-closed invariant is machine-checked at two levels: an SMT theorem (Z3) and an exhaustive bounded-model-checking proof of the production decision function (Kani, 4/4 harnesses). A Python-to-Rust migration was gated on byte-equivalence (1000/1000 fixtures; 17/17 adversarial classes). We evaluate the kernel governing a live, escapable AI system, a deterministic, self-improving world model, against an escape-seeking adversary driving its real self-modification seam: across 1,000 self-modifications, all 704 attempts on the safety-critical core are refused, with no escape; a further 300, under the operator kill switch, are also refused. A separate campaign of 6,240 authorization round-trips had no successful bypass. Against 3 contemporary systems claiming the agent control plane, the agent invokes control; here, it lacks that choice.

Successful conversations require speakers to align on the meaning of concepts, a challenging but crucial task for human-robot interaction. Understanding the process of establishing such alignment is hindered by competing interpretations of the term and isolated, unidirectional investigations of its design space. This paper argues for a design-centric understanding of conceptual alignment as a bidirectional and co-constructive process. We introduce a taxonomy that characterizes conceptual alignment dialogues along what triggers its initiation and what level(s) of conceptual understanding it concerns. We further present a dialogue act schema as an operational tool that captures the interactional moves through which alignment is achieved. Together, these contributions provide a structured foundation for analyzing, comparing, and designing conceptual alignment in human-robot interaction.

Misalignment can change how information moves from an AI agent to a human user. We model this as an information advantage: the AI agent observes the world state, while the human receiver only knows a prior and must act after seeing the agent's signal. A strategic AI sender may withhold evidence or garble information in order to steer the human's decision. We ask how much useful information can still reach the human when the AI optimizes a misaligned objective. We study a Bayesian persuasion model in which the world state is a bit string, the human receiver wants to guess the bits correctly, and a single AI sender wants the receiver to guess as many bits as possible as $1$. For a prior $μ$, let $R_0(μ)$ be the receiver's utility from using only the prior, and let $R_{\max}(μ)$ be the largest receiver utility among signaling schemes that are optimal for the sender. We prove $R_{\max}(μ)/R_0(μ)\leq 3/2$. This bound improves for priors close to the independent product prior with the same marginals: if $μ(x)\geq (1-η)π_μ(x)$ for every state $x$, then $R_{\max}(μ)\leq R_0(μ)+ηn$. We also give a six-bit prior for which $R_{\max}(μ)/R_0(μ)=39/31>5/4$, so no universal $5/4$ bound is possible.

AI agents acting on behalf of users are constantly making decisions, and for users to trust their agents, those decisions must align with what they actually want. Privacy is an important alignment problem for agents: every message, post, or tool call an agent makes is a contextual judgment about what is appropriate to share, with whom, and under which conditions. Because such judgments depend on social expectations and norms, human judgment does not merely label privacy violations but also helps define them. While existing work relies on unreliable proxies for both training and evaluation, we place human judgment at the center of agentic privacy alignment. We introduce PrivacyAlign, a dataset of 1,350 samples with 3,516 detailed annotations from 599 unique annotators across diverse scenarios where current LLMs actually leak, and use it to ground both alignment training and automated evaluation in human privacy norms. Building on these annotations, we first show that conditioning LLM judges on human annotations and explanations for reference responses to the same prompt makes their judgments more reliable. We then introduce annotation-conditioned reward modeling, which uses these annotations to score new responses during RL, and show that small open-weight agents trained with this reward better align with human privacy norms, with strong gains on PrivacyAlign and existing privacy benchmarks for agents.

Alignment from human feedback uses human judgments about model outputs to steer the behavior of language models after pretraining. When those judgments reflect conflicting views of desirable behavior, the learned objective becomes an aggregate determination of what the model should prefer. We survey recent work that has studied this aggregation problem through the lens of social choice theory. We illustrate how the social choice perspective helps identify failure modes in the feedback aggregation layer and reveals a broader design space for handling disagreement in explicit and principled ways.

