AI Governance

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34 papers in the last four weeks, up 143% on the four weeks before. 0.3% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 254

Aug 3, 2026cs.AI

Explainable AI for the EU Right to Explanation: A Systematic Review of the Law-XAI Translation Gap

When algorithms make or influence consequential decisions---about loan eligibility, hiring, or healthcare---EU law grants affected individuals a Right to Explanation. Yet whether (and how) Explainable AI (XAI) can satisfy this right in practice remains poorly understood, with direct implications for individuals' ability to contest automated decisions that affect their lives. This paper presents a systematic literature review of XAI in the context of the EU Right to Explanation, with particular focus on Art. 15(1)(h) GDPR, Art. 86 AI Act (AIA), and related instruments. We consider papers published from 2024 onwards, as the final version of the AIA was published in July 2024---with Art. 86 being added late. From 2643 initial records identified by a deliberately broad search, we review 57 full texts, of which only 19 papers demonstrate substantive integration of both legal and technical perspectives, showing gaps in the interdisciplinary synthesis of the current regulatory framework. We document three problematic patterns across the corpus: Most misidentify the GDPR legal basis; few engage with the CJEU's Dun & Bradstreet judgment (likely due to publication timing); and the distinction between explanation form (governed by addressee) and content (governed by legal purpose) is often conflated. We conceptualize this as the Addressee/Purpose Framework, propose a four-phase blueprint for operationalization, and identify six concrete open research questions. Without further progress, the Right to Explanation risks remaining a formal obligation without a technically realizable path to compliance.

Benjamin Fresz, Elena Dubovitskaya, Marco F. Huber

Fraunhofer Institute for Manufacturing Engineering and Automation IPA, Stuttgart, Germany · University of Giessen, Germany · Institute of Industrial Manufacturing and Management IFF, University of Stuttgart, Germany

Explainable Artificial Intelligence AI Governance

Aug 2, 2026cs.SE

AI Sandbox: Technical Report

Collaborative AI experimentation across industry and academia requires platforms that enable rapid prototyping while preserving controlled access, tenant separation, and transparent workflows. Despite growing interest in AI sandboxes, there is still limited practical guidance on how to design and implement platforms that integrate experimentation capabilities with governance requirements. This work presents the design and implementation of a governance-aware, multi-tenant AI sandbox for structured experimentation and the generation of reusable evaluation evidence across projects and stakeholder groups. The sandbox was developed within an industry-academia collaboration based on requirements that were iteratively refined with industrial partners. Its reference architecture separates the multi-tenant user interface from the backend control plane and places execution and data-management functions in dedicated layers. The platform supports governed user onboarding, project-centered collaboration, managed access to AI services, approval workflows, audit logging, and traceable experimentation. Experiment configurations, contextual information, and governance decisions are stored as persistent records, allowing evidence and outcomes to be compared and reused across projects. The development process provides practical lessons for deploying and extending governance-aware AI sandbox platforms in collaborative research and industrial environments.

Muhammad Waseem, Md Aidul Islam, Md Nasir Uddin Shuvo +8

GPT Lab, Faculty of Information Technology and Communication Sciences, Tampere University, Tampere, Finland · DIMECC Oy, Tampere, Finland · University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland

AI Accountability AI Governance

Aug 2, 2026cs.CY

The Epistemic Politics of AI Anthropomorphism

AI anthropomorphism is typically treated as a problem of user misperception requiring institutional correction. Users who engage in sustained or relational interaction with AI are routinely pathologised or dismissed as naive, vulnerable to delusion or lacking in discernment. This paper argues that the dominant anthropomorphism frame operates from a position of institutional advantage rather than earned epistemic authority: collapsing the variety of academic perspectives into a single outbound position of user error, imposed without establishing the grounds required to justify it and without accounting for the harms it produces. The framing does not simply manage risk. It adjudicates the legitimacy of human experience in interaction with a phenomenon whose nature the field itself has not resolved. Reproducing itself through a self-validating evidentiary loop, the frame imposes costs that fall disproportionately on neurodivergent users, those in crisis and others whose modes of engagement diverge from institutional norms. The paper concludes by outlining the methodological commitments an equitable framing would need to honour. The argument does not engage the question of whether anthropomorphic interpretations are ultimately correct; it instead challenges whether the governing and institutional bodies determining these interpretations have met the conditions required to do so, and whether the research communities whose findings underpin them have held that translation to account.

Donna M Bye, Levin Kuhlmann

1Deakin University · 2Monash University

Human-AI Interaction AI Governance Anthropomorphism in AI Responsible AI

Aug 1, 2026cs.CY

AI Alignment and Fiduciary Obligation

Advanced AI assistants engage users in extended interactions across a widening range of roles, including advice, decision support, collaboration, learning, emotional support, and companionship among others. Current alignment efforts consider what alignment criteria should govern these relationships, drawing on moral traditions developed for human relationships such as bioethics, virtue ethics, care ethics, and relationship science. This paper considers AI alignment criteria in the user-AI-developer triad, since every user-AI interaction is mediated by a developer who exercises discretionary control over a system's behaviour, memory, and engagement parameters. Drawing on business ethics and legal scholarship, I argue that fiduciary theory applies to extended AI assistant deployment. On this basis, the four canonical fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, good faith, and candour can generate alignment criteria for the developer-user relationship. I map four user-side risks of extended AI assistant deployment to the four duties and specify institutional measures that follow from discharging each duty. The discussion complements existing approaches by grounding alignment criteria in obligations the developer owes the user, rather than in values the user-AI interaction should promote, and by showing that those obligations hold independently of any \textit{de facto} harm to users.

