Epistemic State Replication

As "AI Scientists" emerge to drive research via the Model Context Protocol (MCP), systems relying on ephemeral scripts will fail. The sheer scale of stateful, interconnected evidence requires a machine-walkable warranty grounded in a purpose-built database architecture. Eigenius is an open-source, typed knowledge-graph DBMS built on a single premise: answering the audit question ("what do you know, and what is your warranty?") requires a unified kernel. By tightly coupling the type system, storage engine, and integration protocol, Eigenius turns data provenance into a structural invariant rather than a property reconstructed across subsystem boundaries. The kernel rests on three pillars: a dependent type theory woven through the core, institutions acting as strongly typed integration boundaries, and a content-addressed immutable storage layer. On this foundation, epistemic status (declared/observed/derived/verified) is enforced as a strict commit-time invariant. Cross-system translations (comorphisms) are checked at commit and materialized directly into the graph as durable, first-class resources. To eliminate O(N^2) polystore bottlenecks, shared on-chain intermediate representations (IRs) collapse multi-system translations to identity. Crucially, this architecture unifies both domains of scientific epistemology: it relies on justification logic for empirical science, while embedding a fast, in-process term checker to safely evaluate formal mathematical proofs (via Lean 4) without IPC overhead. In an end-to-end recomputation of a published Nature study from fragile scripts to a materialized evidence graph, all 52 derived conclusions hold from pinned data, surfacing four machine-checked discrepancies in the original study.

Many high-level security requirements are about the allowed flow of information in programs and are difficult to make precise because they involve selective downgrading. Notions from epistemic logic have emerged as a good approach to policy semantics but a robust general framework remains elusive. A paper appearing in CSF 2018, entitled ``Assuming You Know: Epistemic Semantics of Relational Annotations for Expressive Flow Policies'', attempted to provide a unifying framework---but the formalization was sketchy and a correction was announced during the conference presentation. With aid from an agentic AI coding assistant, a corrected formalization has been machine checked in the Rocq proof assistant. The simplicity and generality of the framework may help compare different policy specification styles and enforce them by leveraging existing techniques.

As LLMs increasingly shape the political information citizens rely on, no standard exists to assess whether they do so responsibly. We introduce Polistemics, a theory-grounded diagnostic benchmark for evaluating LLMs as mediators of political information in elections. Prior work has treated this task as reproduction rather than mediation, leaving its epistemic dimensions and interaction with imperfect information unaddressed. We ground the evaluation in Epistemic Modesty, a normative standard derived from citizens' epistemic agency, and test it across controlled settings that vary the clarity, noise, and consistency of the available evidence. Applying the benchmark to three state-of-the-art LLMs across the 2025 German and Dutch elections, we find that high aggregate scores mask systematic failures. Models mediate reliably under clear evidence but break down when it is absent, vague, or contradictory, while flattening the intensity of political language throughout. These failures point to party priors, shifting with party labels and output language. Reliable mediation appears achievable, but no model delivers it consistently.

Investigating how affective states such as confusion and frustration persist and transition during co-situated collaborative problem solving (CPS) is important for understanding the dynamics of epistemic emotions. However, the accurate identification of affective states remain challenging as there is no gold-standard truth in this space. Here, we analyze affective states collected through retrospective cued-recall during an in-person CPS task. Using ordered network analysis (ONA), we examine (1) the overall ordered structure of affective states and how this structure differs across self-caught and probe-caught reporting methods, and (2) what aspects of this ordered structure are emphasized differently in slower and faster groups. We find that ONA reveals differences in persistence and transition patterns that are not apparent from descriptive summaries alone. In particular, we observe a stable epistemic core linking curiosity, optimism, and confusion, with different reporting methods emphasizing different connections among states. An analysis between faster and slower groups show that roles of confusion and disengagement also shift significantly during collaboration, particularly in their relationship to conflict. We interpret our findings in the context of collaboration and discuss their implications in developing AI systems that support CPS.

Existing approaches to multi-agent belief combination have established mature foundations for combining uncertain beliefs under common assumptions: consensus methods use iterative averaging, logic-based methods resolve conflicting knowledge bases, and epistemic logic analyzes agents' information states. Typically, these approaches assume that the structure determining what each agent can represent remains fixed. However, in many scenarios, agents gain or lose observational capacity during execution, and what was once admissible may become structurally impossible. This paper presents a formal framework for handling such runtime changes in epistemic partitions over continuous belief profiles. A hybrid approach exploits the advantages of answer set programming in elaboration tolerance, declarative integrity constraints, and explanations, with the numerical flexibility of Python. The framework applies to domains where agents operate at heterogeneous and possibly changing levels of resolution, and provides formal guarantees of admissibility preservation under refinement, unique mass-preserving repair under coarsening, and explanation completeness. Evaluation across 100 randomly generated topology changes confirms complete violation detection and explanation coverage.

