Cognitive Science

While textual frequency has been validated as relevant to human cognition in reading speed, its relatedness to Large Language Models (LLMs) is seldom studied. We propose a novel research direction in terms of textual data frequency, which is an understudied topic, to the best of our knowledge. Our framework is composed of three units. First, this paper proposes Textual Frequency Law (TFL), which indicates that frequent textual data should be preferred for LLMs for both prompting and fine-tuning. Since many LLMs are closed-source in their training data, we propose using online resources to estimate the sentence-level frequency. We then utilize an input paraphraser to paraphrase the input into a more frequent textual expression. Next, we propose Textual Frequency Distillation (TFD) by querying LLMs to conduct story completion by further extending the sentences in the datasets, and the resulting corpora are used to adjust the initial estimation. Finally, we propose Curriculum Textual Frequency Training (CTFT) that fine-tunes LLMs in an increasing order of sentence-level frequency. Experiments are conducted on our curated dataset Textual Frequency Paired Dataset (TFPD) on math reasoning, machine translation, commonsense reasoning and agentic tool calling. Results show the effectiveness of our framework.

A robust decision-making process must take into account uncertainty, especially when the choice involves inherent risks. Because artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly integrated into decision-making workflows, managing uncertainty relies more and more on the metacognitive capabilities of these systems; i.e, their ability to assess the reliability of and regulate their own decisions. Hence, it is crucial to employ robust methods to measure the metacognitive abilities of AI. This paper is primarily a methodological contribution arguing for the adoption of the meta-d' framework as the gold standard for assessing the metacognitive sensitivity of AIs--the ability to generate confidence ratings that distinguish correct from incorrect responses. Moreover, we propose to leverage signal detection theory (SDT) to measure the ability of AIs to spontaneously regulate their decisions based on uncertainty and risk. To demonstrate the practical utility of these psychophysical frameworks, we conduct two series of experiments on three large language models (LLMs)--GPT-5, DeepSeek-V3.2-Exp, and Mistral-Medium-2508.

Standard evaluation of LLM confidence relies on calibration metrics (ECE, Brier score) that conflate how much a model knows (Type-1 accuracy) with how well its confidence signal tracks that knowledge (Type-2 metacognitive sensitivity). We apply Signal Detection Theory (SDT) to decompose these capacities, treating token-level normalised log-probability as a graded confidence variable and answer correctness as the state to be discriminated. We characterise the Type-2 ROC of this signal, including its unequal-variance structure via z-ROC analysis, and -- because the meta-d' efficiency ratio is not well defined for open-ended QA, which lacks a two-alternative Type-1 decision -- quantify metacognitive efficiency with a model-free information measure, normalised metacognitive information (meta-I_2r). Applied to four LLMs (Llama-3-8B-Instruct, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3, Llama-3-8B-Base, Gemma-2-9B-Instruct) across 224,000 factual QA trials, we find: (1) metacognitive information varies more than two-fold across models and co-varies inversely with accuracy -- the least accurate model has the most informative confidence -- though with four models this ordering cannot be separated from an error-difficulty confound, so we report it as coupling, not decoupling; (2) the confidence signal has model-specific unequal-variance structure (z-ROC slopes 0.81 to 1.18) invisible to calibration metrics; (3) metacognitive information is domain-specific, strongest in Arts & Literature for every model; (4) temperature dissociates Type-1 accuracy from metacognitive information, which stays stable while accuracy shifts. All estimates carry permutation nulls and bootstrap confidence intervals. Pre-registered; code and data public.

In psychological support and emotional companionship scenarios, the core limitation of large language models (LLMs) lies not merely in response quality, but in their reliance on local next-token prediction, which prevents them from maintaining the temporal continuity, stage awareness, and user consent boundaries required for multi-turn intervention. This stateless characteristic makes systems prone to premature advancement, stage misalignment, and boundary violations in continuous dialogue. To address this problem, we argue that the key challenge in process-oriented emotional support is not simply generating natural language, but constructing a sustainably updatable external situational structure for the model. We therefore propose LEKIA 2.0, a situated LLM architecture that separates the cognitive layer from the executive layer, thereby decoupling situational modeling from intervention execution. This design enables the system to maintain stable representations of the user's situation and consent boundaries throughout ongoing interaction. To evaluate this process-control capability, we further introduce a Static-to-Dynamic online evaluation protocol for multi-turn interaction. LEKIA achieved an average absolute improvement of approximately 31% over prompt-only baselines in deep intervention loop completion. The results suggest that an external situational structure is a key enabling condition for building stable, controllable, and situated emotional support systems.

