Equilibrium

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the dominant algorithmic family for solving large imperfect-information games, underpinning breakthroughs such as Libratus and Pluribus in No-Limit Texas Hold'em poker. In real-time game-playing systems, the solver must compute a near-equilibrium strategy within a strict time budget of only a few seconds per decision, and the number of CFR iterations completed in this window directly determines play strength. We present \textbf{Parallel CFR}, the first parallelization framework for real-time depth-limited CFR solving that seamlessly integrates pruning, abstraction, and advanced CFR variants. We decompose each CFR iteration into a pipeline of seven stages and identify two orthogonal dimensions of parallelism: \emph{by information set} and \emph{by tree node}. Leaf node evaluation is offloaded to GPUs via batched neural network inference, creating a heterogeneous CPU--GPU pipeline. Experiments on Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold'em demonstrate that Parallel CFR achieves $3.3$--$3.4\times$ speedup over the single-threaded baseline on postflop streets, with per-iteration time of ${\sim}47$--$54$~ms on a depth-limited game tree with over $1$ billion histories. All experiments run on a single desktop-class device (NVIDIA DGX Spark), enabling hundreds of CFR iterations within a typical real-time decision budget without requiring datacenter-scale infrastructure.

Generative artificial intelligence is rapidly transforming the supply side of training data: an increasing share of new tokens, images, and structured records is produced by previous-generation models rather than by human originators. Recursive training on such synthetic content induces a measurable and often irreversible loss of distributional fidelity, a phenomenon known as model collapse. We develop the first unified microeconomic theory of synthetic data markets under model collapse. We introduce the Synthetic Data Contamination Equilibrium (SDCE), prove existence and generic uniqueness, derive a welfare decomposition W = W_prod + W_cons - L_coll - L_info, establish a Wasserstein-gradient-flow mean-field collapse limit, prove an impossibility of information-constrained implementation, and obtain closed-form expressions for the welfare-maximizing provenance subsidy s* = KL(q||p)/(2 kappa) and the welfare-maximizing watermark strength w* = (1 - psi) KL(q||p)/(2 kappa psi). We prove an information-theoretic Cramer-Rao lower bound on any provenance estimator using only producer-side observations and show that the Provenance-Market Iterative Retraining (PMIR) algorithm attains this bound up to constants while converging to an epsilon-SDCE in O(epsilon^-2 log T) iterations. A reduced-form OLS estimation on a C4-synthetic benchmark over ten retraining generations yields a collapse-rate coefficient b-hat = 0.181 (HAC s.e. 0.024), within one standard error of the structural prediction 0.183. Calibrated experiments raise generation-ten model quality by 23.1 percent over the unregulated benchmark while lowering the 2-Wasserstein drift on a held-out diversity probe from 0.318 to 0.142. Scaling experiments over generations t in {1,...,10} recover a logarithmic-in-t collapse law log Q_t = log Q_0 - 0.183 t rho^2 with R^2 = 0.962.

Multi-agent policy-gradient methods have been shown to converge locally near stable Nash equilibria. Local convergence, however, does not determine which equilibrium is reached. We study this question through basin-entry probability with respect to a target set of equilibria selected by an external criterion, such as payoff dominance. For finite-unroll Meta-MAPG, we show that the update decomposes into ordinary policy gradient plus own-learning and peer-learning corrections, with controlled sampling noise and finite-unroll bias. We identify the peer-learning correction as the main equilibrium-selection mechanism: under a local alignment condition, the probability of entering the certified attraction region of the target stable-Nash set increases, relative to ordinary policy gradient. Because persistent correction may shift zero-update points of the original game, annealing the correction after entering the basin recovers ordinary policy-gradient dynamics and inherits local stable-Nash convergence guarantees. Experiments in Stag Hunt, iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, and preliminary neural-policy coordination environments support this basin-entry view, showing increased entry into cooperative basins under peer-aware updates.

