Cognitive Modeling

Understanding social polarization requires integrating insights from psychology, sociology, and complex systems science. Agent-based modeling provides a natural framework to combine perspectives from different fields and explore how individual cognition shapes collective outcomes. This study introduces a novel agent-based model that integrates two cognitive and social mechanisms: the desire to be unique within a group (optimal distinctiveness theory) and the tendency to simplify complex information (cognitive compression). In the model, virtual agents interact in pairs and decide whether to adopt each other's opinions by balancing two opposing drives: maximizing opinion diversity within their local social group while simplifying the overall opinion landscape, with both evaluated using Shannon entropy. We show that the combination of these mechanisms can reproduce real-world patterns, such as the emergence of distinct heterogeneous opinion clusters. Moreover, unlike many existing models where opinions become fixed once opinion groups form, individuals in our model continue to adjust their opinions after clusters emerge, leading to ongoing variation within and between opinion groups. Computational experiments reveal that polarization emerges when local group sizes are moderate (consistent with Dunbar's number), while smaller groups cause fragmentation and larger ones hinder distinct cluster formation. Higher cognitive compression increases unpredictability, while lower compression produces more consistent group structures. These results demonstrate how simple psychological rules can generate complex, realistic social behavior and advance understanding of polarization in human societies.

Modeling human cognitive states is essential for advanced artificial intelligence. Existing Large Language Models (LLMs) mainly address isolated tasks such as emotion analysis or stance detection, and fail to capture interactions among cognitive dimensions defined in psychology, including emotion, thinking style, stance, and intention. To bridge this gap, we construct CognitiveBench, the first benchmark with unified annotations across the above four dimensions. Experiments on CognitiveBench show that although LLMs perform well on single dimension tasks, their performance drops sharply in joint multi-dimensional modeling. Using Gromov $δ$-hyperbolicity analysis, we find that CognitiveBench exhibits a strong hierarchical structure. We attribute the performance bottleneck to ``Cognitive Crowding'', where hierarchical cognitive states require exponential representational space, while the Euclidean space of LLMs grows only polynomially, causing representation overlap and degraded performance. To address this mismatch, we propose HyCoLLM, which models cognitive states in hyperbolic space and aligns LLM representations via Hyperbolic Guided Alignment Tuning. Results show that HyCoLLM substantially improves multi-dimensional cognitive understanding, allowing 8B parameter model to outperform strong baselines, including GPT-4o.

Generative Agents, owing to their precise modeling and simulation capabilities of human behavior, have become a pivotal tool in the field of Artificial Intelligence in Education (AIEd) for uncovering complex cognitive processes of learners. However, existing educational agents predominantly rely on static personas to simulate student learning behaviors, neglecting the decisive role of deep cognitive capabilities in learning outcomes during practice interactions. Furthermore, they struggle to characterize the dynamic fluidity of knowledge internalization, transfer, and cognitive state transitions. To overcome this bottleneck, this paper proposes a human-like educational agent capable of simulating student cognitive evolution: CogEvolution. Specifically, we first construct a cognitive depth perceptron based on the Interactive, Constructive, Active, Passive (ICAP) taxonomy from cognitive psychology, achieving precise quantification of learner cognitive engagement. Subsequently, we propose a memory retrieval method based on Item Response Theory (IRT) to simulate the connection and assimilation of new and prior knowledge. Finally, we design a dynamic cognitive update mechanism based on evolutionary algorithms to simulate the real-time integration of student learning behaviors and cognitive evolution processes. Comprehensive evaluations demonstrate that CogEvolution not only significantly outperforms baseline models in behavioral fidelity and learning curve fitting but also uniquely reproduces plausible and robust cognitive evolutionary paths consistent with educational psychology expectations, providing a novel paradigm for constructing highly interpretable educational agents.

