Human Oversight of AI

The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in high-risk, decision-making scenarios presents technical, safety, and normative challenges; problems that may only be ameliorated by human oversight. However, notions of human oversight lack a common foundational understanding: oversight architectures are not well defined, the roles involved remain unclear, and implementation steps are opaque. Hence, researchers and practitioners struggle to determine how to design, implement, and evaluate systems that enable effective human oversight. This paper advances a practical framework for effective human oversight of AI systems, based on a cross-disciplinary perspective that draws on insights from computer science, human-computer interaction, psychology, philosophy, and law. The core contributions are: (1) a foundational framework, with a working definition, architecture and processes for effective human oversight of AI systems; (2) an initial template for documenting oversight architectures and processes, applied to diverse domains; and (3) a synthesis of open research challenges that need to be considered in the emerging field of effective human oversight of AI systems.

AI-based writing assistants are ubiquitous, yet little is known about how users' mental models shape their use. We examine two types of mental models -- functional or related to what the system does, and structural or related to how the system works -- and how they affect control behavior -- how users request, accept, or edit AI suggestions as they write -- and writing outcomes. We primed participants ($N = 48$) with different system descriptions to induce these mental models before asking them to complete a cover letter writing task using a writing assistant that occasionally offered preconfigured ungrammatical suggestions to test whether the mental models affected participants' critical oversight. We find that while participants in the structural mental model condition demonstrate a better understanding of the system, this can have a backfiring effect: while these participants judged the system as more usable, they also produced letters with more grammatical errors, highlighting a complex relationship between system understanding, trust, and control in contexts that require user oversight of error-prone AI outputs.

The AI-based sensing and autonomous monitoring have become the main components of wildfire early detection, but current systems do not provide adaptive inter-agent coordination, structurally defined human control, and cryptographically verifiable responsibility. Purely autonomous alert dissemination in the context of safety critical disasters poses threats of false alarming, governance failure and lack of trust in the system. This paper provides a blockchain-based governance-conscious agentic AI architecture of trusted wildfire early warning. The monitoring of wildfires is modeled as a constrained partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) that accounts for the detection latency, false alarms reduction and resource consumption with clear governance constraints. Hierarchical multi-agent coordination means dynamic risk-adaptive reallocation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). With risk-adaptive policies, a permissioned blockchain layer sets mandatory human-authorization as a state-transition invariant as a smart contract. We build formal assurances such as integrity of alerts, human control, non-repudiation and limited detection latency assumptions of Byzantine fault. Security analysis shows that it is resistant to alert injections, replays, and tampering attacks. High-fidelity simulation environment experimental evaluation of governance enforcement demonstrates that it presents limited operational overhead and decreases false public alerts and maintains adaptive detection performance. This work is a step towards a principled design paradigm of reliable AI systems by incorporating accountability into the agentic control loop of disaster intelligence systems that demand safety in their application.

Organizational knowledge is fragmented across a variety of software systems, tacit expertise, and manual documents that have traditionally been designed for human consumption. As AI systems are increasingly deployed and granted decision-making roles, they require access to this knowledge. This raises two questions: how should organizations store and maintain knowledge so that it remains accessible to both humans and future AI systems, and how should agency be allocated between humans and AI across tasks with different risks and levels of uncertainty? In this position paper, we describe how organizational knowledge evolves and contribute a framework that maps task attributes and knowledge availability to recommended agency allocations and control mechanisms. We illustrate the applicability of the framework on two different manufacturing tasks: a routine operation (visual quality inspection) and a one-off strategic decision (factory location), and conclude with opportunities for future research.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly integrated into healthcare and pharmacy workflows, supporting tasks such as medication recommendations, dosage determination, and drug interaction detection. While these systems often demonstrate strong performance under standard evaluation metrics, their reliability in real-world decision-making remains insufficiently understood. In high-risk domains such as medication management, even a single incorrect recommendation can result in severe patient harm. This paper examines the reliability of AI-assisted medication systems by focusing on system failures and their potential clinical consequences. Rather than evaluating performance solely through aggregate metrics, this work shifts attention towards how errors occur and what happens when AI systems produce incorrect outputs. Through a series of controlled, simulated scenarios involving drug interactions and dosage decisions, we analyse different types of system failures, including missed interactions, incorrect risk flagging, and inappropriate dosage recommendations. The findings highlight that AI errors in medication-related contexts can lead to adverse drug reactions, ineffective treatment, or delayed care, particularly when systems are used without sufficient human oversight. Furthermore, the paper discusses the risks of over-reliance on AI recommendations and the challenges posed by limited transparency in decision-making processes. This work contributes a reliability-focused perspective on AI evaluation in healthcare, emphasising the importance of understanding failure behavior and real-world impact. It highlights the need to complement traditional performance metrics with risk-aware evaluation approaches, particularly in safety-critical domains such as pharmacy practice.