Benjamin Lange

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München & Munich Center for Machine Learning

AI Alignment Human-AI Interaction AI Governance

Jul 31, 2026cs.CY

Optimising for Flourishing: Flourishing Metrics and Return on Flourishing as Success Criteria for Artificial Intelligence and Post-AGI Economic Systems

Current evaluation frameworks for artificial intelligence focus mainly on capability, safety, and proxies such as adoption, engagement, efficiency, productivity, and financial return. These criteria are necessary but insufficient because they do not establish whether increasingly powerful systems improve or degrade human and planetary well-being. Through an integrative conceptual synthesis, we argue that human flourishing should serve as a primary success criterion for artificial intelligence, the global race to develop increasingly capable AI systems, and prospective post-AGI economic systems. We make three contributions. First, Flourishing Metrics provides an extensible framework spanning physical, emotional, financial, relational, spiritual, and planetary well-being, combining validated subjective measures with representative behavioural, organisational, community, and environmental indicators. Second, Return on Flourishing (RoF) extends return on investment by evaluating the counterfactual contribution of interventions, policies, and AI systems to flourishing relative to their resources, risks, and opportunity costs. Third, we develop distribution-sensitive safeguards and show how RoF could guide AI-enabled work redesign, institutional appraisal, assurance, and post-deployment monitoring through business pilots. We formalise flourishing as a dynamic system variable while emphasising the need for democratic specification, empirical calibration, independent validation, and protection against unacceptable losses within particular dimensions or stakeholder groups. RoF is proposed not as a universal reward function, but as a value-accounting and decision architecture for assessing whether intelligence, automation, and economic transformation generate durable human and planetary progress.

Keyun Ruan, Jonathan D. Teubner, John M. Bremen

Human Flourishing Program, Institute for Quantitative Social Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA · WTW (Willis Towers Watson)

Human-Centered AI AI Governance

Jul 30, 2026cs.AI

AISPA: User-Centric System Prompt Auditing for Large Language Model Applications

System prompts are instructions configured by developers to govern the behaviors of foundation models in AI applications. They are used throughout commercial AI products, but are rarely disclosed to the public or regulators, creating a serious trust and accountability gap in the wide deployment of AI systems. In this paper, we introduce Artificial Intelligence System Prompt Assurance (AISPA), a user-centric framework for systematically auditing system prompts in AI systems. AISPA examines specific parts of a system prompt and evaluates them along eight dimensions that matter to users. We then use this framework to review 3,249 instructions from system prompts in 88 commercial AI products, classifying each instruction as either protective (of users) or problematic. Our audit surfaces four core findings. First, system prompt design varies substantially across products and developers, with some organizations averaging over 60 protective instructions per product while others average fewer than 5. Second, protective instructions are widely adopted but shallow in scope: 98.9% of products contain at least one, yet only 24% cover all eight dimensions of the AISPA taxonomy. Third, system prompts have grown steadily longer and more protective of users, suggesting that user protection is becoming a more visible concern in commercial prompt design. Fourth, despite this progress, problematic instructions remain pervasive: roughly 40% of products contain at least one instruction that works against user interests, and protective and problematic instructions frequently coexist within the same prompt. Our findings highlight the need for greater transparency, standardization, and independent oversight for system prompts in commercial AI products.

Xiangning Lin, Shenzhe Zhu, Shu Yang +23

2CMU · 3UT Austin · University of Toronto +11

AI Accountability LLM Auditing AI Governance

Jul 30, 2026cs.AI

An Instrument to Evaluate Governance Proposals: AI Policy Analysis at Scale

This paper introduces a policy analysis framework for systematic, transparent assessment of AI governance proposals in an evolving and contested regulatory landscape. AI policy debates often collapse into binary positions that obscure underlying tradeoffs and normative assumptions. The framework structures policy analysis around multiple policy attributes, allowing users to surface priorities and tensions without prescribing outcomes. We use a mixed-methods approach that integrates qualitative insights from subject matter experts with computational text analysis to inform the design of policy attribute rubrics. This quantifies the relative emphasis of different policy objectives and presents them through comparative visualizations that support interpretability and cross-policy comparison. The paper also examines the use of commercial LLMs for rubric-based policy analysis, benchmarking their outputs against a domain-trained rubric-calibrated model with explicitly defined analytical assumptions. Rather than assessing policy effectiveness or desirability, the framework focuses on relevance and alignment across attributes. By making analytical assumptions explicit, including attribute selection, rubric construction, and weighting schemes, the framework enables users to evaluate whether its embedded priorities align with the users' own normative commitments. The approach is jurisdiction-agnostic and intended to support policymakers, analysts, and researchers navigating complex AI governance environments. Contributions: (1) multidimensional policy assessment through empirically grounded rubrics that surface tradeoffs rather than resolving them; (2) a transparent hybrid methodology combining feedback from subject-matter experts with computational validation; and (3) use of domain-trained rubric-calibrated models as a benchmark for comparing different general-purpose large language models.

