Accountability

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6 papers in the last four weeks, against 2 the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 28

Sep 24, 2026cs.AI

When No One Owns the Judgment: Accountability Under Contribution Dissolution in Human-AI Collaboration

Communities often respond to potentially AI-assisted work by asking three questions: Was AI used? Was that use disclosed? Can hidden use be detected? These questions place AI use itself at the center of accountability while overlooking a deeper problem: unowned judgment. Evaluations, claims, decisions, and creative directions can be shaped by AI with no accountable human or institution prepared to stand behind them. We develop this argument through two illustrative cases: AI-assisted peer review and concealed AI use in creative work. The first shows how contribution dissolution can weaken responsibility while the second shows how the fear of losing credit can discourage honest disclosure. The cases expose the limits of disclosure rules and provenance records as responses to AI-mediated collaboration. We offer three directions for discussion: distinguishing the roles AI plays, identifying judgments that require clear human ownership, and creating conditions in which AI involvement can be disclosed without default penalty. The broader aim is to make AI-shaped contributions discussable, creditable, contestable, and repairable.

Hengzhi Ye

School of Computer Science Peking university Beijing, China

Accountability Human-Ai Collaboration Disclosures Human Judgment Contributions Peer Review

Sep 23, 2026cs.MA

Compliant with Local Controls, Collectively Discriminatory. A Governance Architecture for Multi-Agent AI in Regulated Finance

Financial institutions are beginning to deploy agentic workflows in credit, fraud, collections, compliance, and operational control. Governance remains largely component-centric: each model or agent is specified, tested, authorized, and monitored locally. That is insufficient when institutional risk arises from the joint behavior of many locally acceptable components. We call this gap constitutional non-compositionality: local compliance checks need not compose into acceptable collective outcomes such as bounded disparate impact, market integrity, or traceable accountability. We propose ARIA as a finance-specific reference architecture and falsifiable research agenda for agent-population governance. It organizes six capabilities across normative-accountability, execution-control, and assurance-learning planes: policy specification, population-level observed-versus-expected behavior monitoring (M2), bounded authority, runtime containment, adaptive policy change, and preserved human oversight competence. Two simulations illustrate shared-signal thin-file exclusion under local controls and earlier warning from observed-versus-expected distributional monitoring in a constructed drift regime. The contribution maps these controls to fair-lending, EU AI Act, model-risk, and conduct-supervision evidence needs, and closes with a validation agenda rather than a production-effectiveness claim.

Jose Manuel de la Chica Rodriguez, Juan Manuel Vera Diaz, Pablo Delgado Romero

Santander AI Lab, Grupo Santander, Madrid, Spain

Artificial Intelligence Governance Governance Accountability Banking Discriminative

Sep 22, 2026cs.CY

The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence in Military Operations

Deep learning systems now mediate military decisions to use force, yet their internal logic resists inspection, their evaluation practices are gameable, and their deployment fractures accountability across dispersed stakeholders. The ethical challenge posed by these systems is fundamentally epistemic: not just whether autonomous weapons should be permitted to kill, but whether the conditions for responsible human judgment can survive when critical functions are delegated to opaque algorithms. We show that this epistemic condition produces a concrete accountability gap: responsibility diffuses across designers, operators, and policymakers while International Humanitarian Law presupposes capacities for judgment that current AI systems lack. To address this gap, we propose a governance framework that proceduralizes ethical constraints through named accountability roles, adversarial auditing with undisclosed benchmarks, tiered deployment thresholds, and a proposed NATO evaluation standard. Counterfactual analysis of eight documented cases (1988-2025) shows that each governance mechanism addresses a documented class of failure, but no single safeguard suffices in isolation: effective governance of military AI requires not only technical constraints but the institutional infrastructure to keep human judgment meaningful.

Nicolas Drapier, Florian Mauberger, Aladine Chetouani +1

L2TI Laboratory, Universit´e Sorbonne Paris Nord, 99 Avenue Jean-Baptiste Cl´ement, Villetaneuse, 93430, France. · SAS Impact, 1 Rue Sainte-Anne, Orl´eans, 45000, France.

Artificial Intelligence Governance Accountability Ethics Artificial Intelligence Systems Human Judgment War

Sep 14, 2026cs.AI

Empirical Evaluation of Open-Source Large Language Models for Retrieval-Augmented Generation in ESG Domain

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) reporting is critical for corporate accountability, with Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) offering strong potential to automate KPI extraction. However, open-source LLM performance in domain-specific ESG tasks remains insufficiently understood. This paper evaluates open-source LLMs in ESG contexts using a structured framework and evaluation resource based on 498 real-world ESG reports from EU-listed companies (2010-2024). We evaluate seven open-source models (2B to 30B parameters) -- glm-4.7-flash, nemotron-3-nano:4b, qwen3:4b-instruct, gemma3:4b, gemma4:e4b, gemma4:e2b, and ministral-3:8b -- using 100 persona-based synthetic QA pairs covering ESG information needs. System performance is assessed via RAGAS metrics, including contextual recall, precision, relevance, faithfulness, answer relevancy, and factual correctness. Results show notable performance variations across architectures. Retrieval performance is strong across models (context recall around 0.58-0.61, context precision around 0.78-0.81, context relevance 0.965-0.985). Generation diverges most on faithfulness (0.607-0.822) and least on answer relevancy (0.760-0.881): glm-4.7-flash leads in faithfulness (0.822), qwen3 in factual correctness (0.449), and ministral-3 in answer relevancy (0.881). Low overall factual correctness (0.387-0.449) highlights the need for domain-specific fine-tuning. This work provides data-driven guidance for deploying open-source models in ESG reporting.

