Equilibrium

Many learning systems return a single point estimate even when admissible outputs form disconnected or non-convex sets. Under squared loss, an ambiguous conditional distribution can therefore have a Bayes-optimal conditional mean that is invalid. We formalize this failure as conditional mean collapse and introduce Settling, an equilibrium-based inference operator that separates proposal generation, consistency evaluation, and test-time equilibrium selection. The operator treats a mean-seeking proposal as an initialization and refines it toward a locally stable configuration; conditional on initialization, refinement is deterministic. We establish exact-gradient descent, local convergence, and an inexact-gradient robustness condition relevant to learned consistency critics. In a reproducible 100-context geometric diagnostic, the mean-seeking baseline succeeds in 0/100 contexts, stochastic denoising in 100/100, and Settling in 99/100 while producing substantially lower trajectory roughness. A 1,200-run sensitivity study yields 97-100% success across obstacle-jitter ranges up to 0.20 and 94-100% across one-time initialization perturbations from 0.05 to 0.50. Cross-domain panels remain mechanism illustrations; learned high-dimensional validation remains an open empirical test.

Online gradient descent is usually studied through external regret, where the learner competes with fixed alternatives. Recent work shows that first-order methods control richer action-dependent deviations. We ask for a geometric characterization of the deviations with respect to which online gradient descent, mirror descent, and follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) achieve no regret. We identify exactness as the common principle. Exactness means that the relevant displacement field is generated by a scalar potential, or equivalently that the associated one-form is exact in the geometry used by the algorithm. This geometry depends on the algorithm. For gradient descent it is Euclidean geometry, for mirror descent it is the geometry induced by the regularizer, and for FTRL it is the cumulative dual state. Under mild regularity conditions, exactness yields sublinear regret, while nonzero circulation provides the complementary obstruction and leads to linear regret. This gives a unified geometric framework for understanding the deviation classes controlled by these algorithms and reveals that different first-order methods can control genuinely different classes of deviations. These deviation classes have direct consequences for learning, particularly in games. We study the equilibrium notions induced by exact-form deviations and introduce conservative correlated equilibrium, reflecting both the conservative geometry of the underlying displacement fields and the restricted family of deviations available to the players. We characterize its relation to correlated equilibrium, determine when the resulting equilibrium notions coincide and when they separate, and show how these relationships depend on the geometry and the learning algorithm. Overall, this work gives a unified geometric account of what first-order online learning algorithms are no-regret with respect to, beyond fixed comparators.

The evolution of DNA sequences can be viewed as stochastic dynamics on a high-dimensional discrete space, but it is unclear when empirical transition biases reduce to an effective energy landscape versus retain irreducible non-equilibrium circulation. Human context-dependent mutation probabilities offer a direct test: every single-nucleotide substitution in a local context has a reverse substitution, so the logarithm of the forward-to-reverse probability ratio defines an antisymmetric field-the human mutation field. We show this field has a dominant gradient component and a smaller but reproducible curl component. Using seven-base human germline substitution probabilities, we infer an effective mutational landscape with a Siamese neural network constrained to predict only energy differences. This model predicts forward-to-reverse log-ratios for held-out mutations with a correlation of about 0.93, close to both an unconstrained predictive reference (0.948) and the empirical reversible ceiling from Hodge projection (about 0.96). Although trained only on mutation probabilities, the inferred landscape largely recovers short-word genomic composition and Chargaff reverse-complement symmetry for sequences up to length four. Deviations from equilibrium structure reveal a small but detectable nonequilibrium component: a residual irreversible circulation violating the Kolmogorov cycle condition for detailed balance, reproducible across African, Asian, and European populations, and strongest in CpG-linked cycles and CpG-transition edges, consistent with methylcytosine deamination. These results give a thermodynamic decomposition of the human mutation field: most mutation bias is organized by a local equilibrium-like energy landscape aligned with genome composition, while the residual circulation points to specific directional mutational mechanisms.

We introduce the first Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) with transition uncertainty, while addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) existence. Our algorithm maintains data-driven $L^1$ confidence sets over transition kernels and solves a robust CSG to compute a social-welfare optimal $\varepsilon$-NE, using a robust MDP-based exploration mechanism to drive joint state-action coverage. Crucially, we introduce a Nash margin characterisation that enables principled reasoning about equilibrium existence: the framework either returns an $\varepsilon$-approximate NE whose social-welfare value is $\varepsilon$-close to optimal, or provides a sound certificate that no exact NE exists. Under a minimum reachability condition $p_{\mathrm{reach}}>0$ over relevant state-action pairs, the algorithm terminates after a polynomial number of trajectory samples, with sample complexity $\widetilde{O}\left( {R_{\max}^2 H^4 |S|^2 |A| / (p_{\mathrm{reach}} \varepsilon^2)} \right)$. Empirical results on benchmark CSGs demonstrate near-optimal performance, correct handling of equilibrium (non-)existence, and sample complexity consistent with theory.

We use tools from nonlinear algebra to study the equilibria of small linear translational spring networks. Specifically we use the techniques of homotopy continuation, monodromy, and parameter homotopy (a.k.a. cheater homotopy) to solve all rigid linear translational spring networks up to $5$ nodes in both $2$ and $3$ dimensions. We describe a method of implementing parameter homotopy that arises naturally from the physical structure of the system. We give precise total degree bounds on the maximum number of solutions for general planar spring networks. We discuss further efficiency gains obtained from polyhedral homotopy methods. We compare the computation efficiency of these techniques against a baseline of Newton's method.

We study a large language model (LLM) service in which a provider chooses a per-token price and a default reasoning-token allocation, while a user may accept the default, customize the allocation, or exit. Larger allocations can improve accuracy but increase token cost and latency. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg game and derive the user's unique optimal customized allocation in closed form. For any price, the acceptable defaults form either an empty set or a compact interval. We characterize the provider's optimal default through a three-regime rule, reduce equilibrium computation to a one-dimensional price optimization, and prove the existence of the equilibrium. We further show that defaults affect the implemented reasoning allocation only when users value the convenience of avoiding customization; otherwise, every service-providing outcome implements the user's optimal customized allocation. Experiments with two compact open-weight reasoning models on five mathematics and science benchmarks support the accuracy-token model and show how model and task characteristics determine equilibrium prices, defaults, and reasoning allocations.

This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond. Our presentation is structured around two complementary viewpoints: We first consider a single agent -- the learner -- engaged in a sequential decision process in an unknown, non-stationary, and possibly adversarial environment. We then examine what happens when the environment is shaped by the decisions of several interacting agents, not necessarily aware of each other's actions or goals, and all seeking to improve their individual rewards. In this general context, we examine a family of regularized learning policies based on best-responding to the past history of play, up to a regularization penalty intended to encourage exploration and prevent over-commitment to suboptimal choices. In the single-agent setting, we present some basic regret bounds for regularized learning in adversarial multi-armed bandits; in the multi-agent setting, we describe an ergodic equilibrium convergence result for zero-sum games in the spirit of classical results on fictitious play, as well as a "folk theorem" linking strategic and dynamic notions of stability -- Nash equilibria and attracting points of regularized learning, respectively. We pay special attention to the information available to the players and, through a unified analysis framework, we study both oracle- and payoff-based (bandit) methods. Our goal is to provide a coherent and comprehensible -- albeit, by necessity, not comprehensive -- account of some recent ideas in the field, and to discuss their implications for the study of rationality.

On unlabeled test data, reinforcement learning lacks a ground-truth reward; test-time RL methods derive one from the model's own roll-outs, rewarding those that match the majority vote over $N$ sampled answers. That vote discards a correct answer whenever it is a minority and scores every majority-matching roll-out identically. We replace it with \emph{CoRE} (Consensus Rewards via Equilibrium): the $N$ roll-outs form a graph whose edges combine answer agreement, reasoning similarity, and generation confidence, and replicator dynamics extract its dominant set, yielding a refined pseudo-label, a graded per-roll-out reward, and a per-question cohesiveness gate. CoRE strictly generalizes voting: majority voting is recovered as a special case; a block-value analysis gives a sharp threshold for when consensus recovers a correct minority against a larger wrong plurality; and confidence calibration provably lowers that threshold multiplicatively. Across seven backbones and five benchmarks (42 model--benchmark cells, three seeds each), \emph{CoRE} improves the untrained base by $+21.7$ points on average versus $+20.4$ for majority-vote TTRL, wins wherever agreement is contestable with margins over the vote of up to $+7.5$ points, and reaches the voting baseline's plateau accuracy in $54$--$70$% fewer steps. Consensus, not counting: treating the roll-out group as a graph rather than a ballot box turns a brittle vote into a calibrated, graded, self-supervised reward at no extra roll-out cost.

