Cognitive Modeling
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4 papers in the last four weeks, up 33% on the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.
Latest papers 83
When people share the same documents and observations yet reach different conclusions, the disagreement often shifts into a judgment that the other party is cognitively defective, irrational, or acting in bad faith. This paper argues that such divergence is better described as a form of non-identifiability inherent in inference and learning, rather than as a defect of the other party. We organize the phenomenon into two levels: (i) -level non-identifiability, where conclusions diverge under the same world model because inference settings differ; and (ii) -level non-identifiability, where repeated use of an inference setting biases data exposure and update rules, causing the learned world model itself to diverge. We introduce an inference profile , consisting of Reference, Exploration, Stabilization, and Horizon, and show how outputs can split even for the same observation and the same . We further explain why disagreements tend to project onto a small number of bases -- abstract versus concrete, externalizability, and order versus freedom -- as a consequence of general constraints on learning systems: computational, observational, and coordination constraints. Finally, we relate the framework to deep representation learning, including representation hierarchy, latent-state estimation, and regularization-exploration trade-offs, and illustrate the framework through a case study on AI regulation debates.
LLMs and the ZPD
One hundred years ago Vygotsky and his circle were exploring the nature of consciousness and defining what would become psychology in the Soviet Union. They concluded that children develop "scientific thinking" through interacting with enculturated adults in Zones of Proximal Development or ZPDs. The proposal is that, contrary to the claims of some, the LLM mechanism is not doing thinking with "distributed representations," but rather the completion model is doing "primitive thinking" in terms of practices. Viewed from this perspective, it would seem our large language models don't hallucinate, but rather dream, and that what is needed is not "guard rails" but an investigation of the set of cognitive tools that enable us to do things that look like common-sense. The proposal here is that interaction is core to human communication rather than just an add-on to "real" understanding.
The Grounding Gap: How LLMs Anchor the Meaning of Abstract Concepts Differently from Humans
Abstract concepts - justice, theory, availability - have no single perceivable referent; in the human brain, their meaning emerges from a web of experiences, affect, and social context. Do large language models (LLMs) ground abstract concepts in a similar way? We study this by replicating property-generation experiments from cognitive science on 21 frontier and open-weight LLMs. Across models and experiments, we find a consistent pattern: when compared to humans, models rely too heavily on word associations, and underproduce properties tied to emotion and internal states. This yields a large and consistent grounding gap: no model exceeds a Pearson correlation r=0.37 with human responses, compared to a human-to-human ceiling above r=0.9. To better interpret this gap, we also replicate a rating experiment on grounding categories and find that here LLMs align more closely with human judgment, and alignment improves as models get larger. We then use sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to inspect whether this information is also reflected in the models' internal features, and we do identify features connected to grounding dimensions such as "sensorimotor" and "social". These findings suggest that current LLMs can recover grounding dimensions when explicitly queried, but do not recruit them in a human-like way when words are generated freely.
Cognitive Agent Compilation for Explicit Problem Solver Modeling
Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for tutoring, feedback generation, and content creation, but their broad pretraining makes them hard to constrain and poor substitutes for controllable learners. Educational systems often require inspectable and editable knowledge states: educators want to know what a system assumes the learner knows, and learners benefit when the system can justify actions in terms of explicit skills, misconceptions, and strategies. Inspired by cognitive architectures, we propose Cognitive Agent Compilation (CAC), a framework that uses a strong teacher LLM to compile problem-solving knowledge into an explicit target agent. CAC separates (i) knowledge representation, (ii) problem-solving policy, and (iii) verification and update rules, with the goal of making bounded problem solving more inspectable and editable in educational settings. We present an early proof of concept implemented with Small Language Models that surfaces key design trade-offs, particularly between explicit control and scalable generalization, and positions CAC as an initial step toward bounded-knowledge AI for educational applications.
Uneven Evolution of Cognition Across Generations of Generative AI Models
The pursuit of artificial general intelligence necessitates robust methods for evaluating the cognitive capabilities of models beyond narrow task performance. Here, we introduce a psychometric framework to assess the cognitive profiles of generative AI, comparing them to human norms and tracking their evolution across generations. Initial evaluation of leading multimodal models using tasks adapted from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale revealed a profoundly uneven cognitive architecture: near-ceiling performance in verbal comprehension and working memory (> percentile) contrasted with near-floor performance in perceptual reasoning (< percentile). To track developmental trajectories beyond human-normed limits, we developed the Artificial Intelligence Quotient (AIQ) Benchmark and applied it to six generations and two model families, revealing significant but asymmetric performance gains. Notably, we uncovered a sharp dissociation between modalities; abstract quantitative reasoning matured far more rapidly when presented linguistically compared to a visually analogous format, indicating an architectural bias towards language-based symbolic manipulation. While abstract visual reasoning improved, visual-perceptual organization remained largely stagnant. Collectively, these findings demonstrate that the cognitive abilities of generative models are evolving unevenly, suggesting that scaling and optimization approaches to AGI development alone may be insufficient to overcome fundamental architectural limitations in achieving balanced, human-like general intelligence.