Motaz Saad, Anna Borrelli, Ivan Gentile +3

University of Salento · University of Naples Federico II · IFAB Foundation

Large Language Model Benchmarks Empirical Study Relevance Accountability

Sep 7, 2026cs.MA

Audit Without Verification: When LLM Accountability Layers Relay Rather Than Check

Multi-agent LLM pipelines increasingly span organisational boundaries; when a fault surfaces, someone must determine where it entered. The artifact available is rarely a full execution trace: it is the reports each agent filed, and a filed report can state a conclusion alongside its observations. Using a pre-registered, institutionally partitioned pipeline of six agents with process-level information boundaries, balanced defect injection and matched clean twins (345,600 requests per chain model, two models), we first report that our pre-registered hypothesis -- that collective responsibility framing degrades escalation with chain length -- is not supported. The layer nevertheless fails asymmetrically. It originates almost nothing: zero allegations across 7,996 clean episodes where every agent stayed silent. It filters upstream error poorly, naming an innocent party in 34.4% and 62.6% of clean episodes where an agent raised a false alarm. Conditional on no agent proposing the true origin (59.5% of episodes on one chain model), an auditor reading the reports recovers it in 4.1% of cases -- below a uniform guess (20%) and the best fixed-link accuser (31.0%) -- while reaching 60.3% from the raw documentation of the same episodes. Deleting one clause, the field carrying the agents' own conclusion, isolates the cause at constant observations: accuracy rises to 45.2% (+41.2 pp, 95% CI +35.3 to +46.9) and adherence collapses from 94.4% to 3.4%; where the suggestion was correct the same deletion instead costs accuracy, 70.5% to 55.7%. The harm replicates on two frontier auditors in four conditions out of four (+8.5 to +39.0 pp) and in a second domain (+47.7 and +61.1 pp), where the cost disappears. The net effect is governed by upstream reliability together with both conditional magnitudes. An accountability layer needs evidence sufficiently independent of the conclusions it verifies.

Paul-Peter Arslan

Institute For Future Technologies

Accountability Model Auditing Escalation Multi-Agent Large Language Model Systems

Sep 1, 2026cs.AI

When the Algorithm Becomes the Brand Crisis: A Sociotechnical Theory of Distributed Responsibility and Accountable Transparency

Artificial intelligence systems increasingly enact market-facing promises through chatbots, recommendation systems, automated decisions, and generative interfaces. Their failures, misuse, and misrepresentation raise a question that conventional brand-crisis models do not fully specify: how do stakeholders assign responsibility when technical causation, customer-facing control, and governance duties are distributed across an AI system, developer, deployer, vendor, and user? This conceptual paper develops a sociotechnical process theory from a structured, federated scoping synthesis of verified academic and primary sources. It distinguishes an AI/algorithmic incident from an AI-related organisational crisis and, in turn, from an AI-related organisational scandal. The framework proposes that incident configuration shapes actor-specific attribution; attribution informs capability, integrity, fairness, and relationship appraisals; and public moralisation may, but need not, escalate an incident into scandal. The theory offers a reconciliation of findings that algorithm involvement can buffer negative brand reactions in some settings while robot and chatbot failures can redirect responsibility to an associated firm in others. It introduces accountable transparency as a proposed response configuration that combines timely notice, an intelligible account, role-responsibility acknowledgement, remedy, evidence of correction, and recourse. The evidence supports conditional, proximal inferences about blame, trust, satisfaction, firm evaluation, and communication credibility more strongly than claims about durable reputation, brand equity, or market performance.

Mohammad Saleh Torkestani, Taha Mansouri

University of Exeter, UK · University of Salford, UK

Accountability Socio-Technical Systems Reputation Transparency Brand-As-Memory Distributed Optimization

Aug 13, 2026cs.AI

Correct Is Not Governed: Provenance Integrity in Agentic Workflows

Agentic workflows are commonly evaluated by whether they reach the correct outcome. That is insufficient in institutional settings, where a correct action may rely on the wrong authority, an unsupported completion claim, or work made stale by a later change. We define governed execution as work whose decisions, completion, and response to change are supported by inspectable provenance. We present Matrix, a deterministic causal-state layer that records authority and fact dependencies, verifies completion evidence, and selectively invalidates affected work. Across controlled comparisons, governed and direct workflows often reached the same outcomes, but only the governed path consistently preserved governing evidence, refused unsupported closure, and limited recovery to dependent tasks. A role-separated transfer challenge then failed: a deterministically enforced completeness contract severely over-blocked synthetic packets produced outside its authoring context. These results do not establish Matrix as a general accuracy enhancer; they support its primary role as an institutional integrity layer for making agentic work auditable and independently verifiable.