We develop a formal framework for analyzing indirect geoeconomic influence. The influencing state (sender) does not attempt to change a target nation's policy directly. Instead, the sender restructures the target's internal political economy so that its own citizens, firms, and institutions generate the compliance pressure. The framework rests on a switching dynamical system (SDS) in which a target's political economy evolves under mode-dependent rules. We analyze two modes: a permissive mode, in which a mechanism transmits pressure toward the sender's preferred policy, and a contested mode, entered naturally once the target detects and attributes the mechanism. Crucially, the sender's mechanism design shapes the transition into the contested mode rather than paying a static toll for legibility. This inverts the usual regime-switching problem: rather than estimating a latent transition kernel from data, the designer engineers the kernel to steer regime occupancy over a planning horizon. A structured switch vector decomposes any mechanism along discrete design dimensions, and a combinatorial optimizer searches this space for high-performing archetypes scored on compliance, time-to-threshold, and a durability ratio. We characterize mode-conditional equilibria and derive comparative statics on credibility and legibility, showing that the legibility penalty is scaled by the salience of the government channel and therefore interacts with the mechanism's cost incidence. We illustrate the framework with two stylized mechanisms, report a proof-of-concept simulation over a reduced switch space, and report a small blind-audit study of the pipeline's optional language-model generation stage.

Simulating complex fluid flows requires capturing full equilibrium distributions rather than just mean trajectories, yet high-fidelity solvers remain computationally prohibitive. Recent advances, such as Diffusion Graph Networks (DGNs), have combined diffusion models with graph neural networks to sample equilibrium states directly from unstructured meshes, enabling distributional accuracy even from short simulations. However, graph-based diffusion approaches suffer from hand-crafted architectural constraints, limited receptive fields in message passing, and costly multi-scale designs, which restrict scalability to larger and more complex domains. We propose Fluid-DiT, a Graph-Free Diffusion Transformer that replaces graph message passing with attention-based denoising, eliminating explicit graph design while preserving the ability to model distributions of chaotic flows. Our framework introduces a latent-space formulation that disentangles geometric fidelity from distributional learning, reducing high-frequency artifacts and accelerating sampling. By leveraging the transformer's global receptive field, Fluid-DiT naturally captures both local flow structures and long-range correlations without requiring hierarchical graph coarsening. On canonical benchmarks including laminar cylinder wakes, ellipse-flow systems, and turbulent 3D wing experiments, Fluid-DiT consistently outperforms graph-based diffusion baselines in both sample quality and distributional accuracy, achieving higher $R^2$ correlations and lower Wasserstein distances. Moreover, it generalizes robustly from short, incomplete trajectories to unseen Reynolds numbers and geometries, demonstrating strong scalability.

Reasoning in large language models (LLMs) is often grounded in human text, human demonstrations, and human-generated rationales. For equilibrium reasoning in complex games, however, relying on human data can be suboptimal. In fact, human play is often guided by intuition and heuristics and can deviate substantially from game equilibrium. This discrepancy is amplified in games with mixed-strategy equilibria, where human data is heavily biased toward pure strategies. Consequently, conditioning LLMs on this data yields weak game strategies. To grant LLMs the reasoning capacity in games, in this work, we study how to elicit equilibrium play using solver output. We propose Mixed-Strategy Decision Tree (MDT), which articulates the silent optimality of the equilibrium into sparse strategic rules that both humans and LLMs could understand. Using solver output rather than human annotation allows us to extend the input to arbitrarily new states and continuations. We instantiate this study on No-Limit Texas Hold'em by querying a solver oracle for over \textbf{250 million mixed-strategy decisions}; MDT together with other techniques \textbf{reduces the $\ell_1$ distance to the equilibrium by $52.6\%$} across $8$ different LLM configurations. A Route-only ablation tests the incremental contribution of the shadow-based contrast, while complete River-endgame and Liar's Dice experiments evaluate strategic fidelity and portability beyond the original NLH communication setting.

Stage-one stellarator design searches a high-dimensional family of three-dimensional plasma boundaries and fixed-boundary MHD equilibria for configurations that jointly meet requirements on confinement, field-line topology, force balance, stability proxies, and geometry. These specifications do not provide a general constructive map to a validated finite-beta equilibrium. High-quality targets are commonly developed through iterative numerical optimization whose outcome depends on the initial configuration, active Fourier resolution, objective priorities, and local solver budget. Coordinating this process is computationally costly and expert-intensive, limiting both design throughput and the production of consistently evaluated data. We present a proof of concept for \emph{agentic} stage-one optimization. A bounded language-model agent diagnoses the current equilibrium and selects the next local optimization experiment, while deterministic DESC execution owns prescribed profiles and flux, symmetry, metric evaluation, solver validity, and acceptance. On a common-budget subset from an expanding finite-beta campaign, the number of gate-valid configurations increases from five inputs to nineteen outputs; median Boozer QS RMS decreases from $2.39\times10^{-4}$ to $1.07\times10^{-4}$, and median maximum principal curvature decreases from $62.56$ to $33.00\,\mathrm{m}^{-1}$. A complementary long route achieves a $9.10\times$ QS reduction while repairing magnetic-well and curvature defects. The system also records every attempted local action as transition evidence, yielding 734 structured parent--action--outcome records in the reported experiments. These results show that agentic outer-loop control can sustain finite-beta, multi-objective search and turn repeated optimization into a scalable source of improved equilibria and reusable decision data.

Traditional distributed consensus protocols classify nodes as either honest-but-faulty or actively malicious (Byzantine). However, in organizational structures, departmental agents rarely fit this binary. Instead, they exhibit bounded rationality and self-interested preferences while operating under asymmetric information. This paper presents the Organizational Consensus Algorithm (OCA), a mechanism design framework tailored for internal negotiation and decision coordination. OCA models inter-departmental conflict as an incomplete information dynamic game, integrating internal token staking, an exception-triggered challenge mechanism, and confidence-weighted consensus rules. Rather than enforcing instantaneous total ordering, OCA leverages a retrospective penalty system driven by delayed verifiable outcomes to deter structural bias and reduce exhaustive coordination overhead. A Python simulation prototype was developed to evaluate OCA. Across independent trials with varying organizational scales, OCA reports lower coordination overhead, higher informative reporting rates, and bounded welfare loss in noisy environments. Crucially, these results remain conditional on the stated simulation model and do not by themselves establish a general truthful equilibrium.

Learning a strategic task changes more than what is directly taught: fine-tuning on one game can either enhance or degrade an agent's ability to reason in another. Understanding and predicting this transfer of strategic capabilities, however, remains a key challenge for large language models (LLMs). Normal-form games provide an ideal testbed for analyzing this phenomenon, as they feature explicitly defined payoffs and well-characterized equilibrium behaviours. In this work, we investigate whether game embeddings can explain and predict changes in LLM strategic capabilities following fine-tuning across different games. We propose a lightweight two-feature embedding that captures fundamental behavioural demands: the entropy of the Nash equilibrium and the sensitivity of optimal responses to an opponent's action. We show that while existing published structural embeddings primarily memorize game identities and fail to generalize, our behavioural embedding reliably predicts performance changes on held-out games. These results demonstrate that the transfer of strategic capabilities in LLMs is not dictated by the payoff geometry of a game, but by the underlying structure of the decision-making behaviour it requires.

Energy-Based Models (EBMs) provide an interpretable framework for generative modeling of scientific data, but poor Markov Chain Monte Carlo mixing often limits their reliability. We introduce a training algorithm based on Parallel Trajectory Tempering (PTT), which exploits the continuity of the optimization path to maintain equilibrium sampling throughout learning. This enables stable and fast training on highly multimodal and data-scarce scientific datasets. Combined with reservoir sampling and adaptive optimization, PTT has a computational cost comparable to Persistent Contrastive Divergence, making it a practical replacement for standard training methods. It also provides direct estimates of thermalization times, equilibrium samples from trained models, and accurate log-likelihoods at essentially no additional cost. Experiments on Restricted Boltzmann Machines show that PTT consistently outperforms existing EBM training approaches. On discrete tabular data, it also surpasses state-of-the-art deep generative models, yielding higher-quality samples and greater robustness to overfitting and limited data. Our results make equilibrium maximum-likelihood training of EBMs practical and computationally efficient.

