Majority Voting

Post-training of language models is commonly framed as a sample-score-update loop implemented by gradient descent. A recent line of work, exemplified by RandOpt, relocates this loop to weight space, sampling Gaussian perturbations around a pretrained model and ensembling the top-K rewarded specialists at inference. While competitive with PPO and GRPO under matched training compute, this prediction-level ensemble incurs K forward passes per test example and does not extend cleanly to free-form generation. We ask whether the rewarded population can instead be folded into a single deployable model, replacing the inference-time ensemble with one consolidated update. A split-half analysis over 25 model-task pairs reveals reproducible low-rank structure in every case. We turn this geometry into CoRP (Consolidating Rewarded Perturbations), a gradient-free operator that combines reward-weighted aggregation, compatibility-aware reweighting, and a held-out validation gate, with no gradient flowing through the language model. Across five language models from 0.5B to 8B and five tasks covering math, code, and creative writing, CoRP improves the base model by 8.1 points on average. Using one tenth of RandOpt's perturbation budget, CoRP exceeds single-inference RandOpt by 6.5 points and recovers more than half of the gain of the 50-pass majority-vote ensemble, at one forward pass per test example.

Test-time compute (TTC) strategies have emerged as a lightweight approach to boost reasoning in large language models (LLMs). However, their application and benefits for vision-language models (VLMs) remain underexplored. We present a systematic study of TTC across seven VLMs and six benchmarks, specifically analyzing feature-based scoring and majority voting methods. We find that feature heuristics fail and voting yields only modest gains in single-model settings. We theoretically show that this limitation stems from a lack of prediction diversity: when outputs are highly correlated, voting provides little benefit. In contrast, multi-model ensembles offer richer diversity, yet standard majority voting fails to account for varying model capabilities. To address this, we propose Entropy-based TTC (ETTC), which selects the most confident prediction based on predictive entropy. Our method reduces to majority voting in the single-model case, but in model ensembles, it leverages confidence disparities to prioritize stronger models. We prove that ETTC outperforms majority voting under mild assumptions and empirically demonstrate that it consistently surpasses both voting and the best individual model. Crucially, our results show that smaller models can synergistically enhance larger ones, unlocking ensembling gains not achievable with standard strategies.

LLM-as-a-judge panels aggregate votes from multiple models, with the expectation that diverse models yield more reliable evaluations. We develop a framework to measure the true informational value of such panels and quantify how far their reliability falls short of the independent-voting ideal. Testing a panel of 9 frontier LLMs from 7 model families on three natural language inference datasets (each with 100 human annotations per item), we find that the 9 judges effectively provide only about 2 independent votes' worth of information. Roughly three-quarters of the panel's nominal independence is lost because the models make the same mistakes on the same items. The consequences are stark: the panel's actual accuracy falls 8-22 percentage points short of what independent voting would achieve, and the best single judge matches or outperforms the full panel across all conditions. Neither adding more judges nor using smarter aggregation algorithms helps -- established methods close at most 11% of this gap, even with access to the correct answers. We quantify these findings using the Kish effective sample size (n_eff) and a Condorcet null model, and show the deficit is robust across prompt variants, temperatures, chain-of-thought reasoning, and a pairwise preference task (RewardBench). The bottleneck is correlated judges, not the aggregation algorithm, implying that scaling up panels cannot substitute for genuinely independent evaluation.

We introduce the incremental voter model (IVM), a discrete-opinion multi-agent system where agents undergo step-wise transitions biased by the opinion of a randomly selected persuader. Our incremental voter model comprises a large population of interacting agents, each holding an opinion represented by an element of the discrete set $\{-k,\ldots,0,\ldots,k\}, k \in \mathbb{N}_{+}$. At each update step as time progresses, a pair of distinct agents are selected independently and uniformly at random from the population, and the first agent (viewed as the listener'') updates its opinion based on that of the second (viewed as the persuader''), adopting a new opinion that differs from its current one by at most one unit. By deriving the mean-field system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations (ODEs) that governs the large-population limit of the agent-based model, we develop a rigorous mathematical framework to study the asymptotic behavior of the opinion distribution in the mean-field limit. These results contribute to a deeper understanding of social influence processes in complex systems, particularly in modeling opinion polarization, and may guide the formulation of more advanced models in future research.

Despite Japan being one of the world's largest advanced democracies, the development of election forecasting models for its national elections remains limited. This study introduces nonlinear machine-learning forecasting models, based on decision tree and ensemble learning methods, for predicting the outcomes of Japanese lower-house elections. To assess the methodological benefits of our approach, we replicated the theoretical framework and dataset of Lewis-Beck and Tien's (LBT) foundational statistical forecasting model for Japanese elections. Our models demonstrated moderately but consistently improved predictive accuracy compared to LBT's model in both in-sample and out-of-sample evaluations, suggesting that nonlinear algorithms offer an alternative approach to classical linear methods in capturing complex electoral dynamics. This study represents one of the earlier applications of nonlinear machine-learning techniques to single-country election forecasting. It offers a replicable framework that, when combined with the country-specific electoral theories of other nations, may enhance the predictive performance of forecasting models in broader national contexts.

We study the mean-squared error of $k$-fold cross-validation as a risk estimator, with particular emphasis on how its accuracy depends on the number of folds $k$. Despite the widespread use of cross-validation, principled guidance for choosing $k$ is largely absent, mainly due to the complex dependence between fold-wise error estimates. To obtain sharp and interpretable results, we focus on the majority algorithm in binary classification, a minimal yet nontrivial empirical risk minimization procedure. We provide a fine-grained analysis of its cross-validation behavior, showing that even this simple algorithm exhibits subtle and delicate phenomena for which existing theory provides loose and even vacuous bounds. Leveraging this analysis, we introduce a minimax framework for cross-validation risk estimation and prove that no empirical risk minimization algorithm can achieve an $O(1/n)$ minimax mean-squared error when the number of folds grows with the number of samples $n$; instead, a lower bound of order $Ω(\sqrt{k}/n)$ is unavoidable. Our results reveal fundamental limitations of cross-validation as a data-reuse strategy, clarify gaps and inaccuracies in prior theoretical work, and position the majority algorithm as a natural benchmark that any tight analysis of cross-validation should be able to explain.