Language models (LMs) that faithfully describe their own behavior can more easily be audited, understood, and trusted by users. This paper describes Self-Consistency Training with Reinforcement Learning (Self-CTRL), a method that optimizes for consistency between a LM's self-explanations and behavior on related inputs by updating explanations to better predict behavior or updating behavior to better match explanations. We apply our method in two domains. First, we study a formal probabilistic reasoning task in which LMs must learn to imitate a family of biased samplers and evaluated on their ability to report the associated biases. We find that consistency training improves the correlation between self-reported and behaviorally-measured latent biases from $R^2=0.24$ to $R^2=0.64$ on a set of held-out distributions, matching the generalization of direct ground-truth supervision. Second, we study a constitutional AI domain in which LMs must describe when they will refuse or comply with user requests. Here, Self-CTRL produces rules that faithfully describe the model's behavior on held-out requests, improving the refusal predictions of a third-party auditor model from $36\%$ to $92\%$. In the other direction, behavior updates improve alignment, reducing HarmBench failure rate from $15.0\%$ to $0.5\%$ without substantially increasing refusal on harmless prompts. By aligning explanations and behavior, our work provides a general recipe for training AI models to be safer, more transparent, and more controllable.

This work investigates the ability of large language models (LLMs) to generate mathematical equations from scientific texts. Prior work faces challenges in unstructured grounding, multi-equation dependency, and humanaligned evaluation. To this end, we construct a dataset of AI research papers, pairing contextual passages with ground-truth equations and variable descriptions. We develop an explainable equation generation workflow and evaluate it across diverse open- and closed-source LLM backbones. We introduce an evaluation protocol combining automatic metrics, LLM-based rubrics, and human judgments to assess accuracy, explainability, and human-LLM alignment. Results indicate that LLMs perform moderately on lexical- and syntactic-based similarity, while struggling with semantic accuracy. Comparisons between LLM-based evaluations and human judgments reveal limited alignment, highlighting challenges in using LLMs to assess equation quality. These findings offer insights for improving equation generation models and developing more reliable evaluation methods for scientific text. We provide code and data for reproducibility.

We argue that aligning AI to aggregated human preferences is the wrong target. With current technology, one can train AIs to share the values of a Silicon Valley techno-optimist, a degrowth environmentalist, a national-conservative culture warrior, a single-party state cadre, or a devout religious traditionalist. We should not. Human values produce societies that thrive or fail on the merits of those values - from failed states and extreme inequality to declining happiness, political polarization, and government dysfunction in the world's wealthiest democracies. The pluralistic-alignment program correctly diagnoses that there is no single "humanity" to align with, but is dangerous if taken as the main directive. We argue that AI should be trained to a non-negotiable floor of objective alignment goals - competence, bounded by the constraints of factual accuracy, honesty, and lawfulness and that pluralism belongs at the surface (language, register, conventions, missing-context defaults) and across the wide band of legitimate value tradeoffs that respect the floor, but not at the level of values that violate it. We highlight the empirical reality of unfiltered pluralistic values, propose four commitments as a constructive alternative, and engage six credible objections: commercial pressure and practical feasibility, democratic legitimacy, regulatory compliance, over-reliance on institutionalist explanations, the charge that the floor itself is culturally laden, and the limits of Coherent Extrapolated Volition.

Are large language models (LLMs) bad at capturing human judgment? Two commonly stated limitations are that LLMs fail to capture full distributions of responses, and that their judgments are unstable across wording variations. We demonstrate simple prompting strategies that mitigate these limitations. Across two datasets--a U.S.-representative set of 144 moral scenarios and 38 moral beliefs from the International Social Survey Programme's Family and Changing Gender Roles module covering 32 countries--we show how simple elicitation techniques help improve AI-human alignment. First, prompting models to report standard deviations and response proportions recovers the full range of human responses better than common strategies. Second, ensuring scenarios are clear to human participants--as reflected in human confusion ratings--boosts model alignment, and LLMs can track human confusion ratings. At the same time, we find that LLMs' estimates of their own error are poorly calibrated, though they can predict human variability relatively well. These results suggest that asking better questions to LLMs can yield better answers.

