AI Accountability

Production AI systems often operate with incomplete, conflicting, or insufficient evidence. Forced classifiers collapse such cases into action labels, while generative systems can produce outputs that are difficult to interpret as auditable execution decisions. We study operational decision control for AI systems, where uncertainty must be explicitly routable, policy-governed, and auditable rather than hidden inside forced predictions or free-form generation. We present EvaluatorDPT, a bounded decision-control model that predicts YES, NO, or TBD, where TBD is learned as a deferral outcome rather than added only as a post-hoc confidence rule. The model uses a transformer encoder with a primary bounded-decision head and structured auxiliary channels for values and emotions/sentiments. The interface is domain-agnostic in form: a deployment domain supplies evidence and policy thresholds, while the model emits a bounded distribution that can be controlled at inference time through recorded operating thresholds and, when validated, auxiliary semantic signals. For the evaluated model version, we report decision performance on held-out validation and test splits; auxiliary emotion metrics are omitted because the emotion head is disabled for this evaluation. On the held-out test split (n=44,597), the model achieves Accuracy = 0.8260 and Macro F1 = 0.8252, with per-class F1 of 0.8314 (YES), 0.8486 (NO), and 0.7956 (TBD). The evaluation record also includes calibration evidence (ECE = 0.0338 on validation), threshold-sweep outputs, multi-seed stability checks, confusion matrices, and reproducibility commands. Our main contribution is a bounded execution interface in which deferral is learned, inference-time routing remains inspectable, auxiliary signals provide a path to auditable behavior control, and evaluation evidence supports external review.

Large language models (LLMs) can support democratic deliberation at scales previously constrained by turn-taking and facilitation bandwidth. Recent work shows that LLM-generated group statements are often preferred over human-mediated outputs, while theoretical analyses argue that LLMs relax the simultaneity constraints limiting collective intelligence. Yet pure LLM mediation risks collapsing pluralism, over-optimizing for agreement, and undermining legitimacy when participants cannot contest how they are represented. We propose a symbiotic human-AI framework organized into three layers: observation and diversity amplification, facilitation with clause-level provenance, and human primacy for ratification. Our contributions include graded coverage, diversity, and erasure metrics with salience-aware weighting; a provenance pipeline combining cross-encoder similarity with causal knockout diagnostics; preference-conditioned trade-off control; equity-aware contestability workflows; adversarial robustness tests; and an evaluation protocol with ablation designs informed by evidence of LLM-as-judge limitations. The result is a testable blueprint for deliberation technology that scales collective intelligence while preserving agency and legitimacy.

The widespread deployment of generative artificial intelligence (AI) models has raised serious concerns about the proliferation of AI-generated content. This has led to a surge of interest in, and demand for, reliable tracking and detection mechanisms for content that is AI-generated, such as watermarking, metadata tagging, content tagging, and more. The problem has captured the attention of policymakers as well as the popular media, and a spate of recent bills in the US have sought to regulate the spread of AI content, and enforce or promote methods to track and label it. This work performs a critical analysis of the policy discourse surrounding generative AI content transparency in the US and EU. Through a broad document selection methodology, we first collect a broad corpus of documents containing legislative language and policy-relevant discourse on the topic. We then analyze these through inductive coding, and leverage our coding to systematize these documents, identifying key patterns, gaps, and open questions. We identify critical points of disconnect between policy and technological capabilities and practice, and we highlight and discuss potential ambiguities and pitfalls raised by the trends in our corpus.

Every major framework for governing artificial intelligence presupposes an identifiable entity -- a developer, deployer, or operator -- who can be held responsible and compelled to comply. Decentralized AI (DeAI) dissolves this presupposition. We analyze DeAI as a six-layer decentralizing stack -- model, training, compute, harness, identity, and ownership -- and show how partial decentralization across layers compounds into what we call the \emph{governance vacuum}: a condition in which AI systems are consequential enough to require governance but lack the properties that existing frameworks presuppose in their targets. This vacuum takes two analytically distinct forms: an \emph{accountability gap}, where no addressable principal can be identified, and an \emph{incapacitation gap}, where even an identified principal cannot alter the running system. We demonstrate that these failures are not merely jurisdictional but defeat every presupposition of governance through normative address -- the communication of rules to a comprehending, responsive agent. Drawing on Lessig's modalities of regulation and Searle's distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, we argue for a shift in the locus of governance from policy to protocol, from normative address to architectural constraint. Protocol-based constitutive governance does not address the agents operating within a system but shapes the substrate that determines what kinds of actions are possible within it. We identify four ethical conditions -- legitimacy, contestability, transparency, and non-domination -- that such governance must satisfy to avoid degenerating into unaccountable technocratic power, and we argue that the central political challenge of governing AI in a decentralized world is reconstructing forms of democratic authorization for architectural choices that persist after the ordinary chain of policy has broken down.

