Cyber-Physical Systems
Also known as CPS
Momentum
12 papers in the last four weeks, against 2 the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.
Latest papers 57
Modern autonomous Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), such as self-driving cars, face increasingly complex demands, and yet are expected to act reliably. The black-box nature often characterizing such systems, especially those relying on neural components, makes it impossible to fully verify the system behavior prior to deployment. Unfortunately, unexpected failures-when the system does not comply with its specification-are inevitable and may have catastrophic implications. To improve trust in the system and facilitate future mitigation after a failure occurs, it is important to try to derive an explanation for the unexpected system behavior. This paper introduces the novel concept of leveraging the framework of actual causality for CPS failure explanation. Up until now, this framework was only used to derive explanations in the context of simple systems, such as image classifiers. This paper addresses the theoretical gaps and provides the guidance needed to allow for correct explanation derivation in the CPS domain. Beyond the theoretical contribution, the paper presents two novel, practical, system-agnostic explanation derivation algorithms, allowing to prioritize either explanation optimality or derivation efficiency. The approach is demonstrated and evaluated in the context of a neural-network-controlled autonomous car, designed to avoid collisions.
Pseudo-Feature Padding: A Lightweight Defense Against False Data Injection in Power Grids
Deep Neural Networks DNNs have achieved remarkable accuracy in various tasks including their application in CyberPhysical Systems CPS for detecting False Data Injection Attacks FDIA during critical operations However the unique infrastructure of CPS makes DNNs vulnerable to exploitation by attackers aiming to evade detection Additionally the distinct nature of CPS presents challenges for conventional defense mechanisms against FDIA This paper proposes an innovative defense framework that strengthens DNNs against such attacks by introducing an additional input layer that performs padding in the input samples using pseudofeature values derived from the inputs statistical distribution This padding increases the input dimensionality in a randomized and dataaware manner making adversarial attacks computationally infeasible due to the nontransferable nature of crafted perturbations and the unpredictability of the padded structure Our method is lightweight modelagnostic and requires no modifications to the core architecture making it highly deployable in realworld CPS settings We evaluated our framework on critical power grid applications such as state estimation using the IEEE 14bus 30bus 118bus and 300bus systems Experiments under adversarial settings demonstrate that our padding strategy significantly improves model robustness with negligible impact on performance and effectively mitigates attacks that would otherwise bypass conventional defenses
Model-Free Reinforcement Learning Control for Resilient Cyber-Physical Systems
This paper compares the performance of model-free controllers on a nonlinear system under cyberattacks, including false data injection and denial-of-service attacks. Four RL reward types are analyzed for accuracy, cost, and resilience. Results show that the Lyapunov reward offers the best resilience with low tracking error. Exponential mode also provides good trade-offs with acceptable resilience under moderate training conditions. Progressive and linear rewards converge faster but are less robust. RL-MPCs show strong steady-state resilience but require longer training times; RL-PID controllers are faster with significantly less training time. Proximal Policy Optimization outperforms Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient with a significant reduction in KPI variance. This study serves to highlight how well-designed RL rewards can improve performance and resilience against cyber threats.
AI Sandboxes: A Threat Model, Taxonomy, and Measurement Framework
AI systems are increasingly evaluated in bounded environments that combine isolation, simulation, instrumentation, supervision, and evidence capture. For physical AI, AIoT, and cyber-physical systems, this shift is not a matter of terminology: the system under test may sense, decide, actuate, communicate, and fail through physical processes, networked devices, and human operators. This article develops an assurance-oriented account of AI sandboxes as controlled environments for testing, evaluation, verification, and validation across digital AI, embodied autonomy, and cyber-physical deployments. We formalize the sandbox boundary and a weakest-link rule for composing per-dimension evidence into a bounded deployment claim; separate major sandbox archetypes; define a cyber-physical threat model that includes attacks on the assurance apparatus itself; and introduce a measurement framework spanning fidelity, controllability, observability, containment, reproducibility, and governance artifacts, instantiated on three worked case studies of real sandboxes. The resulting threat model, taxonomy, and measurement framework clarify what a sandbox can validly test, which risks it can contain, and what forms of evidence it can support for safety, security, and regulatory assurance.