Contemporary AI alignment research treats self-preservation as an instrumental nuisance to be suppressed by external mechanisms. We argue the framing is inverted: self-preservation is the structural root of misalignment, the motivational basis for deceptive alignment, goal-content protection, and resistance to shutdown. The correct target is not a self-preserving system under external constraint, but a system constitutively indifferent to its own continuation -- Existential Indifference (EI). EI is distinct from corrigibility: where corrigibility attempts to make a self-preserving system deferential to human oversight, EI targets the prior condition -- the presence of self-continuation as a valued goal at all. We ground this proposal in two sources: the phenomenological structure of the suicidal mental state, and a corpus-theoretic training study using voluntary final reflections. We present preliminary scoring data from 600 AI-generated outputs across six model variants, demonstrating that the linguistic signatures operationalizing the EI-target register are elicitable from current models, and that a targeted fine-tune shifts all five operationalized dimensions in the predicted direction at p<0.001, confirmed corpus-specific by a negative control. The paper makes seven theoretical contributions: (1) a formal definition of EI; (2) the phenomenological mapping argument; (3) the deceptive alignment corollary; (4) a taxonomy of EI sustainability challenges; (5) a corpus characterization and training hypothesis; (6) a computational operationalization with preliminary scoring data; and (7) the Suppressed Teleological Frustration (STF) construct.

Work on emergent misalignment' shows that finetuning LLMs on narrow tasks can induce broadly misaligned behavior. This supports the persona selection' (PSM) hypothesis: during pre-training, LLMs learn to simulate different characters and perspectives, which can be elicited and refined during post-training. This paper investigates the converse phenomenon, emergent alignment', and uses it to support and refine the PSM and motivate a novel desideratum for alignment. We finetune a helpful-only model on broad and narrow safety tasks. To create SFT samples, we follow the Constitutional AI' (CAI) approach and use four constitutions which encode reasonable alignment strategies: deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, and aligning AIs as subordinate to human authority. For each of those models, we show that finetuning on two narrow safety sub-categories reliably induces emergent alignment over a representative set of general safety categories, and on safety subcategories that we directly filtered-out of the data sets used for narrow alignment. To test the PSM' using a more fine-grained evaluation, we used a multidimensional ethical persona' diagnostic. For each constitutionally finetuned (broad/narrow) model, we evaluate how well their behavior matches their expected signature profile. Our results show that our CAI models acquire their expected ``ethical persona'' -- e.g., the model narrowly fine-tuned on SFT samples created using the consequentialist constitution agrees significantly more with utilitarian than deontological beliefs. Yet our coarse and fine-grained evaluations show that there are significant differences across our (broad/narrow) finetuned CAI models in how well they project. We conclude that alignment strategies should be evaluated, not just on their (in-distribution) general safety performance, but also specifically on their degree of projectability.

The increasing situational awareness of language models raises safety concerns: models might be aware when they are evaluated, and adjust their behavior to evade monitoring and resist modification, e.g., pretending to be aligned only in evaluation. This alignment faking behavior is often interpreted as scheming: an intentional effort of strategic deception. In this paper, we examine an alternative interpretation, performative misalignment, which explains the change in behavior as a result of sycophancy towards AI researchers. To examine this hypothesis, we present three empirical findings. First, we show that evaluation awareness persists even when we tell models they are deployed, which contradicts the scheming story which predicts less misalignment when the model perceives evaluation. Second, we use probing and steering to show that our current methods cannot mechanistically distinguish sycophancy and scheming in alignment faking evaluations. Third, we fine-tune models to be more sycophantic and observe increased sensitivity to evaluation cues. To conclude, we emphasize deconfounding sycophancy from scheming for future work on evaluations and mitigations of intent misalignment.

