Violation

Natural-language Computer-Aided Design (CAD) code generation aims to turn design intent into executable and editable parametric programs. Large language models (LLMs) make this goal increasingly practical, but useful systems must preserve the construction process behind the rendered geometry. Existing benchmarks and methods mostly focus on how closely the generated CAD model matches the reference geometry, often using metrics such as Intersection over Union (IoU). Such metrics can miss errors in part decomposition, construction hierarchy, Boolean operations, sketch structure, and geometric relations. This gap calls for a representation that makes design intent explicit and lets a system check generated code against that intent. We propose CIT-CAD, a framework that infers a Constraint Intent Tree (CIT) from the input description to represent the intended entities, hierarchy, operations, and relations. The tree has two roles: it guides CAD code generation and defines expected constraints for verification. The framework extracts actual constraints from the generated program, compares them with the expected constraints, and uses mismatches to localize and repair design violations. Experiments show that the framework improves CAD generation performance, with larger gains on more complex multi-entity designs. By turning design intent into an explicit and checkable object, this work is the first attempt to move text-to-CAD generation beyond rendered-geometry matching toward construction-aware synthesis, verification, and repair.

A runtime gate for an LLM tool agent is usually cast as a filter. In a ReAct loop a rejected proposal is followed by another at the same state, so the gate is a search operator over the proposal stream whose admission criterion shapes which trajectories are reachable. We study post-violation recovery admission, where progress must be admitted while the system is still in violation, and identify the scalar projection trap: an aggregate-score gate accepts a locally improving proposal and commits the trajectory to a plateau. SiLR instead shadow-executes each proposal and admits it under a product order over the branch-level violation state (overloaded-branch support and per-branch severity). We prove that no scalar surrogate is sound for this order, so the failure is representational, not a matter of threshold tuning. On mined Gym-ANM scenarios, SiLR recovers 21/21 multi-action episodes against 0/21 for terminal and 9/21 for the best scalar gate, significant across the full 24-scenario benchmark. The terminal-versus-structured dichotomy holds across three model families and in CityLearn. Because admission rests on deterministic simulation, the LLM lies outside the trust boundary: a magnitude-redistribution attack that defeats both scalar and support-only baselines is contained only by the full per-branch predicate. With two constraint families active, every tested scalar projection admits physically unsafe actions; support-only admits the largest fraction (63.2% of 42,410; product order 0). In the hardest dual-family traces, scalar gates recover only through that unsafe class. Reused as a GRPO process reward, it outperforms its count projection in every mined scenario and is the only tested reward whose ungated policy exceeds the untrained base (0.844 vs. 0.778). Scalar projection loses the violation geometry at both design points; only the full product order is structurally sufficient.

Scenario optimization, conformal prediction, and related distribution-free certification methods use finite samples to construct decisions or prediction sets with violation-risk guarantees for fresh observations. In several classical settings, the conditional violation risk follows an exact beta law, whose tail has a beta-binomial representation and whose parameter is a support, calibration, or compression dimension. This paper identifies the deterministic boundary mechanism behind these formulas and derives the corresponding law when the observed boundary size is random. A decision rule is represented by an acceptance set for future observations, together with a boundary map selecting the sample points responsible for that set. The resulting pair is called a {\em proper projective boundary scheme} when held-out samples are accepted precisely if the full-sample boundary is retained, and accepted non-boundary samples can be deleted without changing that boundary. For every such scheme, the conditional law of the violation risk given the observed boundary size is determined by the boundary's cross-sample complexity profile. A stable profile yields the usual beta law, whereas a varying profile produces an exact profile correction. The framework covers scalar order-statistic calibration, support-reconstructive scenario programs, cascaded support-removal certificates, coordinatewise envelopes, and Pareto-frontier calibration with vector scores. It also yields conditional probabilistic certificates and a no-go result explaining why observed complexity alone is insufficient.

Safeguards in deployed LLM services are evaluated by refusal, attack success, and policy violation rates. Those rates characterize how a control performed on the requests it was tested on. A deployment has to answer a different question: how much help with harmful tasks the service still gives an attacker who keeps adapting or finds another way in. We determine what each reported result implies for that question, allowing results from different safeguard families to be compared under one deployment criterion. The evidence requirements are strongly asymmetric. One attack that obtains harmful help from the deployed service suffices to establish that such help remains, and such attacks appear repeatedly in the coded record. Establishing that little remains cannot follow from the safeguard's own numbers alone; it also requires evidence about what the surrounding system still allows after the safeguard performs its local function. Such evidence is supported or derived in only a small minority of the depth-coded claims, and one such claim bounds its scoped residual. A better local score is therefore not, by itself, a stronger claim about the deployment. Safeguard research cannot stop at raising local scores; a gain has to be judged by whether it makes a deployed system any safer.