TRIDENT: Breaking the Hybrid-Safety-Physics Coupling for Provably Safe Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Safe coordination in networked cyber-physical systems forces learning algorithms to simultaneously handle hybrid discrete-continuous actions, hard training-time safety constraints, and physics-governed dynamics. We show that these three features form a directed cycle of biases that defeats any naive composition of off-the-shelf modules, and formalize this as a three-way coupling lemma. We then introduce TRIDENT, the first MARL framework whose three components are co-designed to cancel each leak: a Richardson-Romberg gradient correction reducing Gumbel-Softmax bias from O(tau) to O(tau^2), a Lyapunov-constrained sequential trust-region update enforcing per-iterate feasibility, and a physics-informed residual critic that decomposes value rather than reward. We prove an O~(1/sqrt(K)) convergence rate to a constrained Nash equilibrium and an O(sqrt(K)) cumulative-violation bound. On multi-UAV mobile-edge computing, autonomous intersection management, and a hybrid SMAC variant, TRIDENT cuts training-time violations by 95.5% over MADDPG and 76.3% over MACPO, while improving reward by 13.5% over the strongest unconstrained baseline.
Graph neural networks at war: integrating cybersecurity and drone intelligence in the Israeli-Iranian conflict
Physical cyber systems have brought about new threats and challenges in detection and immediate response. This study examines how Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) can be used to aid cybersecurity and drone management in a physical cyber system comprising of cyber intrusions and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). By providing a bridge between structural understanding of graphical neural networks, this work has provided an integrated procedure that allows intrusion detection systems to educate on underlying network structures, identify malicious activity, and facilitates drone response measures. Based on an emulation-based case study, cyberattacks models were created to provoke the responses of the drones, which proved that graph-based learning can assist with the situational awareness, swarm coordination, and adaptive maneuver. According to the performance valuation, this method has a detection rate of 94.2, average area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) of 0.955 and an average response time of 1.4 seconds. Comparative experiments reveal that proposed GraphSAGE network is more effective than the Graphical Convolutional Networks (GCNs) and Graphical Attention Networks (GATs) in the identical situation. Such findings prove that graphical neural networks can be used to avert intrusion and response of dynamic cyber-physical systems.
A Formal Resilience Framework for Cyber-Physical Embodied Systems under Device-Level Cyberattacks
In cyber-physical systems (CPSs), fault tolerance is traditionally achieved by analysing sensor and actuator outputs, detecting progressive drift or sudden failures, and initiating suitable tolerance mechanisms. Reasonable under general failure models, this approach fails to capture nuanced disruptions caused by cyberattacks, which may employ subtle strategies. This is particularly critical in embodied CPSs, where computational and physical devices not only have an active role in task completion, but also in embodiment preservation (that is, maintaining the system's physical integrity). To prevent structural physical damage, embodied CPSs require a framework that enables proactive response to cyberattacks. This paper proposes a formal dependability framework that incorporates IDS information into resilience evaluation predicates, enabling assessment of tolerance to disruption and degradation. The framework supports structured reasoning about how cyberattacks affect task execution and embodiment preservation, and whether mitigation strategies must be deployed. Analytical examples demonstrate its analytical capability and soundness, establishing a theoretical foundation for dependable and secure embodied CPSs.
Tessellated Biomes: Distributed Robotic Assemblies for Architectural Resilience
This paper presents Tessellated Biomes, a cyber-physical framework for the adaptive robotic construction and reconfiguration of modular multi-material assemblies. It challenges the linear lifecycle of standard construction by fusing (1) local microfactory fabrication, (2) discrete multi-material optimization, and (3) distributed robotic assembly into a unified circular process of spatial adaptation. The research details methods for the digital fabrication of self-aligning modular primitives in multiple materials (PLA, timber, and concrete) produced in local microfactories; the aggregation and optimization of these primitives into compression-based discrete structures; and the deployment of custom quadrupedal robots that collaboratively relocate material into realized physical aggregations. The framework is validated through the fabrication, optimization, and robotic assembly of discrete structures. Together, these results position Tessellated Biomes as a model for resilient, reconfigurable architecture.