Cognitive Twins: Investigating Personalized Thinking Model Building and Its Performance Enhancement with Human-in-the-Loop
This paper presents the Personalized Thinking Model (PTM), a hierarchical and interpretable learner representation designed for AI supported education. PTM organizes evidence from learner journals into a five-layer structure covering behavioral instances, behavioral patterns, cognitive routines, metacognitive tendencies, and self-system values. PTM is grounded in Marzano's New Taxonomy of Educational Objectives and tries to clone learner's thinking model and build cognitive twin. It was constructed using a pipeline that combines large language model inference (Gemini 2.5 Pro), sentence embeddings, dimensionality reduction, and consensus clustering. This paper evaluates PTM fidelity through three methods applied to 40 participants in a seven-week study. First, automatic evaluation using atomic information point matching yielded an overall F1 score of 74.57% before human-in-the-loop (HITL) refinement and 75.48% after refinement. Second, user evaluation using a Likert scale produced mean ratings of 4.26 and 4.30 on a five-point scale for pre and post-HITL conditions respectively. Third, semantic alignment verification showed that topic coherence increased from 0.436 at the behavioral layer to 0.626 at the core value layer, while lexical overlap with journal vocabulary decreased from 0.114 to 0.007 across those same layers. These results suggest that the PTM produces outputs with acceptable fidelity, was generally perceived by users as reflecting their thinking, and showed a pattern consistent with semantic abstraction across layers.
A foundation model of vision, audition, and language for in-silico neuroscience
Cognitive neuroscience is fragmented into specialized models, each tailored to specific experimental paradigms, hence preventing a unified model of cognition in the human brain. Here, we introduce TRIBE v2, a tri-modal (video, audio and language) foundation model capable of predicting human brain activity in a variety of naturalistic and experimental conditions. Leveraging a unified dataset of over 1,000 hours of fMRI across 720 subjects, we demonstrate that our model accurately predicts high-resolution brain responses for novel stimuli, tasks and subjects, superseding traditional linear encoding models, delivering several-fold improvements in accuracy. Critically, TRIBE v2 enables in silico experimentation: tested on seminal visual and neuro-linguistic paradigms, it recovers a variety of results established by decades of empirical research. Finally, by extracting interpretable latent features, TRIBE v2 reveals the fine-grained topography of multisensory integration. These results establish artificial intelligence as a unifying framework for exploring the functional organization of the human brain.
Do LLMs have core beliefs?
The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked debate about whether these systems exhibit human-level cognition. In this debate, little attention has been paid to a structural component of human cognition: core beliefs, truths that provide a foundation around which we can build a worldview. These commitments usually resist debunking, as abandoning them would represent a fundamental shift in how we see reality. In this paper, we ask whether LLMs hold anything akin to core commitments. Using a probing framework we call Adversarial Dialogue Trees (ADTs) over five domains (science, history, geography, biology, and mathematics), we find that most LLMs fail to maintain a stable worldview. Though some recent models showed improved stability, they still eventually failed to maintain key commitments under conversational pressure. These results document an improvement in argumentative skills across model generations but indicate that all current models lack a key component of human-level cognition.
Are you with me? A Framework for Detecting Mental Model Discrepancies in Task-Based Team Dialogues
Humans typically use natural language to update teammates on task states. Since not all updates are communicated, discrepancies arise between the team members' mental models that negatively affect overall team performance. How can we categorize such discrepancies? Do misalignments detected in team dialogue predict future mental model misalignments? Traditional shared mental model (SMM) assessment methods rely on retrospective expert coding that cannot capture real-time coordination dynamics. We propose a framework to identify and categorize four types of mental model discrepancies: unsupported beliefs, false beliefs, belief contradictions, and omissions, all of which can naturally emerge in team dialogues. Using dialogues from twenty dyad teams performing collaborative object identification tasks across four sequential levels, we demonstrate that these discrepancy patterns contain predictive signals. Averaging historical discrepancy counts achieves meaningful prediction accuracy using uniform weighting as an exploratory baseline, with differential predictability across discrepancy types.