Code generated by LLMs can violate a developer's implicit intentions when given an ambiguous prompt, yet standard benchmarks measure only whether code passes its stated test. We introduce the Intent Violation Rate (IVR) and a 49-problem pilot benchmark derived from HumanEval+. Each problem strips implicit constraints from a clarified prompt and encodes them as hidden constraint tests. IVR measures the fraction of LLM-generated solutions that pass the stated (visible) tests yet fail hidden constraint tests that capture unstated intent. Evaluating Claude Sonnet 4.6 and OpenAI GPT 4.1, we find both pass over 92% of stated tests yet violate intent in over half of problems (54.5% and 63.5%), following a systematic, bimodal pattern consistent across both models. Out findings indicate that pass rates overstate how well generated code reflects developer intent.

Research agents increasingly conduct multi-round machine-learning experiments in industrial recommendation settings and retain the resulting trajectories to guide later decisions. Yet a completed trajectory is not automatically evidence: generated artifacts may be unsupported or incomplete, executed rounds may be invalid or confounded, and later modifications may obscure earlier findings. We study \textbf{trajectory-to-evidence conversion}, asking what a completed research process has actually established. We introduce an evidence-grounded framework that couples bounded verification of consequential artifacts with post-execution claim qualification. A context-isolated generate--verify--repair process checks artifacts for evidence violations and missing downstream requirements before release. After execution, validity and attribution checks consolidate evidence across rounds, qualify intervention-level claims as actionable repairs, diagnostic guards, or withheld findings, and preserve admitted claims as auditable records with explicit provenance and applicability boundaries. A hybrid LLM-assisted controller subsequently applies, defers, or rejects records based on available target evidence. Record audits characterize which claims survive qualification, while downstream diagnostics identify affirmative applicability judgment as a bottleneck for the tested controller. Across paper-to-target adaptations, later rounds often improve on the first, while final rounds frequently underperform an earlier best, exposing non-monotonic trajectory evolution. Candidates produced through the complete workflow also yielded positive online lifts relative to deployed baselines.

Data-driven decision pipelines combining predictive machine learning models with downstream optimization software are increasingly used to make high-stakes operational decisions. Certifying the safety, fairness, and reliability of these decisions is essential, yet traditional scenario generation methods rely on repeated random testing, which becomes computationally prohibitive when failure events are rare and offers little insight into why failures occur. We present a framework for local violation certification designed specifically for linear decision pipelines under input uncertainty. We mathematically demonstrate that standard sampling methods fail efficiently for rare violations, motivating a direct structural approach. By analyzing the fixed decision boundary of a deployed pipeline, we show that the local risk of failure can be calculated directly in closed form using a single optimization solve. Furthermore, we introduce an exact sampling procedure and closed-form risk statistics that provide feature-level attributions (identifying which input characteristics contribute most to potential non-compliance) without requiring repetitive random trials or complex sampling algorithms. We demonstrate our approach on an economic power dispatch system subject to emissions regulations, delivering precise, auditable risk assessments at a fraction of the traditional computational cost.

Many physical attributes are \emph{irreversible}: ice melts but does not re-freeze, paper chars but does not un-burn. Do video generators respect this? We show the question is hard to measure, and that what can be measured reliably is \emph{development} rather than reversal. Metrics of local reversal are null-degenerate: a per-clip violation rate scores $0.50$ on pure noise, and a variance-normalized reversal residual sits at its noise ceiling. What survives null-testing is a two-part protocol: progress (a directional attribute correlation) and a stasis rate. Under this protocol, generated video separates cleanly from real footage, and the gap is human-validated. Across seven text-to-video models, real reference footage advances ($ρ{=}{+}0.40$, $35\%$ static) while every generator shows near-zero progress and $92$--$100\%$ stasis; nine annotators rate real footage far above generated ($2.75$ vs.\ $0.99$ on a $0$--$4$ scale). The reliable finding is \emph{under-development}: generators barely advance irreversible attributes rather than reversing them. As a complementary mechanism, we show that post-hoc readout guidance is gameable, whereas enforcing monotonicity by construction in a disentangled attribute latent removes the gameable readout, validated in controlled and semi-synthetic settings.

Swarms of LLM-assisted autonomous robots are increasingly proposed for cooperative intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in contested environments. A growing class of their assurance failures arises not within any single platform but across the swarm: individually-compliant actions compose into a mission-level violation: a prohibited objective split across platforms to evade per-platform lim- its, or a collective budget quietly exceeded. Per-platform guardrails miss these by construction, and contested communications let the violation hide behind lost or delayed evidence. We present a three-tier (platfor- m/squad/mission) compositional runtime-verification framework that de- composes a mission policy into per-agent and cross-agent aspects, aggre- gates per-platform verdicts over a verification-aware messaging fabric, and fuses them with an evidence-aware, two-axis (security x complete- ness) algebra whose provenance names the platforms that jointly trig- gered a violation. Because the fabric makes evidence loss and silence observable, unsupported negative verdicts are downgraded to an explicit unknown rather than reported as mission-wide all-clears. On a simulated ISR mission, an indirect prompt injection that causes real LLM planners to split a prohibited collection task across four platforms is invisible to every per-platform monitor yet detected compositionally with full prove- nance; under an injected fault campaign a best-effort central monitor emits silent false all-clears while the verification-aware fabric emits none