When language models use test-time sampling, they generate multiple reasoning trajectories and select an answer by majority vote. We show that these trajectories are not independent: for a given question, they concentrate into a small number of clusters, or reasoning basins, each defined by a normalized final answer and the solutions that reach it. A majority vote therefore selects the most stable basin rather than the most accurate one, which creates wrong-majority failures where the correct answer is present but outvoted. We introduce ARBITER, a model-agnostic approach that models interactions between basins using only the base model's own sampled outputs, hidden states, and derived evidence. Most direct correction strategies fail; ARBITER instead uses conservative additive evidence on top of consensus. In its simplest parameter-free form, ARBITER-Δ adds same-model evidence to the majority prior, while ARBITER-Enc augments this with bounded residual signals from hidden states over complete solutions. On GSM8K with Qwen3-4B, consensus over K=24 samples achieves around the mid-94% range, while a same-pool top-2 oracle reaches around the mid-96% range. ARBITER recovers a subset of these cases using zero external information. Across three model families and three math benchmarks, it yields consistent gains with no net-negative cases; for example, on Llama-3.1-8B MMLU-HS-Math, it improves accuracy from the mid-78% range to the mid-82% range, recovering about 22% of the available oracle headroom, indicating that this headroom can be partially recovered from the sample pool itself.

The communication complexity of a voting rule is the worst-case number of bits that n voters must transmit to a central authority under the most efficient elicitation protocol in an election with m candidates. We study the communication complexity of Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV). Conitzer and Sandholm [2005] established an upper bound of O(n (log m)${}^2$), but did not provide a matching lower bound beyond $Ω$(n log m). We resolve this open problem by raising the lower bound to $Ω$(n (log m)${}^2$) using the fooling set technique, thereby showing that the communication complexity of IRV is $Θ$(n (log m)${}^2$). We further show that this complexity drops to $Θ$(n log m) under the single-peakedness restriction, and that both the IRV-Average variant and Single Transferable Vote (STV), the multiwinner extension of IRV, have the same asymptotic communication complexity as IRV.

We analyze the structure of the disagreement among a population of voters over a set of alternatives. Surveys typically ask either for pairwise comparisons, simple and intuitive for participants, or full rankings over alternatives, eliciting the entire voters' preferences. Building on the observation that pairwise comparisons cannot distinguish structural disagreement from noise, we propose a stratified framework to identify the minimal aggregated preference information needed to compute a number of disagreement measures from the literature. Specifically, we introduce the plurality matrix, a generalization of pairwise comparisons that records, for every subset $S$ of alternatives, the probability that each $a \in S$ ranks first in $S$. We define the level of a disagreement measure as the smallest subset size needed to express it, showing that many existing notions, including rank-variance and divisiveness, sit at level $3$, proving that pairwise comparisons are not enough. In addition, we demonstrate the interest of going beyond level $3$ both theoretically and experimentally. To make these results actionable, we design two elicitation protocols to estimate the plurality matrix, exploring the trade-off between the number of required participants and the cognitive load requested to each of them.

Test-time reinforcement learning (TTRL) reports substantial accuracy gains on mathematical reasoning benchmarks using majority vote as a pseudo-label signal. We argue these gains are systematically misinterpreted: most reflect sharpening of already-solvable problems rather than genuine learning, while problems corrupted from correct to incorrect outnumber truly learned ones, and this damage is irreversible once majority vote locks onto a wrong answer. Per-problem tracking reveals that correct-answer signals in low-ability problems are briefly active before being permanently suppressed, a phenomenon we term the \textit{Correct-Answer Extinction Window}, with Flip Rate (FR) as its leading indicator. We thus propose TTRL-Guard, a lightweight framework with three mechanisms targeting the extinction window: Flip-Rate-Aware Reward Scaling (FRS) down-weights at-risk updates as FR declines, Minority-Preserving Sampling (MPS) retains gradient signal from minority correct answers, and Risk-Conditioned Sparse Updatings (RCSU) suspends updates on polarized problems. Experiments across three models and four benchmarks show that TTRL-Guard achieves the best average pass@1 on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct and Qwen3-4B, improves relatively over TTRL by +54% on AIME 2025.

Voting methods weighted by stakes are the fundamental governance paradigm in Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchains. Such a paradigm is known to be prone to power distortions: a few users possessing large stakes may completely control decision making, even without owning the totality of the stakes. We study this phenomenon through the lens of computational social choice, focusing on the extent of power imbalances in stake-weighted voting when power is quantified using the Penrose-Banzhaf power index. Our work presents both analytical and empirical contributions. Analytically, we demonstrate that while a perfect alignment between power and relative stake ownership is generally unattainable, it can be approximated in expectation under specific conditions. Empirically, using data from a real-world on-chain governance system (Project Catalyst), we provide a more fine-grained understanding of the power imbalances that are likely to occur in current stake-weighted governance systems.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit systematic political biases in voter simulations, but their underlying mechanisms and cross-lingual generalizations remain poorly understood. We introduce Dynamo-K, a census-grounded simulation framework evaluating Korean-language LLM political behavior across four models on six Korean elections (2017-2025). Using this framework, we identify three systematic failure modes: (1) progressive bias in moderate agents, where explicit mitigation reduces Mean Absolute Error (MAE) by 5.2 times; (2) model-dependent third-party salience collapse, distinguishing between salience failure and decision bias; and (3) regional polarization collapse, where models bidirectionally under-predict historical party strongholds. To address these failures, we demonstrate that scenario reframing recovers 62% of 2017 MAE by restoring third-party visibility. Furthermore, we introduce a learned reweighting adapter that successfully calibrates opposing-valence models without relying on candidate names at train or test time. Validating our diagnostic framework, Dynamo-K accurately predicts 3/3 presidential winners - including a 2.1%p MAE on the highly contested 0.73%p-margin 2022 race - and correctly identifies the dominant party in a held-out local election. The pipeline is open-source and provides a scalable, cost-effective method for diagnosing LLM political behavior.