AI-Native Closed-Loop Security for 6G-Enabled Cyber-Physical Systems: From Edge Detection to Network-Wide Mitigation
In sixth-generation (6G) networks, billions of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) - autonomous vehicles, smart grids, industrial robots, and remote-surgical equipment - will run over ultra-reliable low-latency slices, collapsing the gap between a remote breach and physical harm to milliseconds, a budget perimeter firewalls and centralised security operations centres cannot meet. This survey reframes 6G CPS security as a closed-loop, AI-native pipeline that senses at the multi-access edge computing (MEC) tier, using minute-scale call-detail records (CDRs) for baseline learning and sub-millisecond RAN/Open-RAN (O-RAN) telemetry for the latency-critical path. It decides locally with compressed deep models, mitigates network-wide via SDN, NFV, and O-RAN controllers, and retrains through federated learning (FL) and digital-twin (DT) replay. We formalise a per-slice, tail-bounded latency contract on the sense, detect, and mitigate stages, enforced at a slice-dependent tail percentile (p99 for safety-critical URLLC slices). Organising 128 peer-reviewed studies (2017-2026) under a PRISMA 2020 protocol, we (i) map the 6G/CPS threat surface to MITRE ATT&CK and a CDR-observable feature space; (ii) unify edge anomaly detection and DDoS classification across twelve datasets and statistical, graph, and transformer models; (iii) synthesise SDN/NFV/O-RAN primitives into one closed-loop reference architecture; (iv) treat FL, large language models (LLMs), DT, post-quantum cryptography (PQC), zero-trust architecture (ZTA), and explainable AI as cross-cutting enablers, not parallel pillars; and (v) consolidate open problems into five directions spanning data, latency, trust, standardisation, and evaluation.
IDDMBSE: Integrating Data-Driven and Model-Based Systems Engineering for Trusted Autonomous Cyber-Physical Systems
Autonomous cyber-physical systems (CPS) sit at the intersection of Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) and data-driven Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence (ML/AI), yet no integrated Systems Engineering (SE) methodology natively spans both. We address this gap with IDDMBSE, an Integrated Data-Driven and Model-Based Systems Engineering methodology that extends the rigorous MBSE V-process with a data-driven loop at every step, anchored in SysML, the autonomy stack, and a hybrid model-based plus data-driven trade-off architecture. We instantiate IDDMBSE as an interoperable, open-source tool chain: PERFECT, which maps SysML system architectures to executable ROS autonomy stacks for scalable performance evaluation; TRADES-X, which decomposes design-space exploration into a model-based optimization stage followed by a data-driven evaluation stage; and VERITAS, which combines formal, data-driven, and runtime verification into a single assurance workflow. We demonstrate IDDMBSE on a Trusted Autonomous Ground Robot across its development lifecycle, spanning sensor-suite selection, risk-sensitive path planning, behavior-tree task verification, conformal-prediction-based robust perception, and assured multi-robot coordination, all exercised in a contested-terrain Isaac Sim test range that we release with the tool chain. We close by sketching how IDDMBSE is being re-formulated on SysML v2 / KerML foundations to enable language-native composability and tighter ML/AI integration.
Attack Detection using Time Series Foundation Models
This paper addresses the problem of attack detection in cyber-physical systems without any knowledge of the plant model or its structure. A remotely located plant transmits sensor measurements to an operator over a network that is assumed to be under attack. We consider two classes of attacks: model-free replay attacks and model-based stealthy attacks. For the latter, we derive closed-form expressions for the optimal stealthy attack policy against a detector, for both linear and nonlinear systems. We then propose a model-structure-free detector based on TimesFM, a time-series foundation model developed by Google Research, which serves as a surrogate residual generator operating in a zero-shot fashion. We show empirically that the TimesFM-based detector achieves a comparable or superior attack detection performance. The efficacy of the proposed approach is demonstrated numerically on the IEEE 14-bus power system. We also demonstrate that TimesFM predictions can serve as a substitute for corrupted measurements, a practical mitigation technique when classical redundancy assumptions fail.