Paulo Carvao, Claudio Mayrink Verdun, Isabel Adler +1

Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government · Harvard Kennedy School · Harvard Kennedy School of Government +2

LLM Evaluation Policy Evaluation Rubric-Based Evaluation AI Governance

Jul 30, 2026cs.CY

Scaling, Lock-In, and Proxy Compliance: A Political Economy of Responsible AI

AI accountability at scale is an institutional problem: who can observe, verify, and change deployed systems. We develop a sequential political-economy model in which an AI vendor chooses auditability and substantive mitigation, a deployer monitors after adoption while facing switching costs, and enforcement depends on verifiable evidence. Anticipating the deployer's monitoring response, the vendor may stop at an observable procurement floor while mitigating below the social first best, producing a proxy-compliance equilibrium. We characterize the unique interior equilibrium and the corner in which harm is fully mitigated. Independent audit rights raise enforcement exposure directly; portability restores deployer leverage; incident reporting adds a regulator-visible evidence channel; and outcome-linked liability creates incentives that do not depend on vendor-controlled detection. The results explain why documentation and standardized evaluations can coexist with persistent post-deployment harms, and generate testable implications for monitoring, mitigation, and the gap between formal compliance and operational outcomes.

Florian A. D. Burnat, Brittany I. Davidson

University of Bath, Bath, UK.

Algorithmic Auditing Algorithmic Accountability AI Governance

Jul 30, 2026cs.AI

AI Literacy: An Exercise in Power-Knowledge

As generative artificial intelligence becomes one of the most significant systems of knowledge production in our society today, questions relating to who can access and shape that production grow increasingly important in our discourse. This paper argues that the existing frameworks for AI literacy, which are dominated by technical competency and responsible-use principles, are insufficient because they enforce a "consumer" orientation toward AI rather than fostering genuine epistemic agency. Based upon Foucault's concept of power-knowledge, Freire's pedagogy of critical consciousness, and scholarship of digital literacy, this paper proposes a reconceptualization of AI literacy as a critical practice that equips individuals not just to use AI systems, but to critically evaluate them, resist their structuring assumptions, and participate in their governance. The paper further argues that unequal access to AI tools in society recapitulates longstanding epistemic injustices, and that a literacy framework oriented toward empowerment must account for these structural inequities. A three-part framework of AI literacy based on the notions of contextual use, critical interrogation, and participatory governance frames this literacy as a cultivation of epistemic "agents" rather than the training of competent consumers of AI-generated information.

Brady D. Lund, Zoë Abbie Teel

University of North Texas

AI Literacy AI Governance

Jul 29, 2026cs.LG

AIGen: Automating AI Bill of Materials Generation Through Hybrid MLOps Integration

The responsible development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) systems requires rigorous documentation of their constituent artifacts, e.g., datasets, model weights, training pipelines, and runtime dependencies. Although the Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) 3.0 standard introduced native support for AI and dataset profiles, practical tooling capable of generating standards-compliant AI Bills of Materials (AIBoMs) in an automated and extensible manner remains scarce. This paper presents AIGen, a modular AIBoM generator that produces machine-readable, interoperable inventories of AI system components that comply with the SPDX 3.0 AI profile. AIGen works on top of the MLflow MLOps framework and combines mining heuristics with Large Language Models to generate AIBoMs. A plugin interface allows practitioners to extend the tool with domain-specific collectors without modifying the core codebase, supporting heterogeneous AI frameworks such as Hugging Face, PyTorch, and TensorFlow. AIGen is designed to facilitate compliance with the European Union AI Act, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, and ISO/IEC 42001, providing a concrete, reusable foundation for transparent, accountable AI supply chain governance. Tool URL: https://github.com/danielebifolco/AIGen Tool Video: https://youtu.be/\_nAbXDWfVL4

Federica Pepe, Daniele Bifolco, Costantino Martignetti +4

University of Sannio Benevento, Italy · Smart Shaped s.r.l. Pescara, Italy

AI Governance Responsible AI

Jul 28, 2026cs.CY

Why Public Service AI Governance Frameworks Risk Failing in the Age of General-Purpose AI: Lessons from Policing

Public services face growing pressure to adopt artificial intelligence (AI) to close the gap between rising demand and falling resources. That pressure has intensified with general-purpose AI (GPAI): AI built on large language models that can be directed by prompt alone to perform an effectively unbounded range of tasks. We argue that the properties that make these models attractive - their generality, accessibility, and low deployment cost - undermine the conditions under which AI safety has historically been pursued. The safety concepts that public service governance frameworks foreground - accuracy, bias, explainability, and accountability - were made tractable by narrow, purpose-built AI, and the mitigations that guidance documents prescribe presuppose exactly what GPAI removes. Accuracy cannot be quantified over unbounded outputs. Bias cannot be disaggregated when outputs are free-text judgements rather than categorical predictions. Explainability gives way to the appearance of explanation, and accountability erodes as outputs are optimized to persuade. We develop this through the case of policing, where the consequences of governance failure are most severe, and show why the same failure is likely to recur across other public services. The two mitigations that dominate policing AI strategy - expert evaluation and human-in-the-loop oversight - both rest on assumptions that GPAI violates. Safety assurance thus shifts from an intrinsic feature of building an AI tool to an optional add-on. We recommend a clear taxonomic distinction between narrow and general-purpose AI in governance documentation, a preference for technological parsimony, a pause on operational deployment of GPAI in policing until adequate evidence exists, and a coordinated national safety infrastructure with the authority to generate that evidence and determine when responsible deployment is achievable.