Humans and artificial agents must often learn and switch between multiple tasks in dynamic environments. Success in such settings requires cognitive flexibility: the ability to retain prior knowledge (cognitive stability) while also transferring it to novel tasks (cognitive generalization). Cognitive flexibility research has largely focused on the role of model architecture to achieve these complementary goals. However, it is less well understood how the structure of the environment itself influences cognitive flexibility, and how it interacts with model architecture. To address this gap, we design a multi-task learning environment in which tasks are defined by a combination of two cue dimensions, allowing us to characterize the environment with graph-theory methods. We also introduce gating-based (multiplicative) and concatenation-based attention models that can decompose tasks into components and can sequentially allocate attention to them. We compare the attention-based models' performance in the multi-task learning environment to multilayer perceptrons. Generalization and stability are systematically evaluated across environments that vary in richness and task connectivity. We observe that richer environments improve both generalization and stability. In addition, a critical novel observation is that (graph theory based) connectivity between the tasks in the environment strongly modulates both stability and generalization, with especially pronounced benefits for attention-based models. These findings underscore the importance of considering not only cognitive architectures but also environmental structure and their interaction in shaping multi-task learning, generalization, and stability.

Implicit biases in both humans and large language models (LLMs) pose significant societal risks. Dual process theories propose that biases arise primarily from associative System 1 thinking, while deliberative System 2 thinking mitigates bias, but the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to this phenomenon remain poorly understood. To better understand what underlies this duality in humans, and possibly in LLMs, we model System 1 and System 2 thinking as semantic memory networks with distinct structures, built from comparable datasets generated by both humans and LLMs. We then investigate how these distinct semantic memory structures relate to implicit gender bias using network-based evaluation metrics. We find that semantic memory structures are irreducible only in humans, suggesting that LLMs lack certain types of human-like conceptual knowledge. Moreover, semantic memory structure relates consistently to implicit bias only in humans, with lower levels of bias in System~2 structures. These findings suggest that certain types of conceptual knowledge contribute to bias regulation in humans, but not in LLMs, highlighting fundamental differences between human and machine cognition.

Predicting the difficulty of multiple-choice questions (MCQs) is important for effective assessment, yet current methods typically assume a unimodal student ability distribution, overlooking the heterogeneous nature of student misconceptions. We propose a persona-driven framework that replaces theoretical ability sampling with data-driven cognitive profiling. Using student interactions from the EEDI dataset, we identify behavioral personas via latent class analysis (LCA), then condition a large language model (LLM) to simulate response distributions for each persona. These signals are aggregated with topic context and fed into a Ridge Regression model to predict the item response theory (IRT) difficulty parameter. With five-fold cross-validation, our method improves over a recent baseline (MSE: 0.367 to 0.274; R2: 0.525 to 0.686). The discovered personas are interpretable and offer insights into why items are difficult, with potential applications to diagnostic assessment design.

Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) operate fundamentally as Bounded-Input Bounded-Output (BIBO) systems. They remain in a passive state until explicitly prompted, computing localized responses without intrinsic temporal continuity. While effective for isolated tasks, this reactive paradigm presents a critical bottleneck for engineering autonomous artificial intelligence. Current multi-agent frameworks attempt to distribute cognitive load but frequently rely on static memory pools and passive message passing, which inevitably leads to cognitive stagnation and homogeneous deadlocks during extended execution. To address this structural limitation, we propose Global Workspace Agents (GWA), a cognitive architecture inspired by Global Workspace Theory. GWA transitions multi-agent coordination from a passive data structure to an active, event-driven discrete dynamical system. By coupling a central broadcast hub with a heterogeneous swarm of functionally constrained agents, the system maintains a continuous cognitive cycle. Furthermore, we introduce an entropy-based intrinsic drive mechanism that mathematically quantifies semantic diversity, dynamically regulating generation temperature to autonomously break reasoning deadlocks. Coupled with a dual-layer memory bifurcation strategy to ensure long-term cognitive continuity, GWA provides a robust, reproducible engineering framework for sustained, self-directed LLM agency.

Large language models show potential for scalable mental-health support by simulating Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) counselors. However, existing methods often rely on static cognitive profiles and omniscient single-agent simulation, failing to capture the dynamic, information-asymmetric nature of real therapy. We introduce CCD-CBT, a multi-agent framework that shifts CBT simulation along two axes: 1) from a static to a dynamically reconstructed Cognitive Conceptualization Diagram (CCD), updated by a dedicated Control Agent, and 2) from omniscient to information-asymmetric interaction, where the Therapist Agent must reason from inferred client states. We release CCDCHAT, a synthetic multi-turn CBT dataset generated under this framework. Evaluations with clinical scales and expert therapists show that models fine-tuned on CCDCHAT outperform strong baselines in both counseling fidelity and positive-affect enhancement, with ablations confirming the necessity of dynamic CCD guidance and asymmetric agent design. Our work offers a new paradigm for building theory-grounded, clinically-plausible conversational agents.