In-context learning (ICL) enables fast task adaptation from demonstrations without per-task parameter updates but remains highly sensitive to example selection and formatting. In unified multimodal models spanning understanding and generation, this sensitivity is exacerbated by cross-modal interference and varying cognitive demands. Consequently, in-context learning efficacy is often non-monotonic and highly task-dependent. To diagnose these behaviors, we introduce a six-level Capability-Oriented Taxonomy that categorizes the functional role of demonstrations from basic perception to high-order discernment. Guided by this cognitive framework, we construct UniICL-760K, a large-scale corpus featuring curated 8-shot in-context learning episodes across 15 subtasks, alongside UniICL-Bench for rigorous, controlled evaluation. We show that this data-driven assembly is the primary source of our gains. As a complementary, lightweight stabilizer, we additionally propose the Context-Adaptive Prototype Modulator, a plug-and-play module that further improves few-shot stability. Evaluations on UniICL-Bench show that our approach yields highly competitive unified results, outperforming larger-parameter multimodal large language model baselines on most understanding in-context learning tasks. Data and code are available at https://github.com/xuyicheng-zju/UniICL.

Creative ideas often arise by associating remote concepts. Can random associations reliably increase originality, and do they help humans and large language models (LLMs) in the same way? We asked human participants and seven LLMs to design products by drawing inspiration from a random source or addressing an unmet user need. Humans reliably benefited from cross-domain mappings, while LLMs generated more original ideas than humans but showed no overall benefit from the intervention, though this changed with semantic distance. More distant source-target pairings produced more original ideas in both humans and LLMs. Humans benefited at nearly any distance, while only the highest-rated LLMs benefited when the source was sufficiently remote. Humans and LLMs also used sources differently: humans tended to transfer surface features, while LLMs transferred structural and functional properties. These findings reveal the generative role of remote associations and systematic differences in how humans and AI respond to the same creativity intervention.

Artificial intelligence is increasingly embedded in human decision-making, yet distinguishing systems that genuinely amplify human cognition from those promoting excessive dependence remains underdefined. This paper introduces a framework to distinguish cognitive amplification (improving hybrid performance without degrading human capability) from cognitive delegation (outsourcing reasoning to the AI). We define four metrics: the Cognitive Amplification Index (CAI*), Dependency Ratio (D), Human Reliance Index (HRI), and Human Cognitive Drift Rate (HCDR). We test this framework in an agent-based NetLogo simulation across three reliance regimes and multiple dependency-atrophy configurations, performing constrained optimizations and parameter sweeps to determine if positive collaborative gain is recoverable. Finally, we introduce an extension with an explicit human-AI interaction term. Our metrics effectively distinguish degenerate AI-dominated delegation, capability-preserving but weakly competitive interaction, and structurally dependent boundary regimes. Across all baseline configurations, no regime achieves positive collaborative gain relative to the best standalone baseline, even when reducing capability atrophy to zero. This limitation proves structural rather than merely parametric. Positive collaborative gain (CAI* > 0) becomes attainable only after introducing an explicit interaction term allowing retained human capability to contribute directly to the assisted output. This framework provides a basis for evaluating whether human-AI systems remain cognitively sustainable. The results suggest that preventing capability erosion alone is insufficient for genuine amplification if the architecture remains delegation-oriented. Amplification requires both preserved human capability and a coupling mechanism through which it contributes productively to the hybrid outcome.