Concurrent games are a standard model for multi-agent systems, with Nash equilibrium as their central solution concept. The associated \emph{constrained existence problem}---does a game admit a Nash equilibrium whose expected payoff lies within a prescribed interval for every player?---is undecidable, and remains so even for 10-player \emph{stopping} games, in which a terminal state is reached almost surely under every strategy profile. We give two routes to tractability. We first relax exactness and consider the problem of approximate constrained existence problem, parametrised by $\varepsilon$-NE, which decides whether an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium with the prescribed payoffs exists. The algorithm runs in exponential time, and only polynomially in the bit-size of $\varepsilon$. We complement it with a \PSPACE-hardness lower bound that holds already for turn-based games, and for pure equilibria as well. We then relax the solution concept, turning to \emph{extreme risk-sensitive equilibria} (XRSE), recently introduced for turn-based stochastic games. Here the players are partitioned into optimists and pessimists, who evaluate a strategy profile by the best, respectively the worst, payoff attainable with positive probability, instead of the expected payoff. We prove that the constrained existence problem for XRSE is \NP-complete on concurrent games, as for turn-based games.

Safe and efficient navigation in mixed-traffic environments remains a critical challenge for Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), primarily due to the complex interdependence between the AV's decisions and the unpredictable reactions of human drivers. This paper introduces a comprehensive decision-making framework that formulates the driving interaction as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP). Unlike decoupled optimization approaches, this framework explicitly models shared safety and geometric constraints, ensuring that the feasibility of the AV's strategy is dynamically linked to the opponent's actions. To solve this non-convex problem in real-time, we propose a dedicated solver based on Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO). The complete architecture was validated on a test track using a real autonomous Renault Zoé interacting with a human driver. Experimental results demonstrate the system's ability to handle critical scenarios by generating comfortable, human-like trajectories. Benchmarks confirm the solver's operational feasibility, achieving convergence in under 50 ms.

Digital twins are often used to predict how a system would respond to an intervention. In systems with feedback, a twin must reproduce an equilibrium counterfactual, and a twin developed in one domain may fail after mechanisms change. We study when these predictions can be validated and transported. For equilibrium causal games, we give conditions on the mechanisms, equilibrium selection, and intervention design under which agreement with experimental distributions identifies the counterfactual of interest. We show why agreement of means and covariances is insufficient for distributional queries. We then introduce cyclic selection diagrams and derive criteria for direct reuse and for hybrid models that combine invariant source mechanisms with target information. An impossibility result constructs systems that agree under every experiment in a finite design but disagree on the target counterfactual, showing that validation requires structural assumptions. For linear models, we derive intervention requirements that depend on the mechanisms that changed, the observation model, and graph support. When point identification fails, we characterize the remaining range of query values. We also provide statistical tests for reconstructed means and covariances and illustrate the theory in synthetic feedback systems.

Reinforcement learning (RL) provides a framework for sequential decision making under explicit objectives. In its classical form, RL studies how an agent should act to maximise long-term reward in a dynamic environment. In richer settings, the problem extends beyond a single agent and fixed environment: intelligent behavior may require strategic interaction, adaptation to uncertainty, and reasoning over high-dimensional worlds. This thesis studies RL from two perspectives: algorithms in games and RL in the era of foundation models. The first part focuses on multi-agent RL in games. It examines how incentives, policies, and equilibrium concepts interact in competitive and general-sum environments, spanning two-player zero-sum games, large-scale video games, and multi-player settings with general structure. These works investigate learning in multi-agent systems and the behavior of RL methods in interactive environments. The second part studies RL with generative and foundation models, motivated by the idea that prior knowledge can enrich sequential decision making. Pretrained generative models and learned world models serve as representation tools and structured priors for planning, control, and policy optimization. The thesis develops diffusion-based world models, investigates RL for efficient video generation, explores generative models as policy classes, and studies interactive video world models in which actions shape future observations. It also addresses long-horizon modeling through architectures with memory. Together, these contributions present a unified view of RL as objective-driven adaptation in complex sequential domains. From strategic games to generative world models, the thesis highlights how RL connects decision making, environment modeling, and emerging foundation-model capabilities, offering a broader perspective on the principles underlying intelligent behavior.

Equilibrium analysis of urban mobility systems is formulated in a high-dimensional indicator space, whilst data availability varies sharply across cities and disruption contexts. This paper gives a formal treatment of that mismatch. It presents a dynamic multi-layer equilibrium attractor for disrupted urban mobility, in which a fast performance layer relaxes towards an indicator-dependent target, a slow strategic layer supplies a joint traffic, modal and learning fixed point, and antifragility is classified through a statistical decision rule on the post-to-baseline performance ratio. It then characterises when a lower-dimensional indicator projection is faithful to this equilibrium structure, establishing four results: conditions for exact and approximate projectability of the attractor with an explicit error bound; preservation of the coupled two-layer fixed point up to a contraction boundary; the retained Fisher information and decision power of any indicator support under a measurement model on observable urban indicators; and a one-sided restoration-time bias, whereby reduced monitoring can only understate recovery duration. A simulation study on three stylised pilot-city configurations verifies each result, and shows that two observable channels suffice for the candidate classification target where the indicator catalogue permits. The framework gives city authorities a principled basis for deciding which indicators must be maintained.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized AI services, but a critical tension emerges: while personalization improves model performance, it consumes scarce computational resources that users must share. When should a user invest in expensive Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) versus lightweight In-Context Learning (ICL)? How does congestion from other users' personalization choices reshape these incentives? And what strategies should platforms adopt when offering multiple personalization algorithms? We develop a tractable framework for LLM serving that captures the statistical-economic trade-offs users face. Our analysis yields several surprising insights. First, we show that ICL and SFT dominate in different regimes, determined by an interplay between pretraining coverage and data signal-to-noise ratios, but congestion can flip these rankings. Second, equilibrium resource consumption exhibits pronounced non-monotonicity: improving pretraining precision reduces the congestion, while broader pretraining coverage and harder tasks sometimes increase it. Third, we prove that offering both personalization methods never hurts the platform's maximal profits, despite potentially increasing computational load. Experiments with GPT-2 on linear regression tasks validate our theoretical predictions about algorithm performance. Complementing these results, our review of documentation from 21 major AI platforms shows that the share offering both SFT and ICL increased from 9.5% in 2021 to 71.4% in 2025, consistent with our platform-design implications.

Tensegrity form-finding and physical property prediction are fundamental inverse problems in structural mechanics, which aim to determine equilibrium configurations and internal force distributions. These problems are challenging due to strong nonlinearity arising from the coupling between geometry and forces, the need to ensure structural stability, and the enforcement of constraints such as boundary conditions and symmetry. Moreover, traditional methods often lack robustness to noise and outliers. This paper proposes an energy-based learning framework for clustered tensegrity form finding and physical property prediction. The proposed approach incorporates total potential energy minimization and constitutive relations into the training objective, enabling the simultaneous prediction of equilibrium nodal configurations and associated physical quantities, including member forces and force densities. By incorporating energy-based physical losses directly into the learning process, the framework improves physical consistency, robustness, and data efficiency. Numerical experiments on tensegrity structures, including prism and lander systems, show the great potential of the proposed approach and demonstrate its capability for scalable form finding and accurate prediction of structural properties.

For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds. First, interior Nash equilibria lack $C^1$ vector field information, meaning agents cannot distinguish aligned from strictly opposing incentives. Inheriting this geometry, the worst-case pure Nash equilibria dictating robust PoA bounds manifest as topologically unstable strict saddles, and in canonical congestion games, as global repellers supported on almost everywhere strictly dominated strategies. Anchoring efficiency guarantees to these unstable states causes algebraic sensitivity; we prove that accommodating all strictly positive affine costs renders the PoA unbounded. Furthermore, projecting learning trajectories onto the discrete simplex of correlated play systematically accommodates non-rationalizable behavior. Evaluating dynamics via Coarse Correlated Equilibria or proximal refinements fails to preclude strictly dominated strategies. Moreover, optimal $O(1/T)$ swap-regret minimization does not preclude macroscopic turbulence, manifesting as chaotic limit sets even in minimal games. Finally, we examine the non-atomic limit of congestion games. Though considered highly stable with tight sub-linear $Θ(p/\ln p)$ PoA bounds (where $p$ is the polynomial degree), we prove that under discrete-time learning, the unique equilibrium destabilizes into Li-Yorke chaos and global attractors whose time-averaged inefficiency degrades exponentially as $2^p$. These results necessitate re-evaluating worst-case equilibrium frameworks for dynamically grounded metrics.