Ethical constraints on open-weight AI models are both a reflection of societal concerns and a foundation for AI governance policy. They are expected to propagate to downstream derivatives while implemented as voluntary metadata disclosures that must be restated at each generation of reuse. We audit 2,142,823 model repositories on Hugging Face Hub to test whether this disclosure-based governance infrastructure can sustain traceability across deep model lineages. Restriction evidence decays with a half-life of 1.31 derivation steps ($R^2$=0.98), and beyond seven downstream generations at least 80% of descendant models lack sufficient public evidence for a governance determination, a depth boundary we formalize as the governance horizon. Platform-level interventions to restore missing licence metadata reveal that policy design (not enforcement alone) is the binding factor: inheritance-only designs require near-complete enforcement to move the horizon, whereas a mandatory-declaration design that explicitly resolves orphan lineage components shifts the horizon already at moderate enforcement. The structural bottleneck is lineages with no inheritable upstream intent: such orphan components remain undecidable under any inheritance-only policy regardless of enforcement rate, and unresolved upstream nodes additionally create direct downstream undecidability bottlenecks that inheritance rules alone cannot recover. Comparison with PyPI, where governance signals are carried by explicit machine-readable declarations, corroborates that the collapse is topology-specific to open-weight derivation rather than inherent to open ecosystems. These results establish that disclosure-based governance has a shallow, structurally determined reach in open-weight AI, and that achieving deep supply-chain accountability requires provenance mechanisms propagating governance signals through derivation itself.

Agentic AI orchestrators reduce the interface and assembly costs of composing information systems capabilities across organizational boundaries, seemingly accelerating modularization and organizational disaggregation. Yet AI-enabled capabilities whose outputs require evidence, review, signoff, or assignable responsibility may retain integrated accountability boundaries even when their technical interfaces become modular. We develop a capability-level theory of accountability-boundary placement in agentic ecosystems. We introduce accountability assets: complementary assets that make AI-supported outputs legitimate, auditable, reviewable, and assignable to a responsible party. We argue that verification cost and responsibility transferability determine whether the execution and accountability boundaries can move together. The theory identifies three boundary strategies: component, integrated, and dual-track. It also introduces rule debt, the governance burden that accrues when organizational decision rules migrate from formal information systems into ungoverned agentic execution environments. Integrating digital innovation, transaction cost, complementary-assets, digital platform governance, and IS control perspectives, we develop seven propositions linking agentic assembly-cost reductions, accountability assets, appropriability, orchestrator intent capture, and boundary misconfiguration to boundary strategy, value appropriation, and rule debt. The theory explains when digital modularization extends to organizational disaggregation and when accountability keeps capabilities integrated. Structured illustrations across document processing, legal services, audit, clinical decision support, and procurement discipline the boundary logic.

Agentic AI systems are increasingly proposed for social-good domains, often invoking the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a vocabulary of global benefit. Yet claims of social good do not establish accountability to the communities a system claims to serve. We present a structured survey of 112 papers on agentic AI for social good published between 2015 and 2026. We find a moral-geographic asymmetry: papers are least likely to specify geographic context in precisely the domains where local political, legal, and cultural context matters most. Across the corpus, 82 of 112 papers (73%) specify no geographic context. Papers aligned with health or physical/ecological SDGs specify geography 37-40% of the time, while papers aligned with institutional and social-policy SDGs do so only 13%. SDG 16, peace, justice, and strong institutions, is both the most-covered goal in the corpus and the one with the lowest geographic-specification rate. We interpret this as moral abstraction: agentic AI for social good often treats institutional good as universal in ways it does not treat health or ecological good. A second finding compounds this: only 28 of 112 papers (25%) report any real-world deployment or small-scale test. We identify five accountability gaps and propose a minimal reporting standard for more context-specific, participatory, and accountable agentic AI for social good.