The accelerating displacement of human labor by artificial intelligence (AI) and robotic systems represents a structural transformation whose societal consequences extend far beyond conventional labor market analysis. This paper presents a systematic multi-domain examination of the likely effects on economic structure, psychological well-being, political stability, education, healthcare, and geopolitical order. We identify a critical and underexamined dimension of this transition: the governance gap between nominal human oversight of AI systems -- where humans occupy positions of formal authority over AI decisions -- and genuine human oversight, where those humans possess the cognitive access, technical capability, and institutional authority to meaningfully understand, evaluate, and override AI outputs. We argue that this distinction, largely absent from current governance frameworks including the EU AI Act and NIST AI Risk Management Framework 1.0, represents the primary architectural failure mode in deployed AI governance. The societal consequences of labor displacement intensify this problem by concentrating consequential AI decision-making among an increasingly narrow class of technical and capital actors. We propose five architectural requirements for genuine human oversight systems and characterize the governance window -- estimated at 10-15 years -- before current deployment trajectories risk path-dependent social, economic, and institutional lock-in.

AI-assisted task delegation is increasingly common, yet human effort in such systems is costly and typically unobserved. Recent work by Bastani and Cachon (2025); Sambasivan et al. (2021) shows that accuracy-based payment schemes suffer from incentive collapse: as AI accuracy improves, sustaining positive human effort requires unbounded payments. We study this phenomenon in a budget-constrained principal-agent framework with strategic human agents whose output accuracy depends on unobserved effort. Our first contribution is a general impossibility result showing that incentive collapse is not merely a limitation of simple linear payments, but arises for any payment rule based only on observed task accuracy.To overcome this barrier, we propose a sentinel-auditing payment mechanism that enforces a strictly positive and controllable level of human effort at finite cost, independent of AI accuracy. Building on this incentive-robust foundation, we develop an incentive-aware active statistical inference framework that jointly optimizes (i) the auditing rate and (ii) active sampling and budget allocation across tasks of varying difficulty to minimize the final statistical loss under a single budget. Experiments demonstrate improved cost-error tradeoffs relative to standard active learning and auditing-only baselines.

As AI assistants become integrated into safety engineering workflows for Physical AI systems, a critical question emerges: does AI assistance improve safety analysis quality, or introduce systematic blind spots that surface only through post-deployment incidents? This paper develops a formal framework for AI assistance in safety analysis. We first establish why safety engineering resists benchmark-driven evaluation: safety competence is irreducibly multidimensional, constrained by context-dependent correctness, inherent incompleteness, and legitimate expert disagreement. We formalize this through a five-dimensional competence framework capturing domain knowledge, standards expertise, operational experience, contextual understanding, and judgment. We introduce the competence shadow: the systematic narrowing of human reasoning induced by AI-generated safety analysis. The shadow is not what the AI presents, but what it prevents from being considered. We formalize four canonical human-AI collaboration structures and derive closed-form performance bounds, demonstrating that the competence shadow compounds multiplicatively to produce degradation far exceeding naive additive estimates. The central finding is that AI assistance in safety engineering is a collaboration design problem, not a software procurement decision. The same tool degrades or improves analysis quality depending entirely on how it is used. We derive non-degradation conditions for shadow-resistant workflows and call for a shift from tool qualification toward workflow qualification for trustworthy Physical AI.