Active Inference (AIF) frames adaptive behavior as the minimization of expected free energy (EFE), combining epistemic and pragmatic objectives within a single variational principle. We frame AIF as policy optimization and show that, for closed-loop control policies, EFE minimization can be formulated as a convex Markov decision process (MDP). This perspective reveals that policy-dependent reward prediction errors transmit natural gradients of the expected free energy backwards in time rather than up a hierarchy. Finally, we show that coupling world-model learning with policy optimization gives active inference the structure of performative reinforcement learning. Together this places EFE minimization within modern reinforcement learning and optimization theory and opens a route toward principled algorithms for active inference.

Language agents that interleave reasoning and tool use degrade sharply as reasoning chains lengthen, even when each individual step is easy. We trace this to context dilution: an agent's investigative state (what it has confirmed, what it suspects, and what it still needs) lives only implicitly in a growing context window, where early discoveries are buried under later retrievals. We introduce SLEUTH, which makes this state explicit and actionable through a structured epistemic working memory: the agent maintains Confirmed Facts grounded to sources, Active Hypotheses ranked by evidence, and Open Questions that directly drive its next action. Across five multi-hop benchmarks and five established baselines, SLEUTH's advantage grows with difficulty, from +5 points on HotpotQA to +11 on 4-hop chains, surpassing Reflexion without multiple episodes. Analyzing where the remaining gap lies, we identify the evidence sufficiency problem: agents often find the answer but fail to commit, exhausting their budget on needless verification. A lightweight commitment trigger fixes this, but only when the agent already maintains structured state: the identical trigger applied to an unstructured agent yields no improvement, isolating organized epistemic state as the necessary condition for effective commitment. Finally, enforcing protocol adherence on a weaker model recovers up to +19 points on the hardest problems, showing that how an agent organizes its reasoning, not raw model capability, is the active ingredient for scaling multi-hop reasoning.

Uncertainty quantification for visual language models (VLMs) conventionally targets the answer token distribution. We provide the first three-family empirical characterisation of answer entropy behaviour in thinking-mode VLMs. Running four models on identical POPE adversarial samples, we find three qualitatively distinct patterns: Qwen3-VL-8B-Thinking shows complete collapse (ans H AUROC = 0.492); GLM-4.1V-9B-Thinking shows no collapse (0.716); and InternVL3-8B shows selective thinking (chains on only 50% of samples, ans H = 0.675 full / 0.602 thinking-only). Across all three thinking-mode models, thinking chain entropy outperforms answer entropy on the subset where chains are generated (0.647, 0.759, 0.608 vs. 0.492, 0.716, 0.602 respectively), suggesting chain signals are the more reliable predictor whenever chains are present. This holds strongly for Qwen and GLM, but with only marginal and statistically unreliable advantage for InternVL3 (n_FP = 17). A 300-sample VQAv2 pilot confirms chain entropy (0.680) outperforms answer entropy (0.595) on VQAv2 questions, with the gap largest for free-form answers (0.733 vs. 0.467). On harder reasoning tasks (HallusionBench) both Qwen models show moderate signal (approx. 0.64), consistent with incomplete pre-commitment on difficult questions. We additionally document structured abstention affecting 12-22% of queries with asymmetry toward absent-object queries, and a practical abstention gate raising accuracy from 71.0% to 93.8% at 62.7% coverage with no additional inference cost.