Deep equilibrium models promise input-adaptive implicit computation: harder problems should demand more solver iterations, and the solved equilibrium should encode the result of genuine iterative inference. We report a cautionary study of a port-Hamiltonian DEQ with a learned initialization on two reasoning tasks -- ProofWriter entailment over frozen DeBERTa embeddings and a BFS-verified graph-reachability benchmark -- in which the implicit computation is a silent no-op. Across tasks, seeds, and controlled ablation arms, the solved equilibrium equals the solver's start point to numerical precision, and bypassing the solver entirely changes test accuracy by +0.00 percentage points in 18 of 19 training runs. Controlled interventions falsify the tempting explanation: removing the anchoring term reproduces every result, and retraining with noise-decoupled starts yields a solver that converges to the noisy start while the decoder learns to ignore it. The single escaping run diverges instead ($\|h^{*}-z_0\|=171$), producing a co-adapted noise channel whose removal improves accuracy. Iteration counts are uncorrelated with ground-truth difficulty ($r=0.009$), and the full apparatus never outperforms a two-layer MLP on either task. We trace the mechanism to gradient starvation along two distinct routes, show that the standard zeroing ablation is confounded and gives wildly seed-dependent answers where the correct substitution test gives a stable zero, and distill a four-test diagnostic protocol for auditing claimed implicit computation. All experiments run on a single free Colab GPU; code, raw logs, and analysis scripts are released.

Trader-facing dynamic fees are increasingly proposed for automated market makers (AMMs), but historical data do not identify how order flow would respond: trader-facing fees do not vary, trader types are latent, and a replayed tape is not a sequential decision environment. We therefore construct a minimal closed-loop simulator in which the missing signal exists by construction: two constant-product pools repriced by an equilibrium-inspired dynamic-fee rule, fee-sensitive noise flow, and closed-form CEX--AMM arbitrage. Equilibrium is used as a closure principle, not as an object the trader learns. Against a tuned benchmark ladder of schedule, planning, lookahead, and tabular policies, a small DQN is the only evaluated valid policy whose paired improvement over tuned one-step routing excludes zero. On a reserved final block of 1{,}000 seeds with completion forced to 1.0 for every policy, it reduces implementation shortfall under every tested intra-step ordering, by $13.3\bps$ of order notional under the pre-specified agent-last ordering, and the edge is concentrated in, and learned from, dynamic-fee environments: under constant fees the paired difference is indistinguishable from zero. The result is model-conditioned counterfactual evidence about execution control in AMMs, not evidence about historical traders, equilibrium play, or deployable profit.

This paper develops a continuum theory of exit-and-join coalition dynamics in nonatomic cooperative games. We extend the Aumann-Shapley value and the Aumann-Drèze value to coalition structures in which each coalition is treated as a restricted nonatomic game, yielding a marginal-contribution-based payoff density that governs incentives for agents to remain in, exit, or join coalitions. We derive deterministic mean-field dynamics from decentralized switching rules and show that payoff-difference switching recovers replicator dynamics as a special case. We characterize exit-and-join equilibrium by the absence of profitable positive-mass deviations and prove its equivalence with stationarity of the induced mass dynamics under incentive-compatible and strictly payoff-responsive switching rates. For mass-based cooperative games, we construct a Lyapunov function and establish global convergence under strict concavity. We further show that the equilibrium is equivalent to a Wardrop equilibrium of an induced nonatomic population game and admits a variational inequality formulation. The framework is extended to incorporate switching costs and endogenous coalition acceptance rules, leading to constrained equilibria characterized by quasi-variational inequalities. The proposed theory unifies cooperative value allocation, noncooperative coalition mobility, mean-field dynamics, evolutionary game theory, and population games within a common framework for analyzing coalition formation and adaptation in large-scale multi-agent systems.

Many two-player zero-sum games admit not a unique Nash equilibrium but a convex set of them: a polytope of profiles that all share the minimax value V* yet prescribe different behaviour. Standard solvers each converge to some equilibrium and are treated as interchangeable. We ask whether they instead select different members of the Nash set, systematically as a function of the algorithm rather than the seed. Using a tabular, exactly solvable testbed of six games with analytically known Nash sets -- including a two-dimensional Nash polytope and Kuhn poker -- we find that (i) selection is determined by the algorithm, not the seed, but families differ only on asymmetric Nash sets; (ii) regularized last-iterate methods (R-NaD, magnetic mirror descent) select the maximum-entropy member, the information projection of their uniform reference onto the Nash set -- exactly on the 2-D polytope and at 99.7% of maximum entropy in Kuhn -- while regret-averaging methods (CFR, CFR+, fictitious play) drift to a lower-entropy face; we confirm this on a randomized 180-game ensemble, where R-NaD attains the maximum-entropy member in 100% of converged games while CFR+ sits strictly below it in 94% (paired Wilcoxon p < 10^-27); (iii) the selected member has downstream consequences against sub-optimal opponents that scale with sequential/hidden-information structure but stay bounded -- in Kuhn the max-entropy member is a strictly better hedge, whereas on the matrix games the members differ without either dominating. We also report two negative results correcting common intuitions: removing CFR's positive-orthant (max(R,0)) projection does not eliminate boundary drift; and R-NaD's selection is anchor-following, not initialization-independent. We state the maximum-entropy / I-projection characterization as a strongly data-supported conjecture, checked throughout against analytic ground truth.

Gradient equilibrium (GEQ) is a recently introduced online optimization framework that generalizes first-order stationarity from offline optimization and abstracts problems like online conformal prediction. While GEQ has curious similarities with known online learning frameworks, namely regret minimization, prior work has shown that GEQ error and regret are incomparable objectives, leaving open a precise understanding of how GEQ fits into the broader online learning landscape. In this work, we show that GEQ is equivalent to Blackwell approachability in the algorithmic sense. That is, a Blackwell approachability problem can always be solved using queries to a black-box GEQ oracle, with no asymptotic loss in the oracle's error rate, and vice versa. Taken together with known equivalences between approachability, regret minimization, and calibration, these results imply that GEQ is equivalent to these frameworks, as well. Our reductions are efficient and can be used to transfer refined guarantees, such as optimism and strong adaptivity, from regret minimization to GEQ. Along the way, we also identify necessary and sufficient conditions for GEQ, and establish reductions between different notions of GEQ with unconstrained and constrained decision sets.

Nash equilibrium (NE) arises from selfish utility maximization, yet its social welfare can be arbitrarily far from optimal. Moreover, computing an NE is intractable in general. We study augmented game models in which players use budget-balanced internal transfers to improve incentives before play. We first introduce \emph{Self-Enforcing Transfer Equilibrium} (SETE), where players commit to nonnegative peer-to-peer transfers that are paid only if the recipient does not deviate from a prescribed strategy. For polymatrix games, we show that every stationary point of the social welfare function, in particular any socially optimal strategy profile, can be sustained as a SETE. This induces a Nash equilibrium in the agent normal form of the corresponding augmented game. We further propose a polynomial-time algorithm and a decentralized learning dynamic to compute such product-form equilibria. We then introduce \emph{Mediated Self-Enforcing Transfer Equilibrium} (M-SETE), where a mediator makes both the payment schedule and the prescribed strategies binding offers. This additional enforcement resolves the agent-normal-form limitation: an M-SETE is a Nash equilibrium of the augmented game itself, not merely of its agent normal form, and any socially optimal strategy profile can be supported as an M-SETE in any finite game while preserving budget balance. Thus, internal transfers improve welfare and computation while preserving independent play on the equilibrium path. When full sequential-game stability is required, binding mediation provides the corresponding implementation.

We introduce optimal coarse correlated equilibria for continuous-time mean field games. A coarse correlated equilibrium is a randomized recommendation scheme from which no player can gain by ignoring the recommendation and switching to an alternative strategy. The problem is as follows: a moderator selects, among all mean-field coarse correlated equilibria, one that optimizes a prescribed performance criterion, which may differ from the representative player's objective. After formulating the problem, we develop a linear programming (LP) formulation, prove the existence of optimal LP coarse correlated equilibria, and relate the LP characterization to the original probabilistic setting. Building on this characterization, we design a no-regret primal-dual algorithm, based on an equivalent Lagrangian formulation of the external-regret constraint, for learning such equilibria. We provide explicit convergence rates for the learning algorithm, and numerical examples illustrate the method.

Large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems (MAS) have demonstrated great potential in solving tasks with execution complexity, by distributing subtasks across cooperative agents. However, this divide-and-conquer paradigm falls short on decision-making tasks that are also prevalent in the real world. These tasks require simultaneous reasoning from the stances of all involved stakeholders whose decisions are mutually dependent and thus cannot be solved in isolation. We characterize this challenge as stance entanglement, a form of decision complexity distinct from execution complexity. To address it, we propose Multi-Agent Fictitious Play (MAFP), a novel MAS paradigm that represents stakeholder stances as agents and formulates decision-making as an equilibrium-seeking process. Built on the game-theoretic principle of fictitious play, MAFP iteratively updates each agent's decision by best responding to the empirical mixture of other agents' past decisions. This enables agents to expose and address one another's weaknesses, progressively improving decision quality and robustness. We evaluate MAFP on challenging decision-making tasks that test the capability of deciding strategies for competitive scenarios prior to acting. MAFP outperforms both single-round and multi-round baselines on two complementary metrics, tournament strength and robustness, demonstrating its effectiveness in addressing stance entanglement.

