Multi-Agent Negotiation
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LLM agents are starting to own the full customer experience. Soon, LLMs may be selling and buying on behalf of companies and customers respectively. Small models are more cost-efficient at scale, but can reinforcement learning train them into competent sellers? We train four Gemma 4 checkpoints (2.3B to 31B effective parameters) with GRPO on a programmatic utility reward for bilateral multi-issue bargaining, and evaluate every arm on the same 1,152 negotiations against two frontier buyers it never saw in training. With the same learning rate () for every size, the gain of the RL model over its base rises from at 2.3B to at 31B. Each size was trained once and the two smallest checkpoints use a different architecture, so we fit no scaling law. Tripling the learning rate, with the same or fewer training steps, improves on the shared rate at every size by (2.3B) to (4.5B). In exploratory comparisons with two frontier models run as sellers, the 12B seller trained at the tripled rate scores above both, though its untrained base already scores as high as they do. The 4.5B seller at that rate shows no detectable difference from either and fits on one 48 GB GPU. A further 2.3B arm at ten times the shared rate raises pooled score, but its gain concentrates on the evaluation buyer that shares a model family with the training pool. These results suggest tuning the learning rate before concluding that a small model cannot learn to negotiate, and testing against buyers from more than one model family.
Learning to Sell: Reinforcement Learning for Strategic Large Language Model Agents in Multi-Product Markets
Autonomous large language model (LLM) agents operating in multi-product markets must make sequential decisions under information asymmetry and resource constraints. We develop a machine learning approach for training such agents to act effectively as sellers in a multi-item bargaining environment, where a seller concurrently negotiates a catalog of substitutable assets across a pool of independent buyers. Buyers hold private, heterogeneous valuations across products, and each can purchase at most one item. Facing limits on total communication turns, the seller must dynamically match buyers with the most profitable products considering their private valuations, while strategically allocating its limited interaction budget toward combinations of greater potential value. We formalize this problem as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process using a structured, four-part message protocol that maps natural language into a parsable and regulated decision space. Using this formalization, we design a post-training method using Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). To evaluate this framework, we construct a multidimensional metric suite that quantifies constraint adherence, seller surplus extraction, and allocation quality. Our trained seller agent learns to match limited inventory to buyers more effectively, matching or outperforming trillion-parameter frontier models in both seller surplus extraction and buyer-product allocation quality. Finally, these learned strategies generalize robustly to unseen market structures, correlated valuation distributions, and price ranges not encountered during training.
Evaluating Rational Contracting in Natural Language
The emergence of language-based AI agents promises to transform the scope of machine economic activity. Instead of just proposing bids or following hard-coded protocols, such agents can be used to negotiate and execute agreements in open-ended natural language. However, most evaluations of these abilities have focused on one-off exchanges or simple economic games, leaving open the rich space of time-extended, contingent, and incomplete contracts made expressible by language; they also focus on raw profit, without measuring the qualities required for trustworthy contracting. We address this by formulating a rational framework for how agents should negotiate and perform natural language contracts in uncertain multi-step environments. Within this framework, we develop metrics and baselines for quantifying rational and cooperative play. To evaluate how agents perform at such contracting, we instantiate our framework in ContractSim, an evaluation suite where two players negotiate and execute a multi-turn supplier contract under environmental and inter-player uncertainty. Across six environments and three supplier settings (catering, hotel cleaning, and AI hosting) we find that current LLM-based agents reach agreement reliably, and negotiate efficient contracts when environmental uncertainty is low. However, under high uncertainty, they often fail to negotiate satisfiable, efficient, or mutually beneficial contracts. They are also frequently uncooperative when executing contracts, violating contract terms for additional profit even when contracts are easy to satisfy. These findings highlight room for improvement in the design of language agents that can negotiate, interpret, and execute contracts both rationally and cooperatively.