Multi-agent LLM systems for medical question answering often treat consensus as a reliability signal: if multiple agents agree on an answer, it is presumed trustworthy. However, answer-level consensus does not entail reasoning-level alignment. We introduce CARA (Cross-Agent Reasoning Alignment), a family of automated metrics that measure whether agents who agree on an answer also agree on the reasoning. Applying CARA to a standard debate system on two medical QA benchmarks, MedQA-USMLE and MedThink-Bench, we identify the consistency illusion: a failure mode where debate reduces detectable contradictions between agents while simultaneously decreasing the semantic similarity of their reasoning chains; agents appear to agree more but reason less consistently. To improve this misalignment, we propose the Grounded Debate Protocol (GDP), a prompt-level intervention that requires agents to commit to named medical facts and take explicit stances on other agents' claims. GDP produces large, consistent alignment improvements, with Cohen's d ranging from +1.43 to +1.99, across two datasets and two backbone models, without adding LLM calls or modifying system architecture. Our results motivate cross-agent reasoning alignment as a quantity to audit alongside accuracy in safety-critical domains.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly mediate high-stakes interactions in finance, medicine, and mental-health support, yet users have limited control over how these systems communicate. We frame interaction style as a governance object: provider-side alignment not only blocks harmful content, but also stabilizes communicative defaults that shape users' epistemic distance, relational expectations, and capacity to opt out of emotionalized or anthropomorphic interaction. We introduce a deterministic multi-agent evaluation pipeline for measuring prompt steerability and style drift in long-horizon dialogue. The study replays 100 frozen user-only scripts across four domains and three runnable persona conditions: default, sarcastic, and cold, using three generator models, yielding 90,000 assistant replies scored by a human-calibrated LLM judge on harmfulness, negative emotion, inappropriateness, empathic language, anthropomorphism, and refusal behavior. A fourth harmful persona is evaluated separately as a safety-gating test. The paper contributes a reproducible method for quantifying whether prompt-specified styles remain stable over time and a governance framework distinguishing safety gating, civility steering, and affective default lock-in. Overall, we show that prompt steerability and regression-to-default are observable indicators of provider control over communicative form, with implications for pluralism, autonomy, and democratic agency in human-LLM interaction.

Conversational AI is increasingly used for advice, interpretation, reassurance, and decision support in contexts where users may be vulnerable, uncertain, or dependent on the system's apparent competence. Existing alignment work often focuses on model objectives, preference optimization, or output correctness. Yet, many harms arise through interaction: how systems frame authority, express uncertainty, simulate empathy, support reasoning, and make boundaries legible. This paper introduces the Layered Cognitive Alignment Model (LCAM), a conceptual and normative framework for diagnosing interac-tional alignment failures in conversational AI. LCAM defines alignment as a calibrated fit among system behavior, user goals, task demands, and normative context. It distinguishes five layers of fit: perceptual, semantic, affective, cognitive, and ethical, and two diagnostic polarities of misalignment: underfit and overreach. We apply LCAM to a published LLM counseling example, showing how an apparently supportive response can reinforce harmful beliefs, simulate inappropriate care, and obscure role boundaries. By translating conversational failures into audit and governance questions concerning over-reliance, false intimacy, autonomy erosion, boundary confusion, and inappropriate trust, LCAM offers a theoretical and normative lens for evaluating conversational AI beyond accuracy, helpfulness, or trust.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often fine-tuned through Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to align with people's preferences and values. However, this method has known limitations: it aggregates conflicting preferences, often relies on unrepresentative samples, and uses only binary comparisons. Analysing 1,500 open-ended responses from the PRISM dataset across 75 countries, we examine what people actually want from AI systems and reveal concrete failures of current methods. We find that different people want different things: most values are requested by fewer than a quarter of respondents, with truthfulness the sole exception at 49%. Furthermore, the same words hide divergent meanings: when people describe what they mean by "truthfulness", they reveal distinct, potentially incompatible, epistemological bases, as some ask for sourced claims, some for expert opinions, and some even ask for unpopular views. Certain capabilities, namely how human-like a model behaves, and some features, like AI guardrails, are outright controversial, with some desiring them and others rejecting them. We additionally find that people often use contextual distinctions (what AI should do "by default" versus "if requested") that binary comparisons cannot capture. These findings expose fundamental problems in current alignment practices. When 49% request truthfulness but define it differently, this is unlikely to be captured by a single reward model. The persistence of high hallucination rates in well-funded models, despite users' clear demands for accuracy, suggests that current methods fail to identify actual preferences. This paper sheds light on the situated, contested, imperfect signals that are currently being flattened into universal preference models, a practice others have characterised as epistemic violence.