In large language model (LLM) serving, each request accumulates persistent graphics processing unit (GPU) memory during service as its key-value cache grows with every generated token. Under high concurrency, aggregate memory usage therefore increases endogenously over time: the service process itself creates future capacity pressure. When memory capacity is exceeded, systems evict active requests, discarding cached state and restarting them later, which wastes computation and reduces throughput. We develop a discrete-time dynamical model of memory-constrained LLM inference that captures admission, memory growth, and eviction under continuous batching. In the saturated-input regime, the system admits both eviction-free fixed points and limit cycles with evictions. For homogeneous workloads, we show that the eviction-free equilibrium is unstable and that, except for a Lebesgue-measure-zero exact-capture set, the system converges to a unique worst-case limit cycle that is asymptotically stable outside this exceptional set, with throughput losses as large as 50%. For heterogeneous workloads, we prove a stability criterion in the two-class common-input setting and explain how the survival-polynomial mechanism generalizes to multiple classes and heterogeneous-input lengths. Under an input-dominated scaling regime, coprime decoding lengths stabilize the eviction-free equilibrium, while non-coprime lengths create synchronized modes that drive instability. These results characterize when workload heterogeneity desynchronizes completions and helps stabilize memory-constrained serving. More broadly, we identify service-induced congestion as a structural instability mechanism and derive scheduling design principles for sustaining high throughput.

Real-time reconstruction of magnetohydrodynamic equilibria is essential for plasma shaping, stability assessment and feedback control in magnetic confinement fusion. However, Grad-Shafranov equilibrium calculations remain largely device-specific and iterative, limiting their use in latency-constrained control settings. Existing neural approaches can accelerate individual equilibrium predictions, but they do not generally provide reusable models across changing plasma boundaries or tokamak geometries. Here we show that equilibrium reconstruction can be recast as a cross-device operator learning problem. We develop a domain-specific neural operator framework that maps geometry and profile parameters directly to the poloidal flux field, replacing repeated solve-on-demand computation with amortized operator inference. Using the analytically tractable Solov'ev family as a controlled Grad-Shafranov testbed, we generate equilibria across eight geometrically distinct tokamak-like configurations and benchmark five neural operator architectures under four transfer-learning strategies. Single-geometry pretraining gives poor transfer to unseen devices, whereas multi-geometry pretraining enables data-efficient adaptation. The Wavelet Neural Operator gives the strongest cross-geometry performance, reaching mean relative L2 errors below 4% with 100 labelled target equilibria and below 2% with full fine-tuning. The predicted magnetic fields satisfy the divergence-free constraint to numerical precision, and four architectures achieve millisecond or sub-millisecond inference. These results identify neural operator pretraining as a route towards reusable, real-time equilibrium inference across fusion device configurations.

Physics-informed neural networks (PINNs) are meshless and carry moving geometry and topology change through resampling of collocation points; the finite-element method (FEM) is the workhorse for boundary-fitted discretisations. Coupling the two across a shared interface promises the best of both, yet existing PINN-FEM schemes are validated only empirically. We put the coupling on a domain-decomposition footing: viewing each solver as a Steklov-Poincaré (trace-to-flux) operator, we transfer the classical Dirichlet-Neumann (DN) divergence diagnosis and its Robin-Neumann (RN) cure, including a closed-form, sweep-free interface impedance, and prove a PINN-specific contraction theorem: a trained network realises only a perturbed Steklov operator with a per-step training residual, and RN still contracts, with no shared-eigenbasis hypothesis, to a floor set by the achieved training loss. Because a PINN has no stiffness matrix, we introduce a Fourier-mode interface probe that recovers the network's resolvable Steklov eigenvalues to within 0.5% and doubles as a diagnostic of the network's spectral cap. The theory predicts measured PINN-FEM contraction rates to within 7% on 1D and 2D Poisson couplings, and a two-slab analogue of the large-added-mass regime shows RN's per-mode impedance matching winning decisively where tuned scalar relaxation saturates. We demonstrate the framework on a Stokes/rigid-disc problem with Alart-Curnier contact: the meshless PINN fluid absorbs the topology change at contact by collocation exclusion alone, no remeshing and no cut cells, and the static-equilibrium contact reaction matches the submerged weight to 0.4% under mesh refinement. We quantify remaining limitations: the warm-started PINN drifts off the Stokes manifold over long horizons, and matched FEM-FEM benchmarks attribute pre-impact squeeze-film signatures to PINN under-resolution.

We introduce Equilibrium State Estimation (ESE), a novel paradigm for simultaneous prediction, where multiple interacting systems require separate yet coordinated forecasts. Such scenarios often arise in real-world settings such as economics and healthcare modeling. Unlike existing approaches that predict one system at a time, ESE forecasts all systems in a single pass. It first estimates the equilibrium state across systems, then generates holistic forecasts based on the difference between the current state and the estimated equilibrium. Extensive experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets, including currency exchange and COVID-19 spread modeling, demonstrate that ESE is at least as accurate as state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods while being significantly faster. In addition, ESE integrates seamlessly with conventional predictors, combining their accuracy with its exceptional efficiency and delivering a 10-70x speedup. With linear-time complexity, ESE scales far better than SOTA methods as the number of systems increases. Moreover, it remains accurate under diverse perturbations, establishing ESE as a fast, generalizable, robust, and scalable multi-prediction method.

In this paper, we develop a continuous-time model-free reinforcement learning algorithm to learn deterministic equilibrium policies in general time-inconsistent control problems. Utilizing the extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system, we recast the original time-inconsistent problem into an equivalent two-stage problem. In the first stage, for given auxiliary functions, we employ the deterministic policy gradient approach to learn an optimal policy in an auxiliary time-consistent control problem. In the second stage, given the updated policy, we exploit the inner fixed point iterations and some martingale characterizations to learn the auxiliary functions. As a theoretical contribution, we provide some mild model assumptions and establish the convergence of inner fixed point iterations. By repeating this actor-critic style of iterations across two stages, our algorithm aims to learn the equilibrium under different sources of time-inconsistency in a unified manner. The superior effectiveness of the proposed algorithm are illustrated in two classical financial applications with time-inconsistency: mean-variance portfolio management and optimal tracking portfolio under non-exponential discounting.

Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare. In these settings, the central challenge is not merely finding an equilibrium, but selecting socially desirable outcomes among many suboptimal Nash equilibria. Standard deep multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods struggle with this problem, as value-decomposition approaches are constrained by monotonicity assumptions and policy-gradient methods often converge to stable but socially inefficient equilibria. To address this limitation, we propose $Φ$-Actor-Critic ($Φ$-AC), a framework that leverages swap regret minimization to steer learning toward high-welfare correlated equilibria (CE). To make counterfactual regret estimation tractable in deep MARL, $Φ$-AC employs a centralized attention critic that predicts vector-valued regrets in a single forward pass, avoiding computationally expensive counterfactual simulations. We further introduce a Lagrangian-based equilibrium selection mechanism that optimizes social welfare while enforcing stability through regret constraints. Experiments on matrix games, Multi-Agent Particle Environments (MPE), and the Melting Pot Harvest scenario demonstrate that $Φ$-AC learns efficient and stable coordination strategies across diverse mixed-motive settings while maintaining high collective return and competitive fairness.

Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems often fail to reliably outperform a single strong model equipped with best-of-N sampling. We argue that a core source of this instability is ill-posed equilibrium selection: current systems specify what information agents share, but not which coordination convention should be selected. We formalize a broad class of such systems as discounted incomplete-information Markov games and show that two common pathologies, oscillation between competing conventions and drift across them, can both induce unstable learning and linear Bayesian regret. To obtain a well-posed target, we introduce the Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium (HQRE), an entropy-regularized equilibrium concept with agent- and state-dependent temperatures. Under a monotonicity condition, HQRE is unique, admits linearly convergent mirror updates, and yields bounded Bayesian regret; the same condition yields rollout-measurable stability diagnostics. We instantiate this objective in two algorithms: DICE-PC, which coordinates frozen models through prompt-control actions, and DICE-FT, which performs parameter-efficient mirror fine-tuning. Across eleven benchmarks in four domains, DICE improves accuracy-cost trade-offs over strong within-class baselines; on reasoning and planning tasks, DICE-PC improves by 4.3 percentage points on average and DICE-FT by 8.5 points.