Deal Me Maybe: The Role of Emotions in Multi-Agent Negotiation
Negotiation is a demanding social task for LLM agents, requiring strategic reasoning, persuasion, and interpersonal adaptation. Yet existing benchmarks often treat agents as emotionally neutral, overlooking a key driver of human bargaining behavior. We study how prompt-conditioned emotions affect LLM-based price negotiation. In a controlled framework, buyer and seller agents are independently assigned one of six emotional states and negotiate over 350 real consumer products under two budget conditions. Across 36 emotion-pair settings and five widely used LLMs, we find that emotions strongly shape outcomes. Angry buyers almost never reach agreement (0.39% deal rate), while happy buyers agree most often (28.91%), but obtain worse prices than fearful buyers. Emotion effects are role-dependent: buyer emotion mainly drives acceptance and rejection, whereas seller emotion shapes concession dynamics. These effects influence not only language, but also termination behavior and price trajectories, raising concerns for emotion-conditioned agents in commerce.
When LLM Agents Negotiate: Private Information and Dynamic Bargaining in Supply Chains
As LLM agents move from decision support to autonomous procurement, firms need to know whether delegated negotiators create value, divide it predictably, and avoid money-losing contracts. We study this in a canonical supply chain bargaining problem: a buyer with private demand information negotiates a quantity-payment contract with an uninformed seller. We benchmark nine LLMs from OpenAI, Google, and Alibaba against a validated Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium across 9,840 LLM-to-LLM negotiations. First, capability governs value creation. Agents agree in 98.9% of negotiations and capture 95.4% of first-best surplus undiscounted, but average 2.98 rounds against the benchmark's 1.25, and this delay erodes 21-34% of surplus. Capability also governs reliability: baseline models accept individually irrational contracts in 19.2% of cases, versus 0.0-0.6% at mid-tier and flagship, making automated profit verification the binding guardrail below that threshold. Second, surplus capture is relational. Provider identity predicts who captures surplus better than capability rank: self-play buyer shares average 40% for OpenAI, 50% for Google, and 70% for Alibaba's Qwen, an ordering that survives restricted communication and no discounting. Reversing which provider sells moves the division by 7-18 percentage points, and the capable Qwen flagship is the weakest cross-family seller: vendor choice is a first-order distributional decision. Third, the prompt is a strategic lever. Delegation separates the principal's economic patience from the agent's prompted strategic patience, a free deployment choice that is the single strongest driver of surplus division (90% of explained variance). Together these establish an equilibrium-referenced audit of AI agents along three dimensions: discounted efficiency, distributional profile, and operational reliability.
CoRenew: A large language model agent-based policy simulation platform for multifamily residential redevelopment
The difficulty of collective action remains a central challenge in the design of policies for multifamily residential redevelopment. Stakeholders continually adjust their decisions in response to evolving negotiation contexts and the reactions of others, meaning that when a policy intervenes and which stakeholders it targets can substantially reshape collective outcomes. Assessing these adaptive responses ex ante remains difficult because existing simulation models often rely on predefined behavioral rules. Here, we present CoRenew, an open-source platform that uses LLM-based agents to simulate negotiations among multiple stakeholders and evaluate the effects of alternative policy combinations. Integrating open source geographic and demographic data, the platform can generate synthetic residents, simulate negotiation dynamics under alternative policy settings and compares policy performance across competing objectives. It supports both numerical and semantic policy inputs and includes built-in tools for visualization and result export. We validate its behavioral realism against survey responses from 324 residents and a nine-month observed negotiation process from a real redevelopment case. With its modular and adaptable architecture, CoRenew can be used to assess policies across different institutional and cultural contexts.
Commitment To Cooperation With Self-Negotiated Contracts
As AI agents operate with increasing autonomy in a multi-agent world, they will need to learn to cooperate with other agents and with humans to generate mutual benefits. However, cooperation is a challenge because the costs of cooperation are often incurred early on, but the benefits are only realized later, creating an incentive to defect. How can AI agents cooperate with commitment? Here, we draw on inspiration from legal institutions and contracting that human societies have used to solve principal-agent problems of this kind. Contracts provide observable representations of agreements that enable credible commitments through the enforcement of terms. We study the role of contract-based cooperation using LLM-based agents in \CT, a spatial-temporal game that combines bargaining with navigation towards a goal. We study a suite of contract representations that range from formal contracts that compile to code to natural contracts that require reinterpretation. We evaluate agents with a range of LLM backbones using different sizes and providers. We find that self-negotiated contracts can improve cooperative outcomes beyond what is possible with regular trading.