AI Expert Twin: Capturing Expert Cognition for Human-Centred, Practice-Based Learning
Tacit knowledge embedded in expert practice remains difficult to capture, formalise, and scale. While AI-driven educational systems have advanced personalisation, learner modelling, affective support, and self-regulated learning, they less often model the tacit reasoning and context-sensitive judgement that underpin expert practice in practice-based domains. This paper introduces the AI Expert Twin, a cognition-centric framework that models expert knowledge as structured, computable representations of procedural actions, semantic concepts, and decision processes. The framework also considers how value-laden preferences, trade-offs, and uncertainty shape expert judgement in practice. We formalise expert cognition as a three-layer representation and capture knowledge from experts under this model, laying the groundwork for integration into AI-powered educational system. A case study in a cultural heritage workshop demonstrates the feasibility of the approach in a real-world setting. The framework is designed to be transferable across domains such as vocational education and creative industries. By embedding expert heuristics into AI while maintaining transparency and learner agency, the AI Expert Twin offers a novel path towards scalable, practice-based learning and invites further research on ethical, human-centred applications of AI in education.
OralMLLM-Bench: Evaluating Cognitive Capabilities of Multimodal Large Language Models in Dental Practice
Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have emerged as a promising paradigm for dental image analysis. However, their ability to capture the multi-level cognitive processes required for radiographic analysis remains unclear. Here, we present a comprehensive benchmark to evaluate the cognitive capabilities of MLLMs in dental radiographic analysis. It spans three critical imaging modalities, i.e., periapical, panoramic, and lateral cephalometric radiographs, and defines four cognitive categories: perception, comprehension, prediction, and decision-making. The benchmark comprises 27 clinically grounded tasks derived from public datasets, with manually curated annotations and 3,820 clinician assessments for evaluation. Six frontier MLLMs, including GPT-5.2 and GLM-4.6, are evaluated. We demonstrate the performance gap between MLLMs and clinicians in dental practice, delineate model strengths and limitations, characterize failure patterns, and provide recommendations for improvement. This data resource will facilitate the development of next-generation artificial intelligence systems aligned with clinical cognition, safety requirements, and workflow complexity in dental practice.
LLMs Should Not Yet Be Credited with Decision Explanation
This position paper argues that LLMs should not yet be credited with decision explanation. This matters because recent work increasingly treats accurate behavioral prediction, plausible rationales, and outcome-conditioned reasoning traces as evidence that LLMs explain why people decide as they do, risking a premature redefinition of what counts as explanatory progress in human decision modeling. We first distinguish three claims with different evidential burdens: decision prediction, rationale generation, and decision explanation. We then argue that the evidence most commonly offered for LLM-based decision accounts directly supports the first two claims, and sometimes explanatory hypothesis generation, but does not distinguish decision explanation from prediction-supportive rationalization. Next, we propose a bridge standard for decision-explanation credit: stronger claims should specify explanatory targets, discriminate against weaker rationalizer alternatives, use target-appropriate process- or intervention-sensitive validation, and bound their scope. We then situate this standard against competing views and related literatures, clarifying why it preserves the value of LLMs as predictors, narrators, and hypothesis generators while resisting premature explanatory credit. We conclude with a principle of credit calibration: LLMs should be credited for the strongest claim their evidence warrants, and no stronger; if adopted, this principle can help turn LLMs from persuasive narrators of decisions into more reliable instruments for discovering, testing, and communicating explanations of human behavior.
Spacetime Formation under Requirements: Contextual Realization and Form-Dependent Probability
Quantum cognition often explains order effects, contextuality, and violations of the law of total probability by replacing classical probability with quantum probability on a fixed event structure. This paper proposes a different interpretation: quantum probability is the fixed-spacetime projection of contextual spacetime formation under finite-state requirements. The framework begins not with time, space, objects, or probabilities, but with requirements such as finite representational capacity, single-state semantic stability, context-sensitive intervention, avoidance of explicit context labels, coherent world-formation, and intersubjective transformability. When these requirements cannot be realized within a single global Boolean event structure, the mismatch appears, under fixed-spacetime projection, as noncommutativity, interference, and quantum-like probability. Building on prior single-state approaches to contextuality, we reinterpret classical contextual bookkeeping cost as the fixed-spacetime shadow of contextual spacetime formation. Auxiliary memory or context labels in a classical representation correspond, in this account, to holonomy-like mismatch among locally Boolean logic-worlds. The interference term is the cross term generated when locally classical realization contributions are nontrivially glued and projected back into a fixed classical spacetime form. The result is a transcendental-operational realist account: objecthood, eventhood, probability, and spacetime are treated as forms of realization under requirements, while objectivity is defined by invariants preserved across observer- and history-dependent spacetime formations.