In cognitive science and linguistic theory, dialogue is not seen as a chain of independent utterances but rather as a joint activity sustained by coherence, consistency, and shared understanding. However, many systems for open-domain and personalized dialogue use surface-level similarity metrics (e.g., BLEU, ROUGE, F1) as one of their main reporting measures, which fail to capture these deeper aspects of conversational quality. We re-examine a notable retrieval-augmented framework for personalized dialogue, LAPDOG, as a case study for evaluation methodology. Using both human and LLM-based judges, we identify limitations in current evaluation practices, including corrupted dialogue histories, contradictions between retrieved stories and persona, and incoherent response generation. Our results show that human and LLM judgments align closely but diverge from lexical similarity metrics, underscoring the need for cognitively grounded evaluation methods. Broadly, this work charts a path toward more reliable assessment frameworks for retrieval-augmented dialogue systems that better reflect the principles of natural human communication.

Large language models (LLMs) display a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks (a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models), yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests targeting distinct foundational cognitive components: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (goal-directed spatial updating), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Comparison with a human baseline shows that LLMs and humans fail at different parts of the same tasks. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

Objective: This study develops and validates a patient simulation framework that aligns with the National Institute of Standards and Technology AI Risk Management Framework MAP and MEASURE functions, providing an empirical basis for identifying and characterizing performance risks in conversational clinical AI across medical, linguistic, and behavioral patient variation. We applied the framework to a conversational decision aid for antidepressant selection in major depressive disorder. Methods: The simulator integrates three profile dimensions: (1) medical profiles constructed from All of Us electronic health records using risk-ratio gating; (2) linguistic profiles modeling a health literacy gradient and condition-specific communication; and (3) behavioral profiles representing cooperative, distracted, and adversarial engagement. We generated 500 simulated conversations and evaluated profile fidelity through human annotation and a large language model (LLM) judge, then assessed downstream effects on the AI Decision Aid's concept retrieval and antidepressant recommendations. Results: The patient simulator expressed medical concepts with high fidelity (96.6% accurate across 8,210 concepts), with human inter-annotator agreement of 0.73$κ$ and LLM-judge agreement against human annotators of 0.78$κ$, both indicating substantial agreement. Behavioral profiles were reliably distinguished (0.93$κ$, near perfect agreement), and linguistic profiles showed substantial agreement at the lower bound of the substantial range (0.61$κ$), adequate to support profile-level analysis. The framework revealed monotonic degradation in AI Decision Aid performance across the health literacy gradient. Rank-1 concept retrieval increased from 47.6% for limited health literacy to 81.9% for proficient health literacy, with corresponding declines in antidepressant recommendation accuracy.

College students increasingly use AI chatbots to support academic reading, yet we lack granular understanding of how these interactions shape their reading experience and cognitive engagement. We conducted an eight-week longitudinal study with 15 undergraduates who used AI to support assigned readings in a course. We collected 838 prompts across 239 reading sessions and developed a coding schema categorizing prompts into four cognitive themes: Decoding, Comprehension, Reasoning, and Metacognition. Comprehension prompts dominated (59.6%), with Reasoning (29.8%), Metacognition (8.5%), and Decoding (2.1%) less frequent. Most sessions (72%) contained exactly three prompts, the required minimum of the reading assignment. Within sessions, students showed natural cognitive progression from comprehension toward reasoning, but this progression was truncated. Across eight weeks, students' engagement patterns remained stable, with substantial individual differences persisting throughout. Qualitative analysis revealed an intention-behavior gap: students recognized that effective prompting required effort but rarely applied this knowledge, with efficiency emerging as the primary driver. Students also strategically triaged their engagement based on interest and academic pressures, exhibiting a novel pattern of reading through AI rather than with it: using AI-generated summaries as primary material to filter which sections merited deeper attention. We discuss design implications for AI reading systems that scaffold sustained cognitive engagement.