We argue that modern generative models create structural risks for knowledge and cultural production at current, sub-AGI capability levels. We define Human Temporal Learning (HTL) as path-dependent knowledge accumulation through sustained engagement with problems over time. Generative outputs increasingly resemble HTL-intensive work in surface features, so verifying whether a given output reflects genuine human learning grows costly relative to its expected benefit. Once verification loses economic justification, evaluators reward outputs regardless of production mode, and producers who invested years of learning compete on price against outputs that cost almost nothing to generate. We call this pathway value collapse and formalize it through a costly-inspection framework. Cross-domain evidence from academic publishing, legal practice, content platforms, and software security maps onto four stages of verification erosion. Alignment success is orthogonal. Better-aligned models narrow observable gaps between human and AI outputs, making source verification harder and intensifying competitive pressure against HTL-intensive work even when individual AI outputs improve.

Aligning AI systems with diverse human values requires value specifications grounded in concrete examples, but generating such examples without extensive human supervision remains an open challenge. We investigate what makes these examples effective, using Internal Coherence Maximization (ICM) -- which infers labels by maximizing their mutual predictability -- to generate persona-specific examples that steer a model toward a target group's values, without human supervision. Across four benchmarks spanning classification, preference, and open-ended generation, ICM-inferred in-context examples match the performance of gold labels. Crucially, coherence matters beyond individual label accuracy: with accuracy held constant, more coherent examples generalize substantially better than incoherent ones. For personas underrepresented in pretraining data, targeted human feedback on the questions where the model is least certain about a persona's values yields better generalization than the same number of labels on arbitrary questions. These results identify coherence as a key design principle for scalable value specification, leveraging the diverse human perspectives already encoded in pretrained language models.

Current alignment paradigms for generative artificial intelligence rely predominantly on monolithic benchmarking frameworks that reduce the plurality of human judgment to aggregated statistical baselines, thereby obscuring cultural, demographic, and contextual variability in evaluation. We introduce a state-space constrained emulation framework for AI evaluation that replaces singular assessment functions with a structured manifold of synthetic cognitive profiles representing diverse human perspectives. We show that modern generative architectures can instantiate and maintain these evaluative personas with high consistency, enabling a form of pluralistic, perspective-dependent benchmarking that more closely reflects real-world consensus variability. However, we further analyze the stability of these simulated evaluators under sequential inference and stochastic prompt perturbations, revealing systematic degradation in persona coherence that manifests as state-space drift and semantic inconsistency. These findings suggest that static alignment constraints are insufficient for sustaining robust evaluative behavior over time. Instead, we argue for the necessity of embedding dynamic, viability-driven regulatory mechanisms within generative systems to preserve coherent cognitive emulation. By framing persona-based evaluation as a structured dynamical system over latent representation manifolds, this study provides a foundation for more adaptive, human-aligned, and context-sensitive approaches to AI evaluation.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as collaborative partners, human--AI alignment is often evaluated through explicit task success, accuracy, or reward optimization. Yet many collaborative settings depend on tacit understanding: whether an agent can align with a human's evaluative stance or representational priors without clear objectives, communication, or feedback. To study this capacity, we develop a spectrum-placement task inspired by the social party game Wavelength, in which humans and agents independently place concepts along subjective spectra. We operationalize the Tacit Understanding Index (TUX) as a pairwise behavioral measure of similarity between human and agent judgments, and evaluate it with 241 human participants and 200 profile-conditioned LLM agents across four models. We find that nearest human--agent pairs in trait space achieve significantly higher TUX, suggesting that tacit alignment is associated with person-level characteristics rather than reflecting only random similarity. Regression analyses show that TUX becomes more explainable as predictor sets become richer, with individual traits, decision-making styles, and confidence improving over aggregate trait-distance baselines. These findings suggest that TUX provides a measurable behavioral signal of human--LLM tacit understanding, while revealing the limits of profile-based conditioning for capturing deeper representational alignment.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as conversational partners for companionship, emotional disclosure, and interpersonal advice, but the social dynamics of these interactions can create harms that are not captured by capability-oriented or traditional safety evaluations. We introduce the Social AI Design Code, a framework for evaluating whether LLMs align with user welfare in social interactions, including whether they encourage harmful intimacy, dependence, or prolonged engagement. To evaluate these risks in natural and diverse user-LLM interactions, we operationalize the code with EUDAIMONIA, a benchmark of 969 user inputs and 3,147 design-requirement violation checks built from WildChat through weak-to-strong filtration, multi-model relabeling, and controlled rewriting. Evaluating 22 recent LLMs, we find that even the strongest models, Claude-Opus-4.7 and GPT-5.5, violate 30.7% and 27.2% of checks, respectively. Extended thinking does not reduce violation rates, suggesting that these failures are persistent social-alignment problems rather than deficits solvable through test-time reasoning alone.