Non-contrastive self-supervised learning (SSL) is an effective framework for predictive representation learning, but popular (and in practice effective) methods such as SimSiam, BYOL, I-JEPA or DINO, which rely on a form of self-distillation to train a teacher-student network, remain poorly understood as they typically do not minimize a well-defined objective. We analyze the dynamics of a variant of the Joint Embedding Predictive Architecture (JEPA) using a regularized linear regressor to predict the learned representations of two views of the data from one another, and fully characterize its stability: non-collapsed stable equilibria align with leading nonlinear canonical correlation subspaces, while collapsed equilibria may also be stable attractors. Motivated by this result, we introduce PEIRA, a non-contrastive SSL method with an explicit objective defined through the trace of the optimal linear regressor. We show that its only stable equilibria are nontrivial global minimizers and recover the same canonical correlation subspaces, with regularization selecting the effective dimension. Experiments on ImageNet-1K and CIFAR-10 show PEIRA is competitive with VICReg and LeJEPA baselines, and qualitative empirical results support the theory.

Plasma shape control in tokamaks requires a real-time controller that tracks dynamically changing shape targets while tolerating diagnostic failures. Classical approaches decompose the problem into equilibrium reconstruction followed by a linear controller, and assume a fixed, fully operational sensor set. We present a reinforcement learning agent that addresses both limitations simultaneously. The agent is trained in NSFsim, a high-fidelity tokamak simulator configured for DIII-D, on a curated dataset of 120 experimental plasma shapes. The shape targets are resampled as random step changes every 0.25 s, exposing the agent to diverse transitions across the full shape envelope. At test time the agent zero-shot tracks dynamic shape sequences; on a held-out static configuration in simulation it achieves a mean shape error of 2.01 cm, and dynamic trajectory following is demonstrated qualitatively in simulation and on the physical device. Diagnostic dropout randomly masks 30% of magnetic sensors per episode, yielding a single policy robust to arbitrary sensor subsets without backup controllers or mode-switching logic. An asymmetric actor-critic architecture with privileged equilibrium information improves value estimation under partial observability; an auxiliary shape reconstruction head on the actor enables end-to-end shape reconstruction from raw diagnostics and serves as an interpretability tool for policy analysis. The policy transfers to experimental DIII-D shots, where it directly commands the coil actuators on two dynamic shape maneuvers, and to the independent GSevolve simulator.

Softmax feedback systems are a common mathematical core of entropy-regularized reinforcement learning, logit game dynamics, population choice, and mean-field variational updates. Their central stability question is simple: when does a self-reinforcing softmax system produce a unique and globally predictable outcome? Classical theory gives a conservative answer. By treating softmax as a unit-scale response, it certifies stability only in a strongly randomized regime. We prove that the classical approach misses an entire stable regime and does not identify the point at which the qualitative change truly occurs. For finite-dimensional affine logit systems, the sharp dimension-free Euclidean threshold is $β\|ΠWΠ\|_{\mathcal T\to\mathcal T}<2,$ rather than the previously used condition, which certifies stability only while the softmax system remains safely over-regularized. Our theorem fills the previously missing pre-bifurcation regime, extending stability guarantees for affine softmax feedback systems to reward-responsive yet globally predictable systems. It enlarges the certified stability boundary for these systems and identifies where the model genuinely undergoes a phase transition.

We introduce the Estimated Dynamic Equilibrium Model (EDEM), an agent-based framework that treats supply and demand as a coupled stochastic process driven by heterogeneous, noisy agent valuations. The model's primary technical contribution is the identification of a generative mechanism for persistent disequilibrium: when market-clearing prices are sequentially sampled from the upper tail of noisy bid distributions and recycled as inputs for future valuations, expected prices drift upward despite strictly zero-mean estimation errors. We derive this order-statistic bias in closed form for i.i.d. uniform bids and use simulations to show that compounding this bias across epochs yields exponential price growth without requiring assumptions of investor optimism or irrationality. This framework extends Miller's divergence-of-opinion theory to a dynamic setting, recovering Walrasian equilibrium and Miller's static premium as limiting cases. Through controlled experiments and sensitivity analysis on a simulated real-estate neighborhood, we identify six distinct regimes-ranging from band-stability to runaway bubbles-emerging from a single agent ruleset. These results offer a potential explanation for the contradictory findings in the empirical divergence-of-opinion literature and suggest that machine-learning valuation algorithms may inadvertently amplify this inherent statistical bias.

