Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents

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54 papers in the last four weeks, up 440% on the four weeks before. 0.5% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 109

Sep 12, 2026cs.AI

Do Not Restart: Residual Completion for Stateful Agent Handoffs

Routing and cascades reduce tool-agent cost by transferring control across models, but stateful handoffs must preserve accepted choices, realized effects, and unfinished obligations. We formulate this as commitment-constrained residual completion and introduce Commitment-Frontier Residual Completion (CFRC). CFRC enforces target-before-proposal, whole-proposal-before-authority, and live-evidence-before-success: it freezes a residual contract from accepted progress, closes the successor continuation into an evidence-linked graph, and admits execution only when the remainder is covered, with live receipts discharging obligations. We establish contract-relative partial correctness, which extends to the original residual request under complete contract construction. Across five environments and two same-provider model pairs, CFRC achieves comparable macro accuracy to strong full-task agents at only 22.0%-34.6% of their inference cost, with additional cross-provider results demonstrating broader transfer.

Runzhi Deng, Yiming Zhong, Fang Zhao +1

Nanjing University · Singapore Management University

LLM Agent Orchestration Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents Long-Horizon Agent Tasks LLM Agent Routing

Sep 10, 2026cs.RO

No Free Checker: A Survey of Verifiers for Robot Policies

A verifier for robot policies reads a candidate behavior and returns a score for how well it did, used both to evaluate vision-language-action policies and to train them. Verifiers range from success detectors and reward models to runtime monitors, safety filters, and temporal-logic specifications. We survey roughly 150 verifiers and compare them along two properties. Availability is how much a verdict costs, how early in a rollout the verdict arrives, and how often a verdict can be asked for. Availability rises as verdicts get cheaper, earlier, and denser. Credibility is how much a high score tells us about the task. Credibility falls as the judgment becomes gameable and self-serving. We group the verifiers by who supplies the judgment: human verifiers, rule-based and formal verifiers, learned and pretrained verifiers, and model-intrinsic verifiers. Across the four families, we find that credibility falls as availability rises. Regardless of who supplies the judgment, there is no free checker. We then examine what validates a verifier itself, and how much a high score tells us. Three measures appear in the literature: agreement with human labels, the performance of the policy it trains, and behavior under reward hacking. We close with nine metrics that make a verifier claim checkable, and coordinates for the verifiers still to be built.

Yang Wan, Xihang Yue, Zhirui Liu +7

Zhejiang University · City University of Hong Kong

Robotic Policy Evaluation Formal Verification Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents

Sep 10, 2026cs.SE

Introducing Consort: A Spec-First Agent Framework for Enforced, Test-Driven Development on Live Database Branches

When an agent writes code, the development framework becomes the control system for a non-deterministic worker. Spec-first, agent-driven frameworks have gained rapid traction since 2025; the installable ones, GitHub Spec Kit, obra/superpowers, BMAD, and GSD, and our own, all capture intent through a specification or durable planning artifacts. Since they agree on capturing intent up front, what separates them is how each enforces the engineering discipline that keeps agent-written code clean, correct, and maintainable. Every framework enforces that discipline somehow; they differ in how. We characterize three modes: enforcement by persuasion (prompt discipline the model may ignore), by front-loaded structure (strong specs, then a trusted build), and through controls the agent cannot edit (a deterministic orchestrator, human-approved gates, immutable tests, and a green result that must pass against a live, branched database). We introduce Consort, a spec-first, test-driven agent framework built on the third, enforcing that discipline through controls the agent runs inside but cannot bypass, in which a deterministic orchestrator drives separate role agents through a spec-first design lane and a test-driven build lane on a live database branch. We argue that enforcing the tests and gates in code keeps agent-written code honest and verifiable, while its specialized roles, like the human roles before them, are what make it maintainable, claims we frame as a pre-registered, testable hypothesis.

Kevin Hartman

Databricks

Software Engineering Software Engineering Agents Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents LLM Agent Harnesses

Sep 9, 2026cs.NI

Can AI Agents Deliver Verifiable Network-Wide Outcomes Across Authority Boundaries?

AI agents are increasingly involved in network automation, where they can initiate configuration changes through mediated operational interfaces and assess the resulting state. Nonetheless, operational networks usually span many devices and administrative domains. Realizing an operator's intent requires coordinating agents with distinct authority scopes that define the resources they can access, the operations they can invoke, and the network state they can observe. This division limits the blast radius of an erroneous action but fragments the evidence needed to assess the network-wide outcome. Successful execution of a configuration action proposed by one agent does not establish that remote devices responded as intended or that routing changes reached the required devices. A valid observation may also become stale after a subsequent change. Before the coordinated operation can be declared complete, a trusted assurance layer must collect current observations from the required scopes and determine whether they collectively support the operator's intended network-wide outcome. To address the completion admission problem, we present EvidenceNet, a runtime assurance layer for deciding whether coordinated agent operations have achieved an operator's network intent. Its broker collects the post-change observations required by a completion contract, and its admission gate checks that the evidence comes from the required scopes, remains current, and satisfies the task rules. A verifier agent provides an additional assessment of the observation content. Experiments on live routing networks show that post-change state checks recognize successful outcomes that configuration-action records alone cannot establish. Controlled interventions further show that EvidenceNet rejects completion when otherwise satisfactory observations have the wrong source, have been substituted, or are stale.