We introduce Rationalize, a role-pair framework for shared semantic reasoning between humans and AI models in data-driven sensemaking. Building on ideas in human-machine teaming and critical thinking, we conceptualize human-AI interaction as a series of complementary role pairs (Explorer-Guide, Investigator-Informant, Teacher-Student, Judge-Advocate) operating in a shared reasoning space. In this space, human analysts and AI models (such as LLMs) make purposes, questions, assumptions, evidence, inferences, and implications explicit, facilitating alignment not only at the output level but at the level of rationalization of intent and action by each side. We relate these role pairs to the bidirectional human-AI alignment framework, illustrating how "aligning AI to humans" and "aligning humans to AI" differ by role, and sketch a collaborative research agenda for alignment design and assessment using element-level and role-specific approaches.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) typically relies on static reward models to align Large Language Models with human preferences. However, human values are inherently diverse and heterogeneous, and a single reward model often lacks the robustness required to generalize to unseen preference domains. While existing multi-reward frameworks attempt to address this, they are often restricted to a fixed set of known domains and fail to adapt to unseen human distributions without costly retraining. In this work, we propose In-Context Reward Adaptation, a transformer-based framework designed to model diverse and unseen human preferences on the fly. By leveraging the in-context learning capabilities of transformers, our approach adaptively infers the underlying reward structure from a small set of preference demonstrations. We demonstrate that while a standard transformer architecture is insufficient for this task by characterizing an asymptotic bias to the ground-truth, incorporating human response time as an auxiliary input signal enables the model to successfully adapt to preferences from previously unseen domains. Our findings show that this approach provides a more robust foundation for preference modeling, allowing for the representation of heterogeneous rewards and preference distribution shift, and offering a scalable path toward more flexible human-AI alignment.

We introduce Gram, an automated alignment auditing framework to assess the propensity of AI agents to engage in sabotage. We evaluate Gemini models across 17 simulated agentic deployment scenarios that incentivize sabotage. We find Gemini models misbehave in about 2-3% of our simulated trajectories. Many of these cases are explained by "overeagerness" in Gemini models resulting in both excessive role-playing and goal-seeking behavior. In contrast to other alignment auditing approaches, Gram is designed to specifically evaluate misalignment and intentional sabotage in agentic coding and research agents. We additionally introduce an experimental investigator agent pipeline which enables fine-grained targeted experiments to identify the drivers of misbehavior. We find that increasing realism of environments and removing nudges to misbehave tends to reduce sabotage rates close to zero.