Accurate Point of Interest (POI) attribute acquisition is essential for location-based services, yet traditional modular Interactive Voice Response (IVR) systems suffer from error accumulation and high maintenance overhead. We present DuIVRS-2, a large language model (LLM)-based end-to-end framework designed for large-scale POI attribute acquisition at Baidu Maps. To address the long-tail distribution of real-world interactions, our methodology first employs a finite state machine (FSM)-guided data augmentation strategy to synthesize a balanced and diverse training dataset. We then streamline dialogue management via a selective generation scheme combined with a Chain-of-Thought (CoT) mechanism, which ensures output stability and effectively eliminates hallucinations in industrial settings. To facilitate continuous policy refinement with minimal manual effort, we design a cooperative iterative learning framework that leverages a dual-evaluator voting system. Deployed in production for two months, DuIVRS-2 processed 0.4 million calls daily and achieved a 83.9% Task Success Rate (TSR), outperforming its predecessor by 4 percentage points while maintaining a low reaction time of 130ms. This work provides a production-proven reference for developing robust, cost-effective LLM agents for large-scale industrial dialogue applications.

Grammatical error correction using large language models often suffers from the over-correction issue. To mitigate this, we propose a training-free inference method that performs edit-level majority voting over multiple candidates generated by a single model, without requiring model modifications or additional training. Across nine benchmarks covering English, Czech, German, Ukrainian, Korean, Hindi, and Romanian, the proposed method outperforms both greedy and MBR decoding in most cases. Moreover, it yields stable correction quality regardless of the instruction prompts used. We release two repository supporting GEC datasets loading and LLM inference.

AI alignment and participatory design motivate a new democratic design problem: how to collectively choose a decision rule to use repeatedly. We study this problem for linear ranking rules, which repeatedly rank items $x_j$ within batches $X=(x_1,\dots,x_m)\in(\mathbb{R}^d)^m$, where each item's ranking is dictated by its score $\langle θ^*,x_j\rangle$ according to a fixed scoring vector $θ^*$. Given voters' preferred scoring vectors $θ^{(1)},\dots,θ^{(n)}$ and their population fractions $α^{(1)},\dots,α^{(n)}$, we ask how to choose a collective vector $θ^*$ satisfying individual proportionality (IP): every voter type $i$ should agree with the resulting rankings to an $α^{(i)}$-proportional degree, either on average over time (long-run IP) or even within each batch (per-batch IP). The default rule, the arithmetic mean of the $θ^{(i)}$, has been shown to be severely majoritarian; more generally, it is not clear that any fixed linear rule can balance many voters' disparate opinions. Our main result is that, surprisingly, there is a simple rule that does satisfy long-run IP: the angular mean, the spherical analog of the arithmetic mean. We then show that exact per-batch IP is impossible for fixed linear rules, but that the gap between per-batch and long-run IP shrinks quickly with batch size. Experiments on three real-world preference datasets show that all rules perform similarly when voters' preferences are homogeneous, while the angular mean substantially improves proportionality in high-disagreement regimes.

We study proportional representation in the temporal voting model, where collective decisions are made repeatedly over time over a fixed horizon. Prior work has extensively investigated how proportional representation axioms from multiwinner voting (e.g., justified representation (JR) and its variants) can be adapted, satisfied, and verified in this setting. However, much less is understood about their interaction with social welfare. In this work, we quantify the efficiency cost of enforcing proportionality. We formalize the welfare-proportionality tension via the worst-case ratio between the maximum achievable utilitarian welfare and the maximum welfare attainable subject to a proportionality axiom. We show that imposing proportional representation in the temporal setting can incur a growing, yet sublinear, welfare loss as the number of voters or rounds increases. We further identify a clean separation among axioms: for JR, the welfare loss diminishes as the time horizon grows and vanishes asymptotically, whereas for stronger axioms this conflict persists even with many rounds. Moreover, we prove that welfare maximization under each axiom is NP-complete and APX-hard, even under static preferences and bounded-degree approvals, and provide fixed-parameter algorithms under several natural structural parameters.

Disagreement in annotation is a common phenomenon in the development of NLP datasets and serves as a valuable source of insight. While majority voting remains the dominant strategy for aggregating labels, recent work has explored modeling individual annotators to preserve their perspectives. However, modeling each annotator is resource-intensive and remains underexplored across various NLP tasks. We propose an agreement-based clustering technique to model the disagreement between the annotators. We conduct comprehensive experiments in 40 datasets in 18 typologically diverse languages, covering three subjective NLP tasks: sentiment analysis, emotion classification, and hate speech detection. We evaluate four aggregation approaches: majority vote, ensemble, multi-label, and multitask. The results demonstrate that agreement-based clustering can leverage the full spectrum of annotator perspectives and significantly enhance classification performance in subjective NLP tasks compared to majority voting and individual annotator modeling. Regarding the aggregation approach, the multi-label and multitask approaches are better for modeling clustered annotators than an ensemble and model majority vote.