Visual perspective taking--inferring how the world appears from another's viewpoint--is foundational to social cognition. We introduce FlipSet, a diagnostic benchmark for Level-2 visual perspective taking (L2 VPT) in vision-language models. The task requires simulating 180-degree rotations of 2D character strings from another agent's perspective, isolating spatial transformation from 3D scene complexity. Evaluating 103 VLMs reveals systematic egocentric bias: the vast majority perform below chance, with roughly three-quarters of errors reproducing the camera viewpoint. Control experiments expose a compositional deficit--models achieve high theory-of-mind accuracy and above-chance mental rotation in isolation, yet fail catastrophically when integration is required. This dissociation indicates that current VLMs lack the mechanisms needed to bind social awareness to spatial operations, suggesting fundamental limitations in model-based spatial reasoning. FlipSet provides a cognitively grounded testbed for diagnosing perspective-taking capabilities in multimodal systems.

Despite recent successes, test-time scaling -- i.e., dynamically expanding the token budget during inference as needed -- remains brittle for vision-language models (VLMs). Unstructured visual reasoning chains entangle perception and reasoning, leading to long, disorganized contexts where small perceptual mistakes may cascade into completely wrong answers. Reasoning also requires expensive reinforcement learning with hand-crafted rewards. Here, we introduce SPARC (Separating Perception And Reasoning Circuits), a modular framework that explicitly decouples visual perception from reasoning. Inspired by sequential sensory-to-cognitive processing in the brain, SPARC implements a two-stage pipeline where the model first performs explicit visual search to localize question-relevant regions, then conditions its reasoning on those regions to produce the final answer. This separation enables independent test-time scaling with asymmetric compute allocation (e.g., prioritizing perceptual processing under distribution shift), and supports selective optimization (e.g., improving the perceptual stage alone when it is the bottleneck for end-to-end performance). It also accommodates compressed contexts by running global search at lower image resolutions and allocating high-resolution processing only to selected regions, thereby reducing visual token count and compute. SPARC outperforms monolithic baselines and strong visual-grounding approaches across challenging visual reasoning tasks, such as improving Qwen3VL 4B on the $V^*$ VQA benchmark by 6.7 points and surpassing "thinking with images" by 4.6 points in an OOD setting with a $200\times$ lower token budget.

Online financial services constitute an essential component of contemporary web ecosystems, yet their openness introduces substantial exposure to fraud that harms vulnerable users and weakens trust in digital finance. Such threats have become a significant web harm that erodes societal fairness and affects the well-being of online communities. However, existing detection methods based on graph neural networks (GNNs) struggle with two persistent challenges: (1) long-tailed data distributions, which obscure rare but critical fraudulent cases, and (2) fraud camouflage, where malicious transactions mimic benign behaviors to evade detection. To fill these gaps, we propose HIMVH, a Hippocampus-Inspired Multi-View Hypergraph learning model for web finance fraud detection. Specifically, drawing inspiration from the scene conflict monitoring role of the hippocampus, we design a cross-view inconsistency perception module that captures subtle discrepancies and behavioral heterogeneity across multiple transaction views. This module enables the model to identify subtle cross-view conflicts for detecting online camouflaged fraudulent behaviors. Furthermore, inspired by the match-mismatch novelty detection mechanism of the CA1 region, we introduce a novelty-aware hypergraph learning module that measures feature deviations from neighborhood expectations and adaptively reweights messages, thereby enhancing sensitivity to online rare fraud patterns in the long-tailed settings. Extensive experiments on six web-based financial fraud datasets demonstrate that HIMVH achieves 6.42% improvement in AUC, 9.74% in F1 and 39.14% in AP on average over 15 SOTA models.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) excel at single-image understanding, they exhibit significantly degraded performance in multi-image reasoning scenarios. Multi-image reasoning presents fundamental challenges including complex inter-relationships between images and scattered critical information across image sets. Inspired by human cognitive processes, we propose a Cognition-Inspired Meta-Action Framework (CINEMA), which decomposes multi-image reasoning into five structured meta-actions: Global, Focus, Hint, Think, and Answer, explicitly modeling the sequential cognitive steps humans naturally employ. For cold-start training, we introduce a Retrieval-Based Tree Sampling strategy that generates high-quality meta-action trajectories to bootstrap the model with reasoning patterns. During reinforcement learning, we adopt a two-stage paradigm: an exploration phase with Diversity-Preserving Strategy to avoid entropy collapse, followed by an annealed exploitation phase with DAPO to gradually strengthen exploitation. To train our model, we construct a dataset of 56k cold-start and 58k reinforcement learning instances spanning multi-image, multi-frame, and single-image tasks. We conduct extensive evaluations on multi-image reasoning benchmarks, video understanding benchmarks, and single-image benchmarks, achieving competitive state-of-the-art performance on several key benchmarks. Our model surpasses GPT-4o on the MUIR and MVMath benchmarks and notably outperforms specialized video reasoning models on video understanding benchmarks, demonstrating the effectiveness and generalizability of our human cognition-inspired reasoning framework.