Digital Pantheon: Simulating and Auditing Coalition Formation with LLM Agents
The formation of political coalitions is a complex negotiation driven by both concrete policy objectives and deep-seated ideological convictions. While Large Language Models (LLMs) open new avenues for computational political science, the neutrality and helpfulness biases instilled by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) prevent them from sustaining steadfast partisan behaviour. We present a multi-agent framework that reconciles factual grounding with ideological alignment by combining Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG): DPO instils aggressive party-specific personas, while a per-party RAG pipeline keeps each agent bounded to its official manifesto. We operationalize the framework on the 2019 Flemish election, deploying the partisan agents in a hub-and-spoke negotiation arbitrated by a formateur. To make the emergent negotiation interpretable, we introduce a Multi-Layered Information Lineage Topology (MILT) that traces every clause in the final agreement back to its manifesto origin and classifies it into five provenance states, a Coalition Influence Score (CIS) that aggregates these traceable contributions to identify which party shaped the agreement, and a real-world grounding pass that benchmarks each simulated provision against the historically adopted coalition agreement. Across three independent simulations the framework yields a stable winner and ranking (N-VA ahead of CD&V and Open Vld), and manifesto-anchored lineage reliably predicts real-world materialization whereas hallucinated content does not. The result is a transparent, scalable testbed for the ex-ante exploration of party compatibility and formateur-mediated compromise.
MIND-CAVs: Multi-Intelligence Negotiation and Decision System for CAVs based on Intent-Driven Autonomy
Modern autonomous vehicles largely operate as isolated agents: they rely on on-board perception and decision modules and broadcast Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) that expose only low-level kinematic state. While existing cooperative driving frameworks enable limited sensor sharing, they rarely communicate high-level maneuver intentions, and edge computing is primarily used for content delivery rather than decision arbitration. As a result, current connected autonomy lacks a principled mechanism for making globally consistent, intent-aware coordination decisions across vehicles. To address this gap, we propose MIND-CAVs, a Multi-Intelligence Negotiation and Decision framework for connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) based on intent-driven autonomy. Each vehicle abstracts raw sensor observations into structured intent representations, exchanges them over V2X links, and receives globally consistent coordination plans from roadside edge servers. Edge agents combine learned and rule-based arbitration mechanisms to negotiate conflicting intents among vehicles, while a cloud platform records decisions for auditing and continual retraining. We implement MIND-CAVs in a CARLA-based AI-in-the-loop platform and evaluate it in multi-lane highway scenarios involving conflicting maneuvers and route-constrained exits. Experimental results show improved maneuver completion time and reduced unsafe proximity and unnecessary braking compared with isolated autonomy, first-come-first-served arbitration, and multi-agent reinforcement learning baselines.
Strategic Bargaining in Multi-Buyer Markets: Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards for LLM Negotiations
Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations. A prevalent yet complex scenario involves a single seller negotiating concurrently with multiple buyers, each possessing heterogeneous, private budgets. In such settings, constrained by a limited number of communication turns, the seller must balance exploring the broader market to discover the highest valuation with concentrating sufficient turns on a single target buyer to secure the best possible outcome. Our analysis reveals a significant gap in standard Large Language Models (LLMs): while these models are linguistically proficient, they fail to act as effective economic decision-makers. Specifically, they exhibit a failure to explore the buyer pool, often fixating on the current highest bid rather than strategically investigating the market to discover latent high valuations. In this paper, we propose a specialized training recipe using Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). By anchoring the reward function to objective economic outcomes, the strategic balance between market discovery and surplus extraction emerges natively through the learning process. Our results demonstrate that the trained seller undergoes a multi-stage strategic evolution, learning to leverage price anchoring and strategic probing to identify more profitable counterparties. The agent extracts a substantially higher surplus than frontier models by both improving its persuasive bargaining skills and consistently closing deals with high-value buyers. Finally, we show that our seller strategies generalize robustly to unseen buyer negotiation styles and budget distributions.
When Does Personality Composition Matter for Multi-Agent LLM Teams?