Jesus Salas

Independent Researcher · The author is employed by Microsoft.

Agentic Workflows Accountability Provenance Correct

Aug 12, 2026cs.CY

No One to Blame: A Framework of Constitutive AI Unaccountability

The increasing deployment of autonomous, agentic AI systems challenges traditional accountability mechanisms. Existing research predominantly frames AI accountability gaps as barriers that can be overcome through better standards, transparency, and institutional reform. We argue that this framing is insufficient: certain configurations of actors, systems, and institutions render AI accountability conceptually unachievable regardless of effort. We introduce the concept of constitutive AI unaccountability to capture these configurations. Through a three-stage qualitative study comprising a concept-centric literature analysis, a secondary analysis of 27 expert interviews with AI professionals from technical, legal, and sociotechnical backgrounds, and an illustrative framework application to the open-source agentic AI system OpenClaw, we identify nine categories and 20 themes of constitutive AI unaccountability. These are organized across structural, technological, and normative clusters and reinforce one another through eight directed interdependencies. Our framework is operationalized as a diagnostic instrument of 20 questions, which detected 17 of 20 conditions when applied to OpenClaw, including an inverted anthropomorphism configuration in which the AI agent was the only identifiable actor. We contribute a reframing of AI unaccountability as a constitutive property of sociotechnical systems, an extension of the four barriers to accountability, and a practical instrument for identifying accountability voids in specific AI deployments.

Long Hoang Nguyen, Eva Späthe, Sebastian Lins +1

Technical University of Munich · University of Kassel

Accountability Artificial Intelligence Governance Socio-Technical Systems Openclaw Agentic

Jul 30, 2026cs.CY

Scaling, Lock-In, and Proxy Compliance: A Political Economy of Responsible AI

AI accountability at scale is an institutional problem: who can observe, verify, and change deployed systems. We develop a sequential political-economy model in which an AI vendor chooses auditability and substantive mitigation, a deployer monitors after adoption while facing switching costs, and enforcement depends on verifiable evidence. Anticipating the deployer's monitoring response, the vendor may stop at an observable procurement floor while mitigating below the social first best, producing a proxy-compliance equilibrium. We characterize the unique interior equilibrium and the corner in which harm is fully mitigated. Independent audit rights raise enforcement exposure directly; portability restores deployer leverage; incident reporting adds a regulator-visible evidence channel; and outcome-linked liability creates incentives that do not depend on vendor-controlled detection. The results explain why documentation and standardized evaluations can coexist with persistent post-deployment harms, and generate testable implications for monitoring, mitigation, and the gap between formal compliance and operational outcomes.

Florian A. D. Burnat, Brittany I. Davidson

University of Bath, Bath, UK.

Accountability Artificial Intelligence Governance Compliance Model Auditing Economies Lock-In+1

Jun 16, 2026cs.RO

Accountability in Autonomous Drone-Based Firefighting: Insights From a Field Trial

There is a growing research field exploring how autonomous drones can enhance emergency response effectiveness. Integrating these (artificial) agents into existing emergency teams and workflows may significantly impact established accountability relationships. This paper examines how autonomous drones affect accountability attribution within complex socio-technical systems. Drawing on two real-life field trials in firefighting, the study reveals substantial uncertainty around accountability when drones are organizationally deployed. Using Bovens' accountability framework, two challenges are identified: (1) uncertainty about the role of drones within hierarchical structures, leading to confused accountability ascriptions; and (2) new forms of human-drone interactions introducing additional accountability-relevant issues. Based on these insights, the paper proposes actionable recommendations to support the responsible integration of autonomous drones into firefighting operations without undermining accountability. These findings offer practical guidance for policymakers and contribute to further research on accountability in autonomous systems.

Dzmitry Katsiuba, Anna Katharina Boos, Robin Hany +2

University of Zurich · Zeppelin University

Jun 11, 2026cs.CY

"Is This Not Enough?": Asymmetries in Institutional Accountability and Collective Sensemaking in the Case of Canada's Algorithmic Visa Triage System

This paper examines how algorithmic accountability in Canada's visa system is articulated institutionally and experienced by applicants across borders. We analyzed Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)'s Algorithmic Impact Assessment (AIA) for the temporary resident visa (TRV) triage system using the algorithmic decision-making adapted for the public sector (ADMAPS) framework and analyzed Reddit discussions among applicants using a mixed-methods approach. We show that while institutional artifacts emphasize transparency, procedural safeguards, and bounded impacts, applicants engage in collective sensemaking to interpret opaque decisions, often relying on peer knowledge amid uncertainty. We identify three asymmetries between how institutional accountability is structured and how people perceive the process: epistemic asymmetry in access to decision logic, jurisdictional asymmetry in exposure shaped by geopolitical positioning, and temporal--relational asymmetry in how waiting and uncertainty are experienced. We emphasize why it is important to shift attention from institutional design to the uneven distribution of experiences with public-sector algorithmic governance. Together, these contributions demonstrate how algorithmic governance systems in the context of transnational migration produce structured asymmetries not captured by institutional disclosure frameworks, and how extending ADMAPS can account for those uneven translations of accountability.