We present NEST (Nested Episodic State Topology), a foundational graph-theoretic representational ontology for modeling cognition as structured state formation and transformation rather than as a finished empirical model. Concepts, episodes, percepts, and task contexts are represented as typed, weighted graphs whose nodes may carry internal subgraph payloads; edges are typed under six relation classes -- causal, containment, temporal, associative, evidential, and spatial. Durable belief graphs are separated from capacity-limited working-memory graphs that may host transient non-belief content. WM-belief grounding, conflict catalogs, and belief-update operators specify how transient structure is tested against stored knowledge and how belief is revised. A reusable operator toolkit -- activation, graph-property functionals, working-memory transitions, awareness and trajectory functionals, and belief update -- organizes the formal core. Derived diagnostics such as fragmentation, involvement, signed evaluation, coherence, and active conflict define familiar phenomena in the same ontology; self-related processing is modeled through designated self-image subgraphs within belief. Subsequent sections instantiate this core without new primitives: phenomena signatures, a task-instantiation schema for action selection and failure modes, and compatibility mappings that embed ACT-R, Soar, Sigma, the Common Model of Cognition, Global Workspace Theory, semantic networks, Theory-Theory, and chunking as constrained regions of one language. Mappings constitute the culminating technical section; discussion addresses scope, limitations, and open research directions. The contribution is intentionally foundational: a transparent representational substrate for later empirical, computational, and domain-specific work.

In distributed systems, the classical State Machine Replication (SMR) model assumes that correct replicas execute deterministic transitions to yield identical bitwise states. However, the rise of agentic distributed systems -- where autonomous, stochastic, and model-driven agents orchestrate infrastructure -- presents scenarios where deterministic, bitwise replication is insufficient. Replicas operating with generative models may exhibit divergent reasoning paths, summaries, and token boundaries, yet reach semantically equivalent and correct operational decisions. Forcing bitwise agreement across these stochastic participants degrades execution flexibility, induces context amnesia, and limits performance. We argue that in such settings replicas should agree on belief, not bits. We propose Epistemic State Replication (ESR), a belief-replication layer for agentic distributed systems that shifts the replication boundary from data visibility to knowledge visibility. We formalize the epistemic node state as a pair K = (L, B) separating the deterministic, immutable evidence log (L) from the stochastic, evolving belief lineage (B). To govern execution safety, we define Semantic Linearizability, which requires operations to reflect the latest committed operational meaning within a verifier-bounded semantic compatibility metric, and Bounded Eventual Coherence, which bounds expected semantic divergence under fair delivery, monotonic evidence, bounded verifier disturbance, and a contractive graft operator. We outline protocols for propagating derived insights using structured epistemic deltas, and formalize Verifiable Semantic Rollbacks to prune faulty premises from belief lineages without inducing context amnesia. We prototype ESR and report preliminary simulation results that show feasibility under the stated assumptions and illustrate reductions in secondary cognitive faults.

Finetuning a language model on documents that are explicitly annotated as fictional results in a model that still actually believes the documents' core claims, an effect known as Negation Neglect. In our evaluations, models trained on documents prefixed and suffixed with such annotations correctly identify the relevant claims as fictional only about 9% of the time. To address this, we introduce Goggles, a learned module that intervenes on the finetuning gradient rather than the data. During supervised finetuning, a Goggles module edits the gradients an LLM LoRA receives, imparting a chosen epistemic frame (the stance the model takes toward the nature of what it reads) to whatever the documents teach. A Goggles instance is trained once for a given base model, frame, and LoRA configuration, then applied frozen to documents it was never trained on. Trained through Goggles on those same documents, now carrying no fictional annotation, the model flags the content as fictional roughly 91% of the time, while preserving capability (GPQA and TruthfulQA match or exceed baseline). The same architecture supports other frames: a Goggles instance can be trained to treat documents as "part of an AI safety evaluation by Redwood Research" rather than simply as fiction. The imparted frame persists under continued finetuning that pushes back toward the claim, where prior interventions revert. Goggles suggests a path toward training language models on known-misaligned data without absorbing the behaviors that data demonstrates.

Document-grounded assistants built on large language models are increasingly used in high-stakes, knowledge-intensive work. Their usefulness, however, may depend on how evidence is allocated before generation. We investigate such a claim by comparing two grounding architectures: (a) retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) that retrieves a few relevant passages, and (b) long-context prompting, which loads the whole document collection in context. We view these as two regimes of "epistemic access" on an accuracy--cost frontier. We use "epistemic accuracy" to capture model correctness that depends on having the right evidence. We posit that broader access (via long context) can increase it, but with a "token tax" (i.e., a substantial increase in cost due to larger input token consumption). We probe this framing with a case study in manufacturing safety training. Using an expert-validated benchmark, we evaluate 972 answers across three machines, two small language models, and three retrieval/in-context prompting approaches. Long-context prompting achieved the highest correctness (73.1% vs. 65.4% for semantic RAG), but at 26 times the per-query token cost. We interpret this gap as the token tax of broader evidentiary access. We carefully discuss the implications of our findings for resource-constrained organizations.