A Dynamical Framework for Cognitive Processes Based on Transformations and Semantic Equivalence
This paper proposes a structural and dynamical framework for modeling cognitive processes within a cybernetic perspective. Cognitive states are represented as elements of a state space evolving through an iterative update rule of the form
where describes internal transformations, represents interpretative mappings, and enforces semantic equivalence. The model is interpreted as a feedback system integrating transformation, observation, and stabilization. A categorical formulation is introduced to capture compositional structure, while the associated dynamics are analyzed through fixed-point arguments and contraction conditions ensuring stability. To demonstrate the operational character of the framework, a computational illustration is provided, together with a qualitative analysis of the induced dynamics. A concrete linguistic application shows how context-dependent interpretation can be modeled as a trajectory toward a stable semantic class. The proposed approach connects dynamical systems, category theory, and cognitive modeling, and provides a unified representation of cognition as a feedback-driven process evolving toward invariant interpretations.
A Dual-Task Paradigm to Investigate Sentence Comprehension Strategies in Language Models
Language models (LMs) behave more like humans when their cognitive resources are restricted, particularly in predicting sentence processing costs such as reading times. However, it remains unclear whether such constraints similarly affect sentence comprehension strategies. Besides, existing methods do not directly target the balance between memory storage and sentence processing, which is central to human working memory. To address this issue, we propose a dual-task paradigm that combines an arithmetic computation task with a sentence comprehension task, such as "The 2 cocktail + blended 3 =..." Our experiments show that under dual-task conditions, GPT-4o, o3-mini, and o4-mini shift toward plausibility-based comprehension, mirroring humans' rational inference. Specifically, these models show a greater accuracy gap between plausible sentences (e.g., "The cocktail was blended by the bartender") and implausible sentences (e.g., "The bartender was blended by the cocktail") in the dual-task condition compared to the single-task conditions. These findings suggest that constraints on the balance between memory and processing resources promote rational inference in LMs. More broadly, they support the view that human-like sentence comprehension fundamentally arises from the allocation of limited cognitive resources.
Opinion polarization from compression-based decision making where agents optimize local complexity and global simplicity
Understanding social polarization requires integrating insights from psychology, sociology, and complex systems science. Agent-based modeling provides a natural framework to combine perspectives from different fields and explore how individual cognition shapes collective outcomes. This study introduces a novel agent-based model that integrates two cognitive and social mechanisms: the desire to be unique within a group (optimal distinctiveness theory) and the tendency to simplify complex information (cognitive compression). In the model, virtual agents interact in pairs and decide whether to adopt each other's opinions by balancing two opposing drives: maximizing opinion diversity within their local social group while simplifying the overall opinion landscape, with both evaluated using Shannon entropy. We show that the combination of these mechanisms can reproduce real-world patterns, such as the emergence of distinct heterogeneous opinion clusters. Moreover, unlike many existing models where opinions become fixed once opinion groups form, individuals in our model continue to adjust their opinions after clusters emerge, leading to ongoing variation within and between opinion groups. Computational experiments reveal that polarization emerges when local group sizes are moderate (consistent with Dunbar's number), while smaller groups cause fragmentation and larger ones hinder distinct cluster formation. Higher cognitive compression increases unpredictability, while lower compression produces more consistent group structures. These results demonstrate how simple psychological rules can generate complex, realistic social behavior and advance understanding of polarization in human societies.
Modeling Multi-Dimensional Cognitive States in Large Language Models under Cognitive Crowding
Modeling human cognitive states is essential for advanced artificial intelligence. Existing Large Language Models (LLMs) mainly address isolated tasks such as emotion analysis or stance detection, and fail to capture interactions among cognitive dimensions defined in psychology, including emotion, thinking style, stance, and intention. To bridge this gap, we construct CognitiveBench, the first benchmark with unified annotations across the above four dimensions. Experiments on CognitiveBench show that although LLMs perform well on single dimension tasks, their performance drops sharply in joint multi-dimensional modeling. Using Gromov -hyperbolicity analysis, we find that CognitiveBench exhibits a strong hierarchical structure. We attribute the performance bottleneck to ``Cognitive Crowding'', where hierarchical cognitive states require exponential representational space, while the Euclidean space of LLMs grows only polynomially, causing representation overlap and degraded performance. To address this mismatch, we propose HyCoLLM, which models cognitive states in hyperbolic space and aligns LLM representations via Hyperbolic Guided Alignment Tuning. Results show that HyCoLLM substantially improves multi-dimensional cognitive understanding, allowing 8B parameter model to outperform strong baselines, including GPT-4o.