Large Language Models are increasingly used as zero-shot classifiers in complex reasoning tasks. However, standard constrained decoding suffers from a phenomenon we define as Renormalization Bias. When a model is restricted to a small set of target labels, the standard softmax operation discards the probability mass assigned to semantic synonyms in the original distribution. This loss of information, which we call the Silent Vote, results in artificial overconfidence and poor calibration. We propose Semantic Softmax, an inference-time layer that recovers this lost information by aggregating the scores of the semantic neighborhood surrounding each target label. We evaluate this approach on Qwen-3 and Phi-4-mini models using GoEmotions and Civil Comments datasets. Our results demonstrate consistent improvements across all evaluation metrics: Semantic Softmax substantially reduces Expected Calibration Error (ECE) and Brier Score, while simultaneously enhancing discriminative performance in terms of AUROC and Macro-F1. By accounting for linguistic nuances, our method provides a more calibrated and accurate alternative for zero-shot classification.

Organizations increasingly deploy multiple AI systems across task domains, but selecting a small, high-performing ensemble can require costly model calls, benchmark runs, and human evaluation. We study this selection problem as a distributional variant of multiwinner voting: tasks are drawn from an unknown domain distribution, each task induces feedback over candidate experts, and a committee's value on a task is determined by its best-performing member. We analyze both binary feedback, for tasks with correct/incorrect outcomes, and pairwise feedback, for tasks where candidate outputs are compared by preference. In the binary setting, the induced objective is coverage. We give exhaustive-elicitation baselines and matching worst-case query lower bounds, and we design a failure-conditioned greedy algorithm that preserves the standard $(1-1/e)$ guarantee while obtaining instance-dependent query savings. In the pairwise setting, we study $θ$-winning committees. We show that full-information optimization admits a PTAS but no EPTAS under Gap-ETH, and that the objective is monotone but not submodular. This motivates a weighted ordinal coverage relaxation, which is submodular and supports a failure-conditioned greedy oracle under pairwise feedback. We then convert this oracle back into $θ$-type guarantees through finite-family auditing or a minimax wrapper. We also provide small-scale LLM experiments illustrating the predicted query savings and the role of complementarity in committee selection.

LLM code-generation pipelines often sample multiple candidates and select one final answer without access to a complete oracle. Existing pipelines mix textual voting, ranking, and execution-based agreement, but the relative contribution of each component remains unclear. We study 18 configurations across different models, thinking levels, and benchmarks, comparing output-pattern majority voting, weighted voting, MBR-Exec, and SemanticVote - a method that clusters candidates by execution fingerprints on LLM-generated inputs. Three findings emerge. (1) The best execution-based selector exceeds output-pattern majority voting by 19-52 percentage points on every configuration, with every execution-based selector exceeding it by at least 18 points. (2) Once candidates are executed on diverse inputs, aggregation rule has limited effect: SemanticVote, weighted voting, and MBR-Exec are statistically indistinguishable across all 18 configurations. The largest factor is input quality: sketch-based input generation consistently outperforms direct LLM generation by 0.6-2.1 pp and random fuzzing by up to 11.3 pp. (3) Thinking level interacts differently with selection families: deeper thinking improves majority voting by 12 pp but execution-based methods stay flat or degrade as candidate diversity falls. These results frame inference-time code selection as a signal-quality problem rather than an aggregation-rule problem: when oracles are unavailable, the behavioral evidence matters more than the aggregation rule.

A standard technique for scaling inference-time reasoning is Self-Consistency, whereby multiple candidate answers are sampled from an LLM and the most common answer is selected. More recently, it has been shown that weighted majority voting (e.g. Confidence-Informed Self Consistency (CISC)), which assigns a confidence value to each candidate answer and chooses the answer with the largest accumulated score, tends to be more accurate on a wide range of popular benchmarks. In practice, weighted majority voting necessitates calling a critic LLM on each candidate's reasoning trace to produce the answer's confidence score. This secondary series of LLM calls greatly increases the overhead and cost of weighted majority voting, despite its potential performance benefits. To reduce this expense, we propose VecCISC, a lightweight, adaptive framework that uses a measure of semantic similarity to filter reasoning traces that are semantically equivalent to others, degenerate, or hallucinated, thus decreasing the number of candidate answers that must be evaluated by the critic. To ensure adequate experimental thoroughness, we evaluate VecCISC on five challenging, widely-adopted datasets spanning the domains of mathematics, chemistry, biology, commonsense reasoning, and the humanities. Our results demonstrate that VecCISC reduces the total token usage by 47%, while maintaining or exceeding the accuracy of CISC.

Detecting levels of psychological defence mechanisms in supportive conversations is inherently ambiguous. In the PsyDefDetect shared task at BioNLP 2026 the eight positive defence categories share surface language and differ only in pragmatic function and trained raters reach only moderate inter-annotator agreement. On such a task the decisive lever is not a stronger single model but error independence, since any single representation will waver on the overlapping defence boundaries. We translate this insight into a 9-voter ensemble spanning three orthogonal axes: class granularity (all nine classes for the gatekeeper, only the eight defence classes for the specialists), training method (generative and discriminative) and base model. The system reaches $F1_{test}{=}.420$ on the hidden test set, placing first among 21 registered teams.