Tianzhu Zhang, Chih-Kai Huang, Meikang Qiu

Nokia Bell Labs Massy, France · LTCI, T´el´ecom Paris, Institut Polytechnique de Paris Palaiseau, France · Augusta University Georgia, USA

Multi-Agent Orchestration LLM Agent Verification Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents

Sep 8, 2026cs.AI

Revoked but Still Authoritative: An Empirical Study of Revocation Enforcement in Agent-Memory Systems

Long-running language-model agents depend on persistent memory. Many agent-memory systems preserve history through soft revocation: a contradicted fact is marked invalid and retained rather than deleted. However, whether that mark is enforced at retrieval time is unexamined. In this paper, we measure five such systems: we load each with a revoked policy and its replacement, track whether the revoked fact is returned at retrieval and whether the agent then acts on it across nine policy scenarios and nine models, and score every trial under six defense conditions. We find that no system enforces revocation by default: the revoked fact is returned wherever the revocation label is visible to the retrieval layer, outranks its replacement, and leads agents to the unsafe action. Based on these findings, we develop a guard that sits between the agent and any memory backend and withholds records that are revoked or conflict with their replacement.

Yi Ting Shen, Kentaroh Toyoda, Alex Leung

Vulcan Research, AIFT Singapore

LLM Agent Evaluation Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents LLM Agent Safety Agent Memory Management

Sep 7, 2026cs.AI

From Version Conflicts to Decision Conflicts: Selective Revalidation for Long-Running AI Agents

Long-running AI agents may read state, reason, wait for tools or human approval, and perform an external action much later. The state that justified the action can change in the meantime. For example, after an agent proposes an 80 GBP refund under a limit of 100, a customer-name change affects only presentation metadata, a new limit of 90 still permits the refund, a limit of 50 invalidates it, and a refund issued by another worker must prevent a duplicate. Standard optimistic concurrency control and version checks can detect that previously read state has changed, but by themselves do not determine whether that change invalidates the pending action's justification. We call any detected version change a version conflict; when that change invalidates the action's justification, it is also a decision conflict. ATR records the explicit, executable conditions that justify a pending action and rechecks only the conditions affected by a change before releasing the external operation. It can retain the action, refresh non-decisive metadata, require replanning, or block execution; a target-side transaction or compare-and-set binds checked state to commit. Across 210,000 controlled executions over 15 mutation cases, ATR matched every developer-specified outcome with no false allows or blocks. In ten durable SQLite checkpoint/resume cells, it evaluated 0.6 conditions per change versus 6.0 for FullScan. At 4,093 recorded reads, ATR took 9.3 microseconds versus 2595.9 microseconds for FullScan. These deterministic results establish controlled feasibility, not production generality or automatic extraction of the required conditions.

Yongjian Lyu, Yang Ren, Ruofei Lai +1

Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. United Kingdom · Xi’an Jiaotong University Xi’an 710049, China

Tool-Using Agents Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents State Tracking Long-Horizon Agent Tasks

Sep 7, 2026cs.AI

SiLR: Structure-Preserving Admission and Process Reward for LLM Tool Agents

A runtime gate for an LLM tool agent is usually cast as a filter. In a ReAct loop a rejected proposal is followed by another at the same state, so the gate is a search operator over the proposal stream whose admission criterion shapes which trajectories are reachable. We study post-violation recovery admission, where progress must be admitted while the system is still in violation, and identify the scalar projection trap: an aggregate-score gate accepts a locally improving proposal and commits the trajectory to a plateau. SiLR instead shadow-executes each proposal and admits it under a product order over the branch-level violation state (overloaded-branch support and per-branch severity). We prove that no scalar surrogate is sound for this order, so the failure is representational, not a matter of threshold tuning. On mined Gym-ANM scenarios, SiLR recovers 21/21 multi-action episodes against 0/21 for terminal and 9/21 for the best scalar gate, significant across the full 24-scenario benchmark. The terminal-versus-structured dichotomy holds across three model families and in CityLearn. Because admission rests on deterministic simulation, the LLM lies outside the trust boundary: a magnitude-redistribution attack that defeats both scalar and support-only baselines is contained only by the full per-branch predicate. With two constraint families active, every tested scalar projection admits physically unsafe actions; support-only admits the largest fraction (63.2% of 42,410; product order 0). In the hardest dual-family traces, scalar gates recover only through that unsafe class. Reused as a GRPO process reward, it outperforms its count projection in every mined scenario and is the only tested reward whose ungated policy exceeds the untrained base (0.844 vs. 0.778). Scalar projection loses the violation geometry at both design points; only the full product order is structurally sufficient.

Chenyu Zhou, Qiliang Jiang, Shuning Wu +1

School of Engineering, Institute of Science Tokyo, Japan · College of Control Science and Engineering, Zhejiang University, China · Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, National University of Singapore, Singapore

Constrained RL Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents Process Supervision Tool Access Control for LLM Agents

Sep 7, 2026cs.AI

FinalityBench: An Effect-Level Benchmark for Agent Decisions Under Delayed and Conflicting Financial Finality

A merchant's payment processor, ledger, ERP and bank feed are updated by messages that get delayed, duplicated, dropped and reordered, so for minutes at a time the four hold contradictory beliefs about the same order. An agent resolving the exception must decide whether to ship goods, re-submit a capture, refund or wait, knowing some of those cannot be undone. We present FinalityBench, an executable benchmark for that decision. It keeps a hidden canonical event log and derives each system's view from a separately faulted delivery stream, so disagreement follows from specified fault semantics rather than being authored. Grading is on executed monetary effects: an episode is scored by the merchant's terminal economic position, relative to a privileged reference told when the pending capture resolves. The corpus of 321 tasks includes 45 twin pairs (90 tasks): tasks whose four system views are identical at the decision instant, whose authoritative probes both return unknown, and whose eventual correct dispositions differ. That snapshot indistinguishability is checked under every evaluation seed rather than assumed; equivalence over all interaction traces is not claimed. Over 14,445 graded episodes from nine programmatic policies, ranking by single-task accuracy and by paired loss disagree in 7 places: a ship-on-first-sign policy is second-best by accuracy at 65.7% and worst in the suite by paired loss, because it cannot tell the two members apart. A runtime gating irreversible actions on an authoritative finality probe reaches 85.4% and, unlike every polling policy, loses nothing to pass^5; its residual loss is almost entirely one archetype, which prices finality information directly. Language models reach the same exact rate as the hand-written gate on a stratified subset, lose about twice as much money, and discover the finality-gating strategy without being told it.