Recent events surrounding the relationship between frontier AI suppliers and national-security customers have made a structural problem newly visible: once a privately governed model becomes embedded in military workflows, the supplier can influence not only technical performance but also the operational boundary conditions under which the system may be used. This paper argues that the central strategic issue is not merely access to capable models, but preservation of decision sovereignty: the state's ability to retain authority over decision policy, version control, fallback behavior, auditability, and final action approval even when analytical modules are sourced from commercial vendors. Using the public Anthropic--Pentagon dispute of 2026, the broader history of Project Maven, and recent U.S., NATO, U.K., and intelligence-community guidance as a motivating context, the paper develops a trade-secret-safe architectural formulation of the Energetic Paradigm as a layered, model-agnostic command-support design. In this formulation, supplier models remain replaceable analytical components, while routing, constraints, logging, escalation, and action authorization remain state-owned functions. The paper contributes three things: a definition of decision sovereignty for military AI; a threat model for supplier-induced boundary control; and a public architectural specification showing how model replaceability, human authority, and sovereign orchestration can reduce strategic dependency without requiring disclosure of proprietary implementation details. The argument is conceptual rather than experimental, but it yields concrete implications for procurement, governance, and alliance interoperability.

As the capabilities and adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems grow, trust in these AI systems is an increasingly urgent concern. Much research has focused on models of AI governance and has primarily examined incentives for safe development and effective regulation. Hence they typically represented users trust as a one-shot adoption choice rather than as a dynamic, evolving process shaped by repeated interactions. We instead model trust as the dynamic choice of reduced monitoring in a repeated, asymmetric interaction between users and AI developers, where checking developers' behaviour is costly. Using evolutionary game theory, we study how users' strategies of trust and developers' strategies of providing safe (compliant) or unsafe (non-compliant) AI co-evolve under different levels of monitoring cost and institutional regimes. We conduct the analysis on both imitation-based and learning-based perspectives, with the stochastic finite-population dynamics, the infinite-population replicator analysis and the reinforcement learning analysis. We find three robust long-run regimes: no adoption by users while developers provide unsafe AI, unsafe but widely adopted systems, and safe systems that are widely adopted. Only the last is desirable, and it arises when penalties for unsafe behaviour exceed the extra cost of safety and users can still afford to monitor at least occasionally. Our results formally support governance proposals that emphasise transparency, low-cost monitoring, and meaningful sanctions, and they show that neither regulation alone nor blind user trust is sufficient to prevent the drift towards unsafe or low-adoption outcomes.

Ethical discourse on AI in healthcare has focused predominantly on back-end concerns such as bias, fairness and explainability, while the front-end interface, where patients and clinicians actually encounter AI outputs, remains under explored. This paper identifies imbalanced user-AI relationships as a distinct class of front-end ethical failure: patients are rendered highly visible to AI systems through data inference, yet cannot understand, question or influence how they are represented. Through the concept of asymmetric legibility and a chat-based telemedicine case, we show how design choices e.g., default recommendations, restricted inputs and suppressed uncertainty, undermine agency, clinician judgment and human oversight even where systems are technically accurate. We propose reciprocity as a design orientation and offer interventions for more balanced, participatory user-AI relationships in healthcare.