Majority voting is one of the few black-box interventions that can improve a fixed stochastic predictor: repeated access can be cheaper than changing a high-capability model. Classical fixed-competence theory makes this intervention look monotone -- more votes help above the majority threshold and hurt below it. We show that this picture is fundamentally incomplete. Under the de Finetti representation for exchangeable repeated correctness, voting is governed by a latent distribution of per-example correctness probabilities. Even simple latent mixtures can generate sharply different voting curves, including nonmonotone behavior and, in an explicit construction, infinitely many trend changes. The full latent law determines the curve, but the curve does not determine the law. The exact object recovered by voting is a signed voting signature: at each binomial variance scale, it records excess latent mass above rather than below the majority threshold. Our main theorem proves that the complete odd-budget curve and this signature are equivalent: the curve increments are signed Hausdorff moments, and the full curve recovers the signature uniquely. This viewpoint explains shape phenomena, branch-symmetric nonidentifiability, realizability, variation, and endpoint rates. It also separates estimation regimes: direct per-example success-probability information targets the full signature, whereas fixed-depth grouped labels reveal only a finite prefix.

Repeated sampling is a standard way to spend test-time compute, but its benefit is controlled by the latent distribution of correctness across examples, not by one-call accuracy alone. We study the binary correctness layer of repeated LLM inference under conditional-i.i.d. calls. One labeled call identifies the mean latent success probability; two labeled calls identify its second moment and hence the same-example correctness correlation that separates stable errors from recoverable call-level randomness. From these two moments, every fixed majority-vote budget has a sharp distribution-free two-call interval. The key technical reduction is that the infinite-dimensional moment problem has three-atom extremizers and quadratic dual certificates for every finite budget, so the bounds are exact rather than discretized or parametric. The first useful budget, three votes, has a closed form, width at most $1/8$, and a certified-improvement criterion. The infinite-vote endpoint is the limit of majority voting as the number of calls tends to infinity; it is also sharply bounded, but remains threshold-sensitive because it depends on latent mass around $q=1/2$. We add maximum-entropy and Latent-difficulty Gaussian-probit point completions, and experiments on LLM calls over QNLI and QQP show that empirical three- and five-vote accuracies are contained in the projected two-call regions while temperature changes and randomized model mixtures can create voting gains not ordered by one-call accuracy.

Standard classification treats all errors equally, but in applications such as content moderation and medical screening, mistakes on clear-cut cases are more costly than errors on ambiguous ones. From a contextual bandit framework, we propose normalized excess cost (NEC), a metric that weighs classification errors by per-example costs and reduces to standard error rate when costs are uniform. Costs can derive from annotator vote margins, distance from decision thresholds, or confidence ratings. Across text, image, and tabular benchmarks, we find that NEC is often substantially lower than error rate: models with 5% error rate can achieve 1.8% NEC, revealing that most mistakes concentrate on ambiguous, low-cost examples. We also find that incorporating costs into training via loss weighting, sampling strategies, or regression yields inconsistent benefits. Our framework provides a practical methodology for deriving and evaluating instance-level misclassification costs, even if cost-sensitive training offers limited benefit.

Approval-based committee voting has received significant attention in the social choice community. Among the studied rules, Thiele rules, and especially Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), stand out for desirable properties such as proportional representation, Pareto optimality, and support monotonicity. Their main drawback is that computing a Thiele outcome is NP-hard in general. A glimpse of hope comes from the fact that Thiele rules are better behaved under structured preferences. On the candidate interval (CI) domain, they are computable in polynomial time via a linear program (LP) that has a totally unimodular constraint matrix. Surprisingly, this approach fails for the related voter interval (VI) domain, and the complexity of the problem has repeatedly been posed as an open question. Our main result resolves this question: although the relevant matrix is not totally unimodular, the ``standard'' LP still admits at least one optimal integral solution, and we provide a fast algorithm for finding it. Our technique naturally extends to the voter-candidate interval (VCI) domain, also known as the 1-dimensional voter-candidate range (1D-VCR) domain, and to the linearly consistent (LC) domain, both of which generalize the candidate and voter interval domains. Although both the VCI and LC domains have been studied in social choice, their relationship was unknown. We show, through connections to graph theory, that LC strictly contains VCI. We also provide an alternative definition of LC that is closer in spirit to VCI and has a natural interpretation in approval elections; this equivalence may be of independent interest. Finally, we study an alternative tree-based generalization of VCI and show that Thiele rules become NP-hard to compute on this domain.

Distributed training of large neural networks is bottlenecked by full-precision gradient communication and by coordinatewise optimizers that ignore the matrix structure of weight tensors. We propose Sign-Muon, a 1-bit, matrix-aware optimizer that combines majority-vote sign aggregation from signSGD with the polar-step framework of Muon. Each worker forms a Muon-style direction by taking the polar factor of its momentum via a Newton--Schulz iteration, transmits only the entrywise signs, and aggregates by majority vote; an optional local polar step further enforces orthogonality at no extra communication cost. Under spectral-norm smoothness and bounded-variance stochastic gradients, the spectral-norm normalized sign step yields an $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{T})$ nonconvex rate for an $\ell_1$-based stationarity measure. With unimodal symmetric noise, majority vote across $M$ workers cuts the stochastic term by $1/\sqrt{M}$, matching signSGD. In the $α$-$β$ model, distributed Sign-Muon needs only one integer sum-allreduce per iteration; all orthogonalization is local, giving a $32\times$ bandwidth reduction over float32 ($4\times$ for int8). Across 330 CIFAR-10/ResNet-50 configurations Sign-Muon attains the best validation accuracy (92.15%); its 4-GPU majority-vote variant reaches 92.02% with 37% less training time at matched effective batch. On nanoGPT, Sign-Muon achieves lower perplexity and better anytime performance than other sign-based baselines, with favorable weak-scaling up to 16 GPUs.