Games have long been a microcosm for studying planning and reasoning in both natural and artificial intelligence (AI), often focusing on expert-level or even super-human play. But real life also pushes human intelligence along a different frontier, requiring people to flexibly navigate decision-making problems that they have never thought about before. Here, we use novice gameplay to study how people reason about new problem settings. Through a series of large-scale behavioral studies with over 1000 participants and 121 two-player strategic board games (almost all novel to our participants), we show that people are systematic and adaptively rational in how they play a game for the first time, or evaluate a game (e.g., how fair or how fun it is likely to be) before they have played it even once. We explain these capacities via a computational cognitive model that we call the 'Intuitive Gamer', a model based on mechanisms of fast and flat (depth-limited) goal-directed probabilistic simulation. Our work offers new insights into how people rapidly evaluate, act, and make suggestions when encountering novel problems, and could inform the design of more flexible and human-like AI systems that can determine not just how to solve new tasks, but whether a task is worth thinking about at all.

Humans can uniquely assign value to novel, abstract outcomes to support reinforcement learning. However, this flexibility is cognitively costly and reduces learning efficiency. We propose that goal-dependent learning initially relies on capacity-limited working memory. With consistent experience, learners create a "compressed" reward function - a simplified goal rule -- that transfers to long-term memory for a more automatic evaluation upon receiving feedback. This automaticity frees working memory resources, thereby boosting learning efficiency. Across six experiments, we demonstrate that learning is impaired by the size of the goal space but improves when this space allows for compression. Additionally, faster reward processing correlates with better learning. Although the algorithmic details remain to be established, our behavioral results and computational models suggest that efficient goal-directed learning relies on compressing complex goal information into a stable reward function. These findings illuminate the cognitive mechanisms of intrinsic motivation and can inform behavioral interventions supporting human goal achievement.

Human cognition is profoundly shaped by the environments in which it unfolds. Yet, it remains an open question whether learning and decision making can be explained as a principled adaptation to the statistical structure of real-world tasks. We introduce ecologically rational analysis, a computational framework that unifies the normative foundations of rational analysis with ecological grounding. Leveraging large language models to generate ecologically valid cognitive tasks at scale, and using meta-learning to derive rational models optimized for these environments, we develop a new class of learning algorithms: Ecologically Rational Meta-learned Inference (ERMI). ERMI internalizes the statistical regularities of naturalistic problem spaces and adapts flexibly to novel situations, without requiring hand-crafted heuristics or explicit parameter updates. We show that ERMI captures human behavior across 15 experiments spanning function learning, category learning, and decision making, outperforming several established cognitive models in trial-by-trial prediction. Our results suggest that much of human cognition may reflect adaptive alignment to the ecological structure of the problems we encounter in everyday life.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable progress in reasoning across diverse domains. However, effective reasoning in real-world tasks requires adapting the reasoning strategy to the demands of the problem, ranging from fast, intuitive responses to deliberate, step-by-step reasoning and tool-augmented thinking. Drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, we propose a novel taxonomy of LLM reasoning strategies along two knowledge boundaries: a fast/slow boundary separating intuitive from deliberative processes, and an internal/external boundary distinguishing reasoning grounded in the model's parameters from reasoning augmented by external tools. We systematically survey recent work on adaptive reasoning in LLMs and categorize methods based on key decision factors. We conclude by highlighting open challenges and future directions toward more adaptive, efficient, and reliable LLMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) can exhibit step-by-step reasoning, reflection, and backtracking, but these behaviors are often unregulated, leading to overthinking. As a result, LRMs continue generating redundant reasoning even after reaching high-confidence conclusions. This increases inference cost and latency, limiting practical deployment. The root cause is the absence of an intrinsic mechanism to monitor the reasoning state and decide when to continue, backtrack, or stop. We propose MERA, a meta-cognitive reasoning framework that decouples reasoning from control to enable independent optimization of control strategies. MERA constructs high-quality reasoning-control supervision data via a takeover-based pipeline, and transforms long-horizon traces into structured reasoning-control alternating sequences for training. The model is trained with supervised fine-tuning to internalize the structured separation, and further optimized with Control-Segment Policy Optimization (CSPO), which combines segment-wise GRPO with control masking to focus learning on control segments. Experiments across reasoning benchmarks show that MERA improves both efficiency and accuracy.