Background: Amid the opportunities and risks introduced by generative AI, learning research needs to envision how human minds and responsibilities should re-adapt as AI augments or automates various tasks and enters daily learning, knowledge work, and social life. Approach: Drawing on theories of learning, intelligence, and knowledge creation, this conceptual paper proposes intellectual stewardship as a human-centered, conceptually grounded framework for advancing creative learning practices with AI. Key points: Students and teachers work as responsible governors of intellectual processes distributed across human and artificial systems, guided by five core principles. Being knowledge-wise involves understanding the evolving state of knowledge and taking purposeful actions to advance it. Being intelligence-wise emphasizes making informed choices about how to orchestrate distributed cognitive processes and resources. Being context-wise requires sensitivity to recognize opportunities and risks. Being ethics-wise foregrounds ethical judgment, responsibility, and care in the use of knowledge and intellectual power. Finally, self- and community-growing defines the overarching purpose, aligning intellectual work with personal development and the advancement of collective well-being. Contribution: The principles provide a lens for viewing the adaptation of human minds in AI-infused learning environments, calling for the development of meta-level dispositions and capabilities that characterize wisdom-oriented, socially responsible knowledge builders in the AI age.

Critical infrastructure increasingly incorporates embodied AI for monitoring, predictive maintenance, and decision support. However, AI systems designed to handle statistically representable uncertainty struggle with cascading failures and crisis dynamics that exceed their training assumptions. This paper argues that Embodied AIs resilience depends on bounded autonomy within a hybrid governance architecture. We outline four oversight modes and map them to critical infrastructure sectors based on task complexity, risk level, and consequence severity. Drawing on the EU AI Act, ISO safety standards, and crisis management research, we argue that effective governance requires a structured allocation of machine capability and human judgement.

Generative AI is entering research, education, and professional work faster than current governance frameworks can specify how AI-assisted outputs should be judged in learning-intensive settings. The central problem is proxy failure: a polished artifact can be useful while no longer serving as credible evidence of the human understanding, judgment, or transfer ability that the work is supposed to cultivate or certify. This paper proposes AI to Learn 2.0, a deliverable-oriented governance framework for AI-assisted work. Rather than claiming element-wise novelty, it reorganizes adjacent ideas around the final deliverable package, distinguishes artifact residual from capability residual, and operationalizes the result through a five-part package, a seven-dimension maturity rubric, gate thresholds on critical dimensions, and a companion capability-evidence ladder. AI to Learn 2.0 allows opaque AI during exploration, drafting, hypothesis generation, and workflow design, but requires that the released deliverable be usable, auditable, transferable, and justifiable without the original large language model or cloud API. In learning-intensive contexts, it additionally requires context-appropriate human-attributable evidence of explanation or transfer. Worked scoring across contrastive cases, including coursework substitution, a symbolic-regression governance contrast, teacher-audited national-exam practice forms, and a self-hosted lecture-to-quiz pipeline with deterministic quality control, shows how the framework separates polished substitution workflows from bounded, auditable, and handoff-ready AI-assisted workflows. AI to Learn 2.0 is proposed as a governance instrument for structured third-party review where capability preservation, accountability, and validity boundaries matter.

The automation of AI R&D (AIRDA) could have significant implications, but its extent and ultimate effects remain uncertain. We need empirical data to resolve these uncertainties, but existing data (primarily capability benchmarks) may not reflect real-world automation or capture its broader consequences, such as whether AIRDA accelerates capabilities more than safety progress or whether our ability to oversee AI R&D can keep pace with its acceleration. To address these gaps, this work proposes metrics to track the extent of AIRDA and its effects on AI progress and oversight. The metrics span dimensions such as capital share of AI R&D spending, researcher time allocation, and AI subversion incidents, and could help decision makers understand the potential consequences of AIRDA, implement appropriate safety measures, and maintain awareness of the pace of AI development. We recommend that companies and third parties (e.g. non-profit research organisations) start to track these metrics, and that governments support these efforts.