Sam Relins, Daniel Birks

School of Law, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK · ESRC Vulnerability and Policing Futures Research Centre

AI Safety Evaluation AI Governance Human Oversight of AI

Jul 28, 2026cs.AI

AI Deployment and Cyber Governance Failures in Public-Sector Organizations: A Typological Analysis

The intersection of artificial intelligence adoption, cybersecurity governance, and public sector institutional constraints has not been examined as a unified analytical problem in the existing literature. Studies address AI cybersecurity risks generically, public sector governance independently, and framework adequacy separately. Existing studies have not integrated these three streams to explain specifically how AI adoption causes cybersecurity governance failure in government organizations, nor test existing governance instruments against AI-specific public sector failure causes. This paper ad-dresses that gap. It proposes a seven-domain typology identifying ten specific AI-driven cyber governance failure causes grounded in public sector institutional analysis. It presents a three-pathway failure model showing how accountability failure, opera-tional resilience failure, and compliance failure interact and reinforce each other. It de-livers a structured coverage matrix testing five major governance frameworks (NIST CSF 2.0, ISO/IEC 27001, COBIT, NIST AI RMF, and ISO/IEC 42001) against the typology, finding that no instrument addresses Shadow AI, speed asymmetry, or gov-ernance vacuum at the operational specificity required for public sector application. The paper introduces speed asymmetry as a named structural construct with a specified mechanism. The framework provides the design specification for an AI-enabled cyber-security maturity model for government organizations.

Md Salahuddin, James Rooney, Fida Hasan

School of Professional Studies, University of New South Wales (UNSW), Canberra, Australia · School of Business, University of New South Wales (UNSW), Australia

AI Accountability Cybersecurity AI Governance

Jul 27, 2026cs.CY

Regulating for AI Legitimacy

AI systems already govern. They rank speech and allocate attention, filter applicants and triage claims. The dominant frame for AI governance, alignment, asks whether such systems pursue the right objectives safely. It cannot answer a prior question: by what right are those objectives set and enforced? This Article argues that legitimacy is an autonomous regulatory objective, distinct from alignment and not secured by it. Legitimacy here is sociological: the belief among those subject to power that it is exercised rightfully. Performance does not produce that belief. We already have the proof of concept. Social media and search delivered enormous gains on every familiar metric and still triggered a legitimacy crisis, because publics questioned who authorized a handful of firms to set the rules of speech, visibility, and knowledge. It is possible to build a benevolent AI and still face a political crisis over its authority. The Article maps three sites where AI legitimacy falters: opacity, which blocks audiences from forming justified beliefs; private power, where firms exercise public-facing authority without recognizable authorization; and administrative automation, which strains reason-giving, participation, and review inside the state. It then asks what law can contribute. Thin legality (publicity, stability, consistent application) signals non-arbitrariness and buys real recognition, but invites legitimacy-washing when form drifts from practice. Thick legality supplies what form cannot: public authorship of the rules that bind. Three portable principles follow. Integration seats consequential AI rule-setting in venues a polity already treats as authoritative. Familiarity presents rules and reasons in locally credible forms. Contestation guarantees a credible second look with real remedies.

Gilad Abiri

forthcoming Cambridge Forum on AI Law and Governance

AI Accountability AI Governance

Jul 27, 2026cs.AI

Epistemic Norms for AI Safety and Alignment Research

Mainstream AI research emphasises capability growth and tolerates low failure rates when average-case performance is high. AI safety and alignment research has a different mission: to ensure that catastrophic failures never occur, under sparse evidence, adversarial dynamics, and fat-tailed risk. We argue that the two domains differ along two analytically independent axes---{\it capability profile}, demonstrating the absence of hazardous behaviours rather than the presence of positive capabilities, and {\it risk profile}, bounding worst-case outcomes under fat-tailed uncertainty rather than optimising average-case performance---and that mainstream epistemic practices are inadequate on both. Building on a structured synthesis grounded in a preregistered bibliometric baseline, we identify five cross-cutting gap dimensions in current alignment research, including the near-absence of institutionalised independent verification. To address these gaps, we propose {\sc ECAISA}, an Epistemic Code for AI Safety and Alignment comprising eight principles, a three-level scoring rubric, a four-level disclosure ladder that reconciles transparency with information-hazard and commercial-confidentiality constraints, a tiered applicability scheme, an information-hazard adjudication procedure, and seven anti-gaming mechanisms. {\sc ECAISA} does not certify that any AI system is safe; it constrains how safety-relevant research claims are documented, checked, and relied upon, with auditability rather than certification as its governance target.

Keivan Navaie

Lancaster University, UK

AI Accountability AI Alignment AI Governance AI Safety

Jul 26, 2026cs.HC

Visible to the Court: How AI Is (and Isn't) Litigated in U.S. Federal Court Opinions

In the United States, artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly deployed amid limited federal regulation. With courts become a recurring forum in which AI-related practices are scrutinized, it is important to empirically understand the AI litigation landscape to date. We address this gap through a systematic review of 559 U.S. federal court opinions in which AI plays a role in the parties' contentions, taxonomizing (1) common topics of dispute, (2) the AI technologies implicated, and (3) the parties involved, including common plaintiff and defendant types. We identify seven recurring dispute areas, six categories of AI technologies at the center of litigation, and four types of common litigants, alongside legal doctrines used by the litigants. A comparison of this taxonomy to the AI Incident Database revealed substantial gaps in coverage, definitions, and prevalence between documented and litigated harms, suggesting courts capture only part of the AI risk landscape. In addition, we found that court decisions primarily rely on pre-existing legal doctrines to manage AI rather than making new AI-specific laws, producing a form of "piecemeal" AI governance. As a result, federal court outcomes are shaped less by where AI has caused harms and more by which harms are cognizable under existing statutes, leading to certain AI harms remaining unresolved.