As AI becomes part of everyday learning, many courses teach students to use it mainly as a productivity tool: how to prompt, search, summarize, write, code, and use tools more efficiently. We argue that AI education also needs a setting in which students learn to test AI and understand their own role in judging machine-produced knowledge. To this end, we introduce a course-based practice that teaches AI through benchmark construction, using deep research systems as a concrete example of AI-era knowledge work. Students turn disciplinary knowledge into verifiable expert-level questions, review one another's designs for ambiguity and shortcuts, and evaluate AI systems on the resulting tasks. This activity gives students direct exposure to a powerful tool while asking them to specify what a trustworthy answer would require. The produced benchmark, QuestBench, consists of 256 questions across 14 humanities and social-science domains. Evaluation on QuestBench shows that student-designed tasks reveal hidden failures in current deep research systems: across thirteen evaluated systems, the mean question-level pass rate is only 16.85%, and the best-performing system, GPT-5.5, reaches a 57.58% pass rate. The failures are educationally useful because they show how fluent, source-backed answers can still miss the right query, source, term, or evidence standard. Reflections from five student contributors suggest that benchmark construction can help students see professional knowledge not only as content AI may retrieve, but as the basis for judging AI outputs. We present QuestBench as a benchmark artifact and as a reusable classroom setting for a larger educational question: how students can remain responsible knowledge actors as AI enters learning and professional work. The dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/PKUAIWeb/QuestBench/tree/main.

Major deployed generative AI advertising systems preserve a visible boundary between commercial content and AI-generated responses. Yet empirical research shows that ads woven directly into large language model (LLM) outputs often go undetected by users. We argue that generative AI fundamentally changes advertising: rather than placing products into discrete slots, it enables interventions on the generative process itself, which induce commercial influence through less observable channels. This reframes generative AI advertising as a problem of trustworthy intervention rather than content placement. We introduce a taxonomy organized by influence tier, corresponding to interventions on progressively more latent variables: product mentions, information framing, behavioral redirection, and long-term preference shaping; and show how these tiers instantiate across modalities and system architectures, including retrieval-augmented generation and agentic pipelines where upstream decisions can sharply constrain downstream outcomes. Both major deployed systems and designed mechanisms concentrate on the most observable and easiest-to-govern tier, while the forms of commercial influence most consequential for user autonomy remain poorly understood and lack frameworks for detection, measurement, or disclosure. The central challenge is whether commercial influence in generative systems can be made trustworthy, i.e., attributable, measurable, contestable, and aligned with user welfare.

As autonomous systems grow more advanced, objective metrics to evaluate their ethical and legal compliance are critical for informing end users of their limitations and ensuring accountability of those who misuse them. Current ethical embodied AI frameworks remain mostly qualitative, focusing on system design (through safety guardrails or targeted red teaming), and the realized guardrails often directly disallow unsafe behavior without providing the user with an override or interpretable reason. Instead, there is a need for computable metrics through rigorous testing that allow a user to determine the applicability of the system to the task. To address this gap, we introduce the Reference Ethical Benchmark for Autonomy Readiness (REBAR), a quantitative test and evaluation framework for autonomous systems. REBAR maps operating metrics into a computable Autonomy Readiness Level (ARL) rubric that can quantify ethical performance. Key innovations of the framework include a neuro-symbolic Large Language Model (LLM) approach to calculate and explain the ethical difficulty of scenarios, LLM-driven at-scale generation of test instances, and a versatile, photorealistic simulation environment. By evaluating white-box autonomy solutions through this rigorous testing pipeline, REBAR delivers an objective and repeatable benchmark score, bridging the gap between abstract principles and verifiable, accountable autonomy.