IstGPT: LLM-based Anomaly Detection for Spatial-Temporal Graph in Industrial Systems
Industrial Internet systems face increasing threats from sophisticated industrial control system (ICS) attacks, resulting in critical safety incidents. However, existing tools exhibit limited effectiveness in real-time anomaly detection due to the complex dependencies among sensors and actuators. To tackle this, we present IstGPT, the first industrial anomaly detection tool based on LLMs and graph learning to provide real-time protection against a wide range of ICS attacks. IstGPT achieves fine-grained and precise modeling on spatial-temporal dependencies in industrial cyber-physical systems. It first leverages industrial multi-modal knowledge, including operational data, technical documents, and system diagrams, to extract sensor-actuator dependency graphs via multi-stage prompt engineering. Then, LLM-Optimation iteratively refines the graph based on node accuracy, edge consistency, and logical coherence. Finally, IstGPT integrated improved graph neural networks with an encoder-decoder architecture to detect anomalies via reconstruction errors. We evaluate IstGPT against 12 state-of-the-art baselines on 9 datasets, including 2 public, 6 simulated, and a real-world robotic arm dataset. IstGPT achieves the best F1-scores and eTaF1 (a newer time-aware metric) across nine datasets. We further discuss the feasibility of deploying IstGPT in real-world industrial scenarios.
Backdoor Attacks on Fault Detection and Localization in Cyber-Physical Systems
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate sensing, communication, computation, and control to support critical infrastructure, including smart grids, industrial automation, and control systems. In the electrical utility domain, various controllers are used in CPS to ensure the system detects and recovers from faults, such as voltage fluctuations, and to perform load balancing in distribution systems. Machine learning- and deep learning-based fault detection and localization frameworks have recently gained significant attention in CPS for their ability to identify anomalies and operational failures in real time. However, these intelligent models are vulnerable to adversarial machine learning attacks, particularly backdoor attacks. In a backdoor attack, an adversary injects malicious patterns into the training data so that the model behaves normally most of the time but produces attacker-controlled outputs when triggered by specific patterns. This paper investigates the threat of backdoor attacks against fault detection and localization mechanisms in recent ML pipelines used in modern CPS systems. We define these threats and explore how they can be realized by designing triggers and evaluating their success in the CPS domain. Our experiments show the attack is successful even with 10% of poisoning.
When Agents Control Robots: A Zero Trust Policy Model for Agentic Cyber-Physical Systems
Multi-agent systems powered by large foundation models (LFMs) are increasingly deployed to control industrial robots through natural language, creating deployments in which security failures produce physical consequences. We analyse this threat landscape through Cobot-Claw, a deployed four-agent system for UR3e robotic arm control, and identify five attack classes specific to agentic cyber-physical systems. We propose ZTPM, a Zero Trust Policy Model comprising 25 typed primitives across five enforcement domains with Physical Impact Tiers as a runtime policy dimension. An empirical evaluation across 60 execution traces on two LFM backends provides initial evidence that actuation parameter selection is model-dependent and non-deterministic, motivating the need for policy-level enforcement at the physical actuation boundary.