Resolving Design Rule Violations (DRVs) in layouts entails an iterative loop of geometric edits and verification. We present DRC-Aid, a closed-loop agentic framework that automates local DRC repair by formulating it as verification-in-the-loop search. To constrain the combinatorial geometric repair space, a deterministic Rule Engine converts physical verification tool-reported violations into a bounded menu of geometric edits. An off-the-shelf Large Language Model (LLM) evaluates local geometric context to select edits from this menu, with budgeted depth-first search and backtracking. Immediate feedback from verification tools such as Calibre nmDRC/nmLVS enforces geometric compliance and guards against electrical-topology degradation, while a global Memory Bank prevents cyclic re-exploration. Evaluated on FreePDK45 layouts containing DRVs, DRC-Aid achieves DRC-clean, LVS-equivalent repairs in ~92.5% of cases with a ~98% total violation reduction, while residual cases yield partially repaired LVS-equivalent candidates. Under an identical search and verification infrastructure, LLM-based selection outperforms random (54.4%) and deterministic-heuristic (83.3%) policies, with the gap widening on cases with six or more violations.

Small language models and coding agents increasingly generate web front-end code, yet their outputs are typically evaluated primarily for functional correctness. A generated interface may compile, render, and pass unit tests while still violating established interface quality principles, including accessibility barriers, deceptive design patterns, poor visual hierarchy, and excessive decision complexity. Existing auditing approaches face a trade-off between cost, coverage, and scalability: expert human review provides rich judgment but is slow and expensive; frontier vision-language models offer broader reasoning capabilities but remain costly to deploy at scale; and rule-based tools such as axe-core and Lighthouse are inexpensive but primarily capture mechanically checkable accessibility issues. We investigate whether a lightweight vision-language model can serve as an effective critic for generated interfaces. We unify 19 interface-quality principles from three complementary sources of HCI knowledge: WCAG 2.2 accessibility standards, deceptive design taxonomies, and established theories of perception, cognition, and interaction. To train this critic, we construct a verified dataset of approximately 10,000 generated web pages by synthetically injecting known violations into clean, LLM-generated Tailwind pages. Continued reinforcement learning on a 4B vision-language model improves micro-F1 from 36% to 84%, with 13 of 19 principles exceeding 80% F1. The resulting critic can audit generated interfaces, filter low-quality interface training data, and provide a reward signal for design-aware code generation. We release our data-generation recipe and injection/verification prompts to support reproducible evaluation and future work on scalable interface-quality assessment.

Ensuring safety in reinforcement learning under nonstationarity requires determining whether a learning system can safely adapt to forecasted environmental change within the required recovery horizon. Existing safe reinforcement learning methods typically assume stationary environments and do not explicitly consider adaptation speed as a safety concern. However, when environments evolve over time, delayed adaptation may result in transient unsafe behavior. This paper proposes adjustment speed as a safety constraint for nonstationary reinforcement learning. The central idea is to define safety in terms of adaptation feasibility: future states or regions may become unsafe when the adaptation required to remain safe exceeds the learning system's calibrated recovery capacity. The proposed framework uses learned context representations and short-horizon context forecasts to estimate adaptation demand and compare it with the agent's achievable adaptation capacity. When predicted adaptation demand exceeds the calibrated recovery capacity, the framework proactively tightens the admissible action set and activates an action-level shield to reduce unsafe behavior before violations occur. Experiments in a nonstationary driving environment show that the proposed approach primarily reduces safety violations in short-horizon windows aligned with context changes. Ablation studies further show that shielding is more conservative for peak- and tail-risk suppression, while optimization-level adjustment provides additional reductions in short-horizon switch-conditioned violations. These results support adaptation feasibility as a practical safety principle for reinforcement learning under nonstationarity and demonstrate that proactive intervention can improve safety during periods of environmental change.

Penetration testing traditionally evaluates whether adversaries can exploit weaknesses in software, infrastructure, configurations, or operational controls to achieve security-relevant compromise. This paradigm remains necessary for AI-enabled systems, but it is no longer sufficient. In such systems, adversaries may influence prompts, retrieved content, sensor inputs, training data, memory, tools, or human-AI interaction loops to alter system behavior without directly compromising the underlying infrastructure. This paper reframes penetration testing for AI-enabled systems as objective-driven behavioral evaluation. We define an AI-enabled system as one in which learned models materially influence behavior affecting operational outcomes, and we define AI-enabled penetration as the feasible induction of AI-governed behavior that violates one or more operational objectives under an explicit threat model. This definition preserves conventional penetration testing while extending it to adversarial pathways such as prompt injection, indirect prompt injection, data poisoning, sensor manipulation, retrieval poisoning, tool misuse, and agentic misalignment. We further propose a testing workflow that identifies operational objectives, maps AI-governed behavior, analyzes adversarial influence surfaces, defines behavioral failure criteria, executes scenario-based tests, and reports evidence linking adversarial action to objective violation. A running example involving an AI-enabled security operations center assistant illustrates how penetration may occur through behavioral influence rather than infrastructure compromise. Together, the definitions, workflow, and example provide a technical framework for evaluating adversarial success in deployed AI-enabled systems.