Personality prompting shapes how large language models communicate, yet whether these behavioral shifts affect objective task outcomes remains under-explored. Prior work shows that agents prompted with low agreeableness produce adversarial language, while those prompted with high agreeableness become cooperative, but the relationship between communication style and task performance has not been systematically examined across multiple domains. In this work, we investigate whether personality composition matters for multi-agent team performance by manipulating personality traits across frontier LLMs on three task domains: structured coding, open-ended research collaboration, and competitive bargaining. We find that personality effects depend critically on task structure. In coding tasks, low agreeableness leads to large communication shifts that have little effect on milestone completion. In open-ended collaboration and bargaining, the same manipulation substantially degrades performance. We discuss implications for multi-agent system design and the limits of personality manipulation.
SidConArena: An Environment Evaluating Agents in Open-Ended,Positive-Sum Bargaining Game
Evaluating LLM agents requires dynamic environments that go beyond static reasoning and zero-sum games. Real-world economic interaction is often open-ended and mixed-motive: agents must negotiate, create positive-sum surplus, compete for scarce assets, and plan under delayed returns. We introduce SidConArena, a new benchmark framework for evaluating LLM agents in open-ended, positive-sum bargaining. SidConArena formalizes a multi-player economy as a finite-horizon partially observable stochastic game with three coupled phases: natural-language negotiation with binding trades, deterministic converter-based production, and sealed-bid auctions for long-term assets. The framework combines structured observations, phase-aware agent dispatching, a neural-symbolic action interface, and asynchronous execution, enabling free-form interaction while preserving rule-grounded evaluation. Across homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments, stronger frontier models achieve higher economic outcomes, yet agents still misvalue resources, bargain passively, and remain limited in long-horizon investment planning.
Used Car Salesbots? Honesty and Credulity of LLMs as Bargaining Agents under Partial Information
In this work we study agents in simulated bargaining scenarios, where a buyer and a seller communicate through a text channel and attempt to negotiate mutually beneficial trades, under different information regimes (complete information, information asymmetry or mutual uncertainty). We evaluate their performance w.r.t. game-theoretical solutions and further investigate their honesty (their tendency to disclose or withhold information or to mislead and deceive) as well as their credulity (their tendency to trust or distrust information provided by the other agent). We study zero-shot LLM agents with simple prompting scaffolding as well as fine-tuned agents, in order to investigate whether optimising the agents to maximise financial profits makes them stronger negotiators but also more dishonest and less trusting. We find that off-the-shelf LLMs all substantially deviate from game-theoretical equilibria, they attempt to lie about their private information but cannot efficiently exploit information asymmetries. Fine-tuning on financial utility makes the agents stronger at achieving better deals but also more dishonest, highlighting the risks that optimising agents for a task can have on their safety. We release our code and a dataset of bargaining scenarios.
EmoDistill: Offline Emotion Skill Distillation for Language Model Agents in Adversarial Negotiation
Post-trained LLMs are often optimized to produce helpful, polite, and accommodating responses. In adversarial negotiation, however, such behavior can become a vulnerability: emotionally framed language may influence an agent's bargaining decisions in ways that conflict with its user's objectives. We therefore introduce EmoDistill, an offline framework for distilling emotional negotiation skills from LLM-LLM interactions into smaller language-model agents. Here, an emotional negotiation skill is a state-conditioned behavior that determines which explicit emotion to invoke in a bargaining state and how to realize that emotion as an effective negotiation utterance. EmoDistill learns these two components separately: an Implicit Q-Learning (IQL) selector learns which emotion to express in each bargaining state, while a LoRA-adapted 7B policy learns emotion-conditioned expression through Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Judge Policy Optimization (JPO). Across four emotion-sensitive negotiation domains, the full EmoDistill policy achieves competitive utility and improves over vanilla and IQL-only baselines in most settings. Emotion-free ablations show that removing the explicit emotion channel substantially reduces overall negotiation utility, while transfer experiments reveal partial, domain-dependent transfer and robustness to unseen LLM counterparties.