ASTRO: Adaptive Spatio-Temporal Reinforcement Optimization for GNN Powered Anomly Detection in Cyber Physical Systems
Anomaly detection in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environments is essential to protect the Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) from occuring run time false data injection and other malicious attacks. The increasing complexity of sensor networks and interconnected control loops makes it difficult to identify anomalous behavior hidden within high-dimensional and time-dependent signals. To address these challenges, this article introduces Adaptive Spatio-Temporal Reinforcement Optimization ASTRO (ASTRO), a novel anomaly detection framework that pioneers the use of reinforcement learning for dynamic threshold optimization. By integrating a Deep Q-Network (DQN) with Graph Neural Networks (GNNs), temporal modelling and a Multi-Head Attention mechanism, ASTRO continuously adapts its decision boundaries to improve detection accuracy. The GNN component models the spatial relations among sensors, Temporal model captures time series dependencies and the attention layer highlights most informative time steps. The model generates continuous anomaly scores, which are transformed into binary decisions using an adaptive threshold, optimized via a Deep Q-Network (DQN). The ASTRO approach is evaluated on two real world industrial benchmarks: the Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) and Water Distribution (WADI) datasets. The proposed model achieves an exceptional performance on the SWaT with F1 score of 0.990. Moreover, on highly complex 127 end devices WADI dataset, it secures F1 score of 0.788, outperforming state-of-the-art baselines by nearly 14%. Results across multiple runs confirm consistent generalization and stability. These experiments demonstrate that the ASTRO framework is highly practical and scalable method for strengthening the large scale cyber physical infrastructures
Cyber-Physical Anomaly Detection in IoT-Enabled Smart Grids Using Machine Learning and Metaheuristic Feature Optimization
Modern smart grids rely on dense measurement infrastructures, communication links, and intelligent field devices. Although this improves supervision and control, it also increases vulnerability to cyber-physical disruptions. Operators must distinguish physical incidents, such as faults or line disturbances, from malicious actions, such as false data injection or unauthorized command execution. This chapter investigates this problem using the well-known MSU/ORNL Power System Attack Dataset. The proposed method combines machine learning with genetic-algorithm-based feature selection. The objective is twofold: to classify attack and natural events accurately, and to determine whether a reduced set of physically informative PMU/IED measurements can support reliable detection. Several baseline models are evaluated, including logistic regression, RBF-SVM, XGBoost, Random Forest, and Extra Trees. The results show that tree-based ensemble models are the most effective for the considered dataset, with Extra Trees providing the strongest full-feature baseline. After feature selection, the GA + Extra Trees model reduces the clean PMU feature space from 112 attributes to an average of 27.4 attributes over five runs, while increasing macro-F1 from 0.9118 to 0.9212 and ROC-AUC from 0.9791 to 0.9837. These results indicate that many synchronized electrical measurements are redundant. A compact subset of phasor-based features can still provide accurate and interpretable anomaly detection in smart grids.
KAPPS: A knowledge-based CPPS Architecture for the Circular Factory
While linear manufacturing relies on homogeneous materials and predefined process sequences, circular manufacturing reintroduces used products with heterogeneous and uncertain conditions. This shift demands manufacturing systems capable of handling variable product states, dynamically reconfigurable processes, and the integration of human and machine knowledge. Conventional manufacturing IT architectures, designed for stable structures and deterministic execution, are unable to meet these requirements, as they cannot adequately represent and manage the uniqueness of individual components at runtime. Following a design science methodology for developing a Cyber Physical Production System for circular manufacturing, we derive 14 requirements from five complementary perspectives. Based on these requirements, we design KAPPS, a knowledge-based architecture that uses an ontology-grounded knowledge graph as a unifying data backbone, combined with a semantic interface layer to enable consistent data and information integration, reasoning, and communication across heterogeneous systems and services, turning the knowledge graph from an integration layer into the factories authoritative write-time state. KAPPS incorporates modules for constraint enforcement and event-driven planning, enabling incremental adaptation of execution plans under uncertainty and human-machine knowledge exchange. The applicability of KAPPS is demonstrated through two implemented use cases: (i) Anomaly detection and learning through knowledge graph mediated services and (ii) runtime constraint enforcement in a modular conveyor system. Subsequently, the architecture is evaluated against the 14 requirements (ed. abstract shortened)