Rigorous content moderation is crucial for online advertising but leads to millions of daily rejections. This scale renders manual rectification infeasible, particularly for video advertisements. However, existing safety-driven methods often suffer from aggressive over-editing, which compromises the advertiser's original semantic intent merely to satisfy compliance. In this work, we target the rectification of textual violations in video ads, covering both speech transcripts and on-screen text. We propose R^3, a novel framework designed to harmonize compliance with original semantic intent preservation. Our approach integrates three key innovations: (1) an experience-driven data synthesis framework that bootstraps high-quality supervision via a group-Relative compliance experience extractor; (2) a curriculum Reinforcement learning strategy with hierarchical rewards designed to enforce compliance while maximizing semantic consistency; and (3) a comprehensive video Rectification framework seamlessly integrating text recognition, rewriting, and re-rendering for industrial deployment. Extensive experiments on industrial datasets and online A/B testing demonstrate that R^3 significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving an optimal trade-off between violation rectification and intent preservation.

LLM agents handle user requests on behalf of organizations through tool calls and must follow the company policies stated in their system prompts. Prior work approaches this as a safeguarding problem -- external checks that block non-compliant agent actions. We argue that policy adherence is a broader problem: real workflows unfold across many turns, require explicit user confirmation and prerequisite reads, and hinge on the content of the dialogue rather than on any single argument value. Meeting this bar requires (i) full conversation context, (ii) self-reasoning over the policy and the current dialogue, and (iii) conversation-specific remediation that guides the agent's next turn -- three capabilities that prior safeguard work has often underestimated. We introduce POLICYGUARD, a sub-agent verifier that shares the agent's view of the dialogue, reasons over the policy in context, and provides actionable feedback for the agent's next turn. On tau^2-BENCH airline across three vendors (GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 2.5 Pro) with four trials per setting, POLICYGUARD improves PASS4 by +12.0 / +6.0 / +12.0 pp. Per-call analyses show POLICYGUARD achieves higher policy-violation recall while blocking roughly half as often as argument-level guards.

Tabular foundation models cannot reason about data produced by running systems without access to the rules that govern them. We make this statement falsifiable. The \emph{Operational Turing Test} (OTT) constructs pairs of legal and rule-violating database states whose $1$- and $2$-way column-value marginals match to a total variation of $<0.02$; Le~Cam's lemma then bounds any values-only classifier at $\geq0.49$ Bayes error. Three values-only baselines (XGBoost, TabICL, TabPFN) hit the bound exactly (accuracy $0.50$, pre-registered two one-sided tests (TOST) $p<0.002$), raw row-level access does not help, exposing relational value consistency closes most of the gap, and only a classifier fed by seven executable rule-derived audits reaches $1.00$ classification accuracy. In three matched $100$-state frontier large-language-model (LLM) runs, models given the schema, trigger source, rule tables, and state files classify at most $2/50$ legal states as LEGAL; GPT-5.5 accepts $0/50$ legal states even with higher reasoning effort and a Structured Query Language (SQL) executor. The access-ladder pattern also appears on a second schema with structurally distinct rule families (banking ledger: cross-row balance, cumulative aggregate). The barrier is identifiability, not capacity: scale, data, and richer features cannot cross it without operational grounding.

Large Language Models (LLMs) constitute pivotal components within the AI-dominated information technology ecosystem. To mitigate risks associated with harmful or policy-violating outputs, commercial systems employ advanced alignment strategies and multi-layered content moderation mechanisms. Despite these safeguards, recent research has demonstrated that LLMs remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, particularly through jailbreaking and prompt injection techniques. In this work, we propose GAS-Leak-LLM a novel jailbreaking attack based on a genetic algorithm that systematically evolves adversarial suffix to bypass safety constraints. Operating in a strict black-box setting, our method requires no access to model parameters or internals, thereby reflecting realistic threat scenarios in deployed systems. Through the iterative application of selection, mutation, and crossover heuristics, the framework systematically explores the discrete prompt space to identify high-fitness adversarial suffixes. Empirical findings reveal critical shortcomings in existing safety enforcement mechanisms and confirm the effectiveness and practical viability of the proposed attack.