Dipto Das, Matthew Tamura, Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed +1

Department of Computer Science University of Toronto Toronto, Ontario, Canada · Faculty of Information University of Toronto Toronto, Ontario, Canada

Accountability Governance Asymmetry Triage

May 29, 2026cs.AI

LLM-FACETS: A Privacy-Preserving Framework for Evaluating LLM Transparency and Accountability

Assessing whether Large Language Models outputs are factually grounded, epistemically calibrated, and methodologically reproducible is a prerequisite for responsible AI deployment. Yet auditing LLMs remains inaccessible to non-technical practitioners: existing tools require programming expertise and non-trivial environment setup, and cloud-hosted platforms transmit evaluation data to external services, creating barriers for domain experts and compliance officers legally responsible for AI oversight. We introduce LLM-FACETS (LLM FActuality Cross-EvaluaTion System): an open-source framework with a browser-accessible interface and a plugin architecture, structured around three practitioner profiles (technical experts, domain experts, compliance officers) that mirror the stakeholder categories identified in the EU AI Act and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. The architecture makes data flows explicit: deterministic metrics (BLEU, ROUGE, BERTScore) run entirely within the self-hosted server with no outbound transmission; LLM-judge metrics contact external APIs explicitly, with users retaining full credential control. The framework operationalizes transparency through three mechanisms: token-level log-probability visualization for epistemic uncertainty, multi-judge consensus to mitigate judge bias, and RAG Triad metrics (Faithfulness, Answer Relevance, Context Relevance) to detect and localize hallucinations. A plugin architecture allows any new metric or dataset to be integrated without modifying the evaluation pipeline. The open-source implementation enables cross-checking across multiple metrics targeting the same property, ensuring reproducibility and decoupling AI accountability from the teams building the systems assessed. We verify the framework through cross-validation of 18 metric implementations against canonical reference libraries.

Tom Lucas, Alessio Buscemi, Alfredo Capozucca +2

Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology (LIST), Luxembourg, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, and Scriptor Artis, France · Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology (LIST), Luxembourg · University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg +1

Transparency Artificial Intelligence Risk Accountability Privacy-Preserving Framework

May 22, 2026cs.AI

Redrawing the AI Map: A Theory of Accountability Boundaries in Agentic Ecosystems

Agentic AI orchestrators reduce the interface and assembly costs of composing information systems capabilities across organizational boundaries, seemingly accelerating modularization and organizational disaggregation. Yet AI-enabled capabilities whose outputs require evidence, review, signoff, or assignable responsibility may retain integrated accountability boundaries even when their technical interfaces become modular. We develop a capability-level theory of accountability-boundary placement in agentic ecosystems. We introduce accountability assets: complementary assets that make AI-supported outputs legitimate, auditable, reviewable, and assignable to a responsible party. We argue that verification cost and responsibility transferability determine whether the execution and accountability boundaries can move together. The theory identifies three boundary strategies: component, integrated, and dual-track. It also introduces rule debt, the governance burden that accrues when organizational decision rules migrate from formal information systems into ungoverned agentic execution environments. Integrating digital innovation, transaction cost, complementary-assets, digital platform governance, and IS control perspectives, we develop seven propositions linking agentic assembly-cost reductions, accountability assets, appropriability, orchestrator intent capture, and boundary misconfiguration to boundary strategy, value appropriation, and rule debt. The theory explains when digital modularization extends to organizational disaggregation and when accountability keeps capabilities integrated. Structured illustrations across document processing, legal services, audit, clinical decision support, and procurement discipline the boundary logic.

Muhammad Zia Hydari, Farooq Muzaffar

University of Pittsburgh

Accountability Production Agentic Systems Theory

May 21, 2026cs.CY

Whose Good, Whose Place? The Moral Geography of Agentic AI for Social Good

Agentic AI systems are increasingly proposed for social-good domains, often invoking the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a vocabulary of global benefit. Yet claims of social good do not establish accountability to the communities a system claims to serve. We present a structured survey of 112 papers on agentic AI for social good published between 2015 and 2026. We find a moral-geographic asymmetry: papers are least likely to specify geographic context in precisely the domains where local political, legal, and cultural context matters most. Across the corpus, 82 of 112 papers (73%) specify no geographic context. Papers aligned with health or physical/ecological SDGs specify geography 37-40% of the time, while papers aligned with institutional and social-policy SDGs do so only 13%. SDG 16, peace, justice, and strong institutions, is both the most-covered goal in the corpus and the one with the lowest geographic-specification rate. We interpret this as moral abstraction: agentic AI for social good often treats institutional good as universal in ways it does not treat health or ecological good. A second finding compounds this: only 28 of 112 papers (25%) report any real-world deployment or small-scale test. We identify five accountability gaps and propose a minimal reporting standard for more context-specific, participatory, and accountable agentic AI for social good.