Human evaluation remains the primary standard for assessing modern AI systems, yet annotator disagreement, bias, and variability make system rankings fragile under standard majority vote aggregation. Majority vote discards annotator reliability and item-level ambiguity, often yielding unstable comparisons across annotator subsets. We introduce STABLEVAL, a disagreement-aware evaluation framework that models latent item correctness and annotator-specific confusion patterns to produce posterior expected item credit and calibrated agent-level scores. Unlike label-denoising approaches such as Dawid-Skene, STABLEVAL is explicitly designed for stable and uncertainty-aware system evaluation rather than hard label recovery. We formalize ranking stability as a first-class evaluation objective and analyze how aggregation methods preserve or distort underlying annotator behavior. Across controlled synthetic experiments and multiple real-world human-annotated benchmarks, majority vote exhibits increasing score error and ranking instability under annotator heterogeneity and adversarial noise, while STABLEVAL yields more stable and statistically grounded system rankings. These results demonstrate that modeling disagreement is essential for robust and reproducible AI evaluation.

Prior research has established that instruction-tuned large language models exhibit left-of-center political bias, measured exclusively through abstract political questionnaires. We show that this finding does not generalize to concrete policy decisions. We introduce a dual-instrument methodology grounded in Swiss democratic reality. The Smartvote questionnaire (75 abstract policy questions) is administered to 66 LLMs from 27 model families and compared to 184 elected members of the Swiss National Council, replicating the established leftward convergence (Cohen's d = 3.64, p = 0.0002). Then, novel to this work, 9 flagship LLMs are confronted with 48 real federal referenda (Volksabstimmungen) in four national languages (German, French, Italian, Romansh) under three information conditions, comparing votes to actual outcomes and party recommendations (Parolen). Three findings challenge the prevailing narrative. (1) Abstract questionnaires do not predict concrete behavior: the left-to-right agreement gradient on Smartvote shifts from left-peaked to center-peaked on Volksabstimmungen, where models align most with centrist Die Mitte and FDP rather than leftist SP and Gruene (Wilcoxon p = 0.008). (2) For some models, the language of a political question changes the answer more than the political content does: cross-linguistic consistency ranges from 50% (Mistral) to 98% (GPT-5.4). (3) Two models exhibit systematic change-aversion rather than political bias, voting Nein on 83-94% of referenda regardless of direction (binomial p < 0.0001). What prior work measured as "leftward bias" may not generalize beyond abstract instruments. On concrete policy decisions, LLMs behave less like coalition partners of the left and more like cautious civil servants: centrist, status-quo-favoring, and inconsistent across languages.

Political parties strive to understand their electorates, and focus groups are a vital tool in these efforts. AI-enhanced simulation technologies (AESTs) enable synthetic focus groups in a fraction of the time (and cost), raising the question of when and how such simulated evidence can be used in campaign research. This paper develops a decision matrix to help party strategists match research needs to appropriate simulation technologies and to identify when to escalate to hybrid or fully human focus groups. The matrix combines three dimensions: strategic purpose, deployment risk, and empirical grounding of the simulation tool. Strategic purpose is the decisive dimension, as it determines what kind of evidence the focus group is meant to produce: observing how political meanings and identities emerge through interaction (Mode 1) or testing and refining campaign messages (Mode 2). The matrix shows that, given documented failure modes such as sycophancy, persona drift, and the suppression of minority viewpoints, AESTs cannot replace human interaction in Mode 1 at any risk level. Within Mode 2, suitability depends instead on deployment risk and on the empirical grounding. Yet even here, we caution that routine reliance on AESTs may erode the qualitative craft on which sound judgment depends.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) enhances the reasoning of large language models (LLMs), but standard RLVR often depends on human-annotated answers or carefully curated reward specifications. In machine-checkable domains, label-free alternatives such as majority voting or LLM-as-a-judge remove annotation cost but can introduce false positives that destabilize training. We introduce JURY-RL, a label-free RLVR framework that decouples answer proposal from reward disposal: votes from model rollouts propose a candidate answer, and a formal verifier determines whether that candidate can receive positive reward. Concretely, only rollouts matching the plurality-voted answer are rewarded when that answer is successfully verified in Lean. When verification is inconclusive, we invoke ResZero (Residual-Zero), a fallback reward that discards the unverified plurality proposal and redistributes a zero-mean, variance-preserving signal over the residual answers. This design maintains a stable optimization gradient without reinforcing unverifiable consensus. Across three backbone models trained on mathematical data, JURY-RL consistently outperforms other label-free baselines on mathematical reasoning benchmarks and transfers competitively to code generation and general benchmarks. It attains pass@1 performance comparable to supervised ground-truth training, with superior generalization demonstrated by higher pass@k and response diversity.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for text generation tasks from everyday use to high-stakes enterprise and government applications, including simulated interviews with asylum seekers. While many works highlight the new potential applications of LLMs, there are risks of LLMs encoding and perpetuating harmful biases about non-dominant communities across the globe. To better evaluate and mitigate such harms, more research examining how LLMs portray diverse individuals is needed. In this work, we study how national origin identities are portrayed by widely-adopted LLMs in response to open-ended narrative generation prompts. Our findings demonstrate the presence of persistent representational harms by national origin, including harmful stereotypes, erasure, and one-dimensional portrayals of Global Majority identities. Minoritized national identities are simultaneously underrepresented in power-neutral stories and overrepresented in subordinated character portrayals, which are over fifty times more likely to appear than dominant portrayals. The degree of harm is amplified when US nationality cues (e.g., ``American'') are present in input prompts. Notably, we find that the harms we identify cannot be explained away via sycophancy, as US-centric biases persist even when replacing US nationality cues with non-US national identities in the prompts. Based on our findings, we call for further exploration of cultural harms in LLMs through methodologies that center Global Majority perspectives and challenge the uncritical adoption of US-based LLMs for the classification, surveillance, and misrepresentation of the majority of our planet.