Generative AI can convert uncertainty into authoritative-seeming verdicts, displacing the justificatory work on which democratic epistemic agency depends. As a corrective, I propose a Brouwer-inspired assertibility constraint for responsible AI: in high-stakes domains, systems may assert or deny claims only if they can provide a publicly inspectable and contestable certificate of entitlement; otherwise they must return Undetermined. This constraint yields a three-status interface semantics (Asserted, Denied, Undetermined) whose statuses mark entitlement to categorical speech rather than truth values of the underlying world-claim. The framework distinguishes internal entitlement from public standing while connecting them through the certificate as a boundary object. Philosophically, it develops a form of applied intuitionism: resistance to unwarranted completeness becomes a norm of public machine speech, under which categorical commitment requires exhibited and contestable entitlement. I operationalize the constraint through structured certificates, decision-layer gates for threshold and argmax predicates, and a reason-coded output contract. A design lemma shows that, under a refutation-soundness condition on the contractually specified negative side, certificate-sound binary totality presupposes witnessed decidability on the declared scope. Under the output contract, Undetermined is therefore not a tunable reject option but a mandatory status whenever the available certificates do not uniquely license assertion or denial. By making outputs answerable to contestable warrants rather than confidence alone, the paper aims to preserve epistemic agency where automated speech enters public justification.

Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) is increasingly being integrated into complex business workflows, fundamentally shifting the boundaries of managerial decision-making. However, the reliability of its strategic advice in ambiguous business contexts remains a critical knowledge gap. To address this gap, this study compares multiple GenAI models in their ability to detect ambiguity, examines whether a systematic ambiguity-resolution process improves response quality, and investigates their susceptibility to sycophantic behavior when confronted with flawed managerial directives. Using a novel four-dimensional business ambiguity taxonomy, we conducted a human-in-the-loop experiment across strategic, tactical, and operational scenarios. The resulting decisions were assessed through a human-validated automated evaluation framework based on agreement, actionability, justification quality, and constraint adherence. The results show that our approach not only distinguishes different types of ambiguity, but also reveals how ambiguity resolution systematically changes model behavior. In particular, resolving ambiguities improved decision quality across all managerial levels, with the strongest gains observed in constraint adherence. The analysis further showed that sycophantic behavior is not uniform across models: some models challenged flawed assumptions, whereas others tended to comply with them. This study contributes to the bounded rationality literature by positioning GenAI as a cognitive scaffold that can detect and resolve ambiguities managers might overlook, while demonstrating that its artificial limitations require human oversight to ensure its reliability as a strategic partner.

Agentic AI systems - capable of goal interpretation, world modeling, planning, tool use, long-horizon operation, and autonomous coordination - introduce distinct control failures not addressed by existing safety frameworks. We identify six agentic governance failures tied to these capabilities and show how they erode meaningful human control in military settings. We propose the Agentic Military AI Governance Framework (AMAGF), a measurable architecture structured around three pillars: Preventive Governance (reducing failure likelihood), Detective Governance (real-time detection of control degradation), and Corrective Governance (restoring or safely degrading operations). Its core mechanism, the Control Quality Score (CQS), is a composite real-time metric quantifying human control and enabling graduated responses as control weakens. For each failure type, we define concrete mechanisms, assign responsibilities across five institutional actors, and formalize evaluation metrics. A worked operational scenario illustrates implementation, and we situate the framework within established agent safety literature. We argue that governance must move from a binary conception of control to a continuous model in which control quality is actively measured and managed throughout the operational lifecycle.

As AI systems enter institutional workflows, workers must decide whether to delegate task execution to AI and how much effort to invest in verifying AI outputs, while institutions evaluate workers using outcome-based standards that may misalign with workers' private costs. We model delegation and verification as the solution to a rational worker's optimization problem, and define worker quality by evaluating an institution-centered utility (distinct from the worker's objective) at the resulting optimal action. We formally characterize optimal worker workflows and show that AI induces phase transitions, where arbitrarily small differences in verification ability lead to sharply different behaviors. As a result, AI can amplify workers with strong verification reliability while degrading institutional worker quality for others who rationally over-delegate and reduce oversight, even when baseline task success improves and no behavioral biases are present. These results identify a structural mechanism by which AI reshapes institutional worker quality and amplifies quality disparities between workers with different verification reliability.