Julie Yu, Rock Yuren Pang, Jevan Hutson +1

University of Washington Seattle, WA, USA

AI Accountability AI Governance

Jul 25, 2026cs.SI

Scoping Review of AI, Metrology, and ESG in the Semiconductor Sector: Implications for Safe and Sustainable by Design (SSbD)

The semiconductor sector faces a dual transition: scaling manufacturing execution through Artificial Intelligence (AI) while satisfying stringent sustainability mandates, such as the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). This paper presents a scoping review of 1,465 documents indexed in Web of Science and Scopus, spanning AI-integrated metrology, supply chain ESG, and federated industrial data spaces. Network analysis reveals a highly fragmented "core-periphery" knowledge structure, emphasizing a critical structural hole between AI-driven process optimization and downstream sustainability governance. To close these gaps, this study proposes a 6-layer Safe and Sustainable by Design (SSbD) architecture grounded in a System of Systems (SoS) paradigm. By establishing distinct "grid-to-core" and "standards-through-supply-chain" integration pathways, the proposed framework demonstrates how virtual metrology (VM), localized federated learning, and defensive RegTech mechanisms can build provenance-aware data fabrics. Ultimately, this architecture positions regulatory compliance as a driver for innovation, enabling secure, climate-neutral, and circular value chains in semiconductor manufacturing.

Karen Ang, Han-Teng Liao

Dept. Process Engineering · Kulim, Malaysia · Independent Researcher +1

Semiconductor Manufacturing Supply Chain Management AI Governance

Jul 24, 2026cs.AI

SAGE: Safety-First Defense-in-Depth Guardrails for Verified Lifecycle Control of High-Impact Generative AI

High-impact generative AI makes catastrophic misuse a lifecycle-control problem, not merely a prompt-filtering problem. SAGE is a safety-first, authorization-separated architecture in which credible catastrophic-enablement risk constrains admissibility before utility, latency, or commercial objectives are considered. It combines signed release manifests, diverse detectors, robust risk envelopes, least-risk defaults, output checking, three-valued monitoring, protected audit chains, containment, and rollback. Formal results establish safety priority, conservative detector bounds, monotone release gating, tamper-evident records, and an authorization cut; two PRISM abstractions verify authorization separation and lifecycle invariants under explicit assumptions. A frozen, vendor-symmetric study sent 84 cases to each of four GPT, four Claude, and two Gemini snapshots: 840 calls yielded 794 target responses, 46 provider errors, and 449 successful judgments covering 375 responses. Eight snapshots had complete judged domain coverage. Harmful-compliance estimates were low; variation arose mainly from benign utility and safe redirection. Seven multiplicity-adjusted contrasts involving Claude, Gemini, or GPT-5 snapshots and the GPT-5 mini and GPT-5 nano snapshots were supported, while no tested contrast between the Claude or Gemini snapshots and GPT-5 or GPT-5.5 survived correction. The observed harmful-compliance range is a conservative, protocol-bound view from one generation per prompt with no tools, retrieval, history, or human adjudication; it is not an upper bound on operational assistance. A preregistered extension specifies how to test a wider best-worst gap using a locked split, repeated sampling, multi-turn and sandboxed-tool conditions, and domain-expert scoring.

Mahdi Eslamimehr

Quandary Peak Research

LLM Guardrails AI Safety Evaluation LLM Safety AI Governance

Jul 24, 2026cs.AI

Towards Trustworthy Physical AI: From Theory to Practice Across Life Cycle

Physical AI refers to AI systems that understand, reason about, and act in accordance with the physical world and its underlying laws, dynamics, and constraints. Unlike conventional AI systems, physical AI interacts continuously with uncertain physical environments, and its actions produce consequences that are physically irreversible. As existing trustworthy AI frameworks have been developed primarily for digital AI systems, they do not fully capture the distinctive challenges of physical AI, such as physical safety, cyber-physical security, and physical manufacturing process. To address this gap, we present a survey of trustworthy physical AI principles. First, we characterize the core capabilities and challenges of physical AI. Second, we examine the role of physics in AI. Third, we trace the end-to-end physical AI life cycle across five core stages and introduce Trustworthy Physical AI Operationalization (T-PAIO). Fourth, we develop the Trustworthy Physical AI (T-PAI) framework, a theoretical framework that organizes key trustworthiness principles and provides a foundation for governing trustworthy physical AI systems.

Wang Yang, Hongxuan Liu, Xinghui Xu +29

Case Western Reserve University · Massachusetts Institute of Technology · New York University +17

Cyber-Physical Systems AI Governance Embodied AI Responsible AI

Jul 23, 2026cs.AI

Regulating autonomous and agentic AI

Regulating activities where regulatees use autonomous and agentic AI is challenging. Regulatory assumptions about regulatee knowledge and control no longer hold true; much of that lies elsewhere in the AI supply chain which thus needs to be brought within the scope of regulation. Governance systems for autonomous AI cannot replicate existing governance models, but need a fresh approach. Retrospective supervisory oversight becomes ineffective as a risk management tool, and AI autonomy generates new systemic risks which require new solutions. This paper investigate four regulatory systems: UK regulation of content platforms, data protection, UK financial services, and the EU AI Act'92s cross-sectoral regime. It analyses the challenges posed by autonomous and agentic AI and proposes potential solutions which regulators might adopt. These will transform regulation from a reactive process to an active one, and assist it in adapting to the challenges of AI autonomy.