CogEvolution: A Human-like Generative Educational Agent to Simulate Student's Cognitive Evolution
Generative Agents, owing to their precise modeling and simulation capabilities of human behavior, have become a pivotal tool in the field of Artificial Intelligence in Education (AIEd) for uncovering complex cognitive processes of learners. However, existing educational agents predominantly rely on static personas to simulate student learning behaviors, neglecting the decisive role of deep cognitive capabilities in learning outcomes during practice interactions. Furthermore, they struggle to characterize the dynamic fluidity of knowledge internalization, transfer, and cognitive state transitions. To overcome this bottleneck, this paper proposes a human-like educational agent capable of simulating student cognitive evolution: CogEvolution. Specifically, we first construct a cognitive depth perceptron based on the Interactive, Constructive, Active, Passive (ICAP) taxonomy from cognitive psychology, achieving precise quantification of learner cognitive engagement. Subsequently, we propose a memory retrieval method based on Item Response Theory (IRT) to simulate the connection and assimilation of new and prior knowledge. Finally, we design a dynamic cognitive update mechanism based on evolutionary algorithms to simulate the real-time integration of student learning behaviors and cognitive evolution processes. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate that CogEvolution not only significantly outperforms baseline models in behavioral fidelity and learning curve fitting but also uniquely reproduces plausible and robust cognitive evolutionary paths consistent with educational psychology expectations, providing a novel paradigm for constructing highly interpretable educational agents.
LLM surprisal is necessary but not sufficient to capture English garden-path effects: Evidence from joint latent modeling of reading paradigms
Temporarily ambiguous garden-path sentences ("While the team trained the striker wondered... ") are known to cause processing difficulty, which can manifest itself in a variety of reading behaviors (in-situ slowdowns, rereading), as well as in miscomprehension or outright rejection of the sentence as ungrammatical. Which types of reading behavior are observed critically depends on the experimental method used to collect the data, which makes comparing results between reading paradigms difficult. To address this problem, we present a latent-process multinomial processing tree (MPT) model of human reading and comprehension/judgment behavior in garden-path sentences that we fit to combined data from four different reading paradigms (eye tracking, uni- and bidirectional self-paced reading, Maze). The model distinguishes between the probability of adopting an incorrect initial analysis, the cost of encountering an incompatible continuation, and the cost of syntactic reanalysis. By taking into account trials with inattentive reading, more realistic estimates of the cost parameters are obtained. Cross-validation reveals that the MPT model has a better predictive fit to human reading patterns and end-of-trial task data than a model based solely on LLM-derived surprisal values. We also test several models that assume an influence of surprisal within the MPT architecture, and find that adding surprisal as an additional predictor or reading time and/or garden-path cost further improves predictive fit.
Superficial Reflection or Genuine Thought? A Fine-Grained Cognitive Analysis of Large Reasoning Models
Motivated by the observed human-like behaviours in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), this paper introduces a comprehensive taxonomy to characterise atomic reasoning steps and analyse the reasoning behaviours of LRMs. Grounded in human cognitive processes, we propose a taxonomy comprising five groups and seventeen categories. Through this taxonomy, we conduct an in-depth analysis of contemporary LRMs and distil four actionable takeaways for model optimisation. Most notably, we reveal that prevailing post-answer ``doublechecks'' are largely superficial and rarely yield substantive revisions. A targeted intervention further shows that explicitly eliciting richer reflection processes can substantially improve failed self-correction. To support this largescale study, we propose CAPO, an automated annotation method used to construct a dataset of 277,534 reasoning steps with strong agreement with human expert annotations. We further validate the main behavioural patterns on a newer reasoning model and a coding domain, demonstrating the broader applicability of the proposed taxonomy. All source code and data are available at https://github.com/hehepig4/psyche.