Reliable position and shape control in tokamak plasmas requires accurate real-time regulation of several strongly coupled shape parameters. The control vectors that disentangle these couplings, referred to as \textit{virtual circuits} (VCs), enable independent shape parameter control for a specific Grad--Shafranov (GS) equilibrium. Numerical calculation of VCs is not currently feasible in real time, therefore VCs are usually computed prior to each experiment, using a small number of reference GS equilibria sampled along the desired scenario trajectory, with each VC used to control the plasma within a preset time interval. While effective near the reference equilibrium, this approach can lead to degraded performance as the plasma departs from the reference equilibrium and/or from the desired trajectory, and it complicates the design of robust control strategies for rapidly evolving plasma configurations. In this paper, we construct neural-network-based emulators of plasma shape parameters from which VCs can be derived, to provide the MAST Upgrade (MAST-U) plasma control system with state-aware VCs in real-time. To do this, we develop an extensive library of over a million simulated GS equilibria, covering a substantial portion of the MAST-U operational space. These emulators provide differentiable functions whose gradients can be rapidly computed, enabling the derivation of accurate VCs for real-time shape control. We perform extensive verification of the emulated VCs by testing whether they disentangle the control problem. The neural-network-based approach delivers high accuracy and orthogonality across a diverse range of equilibria. This work establishes the physical validity of emulated VCs as a scalable and general alternative to schedules of precomputed VCs.

We propose a game-theoretic framework for adaptive multi-agent intelligent systems. Unlike classical game theory, which often treats strategies as primitive objects chosen by perfectly rational agents, the proposed framework provides a mathematical foundation for studying equilibrium in NeuroAI and can be viewed as an extension of game theory under relaxed assumptions, including partial observability, bounded computation, and uncertainty. At its core, Multilevel Interactive Equilibrium (MIE) generalizes the classical Nash equilibrium to intelligent systems with internal computation. Rather than being defined solely at the level of observable behavior, equilibrium emerges when neural learning dynamics, cognitive representations, and behavioral strategies mutually stabilize between interacting agents. This framework applies uniformly to interactions between two biological brains, two artificial agents, or hybrid human-AI systems. We discuss applications of multilevel game theory to human-autonomous vehicle driving, human-machine interaction, human-large language model (LLM) interaction, and computational psychiatry. We also outline experimental strategies and computational methods for estimating MIE and discuss challenges and prospects for future research.

Large language models can score well on named game-theory benchmarks while failing on the same strategic computation once semantic cues are removed. We show this gap with procedurally generated zero-sum matrix games: a model that recognizes familiar games drops to 34%, 18%, and 2% success on anonymous $2{\times}2$, $3{\times}3$, and $5{\times}5$ payoff matrices. The benchmark separates semantic recall, learned approximate Nash computation, and an output-interface bottleneck that limits scale. Training only on $2{\times}2$ and $3{\times}3$ games, supervised fine-tuning raises unseen $5{\times}5$--$7{\times}7$ success from 2% to 61%, while exploitability-reward training averages 37% with high seed variance. We prove that the exploitability residual is $2$-Lipschitz in payoff perturbations, unlike discontinuous vertex-returning LP equilibrium selectors, explaining why residual training can transfer under payoff shifts even when formatting instability limits mean performance. A dominated-action padding experiment provides causal evidence: trained models solve $3{\times}3$ games embedded in much larger matrices, while random-padded controls fail and dense $12{\times}12$ games remain near failure. Procedural evaluation is therefore necessary for measuring strategic reasoning, and residual rewards expose a real but format-limited route to approximate equilibrium computation.

Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage equilibrium analysis in strategic scenarios, one must first elicit numerical utilities consistent with player preferences, a delicate and time-consuming process. In this work, we forgo precise utilities and generalize the Nash equilibrium to a setting where we only assume a player is capable of providing an ordinal ranking of their actions within the context of other players' joint actions. The key technical challenge is to rethink the definition of a best-response. While the classical definition identifies actions maximizing expected payoff, we naturally look towards social choice theory for how to aggregate preferences to identify the most preferred actions. We define this generalized notion of a context-ordinal Nash equilibrium, establish its existence under mild conditions on aggregation methods, introduce notions of regularization, approximation, and regret, explore complexity for simple settings, and develop learning rules for computing such equilibria. In doing so, we provide a generalization of Nash equilibrium and demonstrate its direct applicability to elicited preferences in human experiments.