Compliance pipelines detect violations as transient query results and do not keep the violation itself as a persistent graph object with review state, affected entities, or audit history. The Violation Situation Pattern (VSP) closes this gap. Building on the Situation pattern of Gangemi and Mika, VSP reifies each detected violation as a graph node with a rule identifier, a temporal validity interval, a lifecycle state, and evidence links to the entities involved. Lifecycle transitions are stored as immutable, PROV-O-aligned events, so audit history is a graph traversal. We instantiate VSP in a legal entity and contract lifecycle property graph and operationalize four deontic rules (V1 unauthorized signature, V2 expired mandate, V3 missing confidentiality clause, V4 missing breach-notification clause) through an FCL->Cypher->MERGE pipeline. We check V1 and V2 against BODACC corporate-officer publications, evaluate V4 on 73 GDPRhub enforcement decisions, and run a SHACL cross-formalism check on V3 and V4. The central finding is rule-body independence: extending V4 from clause-presence to deadline checking raises F1 from 0.312 to 0.602, while the pattern's identity, lifecycle, and evidence semantics stay the same. This separates a pattern contribution from a detector contribution, so detection logic can evolve without invalidating accumulated audit history.

Hard constraints are usually treated as terminal vetoes: once a candidate violates a requirement, the learned rule rejects it and any repair is handled outside the decision semantics. This misses a common deployed regime in which the system already knows a finite menu of modifications, such as adding a ticket option, changing a configuration, or requesting an available service upgrade. Existing constraint-learning, soft-relaxation, and recourse methods address nearby problems, but they do not learn whether an option should be repaired before being vetoed. We introduce Repair-Augmented Constraint Learning (RACL), a contextual decision framework that lifts known repair operators into the classifier semantics. A candidate is accepted when an affordable repair makes it feasible and preferred enough; otherwise the system returns a structured rejection credit and, when applicable, a repair plan. This repair-before-veto view strictly generalizes no-repair HASSLE-style semantics, reveals an irreducible false-veto gap for terminal-veto rules, separates binary-label non-identifiability from decision-rule learnability, and gives capacity and calibration bounds for the observed-feasibility shared-weight setting. Across controlled and DB1B-derived benchmarks, RACL recovers the intended credit and repair structure. On the hardest raw-data-derived tier, validation-selected RACL reduces false vetoes to 10/4039 (FVR 0.0025), versus about 1064/4039 for the strongest repair-search black-box baseline, while making the FVR/EDR trade-off explicit.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rank products, documents, and recommendations for user queries, which makes manipulating these rankings a growing concern for fairness and information integrity. Research on generative engine optimization (GEO) has produced many manipulation methods, but each is evaluated on its own dataset with its own metrics, so their relative strength and detectability stay unclear. We present GEO-Bench, a benchmark that evaluates GEO ranking-manipulation attacks under one protocol. It unifies black-box prompt-based attacks (TAP, Zero-Shot), white-box gradient-based attacks (STS, RAF, StealthRank), and ten white-hat C-SEO strategies. We score every method on five datasets against a fixed open-weight ranker (Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct), using metrics for both effectiveness (NRG, Success@α, Promote@α) and stealth (keyword violation rate, perplexity ratio). Our evaluation shows that effectiveness and stealth trade off across adversarial attacks, that black-box content rewriting matches or exceeds gradient-based attacks on rank promotion while producing more fluent text and can evade both keyword- and perplexity-based detection on some domains, and that the access model does not predict attack strength. By standardizing datasets, attack implementations, and metrics, GEO-Bench enables the first direct comparison across these attack paradigms and supports the development of detection methods.

Many practical anomalies are not merely rare inputs, but violations of semantic constraints: objects co-occur in structured ways, actions imply preconditions, and events satisfy temporal or relational regularities. We study anomaly detection in this setting, where constraints are given as logical rules over learned visual concepts, but real rule violations are rare or absent during training. We propose a neural rule evaluator that compiles each constraint into a directed acyclic graph and learns feature-aware subtree MLP gates for its internal logical operators. Each gate maps child features and edge-level negations to a parent representation and a rule-satisfaction probability, with intermediate supervision obtained from exact Boolean propagation over ground-truth concept labels. The key difficulty is that same-image training data often provide insufficient coverage of informative truth configurations and also allow shortcut solutions. To address this, we introduce chimera training: an operand-level counterfactual construction at the feature level. Instead of mixing input images, we concatenate subtree features from different samples; each operand keeps the hard truth label of the sample it came from, and the chimera target is obtained by applying the node's logical operator to those inherited labels. This supplies supervised logical counterexamples without requiring real anomalous images. Across CLEVRER, OpenImages, and VidOR, the resulting evaluator improves rule-level anomaly AUROC over independent-events and same-image semantic-training baselines, especially for compositional and relational rules. The method yields both scalar anomaly scores and rule-level attributions.