Large language model (LLM) agents have begun to delegate work to one another. Protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and the Agent2Agent protocol (A2A) let an agent publish what it can do and let others call it, and public registries of such agents are already appearing. These protocols assume an advertised capability is a static, truthful fact. A real agent is none of these things: its competence is probabilistic, varies with input, drifts when the underlying model is updated, and, because the agent is itself a language model, it can describe itself with complete confidence and be wrong. A caller therefore sees what an agent claims to do, not what it can do, with no principled way to tell a reliable provider from a fluent impostor. We argue these difficulties share one cause: the market for lemons. When quality is hidden and claims are cheap, good and bad providers become indistinguishable, honest reliability goes unrewarded, and the market decays toward its worst participants. Economics offers three remedies, signaling, screening, and reputation, and none are present in today's agent protocols. We make four contributions: (1) a failure taxonomy that names confident-wrong as a non-adversarial, correlated subclass of Byzantine faults that classical fault-tolerance mismodels; (2) a market-for-lemons model showing that faith-based protocols admit only a low-trust equilibrium; (3) the Trust Layer, a thin, protocol-agnostic narrow waist above MCP and A2A that adds probabilistic capability descriptors, screening, and reputation, and admits a separating equilibrium when the cost of sustaining an overclaim exceeds the gain from it; and (4) a reliability-composition bound for delegation chains with an end-to-end placement argument. The design needs no model retraining and degrades gracefully when its trust anchors are absent or corrupt.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as advisors whose objective is not aligned with the user's: recommenders optimize for engagement, sales assistants for purchases, negotiation agents for concessions. Whether such advisors stay truthful when honesty conflicts with their own payoff is a core alignment-evaluation question. We turn the canonical Crawford-Sobel cheap-talk model into a pre-specified benchmark for LLM honesty under preference misalignment. Cheap-talk theory predicts neither full revelation nor silence but coarse monotone partitions, with fewer informative intervals as preference conflict grows. A sender observes a state omega in [0,1], wants the receiver's action near omega+b, and sends one costless message to a receiver whose ideal action is omega. The design uses 5 bias levels, 3 prompt frames, a fixed low-temperature setting, and 200 states per cell: 12,000 sender calls. For the positive-bias grid b in {0.01,0.04,0.08,0.12} the exact most-informative partition sizes are 7,4,3,2, with oracle normalized mutual information 0.5294, 0.3268, 0.2205, 0.1829. Running the full design on four instruction-tuned models (GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite, Llama-3.3-70B), we find all four over-reveal relative to the most-informative equilibrium by 1.8 to 4.2x: normalized mutual information stays at 0.78-0.94 where the oracle prescribes 0.18-0.53. Informativeness declines with bias as predicted but never approaches the strategic optimum; rather than coarse partitions, models show near-full revelation with a constant upward offset tracking their bias (linear exaggeration). Payoff-maximizing versus honesty framing has negligible effect. A decoder ablation shows the finding is recoverable only when the receiver reads the sender's stated number: an embedding-only decoder mis-reads the same data as near-babbling.

We study two-player zero-sum games (TPZSGs) with bandit feedback under fairness constraints requiring every action to be played with probability at least $α/m$. Existing instance-dependent results target $\textit{pure}$ Nash equilibria, while fairness generically produces $\textit{mixed}$ equilibria, a harder learning target. Our key technical tool is a reparametrization: every fair strategy decomposes as $p = (α/m)\mathbf{1} + (1-α)\widetilde{p}$ with $\widetilde{p} \in Δ_m$, and substituting into the payoff form yields $p^{\top}Aq = \widetilde{p}^{\top}\widetilde{A} q$ for a fair payoff matrix $\widetilde{A} := (1-α)A + α\mathbf{1} c^{\top}$, where $c_j = \tfrac{1}{m}\sum_i A(i,j)$ is the column-mean vector. The fair game on $A$ is then equivalent to a standard zero-sum game on $\widetilde{A}$, so equilibrium existence, KKT structure, and LP basis stability reduce to classical results applied to $\widetilde{A}$. We derive the fair minimax value, fair Nash equilibrium, fair regret, and a clean dual representation showing the price of fairness is at most $α(1-1/m)$ and vanishes whenever the unconstrained equilibrium already has full support. Our main result is an $\widetilde{O}(T^{2/3})$ regret bound for an Explore-Then-Commit algorithm, $\texttt{Fair-ETC-TPZSG}$, applicable to general mixed fair equilibria, together with a discussion of why naive action elimination does not readily improve it. When the fair equilibrium has a single dominant action, equivalently when $\widetilde{p}^{\star}$ is a vertex of $Δ_m$, the bound sharpens to instance-dependent $\widetilde{O}(1/\widetildeΔ(α)^{2})$, where $\widetildeΔ(α)$ is the LP-margin gap.

In this work we study agents in simulated bargaining scenarios, where a buyer and a seller communicate through a text channel and attempt to negotiate mutually beneficial trades, under different information regimes (complete information, information asymmetry or mutual uncertainty). We evaluate their performance w.r.t. game-theoretical solutions and further investigate their honesty (their tendency to disclose or withhold information or to mislead and deceive) as well as their credulity (their tendency to trust or distrust information provided by the other agent). We study zero-shot LLM agents with simple prompting scaffolding as well as fine-tuned agents, in order to investigate whether optimising the agents to maximise financial profits makes them stronger negotiators but also more dishonest and less trusting. We find that off-the-shelf LLMs all substantially deviate from game-theoretical equilibria, they attempt to lie about their private information but cannot efficiently exploit information asymmetries. Fine-tuning on financial utility makes the agents stronger at achieving better deals but also more dishonest, highlighting the risks that optimising agents for a task can have on their safety. We release our code and a dataset of bargaining scenarios.

Poker is a landmark challenge for artificial intelligence. The dominant approach relies on equilibrium solvers built on counterfactual regret minimization, requiring millions of core-hours of training. Large Language Models (LLMs) possess extensive poker knowledge but perform far below solver-based agents when asked to play directly. Traditional rule-based poker agents are interpretable and training-free, but their strategic ceiling remains far below equilibrium play. We introduce \textbf{PokerSkill}, a training-free and solver-free framework that bridges this gap by using detailed rule-based poker skills as a structured action-grounding interface for LLMs. A deterministic context engine analyzes the current state and retrieves only the relevant fragments from a layered skill library, which is entirely designed by human poker experts, constraining the LLM's choice to reasonable actions. Against GTOWizard, a state-of-the-art GTO benchmark, GPT-5.5 XHigh with PokerSkill achieves $-57 \pm 21$ mbb/hand, Claude Opus 4.6 achieves $-80 \pm 29$ mbb/hand and Claude Opus 4.7 achieves $-87\pm 64$ mbb/hand, reducing losses by 49--61% compared to default-prompt baselines and outperforming the strong bot Slumbot. Our key finding is that rule-based skills alone do not constitute a strong strategy, and LLMs alone cannot play well, but their combination yields an agent that requires neither training nor solver access yet competes with systems built on millions of core-hours of computation. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of an LLM achieving competitive performance in a complex imperfect-information game without game-specific training or solver queries. Code is available at https://github.com/lbn187/PokerSkill.

A central challenge in game theory and learning systems such as GANs is understanding which algorithms can efficiently compute equilibria across the heterogeneous landscape of games. Equilibrium computation is typically studied solver by solver and game class by game class, yielding strong local guarantees but a fragmented view of solver behaviour. Existing discrete taxonomies often provide an incomplete account of where algorithms succeed. We study this problem through a solver-game map linking games to effective solver dynamics. Classical theory identifies isolated regions of this map but provides limited insight into intermediate or overlapping regimes, suggesting that solvability is governed by latent structural properties defining a continuous solver-aligned geometry of games. We formalise this perspective through structure-aware solver synthesis. A learned structure recogniser maps each game to a low-dimensional solver-aligned representation, and a policy maps this representation to effective primitive mechanisms, adapting solver behaviour across regimes. This reveals regions where particular solver dynamics are effective and where mixtures of primitives are required rather than a single dominant solver. A bounded residual acts as a local corrector and diagnostic signal for incomplete solver bases or representations. The framework yields both an adaptive solver and an analytical lens: games with similar optimisation dynamics cluster together, revealing continuous regions of algorithmic validity and overlapping solver behaviour. Empirically, we show that fixed primitives exhibit systematic regime mismatch, while the learned representation organises game space into a structured cartography aligned with solver behaviour. These results suggest viewing equilibrium computation as the joint problem of learning solver mechanisms and mapping the geometry of solvability.