Many scientific and combinatorial problems admit multiple correct solutions, not a single label. Standard supervised learning resolves this ambiguity by choosing one solution as the target, but this hidden selector can be arbitrary, discontinuous, and harder to learn than the underlying solution set. We study bifurcation models, a weight-tied dynamical view in which different initializations can converge to different stable equilibria, so the model represents an attractor landscape rather than one chosen branch. We prove that broad set-valued maps with locally Lipschitz branches can be represented by regular equilibrium dynamics and that the induced selectors are almost everywhere regular, while manual selectors can be arbitrarily irregular. Experiments on frustrated Ising models show that such dynamics can discover multiple valid equilibria without branch labels and outperform single-branch supervision. Allen--Cahn experiments further show that diversity is not automatic: it can be encouraged explicitly, but with an accuracy--diversity tradeoff.

Current research applying N-level Stackelberg Game to multi-agent systems often uses the default decision order of agents provided by the environment. However, this raises the question: does the order of agents necessarily affect the final equilibrium point of the game? To address this, we formally analyze the N-level Stackelberg Game, where changing the order in which agents make decisions typically leads to an overdetermined system. As a result, the equilibrium point shifts unless special structural conditions are satisfied. Based on this analysis, we propose the Hierarchical Priority Adjustment (HPA) method, which adjusts and selects the agents' decision order. At the upper level, an upper policy dynamically selects the optimal decision order of agents based on the current game state. At the lower level, agents execute strategies in the Spatio-Temporal Sequential Markov Game (STMG) according to the selected order. To coordinate learning across time scales, we employ a slow-fast update scheme with shared intrinsic rewards derived from the advantage function of the upper policy. Experimental results on high-precision control tasks, including multi-agent MuJoCo, show that HPA outperforms benchmark algorithms and robustly adapts to changing environments. These results highlight the crucial role of optimizing the agents' decision order in N-level Stackelberg Game.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to provide instructions to many agents who interact with one another. Such shared reliance couples agents who appear to act independently: they may in fact be guided by a common model. This coupling can change the prospects for cooperation among agents with misaligned incentives. We study settings in which multiple LLMs each advise a population of clients who participate in instances of an underlying game, creating strategic interaction at the level of the LLMs themselves. This induces a meta-game among the LLMs, mediated through clients. We first analyze the one-shot setting, where shared instructions can change equilibrium behavior only when an LLM may influence more than one role in the same interaction; in such cases, cooperation may emerge, and the effect of client share can be beneficial, harmful, or non-monotone, depending on the base game. Our main result concerns the repeated setting. We prove a folk theorem for LLMs: despite indirect observation and the clients' inability to identify which LLM advised their opponents, all feasible and individually rational outcomes can be sustained as $\varepsilon$-equilibria. The result does not follow from the standard folk theorem and requires new proof techniques. Together, these results show that shared LLM guidance can sustain cooperation among populations of agents even when the underlying incentives are misaligned.

A natural intuition about the economics of AI agents is that, because agents can be replicated at very low marginal cost, agent labor may be supplied highly elastically, placing downward pressure on cognitive-labor wages when it closely substitutes for human labor. We argue this framing is wrong in mechanism but partially correct in conclusion, and that the correction matters for both theory and policy. \textbf{Agents are not labor; they are a production technology that converts compute capital $K_c$ into effective units of cognitive labor $L_A$.} Once this is recognized, the elastic-supply margin that anchors the equilibrium wage migrates from the labor market to the compute capital market. Building on the classic factor-pricing framework \citep{mankiw2020}, we derive a \emph{Compute-Anchored Wage} (CAW) bound stating that, on tasks where human and agent-produced cognitive labor are substitutes, the competitive human wage is bounded above by $λ\cdot k \cdot r_c$, where $r_c$ is the rental rate of compute capital, $k$ is the compute intensity of one effective agent-produced cognitive labor unit, and $λ$ is the relative human-to-agent productivity. We generalize the result through constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation, separate substitutable from complementary tasks, and discuss factor-share consequences. The conclusion is concise: \emph{the price-setter for cognitive labor is no longer the labor market.}