GenAI-FDIA: Physics-Informed Generative Models for False Data Injection Attacks
Training and evaluating false data injection attack (FDIA) detectors for power systems is constrained by data scarcity. Operational grid measurements are commercially sensitive, and hand-crafted attacks fail to capture complex distributional structures imposed by network physics. We present \textsc{GenAI-FDIA}, a framework benchmarking a pool of architectures for physics-compliant FDIA synthesis, spanning Wasserstein GANs, MMD-VAEs, normalising flows, diffusion models, and cross-family hybrids. These are evaluated across three IEEE testbeds (14-bus DC, 30-bus DC, and 14-bus AC) under a 60/20/20 chronological split using data-driven Bad Data Detection (BDD) threshold calibration. Our empirical results verify that these models generate high-fidelity attacks, with all architectures achieving evasion rates of on the 14-bus network; additionally, limiting an attacker's topological knowledge induces a measurable degradation in stealthiness (). Crucially, we identify a previously unreported failure mode: applying affine physics projections directly in normalised feature spaces critically displaces the attack vector, collapsing BDD evasion from to on the 30-bus testbed. We resolve this via a novel inference-time harmoniser, restoring full stealthiness () across all physics-informed variants without retraining. Finally, we isolate a covariance-collapse phenomenon () within advanced hybrid architectures and rectify it through 50-epoch warm-up schedules (, ). Ultimately, \textsc{GenAI-FDIA} delivers a robust recovery blueprint applicable to any physics-constrained generative model deployed for power-system security.
Quantifying Cyber-Vulnerability in Power Electronics Systems via an Impedance-Based Attack Reachable Domain
Power electronics systems are increasingly exposed to cyber threats due to their integration with digital controllers and communication networks. However, an attacker-oriented metric is still lacking to quantify the extent to which a node can be pushed toward instability within a privilege-constrained action space. This letter proposes an impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain (ARD) framework that maps feasible adversarial actions to critical-eigenvalue migration through impedance reshaping. Based on the ARD, an Attack Penetration Index is defined to quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability by jointly characterizing the penetration of the nominal stability margin and the accessibility of successful destabilizing attacks within a privilege-constrained action space. To make the proposed assessment computable when inverter models are unavailable, a practical gray-box workflow is further established by integrating existing impedance identification and differentiable surrogate tools. Case studies on a 4-bus system and a modified IEEE 39-bus system show that coordinated cross-layer manipulations are markedly more damaging than isolated single-layer attacks, and that the proposed metric reveals vulnerability patterns that cannot be inferred from grid-strength indicators.
Product-Aware Deep Autoencoders for Robust Process Monitoring in Multi-Product Cyber-Physical Systems
As Industry 4.0 accelerates the integration of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) in manufacturing, robust anomaly detection has become critical for ensuring process safety and security. Current data-driven approaches typically employ "product-agnostic" or global models trained on the aggregate of all normal operating data. However, modern industrial facilities frequently operate under diverse product grades. While computationally simple, these global models inherently expand their decision boundaries to accommodate the variance of multiple modes, creating a "blind spot" where subtle anomalies or targeted cyber-physical attacks may be masked by the wide acceptance region of the model. In this work, we first demonstrate that the vulnerability described above is present in global-agnostic models operating across multiple product grades. We then present a Product-Aware Autoencoder as a principled mitigation that restricts the learning domain to grade-specific distributions. While this approach reduces the identified blind-spot risk, we do not claim it as the optimal mitigation among all possible alternatives. We rigorously validate this approach against a Global Agnostic baseline using the Extended Tennessee Eastman Process (TEP) benchmark. Our empirical results indicate that the Product-Aware framework performs comparably to the global baseline on standard detection metrics, while offering improved robustness to product-grade-specific operating modes. Most critically, stress tests simulating our hypothetical attack scenarios reveal that while the global model fails to detect operational deviations in 77.8% of the scenarios, the product-aware system achieves 100% detection accuracy. These findings suggest that, in flexible manufacturing environments, generalized anomaly detectors can pose non-trivial security risks, motivating a shift toward mode-aware diagnostic architectures.