Human-Certified Module Repositories (HCMRs) are introduced in this work as a new architectural model for constructing trustworthy software in the era of AI-assisted development. As large language models increasingly participate in code generation, configuration synthesis, and multi-component integration, the reliability of AI-assembled systems will depend critically on the trustworthiness of the building blocks they use. Today's software supply-chain incidents and modular development ecosystems highlight the risks of relying on components with unclear provenance, insufficient review, or unpredictable composition behavior. We argue that future AI-driven development workflows require repositories of reusable modules that are curated, security-reviewed, provenance-rich, and equipped with explicit interface contracts. To this end, we propose HCMRs, a framework that blends human oversight with automated analysis to certify modules and support safe, predictable assembly by both humans and AI agents. We present a reference architecture for HCMRs, outline a certification and provenance workflow, analyze threat surfaces relevant to modular ecosystems, and extract lessons from recent failures. We further discuss implications for governance, scalability, and AI accountability, positioning HCMRs as a foundational substrate for reliable and auditable AI-constructed software systems.

Generative AI tools are increasingly entering academic peer review workflows, raising questions about fairness, accountability, and the legitimacy of evaluative judgment. While these systems promise efficiency gains amid growing reviewer overload, their use introduces new sociotechnical risks. This paper presents a convergent mixed-method study combining discourse analysis of 448 social media posts with interviews with 14 area chairs and program chairs from leading AI and HCI conferences to examine how GenAI is discussed and experienced in peer review. Across both datasets, we find broad agreement that GenAI may be acceptable for limited supportive tasks, such as improving clarity or structuring feedback, but that core evaluative judgments, assessing novelty, contribution, and acceptance, should remain human responsibilities. At the same time, participants highlight concerns about epistemic harm, over-standardization, unclear responsibility, and adversarial risks such as prompt injection. User interviews reveal how structural strain and institutional policy ambiguity shift interpretive and enforcement burdens onto individual scholars, disproportionately affecting junior authors and reviewers. By triangulating public governance discourse with lived review practices, this work reframes AI mediated peer review as a sociotechnical governance challenge and offers recommendations for preserving accountability, trust, and meaningful human oversight. Overall, we argue that AI-assisted peer review is best governed not by blanket bans or detection alone, but by explicitly reserving evaluative judgment for humans while instituting enforceable, role-specific controls that preserve accountability. We conclude with role specific recommendations that formalize the support judgment boundary.

Online power-asymmetric conflicts are prevalent, and most platforms rely on human moderators to conduct moderation currently. Previous studies have been continuously focusing on investigating human moderation biases in different scenarios, while moderation biases under power-asymmetric conflicts remain unexplored. Therefore, we aim to investigate the types of power-related biases human moderators exhibit in power-asymmetric conflict moderation (RQ1) and further explore the influence of AI's suggestions on these biases (RQ2). For this goal, we conducted a mixed design experiment with 50 participants by leveraging the real conflicts between consumers and merchants as a scenario. Results suggest several biases towards supporting the powerful party within these two moderation modes. AI assistance alleviates most biases of human moderation, but also amplifies a few. Based on these results, we propose several insights into future research on human moderation and human-AI collaborative moderation systems for power-asymmetric conflicts.

As AI agents increasingly perform economic tasks on behalf of humans, a fundamental tension arises between agent autonomy and human control over financial assets. We present the Agent Economic Sovereignty Protocol (AESP), a layered protocol in which agents transact autonomously at machine speed on crypto-native infrastructure while remaining cryptographically bound to human-defined governance boundaries. AESP enforces the invariant that agents are economically capable but never economically sovereign through five mechanisms: (1) a deterministic eight-check policy engine with tiered escalation; (2) human-in-the-loop review with automatic, explicit, and biometric tiers; (3) EIP-712 dual-signed commitments with escrow; (4) HKDF-based context-isolated privacy with batched consolidation; and (5) an ACE-GF-based cryptographic substrate. We formalize two testable hypotheses on security coverage and latency overhead, and specify a complete evaluation methodology with baselines and ablation design. The protocol is implemented as an open-source TypeScript SDK (208 tests, ten modules) with interoperability via MCP and A2A.