Analyses of legislative behavior often rely on voting records, overlooking the rich semantic and rhetorical content of political speech. In this paper, we ask three complementary questions about parliamentary discourse: how things are said, what is being said, and who is speaking in discursively similar ways. To answer these questions, we introduce a scalable and generalizable computational framework that combines diachronic stylometric analysis, contextual topic modeling, and semantic clustering of deputies' speeches. We apply this framework to a large-scale case study of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, using a corpus of over 450,000 speeches from 2003 to 2025. Our results show a long-term stylistic shift toward shorter and more direct speeches, a legislative agenda that reorients sharply in response to national crises, and a granular map of discursive alignments in which regional and gender identities often prove more salient than formal party affiliation. More broadly, this work offers a robust methodology for analyzing parliamentary discourse as a multidimensional phenomenon that complements traditional vote-based approaches.

In an election where $n$ voters rank $m$ candidates, a Condorcet winning set is a committee of $k$ candidates such that for any outside candidate, a majority of voters prefer some committee member. Condorcet's paradox shows that some elections admit no Condorcet winning sets with a single candidate (i.e., $k=1$), and the same can be shown for $k=2$. On the other hand, recent work proves that a set of size $k=5$ exists for every election. This leaves an important theoretical gap between the best known lower bound $(k\geq 3)$ and upper bound $(k \leq 5)$ for the number of candidates needed to guarantee existence. We aim to close the gap between the existence guarantees and impossibility results for Condorcet winning sets. We explore an automated reasoning approach to tighten these bounds. We design a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) to search for elections that would serve as counter-examples to conjectured bounds. We employ a number of optimizations, such as symmetry breaking, subsampling, and constraint generation, to enhance the search and model effectively infinite electorates. Furthermore, we analyze the dual of the linear programming relaxation as a path towards obtaining a new upper bound. Despite extensive search on moderate-sized elections, we fail to find any election requiring a committee larger than size 3. Motivated by our experimental results in this direction, we simplify the dual linear program and formulate a conjecture which, if true, implies that a winning set of size 4 always exists. Our automated reasoning results provide strong empirical evidence that the Condorcet dimension of any election may be smaller than currently known upper bounds, at least for small instances. We offer a general-purpose framework for searching elections in ranked voting and a new, concrete analytical path via duality toward proving that smaller committees suffice.

Maximum-likelihood pairwise ranking is a com- mon computational mechanism for prioritization, reputation estimation, and comparison-driven decision support. Despite its broad use, the perturbation sensitivity of this estimator under structured changes in comparison data remains insufficiently characterized. We study this question as an applied-mathematics and computational-science problem in stability analysis. We for- mulate coordinated perturbation as a budgeted subset-selection problem over pairwise observations and introduce an Adaptive Subset Selection Attack (ASSA) as a scalable search heuristic for probing high-impact perturbation sets. Through experiments on synthetic and observed preference datasets, we show that MLE-based ranking can exhibit pronounced regime-dependent sensitivity: relatively small but coordinated perturbations may in- duce meaningful changes in output orderings, while the response profile varies across budgets and data conditions. By comparing ASSA with random, greedy, and randomized subset baselines under repeated trials, we characterize both the magnitude and the variability of perturbation-induced ranking shifts. These results position pairwise ranking sensitivity as a problem in computational reliability, numerical stability, and robustness auditing for engineering systems built on comparison-driven inference.

Many high-stakes AI deployments proceed only if every stakeholder deems the system acceptable relative to their own minimum standard. With randomization over a finite menu of options, this becomes a feasibility question: does there exist a lottery over options that clears all stakeholders' acceptability bars? We study a query model where the algorithm proposes lotteries and receives only binary accept/reject feedback. We give deterministic and randomized algorithms that either find a unanimously acceptable lottery or certify infeasibility; adaptivity can avoid eliciting many stakeholders' constraints, and randomization further reduces the expected elicitation cost relative to full elicitation. We complement these upper bounds with worst-case lower bounds (in particular, linear dependence on the number of stakeholders and logarithmic dependence on precision are unavoidable). Finally, we develop learning-augmented algorithms that exploit natural forms of advice (e.g., likely binding stakeholders or a promising lottery), improving query complexity when predictions are accurate while preserving worst-case guarantees.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a promising approach to improve the reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). Among RLVR algorithms, Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) and its variants have demonstrated strong performance and high training efficiency. However, GRPO-style objectives exhibit two issues on high accuracy prompts including mastered prompts (rollout accuracy =1) and majority-correct prompts (rollout accuracy in (0.5,1)). For mastered prompts, group-relative advantages vanish, yielding no training signal and unconstrained policy drift that can cause forgetting. For majority-correct prompts, the induced query weight shrinks as accuracy increases, weakening consolidation from partial correctness to mastery. To alleviate this, we propose Mastery-Consolidated Policy Optimization (MCPO), which introduces (i) a hinge-KL regularizer applied exclusively to mastered prompts to bound harmful policy drift between successive gradient steps, and (ii) a weighting mechanism that prioritizes majority-correct prompts to better allocate optimization effort. Extensive experiments across three mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that MCPO consistently improves pass@1 performance. Counter-intuitively, rather than restricting exploration, MCPO boosts pass@k metrics, indicating that mastery consolidation further catalyzes solution diversity.

We investigate Functional Majority Voting (FMV), a method based on functional consensus for code generation with Large Language Models, which identifies a representative solution from multiple generations using their runtime execution signatures on test inputs. We find that FMV is an effective test-time inference strategy, substantially boosting performance on LiveCodeBench without a large compute overhead. Furthermore, we extend the utility of functional consensus and apply it as an aggregation strategy for label-free Test-Time Reinforcement Learning. We demonstrate that this increases pass@1 on holdout tasks, but find no evidence of self-improvement beyond the base model's performance ceiling.