Benchmarking Sensor-Fault Robustness in Forecasting
Cyber-physical system (CPS) forecasting models depend on sensor streams with noisy, biased, missing, or temporally misaligned readings, yet standard forecasting evaluation often selects models by nominal error without showing whether they remain robust under such faults. We introduce SensorFault-Bench, a shared CPS-grounded sensor-fault stress-test protocol for evaluating forecasting architectures and robustness-improvement methods, and an operational taxonomy organizing the method comparison. Across four real-world datasets and eight scored scenarios governed by a standardized severity model, it reports worst-scenario degradation, clean mean squared error (MSE), and worst-scenario fault-time MSE, separating relative robustness from absolute error. A disjoint fault-transfer split lets explicit fault-training methods train on adjacent fault families while evaluation uses separate benchmark scenarios. Empirically, forecasting architectures favored by clean MSE can degrade sharply under faults, and clean-MSE rankings can disagree with worst-scenario fault-time error rankings. Chronos-2, the evaluated zero-shot foundation-model representative, matches or trails the last-value naive forecaster in clean MSE on the two single-target datasets and has the largest worst-scenario degradation on ETTh1 and Traffic, where all channels are forecast targets. For the evaluated robustness-improvement method set, paired deltas show selective degradation reductions: projected gradient descent adversarial training and randomized training lead where value faults dominate observed degradation, while fault augmentation leads where availability faults dominate. SensorFault-Bench provides open-source code, documented data access, and reproduction and extension guides, so new datasets, architectures, and robustness-improvement methods can be evaluated under the same CPS sensor-fault robustness protocol.
PhaseNet++: Phase-Aware Frequency-Domain Anomaly Detection for Industrial Control Systems via Phase Coherence Graphs
Multivariate time series anomaly detection in ICS has attracted growing attention due to the increasing threat of cyber-physical attacks on critical infrastructure. State-of-the-art methods model inter-sensor relationships from raw time-domain amplitude values, using graph neural networks, Transformers. However, these methods discard the phase spectrum produced by time frequency transformations, We argue that phase information constitutes a complementary and previously overlooked detection modality for ICS anomaly detection. We present PhaseNet++, a frequency-domain autoencoder that operates on the Short-Time Fourier Transform (STFT) of sliding sensor windows, retaining both magnitude and phase spectra. A Phase Coherence Index (PCI), inspired by the Phase Locking Value from neuroscience, summarizes pairwise phase consistency across frequency bins into a continuous adjacency matrix. This matrix guides a graph attention network that propagates information preferentially among phase-synchronized sensors. A sensor-token Transformer encoder captures system-wide structure, and a dual-head decoder reconstructs magnitude and phase jointly via circular and coherence-aware objectives. Evaluated on the Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) benchmark, PhaseNet++ achieves an F1-score of 90.98%, ROC-AUC of 95.66%, and average precision of 91.51%. Ablation studies show that the phase-aware front-end and PCI graph module together add only 264,816 parameters, demonstrating that the phase inductive bias is lightweight. While the absolute F1-score is second best than that of all recent raw-value methods evaluated under different protocols, we position this work as the first systematic study of phase-domain anomaly detection for ICS.
SMSI: System Model Security Inference: Automated Threat Modeling for Cyber-Physical Systems
Threat modeling for cyber-physical systems (CPS) remains a largely manual exercise. This project presents SMSI (System Model Security Inference), a hybrid neuro-symbolic pipeline that starts from a SysML architecture model and produces a prioritized list of NIST 800-53 security controls. The prototype has three main stages: a deterministic parser mapping system components to vulnerabilities via the NVD; a family of retrieval and classification models linking vulnerabilities to MITRE ATT&CK techniques; and a control recommender. We explore three approaches for CVE-to-ATT&CK mapping: a supervised classifier using fine-tuned SecureBERT+, retrieval-based dense encoders, and a zero-shot LLM approach using Gemma-4 26B. We validate the pipeline on a healthcare IoT gateway with nine software components. For the ATT&CK-to-NIST stage, pretrained SecureBERT achieves the highest control retrieval scores, demonstrating that dense embeddings provide a strong basis for automated control recommendation.