Can artificial intelligence truly contribute to creative mathematical research, or does it merely automate routine calculations while introducing risks of error? We provide empirical evidence through a detailed case study: the discovery of novel error representations and bounds for Hermite quadrature rules via systematic human-AI collaboration. Working with multiple AI assistants, we extended results beyond what manual work achieved, formulating and proving several theorems with AI assistance. The collaboration revealed both remarkable capabilities and critical limitations. AI excelled at algebraic manipulation, systematic proof exploration, literature synthesis, and LaTeX preparation. However, every step required rigorous human verification, mathematical intuition for problem formulation, and strategic direction. We document the complete research workflow with unusual transparency, revealing patterns in successful human-AI mathematical collaboration and identifying failure modes researchers must anticipate. Our experience suggests that, when used with appropriate skepticism and verification protocols, AI tools can meaningfully accelerate mathematical discovery while demanding careful human oversight and deep domain expertise.

For millennia, human cognition was the primary engine of progress on Earth. As AI decouples cognition from biology, the marginal cost of measurable execution falls to zero, absorbing any labor capturable by metrics--including creative, analytical, and innovative work. The binding constraint on growth is no longer intelligence but human verification bandwidth: the capacity to validate, audit, and underwrite responsibility when execution is abundant. We model the AGI transition as the collision of two racing cost curves: an exponentially decaying Cost to Automate and a biologically bottlenecked Cost to Verify. This structural asymmetry widens a Measurability Gap between what agents can execute and what humans can afford to verify. It also drives a shift from skill-biased to measurability-biased technical change. Rents migrate to verification-grade ground truth, cryptographic provenance, and liability underwriting--the ability to insure outcomes rather than merely generate them. The current human-in-the-loop equilibrium is unstable: eroded from below as apprenticeship collapses (Missing Junior Loop) and from within as experts codify their obsolescence (Codifier's Curse). Unverified deployment becomes privately rational--a Trojan Horse externality. Unmanaged, these forces pull toward a Hollow Economy. Yet by scaling verification alongside agentic capabilities, the forces that threaten collapse become the catalyst for unbounded discovery and experimentation--an Augmented Economy. We derive a practical playbook for individuals, companies, investors, and policymakers. Today's defining challenge is not the race to deploy the most autonomous systems; it is the race to secure the foundations of their oversight. Only by scaling our bandwidth for verification alongside our capacity for execution can we ensure that the intelligence we have summoned preserves the humanity that initiated it.

Agentic AI systems are deployed with expectations of substantial productivity gains, yet rigorous empirical evidence reveals systematic discrepancies between pre-deployment expectations and post-deployment outcomes. We review controlled trials and independent validations across software engineering, clinical documentation, and clinical decision support to quantify this expectation-realisation gap. In software development, experienced developers expected a 24% speedup from AI tools but were slowed by 19% -- a 43 percentage-point calibration error. In clinical documentation, vendor claims of multi-minute time savings contrast with measured reductions of less than one minute per note, and one widely deployed tool showed no statistically significant effect. In clinical decision support, externally validated performance falls substantially below developer-reported metrics. These shortfalls are driven by workflow integration friction, verification burden, measurement construct mismatches, and systematic variation in who benefits and who does not. The evidence motivates structured planning frameworks that require explicit, quantified benefit expectations with human oversight costs factored in.