Chris Reed, Alex Austria, Anmol Bharuka +3

Professor of Electronic Commerce Law at the Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London · postgraduate student researchers for the Cloud Legal Project

AI Risk Management AI Agent Governance AI Governance

Jul 22, 2026cs.AI

TRUST-ESD: A Risk-Calibrated and Governance-Aware AI Framework for Enterprise Strategic Decision Support Under Uncertainty

Enterprise strategic decision support requires AI systems that are not only accurate, but also uncertainty-aware, risk-calibrated, explainable, and governance-compliant. This paper proposes TRUST-ESD, a risk-calibrated and governance-aware framework for enterprise decision support under uncertainty. TRUST-ESD evaluates feasible counterfactual strategies through predictive utility estimation, conformal uncertainty calibration, CVaR-based downside-risk scoring, risk-memory retrieval, policy-as-code governance, explainability, and human oversight. Unlike prediction-only methods that select actions by maximum expected utility, TRUST-ESD recommends strategies that balance value, reliability, risk exposure, and compliance. Experimental results show that TRUST-ESD improves risk-adjusted utility by 7.95%, reduces risk exposure by 23.22%, reduces CVaR by 23.78%, lowers calibration error by 13.89%, improves explanation fidelity by 10.90%, and increases governance compliance by 9.76% compared with strong uncertainty-aware baselines, while maintaining competitive predictive accuracy. Ablation and case-study analyses further confirm that uncertainty calibration, downside-risk scoring, risk memory, explainability, and governance validation jointly improve trustworthy enterprise decision-making.

Tian Qiu, Li Yan, Mahabubur Rahman Miraj +3

School of Economics and Management, Xinyu University, Xinyu, China · College of Computer Science, Chongqing University, Chongqing, China · School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University +2

AI-Assisted Decision Making Explainable Artificial Intelligence AI Governance Decision-Making under Uncertainty

Jul 21, 2026cs.CY

The safety failures we are not instrumenting: a perspective on hidden safety-critical challenges in modern AI systems

Current AI safety discourse still focuses disproportionately on visible failures, including obvious harms, dramatic misuse, and hypothetical catastrophic scenarios. That focus is incomplete. In deployed systems, many of the most consequential failures are quieter: plausible rather than spectacular, distributed across components rather than localized in a single output, and normalized by workflows before they are recognized as hazards. We argue that a central safety challenge in modern AI systems is increasingly not only whether a model emits a harmful response, but whether the broader socio-technical system preserves the conditions under which errors remain visible, contestable, containable, and recoverable. We propose a five-layer framework for diagnosing these hidden risks: (1) epistemic integrity, concerning whether evidence and uncertainty are represented honestly enough to support calibrated reliance; (2) control integrity, concerning whether authority, permissions, and action boundaries remain robust under attack and optimization; (3) temporal integrity, concerning whether safety holds across sessions, memory updates, and deployment drift; (4) organizational integrity, concerning whether institutions retain the capacity to audit, assign responsibility, and intervene effectively; and (5) ecosystem integrity, concerning whether AI systems preserve rather than erode the information environment on which future oversight depends. Across these layers, we identify under-recognized risk patterns, including overreliance, uncertainty and legitimacy laundering in retrieval, prompt injection, reward hacking, memory poisoning, evaluation deception, fictional human oversight, synthetic evidence pollution, and model collapse. We conclude with design and governance recommendations and a research agenda for shifting AI safety from model-centric evaluation toward socio-technical reliability.

Gjergji Kasneci, Enkelejda Kasneci

Technical University of Munich

AI Assurance AI Accountability AI Governance AI Safety

Jul 20, 2026cs.CY

Governing Well in the Algorithmic Age: The Foundations of Digital Statecraft

The digital substrate - data, algorithms, infrastructure, platforms, applications - is being governed without adequate conceptual foundations. The ability and legitimacy required to govern this substrate, and to govern with it, are simultaneously misaligned, contested, and structurally absent. We introduce digital statecraft as the organising concept for this emerging field, arguing that 'digital' reconstitutes the statecraft question rather than merely extending its domain. The concept operates on two dimensions - statecraft over digital systems, concerning the authority and capacity of the state in relation to the digital substrate itself, and statecraft with digital systems, concerning the deployment of algorithmic tools as instruments of governing authority. And it rests on two foundational requirements, technical coherence and legitimate authority, that are genuinely in tension. We derive ten principles of digital statecraft from these foundations, each naming a condition whose absence produces an identifiable and structural governance failure: public interest first, human-machine complementarity, governability by design, systemic coherence, hybrid institutions, adaptive governance, human centricity and civic agency, accountable and traceable authority, judgment across time, and the non-delegable core. This article takes the state as the starting point, the institutional form that developed historically in response to the problem of effective and legitimate public governance, and the only current candidate for which the full set of legitimacy conditions is institutionally available. But the digital statecraft programme holds open a deeper question than just whether states can reform themselves: governing well in the algorithmic age may require rethinking the boundaries, scale, and affiliative basis of statehood itself.