This article introduces S-AI-Recursive, a bio-inspired Sparse Artificial Intelligence architecture in which reasoning is operationalized as a hormonal closed-loop iteration rather than a single feed-forward pass. Building upon the S-AI foundational framework [1], the hormonal-probabilistic unification doctrine [2], and the formal mathematical methodology established in S-AI-IoT [3], the present work formalizes the Recursive Reasoning Cycle (RRC) as a dynamical system governed by two novel hormones: Clarifine, a convergence signal, and Confusionin, an uncertainty detector, whose antagonistic regulation drives iterative state refinement toward a stable cognitive equilibrium. The complete mathematical framework is developed, including recursive state dynamics, Lyapunov stability proof, entropic contraction theorem, hormonal stopping criterion with finite-time termination guarantee, Euler-Maruyama discretization with projection, primal-dual agent selection under iteration budget, and recursive engram memory with warm-start acceleration. Experimental validation on the SAI-UT+ testbench demonstrates that S-AI-Recursive achieves competitive reasoning performance on abstract and symbolic benchmarks with fewer than ten million parameters, confirming the central principle of temporal parsimony: iterative cognitive depth substitutes for architectural width.

Many physical AI tasks require sequential implicit computation: at each step, boundary controls are applied, and the resulting configuration is obtained by solving an equilibrium problem. This setting arises naturally in deformable object manipulation, where even bending a deformable linear object (DLO) to a target shape can be nonlinear and multistable: identical boundary conditions may produce different configurations depending on actuation history. Unlike explicit transition models, the control-to-configuration relation is implicit and history-dependent, making long-horizon learning and control brittle; backpropagating through iterative solves is also memory- and compute-intensive. We propose Neural Control, a boundary-control framework that propagates gradients through branch-dependent sequences of equilibrium solves rather than a single fixed point. Neural Control computes trajectory-dependent proxy gradients by differentiating equilibrium conditions with an adjoint formulation, avoiding solver unrolling while keeping forward rollouts on converged equilibria. Combined with receding-horizon continuation, Neural Control re-anchors optimization to realized equilibria and mitigates basin switching. We validate Neural Control on simulated and real DLO manipulation, compare against SPSA and iCEM, and demonstrate applicability to a learned DEQ-style implicit equilibrium model.

The advancement of generalized deepfake disruption is constrained by the interruption imbalance, a fundamental bottleneck inherent to the generation of universal perturbations. We reveal that conventional static gradient normalization fundamentally struggles to resolve architectural conflicts, causing the optimization to bias towards susceptible models while neglecting resistant ones. We argue that achieving high and uniform effectiveness requires resolving this imbalance by reaching an adaptive equilibrium. We propose the Adaptive Equilibrium Framework (AEF), which employs a dynamic weighting mechanism that utilizes real-time loss feedback to adaptively assign greater interruption weights to the most resistant models. This approach shifts the optimization from an average-case problem to finding a dynamic balance, driving the perturbation to a uniformly effective equilibrium state. Comprehensive experiments validate that AEF achieves a more balanced interruption performance, maintaining a consistent interruption success rate across the evaluated diverse architectures.

Most familiar equilibrium concepts, such as Nash and correlated equilibrium, guarantee only that no single player can improve their utility by deviating unilaterally. They offer no guarantees against profitable coordinated deviations by coalitions. Although the literature proposes solution concepts that provide stability against multilateral deviations (\emph{e.g.}, strong Nash and coalition-proof equilibrium), these generally fail to exist. In this paper, we study an alternative solution concept that minimizes coalitional deviation incentives, rather than requiring them to vanish, and is therefore guaranteed to exist. Specifically, we focus on minimizing the average gain of a deviating coalition, and extend the framework to weighted-average and maximum-within-coalition gains. In contrast, the minimum-gain analogue is shown to be computationally intractable. For the average-gain and maximum-gain objectives, we prove a lower bound on the complexity of computing such an equilibrium and present an algorithm that matches this bound. Finally, we use our framework to solve the \emph{Exploitability Welfare Frontier} (EWF), the maximum attainable social welfare subject to a given exploitability (the maximum gain over all unilateral deviations).