Vertical AI firms in accounting, law, healthcare, procurement, and similar domains historically bundled workflow, domain logic, and accountability into a single application. General-purpose AI agents are now unbundling that package, prompting founders and investors to advocate "going headless": cede the workflow and interface to agents and expose domain expertise as callable services. This article argues that going headless is correct for some firms and destructive for others, and that the latter often cede their value capture inadvertently through architectural choices that look like interface decisions. This is a boundary question, and the answer turns on distinguishing the interface boundary, which can often move, from the accountability boundary, which often must not. Drawing on Coase's theory of the firm, Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne's platform envelopment framework, and Teece's analysis of complementary assets and appropriability, the article shows that orchestrators operating through open protocols acquire envelopment power even as technical interoperability improves, and that durable value capture concentrates in cospecialized accountability assets: professional signoff, regulated workflows, evidence trails, and trusted systems of record. The article proposes a three-position taxonomy (component, integrated software platform, dual-track) determined not by sector but by task-accountability regime, and formalizes the construct of rule debt: the future governance, maintenance, and accountability burden that accrues to customer organizations when business rules and professional standards migrate from governed systems into prompts and agent instructions. Four principles follow: decompose by accountability not interface, invert the edges while retaining the core, position rule debt as the customer cost the integrated platform prevents, and avoid single-orchestrator dependence.

When a neural network estimates someone's age from a photograph, does it process biometric data? The answer depends on whether identity-discriminative representations arise within the network during inference, a question that may seem trivial to ML researchers but triggers consent requirements under GDPR, statutory damages under BIPA, or high-risk AI classification under the EU AI Act. Yet no regulatory guidance addresses it. This position paper provides empirical evidence: 14 models evaluated across 3 face verification benchmarks show age estimators fall orders of magnitude short of identification thresholds. Age estimation models cannot identify individuals. We call on researchers to provide transparency about what systems store and can do, and on regulators to distinguish transient processing from template storage.

AI agents increasingly act consequentially in the real world. This creates a problem we call \emph{consequence reception}: harm occurs, the producing system is identified, yet no continuing agent receives consequences in a way that changes future behavior. Pain, understood mechanistically as a corrective feedback signal, is foundational to canonical theories of punishment -- deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation all assume a continuing locus that registers the signal and updates behavior. That, in turn, requires a body for the signal to land on: a boundary whose integrity it protects, a locus where it accumulates, consolidation that converts episodic signal into durable update, and a substrate that responds by altering future action. Current LLM agents -- software-defined composites of weights, prompts, tools, memory, and credentials, freely swapped, copied, reset, and reassembled -- satisfy none of these conditions. The two prevailing legal responses therefore fail to achieve consequence reception. The thin-identity agent-principal dyad has a body but no \emph{consequence--agency coupling}: the human bears pain for behaviors beyond their control -- Elish's \emph{moral crumple zone}. The thick-identity Arbel et al.'s \emph{Algorithmic Corporation} creates legally legible entities but does not guarantee that any AI decision architecture receives pain as a behavioral signal. Achieving consequence-agency coupling is therefore a sociotechnical infrastructural problem, not only a legal one. Until such architectures exist, high-stakes AI deployment should remain tethered to accountable human principals with meaningful control, proportional liability, and authority to constrain or terminate the agent. \emph{If some body does not receive the pain by design, some body will receive it by default.}

AI agents increasingly act autonomously in the world, yet harmful behavior cannot be reliably traced to the account that deployed the agent. This creates an accountability gap across both benign and malicious settings: misconfigured or hijacked agents may cause unintended harm, while malicious operators may deploy agents for scams, harassment, or cyberattacks. In many cases, these agents rely on vendor-hosted language models. Affected parties can observe the harm, but cannot identify the responsible vendor session or account. We formalize this problem as agent attribution: linking an observed agent interaction to the account responsible for the underlying model calls. We present a canary-based protocol in which an authorized party embeds selected signals in content consumed by the agent, then asks the vendor to search a narrow time window of account-linked session logs. Lexical canaries provide exact-match attribution when a benign operator does not deliberately evade detection. Against adaptive adversaries, we use task-relevant semantic canaries whose removal or replacement also removes information required for successful task execution, creating a utility--evasion asymmetry. Across communication, web, and cyber-agent settings, we show that the protocol supports reliable session attribution, withstands adaptive transformations, and scales to practical vendor-side log search.

Establishing trustworthy safety assurance for autonomous driving systems (ADSs) requires evidence that failures arise from avoidable system deficiencies rather than unavoidable traffic conflicts. Current adversarial simulation methods can efficiently expose collisions, but generally lack mechanisms to distinguish these fundamentally different failure modes. Here we present CARS (Context-Aware, Responsibility-attributed Scenario generation), a framework that integrates responsibility attribution directly into adversarial scenario generation. CARS combines context-aware adversary selection with a generative adversarial policy optimized in closed-loop simulation to construct collision scenarios that are both physically feasible and diagnostically attributable. Across benchmark datasets spanning heterogeneous national traffic environments, CARS consistently discovers feasible collision scenarios with high attribution rates under multiple regulation-prescribed careful and competent driver models. By coupling adversarial generation with normative responsibility assessment, CARS moves simulation testing beyond collision discovery toward the construction of interpretable, regulation-aligned safety evidence for scalable ADS validation.