Autonomy, from the Greek autos (self) and nomos (law), refers to the capacity to operate according to internal rules without external control. Autonomous vehicles (AuVs) are therefore understood as vehicular systems that perceive their environment and execute tasks with minimal human intervention, consistent with the direction indicated by the SAE levels of automated driving. However, recent research and deployments increasingly showcase vehicular capabilities that, while not contradicting autonomy, are not entailed by it, including ambiguous goal handling, purposeful social engagement, external tool use, proactive problem solving, continuous learning, and context-sensitive reasoning in unseen and ethically salient situations, enabled in part by multimodal language models. These developments reveal a gap between technical autonomy and the broader social cognitive functions required for human-centered mobility, which are more precisely captured by the notion of agency. Therefore, rather than adding increasingly elaborate modifiers to "autonomous," we introduce agentic vehicles (AgVs) and suggest that autonomy and agency are intertwined but conceptually distinct: if autonomy concerns what to do and how to do it (task executions under internal rules), agency pertains to why to do it and what else can be done (goal-directed, adaptive actions). We present autonomy and agency as orthogonal yet synergistic dimensions with co-development implications. Vehicle agency marks a novel dimension of mobility service intelligence, heralding vehicles as purposeful actors in society.

Reasoning is a hallmark of human intelligence, enabling adaptive decision-making in complex unfamiliar scenarios. In contrast, machine intelligence remains bound to training data, unable to dynamically refine solutions at inference. While recent advances have explored machine reasoning - trading inference-time compute for improved performance - they focus on verbal domains such as mathematical problem-solving where explicit rules govern step-by-step solution generation. Many tasks lack sufficient labelled data and require alternative performance improvement mechanisms, such as inference-time compute. Here we present a paradigm for machine reasoning in vision, enabling performance improvements with increasing thinking time (inference-time compute), even with limited labelled data. Our approach is inspired by dual-process theories of human cognition, integrating a fast-thinking System I module for generating and verifying solutions in familiar tasks, with a slow-thinking System II module that iteratively refines predictions using self-play reinforcement learning, even when task-specific data is limited. This paradigm involves proposing, competing over, and refining solutions until convergence. We demonstrate that extended inference-time compute yields superior performance compared to large-scale supervised learning, foundation models, and human experts in vision tasks. These include computer-vision benchmarks and cancer localisation across five organs, highlighting the potential of inference-time compute for data-scarce problems.

This paper develops a formal account of causal explanation, grounded in a theory of conversational pragmatics, and inspired by the interventionist idea that explanation is about asking and answering what-if-things-had-been-different questions. We illustrate the fruitfulness of the account, relative to previous accounts, by showing that widely recognised explanatory virtues emerge naturally, as do subtle empirical patterns concerning the impact of norms on causal judgments. This shows the value of a communication-first approach to explanation: getting clear on explanation's communicative dimension is an important prerequisite for philosophical work on explanation. The result is a simple but powerful framework for incorporating insights from the cognitive sciences into philosophical work on explanation, which will be useful for philosophers or cognitive scientists interested in explanation.