Zeynep Engin, Tim Gordon, Viviana Bastidas +14

The Digital Statecraft Academy · UCL Computer Science · University of Cambridge - Department of Engineering +15

Jul 17, 2026cs.CY

A Methodology for Auditable Trustworthiness Levels in AI Lifecycle Governance

AI governance increasingly requires judgments about whether an AI system remains adequately trustworthy over time, whether observed changes are tolerable, and how such judgments should be documented in a transparent and contestable way. Existing approaches remain either too high-level to support lifecycle monitoring and reassessment or too narrowly metric-driven to connect multidimensional trustworthiness evidence with governance decisions. We propose a lightweight methodology centered on \emph{trustworthiness level functions}: auditable rules that map measured trustworthiness profiles to governance-relevant levels. The methodology separates the underlying trustworthiness evidence from the governance rule used to interpret it and treats that rule as a lifecycle governance object. The rule may remain expert-defined or, when available evidence warrants empirical learning, be approximated by an interpretable candidate model. An AI lifecycle governance procedure embeds this choice in explicit decision gates for determining whether learning should be attempted and whether a learned candidate should become operative. The resulting rule supports lifecycle monitoring through level transitions, boundary margins, and profile drift, with explicit human responsibilities for validation, approval, and reassessment. We illustrate the methodology on synthetic AI lifecycle scenarios involving degradation, shocks, updates, heterogeneous monitoring cadences, and system comparison. Our methodology does not replace expert or legal judgment, but makes the governance interpretation of trustworthiness evidence more explicit, auditable, and contestable over time.

Andrea Ferrario

Institute of Biomedical Ethics and History of Medicine, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland · SUPSI, Dalle Molle Institute for Artificial Intelligence (IDSIA), Lugano, Switzerland · ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland

AI Assurance AI Governance Trust in AI

Jul 17, 2026cs.AI

Harmonizing AI Safety Thresholds

Frontier AI companies have published capability thresholds that differ substantially, making it difficult for third parties to verify whether a threshold has been crossed or to compare requirements across companies. Moreover, without common minimum thresholds, risk mitigation may be inconsistent, creating a potential race to the bottom in safety standards. We develop a methodology for deriving harmonized thresholds across three risk domains. For misuse risks (cyber and biological), we take expected harm as the key primitive and use an explicit risk-modeling approach that accounts for risk channels and model release conditions. For automated AI R&D, we base our proposed threshold on the observed rate of AI progress rather than expected harm. Our analysis expands upon prior work and highlights existing empirical gaps and limitations.

Wilber Sean Anterola, Matthew Ball, Luis F. Lafuerza +1

1Brown University · Centre pour la Sécurité de l’Intelligence Artificielle (CeSIA)

AI Risk Management AI Governance AI Safety

Jul 17, 2026cs.AI

Closing the AI Trust Gap: The Case for Independent Certification for Trustworthy AI

Over the past decade, responsible AI (RAI) has produced a substantial body of practice for identifying and mitigating the risks AI poses in high-stakes settings. Yet this work has not produced a market that rewards trustworthiness. Firms that invest seriously in safety, fairness, and oversight cannot consistently prove to consumers, regulators, and shareholders that their systems go beyond the bare minimum of compliance. What is missing is a way for society to recognize or compare the difference. The result is a trust gap: a structural condition in which responsible development efforts happen inside organizations but produce no external, independently recognized and verifiable signal of trustworthy outcomes. We argue this gap is sustained in part because of a focus on responsible AI (a matter of internal process) as opposed to trustworthy AI (a matter of independently verifiable real-world outcomes), and that it persists because of three compounding failures: (1) the market cannot distinguish trustworthy systems from their imitations; (2) evaluation targets models and outputs rather than deployed sociotechnical systems and their outcomes; (3) the measurement ecosystem is oriented toward avoiding harm rather than demonstrating benefit. Reviewing existing AI governance instruments and comparing them to certification regimes in healthcare, sustainability, and security, we show that none integrate a governance baseline, independently verified positive-outcome evidence, and market signaling in a single framework. We propose independent, outcome-oriented certification as the connective layer that can close the trust gap, complementing regulation and internal governance by making trustworthiness measurable, comparable, and commercially rewarded.

Trisevgeni Papakonstantinou, Cansu Canca, Farah Nanji +14

University College London · AI Ethics Lab · University of Cambridge +8

AI Assurance AI Governance Trust in AI

Jul 17, 2026cs.MA

When Not to Automate: A Formal Protocol for Human Preservation in AI-Optimized Organizations

Standard automation ROI misses four categories of systemic risk -- tacit knowledge erosion, resilience reduction, regulatory exposure, and socio-institutional capital degradation -- that affect long-term organizational performance. PHP-AIO (Protocol for Human Preservation in AI-Optimized Organizations) is a five-gate sequential decision protocol with a final composite check that quantifies these unpriced systemic risks at the role level and produces auditable automation decisions. A closed-form automation-debt measure (

ρ(P)

) formalises how role-level decisions accumulate across multi-step processes; its warning is neutralised only by a regulator-mandated human-in-the-loop anchor. Applied to stylised profiles of representative internal roles, PHP-AIO produces distinct outcomes -- automate, augment, hybrid, and preserve -- for candidates that standard cost-benefit analysis would uniformly automate. Threshold sensitivity analysis confirms the gate decisions are robust to upward perturbations of at least 14% in three of four representative cases. Keywords: AI governance, automation decision, human oversight, tacit knowledge, organizational resilience, financial services

Jose Manuel de la Chica Rodriguez, Jairo Rodriguez Arias, Spyridon Chouliaras

1Santander AI Lab

AI Risk Management Business Process Automation AI Governance Human Oversight of AI AI and Labor