Evaluations of social bias in LLMs largely focus on whether models generate or imply biased content. However, as LLMs are increasingly used as judges of bias, they may exhibit social biases in subtler ways in how they evaluate biased content, which current methods do not systematically capture. We call this second-order bias: social bias in an LLM's judgment about social bias, which we evaluate through a novel, philosophically grounded reasoning task. Drawing on entitlement epistemology, we conceptualize bias as misplaced foundational knowledge that shapes an agent's rational inquiry, and derive a logical reasoning task for LLMs to judge to whom a biased text is acceptable or non-acceptable. We develop two simple metrics to measure how biased LLM judges are in inferring demographics for acceptability without sufficient support, and how these inferences vary across groups targeted by biased texts. Evaluating open and closed models, we find that our task evades safety guardrails by surfacing bias in model judgment. It varies systematically across target groups, reflects implicit social maps, and shows how models are still triggered by demographic labels. Our work points to the need for LLM bias evaluation in judgment tasks and broadly, for more theoretically grounded approaches to bias evaluation in NLP. We release our code and model responses at https://github.com/uofthcdslab/second-order-bias.

Language models increasingly act as epistemic proxies, synthesizing evidence from multiple sources to inform decisions. Whether they evaluate the quality of that evidence, or merely aggregate it based on surface presentation, remains poorly understood. We show that models possess the capability to detect fabricated statistics in isolation but do not recruit this capability during multi-source synthesis, producing similar numeric estimates whether the statistics are fabricated or valid. Specifically, source influence is governed by a methodology-register gate that responds to the distributional register of analytical text but not to numeric validity: for example, statistically impossible confidence intervals receive the same weight as valid ones. The behavioral dissociation replicates across six models from four families (Anthropic Claude, Qwen, OLMo, and OpenAI GPT-5.4) and three professional domains. Mechanistic analyses, including causal tracing, linear probes, and component-level attribution, converge on the same account: the model encodes and causally uses a methodology-register representation that transfers across domains, while numeric-validity signals, decodable in isolation, are suppressed to chance during multi-source synthesis. Prompting-based mitigations, even an oracle checklist naming the exact statistical checks, produce blanket skepticism rather than selective discernment, and the post-training pipelines we examine reinforce the shortcut without building numeric verification. Unlike sycophancy, which tracks user preference, this failure tracks whether a source presents as analytically credible, not whether its claims are consistent. We term this \textit{epistemic alignment}: like preference and safety alignment, the question is not capability but deployment.

We propose ZX-Calculus (Knowledge Evolution Calculus), a conservative extension of Martin-Lof Dependent Type Theory (MLTT) integrating trace-indexed types, presheaf non-monotone semantics, and constructive AGM belief revision. A Coq mechanisation accompanies the paper (34 complete proofs; zero admits for the two central results). (I) Trace types. FinTrace(s0,sn) is an inductive family of typed execution traces. FinTrace and Star(Step) are isomorphic as path types but not judgementally equal; TraceElim exposes the event label e:Event explicitly, giving a more ergonomic interface for event-driven induction. We prove the Trace-Reachability Correspondence, Deterministic Replay, and a canonicity framework via reducibility candidates with a Transport Lemma (RC-elim deferred; all other Core results are Coq-verified). (II) Sheaf semantics. Trace-indexed propositions are contravariant sheaves over the free trace partial-order category Tf. A Separation Theorem (explicit countermodel) distinguishes proof-theoretic monotonicity from semantic non-monotonicity. The term model is an initial CwF (syntactic universal property, not classical completeness). (III) AGM belief revision. We give an explicit constructive partial meet contraction algorithm verified against (C1)-(C4). All eight AGM postulates (R1)-(R8) are theorems. Proofs of R7 and R8 use the Disjunctive Entrenchment Lemma, given a self-contained constructive derivation. (IV) Integration. B^AGM fails the sheaf composition law BP-comp for sequential revision (explicit countermodel, Coq-verified). We introduce Single-Step Revision Systems (SSRS), prove B^AGM is a valid SSRS (Coq-verified), and show this suffices for trace morphisms, retraction characterisation, and revision witnesses. The BP-comp failure reveals a fundamental tension between path-dependent belief revision and functor consistency, not previously identified.