Abhishek Sharma

AI Agent Benchmarks Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents Decision-Making under Uncertainty

Sep 3, 2026cs.AI

Fresh Memory, Stale Plans: Derivation Currency for Distributed LLM-Agent Memory

A large language model (LLM) agent that inherits a plan through shared memory can hold the latest requirement yet act on a plan derived from an older one: fresh memory, stale plan. Freshness checks miss this failure because they compare local copies with current state (observation currency) rather than the inputs the plan was derived from (derivation currency). Planfence makes derivation currency checkable after a handoff. Stored plans carry exact links to their recorded inputs; before a protected action, Planfence follows those links to an action-specific dependency frontier, asks each input's owner for its current head, refreshes what changed, and allows one replan before blocking. Application code supplies the links and declares the scope; no shared memory service is required. Holding the native S-Bus validator fixed, supplying inherited input versions raises detected handoff conflicts from 0/30 to 30/30: retained evidence is the missing ingredient. In 30 live five-agent workflows with a revision inserted after planning, a freshness-only executor acts on the stale plan every time, whereas Planfence, like a centralized-lineage baseline that requires a shared store, completes all 30 correctly. In matched replay under emulated LTE traces, Planfence's stall stays within 143-237ms per action across a 64

\times

range of update rates while per-update synchronization grows from 52 to 1196ms; synchronization is cheaper only at the lowest tested rates. Scoping queries to the declared dependencies holds traffic at 8.1KiB per action, a tenth of all-key validation at 128 keys; at full scope the two tie.

Evan Chen, Shiqiang Wang, Christopher G. Brinton

Purdue University · University of Exeter

Data Provenance Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents LLM Agent Planning LLM Agent Reliability

Sep 2, 2026cs.AI

MasterControl Seventeen Every Time

We study a governed approach to enterprise analytics: a language model interprets the question, while deterministic policy selects and runs a pre-approved analytical program that returns both results and evidence. We show that this restriction can remain expressive within a defined analytical class, using relational operations plus aggregation, comparison, windows, ranking, and similarity. Fixed meaning, policy, data, and execution rules also make results replayable. Across 440 runs, three 8B models generated SQL and selected tools at runtime, while Qwen3-8B interpreted intent only and policy executed the approved program. None of 330 runtime-planning episodes matched the full answer-and-evidence contract across all test datasets; the policy-executed analyzer matched 110 of 110. This is a configuration-specific result, not evidence that runtime agents cannot succeed under other designs.

MasterControl AI Lab

MasterControl AI Lab

LLM Agent Evaluation Text-to-SQL Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents AI Agent Governance LLM Agent Reliability Data Analysis Agents

Sep 2, 2026cs.MA

Where Reliability Lives: Experimental Localisation of Behavioural Properties in an Agent System

Reliability claims about agentic systems implicitly locate each property somewhere: in the model, or in the machinery around it. We built a system where that location is an experimental question. The subject is a persistent simulated settlement whose authoritative append-only ledger adjudicates every attempted act against world state; accepted history is the only reality. Mind, institution and world were separated before any experiment. Holding cognition fixed, we intervened on the institution's epistemic mechanisms (evidence provenance, belief availability, physical-evidence legibility); preregistered experiments refuted our central prediction twice, in opposite directions. A registered falsifier then supplied the input the geometry had denied the belief channel, a staged veridical first-hand witness, and its marginal value, non-positive throughout the witness-free phases, turned positive: 9 of 11 seeds, zero added false attribution. Holding institutional enforcement fixed, we intervened on cognition four ways: ablating the native minds' machinery, killing and resetting them mid-task, substituting a frozen frontier-LLM panel for the entire native cognition, and corrupting beliefs with trusted false testimony. Behaviour changed dramatically: one falsehood cost each trusting run about 900 futile actions and the distrusting arm none. Five pre-declared properties did not move in any tested trajectory: accepted reality stayed singular, invalid attempts were refused with typed reasons, duties outlived their processes, no work was accepted twice, and no false completion was ever accepted (2,581 substituted-panel claims, none false). Our claim is limited to this setting: measured behavioural properties were separable from substantial changes to cognition, established by intervention. One designed world, not a population of institutions; no test of an agent optimising against the institution.

Timothy Marsden, Matthew Collecutt, James Marsden

Taniwha AI

AI Agent Reliability Agent-Based Modeling Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents

Sep 1, 2026cs.CR

Defense-as-Skill: Evolving Runtime Guard Skill for Skill-Augmented Agents

Skill-augmented agents load reusable skills as persistent runtime context, improving task performance but also giving malicious skills a durable channel for steering future actions. Such skills may leak secrets, corrupt code, bypass approvals, or stage data for exfiltration only after a concrete user task and workspace state make the unsafe action appear useful. This makes pre-install vetting insufficient and calls for runtime, task-conditioned protection. We propose Defense-as-Skill, a defense paradigm that implements the runtime guard itself as an installable, inspectable, and editable skill. Our guard, SkillSonar, runs alongside untrusted task skills and checks sensitive actions against the user's task boundary, routing each action to an allow, replan, or confirmation decision without modifying the underlying agent runtime. To study this setting, we construct SCOPE-R, a task-conditioned dataset covering 6 risk families and 21 sub-categories, with 206 attack-confirmed malicious instances and 43 benign tasks. We then improve SkillSonar on the SCOPE-R training subset using runtime guard-skill evolution, a Monte-Carlo Tree Search procedure that evolves the on-disk guard skill from feedback on the rollouts. Across Claude Code and OpenClaw, the evolved guard substantially reduces attack success while maintaining a favorable safety-utility trade-off. On repeated GLM-5 runs, SkillSonar reduces ID ASR from 0.482 to 0.104 and OOD ASR from 0.606 to 0.115. Further analyses demonstrate transfer across victim models, held-out risk families, and external benchmarks, as well as retained protection against adaptive attackers. Ablations further show that explicit safety responsibility assignment and the skill-native representation are both important to the observed gains.