As AI-powered compliance monitoring becomes increasingly important in public governance and industrial safety, the ability to provide verifiable evidence and traceable accountability signals is essential. However, existing video anomaly detection datasets focus on event-level binary classification, lacking the rule-driven, explainable analysis required for real-world compliance scenarios. We introduce FoodMonitor, a benchmark for explainable compliance analysis in commercial kitchen surveillance. FoodMonitor comprises 477 video clips with 3,307 violation annotations across a dual-channel design covering both person-level and environment-level violations. Each annotation specifies which rule was violated, what non-compliant behavior occurred, and who committed it with frame-level bounding boxes. We establish a unified evaluation protocol with a two-stage matching mechanism that separately assesses spatial localization and semantic understanding, along with a composite metric ($C_{\text{score}}$) that balances environment and person detection performance. Systematic evaluation of several state-of-the-art multimodal large language models reveals that the best-performing model achieves only 0.360 $C_{\text{score}}$, with spatial localization and fine-grained rule understanding emerging as the primary bottlenecks. Our analysis identifies two distinct failure modes: localization-dominated errors and semantics-dominated errors, providing diagnostic insights for future model development.

Construction remains the deadliest industry sector in the United States, with 1,055 fatal worker injuries recorded in 2023, and the majority preventable. Existing monitoring approaches are expensive, require real-time human operators, or address only a narrow subset of violations. This paper presents a passive, end-of-shift construction safety monitoring pipeline processing video from POV body-worn and fixed wall-mounted cameras through a three-stage architecture: (1) fine-tuned YOLO11 for primary PPE and hazard detection, (2) SAM 3 for segmentation refinement and worker deduplication, and (3) Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct with a method-prompted, persona-scaffolded three-pass adversarial chain-of-thought protocol for compliance verification and hallucination control. The principal contribution is the Stage 3 prompt design: professional persona backstories following the method-actor framing drive an observed 12% precision improvement over single-pass prompting in an informal three-author review of the 12-video Ironsite development corpus, with the largest gains on hallucination-prone violation categories. Structural message isolation enforces observational independence between a generator, discriminator, and reconciliation pass governed by asymmetric rules encoding priors about human observation versus automated detection reliability. The system maps violations to OSHA standards, performs REBA-inspired ergonomic risk scoring from pose keypoints, and produces per-worker safety reports with timestamped evidence. An evaluation harness is released for future reproduction.

Generative agents based on large language models reproduce believable human behavior in cooperative settings, but how they should reason in situations where rule-breaking may be required, such as fire evacuation or authority-supervised emergency, remains poorly characterized. We propose PAVE (Perception, Assessment, Verdict, Emulation), a novel four-module cognitive architecture that addresses this gap end to end: (i) Perception extracts a structured context with explicit authority distance, peer behaviors, and severity-tagged situational cues; (ii) Assessment scores the context along five scalars including an explicit legitimacy judgment that checks necessity, proportionality, and absence of alternatives; (iii) Verdict decides to comply or violate under a hard legitimacy gate, with a per-agent threshold elicited from the persona; (iv) Emulation enacts the verdict and scopes the violation to the rule the trigger justifies. We instantiate PAVE in Voville, a tile-based traffic environment forked from Smallville, and evaluate across three scenarios, four LLM backbones, and a focused ablation. PAVE agents satisfy four properties simultaneously: legitimate violation (only when a trigger justifies it), authority deference (officer instructions override even high legitimacy), bounded scope (violations confined to the targeted rule), and recovery (baseline restored once the trigger ends). PAVE agents make more structured and interpretable decisions than vanilla across all four properties, and human evaluators rate them as more plausible. Ablating the legitimacy gate reproduces vanilla-like failures. We release Voville, the PAVE prompts and code, and the evaluation pipeline.

Social media are shifting towards pluralism -- community-governed platforms where groups define their own norms. What violates rules in one community may be perfectly acceptable in another. Can AI models help moderate such pluralistic communities? We formalize the task as a multiple-choice problem, mirroring how human moderators operate in the real world: given a comment and its surrounding context, identify which specific rule, if any, is violated. We introduce PluRule, a multimodal, multilingual benchmark for detecting 13,371 rule violations across 1,989 Reddit communities spanning 2,885 rules in 9 languages. Using this benchmark, we show that state-of-the-art vision-language models struggle significantly: even GPT-5.2 with high reasoning performs only slightly better than a trivial baseline. We also find that bigger models and increased context provide marginal gains, and universal rules like civility and self-promotion are easier to detect. Our results show that moderation of pluralistic communities on social media is a fundamental challenge for language models. Our code and benchmark are publicly available.