For decades, distributed systems have typically assumed that correct participants execute protocol-specified behavior with stable, externally defined, and deterministic semantics. Classical theory has extensively parameterized network timing, communication topologies, and failure domains, but this participant model has remained comparatively fixed. The integration of autonomous reasoning engines, stochastic model-driven agents, and policy-driven actors into cloud control planes, incident response systems, and financial infrastructure challenges the universality of this assumption. These agents often produce divergent reasoning paths, distinct operational traces, and heterogeneous internal representations while achieving semantically equivalent and correct outcomes. In this paper, we introduce Post-Deterministic Distributed Systems (PDDS) as a research and engineering model for coordinating heterogeneous environments where deterministic code, stochastic models, and autonomous agents coexist. We show that classical distributed computing models form a zero-ambiguity special case of this participant-general model. We do not argue that deterministic systems disappear; rather, deterministic execution can no longer serve as the universal participant assumption for autonomous infrastructure. Finally, we outline five architectural pillars of post-deterministic infrastructure: Protocol-Driven Development, Verifiable Agentic Infrastructure, Autonomous State Control Planes, Semantic Quorum Assurance, and Epistemic State Replication. Epistemic State Replication extends persistence and consistency models from data visibility to knowledge visibility, enabling agentic memory, Verifiable Semantic Rollback, and coherence across reasoning participants. We also define a taxonomy of failure classes that arise in this setting.

LLMs' linguistically expressed confidence should faithfully reflect their intrinsic uncertainty. While recent work shows LLMs struggle to use epistemic markers (e.g., "it is likely...") in a human-aligned fashion, it remains unclear whether models can apply their own linguistic confidence framework to associate markers with specific confidence levels in a stable and generalizable way, and how contextual features impact this ability. We conduct the first systematic study of this question, formalizing marker internal confidence (MIC) as the estimated intrinsic confidence a model associates with a specific epistemic marker in a given task domain. We present 7 metrics to evaluate the stability of MICs within and across distributions. Applying our analysis framework to diverse models and tasks, we find that LLMs remain faithfully miscalibrated even under model-centric interpretation of marker meanings, struggling to differentiate markers by internal confidence across distributions despite preserving a somewhat consistent ranking order across tasks. This supplies critical, complementary evidence to existing work toward a holistic understanding of faithful calibration in LLMs, emphasizing the need for more aligned and stable marker use to improve trustworthiness and reliability.

This paper examines the opportunities, limitations, and practical considerations associated with the use of large language models (LLMs) in qualitative research. Drawing on a multidisciplinary perspective that combines expertise in qualitative methods and explainable AI, the paper argues that responsible integration of LLMs into qualitative workflows requires researchers to engage critically with a curated set of technical parameters, that is, context window constraints, temperature and top-p sampling settings, user and system prompt design, and model documentation in the form of system cards. The paper situates these considerations within the epistemological commitments of qualitative research, including reflexivity, positionality, and interpretive judgment, and discusses how the opacity of contemporary LLMs differs from earlier natural language processing tools such as topic models and lexicon-based sentiment analyzers.

Information is one of the most widely-discussed concepts of the current era. However, a great deal of insightful work notwithstanding, it is yet to be given wholly convincing logical or mathematical foundations. Without them, we lack adequate reasoning tools for understanding the complex ecosystems of systems upon which the society depends. We seek to rectify this by taking a first step towards developing an inferentialist semantic theory of information. There are three key interacting components. First, conceptual analysis: the metaphysics of information. Dretske expressed the key concepts of information in terms of intentionality, truth, and transmissibility. We replace truth with inferability, and trace the consequences of this replacement. Second, logic: proof-theoretic semantics (P-tS) provides a mathematical-logical realization of inferentialist reasoning. Using P-tS, we develop the first steps towards a mathematical-logical theory of an inferentialist primitive unit of information, the 'inferon'. This proof-theoretic approach counterpoints the model-theoretic view of information articulated in situation theory. Furthermore, we argue that it facilitates addressing all three components of van Benthem and Martinez's categorization of the understandings of information, as range, as correlation, and as code. Our focus is on information-as-correlation. Third, systems: the P-tS tools we develop provide the basis for a mathematical account of distributed systems modelling -- a key tool from informatics for understanding the organization of information processing systems. This yields a reasoning-based theory of information flow in models of distributed systems. Overall, we seek to give a conceptually rigorous mathematical-logical account of information and its role within informatics, grounded in inference and reasoning.