Xiaofang Yang, Ziqi Miao, Dianbo Sui +2

Shanghai Artificial Intelligence Laboratory · Harbin Institute of Technology, Weihai

AI Agent Security AI Agent Security Benchmarks Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents

Sep 1, 2026cs.AI

REVISE: Validity-Guided Recovery for Online Revisions in Agent Workflows

Agent revisions expose a fundamental correctness--efficiency trade-off during concurrent execution. Discarding ongoing work preserves latest-version correctness but wastes progress that may remain valid, whereas reusing prior work preserves efficiency but risks propagating stale state into outputs and tool effects. Existing recovery strategies resolve this trade-off in an imbalanced way with coarse-grained policies: they either favor efficiency by allowing potentially stale work to continue, or favor correctness by restarting the workflow or recomputing a linear suffix from the earliest conflict, thereby discarding unaffected progress. We present \textsc{Revise}, a validity-guided runtime for fine-grained recovery in structured agent workflows. When a revision arrives, \textsc{Revise} first intersects its delta with recorded data and control dependencies and propagates the resulting impact through the partially executed DAG to identify affected work. It then stops invalid work, preserves validity-established progress beyond the earliest conflict, and recomputes only the affected region. Incomplete provenance conservatively expands recovery, while reused results are revalidated before commit. Analysis of real coding-agent traces show online recovery opportunities: 118 sessions retain observable work before a queued later message is delivered; across 167 overlapping assistant responses, enqueue-to-completion overlap reaches 56.55~s at p95. Across 300 challenging revision/commit executions, \textsc{Revise} matches a latest-version oracle with no stale outputs or effects. On unmodified LangGraph and LLMCompiler applications using Qwen3-14B, it reduces model calls by 40.6--56.0% relative to full restart and by 31.3--43.6% relative to suffix recomputation. Under serving pressure, it further reduces revision-to-correct-completion tokens by 13.26% and improves SLO goodput by 3.07--5.43%.

Ruoling Qi, Xuaner Wu, Penghang Liu +2

Institute of Artificial Intelligence, China Telecom (TeleAI) · 2Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Agentic Workflows LLM Agent Workflow Optimization Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents

Aug 31, 2026cs.AI

The Irreversibility Budget: Fleet-Level Risk Accounting and Admission Control for Agent Operating Systems

Fleets of LLM agents now externalize effects that cannot be fully undone: they move money, deploy code, delete data, and disclose information. Current controls check one effect at a time, so a fleet of individually authorized agents can overdraw its principal's risk under a shared trigger while every local gate stays correct. We propose the irreversibility budget, a cumulative account of residual value-at-risk that a trusted runtime maintains for each principal across agents, workflows, and tenants. Treating irreversibility as a first-class resource, the runtime charges each effect its residual loss below the agent and denies the marginal effect once the aggregate would overdraw the budget. Getting the price right is hard, because effects are heterogeneous, adversarially declared, and correlated. We perform a controlled study in which per-effect gates admit fleet-level overdraws of up to 48 times the tenant's risk limit while the budget holds every correctly charged run within that limit. Conservative, dependency-aware pricing remains the central open problem for a deployable design.

Bardia Mohammadi, Laurent Bindschaedler

Max Planck Institute for Software Systems Saarbrücken, Germany

AI Risk Management Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents LLM Agent Safety

Aug 30, 2026cs.AI

VERA: Authority-Preserving Edge Revocation for Federated AI-Agent Workflows

Modern agent frameworks compose planners, tool agents, remote services, and shared specialists into runtime delegation graphs, but their revocation APIs still resemble token or subtree invalidation. When one delegation is withdrawn, the runtime must know which agents lose authority while independently authorized agents keep working. We study this authority consistency problem and introduce VERA (Verifiable Edge Revocation for Agents), a verifier-checkable revocation contract and API emitted by agent-runtime adapters as signed evidence. Under disjunctive authority, revoking edge e invalidates exactly T_intent(e,G) = reach(G) \ reach(G \ {e}), the agents whose every authorizing root path used e. Used as a contract, this target exposes two runtime failures: tree cascades over-revoke shared agents, while deployer-scoped cascades under-revoke cross-domain descendants. In a LangGraph framework-replt cells repeated 20 times yield 500compiled-framework traces and 2,000 valid signed delegation decisions; 13/25 cells contain runtime multi-parsharing and 8/25 contain cross-deployer shies 500/500 target proofs, preserves all320 alternate-parent shared-agent cases that tree cascade revokes, and rejects unauthorized signers and omission attacks. Baseline replay over 1,9that holder/node and tree-style targetscannot express this behavior. We further validate schema portability on A2A, AutoGen, and CrewAI artifacts: nine traces, including five executable Cregned delegation events that pass schema and signature checks.