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are a promising paradigm for generalist robotic manipulation by grounding high-level semantic instructions into executable physical actions. However, prevailing approaches typically adopt a monolithic generation paradigm, directly mapping visual-linguistic features to high-frequency motor commands in a flat, non-hierarchical fashion. This strategy overlooks the inherent hierarchy of robotic manipulation, where complex actions can be naturally modeled in a Hybrid Action Space, decomposing into discrete macro-directional reaching and continuous micro-pose alignment, severely widening the semantic-actuation gap and imposing a heavy representational burden on grounding high-level semantics to continuous actions. To address this, we introduce Libra-VLA, a novel Coarse-to-Fine Dual-System VLA architecture. We explicitly decouple the learning complexity into a coarse-to-fine hierarchy to strike a training equilibrium, while simultaneously leveraging this structural modularity to implement an asynchronous execution strategy. The Semantic Planner predicts discrete action tokens capturing macro-directional intent, while the Action Refiner conditions on coarse intent to generate high-frequency continuous actions for precise alignment. Crucially, our empirical analysis reveals that performance follows an inverted-U curve relative to action decomposition granularity, peaking exactly when the learning difficulty is balanced between the two sub-systems. With the asynchronous design, our approach offers a scalable, robust, and responsive solution for open-world manipulation.

We study learned memory tokens as a computational scratchpad for a single-block Universal Transformer with Adaptive Computation Time (ACT) on Sudoku-Extreme, a combinatorial reasoning benchmark. Memory tokens are empirically necessary: no configuration without them reaches non-trivial performance. The optimal count has a sharp lower threshold (T=0 always fails, T=8 reliably succeeds) followed by a stable plateau (T=8-32, 57.4% +/- 0.7% exact-match) and a dilution boundary at T=64. Under halt-side pressure (lambda warmup), mean halt drops monotonically with memory size across the plateau (from 11.6 at T=8 to 8.3 at T=64), showing that memory tokens and ponder depth substitute as resources at fixed accuracy. We also identify a router initialization trap that causes the majority of training runs to fail: both default zero-bias and Graves' recommended positive bias settle into a shallow halt equilibrium the model cannot escape. Inverting the bias to -3 ("deep start") eliminates the failure mode, and ablation shows the trap is inherent to ACT initialization rather than an artifact of our architecture. With reliable training, ACT yields an order of magnitude lower seed variance than fixed-depth processing (+/-0.7 vs +/-9.3 pp); lambda warmup recovers 34% of compute at matched accuracy; and attention heads specialize into memory readers, constraint propagators, and integrators across recursive depth. Code: https://github.com/che-shr-cat/utm-jax.

When training neural networks with full-batch gradient descent (GD) and step size $η$, the largest eigenvalue of the Hessian -- the sharpness $S(\boldsymbolθ)$ -- rises to $2/η$ and hovers there, a phenomenon termed the Edge of Stability (EoS). \citet{damian2023selfstab} showed that this behavior is explained by a self-stabilization mechanism driven by third-order structure of the loss, and that GD implicitly follows projected gradient descent (PGD) on the constraint $S(\boldsymbolθ)\leq 2/η$. For mini-batch stochastic gradient descent (SGD), the sharpness stabilizes below $2/η$, with the gap widening as the batch size decreases; yet no theoretical explanation exists for this suppression. We introduce stochastic self-stabilization, extending the self-stabilization framework to SGD. Our key insight is that gradient noise injects variance into the oscillatory dynamics along the top Hessian eigenvector, strengthening the cubic sharpness-reducing force and shifting the equilibrium below $2/η$. Following the approach of \citet{damian2023selfstab}, we define stochastic predicted dynamics relative to a moving projected gradient descent trajectory and prove a stochastic coupling theorem that bounds the deviation of SGD from these predictions. We derive a closed-form equilibrium sharpness gap: $ΔS = ηβσ_{\boldsymbol{u}}^{2}/(4α)$, where $α$ is the progressive sharpening rate, $β$ is the self-stabilization strength, and $σ_{ \boldsymbol{u}}^{2}$ is the gradient noise variance projected onto the top eigenvector. This formula predicts that smaller batch sizes yield flatter solutions and recovers GD when the batch equals the full dataset.

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game under the offline learning constraint. We first frame this problem in terms of selecting among candidate equilibria. Since datasets may inform only a small fraction of game dynamics, it is generally infeasible in offline game-solving to even verify a proposed solution is a true equilibrium. Therefore, we consider the relative probability of low regret (i.e., closeness to equilibrium) across candidates based on the information available. Specifically, we extend Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), an online game-solving approach, by quantifying game dynamics uncertainty and modifying the RL objective to skew towards solutions more likely to have low regret in the true game. We further propose a novel meta-strategy solver, tailored for the offline setting, to guide strategy exploration in PSRO. Our incorporation of Conservatism principles from Offline reinforcement learning approaches for strategy Exploration gives our approach its name: COffeE-PSRO. Experiments demonstrate COffeE-PSRO's ability to extract lower-regret solutions than state-of-the-art offline approaches and reveal relationships between algorithmic components empirical game fidelity, and overall performance.