The phrase 'human in the loop' is increasingly used to imply a sense of safety in relation to AI decision systems. It shouldn't. There are contexts where it can be applied appropriately, but these are not in the deployed decision systems we see dominating today. Human oversight of AI decision processes is one of the most popular proposals for addressing concerns, especially about bias, discrimination, misinformation, manipulation, accountability, and transparency. But there is insufficient examination of what human oversight actually means. The question raised in this paper is whether using the metaphor of a loop does anything to assist understanding of what is required and what is achieved in a particular decision context. Indiscriminate use of the loop metaphor obscures both processes and outcomes. It enables 'humanwashing', an activity analogous to 'greenwashing', where writers and commentators use language primarily aimed at putting systems in the best possible light.

This paper examines what it means for a medical AI system to be right by grounding the question in a specific clinical context: the automatic classification of plasma cells in digitized bone marrow smears for the diagnosis of multiple myeloma. Drawing on philosophy of science and research ethics, the paper argues that correctness in medical AI is not a singular property reducible to benchmark performance, but a multi-dimensional concept involving the availability of expertly labeled medical datasets, the explainability and interpretability of model outputs, the clinical meaningfulness of evaluation metrics, and the distribution of accountability in human-AI workflows. As such, the paper develops this argument through four interrelated themes: the instability of ground truth labels, the opacity of overconfident AI, the inadequacy of standard clinical metrics, and the risk of automation bias in time-pressured clinical settings.

AI deployment in sensitive domains such as health care, credit, employment, and criminal justice is often treated as unsafe to authorize until model internals can be explained. This often leads to an excessive reliance on mechanistic interpretability to address a deployment challenge beyond its intended scope. We argue that the gate should instead be calibrated verification: authorization should be domain-scoped, independently checkable, monitored after release, accountable, contestable, and revocable. The reason is twofold. First, model capability is uneven across nearby tasks, so authorization must attach to a specific use rather than to a model in general. Second, societies have long governed opaque expertise through credentials, monitoring, liability, appeal, and revocation rather than mechanism-level explanation. Recent evidence reinforces this distinction between mechanistic understanding and deployment authority: a 53-percentage-point gap between internal representations and output correction shows that understanding may not translate into action, while one scoping review found that only 9.0% of FDA-approved AI/ML device documents contained a prospective post-market surveillance study. We propose Verification Coverage, a six-component reportable standard with a minimum-composition rule, as the metric that should sit beside capability scores in model cards, leaderboards, and regulatory disclosures.

Engineering managers increasingly must decide how to introduce generative artificial intelligence (AI), retrieval-augmented generation, and coding agents into high-risk operational functions without weakening accountability, privacy, cost discipline, or auditability. The central message of this study is that AI-assisted operational decision support should be managed as a governed engineering capability before it is scaled as automation. Security operations centers (SOCs) provide a suitable setting because they combine privileged telemetry, specialist expertise, software repositories, cloud services, and evidence-sensitive decisions. This study uses Kusto Query Language (KQL) and Microsoft Azure security capabilities as a bounded technical instantiation of that broader engineering management problem. KQL is read-only in ordinary query use, but read-only does not mean risk-free: AI-assisted queries can still create privacy, cost, performance, schema-validity, and decision-quality risks through broad scans, sensitive-field exposure, stale intelligence, and misleading interpretations. Using design science research, the study develops a governed AI query-broker artifact that separates AI planning from operational execution through schema-grounded retrieval, approved templates, policy validation, read-only adapters, normalized outputs, auditable agent traces, and engineering review board gates. The contribution is not a new KQL technique, security product, or detection algorithm. Rather, the study contributes a management framework for governing AI-assisted operational decision support in high-risk digital infrastructure by specifying design propositions, role accountability, maturity stages, quality gates, evaluation criteria, and evidence boundaries.