Visual persuasion uses images to shape cognition, emotion, and behavior, with its effects depending on both visual attributes and semantic context. Despite recent progress, it remains unclear whether Vision-Language Models (VLMs) understand visual persuasiveness. This motivates us to ask: can VLMs assess whether an image persuasively supports an intended message, which visual factors shape this judgment, and do they align with human judgments? Through empirical analyses on image-message pairs where human raters consistently agree on the persuasiveness judgment, we show that VLMs exhibit a recall-oriented bias: they over-predict images as persuasive while achieving high recall. We introduce Visual Persuasive Factors (VPFs), a taxonomy informed by cognitive psychology for quantifying visual cues that shape persuasive judgments. Our factor-level analysis reveals that VPFs distinguish human persuasiveness judgments, whereas VLMs only partially reproduce these patterns, often generating false positives by treating persuasion-relevant cues as sufficient evidence. Building on this insight, we evaluate VPF-guided interventions and find that properly framed VPF knowledge can improve performance, but merely specifying visual cues or adding step-by-step reasoning is insufficient. By analyzing model rationales at the level of functional reasoning steps, we further identify a central bottleneck in connecting object identification to semantic message alignment.

In this study, we investigate developmental mechanisms that enable small, resource-constrained systems such as cm-sized millirobots to autonomously explore, learn, and adapt their capabilities throughout their lifespan. Reinforcement learning algorithms guide the agent's skill acquisition and adaptation through the interplay of our proposed tiny Developmental Skill Method (tinyDSM), which integrates intrinsic motivation and fitness-based assessment. We strive for minimal hard-wired skills while encouraging the open-ended development of new skills. A key emphasis in our approach is to encode minimal a-priori general knowledge, which serves as a foundational starting point for the system as it further learns system-specific dependencies from the initial knowledge provided. Thus, by design, our approach aims to cover generic application domains. The methodology is based on (a) developmental mechanism with intrinsic motivation, and (b) a cognitive architecture (knowledge, reasoning, learning), while (c) utilizing minimal resources. It uses a hierarchical knowledge graph and kinematic reasoners to model and evaluate simple and advanced motion related skills. In our experiments, we use a resource-constrained millirobot with a volume of 36 cm^3 with a Raspberry Pi Pico 32-bit microcontroller that integrates all described features and capabilities except the camera system in 9 kB. Starting with learning the most elementary motor skills the millirobot autonomously progresses from simple linear and angular movements to complex geometric patterns within 15 minutes. To complement the physical experiments, we perform a simulation-based analysis that enables systematic comparisons across learning algorithms and intrinsic motivation parameters.

Humor is a fundamental cognitive phenomenon in which humans derive pleasure from the expectation violations and their resolution, exemplifying the brain's dynamic capacity for predictive processing. Classical humor theories emphasize semantic incongruity as the primary driver of amusement, yet overlook temporal dynamics despite comedians' intuition that "timing is everything." The extent to which temporal structure contributes to humor appreciation and how it interacts with semantic content remains poorly understood. Here, we propose the Dual Prediction Violation (DPV) framework to capture the interplay between content and timing. By analyzing 828 professional Chinese stand-up performances, we show that temporal features substantially outweigh semantic incongruity in predicting audience appreciation. Specifically, we find that peak semantic violations matter more than average incongruity levels, and pauses systematically lengthen before high-surprise punchlines--a strategic coupling that distinguishes successful from unsuccessful performances. These findings reframe humor as temporally scaffolded, where timing and semantic content operate in strategic coordination rather than independently. Our DPV framework bridges humor theory with predictive processing, demonstrating that temporal structure plays a central role in naturalistic humor appreciation with implications for understanding multi-scale prediction integration in linguistic processing.

