Mechanism Design

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10 papers in the last four weeks, up 150% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

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  1. Incentivizing Truthfulness and Collaborative Fairness in Bayesian Learning

    May 12, 2026Rachael Hwee Ling Sim, Jue Fan, Xiao Tian +3Mechanism DesignAlgorithmic Fairness

    Department of Computer Science, National University of Singapore, Singapore · Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR), Singapore · Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA

  2. Regret Minimization in Bilateral Trade With Perturbed Markets

    May 11, 2026Anna Lunghi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto MarchesiMechanism DesignAutomated Negotiation

    Politecnico di Milano

  3. Mechanism Design Is Not Enough: Prosocial Agents for Cooperative AI

    May 8, 2026Xuanqiang Angelo Huang, Charlie Tharas, Samuele Marro +4Mechanism DesignAI Agent Safety

    ETH Zürich · University of Oxford · Institute for Decentralized AI +5

  4. Playing games with knowledge: AI-Induced delusions need game theoretic interventions

    May 8, 2026Will Beaumaster, Paul SchraterLLM SycophancyMechanism Design

    University of Minnesota

  5. LLM Advertisement based on Neuron Auctions

    May 8, 2026Peiran Yun, Wenxin Xu, Jiayuan Liu +4Mechanism DesignOnline Advertising

    Tsinghua University · Carnegie Mellon University · Harvard University +1

  6. \mathsf{VISTA}: Decentralized Machine Learning in Adversary Dominated Environments

    May 8, 2026Hanzaleh Akbari Nodehi, Parsa Moradi, Soheil Mohajer +1Mechanism DesignByzantine-Robust Federated Learning

    University of Minnesota

  7. The Endogeneity of Miscalibration: Impossibility and Escape in Scored Reporting

    May 8, 2026Lauri Lovén, Sasu TarkomaMechanism DesignProper Scoring Rules

    Future Computing Group, University of Oulu, Finland · University of Oulu and University of Helsinki, Finland

  8. Optimizing Social Utility in Sequential Experiments

    May 7, 2026Ander Artola Velasco, Stratis Tsirtsis, Manuel Gomez-RodriguezMechanism DesignSequential Decision Making

    Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Kaiserslautern, Germany · Hasso Plattner Institute, Potsdam, Germany

  9. MenuNet: A Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Matching Markets

    May 4, 2026Zhaohong Sun, Makoto YokooMechanism DesignGame Theory

    Kyushu University, Japan · CyberAgent, Japan

  10. Language Models Refine Mechanical Linkage Designs Through Symbolic Reflection and Modular Optimisation

    Apr 30, 2026João Pedro Gandarela, Thiago Rios, Stefan Menzel +1Mechanism DesignLarge Language Model-Guided Optimization

    Idiap Research Institute, Switzerland · École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland · Honda Research Institute Europe, Germany +2

  11. Calibrating Attribution Proxies for Reward Allocation in Participatory Weather Sensing

    Apr 30, 2026Mark C. Ballandies, Michael T. C. Chiu, Claudio J. TessoneGradient-Based AttributionMechanism Design

    University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland. · WiHi, Zug, Switzerland.

  12. Can We Volunteer Out of the Peer Review Crisis?

    Apr 30, 2026Theo Tang, Toby Handfield, Julian GarciaMechanism DesignGame Theory

    Department of Data Science and Artificial Intelligence, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia · SOPHIS, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

  13. Strategic Bidding in 6G Spectrum Auctions with Large Language Models

    Apr 27, 2026Ismail Lotfi, Ali GhrayebMechanism DesignWireless Resource Allocation

    College of Science and Engineering, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar

  14. Breaking the Secret: Economic Interventions for Combating Collusion in Embodied Multi-Agent Systems

    Apr 26, 2026Qi Liu, Xiaohui Chen, Zhihui Zhao +5Mechanism DesignMulti-Agent Systems

    College of Computer Science and Technology, Taiyuan University of Technology, Taiyuan, China, 030024 · State Key Laboratory of Internet Architecture, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, 100084 · China Mobile Research Institute, Beijing, China, 100053 +3

  15. Mechanism Design for Decentralized Risk Detection: Strict Propriety, Network Coalitions, and the Backfiring Mandat

    Apr 23, 2026Jian Ni, Lecheng Zheng, John R BirgeMechanism DesignGame Theory

    Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Tech · Booth School of Business, University of Chicago