Poli Nemkova, Haeshitha Indukuri, Jaedon Charles

University of North Texas · Florida International University

Accountability Ethics Moral Reasoning Sustainability

May 18, 2026cs.AI

Going Headless? On the Boundaries of Vertical AI Firms

Vertical AI firms in accounting, law, healthcare, procurement, and similar domains historically bundled workflow, domain logic, and accountability into a single application. General-purpose AI agents are now unbundling that package, prompting founders and investors to advocate "going headless": cede the workflow and interface to agents and expose domain expertise as callable services. This article argues that going headless is correct for some firms and destructive for others, and that the latter often cede their value capture inadvertently through architectural choices that look like interface decisions. This is a boundary question, and the answer turns on distinguishing the interface boundary, which can often move, from the accountability boundary, which often must not. Drawing on Coase's theory of the firm, Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne's platform envelopment framework, and Teece's analysis of complementary assets and appropriability, the article shows that orchestrators operating through open protocols acquire envelopment power even as technical interoperability improves, and that durable value capture concentrates in cospecialized accountability assets: professional signoff, regulated workflows, evidence trails, and trusted systems of record. The article proposes a three-position taxonomy (component, integrated software platform, dual-track) determined not by sector but by task-accountability regime, and formalizes the construct of rule debt: the future governance, maintenance, and accountability burden that accrues to customer organizations when business rules and professional standards migrate from governed systems into prompts and agent instructions. Four principles follow: decompose by accountability not interface, invert the edges while retaining the core, position rule debt as the customer cost the integrated platform prevents, and avoid single-orchestrator dependence.

Muhammad Zia Hydari, Farooq Muzaffar

University of Pittsburgh

Accountability Interoperability Artificial Intelligence Systems Orchestration Boundaries

May 16, 2026cs.AI

Responsible Agentic AI Requires Explicit Provenance

Agentic AI is rapidly proliferating across diverse real-world domains such as software engineering, yet public trust has not kept pace. The central reason is that responsibility, despite being widely discussed, remains a subjective and unenforced concept, as no current agentic framework produces the quantifiable, traceable, and interventionable provenance needed to assign it when harm emerges from compositions no single party designed. We position that what is missing is not better benchmark-level evaluation but

\textbf{explicit provenance}

across the full agentic lifecycle, which is the only viable basis for making responsibility computable and actionable. We advance this agenda along four axes: establishing

\textit{why}

such provenance is a structural necessity by identifying responsibility gaps across sociotechnical dimensions, formalizing

\textit{what}

it must encode through a causal attribution function and responsibility tensor, discussing

\textit{how}

it can be made computable across four lifecycle layers with preliminary experiments showing that provenance is estimable and interveneable online before irreversible harm accumulates, and examining

\textit{who}

bears responsibility through a concrete agentic incident. Explicit provenance is not a discretionary refinement but the necessary condition for responsible agentic AI, and no stakeholder across its ecosystem can afford to treat it as optional.

Jinwei Hu, Xinmiao Huang, Qisong He +3

School of Computer Science and Informatics, University of Liverpool, UK · Department of Computer Science, Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence, UAE

Accountability Provenance Lifecycle

May 16, 2026cs.CY

Some[Body] Must Receive That Pain for Agent Accountability

AI agents increasingly act consequentially in the real world. This creates a problem we call \emph{consequence reception}: harm occurs, the producing system is identified, yet no continuing agent receives consequences in a way that changes future behavior. Pain, understood mechanistically as a corrective feedback signal, is foundational to canonical theories of punishment -- deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation all assume a continuing locus that registers the signal and updates behavior. That, in turn, requires a body for the signal to land on: a boundary whose integrity it protects, a locus where it accumulates, consolidation that converts episodic signal into durable update, and a substrate that responds by altering future action. Current LLM agents -- software-defined composites of weights, prompts, tools, memory, and credentials, freely swapped, copied, reset, and reassembled -- satisfy none of these conditions. The two prevailing legal responses therefore fail to achieve consequence reception. The thin-identity agent-principal dyad has a body but no \emph{consequence--agency coupling}: the human bears pain for behaviors beyond their control -- Elish's \emph{moral crumple zone}. The thick-identity Arbel et al.'s \emph{Algorithmic Corporation} creates legally legible entities but does not guarantee that any AI decision architecture receives pain as a behavioral signal. Achieving consequence-agency coupling is therefore a sociotechnical infrastructural problem, not only a legal one. Until such architectures exist, high-stakes AI deployment should remain tethered to accountable human principals with meaningful control, proportional liability, and authority to constrain or terminate the agent. \emph{If some body does not receive the pain by design, some body will receive it by default.}