The basic problem of semantic compression is to minimize the length of a message while preserving its meaning. This differs from classical notions of compression in that the distortion is not measured directly at the level of bits, but rather in an abstract semantic space. In order to make this precise, we take inspiration from cognitive neuroscience and machine learning and model semantic space as a continuous Euclidean vector space. In such a space, stimuli like speech, images, or even ideas, are mapped to high-dimensional real vectors, and the location of these embeddings determines their meaning relative to other embeddings. This suggests that a natural metric for semantic similarity is just the Euclidean distance, which is what we use in this work. We map the optimization problem of determining the minimal-length, meaning-preserving message to a spin glass Hamiltonian and solve the resulting statistical mechanics problem using replica theory. We map out the replica symmetric phase diagram, identifying distinct phases of semantic compression: a first-order transition occurs between phases marked by the emergence of paraphrases, whereas a continuous crossover is seen from extractive to abstractive compression. We speculate on which features of the phase diagram are captured by replica symmetry, and which features change under replica symmetry breaking. We conclude by showing numerical simulations of compressions obtained by simulated annealing and greedy algorithms, and argue that while the problem of finding a meaning-preserving compression is computationally hard in the worst case, there exist efficient algorithms which achieve near optimal performance in the typical case.

The possibility of LLM self-awareness and even sentience is gaining increasing public attention and has major safety and policy implications, but the science of measuring them is still in a nascent state. Here we introduce a novel methodology for quantitatively evaluating metacognitive abilities in LLMs. Taking inspiration from research on metacognition in nonhuman animals, our approach eschews model self-reports and instead tests to what degree models can strategically deploy knowledge of internal states. Using two experimental paradigms, we demonstrate that frontier LLMs introduced since early 2024 show increasingly strong evidence of certain metacognitive abilities, specifically the ability to assess and utilize their own confidence in their ability to answer factual and reasoning questions correctly and the ability to anticipate what answers they would give and utilize that information appropriately. We buttress these behavioral findings with an analysis of the token probabilities returned by the models, which suggests the presence of an upstream internal signal that could provide the basis for metacognition. We further find that these abilities 1) are limited in resolution, 2) emerge in context-dependent manners, and 3) seem to be qualitatively different from those of humans. We also report intriguing differences across models of similar capabilities, suggesting that LLM post-training may have a role in developing metacognitive abilities.

Verbalized confidence, in which LLMs report a numerical certainty score, is widely used to estimate uncertainty in black-box settings, yet the confidence scale itself (typically 0--100) is rarely examined. We show that this design choice is not neutral. Across six LLMs and three datasets, verbalized confidence is heavily discretized, with more than 78% of responses concentrating on just three round-number values. To investigate this phenomenon, we systematically manipulate confidence scales along three dimensions: granularity, boundary placement, and range regularity, and evaluate metacognitive sensitivity using $meta\text{-}d'$. We find that a 0--20 scale consistently improves metacognitive efficiency over the standard 0--100 format, while boundary compression degrades performance and round-number preferences persist even under irregular ranges. These results demonstrate that confidence scale design directly affects the quality of verbalized uncertainty and should be treated as a first-class experimental variable in LLM evaluation.

Conversational speech reveals early signs of cognitive decline, including dementia and mild cognitive impairment (MCI). AI models show promise for speech-based screening, yet most research focuses on monolingual groups. In the UK, dementia is projected to rise fastest among Black and Asian communities, where multilingualism is common, making equity assessment critical. We recruited 1,395 participants (monolingual English speakers and multilingual speakers from Sheffield/Bradford) and collected over 263 hours of speech via the CognoMemory agent. Multilingual participants spoke English alongside Somali, Chinese, or South Asian languages (Hindi, Urdu, Punjabi, Mirpuri, Arabic). We evaluated ASR (Whisper, Wav2Vec 2.0, NeMo) and downstream AI models for cognitive classification and MMSE regression. ASR accuracy showed no significant differences across groups. However, downstream models exhibited systematic disparities: multilingual speakers were more often misclassified as impaired, especially in memory, fluency, and reading tasks. False-positive rates were substantially higher for multilingual (28 to 37%) than monolingual (12 to 16%) speakers, meaning multilingual individuals were approximately 2.5 times more likely to receive incorrect impairment labels. These biases worsened when models were trained on DementiaBank. This is the first large-scale analysis of false-positive bias in speech-based AI cognitive screening for UK multilingual ethnic minorities. Despite strong overall performance, current models show measurable disparities affecting multilingual speakers. Addressing these biases is essential for safe, equitable deployment in diverse healthcare settings.