Organizations across finance, healthcare, transportation, content moderation, and critical infrastructure are rapidly deploying highly automated AI systems, yet they lack principled methods to quantify how increasing automation amplifies harm when failures occur. We propose a parsimonious Bayesian risk decomposition expressing expected loss as the product of three terms: the probability of system failure, the conditional probability that a failure propagates into harm given the automation level, and the expected severity of harm. This framework isolates a critical quantity -- the conditional probability that failures propagate into harm -- which captures execution and oversight risk rather than model accuracy alone. We develop complete theoretical foundations: formal proofs of the decomposition, a harm propagation equivalence theorem linking the harm propagation probability to observable execution controls, risk elasticity measures, efficient frontier analysis for automation policy, and optimal resource allocation principles with second-order conditions. We motivate the framework with an illustrative case study of the 2012 Knight Capital incident ($440M loss) as one instantiation of a broadly applicable failure pattern, and characterize the research design required to empirically validate the framework at scale across deployment domains. This work provides the theoretical foundations for a new class of deployment-focused risk governance tools for agentic and automated AI systems.

To enable human oversight, agentic AI systems often provide a trace of reasoning and action steps. Designing traces to have an informative, but not overwhelming, level of detail remains a critical challenge. In three user studies on a Computer User Agent, we investigate the utility of basic action traces for verification, explore three alternatives via design probes, and test a novel interface's impact on error finding in question-answering tasks. As expected, we find that current practices are cumbersome, limiting their efficacy. Conversely, our proposed design reduced the time participants spent finding errors. However, although participants reported higher levels of confidence in their decisions, their final accuracy was not meaningfully improved. To this end, our study surfaces challenges for human verification of agentic systems, including managing built-in assumptions, users' subjective and changing correctness criteria, and the shortcomings, yet importance, of communicating the agent's process.

Commercial insurance underwriting is a labor-intensive process that requires manual review of extensive documentation to assess risk and determine policy pricing. While AI offers substantial efficiency improvements, existing solutions lack comprehensive reasoning and internal mechanisms to ensure reliability in regulated, high-stakes environments. Full automation remains impractical and inadvisable when human judgment and accountability are critical. This study presents a decision-negative, human-in-the-loop agentic system that incorporates an adversarial self-critique mechanism as a bounded safety architecture for regulated underwriting workflows. In this system, a critic agent challenges the primary agent's conclusions prior to submitting recommendations to human reviewers. This internal system of checks and balances addresses a critical gap in AI safety for regulated workflows. Additionally, the research develops a formal taxonomy of failure modes to characterize potential errors by decision-negative agents. This taxonomy provides a structured framework for risk identification and management in high-stakes applications. Experimental evaluation using 500 expert-validated underwriting cases demonstrates that the adversarial critique mechanism reduces AI hallucination rates from 11.3% to 3.8% and increases decision accuracy from 92% to 96%. At the same time, the framework enforces strict human authority over all binding decisions by design. These findings indicate that adversarial self-critique supports safer AI deployment in regulated domains and offers a model for responsible integration where human oversight is indispensable.

Generative AI is likely to transform terminology work by creating new opportunities for automation. At the same time, it raises concerns about the future of terminologists and terminological resources, as efficiency pressures may encourage excessive automation based on the perception that human expertise can be replaced by AI. However, large language models remain unreliable for terminological purposes due to errors, hallucinations, and various forms of bias, making terminologists indispensable for ensuring the accuracy and reliability of terminological data. This paper argues that human-centered AI, an approach that emphasizes that AI's primary goal should be to contribute to human well-being, provides a framework for maximizing the benefits of generative AI while mitigating its risks. It contends that high levels of automation and meaningful human control are compatible and desirable, and that AI should enhance terminologists' capabilities while preserving their agency and decision-making authority. The implications of AI-assisted terminology work are examined through three interrelated dimensions: the augmented terminologist, ethical AI, and human-centered design. In particular, the paper examines how AI integration reshapes the role of the terminologist, affects professional values and working conditions, requires the management of AI-generated bias, and calls for the design of AI tools around the terminologist's needs. The paper concludes that a human-centered orientation is necessary to ensure that AI strengthens, rather than undermines, the essential role of terminology work in supporting specialized communication and the accurate transmission of knowledge across languages and cultures.