Counterparty Modeling is Not Strategy: The Limits of LLM Negotiators
Negotiation requires more than inferring what the other side wants: it requires using that information to make advantageous offers and counteroffers over multiple turns. We study whether large language model (LLM) agents do this in a controlled multi-attribute bargaining environment. We find that current LLM agents can model a counterparty's preferences, but do not reliably turn that knowledge into strategic bargaining. When given negotiating partner preference information, agents model it accurately and early in their reasoning traces, yet this does not reliably improve outcomes for the informed side. Turn-level analyses show why: agents often respond to what they believe the counterparty values, but do not consistently pair those moves with gains on their own high-value attributes. Sellers are more accommodating overall, and in asymmetric-information conditions, the informed side often makes the more weakly compensated concessions. Because agents fail to leverage this underlying utility structure for strategic advantage, their final agreements are heavily dictated by surface-level opening anchors rather than actual utility weights. Finally, requiring agents to explicitly state concession-for-reciprocity trades before making an offer makes individual turns look more strategic, but ultimately fails to improve the efficiency of the final agreements.
Cattle Trade: A Multi-Agent Benchmark for LLM Bluffing, Bidding, and Bargaining
We introduce \textsc{Cattle Trade, a multi-agent benchmark for evaluating large language models (LLMs) as agents in strategic reasoning under imperfect information, adversarial interaction, and resource constraints. The benchmark combines auctions, hidden-offer trade challenges (TCs), bargaining, bluffing, opponent modeling, and resource allocation within a single long-horizon game lasting 50--60 turns. Unlike prior agent benchmarks that test these abilities in isolation, \textsc{Cattle Trade} evaluates whether agents integrate them across a competitive, multi-agent economic game with conflicting incentives. The benchmark logs every bid, TC offer, counteroffer, and card selection, enabling behavioural analysis beyond final scores or win rates. We evaluate seven cost-efficient language models and three deterministic code agents across 242 games. Strategic coherence, in particular spending efficiency, resource discipline, and phase-adaptive bidding, is associated with rank more strongly than spending volume or any single subskill. Two heuristic code agents outperform most tested LLMs, and behavioural traces surface recurring LLM failure modes including overbidding, self-bidding, bankrupt TC initiation, and weak opponent-state adaptation. Evaluating agentic competence requires benchmarks that test the joint deployment of multiple capabilities in multi-agent environments with conflicting incentives, uncertainty, and economic dynamics.
TERMS-Bench: Diagnosing LLM Negotiation Agents Beyond Deal Rate
Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation. It is also a canonical testbed for agentic language models, requiring multi-turn interaction under hidden preferences, strategic communication, and binding constraints. These properties make negotiation hard to evaluate: unlike math or code, it has no intrinsic verifier. Existing LLM negotiation evaluations rely on LLM-vs.-LLM interaction or aggregate outcomes such as deal rate, leaving failures opaque. We introduce Terms-Bench, short for Testbed for Economic Reasoning in Multi-turn Strategy, a Bayesian-game framework that makes the environment itself the verifier by specifying the counterpart's latent type, policy, and payoff structure. We instantiate it in bilateral price negotiation, where the counterpart's private state and simulator policy are hidden from the agent but observable to the evaluator. This turns the counterpart from a black-box opponent into a diagnostic instrument, enabling agent-attributable failure analysis and oracle-reference optimality gaps. Evaluating 13 LLM agents spanning frontier systems from major providers, Terms-Bench turns negotiation evaluation from aggregate ranking into actionable diagnosis: where agents fail, why they fail, and what to strengthen. Empirically, frontier models saturate deal rate yet diverge in surplus extraction, cue use, belief calibration, and compliance, revealing agent-specific bargaining bottlenecks masked by prior benchmarks.
LLM-X: A Scalable Negotiation-Oriented Exchange for Communication Among Personal LLM Agents
We propose a personal-LLM exchange (LLM-X), a scalable negotiation-oriented environment that enables direct, structured communication across populations of personal agents (LLMs), each representing an individual user. Unlike existing tool-centric protocols that focus on agent-API interaction, LLM-X introduces a message bus and routing substrate for LLM-to-LLM coordination with guarantees around schema validity and policy enforcement. We contribute: (1) an architecture for LLM-X comprising federated gateways, topic-based routing, and policy enforcement; (2) a typed message protocol supporting capability negotiation and contract-net-style coordination; and (3) the first empirical evaluation of LLM-based multi-agent negotiation at scale. Experiments span 5, 9, and 12 agents, under distinct negotiation policies (Low, Medium, High), and across both short-run (minutes) and long-run (2h, 12h) load conditions. Results highlight clear policy-performance trade-offs: stricter policies improve robustness and fairness but increase latencies and message volume. Extended runs confirm that LLM-X remains stable under sustained load, with bounded latency drift.