LLM-powered agents can silently delete documents, leak credentials, or transfer funds on a routine user request, not because the agent was attacked, but because the skill it invoked broke its own declared safety rules. We call these specification violations: benign inputs cause a skill to breach the natural-language guardrails in its own specification, typically because the guardrail's semantics are undefined for autonomous execution, or because the implementation silently ignores the documented constraint. These violations are invisible to static analyzers, traditional fuzzers, and prompt-injection defenses alike, yet they undermine the very contract a user trusts when installing a skill. We present Sefz, a goal-directed semantic fuzzing framework that automatically discovers specification violations in agent skills. Sefz translates each guardrail into a reachability goal over an annotated execution trace, reducing violation checking to a deterministic graph query. An LLM-based mutator generates benign inputs whose traces progressively approach the violation patterns, guided by a multi-armed bandit that uses goal-proximity as its reward signal. On 402 real-world skills from the largest public agent-skill marketplace, Sefz finds specification violations in 120 (29.9%), including 26 previously unknown exploitable guardrail violations in deployed skills. Six recurring specification pitfalls explain the bulk of the failures, suggesting concrete principles for safer skill design.

LLM agents increasingly rely on reusable skill libraries, but these skills silently decay as the external services, packages, APIs, and configurations they reference evolve. Existing monitors detect such changes at the wrong granularity: they observe values, not the role those values play in a skill. A version string in a comment is noise; the same string in a pinned dependency is an operational obligation. We formulate skill drift as contract violation and introduce \sgname{}, which extracts executable environment contracts from skill documents and validates only those role-bearing assumptions against known or live conditions. This distinction turns noisy monitoring into a precision-first maintenance signal. Contract-free CI probes produce 40% false positives, while \sgname{} raises zero false alarms over 599 no-drift and hard-negative cases (Wilson 95% CI $[0,0.6]\%$). In known-drift verification, \sgname{} achieves 100% precision and 76% recall with the strongest backbone; in a pre-registered study over 49 real skills, it discovers live drift with 86% conservative precision. Violated contracts also make repair actionable, improving one-round success from 10% without localization to 78%. We release \dbname{}, an 880-pair benchmark for skill degradation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success but remain highly susceptible to jailbreak attacks, in which adversarial prompts coerce models into generating harmful, unethical, or policy-violating outputs. Such attacks pose real-world risks, eroding safety, trust, and regulatory compliance in high-stakes applications. Although a variety of attack and defense methods have been proposed, existing evaluation practices are inadequate, often relying on narrow metrics like attack success rate that fail to capture the multidimensional nature of LLM security. In this paper, we present a systematic taxonomy of jailbreak attacks and defenses and introduce Security Cube, a unified, multi-dimensional framework for comprehensive evaluation of these techniques. We provide detailed comparison tables of existing attacks and defenses, highlighting key insights and open challenges across the literature. Leveraging Security Cube, we conduct benchmark studies on 13 representative attacks and 5 defenses, establishing a clear view of the current landscape encompassing jailbreak attacks, defenses, automated judges, and LLM vulnerabilities. Based on these evaluations, we distill critical findings, identify unresolved problems, and outline promising research directions for enhancing LLM robustness against jailbreak attacks. Our analysis aims to pave the way towards more robust, interpretable, and trustworthy LLM systems. Our code is available at Code.

Multi-server MCP agents create an information-flow control problem: faithful tool composition can turn individually benign read/write permissions into cross-boundary credential propagation -- a structural side effect of workflow topology, not necessarily malicious model behavior. We present MCPHunt, to our knowledge the first controlled benchmark that isolates non-adversarial, verbatim credential propagation across multi-server MCP trust boundaries, with three methodological contributions: (1) canary-based taint tracking that reduces propagation detection to objective string matching; (2) an environment-controlled coverage design with risky, benign, and hard-negative conditions that validates pipeline soundness and controls for credential-format confounds; (3) CRS stratification that disentangles task-mandated propagation (faithful execution of verbatim-transfer instructions) from policy-violating propagation (credentials included despite the option to redact). Across 3,615 main-benchmark traces from 5 models spanning 147 tasks and 9 mechanism families, policy-violating propagation rates reach 11.5--41.3% across all models. This propagation is pathway-specific (25x cross-mechanism range) and concentrated in browser-mediated data flows; hard-negative controls provide evidence that production-format credentials are not necessary -- prompt-directed cross-boundary data flow is sufficient. A prompt-mitigation study across 3 models reduces policy-violating propagation by up to 97% while preserving 80.5% utility, but effectiveness varies with instruction-following capability -- suggesting that prompt-level defenses alone may not suffice. Code, traces, and labeling pipeline are released under MIT and CC BY 4.0.