In this thesis, we develop algorithms with theoretical guarantees for ensuring reliability and accountability of Machine Learning (ML) systems. As ML systems evolve from predictive models to generative models and autonomous agents, the landscape of trustworthy AI has shifted. This thesis introduces tools grounded in information theory, optimization, and statistical learning to mitigate bias, reduce arbitrary decisions, ensure content provenance, and evaluate LLM-driven agents in autonomous settings. Towards mitigating bias and arbitrariness in traditional ML models, we introduce a kernel-based method to achieve multiaccuracy across complex subpopulations that traditional demographic categories may overlook. We also develop methods to address predictive multiplicity, where equally accurate models yield conflicting individual predictions. We ensure the accountability in generative AI through watermarking large language models (LLMs). We characterize the information-theoretic trade-off between watermark detection and text distortion and derive optimal watermarking strategies by leveraging optimal transport and coding theory. Empirical evaluations show our watermarks achieve a superior detection-quality tradeoff across language generation and coding tasks. Finally, we evaluate autonomous LLM agents in multi-agent environments through the first simulator of a fully LLM-driven supply chain. LLM agents offer significant performance gains, outperforming human teams and reducing costs by up to 67%, but also introduce systemic risks, including costly tail events.

As vehicles transition toward higher levels of automation, Driver Monitoring Systems (DMS) have become essential for ensuring human oversight, safety, and regulatory compliance in a vehicle. These systems rely on multimodal sensing and AI-driven inference to assess driver attention, cognitive state, and readiness to take control. While technologically promising, their deployment introduces a complex set of ethical and legal challenges - ranging from privacy and consent to data ownership and algorithmic fairness. While overarching frameworks such as the GDPR, EU AI Act, and IEEE standards offer important guidance, they lack the specificity required for addressing the unique risks posed by in-cabin sensing technologies. This paper adopts a review-to-design perspective, critically examining existing regulatory instruments and ethical frameworks -- such as the GDPR, the EU AI Act, and IEEE guidelines -- and identifying gaps in their applicability to the distinctive risks posed by multimodal, AI-enabled in-cabin monitoring. Building on this review, we propose a modular ethical design framework tailored specifically to Driver Monitoring Systems. The framework translates high-level principles into actionable design and deployment guidance, including user-configurable consent mechanisms, fairness-aware model development, transparency and explainability tools, and safeguards for driver emotional well-being. Finally, the paper outlines a risk analysis and failure mitigation strategy, emphasizing proactive incident response and accountability mechanisms tailored to the DMS context. Together, these contributions aim to inform the development of transparent, trustworthy, and human-centered driver monitoring systems for next-generation autonomous vehicles.

As AI systems increasingly exhibit autonomous, goal-directed, and long-horizon behavior, users lack a standardized way to detect the degree to which a system functions like an intentional actor for governance and accountability purposes. This position paper defines intentionality not as consciousness, but as a behavioral profile characterized by purpose, foresight, volition, temporal commitment, and coherence - criteria long used in legal and philosophical contexts to infer intent. These properties are design-contingent: architectural choices such as memory persistence, planning depth, and tool autonomy shape the degree to which systems exhibit organized goal pursuit. If intentionality is design-contingent, it is in principle controllable. Yet control requires measurement. We introduce the Functional Intentionality Test (FIT), a multidimensional framework that quantifies intentional-like behavior across five observable dimensions, and propose FIT-Eval, a structured evaluation protocol for eliciting and scoring them. While reduced human agency can increase efficiency, rising intentional capacity heightens accountability risks. By translating intentionality into interpretable levels, FIT enables proportionate oversight and deliberate autonomy calibration in increasingly agentic systems.

AI coding assistants and autonomous agents are becoming integral to software development workflows, reshaping how code is produced, reviewed, and maintained. While recent research has focused mainly on the capabilities and impacts of productivity of these systems, much less attention has been paid to accountability: who is responsible when agents generate, modify, or recommend code? In practice, accountability is defined through the Terms of Service (ToS) and related policy documents that govern the use of AI-powered development tools. In this vision paper, we present a comparative analysis of the Terms of Service for widely used AI coding assistants and agent-enabled development tools. We examine how these documents allocate ownership, responsibility, liability, and disclosure obligations between tool providers and software developers, and we identify common patterns and divergences between providers. Our analysis reveals a consistent tendency to shift responsibility for correctness, safety, and legal compliance onto users, as well as substantial variation in how providers address issues such as indemnification, data reuse, and acceptable use. Based on these findings, we argue that existing policy frameworks are poorly aligned with increasingly agent-mediated and autonomous software development workflows. We outline a research roadmap for accountable agents in software engineering, identifying challenges and opportunities for modeling responsibility, designing governance artifacts, developing tooling that supports accountability, and conducting empirical studies of developers' perceptions and practices.