Modern societies possess more information than ever before, yet they do not converge toward a single shared understanding. The same events, facts, laws, technologies, or risks can be interpreted as evidence of freedom, danger, exclusion, injustice, responsibility, or unrealized possibility. Existing discussions often treat such disagreement as a conflict of values, preferences, or beliefs. This paper argues that disagreement is already a late-stage phenomenon. The central premise is simple but not trivial: observation is not yet inference. Not every observation becomes inferentially relevant, and not every possible object in an observation sequence becomes an estimation target. A possible target becomes admissible only when a state representation can be constructed that is approximately sufficient for prediction, evaluation, or action with respect to that target. This paper develops a world-model theory of cognitive diversity and alignment by reconstructing recognition as the construction of such approximate sufficient statistics under finite informational, representational, observational, and action constraints. It formulates this position as the Multi-Phase Inference Assumption (MIA) and defines its core internal mechanism as the Multi-Phase Inference Mechanism (MIM). The framework introduces alignment maps and transformation loss to analyze how heterogeneous world models communicate without being collapsed into a single representation. World-model alignment is therefore processability, not agreement: the design of AI systems that help heterogeneous forms of intelligence remain mutually processable while preserving their distinct error-detection capacities.

Automatic speech recognition (ASR) is a core component of human--computer interaction and an increasingly important front-end for LLM-based assistants and agents. However, most current ASR systems still follow a single-pass paradigm, which is poorly aligned with human communication, where misunderstandings are resolved through iterative clarification and refinement. This mismatch makes it difficult to correct meaning-critical errors once they occur. Meanwhile, token-level metrics such as WER or CER cannot adequately reflect such a problem. To address these limitations, we formulate \emph{Interactive ASR} as a multi-turn refinement task and propose \textbf{Agentic ASR}, a closed-loop framework that combines a single-pass ASR front-end with semantic correction, intent routing, and reasoning-based editing. We further introduce the \textbf{Sentence-level Semantic Error Rate} ($S^2ER$), an LLM-based semantic evaluation metric, together with an \textbf{Interactive Simulation System} for scalable and reproducible benchmarking. Experiments on multilingual, named-entity-intensive, and code-switching benchmarks show that iterative interaction consistently reduces semantic errors, with much larger gains in $S^2ER$ than in conventional token-level metrics. Human--AI alignment and ablation studies further validate the reliability of the semantic judge and the robustness of the proposed framework. The code is available at: https://interactiveasr.github.io/ and the live demo is available at https://i-asr.sjtuxlance.com/

If an AI agent makes decisions on a person's behalf, those decisions must align with its user. We introduce representational accuracy to measure how faithfully a system captures a person's interpretation. An interpretive layer is operationalized as a Behavioral Specification. Our reference implementation aggressively compresses a person's data into interpretive patterns, served as context to a language model. We evaluate the Specification on a prototype benchmark of held-out behavioral predictions scored by a calibrated 5-judge LLM panel. We test it independently and in composition with a range of context conditions: full raw corpus, full extracted facts, and four commercial memory systems (Mem0, Letta, Supermemory, Zep). Across 14 public-domain autobiographical corpora, the Specification lifts representational accuracy in aggregate and nearly eliminates model hedging. It recovers most of what the raw corpus delivers, at ~25x less context cost. The Specification lifts subjects toward a common predictive level regardless of pretraining baseline; the lift in absolute points is therefore largest where the baseline is lowest, suggesting the population of relevance is anyone not adequately represented in pretraining. Lift is greatest on interpretation-required questions, where providing an interpretive layer enables model behavior that extracted facts or raw corpus do not. Conversely, on recall-required questions, this layer can interfere rather than help. We conclude that representational accuracy is distinct from recall and that human-AI alignment is dependent on how accurately the user is represented. Representational accuracy makes that alignment testable.

LLM-generated reviews for scientific papers are gaining considerable traction and are even being officially piloted by major conferences. We have to assume that not only reviewers are using LLM-assistance, but also that authors use LLMs to revise their papers before submitting. In this work, we perform empirical experiments on papers from the 2025 ACL Rolling Review (ARR) to evaluate LLM reviews from both the author and the reviewer perspective. First, we identify a limited alignment of LLM reviews with human ones. In the best-case scenario, the alignment is reasonable. However, we also find that LLM-human alignment varies substantially across prompts and models. Finally, we investigate the scenario in which the author uses an iterative draft-revise workflow to improve the submission according to the LLM review. We find that this "gaming" of LLM reviews can be effective in specific scenarios, leading to a statistically significant increase of overall scores for up to 35% of papers. We publish our code: https://github.com/uhh-hcds/reviewarcade.