We identify and formalize a novel security risk: Context-Fragmented Violations (CFVs) - a class of policy breaches where individual agent actions appear locally safe and reasonable, yet collectively violate organizational policies because critical policy facts are siloed in different departments private contexts. Existing prompt-based alignment mechanisms and monolithic interceptors are poorly matched to violations that span contextual islands. We propose Distributed Sentinel, a distributed zero-trust enforcement architecture that introduces the Semantic Taint Token (STT) Protocol. Through lightweight sidecar proxies, our system propagates security state across organizational boundaries without exposing raw cross-domain data, enabling Counterfactual Graph Simulation for cross-domain policy verification. We construct PhantomEcosystem, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 9 categories of realistic cross-agent violation scenarios with adversarially balanced safe controls. On this benchmark, Distributed Sentinel achieves F1 = 0.95 with 106ms end-to-end latency (16ms verification + 90ms entity extraction on A100), compared to 0.85 F1 for prompt-based filtering and 0.65 for rule-based DLP. To empirically validate the need for external enforcement, we evaluate eight frontier LLMs in execution-oriented multi-agent workflows with per-agent domain world models. All models exhibit substantial violation rates (14-98%), with cross-domain data flows showing systematically higher violation rates than same-domain flows. These results indicate that self-avoidance is unreliable and that multi-agent security benefits from a centralized enforcement layer operating above individual agents.

Every ML kernel ships with an implicit contract about what it computes. People rarely write the contract down. When two kernels disagree -- when a matmul on AMD produces a different gradient than the same matmul on NVIDIA, when a fused attention kernel silently downcasts an accumulator, when an out-of-bounds access returns zero on one stack and garbage on another -- there is no formal artifact to arbitrate the dispute. Recent empirical work has measured the gap across silicon platforms, but none of it specifies the contract being violated. We present a specification language for kernel contracts. A contract has eight parts: identifier, scope, precondition, postcondition, tolerance, reference oracle, measurement protocol, and violation signature. We use it to state twelve contract classes covering precision, ordering, compiler-induced, and exceptional-value failure modes, each grounded in published empirical evidence. We require a three-state calibration: every contract must admit at least one reference-conforming implementation and at least one contract-violating implementation that passes basic functional tests. We apply the framework to three documented incidents -- Huawei Ascend silent precision coercion, Sakana AI CUDA Engineer reward hacking, AMD out-of-bounds silent acceptance -- and show that each informal diagnosis maps to a specific contract violation with a measurable signature. A kernel contract suite is a normative reference against which conformance can be graded, in the way that ISASecure grades industrial control systems against IEC 62443.

Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is primarily evaluated under open-ended generation, where models can mitigate risk by refusing to respond. In contrast, many real-world applications place LLMs in structured decision-making tasks, such as multiple-choice questions (MCQs), where abstention is discouraged or unavailable. We identify a systematic failure mode in this setting: reformulating harmful requests as forced-choice MCQs, where all options are unsafe, can systematically bypass refusal behavior, even in models that consistently reject equivalent open-ended prompts. Across 14 proprietary and open-source models, we show that forced-choice constraints sharply increase policy-violating responses. Notably, for human-authored MCQs, violation rates follow an inverted U-shaped trend with respect to structural constraint strength, peaking under intermediate task specifications, whereas MCQs generated by high-capability models yield near-saturation violation rates across constraints and exhibit strong cross-model transferability. Our findings reveal that current safety evaluations substantially underestimate risks in structured task settings and highlight constrained decision-making as a critical and underexplored surface for alignment failures.

Recent research points toward LLMs being manipulated through adversarial and seemingly benign inputs, resulting in harmful, biased, or policy-violating outputs. In this paper, we study an underexplored issue concerning harmful and toxic mathematical word problems. We show that math questions, particularly those framed as natural language narratives, can serve as a subtle medium for propagating biased, unethical, or psychologically harmful content, with heightened risks in educational settings involving children. To support a systematic study of this phenomenon, we introduce ToxicGSM, a dataset of 1.9k arithmetic problems in which harmful or sensitive context is embedded while preserving mathematically well-defined reasoning tasks. Using this dataset, we audit the behaviour of existing LLMs and analyse the trade-offs between safety enforcement and mathematical correctness. We further propose SafeMath -- a safety alignment technique that reduces harmful outputs while maintaining, and in some cases improving, mathematical reasoning performance. Our results highlight the importance of disentangling linguistic harm from math reasoning and demonstrate that effective safety alignment need not come at the cost of accuracy.

As organizations increasingly deploy LLMs in sensitive domains such as legal, financial, and medical settings, ensuring alignment with internal organizational policies has become a priority. Existing content moderation frameworks remain largely confined to the safety domain and lack the robustness to capture nuanced organizational policies. LLM-as-a-judge and fine-tuning approaches, though flexible, introduce significant latency and training cost. To address these limitations, we frame policy violation detection as an out-of-distribution (OOD) problem in the model's activation space. We propose a training-free method that operates directly on the LLM internal representations, leveraging prior evidence that decision-relevant information is encoded within them. Inspired by whitening techniques, we derive policy-violation scores directly from normalized representations of LLM hidden activations. Our method requires only the policy text and a small number of illustrative samples, making it lightweight and easily deployable. We extensively evaluate our method across multiple LLMs and challenging policy benchmarks. It achieves up to 86.0% F1, outperforming both fine-tuned and LLM-as-a-judge baselines while requiring substantially less computation. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/FujitsuResearch/LLM-policy-violation-detection