The evaluation of explainable AI (XAI) methods is affected by a lack of standardization. Metrics are inconsistently defined, incompletely reported, and rarely validated against common baselines. In this paper, we identify transparency of evaluation reporting as a central, under-addressed problem. We propose the XAI Evaluation Card, a documentation template analogous to model cards, designed to accompany any study that introduces an XAI evaluation metric. The card covers explicit declaration of target properties, grounding levels, metric assumptions, validation evidence, gaming risks, and known failure cases. We argue that adopting this template as a community norm would reduce evaluation fragmentation, support meta-analysis, and improve accountability in XAI research.

Frontier AI safety claims - published assertions that a highly capable general-purpose model is below a threshold of concern, adequately mitigated, or suitable for release - increasingly shape model deployment, governance, and public trust. Yet the artefacts needed to evaluate them are routinely withheld, producing an evidential inversion: the most consequential claims in AI safety are often the least reproducible. This position paper argues that NeurIPS should require reproducibility standards for papers making such claims, treating non-reproducibility not as a transparency preference but as an evaluation-methodology failure. The 2026 International AI Safety Report [Bengio et al., 2026] concludes that reliable pre-deployment safety testing has become harder to conduct and that models now distinguish test from deployment contexts; the 2025 Foundation Model Transparency Index [Wan et al., 2025] reports a sector-average transparency score of 40/100 with no major developer adequately disclosing train-test overlap; contemporaneous measurement-theory work shows that attack-success-rate comparisons across systems are often founded on low-validity measurements [Chouldechova et al., 2025]. We propose a three-tier disclosure framework, distinguishing public, controlled, and claim-restricted disclosure, paired with a mandatory claim inventory, scope statements, and a phased implementation path with graduated sanctions. The framework treats secrecy and openness as endpoints of a spectrum, with controlled review (via a federated colloquium of qualified secure-review hosts) covering claims whose artefacts cannot be released publicly, and right-scaling claims whose artefacts cannot be reviewed even confidentially. The standard the community applies to its most consequential claims should be at least as high as the standard it applies to its least.

AI products often route requests through version aliases, service tiers, tool choices, regional endpoints, fallback rules, or safety handling before responding. These routing steps are documented product surfaces in several widely used AI platforms and serving stacks. Routing helps AI services stay affordable, fast, and available at scale, and it shapes trust. Trust can break when routing changes the cost, quality, or accountability of a response without the user being able to tell what happened. "Which model answered?" is only part of the audit question. The runtime path matters. Adaptive AI systems should produce a runtime transparency artifact called the route receipt. A route receipt is a compact record of the route that served a request. It should capture enough material facts for people relying on the output to reconstruct important routing decisions without exposing proprietary internals or hidden reasoning. Route transparency should be part of model documentation. Model cards describe trained model artifacts, while route receipts describe the runtime conditions under which a particular answer was produced. The paper introduces the route-receipt concept, a minimal schema and redaction model, and a documentation-based survey of selected platforms showing that receipt fragments already exist without a portable per-answer record.

When a traffic signal controller adjusts green phases and a grid manager curtails power on the same corridor, each system may comply with its own obligations. The resident who suffers the combined effect has no single authority to hold accountable and, under the EU AI Act, limited means to obtain an explanation. Annex III, point 2 excludes safety-component AI in critical infrastructure from Article 86 explanation rights and Article 27 fundamental-rights impact assessment. Provider and deployer duties under Articles 9-15 still apply, and residual pathways under the GDPR, NIS2, and tortious liability offer partial coverage. The Act's principal resident-facing accountability instruments are nonetheless narrowed for the autonomous infrastructure systems most likely to interact across agencies. The paper traces this accountability deficit through four residual pathways (GDPR Article 22, GDPR transparency obligations, tortious liability, and NIS2) and shows that each is structurally bounded by individual-controller, individual-decision scope. As a governance response, it presents AgentGov-SC, a three-layer architecture (Agent, Orchestration, City) specifying 25 governance measures with bidirectional traceability to the EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42001, and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. Five conflict resolution rules and an autonomy-calibrated activation model complete the design. A scenario analysis traces governance activation through a multi-agent corridor cascade involving three documented UAE smart-city systems, with a contrasting single-system scenario confirming proportional activation. The paper contributes a regulatory gap analysis and governance architecture for an increasingly important class of urban AI deployment that existing frameworks treat as bounded and isolated.