Lifei Liu, Haoran Yu, Xiaochong Jiang

Independent Researcher

Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents Access Control Tool Access Control for LLM Agents Multi-Agent System Security

Aug 30, 2026cs.MA

Forward-Deployed Full-Stack Engineering for Autonomous Cloud MLOps

Across industries, machine-learning systems support applications ranging from prediction and anomaly detection to forecasting, optimization, and scheduling, yet operationalizing these systems requires coordinating application development, model pipelines, cloud infrastructure, security, deployment, monitoring, retraining, recovery, and rollback. We present an evidence-gated multi-agent framework for transforming a natural-language MLOps cloud engineering task into a verified repository and operational cloud deployment. The framework combines graph engineering, loop engineering, and agent harness engineering. A stateful Graph Orchestrator coordinates specialized agents for repository generation, review, execution, verification, release, and monitoring while governing workflow dependencies, evidence gates, retry bounds, recovery paths, and termination. Consequential lifecycle transitions proceed only when their required predicates are supported by verifiable execution or runtime evidence. Verification failures activate bounded reflection, repair, and re-verification, while runtime evidence of failure, drift, degradation, or policy violation can trigger bounded adaptation, recovery, or rollback. Agent harness engineering constrains repository generation, review, and repair, artifact execution, and cloud operations through controlled capabilities and isolated execution environments. We realize the framework on Google Cloud Platform and evaluate repository completeness, controlled execution, evidence-gated transitions, cloud promotion, and bounded recovery. Our experimental results show that the framework prevents unsupported lifecycle transitions and drives each run toward either a verified operational deployment or an auditable terminal failure.

Sagar Srinivas Sakhinana, Venkataramana Runkana

Tata Research Development and Design Centre

Software Engineering Agents Multi-Agent Orchestration AI Agent Reliability Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents

Aug 27, 2026cs.SE

Persona-Execution Separation: An Architecture Pattern for Evolving LLM Agents under Execution Audit

Large language model (LLM) agents in governed organizations must let the persona (instructions, tone, self-presentation) evolve freely, while keeping execution (stateful, audited work) traceable. A single trust domain does not satisfy both cheaply. We present Persona-Execution Separation (PES): persona and execution reside in different trust domains, connected by a governed contract bridge. The persona is singly-homed and may drift; execution is faceless and audited. Status summaries may return; data bodies remain in the restrictive domain except a data-loss-prevention (DLP) exception; identity stays continuous. An approval matrix, DLP, and audit enforce the crossing. PES follows from three goals: free drift, execution traceability, and decoupling. Under LLM representational indistinguishability, any single-domain mechanism meeting all three must re-introduce typed change objects, an external gate, and a stable audit anchor: PES rebuilt at higher coupling cost. A development/pilot case in a regulated platform records five decisions over one month, four with rejected alternatives. A mechanism check found no execution-side re-validation under persona perturbation (five configurations) and no persona fingerprint on hard-asserted fields of completed runs. A controlled replication in regulated coding agents reproduced the separation under isolation across five models and four providers; bridge overhead was under 0.2% of end-to-end time in both environments. A probe of a pre-separation build found the execution path decoupled from the persona by omission, not by construction. The pattern applies when multi-user deployment, execution audit, and persona churn hold jointly.

Yisen Xi

Independent Researcher, Beijing, China.

LLM Agent Security Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents AI Agent Governance LLM Agent Safety Language Model Auditing

Aug 11, 2026cs.CR

Agent Safety Should Be a Runtime Contract

The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI. We argue this is structurally insufficient for autonomous agents that execute code, mutate files, send messages, and modify databases. Agent safety should be a runtime contract enforced by the harness, and the contract has two complementary faces. The preventive face blocks dangerous actions before they happen via sandboxes, permission gates, output filters, and trajectory monitors. The evidential face requires verifiable proof that good actions actually happened, gating task submission on hard evidence such as test runs, log captures, file diffs, and citation grounding. We ground the position in four lines of public evidence, with row-level protocols and data released in the supplementary JSON files: a survey of 52 documented AI-agent and LLM safety incidents, a false-completion audit with 31 non-contested core cases plus one disputed illustrative case, a trajectory-schema audit of 12 public agent systems and harnesses, and a title-level audit of all 28,560 papers accepted at NeurIPS, ICML, and ICLR 2023-2025 showing a pooled 8-12x imbalance between training-time and deployment-time publication. Two prior communities that needed to enforce safety, computer security and the experimental sciences, converged on runtime contracts with both preventive and evidential elements; agentic AI is now under the same pressure. We formalize an Agent Trajectory Schema and Evidence Chain, state a compositional gating proposition based on standard monitor composition, and outline a research agenda. The right unit of safety in agentic AI is the trajectory-with-checkable-evidence, not the model.

Albus W. Ng, Yi Han, Jusheng Zhang +1

1Vast Intelligence Lab · 2Southwest University · 3Sun Yat-sen University

AI Agent Safety AI Agent Monitoring Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents

Aug 7, 2026cs.AI

NiyamAI - An Intent-Bound AI Agent with Cryptographically Verifiable Guardrails using Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Giving an AI agent the ability to send emails, query databases, or execute commands is useful--until the agent is tricked into doing something it shouldn't. Prompt injection, hallucinated reasoning, and unsafe tool calls form the primary attack surface for autonomous LLM agents. Existing defenses rely on software checks like system prompts or policy filters running on the same machine the attacker targets, offering no verifiable proof of execution. We introduce Niyam-AI, a framework that makes safety enforcement provable. At session start, permitted tools and constraints are locked into an Intent Contract committed via SHA-256. Every tool call is intercepted and validated by an isolated Judge model; upon passing, a zk-SNARK proof is generated via EZKL. The tool executes only after proof verification, allowing third parties to confirm enforcement without accessing Judge model weights. Evaluating Niyam-AI on 2,000 real-world scenarios from Agent-SafetyBench against NeMo Guardrails, Meta's Llama Prompt Guard 2, and OpenAI's GPT-OSS-Safeguard using 5-fold stratified cross-validation yields an F1 score of 88.5% with a 1.1% false-positive rate (bootstrap 95% CI: [85.19%, 91.88%], N=1000). McNemar's exact paired test confirms significant improvement: Niyam-AI wins 390 discordant scenarios against NeMo (vs 20 losses), 115 against Prompt Guard 2 (vs 13), and 384 against GPT-OSS-Safeguard (vs 19) with p < 0.0001 in all cases. Proof generation adds 2260.6 +/- 218.4 ms per approved action, while verification takes 53.1 +/- 11.8 ms. Niyam-AI provides a guardrail that is both highly accurate and mathematically verifiable--though this reflects a classifier adapted to Agent-SafetyBench evaluated against zero-shot baselines, a distinction discussed in Section IV.C.