Distilling Bayesian Belief States into Language Models for Auditable Negotiation
Negotiation agents must infer what their counterpart values, update those beliefs over dialogue turns, and choose actions under uncertainty. End-to-end large language models (LLMs) can imitate negotiation dialogue, but their opponent beliefs are usually implicit and difficult to inspect. We propose BOND (Bayesian Opponent-belief Negotiation Distillation), a framework for auditable negotiation. BOND consists of an LLM-based Bayesian teacher that scores dialogue contexts against the six possible opponent priority orderings, updates a posterior over those orderings, and uses the posterior for menu-based decision making, as well as a smaller 8B student language model that emits both negotiation actions and normalized posterior beliefs as tagged text. In the CaSiNo negotiation dataset, BOND outperforms the state-of-the-art and achieves mean Brier score 0.085 over opponent-priority posteriors. The distilled student preserves much of this belief signal, achieving Brier 0.114, below the uniform six-ordering reference of 5/36, approximately 0.139. Compared with a 70B structured-CoT baseline, the significantly smaller 8B student model yields substantially better elicited posterior calibration. We further showcase auditability through posterior trajectories, belief-versus-policy error decomposition, and posterior-prefix interventions. These diagnostics reveal that distillation preserves a scoreable belief report more strongly than causal belief-conditioned control, making weak belief-action coupling visible, not hidden.
Talk is Cheap, Communication is Hard: Dynamic Grounding Failures and Repair in Multi-Agent Negotiation
Grounding is the collaborative process of establishing mutual belief sufficient for a communicative goal. While static grounding maps language to a shared context, dynamic grounding requires agents to negotiate meaning across turns. Current multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) benchmarks largely emphasize static, one-shot tasks, overlooking whether agents can repair grounding breakdowns through interaction. We introduce an iterated multi-turn negotiation game where two agents allocate shared resources to private projects with verifiable jointly optimal outcomes. Although individual agents can identify Pareto-optimal allocations in isolation, agent dyads consistently fail to reach them across models. We identify four failure modes: (1) loss of shared interaction history, (2) stubborn anchoring to early proposals, (3) defaulting to equal splits over reward-maximizing coordination, and (4) referential binding errors across turns. Our baselines show that the coordination gap is not explained by individual reasoning limits or insufficient information exchange alone. Instead, the bottleneck lies in dynamic grounding: joint plan formation, commitment, and execution.
Cooperate to Compete: Strategic Coordination in Multi-Agent Conquest
Language Model (LM)-based agents remain largely untested in mixed-motive settings where agents must leverage short-term cooperation for long-term competitive goals (e.g., multi-party politics). We introduce Cooperate to Compete (C2C), a multi-agent environment where players can engage in private negotiations while competing to be the first to achieve their secret objective. Players have asymmetric objectives and negotiations are non-binding, allowing alliances to form and break as players' short-term interests align and diverge. We run AI only games and conduct a user study pitting human players against AI opponents. We identify significant differences between human and AI negotiation behaviors, finding that humans favor lower-complexity deals and are significantly less reliable partners compared to LM-based agents. We also find that humans are more aggressive negotiators, accepting deals without a counteroffer only 56.3% of the time compared to 67.6% for LM-based agents. Through targeted prompting inspired by these findings, we modify agents' negotiation behavior and improve win rates from 22.2% to 32.7%. We run over 1,100 games with over 16,000 private conversations totaling 15.2 million tokens and over 150,000 player actions. Our results establish C2C as a testbed for studying and building LM-based agents that can navigate the sophisticated coordination required for real-world deployments. The game, code, and dataset may be found at https://negotiationgame.io/c2c.