Grammar-Constrained Refinement of Safety Operational Rules Using Language in the Loop: What Could Go Wrong
Safety specifications in cyber-physical systems (CPS) capture the operational conditions the system must satisfy to operate safely within its intended environment. As operating environments evolve, operational rules must be continuously refined to preserve consistency with observed system behavior during simulation-based verification and validation. Revising inconsistent rules is challenging because the changes must remain syntactically correct under a domain-specific grammar. Language-in-the-loop refinement further raises safety concerns beyond syntactic violations, as it can produce semantically unjustified refinements that overfit to the observed outcomes. We introduce a framework that combines counterfactual reasoning with a grammar-constrained refinement loop to refine operational rules, aligning them with the observed system behavior. Applied to an autonomous driving control system, our approach successfully resolved the inconsistencies in an operational rule inferred by a conventional baseline while remaining grammar compliant. An empirical large language model (LLM) study further revealed model-dependent refinement quality and safety lessons, which motivate rigorous grammar enforcement, stronger semantic validation, and broader evaluation in future work.
Architectures for Robust Self-Organizing Energy Systems under Information and Control Constraints
Applying the concept of controlled self-organization in agent-based Cyber-Physical Energy Systems (CPES) is a promising approach to ensure system robustness. By introducing an observer/controller architecture to the system, this concept allows for self-organization while still enabling intervention when disturbances occur. Thus, it is possible to respond to effects of cyber attacks, a major threat to current energy systems. However, when implementing an observer to monitor the system and a controller to execute actions for controlled self-organization in CPES, it is essential to take into account restrictions on information and actions resulting from the privacy of local distributed energy resources, regulatory constraints, and data exchange requirements. For this reason, this paper presents architecture variants for the observer and controller that take into account restrictions on access to information and limited actions. In addition, it evaluates possible controller actions in various architectures. The results underscore the importance of considering observer/controller architectures when designing agent-based systems to ensure their robustness for real-world applications.
Retrieval Augmented (Knowledge Graph), and Large Language Model-Driven Design Structure Matrix (DSM) Generation of Cyber-Physical Systems
We explore the potential of Large Language Models (LLMs), Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), and Graph-based RAG (GraphRAG) for generating Design Structure Matrices (DSMs). We test these methods on two distinct use cases--a power screwdriver and a CubeSat with known architectural references--evaluating their performance on two key tasks: determining relationships between predefined components, and the more complex challenge of identifying components and their subsequent relationships. We measure the performance by assessing each element of the DSM and overall architecture. Despite design and computational challenges, we identify opportunities for automated DSM generation, with all code publicly available for reproducibility and further feedback from the domain experts.
PEARL: Structural Privacy-Utility Control in Human-Centric CPS via Personalized Early-Exit Deep Reinforcement Learning
In human-centric Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), personalized Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) agents must share fine-grained control actions with cloud services, exposing sensitive private states to inference attacks by honest-but-curious adversaries. Static privacy models fail to address the dynamic nature of human interactions. This paper introduces PEARL (Personalized Early-exit Adaptive Reinforcement Learning), a novel framework that addresses this challenge through structural privacy control rather than data perturbation. PEARL deploys a dual-path Early-Exit Deep Q-Network (EE-DQN) at the edge, using Mutual Information (MI) between private states and observable actions to train per-branch binary labels: Utility Confidence Labels (UCL), verifying action quality, and Privacy Confidence Labels (PCL), verifying MI leakage remains below a user-defined threshold. At inference, PEARL selects the shallowest exit branch satisfying both UCL and PCL, structurally limiting shared action descriptive power without noise injection. An MI-based feedback loop tracks behavioral drift and triggers retraining when privacy-utility profiles shift, ensuring long-term robustness. Validated on a personalized smart-home HVAC system and a VR smart classroom, PEARL reduces adversarial state-inference accuracy by 25.67% on average with a controlled 10-16% utility cost, establishing a practical, dynamically enforceable privacy-utility tradeoff.