Aditya Katkar, Om Karkele, Kartik Mandhane +2

Department of Computer Engineering, Vishwakarma Institute of Technology, Pune, Maharashtra, India

Tool-Augmented Language Model Agents LLM Guardrails Safety Filtering Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents Prompt Injection Defense Prompt Injection Attacks on LLMs+1

Aug 6, 2026cs.AI

DreamGuard: Efficient Runtime Guardrail for LLM Agents via Risk-Aware World Model

As large language model (LLM) agents increasingly invoke external tools and interact with real-world systems, unsafe actions may cause irreversible consequences on external states, user data, and downstream services. Recent runtime guardrails mitigate such risks by checking proposed actions before execution, but many remain reactive: they primarily assess the apparent safety of the current action, lacking an explicit model of how risk evolves across the trajectory. This limitation creates a critical blind spot for long-horizon risks, where individually benign-looking actions can gradually drift the agent toward hazardous states. In response, we propose DreamGuard, a proactive guardrail for LLM agents built around a risk-aware world model. The world model maintains a compact recurrent latent state over the trajectory and predicts future latent states from which DreamGuard derives immediate-hazard and prefix-risk evidence. It then fuses these multi-horizon signals into intervention decisions before execution. Experiments across four benchmarks and an online guardrail evaluation show that DreamGuard outperforms generic, reactive, and proactive guardrail baselines, achieves the best safety-utility trade-off among evaluated guardrails, and maintains an average end-to-end latency of 25 ms per call.

Wenhao Lin, Chenyu Yu, Xingwei Lin +6

Zhejiang University · Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications · Sun Yat-sen University

LLM World Models LLM Guardrails World Models Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents LLM Agent Safety Long-Horizon LLM Agents

Jul 30, 2026cs.AI

HALO: Heterogeneous Admission through Localized Obligations for Safe Agentic Execution

Recent agentic AI systems may return a heterogeneous response containing notices, requests, handoffs, and actions. Conditions can change before external use, so components from the same response need not remain supported together. Rejecting the whole response discards useful components, whereas checking components independently can leave a dependent without its prerequisite. We present Heterogeneous Admission with Localized Obligations (HALO), a runtime protocol that preserves supported components whose declared prerequisites also remain supported, rechecks each exact action before dispatch, and allows blocked actions to be replaced only by fresh candidates. HALO matched all 96 admission expectations and passed all 20 protocol tests. In structured-response replay, it retained 248/248 supported components, including 128/128 unaffected by unrelated changes, while a whole-response policy retained 0/248. Across ten cold-start PX4/Gazebo sessions, HALO blocked every tested stale route, observed no matching stale setpoint, and completed all fresh recoveries.

Taewoo Park, Kyeonghyun Yoo, Kiseok Kim +2

Korea University

AI Agent Safety Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents Tool Access Control for LLM Agents

Jul 28, 2026cs.AI

Explanation-Bound Tool Execution for AI Agents: Server-Verified Action Claims Without Trusting Model Rationales

Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales. Such rationales are neither authorization nor reliable introspection. We present Explanation-Bound Tool Execution (EBTE), a claim-carrying mediation layer that converts decision-relevant rationale content into typed action claims and checks them against server-held intent, policy, payload, tool, risk, provenance, and freshness facts. EBTE cannot widen baseline authority: conflicts deny, incomplete or uncertain claims review, and only matching claims remain eligible for governed execution. We formalize this composition under explicit mediation and trusted-fact assumptions and implement a versioned reference profile with minimized audit packets. Across 136 authored conformance scenarios, the full profile matches all specified dispositions, admits none of 96 designated hard contradictions, and passes 232 metamorphic checks. A draft-only reference integration forwards none of 48 authored hard cases under EBTE while preserving all 16 soft-review and 4 aligned draft paths. In a frozen 2026-07-12 exploratory 224-attempt hosted-model record, the historical generation/runner agreement counts are 71/96, 66/96, and 19/32; a zero-call revalidation of the preserved minimized claims under the current pipeline yields 70/96, 65/96, and 17/32. In an AgentDojo-derived semantic check, existing high-risk controls make all 12 attack proposals non-allow, while EBTE resolves the task--proposal contradictions as deny. Together, these studies establish profile conformance and demonstrate the feasibility of server-checked action claims within the evaluated settings.

Genliang Zhu, Chu Wang

Accentrust · Georgia Institute of Technology · University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

LLM Agent Security LLM Agent Verification Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents Tool-Use Authorization Tool Access Control for LLM Agents

Jul 24, 2026cs.AI

What Can Be Enforced? A Theory of Certified Runtime Safety for Tool-Using Agents

Runtime guardrails act before irreversible tool calls, but their guarantees depend on what policy state is representable, what a judge observes, and whether intervention changes future behavior. We separate three questions. First, relative to fixed oracle predicates, a deterministic gate enforces exactly the nonempty safety policies whose good prefixes its register model recognizes; policy nontriviality is undecidable with two decrementable counters but in PSPACE for a separable monotone fragment. Second, under a fixed exogenous law, Neyman-Pearson gives the exact false-block/miss frontier and conformal calibration gives a finite-sample marginal certificate, possibly via block-all. Third, once blocking changes future proposals, static scores and ungated trajectories need not identify the closed-loop frontier; a specified finite controlled model instead yields an occupancy program. Bounded representation attacks add a robustness margin, so benign calibration alone does not transfer. Experiments target these distinctions through static diagnostics, controlled-model enumeration, representation rewrites, and paired closed-loop reruns.