  16. Decoupling Speculation from Merit: The Identity-Bound Asset Integrity Model (IBAIM) for Sustainable Web3 Gaming

    Apr 22, 2026Jinliang XuMechanism Design

    China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, Beijing, China

  17. Kinematic Optimization of Phalanx Length Ratios in Robotic Hands Using Potential Dexterity

    Apr 22, 2026HyoJae Kang, Joonho Lee, Jeongdo Ahn +1Robotic Hand DesignMechanism Design

    Advanced Robotics Research Center, Korea Institute of Machinery & Materials (KIMM)

  18. Thrust Regulation Through Wing Linkage Modulation on the Aerobat Platform: Piezoelectric Slip-Stick Actuated Regulator Development

    Apr 20, 2026Luca CiampagliaAerial RoboticsMechanism Design

    Northeastern University

  19. Decentralized autonomous organization and blockchain-based incentivization framework for community-based facilities management

    Apr 16, 2026Reachsak Ly, Alireza Shojaei, Xinghua Gao +2Mechanism Design

    School of Technology, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois, United States · Myers-Lawson School of Construction, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia, United States

  20. CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas

    Apr 16, 2026Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita +2Social DilemmasCooperative Game Theory

    Carnegie Mellon University · Foundations of Cooperative AI Lab (FOCAL) · Jinesis Lab, University of Toronto & Vector Institute +3

  21. A Co-Design Framework for High-Performance Jumping of a Five-Bar Monoped with Actuator Optimization

    Apr 7, 2026Aastha Mishra, Aman Singh, Shishir KolathayaLegged RoboticsMechanism Design

    Department of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bengaluru, India.

  22. Agentic Service Markets Across the Computing Continuum: A Polymatroidal Architecture

    Mar 5, 2026Lauri Lovén, Alaa Saleh, Reza Farahani +5Mechanism DesignCombinatorial Optimization

    Future Computing Group, University of Oulu, Finland · Distributed Systems Group, TU Wien, Vienna, Austria · Department of Mechatronics, University of Prishtina, Kosova +4

  23. Incentive Aware AI Regulations: A Credal Characterisation

    Mar 5, 2026Anurag Singh, Julian Rodemann, Rajeev Verma +2Mechanism DesignAI Governance

    1Rational Intelligence Lab, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarbrücken, Germany · Department of Statistics, LMU Munich, Germany · 3UvA-Bosch Delta Lab, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands +1

  24. Soft Pneumatic Grippers: Topology optimization, 3D-printing and Experimental validation

    Nov 24, 2025Prabhat Kumar, Chandra Prakash, Josh Pinskier +2Topology OptimizationMechanism Design

    Department Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering. India Institute of Technology Hyderbad, Telangana 502285, India · CSIRO Robotics, Pullenvale, QLD 4069, Australia · Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Delft University of Technology, Mekelweg 2, Delft, 2628CD, Zuid-Holland, The Netherlands

  25. Steering Noncooperative Games Through Conjecture Design

    Nov 12, 2025Francesco Morri, Hélène Le Cadre, David Salas +1Mechanism DesignGame Theory

    Inria, Univ. Lille CNRS, Centrale Lille · Instituto de Ciencias de la Ingeniería Universidad de O’Higgins · Laboratoire PROMESUPR 8521 Université de Perpignan, Tecnosud

  26. Efficiency, Feasibility, and Incentive-Awareness in Constrained Online Resource Allocation

    Jul 13, 2025Yan Dai, Negin Golrezaei, Patrick JailletPrimal-Dual OptimizationOnline Convex Optimization

    Operations Research Center, MIT. · Sloan School of Management, MIT. · Department of EECS, MIT.

  27. Non-Obvious Manipulability in Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games

    May 19, 2025Diodato Ferraioli, Maria Fomenko, Giovanna VarricchioCooperative Game TheoryMechanism Design

    University of Salerno, Italy · University of Calabria, Italy

  28. Design optimization and robustness analysis of rigid-link flapping mechanisms

    Mar 27, 2025Shyam Sunder Nishad, Anupam SaxenaAerial RoboticsMechanism Design

    Department of Mechanical Engineering, IIT Kanpur, India 208016.

  29. How Can Incentives and Cut Layer Selection Influence Data Contribution in Split Federated Learning?

    Dec 10, 2024Joohyung Lee, Jungchan Cho, Wonjun Lee +2Mechanism DesignSplit Federated Learning

    School of Computing, Gachon University, Seongnam 13120, Rep. of Korea · School of Cybersecurity, Korea University, Seoul, Rep. of Korea · Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

  30. No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects

    Aug 19, 2024Shunya Noda, Genta OkadaMechanism Design

    Graduate School of Economics, the University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, 113-0033, Japan