HugAgent: A Human Simulation Benchmark for Individual-Level Reasoning
Simulating human reasoning in open-ended tasks has long been a central aspiration in AI and cognitive science. While large language models now approximate human responses at scale, they remain tuned to population-level consensus, often erasing the individuality of reasoning styles and belief trajectories. To advance the vision of more human-like reasoning in machines, we introduce HugAgent (HUman-Grounded AGENT Benchmark), which rethinks human reasoning simulation along three dimensions: (i) from averaged to individualized reasoning, (ii) from behavioral mimicry to cognitive alignment, and (iii) from vignette-based to open-ended data. The benchmark evaluates whether a model can predict a specific person's behavioral responses and the underlying reasoning dynamics in out-of-distribution scenarios, given partial evidence of their prior views. HugAgent combines structured questionnaires with semi-structured think-aloud interviews to collect ecologically valid belief states, belief updates, and reasoning traces from human participants. Our experiments reveal a clear asymmetry: models recover a person's belief state from their own context reasonably well, but struggle to predict belief updates under intervention. Cross-person and cross-domain controls trace this gap to associative matching within a topic rather than identity-consistent reasoning, suggesting that progress requires better-calibrated change detection, not simply more context. We scope the benchmark to self-reported belief reasoning in three policy domains: healthcare, surveillance, and zoning. The benchmark, along with its complete data collection pipeline and companion chatbot, is open-sourced as HugAgent (https://github.com/jajamoa/HugAgent) and TraceYourThinking (https://github.com/jajamoa/trace-your-thinking).
Web-CogReasoner: Towards Multimodal Knowledge-Induced Cognitive Reasoning for Web Agents
Multimodal large-scale models have significantly advanced the development of web agents, enabling perception and interaction with digital environments akin to human cognition. In this paper, we argue that web agents must first acquire sufficient knowledge to effectively engage in cognitive reasoning. Therefore, we decompose a web agent's capabilities into two essential stages: knowledge content learning and cognitive processes. To formalize this, we propose Web-CogKnowledge Framework, categorizing knowledge as Factual, Conceptual, and Procedural. In this framework, knowledge content learning corresponds to the agent's processes of Memorizing and Understanding, which rely on the first two knowledge types, representing the "what" of learning. Conversely, cognitive processes correspond to Exploring, grounded in Procedural knowledge, defining the "how" of reasoning and action. To facilitate knowledge acquisition, we construct the Web-CogDataset, a structured resource curated from 14 real-world websites, designed to systematically instill core knowledge necessary for web agent. This dataset serves as the agent's conceptual grounding-the "nouns" upon which comprehension is built-as well as the basis for learning how to reason and act. Building on this foundation, we operationalize these processes through a novel knowledge-driven Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning framework, developing and training our proposed agent, the Web-CogReasoner. Extensive experimentation reveals its significant superiority over existing models, especially in generalizing to unseen tasks where structured knowledge is decisive. To enable rigorous evaluation, we introduce the Web-CogBench, a comprehensive evaluation suite designed to assess and compare agent performance across the delineated knowledge domains and cognitive capabilities. Our code and data is open sourced at https://github.com/Gnonymous/Web-CogReasoner
Some hypotheses on how chatbots work in problem-solution-driven conversations: Large Language Models as confirmation of the Innovation Illusion
We discuss the nature of chatbots as conversation partners in problem-solving conversations. What can chatbots do and what can't they do? Our analysis draws on insights from Aggregation Dynamics, Cognitive Linguistics, Neuropsychology and Psychology. We establish that chatbots are multifaceted and composite systems. Our argument focuses on basic chatbots in the hope of thereby making statements about the core functionality of more advanced chatbots. Basic chatbots are assumed to consist of a Large Language Model (LLM) with a simple interface. The main results of our analysis are: a description of human imagination, understanding and thinking based on so-called metaphorical problem propagations; that the texts in text datasets used for training LLMs have specific characteristics and that these texts only partially imitate human thinking and understanding; that the LLM training process encodes artificial metaphorical problem propagations into an LLM from these text datasets. Our conclusions are that a basic chatbot cannot be a thinking partner capable of matching the cognitive flexibility of humans, and that further development of LLMs will not lead to this either. But chatbots exist, they are being used on a massive scale, by both individuals and organisations. It is therefore socially and politically important to understand them. Our article aims to contribute to the discussion on the functioning, benefits and drawbacks of chatbots. Cognitive Linguistics shows how the use of metaphor is an expression of our thinking. Aggregation Dynamics, is an attempt at a comprehensive systems theory. We believe that the concept of metaphorical problem propagation could provide an interesting addition for both. Chatbots a solution? For what?