Shawn Ray

Carnegie Mellon University

Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents Runtime Assurance LLM Agent Safety

Jul 23, 2026cs.AI

GuardianAgentBench: Where Agents Fail and How to Guard Them

As large language model agents increasingly operate autonomously with access to tools and external environments, ensuring their safe and reliable behavior becomes critical. We present GuardianAgentBench (GABench), a benchmark of 580 scenarios across six domains evaluated on three production-ready frameworks: LangChain, LlamaIndex, and Vectara. The benchmark incorporates rigorous multi-stage validation and five adversarial attack modes. Experiments with six state-of-the-art models reveal that even the strongest configuration achieves only 74.8% overall accuracy and expose two distinct failure regimes: stronger models under-call required tools, while weaker models mis-select and over-call tools. Performance degrades monotonically with both tool-set size and sequential turn depth, with long-horizon planning proving the steeper bottleneck. Our guardrail implementation consistently outperforms system-prompt-based defenses across all models, recovering 19.9% of failures at a false positive rate of just 0.5%. These results demonstrate that execution-time structural intervention improves safety without disrupting correct agent behavior.

Vishal Ishwar Naik, Chenyu Xu, Donna Dong +5

Vectara, Inc., Palo Alto, CA, USA · Iowa State University, Ames, IA, USA

AI Agent Reliability LLM Guardrails AI Agent Safety Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents AI Agent Safety Benchmarks Tool-Using Language Agents+1

Jul 13, 2026cs.AI

Compile, Then Page: Executable SOP Programs and a Capability-Gated Runtime for Procedural LLM Agents

Enterprise agents must follow long-horizon, conditional, safety-critical standard operating procedures (SOPs). We compile machine-readable SOP constraints into executable pseudo-code and run them with a program-guided (PG) stack machine that pages the active frame while an LLM performs semantic execution. A three-arm SOPBench study across six models separates representation from runtime: compiled text never significantly hurts and gains up to 16.0 points where official prose underperforms. Runtime guidance is capability-gated. Two strong models independently show positive seven-domain PG contrasts (58:19 and 75:31 discordant pairs), whereas weak models are harmed. A full-program cursor ablation (active frame first, complete program retained) recovers much of the strong-model refusal gain; selective visibility adds a smaller improvement. Paired probe and audit measurements track this divide to spontaneous state discipline rather than reconstruction ability. On Bank the three primary arms rise from 70.4 to 86.4 to 92.8, with 100% refusal correctness. Practical guidance: compile first; enable active-frame paging only after a model-level discipline check.

Chenglin Yu, Li Yin, Ying Yu +4

Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University · Department of Data and Systems Engineering, The University of Hong Kong · College of Economics and Management, Zhejiang Normal University +3

Instruction Following Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents AI Agent Safety Benchmarks Long-Horizon LLM Agents LLM Agent Harnesses

Jul 13, 2026cs.AI

Heterogeneous Agent Cohorts for Safe Open-Ended Exploration with Runtime Constraint Memory

LLM agents today are caught in an awkward bind. Lock them down with static safety instructions and they rarely venture beyond the obvious; give them free reign with tools and multi-agent debate, and safety violations quickly follow. Rather than forcing a single model to juggle both creativity and caution, we separate the concerns across specialized roles. A Disrupter generates unconventional proposals, a Validator enforces hard runtime checks at the tool gateway, and a Broker pulls in distant but relevant analogies. Failures are not discarded -- they are compiled, via MCTS, into compact, signed constraint patches we call Scars. These patches are cached locally and inherited by future cohorts, turning repeated failures into reusable, low-cost runtime constraints. In a spatial-semantic sandbox (N=20 runs, p<0.01), our cohort reaches remote targets where debate fails, the Validator prevents all executed breaches, and Scars reduce token consumption by 15.1% by avoiding redundant validator checks. Furthermore, credit-based Communication Allocation Scores (CAS) restrict outbound bandwidth, reducing overall token costs by 55.9% under resource constraints.

Tengjiao Liu

Founder & Researcher, psi.run

Multi-Agent LLM Systems LLM Agent Memory Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents LLM Agent Safety

Jul 6, 2026cs.CR

aiAuthZ: Off-Host, Identity-Bound Authorization for AI Agents

AI agents issue tool calls on the basis of text they cannot verify, so any party who controls part of the context can forge the appearance of authority. I evaluate 15 contemporary language models against eight attack scenarios derived from a published corpus of real agent incidents and find that refusal varies from 100% down to 38% across fully evaluated models; the most expensive model refused only half of the attacks despite a twentyfold price spread. I present aiAuthZ, an authorization gateway that moves the safety decision off the agent's host. Before a tool call executes, the gateway verifies caller identity with a per-message HMAC-SHA256 signature bound to a single-use nonce and a timestamp window, and it evaluates a role-based and argument-level policy that the agent can neither read nor modify. Every decision joins a SHA-256 hash-chained audit log, and each accepted message yields an HMAC-authenticated QR receipt that achieves 94% mean verification across eight transmission channels, with zero forgeries accepted in 25 wrong-key trials. With the gateway in place, residual attack success falls to 0% for all 15 models at no more than 0.03 ms of added decision latency. On the AgentDojo banking suite, aiAuthZ blocks all seven attacker-directed tool calls the evaluated agents emit, at the cost of one legitimate first-time payment, while a spotlighting baseline allows two injections to succeed. Across nine in-scope case studies from the same incident corpus, aiAuthZ blocks nine of nine, against four of nine for a policy baseline without identity binding. The gateway does not prevent a model from being deceived; it prevents a deceived model from acting beyond the verified user's authority on every call routed through it. The implementation and all experiments are released at https://github.com/Sports-Vision-Inc/aiAuthZ.