Do next-generation LLM agents inherit the cooperative biases documented in their predecessors, or does scale and provider diversity reshape equilibrium behaviour in competitive multi-agent settings? Willis et al. established a benchmark for this question using evolutionary game theory and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), finding consistent cooperative biases in ChatGPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet. We extend this benchmark to four frontier models released in 2025-2026 - Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4 Mini - applying the identical protocol across three prompting styles (Default, Prose, Self-Refine) and four population compositions (balanced and biased, with and without noise). Cooperative bias persists across providers (H1): ten of twelve model-prompt combinations favour cooperative equilibria in balanced noiseless conditions. Cross-provider divergence is substantial (H3): Gemini 2.5 Flash reaches up to 77% aggressive equilibria under biased conditions, while GPT-5.4 Mini reaches 70% cooperative equilibria under Self-Refine. Support for aggressive capability parity is partial (H2): Self-Refine raises ICD in all models and Gemini 3.1 Pro Refine achieves the highest ICD in the dataset (0.925), but Default and Prose prompts show no systematic narrowing. Evidence on noise robustness is directionally positive but not robustly confirmed (H4): with n=500 Moran iterations per condition, average noise sensitivity is about 6 percentage points for Claude Sonnet 4.6 versus 13 pp for Claude 3.5 Sonnet, but this cross-study gap is not statistically significant once the predecessor's unreported sampling error is propagated. Provider identity, rather than model generation, is the strongest correlate of equilibrium outcomes; noise remains a universal challenge regardless of model size or vintage.

We introduce the incremental voter model (IVM), a discrete-opinion multi-agent system where agents undergo step-wise transitions biased by the opinion of a randomly selected persuader. Our incremental voter model comprises a large population of interacting agents, each holding an opinion represented by an element of the discrete set $\{-k,\ldots,0,\ldots,k\}, k \in \mathbb{N}_{+}$. At each update step as time progresses, a pair of distinct agents are selected independently and uniformly at random from the population, and the first agent (viewed as the listener'') updates its opinion based on that of the second (viewed as the persuader''), adopting a new opinion that differs from its current one by at most one unit. By deriving the mean-field system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations (ODEs) that governs the large-population limit of the agent-based model, we develop a rigorous mathematical framework to study the asymptotic behavior of the opinion distribution in the mean-field limit. These results contribute to a deeper understanding of social influence processes in complex systems, particularly in modeling opinion polarization, and may guide the formulation of more advanced models in future research.

The Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) framework scales equilibrium computation to large zero-sum games by iteratively expanding a restricted strategy set using deep reinforcement learning (DRL). A central challenge is to construct, under limited computational budgets, a small strategy population whose induced game well approximates the full game. Existing PSRO variants typically expand the population using best responses to meta-strategies computed from restricted-game payoffs, which can lead to inefficient expansions that provide limited global improvement. We propose to guide population expansion by directly evaluating the post-expansion population quality. Specifically, we adopt Population Exploitability (PE) to measure how well a restricted strategy set represents the full game, and introduce a two-phase exploration--selection framework that explicitly minimizes PE during expansion. We instantiate this framework as Global PSRO, a practical DRL-based algorithm that efficiently generates candidate responses and estimates PE via parameter-sharing conditional neural networks. Experiments across multiple two-player zero-sum games show that Global PSRO achieves lower exploitability and approximates Nash equilibria with significantly fewer policy iterations than prior PSRO methods.

Multimodal large language models often generate reasoning chains containing subtle errors that lead to incorrect answers. Current verification approaches have notable limitations. Learned critics need extensive labeled data and show inconsistent performance across different tasks. Meanwhile, existing training-free methods simply average scores from different sources, missing a key insight: when these scores disagree, that disagreement itself carries important information about whether a reasoning step is truly valid or not. We propose a training-free verification approach that treats step-wise verification as a coordination problem among specialized judges. We formalize these judges' interaction as a Nash equilibrium game where agreement signals valid steps while disagreement reveals instability. Our method computes equilibrium scores through a closed-form solution, enabling both disagreement-aware filtering and stability-conscious ranking of reasoning steps. Evaluated across six benchmarks, our approach achieves consistent improvements of 2.4% to 5.2% over baseline models and shows competitive performance against learned critics, demonstrating that cross-modal agreement (not just average confidence) provides robust verification signals without task-specific adaptation.

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an unpredictable environment, a useful abstraction is to model the situation as a two-player zero-sum game. The goal is then to find a strategy for the system that guarantees the specification against any strategy of the environment. However, to model more complex situations, such as multiple systems with different objectives or an environment composed of various agents, the richer framework of multiplayer games must be considered. In this setting, a natural question is to identify equilibria, i.e., strategy profiles that are robust in the sense that no player has an incentive to deviate. The most well-known equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium, but several alternatives exist. We study five such notions and, for each of them, we provide complexity results for the constrained existence problem, which consists of deciding whether a given game contains an equilibrium that ensures each player a payoff within a specified interval.

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the dominant algorithmic family for solving large imperfect-information games, underpinning breakthroughs such as Libratus and Pluribus in No-Limit Texas Hold'em poker. In real-time game-playing systems, the solver must compute a near-equilibrium strategy within a strict time budget of only a few seconds per decision, and the number of CFR iterations completed in this window directly determines play strength. We present \textbf{Parallel CFR}, the first parallelization framework for real-time depth-limited CFR solving that seamlessly integrates pruning, abstraction, and advanced CFR variants. We decompose each CFR iteration into a pipeline of seven stages and identify two orthogonal dimensions of parallelism: \emph{by information set} and \emph{by tree node}. Leaf node evaluation is offloaded to GPUs via batched neural network inference, creating a heterogeneous CPU--GPU pipeline. Experiments on Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold'em demonstrate that Parallel CFR achieves $3.3$--$3.4\times$ speedup over the single-threaded baseline on postflop streets, with per-iteration time of ${\sim}47$--$54$~ms on a depth-limited game tree with over $1$ billion histories. All experiments run on a single desktop-class device (NVIDIA DGX Spark), enabling hundreds of CFR iterations within a typical real-time decision budget without requiring datacenter-scale infrastructure.

Generative artificial intelligence is rapidly transforming the supply side of training data: an increasing share of new tokens, images, and structured records is produced by previous-generation models rather than by human originators. Recursive training on such synthetic content induces a measurable and often irreversible loss of distributional fidelity, a phenomenon known as model collapse. We develop the first unified microeconomic theory of synthetic data markets under model collapse. We introduce the Synthetic Data Contamination Equilibrium (SDCE), prove existence and generic uniqueness, derive a welfare decomposition W = W_prod + W_cons - L_coll - L_info, establish a Wasserstein-gradient-flow mean-field collapse limit, prove an impossibility of information-constrained implementation, and obtain closed-form expressions for the welfare-maximizing provenance subsidy s* = KL(q||p)/(2 kappa) and the welfare-maximizing watermark strength w* = (1 - psi) KL(q||p)/(2 kappa psi). We prove an information-theoretic Cramer-Rao lower bound on any provenance estimator using only producer-side observations and show that the Provenance-Market Iterative Retraining (PMIR) algorithm attains this bound up to constants while converging to an epsilon-SDCE in O(epsilon^-2 log T) iterations. A reduced-form OLS estimation on a C4-synthetic benchmark over ten retraining generations yields a collapse-rate coefficient b-hat = 0.181 (HAC s.e. 0.024), within one standard error of the structural prediction 0.183. Calibrated experiments raise generation-ten model quality by 23.1 percent over the unregulated benchmark while lowering the 2-Wasserstein drift on a held-out diversity probe from 0.318 to 0.142. Scaling experiments over generations t in {1,...,10} recover a logarithmic-in-t collapse law log Q_t = log Q_0 - 0.183 t rho^2 with R^2 = 0.962.

Non-contrastive self-supervised learning (SSL) is an effective framework for predictive representation learning, but popular (and in practice effective) methods such as SimSiam, BYOL, I-JEPA or DINO, which rely on a form of self-distillation to train a teacher-student network, remain poorly understood as they typically do not minimize a well-defined objective. We analyze the dynamics of a variant of the Joint Embedding Predictive Architecture (JEPA) using a regularized linear regressor to predict the learned representations of two views of the data from one another, and fully characterize its stability: non-collapsed stable equilibria align with leading nonlinear canonical correlation subspaces, while collapsed equilibria may also be stable attractors. Motivated by this result, we introduce PEIRA, a non-contrastive SSL method with an explicit objective defined through the trace of the optimal linear regressor. We show that its only stable equilibria are nontrivial global minimizers and recover the same canonical correlation subspaces, with regularization selecting the effective dimension. Experiments on ImageNet-1K and CIFAR-10 show PEIRA is competitive with VICReg and LeJEPA baselines, and qualitative empirical results support the theory.