Botao Amber Hu, Helena Rong

University of Oxford · Oxford, UK · New York University Shanghai +1

Accountability Implications Body

May 9, 2026cs.LG

Trustworthy AI: Ensuring Reliability and Accountability from Models to Agents

In this thesis, we develop algorithms with theoretical guarantees for ensuring reliability and accountability of Machine Learning (ML) systems. As ML systems evolve from predictive models to generative models and autonomous agents, the landscape of trustworthy AI has shifted. This thesis introduces tools grounded in information theory, optimization, and statistical learning to mitigate bias, reduce arbitrary decisions, ensure content provenance, and evaluate LLM-driven agents in autonomous settings. Towards mitigating bias and arbitrariness in traditional ML models, we introduce a kernel-based method to achieve multiaccuracy across complex subpopulations that traditional demographic categories may overlook. We also develop methods to address predictive multiplicity, where equally accurate models yield conflicting individual predictions. We ensure the accountability in generative AI through watermarking large language models (LLMs). We characterize the information-theoretic trade-off between watermark detection and text distortion and derive optimal watermarking strategies by leveraging optimal transport and coding theory. Empirical evaluations show our watermarks achieve a superior detection-quality tradeoff across language generation and coding tasks. Finally, we evaluate autonomous LLM agents in multi-agent environments through the first simulator of a fully LLM-driven supply chain. LLM agents offer significant performance gains, outperforming human teams and reducing costs by up to 67%, but also introduce systemic risks, including costly tail events.

Carol Xuan Long

John A. Paulson School Of Engineering And Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence Large Language Model Reliability Large Language Model Watermarks Accountability

May 6, 2026cs.AI

Intentionality is a Design Decision: Measuring Functional Intentionality for Accountable AI Systems

As AI systems increasingly exhibit autonomous, goal-directed, and long-horizon behavior, users lack a standardized way to detect the degree to which a system functions like an intentional actor for governance and accountability purposes. This position paper defines intentionality not as consciousness, but as a behavioral profile characterized by purpose, foresight, volition, temporal commitment, and coherence - criteria long used in legal and philosophical contexts to infer intent. These properties are design-contingent: architectural choices such as memory persistence, planning depth, and tool autonomy shape the degree to which systems exhibit organized goal pursuit. If intentionality is design-contingent, it is in principle controllable. Yet control requires measurement. We introduce the Functional Intentionality Test (FIT), a multidimensional framework that quantifies intentional-like behavior across five observable dimensions, and propose FIT-Eval, a structured evaluation protocol for eliciting and scoring them. While reduced human agency can increase efficiency, rising intentional capacity heightens accountability risks. By translating intentionality into interpretable levels, FIT enables proportionate oversight and deliberate autonomy calibration in increasingly agentic systems.

Allessia Chiappetta, Robert Mahari

CodeX, The Stanford Center for Legal Informatics, Palo Alto, California, USA

Accountability Agentic Evaluations Human Agency

May 6, 2026cs.SE

Accountable Agents in Software Engineering: An Analysis of Terms of Service and a Research Roadmap

AI coding assistants and autonomous agents are becoming integral to software development workflows, reshaping how code is produced, reviewed, and maintained. While recent research has focused mainly on the capabilities and impacts of productivity of these systems, much less attention has been paid to accountability: who is responsible when agents generate, modify, or recommend code? In practice, accountability is defined through the Terms of Service (ToS) and related policy documents that govern the use of AI-powered development tools. In this vision paper, we present a comparative analysis of the Terms of Service for widely used AI coding assistants and agent-enabled development tools. We examine how these documents allocate ownership, responsibility, liability, and disclosure obligations between tool providers and software developers, and we identify common patterns and divergences between providers. Our analysis reveals a consistent tendency to shift responsibility for correctness, safety, and legal compliance onto users, as well as substantial variation in how providers address issues such as indemnification, data reuse, and acceptable use. Based on these findings, we argue that existing policy frameworks are poorly aligned with increasingly agent-mediated and autonomous software development workflows. We outline a research roadmap for accountable agents in software engineering, identifying challenges and opportunities for modeling responsibility, designing governance artifacts, developing tooling that supports accountability, and conducting empirical studies of developers' perceptions and practices.

Christoph Treude

Singapore Management University Singapore, Singapore

Coding Agents Software Engineering Accountability Roadmap

May 1, 2026cs.CY

Governing What the EU AI Act Excludes: Accountability for Autonomous AI Agents in Smart City Critical Infrastructure

When a traffic signal controller adjusts green phases and a grid manager curtails power on the same corridor, each system may comply with its own obligations. The resident who suffers the combined effect has no single authority to hold accountable and, under the EU AI Act, limited means to obtain an explanation. Annex III, point 2 excludes safety-component AI in critical infrastructure from Article 86 explanation rights and Article 27 fundamental-rights impact assessment. Provider and deployer duties under Articles 9-15 still apply, and residual pathways under the GDPR, NIS2, and tortious liability offer partial coverage. The Act's principal resident-facing accountability instruments are nonetheless narrowed for the autonomous infrastructure systems most likely to interact across agencies. The paper traces this accountability deficit through four residual pathways (GDPR Article 22, GDPR transparency obligations, tortious liability, and NIS2) and shows that each is structurally bounded by individual-controller, individual-decision scope. As a governance response, it presents AgentGov-SC, a three-layer architecture (Agent, Orchestration, City) specifying 25 governance measures with bidirectional traceability to the EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42001, and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. Five conflict resolution rules and an autonomy-calibrated activation model complete the design. A scenario analysis traces governance activation through a multi-agent corridor cascade involving three documented UAE smart-city systems, with a contrasting single-system scenario confirming proportional activation. The paper contributes a regulatory gap analysis and governance architecture for an increasingly important class of urban AI deployment that existing frameworks treat as bounded and isolated.