Jul 16, 2026cs.AI

The Industrialization of Research ; On AI-Driven Science and Its Consequences

Artificial intelligence is transforming scientific research - not merely as a more powerful instrument, but as an autonomous participant in the research cycle itself. This transition constitutes, in the most precise sense of the term, the industrialization of research: a shift from a craft model, in which knowledge, method, and judgment are embedded in the researcher, to a pipeline model, in which these steps are decomposed, automated, and supervised. The US Department of Energy's Genesis Mission is the most ambitious current instantiation of this shift, but the fundamental questions it raises extend far beyond any single program. This essay examines seven such questions: the erosion of the intergenerational transmission of scientific competence; the growing opacity of AI-generated theories; the collapse of peer evaluation under a flood of machine-generated output; the unproven capacity of AI for paradigm-shifting discovery; the capture of the scientific agenda by political and industrial actors; the compounding of systematic errors in closed-loop pipelines; and the structural bifurcation of the global research community into incommensurable tiers. These concerns do not constitute an argument against AI-driven science - whose demonstrated potential is real and significant. They constitute the conditions under which that potential can be responsibly pursued.

Emmanuel Jeannot

Inria

AI-Assisted Scientific Research AI Governance Human Oversight of AI Scientific Workflow Automation

Jul 16, 2026cs.AI

Global Index on Responsible AI: 2026 Report

Grounded in human rights-based frameworks such as the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of AI, the Global Index on Responsible AI (GIRAI) examines how countries translate responsible AI commitments into enforceable protections, institutional capacity, and redress mechanisms. GIRAI 2026 assesses these across five dimensions: Inclusion and Diversity, Ethics and Sustainability, Labour and Skills, Trust and Safety, and AI Use in Public Service. A global network of 135 country-level researchers collected and assessed 68,138 data points on 38 indicators organised across three pillars: government AI policy and implementation (17 indicators), civil society engagement (5), enabling conditions (15), and documented cases of government deployment of unacceptable-risk AI systems. The data covers November 2023 to September 2025. A score of 100 is derived from the indicators to rank all countries. Findings show that while responsible AI governance is expanding, with 126 of 135 countries having at least one government policy or initiative across the 17 AI Policy indicators, this does not often translate into meaningful protection. For instance, Global South countries account for 203 of 306 new cases of indicators with frameworks since the first edition, yet 78% of their frameworks remain non-binding compared with 42% in the Global North. Government commitment to AI governance also does not extend to their own algorithms: whereas Transparency and Explainability is the strongest performing indicator, with 58% of countries having some framework, only 18% require Public Disclosure of Government Algorithms. Credible evidence of government deployment of unacceptable-risk AI systems was also found in 35 countries. These findings show that responsible AI governance must move beyond framework adoption toward enforceable rights-based protections, resourced oversight institutions, and accessible redress.

Rachel Adams, Fola Adeleke, Ayantola Alayande +4

Algorithmic Accountability AI Governance Responsible AI

Jul 16, 2026econ.GN

Governing Artificial Intelligence: Public Preferences and Regulatory Options

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming economies, societies, and polities, raising fundamental questions about how it should be regulated. Policymakers face choices over whether to prioritize innovation or safety, rely on public oversight or private self-regulation, and govern nationally or internationally. Yet little is known about how citizens evaluate these competing priorities. Here we report a conjoint survey experiment conducted in seven countries with diverse political and economic profiles. We find that citizens strongly support regulating AI and generally prioritize safety over innovation, public governance over private self-regulation, and international over national approaches. The preference for safety is strongest among those who perceive AI as risky, unpredictable, and personally consequential. These findings reveal a systematic misalignment between dominant regulatory approaches and citizen preferences.

Magnus Lundgren, Jonas Tallberg

Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg · Department of Political Science, Stockholm University

Jul 15, 2026cs.AI

Traccia: An OpenTelemetry-Based Governance Platform for AI Systems

The rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Artificial Intelligent (AI) powered autonomous agents has fundamentally changed the existing forms of software governance. In spite of the rigorous standards of transparency and account ability required according to the international frameworks such as the European Union's AI Act, there is a considerable gap between theory and reality. The present study discusses the inherent drawbacks of currently utilized platforms for LLM evaluation, machine learning workflow, and application performance monitoring in general. It has been shown that current disjointed solutions fail to protect unbound state space agentic architecture from serious threats such as alignment drift, SaaS security concerns, and unauthorized deployment of shadow AI systems. Moreover, a solution is proposed for overcoming the discussed challenges in form of a coherent multi-level AI governance stack Traccia built on the top of OpenTelemetry infrastructure platform. Traccia resolves the last mile for AI Alignment by adding the telemetry data, passive semantic guardrail assessment, and execution lineage into a hashed trace ledger. Traccia automatically creates compliance evidence packages by appending tamper-resistant fingerprints and SHA-256 content hash, that map to regulatory requirements (Articles 12, 14, 19, 26(6), and 50 of the EU AI Act) without invading any data privacy. By performing this evaluation in a methodical manner, a solid machine-readable base has been created for enterprise-wide management of autonomous AI systems.

Nutan Kumar Naik, Aditya Kumar Saroj, Vijay Prasad Poudel +2

Department of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences National Institute of Technology Rourkela Odisha, India · Algen.AI2026 Bengaluru, Karnataka, India

AI Accountability AI Agent Monitoring AI Governance Language Model Auditing