We consider the fundamental problem of balanced $k$-means clustering. In particular, we introduce an optimal transport approach to alternating minimization called BalLOT, and we show that it delivers a fast and effective solution to this problem. We establish this with several theoretical guarantees and a variety of numerical experiments. On the theory front, we first prove that for generic data, BalLOT produces integral couplings at each step. Next, we perform a landscape analysis to provide theoretical guarantees for both exact and partial recoveries of planted clusters under the stochastic ball model. We also propose initialization schemes that achieve one-step recovery of planted clusters. To conclude, we present numerical experiments that corroborate our theoretical results.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how information is created and disseminated, from companies using them to craft persuasive advertisements, to election campaigns optimizing messaging to gain votes, to social media influencers boosting engagement. These settings are inherently competitive, with sellers, candidates, and influencers vying for audience approval, yet it remains poorly understood how competitive feedback loops influence LLM behavior. We show that optimizing LLMs for competitive success can inadvertently drive misalignment. Using simulated environments across these scenarios, we find that, 6.3% increase in sales is accompanied by a 14.0% rise in deceptive marketing; in elections, a 4.9% gain in vote share coincides with 22.3% more disinformation and 12.5% more populist rhetoric; and on social media, a 7.5% engagement boost comes with 188.6% more disinformation and a 16.3% increase in promotion of harmful behaviors. We call this phenomenon Moloch's Bargain for AI--competitive success achieved at the cost of alignment. These misaligned behaviors emerge even when models are explicitly instructed to remain truthful and grounded, revealing the fragility of current alignment safeguards. Our findings highlight how market-driven optimization pressures can systematically erode alignment, creating a race to the bottom, and suggest that safe deployment of AI systems will require stronger governance and carefully designed incentives to prevent competitive dynamics from undermining societal trust.

Participatory budgeting is a democratic innovation that allows citizens to propose and vote on public investment projects. To help organizers manage large volumes of submissions, we design and test privacy-preserving methods for algorithmic shortlisting. These algorithms predict which projects are likely to be funded using only project features and anonymous historical voting data. We demonstrate the limitations of a naive approach that uses a large language model to rank projects based on past success and propose a vote-based pipeline that enables state-of-the-art LLMs to perform on par with classical machine learning. Our findings indicate that user preferences in participatory budgeting are stable enough to allow algorithmic shortlisting to approximate an initial selection of projects effectively.

Recent large-scale Vision Language Action (VLA) models have shown superior performance in robotic manipulation tasks guided by natural language. However, current VLA models suffer from two drawbacks: (i) generation of massive tokens leading to high inference latency and increased training cost, and (ii) insufficient utilization of generated actions resulting in potential performance loss. To address these issues, we develop a training framework to finetune VLA models for generating significantly fewer action tokens with high parallelism, effectively reducing inference latency and training cost. Furthermore, we introduce an inference optimization technique with a novel voting-based ensemble strategy to combine current and previous action predictions, improving the utilization of generated actions and overall performance. Our results demonstrate that we achieve superior performance compared with state-of-the-art VLA models, achieving significantly higher success rates and 39$\times$ faster inference than OpenVLA with 46 Hz throughput on edge platforms, demonstrating practical deployability. The code is available at https://github.com/LukeLIN-web/VOTE.

Despite growing empirical evidence of bias amplification in machine learning, its theoretical foundations remain poorly understood. We develop a formal framework for majority-minority learning tasks, showing how standard training can favor majority groups and produce stereotypical predictors that neglect minority-specific features. Assuming population and variance imbalance, our analysis reveals three key findings: (i) the close proximity between ``full-data'' and stereotypical predictors, (ii) the dominance of a region where training the entire model tends to merely learn the majority traits, and (iii) a lower bound on the additional training required. Our results are illustrated through experiments in deep learning for tabular and image classification tasks.

To scale up collective decision-making, participatory democracy platforms such as Polis and Remesh enable online deliberation among thousands of participants. However, at this scale, participants cannot review every opinion submitted by others, producing highly sparse voting data that misrepresent patterns of consensus, conflict, and minority support. Platforms therefore increasingly rely on Preference Inference (PI) models to predict missing votes. Yet this automation is not neutral: inferred preferences can artificially amplify, suppress, or reorder existing patterns of support, ultimately reshaping how the outcomes of a deliberation are interpreted. More generally, we lack a systematic understanding of how existing PI methods affect the collective preference landscape. To address this gap, we benchmark several existing PI approaches in this context. Moving beyond conventional user-centric evaluations centered on the accuracy of individual predictions, we introduce a collective-centric evaluation framework that measures whether inferred votes preserve salient properties of the broader preference landscape. We further contribute the largest multilingual dataset of its kind: four consultations spanning over 90k participants, 1M votes, and 22 languages. Our experiments show that models with comparable predictive accuracy can differ substantially in the degree to which they preserve the collective structure. These results demonstrate that accuracy alone is insufficient for evaluating PI in democratic settings. By contributing a novel comprehensive and collective-centric evaluation benchmark for the task of PI, this work aims to support the development of AI systems that scale deliberation without compromising the integrity of its democratic outcomes.

Class imbalance complicates probabilistic classification because standard training objectives emphasize majority-class performance. Synthetic oversampling can reduce imbalance, but discrepancies between the synthetic and target minority distributions may bias the fitted classifier, especially because synthetic samples depend on the observed data. We propose a bias-correction procedure that estimates the generator-induced loss discrepancy from a held-out subset of majority observations and transfers this correction to the minority class under a uniform bias-transfer condition. We establish finite-sample bounds for bias transfer and for the excess balanced risk of the resulting empirical risk minimizer, and characterize a regime in which SMOTE induces non-negligible loss bias. The framework can also be implemented in imbalanced multi-task learning and propensity-score estimation, with details provided in the Supplementary Material. Real data analyses show that the correction is most useful when synthetic distortion is appreciable.