Talal Ashraf Butt, Muhammad Iqbal, Razi Iqbal

aHigher Colleges of Technology, Fujairah, United Arab Emirates · bCentral Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, United States of America

Accountability Artificial Intelligence Risk Urban Environments

Apr 20, 2026cs.CY

Regulating Artificial Intimacy: From Locks and Blocks to Relational Accountability

A series of high-profile tragedies involving companion chatbots has triggered an unusually rapid regulatory response. Several jurisdictions, including Australia, California, and New York, have introduced enforceable regulation, while regulators elsewhere have signaled growing concern about risks posed by companion chatbots, particularly to children. In parallel, leading providers, notably OpenAI, appear to have strengthened their self-regulatory approaches. Drawing on legal textual analysis and insights from regulatory theory, psychology, and information systems research, this paper critically examines these recent interventions. We examine what is regulated and who is regulated, identifying regulatory targets, scope, and modalities. We classify interventions by method and priority, showing how emerging regimes combine "locks and blocks", such as access gating and content moderation, with measures addressing toxic relationship features and process-based accountability requirements. We argue that effective regulation of companion chatbots must integrate all three dimensions. More, however, is required. Current regimes tend to focus on discrete harms, narrow conceptions of vulnerability, or highly specified accountability processes, while failing to confront deeper power asymmetries between providers and users. Providers of companion chatbots increasingly control artificial intimacy at scale, creating unprecedented opportunities for control through intimacy. We suggest that a general, open-ended duty of care would be an important first step toward constraining that power and addressing a fundamental source of chatbot risk. The paper contributes to debates on companion chatbot regulation and is relevant to regulators, platform providers, and scholars concerned with digital intimacy, law and technology, and fairness, accountability, and transparency in sociotechnical systems.

Henry Fraser, Jessica M. Szczuka, Raffaele F. Ciriello

Queensland University of Technology · School of Law · ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society (ADM+S) +3

Artificial Intelligence Companions Regulation Accountability Chatbots Lock-In

Apr 17, 2026cs.HC

"Taking Stock at FAccT": Using Participatory Design to Co-Create a Vision for the Fairness, Accountability and Transparency Community

As a relatively new forum, ACM FAccT has become a key space for activists and scholars to critically examine emerging AI and ML technologies. It brings together academics, civil society members, and government representatives from diverse fields to explore the broader societal impacts of both deployed and proposed technologies. We report a large-scale participatory design (PD) process for reflexive conference governance, which combined an in-person CRAFT session, an asynchronous Polis poll and the synthesis of a governance-facing report for the FAccT leadership. Participants shaped the substantive agenda by authoring seed statements, adding new statements and making patterns of agreement, disagreement and uncertainty made visible through voting.Our endeavors represent one of the the first instances of applying PD to a venue that critically interrogates the societal impacts of AI, fostering a niche in which critical scholars are free to voice their concerns. Finally, this work advances large-scale PD theory by providing an effective case study of a co-design paradigm that can readily scale temporally and epistemologically.

Shiran Dudy, Jan Simson, Yanan Long

Northeastern University, Boston, United States · LMU Munich, Munich, Germany · Munich Center for Machine Learning (MCML), Munich, Germany +3

Participation Algorithmic Fairness Co-Design Transparency Accountability Asynchronous Execution

Apr 17, 2026cs.CY

Reckoning with the Political Economy of AI: Avoiding Decoys in Pursuit of Accountability

The Project of AI is a world-building endeavor, wherein those who fund and develop AI systems both operate through and seek to sustain networks of power and wealth. As they expand their access to resources and configure our sociotechnical conditions, they benefit from the ways in which a suite of decoys animate scholars, critics, policymakers, journalists, and the public into co-constructing industry-empowering AI futures. Regardless of who constructs or nurtures them, these decoys often create the illusion of accountability while both masking the emerging political economies that the Project of AI has set into motion, and also contributing to the network-making power that is at the heart of the Project's extraction and exploitation. Drawing on literature at the intersection of communication, science and technology studies, and economic sociology, we examine how the Project of AI is constructed. We then explore five decoys that seemingly critique - but in actuality co-constitute - AI's emergent power relations and material political economy. We argue that advancing meaningful fairness or accountability in AI requires: 1) recognizing when and how decoys serve as a distraction, and 2) grappling directly with the material political economy of the Project of AI. Doing so will enable us to attend to the networks of power that make 'AI' possible, spurring new visions for how to realize a more just technologically entangled world.