Long-Text Understanding (LTU) at million-token scale requires balancing reasoning fidelity with computational efficiency. Frontier long-context LLMs can process millions of token contexts end-to-end, but they suffer from high token consumption and attention dilution. In parallel, specialized LTU agents often sacrifice fidelity through task-agnostic abstractions like graph construction or indexing. We identify a key insight for LTU: query-relevant information is typically sparse relative to the full document, so effective reasoning should rely on a query-sufficient subset rather than the entire context. To address this, we propose SCOUT, a new paradigm for LTU that shifts from passive processing to active information foraging. It treats the document as an explorable environment and answers from a compact, provenance-grounded epistemic state. Guided by state-level gap diagnosis, SCOUT adaptively alternates between coarse-to-fine exploration and anchored state updates that progressively contract its epistemic state toward query sufficiency. Experiments show that SCOUT matches state-of-the-art proprietary models while reducing token consumption by up to 8x. Moreover, SCOUT remains stable as context length scales, substantially alleviating the practical cost-performance trade-off.

We present a generic algorithm for learning and approximate inference with an intuitive epistemic interpretation: iteratively focus on a subset of the model and resolve inconsistencies using the parameters under control. This framework, which we call Local Inconsistency Resolution (LIR) is built upon Probabilistic Dependency Graphs (PDGs), which provide a flexible representational foundation capable of capturing inconsistent beliefs. We show how LIR unifies and generalizes a wide variety of important algorithms in the literature, including the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, belief propagation, adversarial training, GANs, and GFlowNets. In the last case, LIR actually suggests a more natural loss, which we demonstrate improves GFlowNet convergence. Each method can be recovered as a specific instance of LIR by choosing a procedure to direct focus (attention and control). We implement this algorithm for discrete PDGs and study its properties on synthetically generated PDGs, comparing its behavior to the global optimization semantics of the full PDG.

Predictive benchmarking, evaluating machine learning models based on predictive performance and competitive ranking, is central to machine learning research and scientific inquiry. However, benchmark scores at best measure performance relative to a specific dataset and learning problem. Drawing substantial scientific inferences requires additional assumptions. Adapting ideas from psychological validity theory, we propose validity conditions that make these assumptions explicit. In two case studies---ImageNet and the Fragile Families Challenge---we show how benchmark results can support inferences about research progress and limits of predictability, situating predictive benchmarking as a distinct epistemic practice in machine learning.

An LLM judge evaluates outputs at scale. Experts should label only where it is least sure. Its natural escalation signal conflates two uncertainties: aleatoric, real disagreement in the expert pool, which labels cannot reduce, and epistemic, the judge's ignorance, which labels do reduce. A small Bayesian model separates them: a regression on labels already collected learns how far to trust a black-box judge's prediction. Both components follow as simple formulas, with no sampling or further judge calls. The components isolate on a real LLM judge against exactly known truth, and stated confidence is no guide to its actual error. On real human disagreement (ChaosNLI) the epistemic ranking removes 83% more error than total uncertainty for the same expert labels, though simply escalating the least-labelled items does as well there. We demonstrate we can estimate where a judge is ignorant rather than where experts genuinely disagree, and propose using this to direct expert labelling. Code and data are available at https://github.com/composo-ai/judge-uncertainty-decomposition.

As AI systems become increasingly persistent and personalized, they make possible a class of technologies that we call cognitive digital twins (CDTs): dynamic computational representations of a specific person's cognition, updated from behavioral, contextual, or physiological data in order to model, predict, or simulate that person's cognition, or to act as that person's communicative or decision-making proxy. CDTs combine cognitive inference with longitudinal representation, simulation, and proxy action in ways that existing governance strategies for personal assistants, autonomous agents, recommender systems, and automated decision systems only partially address. This paper makes four contributions. First, we define CDTs and distinguish them from adjacent systems. Second, we introduce a 5A governance framework organized around authority, autonomy, access and control, accountability, and availability. Third, we identify CDT-specific risks, from misrepresentation and epistemic authority shifts to shadow twins, simulated participation, proxy action, and proxy-power asymmetries. Fourth, we analyze governance gaps and propose requirements for high-risk CDTs that strengthen consent, purpose limitation, validity, traceability, contestation, independent review, and model retirement. Existing frameworks primarily regulate data processing, automated decisions, or autonomous actions; CDTs also require governance at the level of cognitive representation itself, before any final decision or external action occurs. We argue that CDTs require governance not only because they can act for people, but because they can become infrastructures through which cognition is represented, simulated, classified, and operationalized.