ArgRE: Formal Argumentation for Conflict Resolution in Multi-Agent Requirements Negotiation
As software systems grow in complexity, they must satisfy an increasing number of competing quality attributes, making it essential to balance them in a principled manner -- for example, a safety requirement for sensor-fusion verification may conflict with a tight planning-cycle budget. Multi-agent large language model frameworks support this balancing process by assigning specialized agents to different objectives. However, their conflict resolution is typically heuristic. Requirements are aggregated implicitly without explicit acceptance or rejection, limiting auditability in regulated domains. We present ArgRE, a multi-agent requirements negotiation system that embeds Dung-style abstract argumentation into the negotiation stage. Each proposal, critique, and refinement is modeled as an argument, conflicts are represented as directed attack relations, and the accepted set of arguments is computed under grounded and preferred semantics. The pipeline further integrates KAOS goal modeling, multi-layer verification, and standards-oriented artifact generation. Evaluation across five case studies spanning safety-critical, financial, and information-system domains shows that ArgRE provides argument-level traceability absent from existing frameworks. Independent evaluators rated its decision justifications significantly higher than those of heuristic synthesis (4.32 vs. 3.07, p < 0.001), indicating improved auditability, while semantic intent preservation remains comparable (94.9% BERTScore F1) and compliance coverage reaches 84.7% versus 47.6%--47.8% for baselines. Structural analysis further confirms that the default pairwise protocol yields acyclic graphs in which grounded and preferred semantics coincide, whereas cross-pair arbitration introduces controlled cyclicity, leading to predictable divergence between the two semantics.
Preference Estimation via Opponent Modeling in Multi-Agent Negotiation
Automated negotiation in complex, multi-party and multi-issue settings critically depends on accurate opponent modeling. However, conventional numerical-only approaches fail to capture the qualitative information embedded in natural language interactions, resulting in unstable and incomplete preference estimation. Although Large Language Models (LLMs) enable rich semantic understanding of utterances, it remains challenging to quantitatively incorporate such information into a consistent opponent modeling. To tackle this issue, we propose a novel preference estimation method integrating natural language information into a structured Bayesian opponent modeling framework. Our approach leverages LLMs to extract qualitative cues from utterances and converts them into probabilistic formats for dynamic belief tracking. Experimental results on a multi-party benchmark demonstrate that our framework improves the full agreement rate and preference estimation accuracy by integrating probabilistic reasoning with natural language understanding.
Diversity Without Fidelity: A Solver-Sampler Mismatch in Multi-Agent LLM Negotiation Simulation
Language models are increasingly used to simulate people: survey respondents, negotiators, stakeholders in policy exercises. In that role a model should reproduce how people plausibly behave, hesitating, conceding late, and settling for imperfect deals, rather than playing the best move. We call this the sampler role, in contrast to the solver role of finding the best move, and we test how the reasoning modes providers ship to strengthen models as solvers affect it. Our testbed is multi-party negotiation: five agents bargain over a regulation for fifteen turns, and unresolved issues are decided by an authority. Agents without a structured memory of the negotiation almost never reach agreement, whether reasoning is on or off: 314 of 315 such runs end with the authority deciding. What reasoning changes is how the failure looks. With reasoning enabled, one model family negotiates visibly, with varied moves, concessions in most runs, and a different path every time, yet still ends without agreement in fifteen runs of fifteen. Diversity checks would pass a model whose endings never change. Two further results show the task permits agreement: when agents write their own short running notes on the negotiation, agreement becomes the norm, while the same notes supplied ready-made change nothing; and hand-coded agents following textbook concession strategies agree in most runs under identical rules. Simulation pipelines should therefore vet models as samplers, on the distributions of outcomes they produce. Fidelity as a sampler must be tested on its own: solver strength is no guide to it, and switching on reasoning leaves it where it was.
The Language of Bargaining: Linguistic Effects in LLM Negotiations
Negotiation is a core component of social intelligence, requiring agents to balance strategic reasoning, cooperation, and social norms. Recent work shows that LLMs can engage in multi-turn negotiation, yet nearly all evaluations occur exclusively in English. Using controlled multi-agent simulations across Ultimatum, Buy-Sell, and Resource Exchange games, we systematically isolate language effects across English and four Indic framings (Hindi, Punjabi, Gujarati, Marwadi) by holding game rules, model parameters, and incentives constant across all conditions. We find that language choice can shift outcomes more strongly than changing models, reversing proposer advantages and reallocating surplus. Crucially, effects are task-contingent: Indic languages reduce stability in distributive games yet induce richer exploration in integrative settings. Our results demonstrate that evaluating LLM negotiation solely in English yields incomplete and potentially misleading conclusions. These findings caution against English-only evaluation of LLMs and suggest that culturally-aware evaluation is essential for fair deployment.