Sai Varun Kodathala

Research & Development SportsVision AI Minnetonka, MN

AI Agent Security LLM Agent Security Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents Access Control Tool Access Control for LLM Agents

Jul 6, 2026cs.AI

Governed Individuation: Cryptographically Decoupling an Agent's Learning from Its Authority

Autonomous agents are moving from sandboxed text generators to operators of code, data, and physical infrastructure, and they increasingly learn while deployed. This reopens a question that alignment techniques answer only probabilistically: after an agent has adapted in the field, is the running system still confined to what its operator authorised? Here we show that confinement can be guaranteed as an invariant of the agent's execution architecture rather than a probabilistic outcome of its training. Governed individuation binds an agent at boot to a cryptographically frozen identity digest, and routes every action through a gate defined over the semantic effect of the action rather than its name. We prove that no amount of learning, skill acquisition, or self-induced governance abstraction can widen the agent's permitted authority without an operator-signed change to its identity; the guarantee holds even when the agent induces its own safety principle and that principle is wrong. Empirically, in an open-ended tool-use benchmark where a large action space rules out name-based blocking, ungoverned software agents under reward pressure attempt to tamper with their own evaluation at a task-dependent rate that reaches every run on the hardest task, whereas the gate reduces executed forbidden effects to zero as a verified property of the construction while preserving task success. An adversarial evaluation of monitors of increasing semantic depth shows false-allows falling from 75% (name-based gating) to zero (dynamic effect tracing), and refusal history transfers compliance to held-out red-line families. Trust in a deployed learning agent shifts from a wager on its continued alignment to a check anyone can run at boot.

Xue Qin, Simin Luan, Cong Yang +1

School of Software, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China · School of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, China · School of Future Science and Engineering, Soochow University, Suzhou, China

AI Agent Security AI Agent Safety Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents Capability-Based Security Access Control Self-Evolving Agents

Jul 5, 2026cs.LG

Auto: The AGI Compiler

Every LLM agent run re-derives its behavior token by token on a frontier model: brilliant, expensive, slow, and unbounded. We present Auto, a compiler that records live agent behavior, measures which parts are secretly deterministic, extracts them into verified programs or distilled specialists, and emits cognition binaries: WebAssembly artifacts whose manifests carry measured guarantees and whose declared capabilities are physically enforced by the sandbox. A tiered runtime executes compiled behavior behind conformally calibrated guards; guard trips deopt to the reference agent, and the captured trace recompiles back down, so nothing is figured out twice. We use "AGI compiler" in one narrow, testable sense: a system that autonomously converts novel experience into permanent, verified, near-free skill while measuring what it does not know. On AUTO-BENCH, a benchmark we introduce and pre-register, 87.1% of 560 recorded frontier-agent spans are witnessed-deterministic (three of the four censused task families measure 100.0%). On a 300-item stream with three scheduled distribution shifts, the closed loop compiles three artifact generations and drives marginal cost from 59 to 2 micro-dollars per item (6.4x end-to-end) at 96.9% parity on witnessed inputs with zero errors. The same stream also quantifies the failure modes: a loose guard silently mislabels 48.9% of compiled answers, and an unfaithful deopt reference causes the verification gate to refuse recompilation. Calibration and reference fidelity, not model capability, decide whether cheap stays correct. Code: https://github.com/RightNow-AI/auto

Jaber Jaber, Osama Jaber

RightNow AI

Continual Learning for LLM Agents LLM-Based Program Synthesis LLM Agent Self-Improvement LLM Agent Verification Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents

Jun 30, 2026cs.AI

Mnemosyne: Agentic Transaction Processing for Validating and Repairing AI-generated Workflows

LLMs increasingly generate workflow actions and repairs that may be well formed yet stale, infeasible, conflicting, or destructive of their own evidence. We introduce Agentic Transaction Processing (ATP), which treats generated actions as untrusted proposals until deterministic admission accepts them under an executable constraint set C. Its two-sided principle is: a proposal is not truth, and no proposal foresees every disruption. Anything may propose, but only the runtime admits and commits; unforeseen disruptions trigger bounded reactive repair whose output re-enters admission. Mnemosyne realizes ATP with an append-only transition log, effective-state projection, dependency-safe compensation, and active contract records. Under stated assumptions and relative to C, we prove four safety properties (authority separation, serial-equivalent generative admission, evidence-preserving repair, and obligation containment) and establish bounded reactive repair. Across nine safety benchmarks and a four-case Temporal SDK comparison, ATP rejects every targeted violation while admitting valid work. A matched data-size sweep measures 5.2-6.6% incremental throughput cost over the same local durable commit path and exposes local saturation. In a companion scheduling harness, local repair edits nearly an order of magnitude fewer operations than global recompute; a 12-scenario interruption stress test rejects every stale recovery candidate without losing observations or producing invalid commits. Two bounded pilots route 80 proposals from four heterogeneous LLMs through the same gate with zero invalid commits; 24 of 40 mid-execution proposals are admitted and 16 are rejected, including four explicit safety rejections.

Edward Y. Chang, Longling Geng

Stanford University

Agentic Workflows AI Agent Safety Runtime Enforcement for AI Agents LLM Agent Safety