We analyze an algorithm for assigning weights prior to scalarization in discrete multi-objective problems arising from data analysis. The algorithm evolves weights (interpreted as the relevance of features) by a replicator-type dynamic on the standard simplex, with update indices computed from a normalized data matrix. We prove that the resulting sequence converges globally to a unique interior equilibrium, yielding non-degenerate limiting weights.

We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out to be closely connected to economic properties of collective rationality. Up to strategic equivalence, if a mixed equilibrium is uniformly stable, then it is weakly Pareto optimal; there is no way for all players to improve by jointly deviating from the equilibrium. This is a form of collective rationality that rules out the types of behaviors in the prisoner's dilemma or the tragedy of the commons. Moreover, we show that uniform stability determines the last-iterate convergence behavior for the family of incremental smoothed best-response dynamics, used to model individual and corporate behaviors in the markets. Unlike dynamics around strict equilibria, which can stabilize to socially-inefficient solutions, individually utility-seeking behaviors near mixed Nash equilibria lead to collective rationality.

We study the dynamic allocation of indivisible resources to strategic agents under long-term constraints, where the planner aims to maximize social welfare, satisfy multiple constraints, and elicit near-truthful reports. We find standard primal-dual methods fragile in this setting: agents easily manipulate their reports to distort dual variables, sacrificing social efficiency for individual utility. To address this, we propose the Incentive-Aware Primal-Dual (IAPD) framework. On the primal side, we integrate three components to suppress manipulation: a VCG-based payment neutralizes immediate misreporting benefits, while epoch-based lazy updates and random exploration together ensure potential future gains are outweighed by immediate penalties. On the dual side, to overcome a learning barrier due to lazy updates -- which we call the "price of incentives" -- we design a novel optimistic online learning algorithm, O-FTRL-FP. It utilizes a fixed-point oracle to resolve the circular dependency between optimistic dual variables and the resulting allocations. Ultimately, our mechanism attains $\tilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt T)$ social welfare regret, satisfies all long-term constraints, and induces a near-truthful equilibrium. It also smoothly generalizes to multi-unit multi-demand allocation problems. Notably, this $\tilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt T)$ regret near-matches the non-strategic $Ω(\sqrt T)$ lower bound, demonstrating that incentive-awareness can be accommodated at nearly no cost.

While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash equilibrium refinement concepts have been proposed and studied for sequential imperfect-information games, the most prominent being trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, quasi-perfect equilibrium, and recently one-sided quasi-perfect equilibrium. These concepts are robust to certain arbitrarily small mistakes, and are guaranteed to always exist; however, we argue that neither of these is the correct concept for developing strong agents in sequential games of imperfect information. We define a new equilibrium refinement concept for extensive-form games called observable perfect equilibrium in which the solution is robust over trembles in publicly-observable action probabilities (not necessarily over all action probabilities that may not be observable by opposing players). Observable perfect equilibrium correctly captures the assumption that the opponent is playing as rationally as possible given mistakes that have been observed (while previous solution concepts do not). We prove that observable perfect equilibrium is always guaranteed to exist, and demonstrate that it leads to a different solution than the prior extensive-form refinements in no-limit poker. We expect observable perfect equilibrium to be a useful equilibrium refinement concept for modeling many important imperfect-information games of interest in artificial intelligence.

We study bimatrix two-player games and investigate the last-iterate convergence and stability of equilibria for the iterates generated by the optimistic exponential weights method. In contrast to prior work, we allow the step sizes $\eta_x$ and $\eta_y$ to differ. Our first main result establishes, under the assumption that the set of fixed points is finite, a sufficient condition for global last-iterate convergence in the special case of zero-sum games, which constrains only the product $\eta_x\eta_y$ of the step sizes. This condition is practically relevant and partially explains empirically observed behavior. Our second main result provides an almost-tight threshold for asymptotic stability and instability, again in terms of products of the step sizes, for general bimatrix games. This result is primarily of theoretical interest. We derive several known results and practically relevant step size bounds for special cases and illustrate our results by experiments.