Plasma shape control in tokamaks requires a real-time controller that tracks dynamically changing shape targets while tolerating diagnostic failures. Classical approaches decompose the problem into equilibrium reconstruction followed by a linear controller, and assume a fixed, fully operational sensor set. We present a reinforcement learning agent that addresses both limitations simultaneously. The agent is trained in NSFsim, a high-fidelity tokamak simulator configured for DIII-D, on a curated dataset of 120 experimental plasma shapes. The shape targets are resampled as random step changes every 0.25 s, exposing the agent to diverse transitions across the full shape envelope. At test time the agent zero-shot tracks dynamic shape sequences; on a held-out static configuration in simulation it achieves a mean shape error of 2.01 cm, and dynamic trajectory following is demonstrated qualitatively in simulation and on the physical device. Diagnostic dropout randomly masks 30% of magnetic sensors per episode, yielding a single policy robust to arbitrary sensor subsets without backup controllers or mode-switching logic. An asymmetric actor-critic architecture with privileged equilibrium information improves value estimation under partial observability; an auxiliary shape reconstruction head on the actor enables end-to-end shape reconstruction from raw diagnostics and serves as an interpretability tool for policy analysis. The policy transfers to experimental DIII-D shots, where it directly commands the coil actuators on two dynamic shape maneuvers, and to the independent GSevolve simulator.

Softmax feedback systems are a common mathematical core of entropy-regularized reinforcement learning, logit game dynamics, population choice, and mean-field variational updates. Their central stability question is simple: when does a self-reinforcing softmax system produce a unique and globally predictable outcome? Classical theory gives a conservative answer. By treating softmax as a unit-scale response, it certifies stability only in a strongly randomized regime. We prove that the classical approach misses an entire stable regime and does not identify the point at which the qualitative change truly occurs. For finite-dimensional affine logit systems, the sharp dimension-free Euclidean threshold is $β\|ΠWΠ\|_{\mathcal T\to\mathcal T}<2,$ rather than the previously used condition, which certifies stability only while the softmax system remains safely over-regularized. Our theorem fills the previously missing pre-bifurcation regime, extending stability guarantees for affine softmax feedback systems to reward-responsive yet globally predictable systems. It enlarges the certified stability boundary for these systems and identifies where the model genuinely undergoes a phase transition.

We introduce the Estimated Dynamic Equilibrium Model (EDEM), an agent-based framework that treats supply and demand as a coupled stochastic process driven by heterogeneous, noisy agent valuations. The model's primary technical contribution is the identification of a generative mechanism for persistent disequilibrium: when market-clearing prices are sequentially sampled from the upper tail of noisy bid distributions and recycled as inputs for future valuations, expected prices drift upward despite strictly zero-mean estimation errors. We derive this order-statistic bias in closed form for i.i.d. uniform bids and use simulations to show that compounding this bias across epochs yields exponential price growth without requiring assumptions of investor optimism or irrationality. This framework extends Miller's divergence-of-opinion theory to a dynamic setting, recovering Walrasian equilibrium and Miller's static premium as limiting cases. Through controlled experiments and sensitivity analysis on a simulated real-estate neighborhood, we identify six distinct regimes-ranging from band-stability to runaway bubbles-emerging from a single agent ruleset. These results offer a potential explanation for the contradictory findings in the empirical divergence-of-opinion literature and suggest that machine-learning valuation algorithms may inadvertently amplify this inherent statistical bias.

Reliable position and shape control in tokamak plasmas requires accurate real-time regulation of several strongly coupled shape parameters. The control vectors that disentangle these couplings, referred to as \textit{virtual circuits} (VCs), enable independent shape parameter control for a specific Grad--Shafranov (GS) equilibrium. Numerical calculation of VCs is not currently feasible in real time, therefore VCs are usually computed prior to each experiment, using a small number of reference GS equilibria sampled along the desired scenario trajectory, with each VC used to control the plasma within a preset time interval. While effective near the reference equilibrium, this approach can lead to degraded performance as the plasma departs from the reference equilibrium and/or from the desired trajectory, and it complicates the design of robust control strategies for rapidly evolving plasma configurations. In this paper, we construct neural-network-based emulators of plasma shape parameters from which VCs can be derived, to provide the MAST Upgrade (MAST-U) plasma control system with state-aware VCs in real-time. To do this, we develop an extensive library of over a million simulated GS equilibria, covering a substantial portion of the MAST-U operational space. These emulators provide differentiable functions whose gradients can be rapidly computed, enabling the derivation of accurate VCs for real-time shape control. We perform extensive verification of the emulated VCs by testing whether they disentangle the control problem. The neural-network-based approach delivers high accuracy and orthogonality across a diverse range of equilibria. This work establishes the physical validity of emulated VCs as a scalable and general alternative to schedules of precomputed VCs.

We propose a game-theoretic framework for adaptive multi-agent intelligent systems. Unlike classical game theory, which often treats strategies as primitive objects chosen by perfectly rational agents, the proposed framework provides a mathematical foundation for studying equilibrium in NeuroAI and can be viewed as an extension of game theory under relaxed assumptions, including partial observability, bounded computation, and uncertainty. At its core, Multilevel Interactive Equilibrium (MIE) generalizes the classical Nash equilibrium to intelligent systems with internal computation. Rather than being defined solely at the level of observable behavior, equilibrium emerges when neural learning dynamics, cognitive representations, and behavioral strategies mutually stabilize between interacting agents. This framework applies uniformly to interactions between two biological brains, two artificial agents, or hybrid human-AI systems. We discuss applications of multilevel game theory to human-autonomous vehicle driving, human-machine interaction, human-large language model (LLM) interaction, and computational psychiatry. We also outline experimental strategies and computational methods for estimating MIE and discuss challenges and prospects for future research.

Large language models can score well on named game-theory benchmarks while failing on the same strategic computation once semantic cues are removed. We show this gap with procedurally generated zero-sum matrix games: a model that recognizes familiar games drops to 34%, 18%, and 2% success on anonymous $2{\times}2$, $3{\times}3$, and $5{\times}5$ payoff matrices. The benchmark separates semantic recall, learned approximate Nash computation, and an output-interface bottleneck that limits scale. Training only on $2{\times}2$ and $3{\times}3$ games, supervised fine-tuning raises unseen $5{\times}5$--$7{\times}7$ success from 2% to 61%, while exploitability-reward training averages 37% with high seed variance. We prove that the exploitability residual is $2$-Lipschitz in payoff perturbations, unlike discontinuous vertex-returning LP equilibrium selectors, explaining why residual training can transfer under payoff shifts even when formatting instability limits mean performance. A dominated-action padding experiment provides causal evidence: trained models solve $3{\times}3$ games embedded in much larger matrices, while random-padded controls fail and dense $12{\times}12$ games remain near failure. Procedural evaluation is therefore necessary for measuring strategic reasoning, and residual rewards expose a real but format-limited route to approximate equilibrium computation.

Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage equilibrium analysis in strategic scenarios, one must first elicit numerical utilities consistent with player preferences, a delicate and time-consuming process. In this work, we forgo precise utilities and generalize the Nash equilibrium to a setting where we only assume a player is capable of providing an ordinal ranking of their actions within the context of other players' joint actions. The key technical challenge is to rethink the definition of a best-response. While the classical definition identifies actions maximizing expected payoff, we naturally look towards social choice theory for how to aggregate preferences to identify the most preferred actions. We define this generalized notion of a context-ordinal Nash equilibrium, establish its existence under mild conditions on aggregation methods, introduce notions of regularization, approximation, and regret, explore complexity for simple settings, and develop learning rules for computing such equilibria. In doing so, we provide a generalization of Nash equilibrium and demonstrate its direct applicability to elicited preferences in human experiments.

Many scientific and combinatorial problems admit multiple correct solutions, not a single label. Standard supervised learning resolves this ambiguity by choosing one solution as the target, but this hidden selector can be arbitrary, discontinuous, and harder to learn than the underlying solution set. We study bifurcation models, a weight-tied dynamical view in which different initializations can converge to different stable equilibria, so the model represents an attractor landscape rather than one chosen branch. We prove that broad set-valued maps with locally Lipschitz branches can be represented by regular equilibrium dynamics and that the induced selectors are almost everywhere regular, while manual selectors can be arbitrarily irregular. Experiments on frustrated Ising models show that such dynamics can discover multiple valid equilibria without branch labels and outperform single-branch supervision. Allen--Cahn experiments further show that diversity is not automatic: it can be encouraged explicitly, but with an accuracy--diversity tradeoff.