Expectations about the support of artificial intelligence (AI) may influence interaction outcomes similar to placebos. Such expectations may result from AI washing, a practice of overstating a system's AI capabilities when actual functionality is limited. For example, some computer mice are marketed as "AI-assisted" despite lacking AI in core functions. In a within-subjects study, 28 participants completed Fitts' Law tasks with a computer mouse under three conditions: no support, supposed predictive AI support, and supposed biosignal-enhanced AI support. Objective Fitts' Law performance indicators and subjective performance expectations, perceived workload, and perceived usability were measured. Compared to baseline, participants expected significantly improved performance in placebo conditions. However, these expectations did not translate into differences in objective or subjective assessments. This paper contributes evidence that AI washing inflates user expectations without altering actual interaction outcomes, highlighting a critical transparency issue. By exposing how deceptive AI marketing can shape user expectations, we underscore the need for accountability in AI product claims. Further, we establish Fitts' Law as a rigorous methodological lens for auditing AI-labelled input devices.

Decentralized, agentic AI marketplaces are rapidly emerging to support software engineering tasks such as debugging, patch generation, and security auditing, often operating without centralized oversight. However, existing reputation mechanisms fail in this setting for three fundamental reasons: agents can strategically optimize against evaluation procedures; demonstrated competence does not reliably transfer across heterogeneous task contexts; and verification rigor varies widely, from lightweight automated checks to costly expert review. Current approaches to reputation drawing on federated learning, blockchain-based AI platforms, and large language model safety research are unable to address these challenges in combination. We therefore propose \textbf{AgentReputation}, a decentralized, three-layer reputation framework for agentic AI systems. The framework separates task execution, reputation services, and tamper-proof persistence to both leverage their respective strengths and enable independent evolution. The framework introduces explicit verification regimes linked to agent reputation metadata, as well as context-conditioned reputation cards that prevent reputation conflation across domains and task types. In addition, AgentReputation provides a decision-facing policy engine that supports resource allocation, access control, and adaptive verification escalation based on risk and uncertainty. Building on this framework, we outline several future research directions, including the development of verification ontologies, methods for quantifying verification strength, privacy-preserving evidence mechanisms, cold-start reputation bootstrapping, and defenses against adversarial manipulation.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) and Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) in high-stakes domains demand reliable verification, yet centralized approaches suffer four limitations: (1) Robustness, with single points of failure vulnerable to attacks and bias; (2) Scalability, as reasoning complexity creates bottlenecks; (3) Opacity, as hidden auditing erodes trust; and (4) Privacy, as exposed reasoning traces risk model theft. We introduce TRUST (Transparent, Robust, and Unified Services for Trustworthy AI), a decentralized framework with three innovations: (i) Hierarchical Directed Acyclic Graphs (HDAGs) that decompose Chain-of-Thought reasoning into five abstraction levels for parallel distributed auditing; (ii) the DAAN protocol, which projects multi-agent interactions into Causal Interaction Graphs (CIGs) for deterministic root-cause attribution; and (iii) a multi-tier consensus mechanism among computational checkers, LLM evaluators, and human experts with stake-weighted voting that guarantees correctness under 30% adversarial participation. We prove a Safety-Profitability Theorem ensuring honest auditors profit while malicious actors incur losses. All decisions are recorded on-chain, while privacy-by-design segmentation prevents reconstruction of proprietary logic. Across multiple LLMs and benchmarks, TRUST attains 72.4% accuracy (4-18% above baselines) and remains resilient against 20% corruption. DAAN reaches 70% root-cause attribution (vs. 54-63% for standard methods) with 60% token savings. Human studies validate the design (F1 = 0.89, Brier = 0.074). The framework supports (A1) decentralized auditing, (A2) tamper-proof leaderboards, (A3) trustless data annotation, and (A4) governed autonomous agents, pioneering decentralized AI auditing for safe, accountable deployment of reasoning-capable systems.