Janet Vertesi, danah boyd, Alex Taylor +1

Princeton University, Princeton, NJ USA · Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA · University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK +1

Accountability Economies

Apr 10, 2026cs.CY

Post-Deployment Accountability in AI Governance: A Cross-Regulatory Empirical Analysis of AI Incidents

Post-deployment accountability has become central to AI governance, yet little empirical evidence shows whether monitoring, incident reporting, and impact assessment obligations are visible when AI systems fail. This study analyzes real-world AI incidents from the AI Incident Database (2020--2026) and codes them against nine post-deployment provisions from the EU AI Act, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, and the GDPR. The findings show substantial accountability gaps: 77.1% of incidents lack evidence of EU AI Act post-market monitoring, and 99.6% lack documented Data-Protection Impact Assessment evidence. Governance gaps are also systemic, with 9.8% of incidents simultaneously non-compliant under two or more regimes. Incidents detected through internal monitoring show much higher compliance than externally detected incidents (87.5% vs 5.3% under the EU AI Act; 95.8% vs 58.1% under NIST), suggesting that monitoring capacity is a key condition for effective post-deployment governance. Building on these findings, the paper proposes the Proactive AI Governance Compliance Framework (PAGCF), a four-phase lifecycle for pre-deployment assessment, continuous monitoring, incident preparedness, and cross-framework verification.

Ummara Mumtaz, Summaya Mumtaz

Artificial Intelligence Governance Accountability Eu Artificial Intelligence Act Artificial Intelligence Risk

Apr 8, 2026cs.CL

Why teaching resists automation in an AI-inundated era: Human judgment, non-modular work, and the limits of delegation

Debates about artificial intelligence (AI) in education often portray teaching as a modular and procedural job that can increasingly be automated or delegated to technology. This brief communication paper argues that such claims depend on treating teaching as more separable than it is in practice. Drawing on recent literature and empirical studies of large language models and retrieval-augmented generation systems, I argue that although AI can support some bounded functions, instructional work remains difficult to automate in meaningful ways because it is inherently interpretive, relational, and grounded in professional judgment. More fundamentally, teaching and learning are shaped by human cognition, behavior, motivation, and social interaction in ways that cannot be fully specified, predicted, or exhaustively modeled. Tasks that may appear separable in principle derive their instructional value in practice from ongoing contextual interpretation across learners, situations, and relationships. As long as educational practice relies on emergent understanding of human cognition and learning, teaching remains a form of professional work that resists automation. AI may improve access to information and support selected instructional activities, but it does not remove the need for human judgment and relational accountability that effective teaching requires.

Songhee Han

Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA

Artificial Intelligence Education Automated Human Judgment Delegation Cognitive Science Accountability+2

Apr 7, 2026cs.AI

Auditable Agents

LLM agents call tools, query databases, delegate tasks, and trigger external side effects. Once an agent system can act in the world, the question is no longer only whether harmful actions can be prevented--it is whether those actions remain answerable after deployment. We distinguish accountability (the ability to determine compliance and assign responsibility), auditability (the system property that makes accountability possible), and auditing (the process of reconstructing behavior from trustworthy evidence). Our claim is direct: no agent system can be accountable without auditability. To make this operational, we define five dimensions of agent auditability, i.e., action recoverability, lifecycle coverage, policy checkability, responsibility attribution, and evidence integrity, and identify three mechanism classes (detect, enforce, recover) whose temporal information-and-intervention constraints explain why, in practice, no single approach suffices. We support the position with layered evidence rather than a single benchmark: lower-bound ecosystem measurements suggest that even basic security prerequisites for auditability are widely unmet (617 security findings across six prominent open-source projects); runtime feasibility results show that pre-execution mediation with tamper-evident records adds only 8.3 ms median overhead; and controlled recovery experiments show that responsibility-relevant information can be partially recovered even when conventional logs are missing. We propose an Auditability Card for agent systems and identify six open research problems organized by mechanism class.

Yi Nian, Aojie Yuan, Haiyue Zhang +7

University of Southern California · Arizona State University · University of Tennessee, Knoxville +1

Accountability Model Auditing

Jan 8, 2026cs.AI

Neutral Substrates: A Design Constraint for Shared Records Under Persistent Interpretive Disagreement

Shared accountability records are often used by parties who may never agree about causation, responsibility, or normative interpretation. For such records, neutrality cannot be achieved by omitting contested information, because accountability requires preserving the claims parties made, with their sources and provenance. Nor can neutrality be achieved by asserting one contested interpretation as the shared base. This paper defines a neutral substrate as a shared representational layer that provides stable reference while making no object-level substrate-layer commitments to causal or normative propositions. The central design constraint is that, when causal and normative propositions are contestable across admissible frameworks and the substrate's referential commitments are common ground, the substrate's neutrality is guaranteed at design time if and only if its foundational layer is restricted to those referential commitments and attribution propositions whose attributional basis is fixed by them. Causal and normative content may still be represented, but not as object-level foundational-layer commitments: it may appear there only as the content of attributed assertions with provenance, made by some identified framework, source, agent, institution, record, or document. The representational machinery used here is standard: reification, attribution, and provenance. The contribution is the constraint: a checkable condition on the foundational layer of a shared record, stated together with the assumptions it depends on and the boundary condition under which the constraint does not apply. A neutral substrate says enough to preserve accountability, but it does not turn one party's interpretation into an object-level substrate-layer commitment. The constraint does not apply at that layer when the referential regime or attributional basis is contested among the frameworks in play.

Denise M. Case

Department of Computer Science and Information Systems Northwest Missouri State University, Maryville, MO, USA

Accountability Shared Control Commitment Disagreement Provenance