How do people acquire rich, flexible knowledge about their environment from others despite limited cognitive capacity? Humans are often thought to rely on computationally costly mentalizing, such as inferring others' beliefs. In contrast, cultural evolution emphasizes that behavioral transmission can be supported by simple social cues. Using reinforcement learning simulations, we show how minimal social learning can indirectly transmit higher-level representations. We simulate a naïve agent searching for rewards in a reconfigurable environment, learning either alone or by observing an expert - crucially, without inferring mental states. Instead, the learner heuristically selects actions or boosts value representations based on observed actions. Our results demonstrate that these cues bias the learner's experience, causing its representation to converge toward the expert's. Model-based learners benefit most from social exposure, showing faster learning and more expert-like representations. These findings show how cultural transmission can arise from simple, non-mentalizing processes exploiting asocial learning mechanisms.

What kind of internal organization would allow an artificial agent not only to adapt its behavior, but to sustain a history-sensitive perspective on its world? I present a minimal architecture in which a slow perspective latent $g$ feeds back into perception and is itself updated through perceptual processing. This allows identical observations to be encoded differently depending on the agent's accumulated stance. The model is evaluated in a minimal gridworld with a fixed spatial scaffold and sensory perturbations. Across analyses, three results emerge. First, the perspective latent reorganizes perceptual encoding: identical observations are represented differently depending on prior experience, and this reorganization of salience gating replicates across runs, with five of 16 gating dimensions changing direction consistently across 30 independent runs after correction for multiple comparisons. Second, only adaptive self-modulation yields the characteristic growth-then-stabilization dynamic of the perspective latent, unlike rigid or always-open update regimes. Third, perturbation history is followed by reduced adaptive plasticity after nominal conditions are restored, showing a directionally consistent trend across seeds. Gross behavior remains stable throughout the analysis, suggesting that the dominant reorganization is perceptual rather than behavioral. Together, these findings identify a minimal mechanism for history-dependent perspectival organization in artificial agents.

Learner-item cognitive modeling plays a central role in the web-based online intelligent education system by enabling cognitive diagnosis (CD) across diverse online educational scenarios. Although ID embedding remains the mainstream approach in cognitive modeling due to its effectiveness and flexibility, recent advances in language models (LMs) have introduced new possibilities for incorporating rich semantic representations to enhance CD performance. This highlights the need for a comprehensive analysis of how LMs enhance embeddings through semantic integration across mainstream CD tasks. This paper identifies two key challenges in fully leveraging LMs in existing work: Misalignment between the training objectives of LMs and CD models creates a distribution gap in feature spaces; A unified framework is essential for integrating textual embeddings across varied CD tasks while preserving the strengths of existing cognitive modeling paradigms to ensure the robustness of embedding enhancement. To address these challenges, this paper introduces EduEmbed, a unified embedding enhancement framework that leverages fine-tuned LMs to enrich learner-item cognitive modeling across diverse CD tasks. EduEmbed operates in two stages. In the first stage, we fine-tune LMs based on role-specific representations and an interaction diagnoser to bridge the semantic gap of CD models. In the second stage, we employ a textual adapter to extract task-relevant semantics and integrate them with existing modeling paradigms to improve generalization. We evaluate the proposed framework on four CD tasks and computerized adaptive testing (CAT) task, achieving robust performance. Further analysis reveals the impact of semantic information across diverse tasks, offering key insights for future research on the application of LMs in CD for online intelligent education systems.

Electroencephalography (EEG) provides a non-invasive insight into the brain's cognitive and emotional dynamics. However, modeling how these states evolve in real time and quantifying the energy required for such transitions remains a major challenge. The Schrödinger Bridge Problem (SBP) offers a principled probabilistic framework to model the most efficient evolution between the brain states, interpreted as a measure of cognitive energy cost. While generative models such as GANs have been widely used to augment EEG data, it remains unclear whether synthetic EEG preserves the underlying dynamical structure required for transition-based analysis. In this work, we address this gap by using SBP-derived transport cost as a metric to evaluate whether GAN-generated EEG retains the distributional geometry necessary for energy-based modeling of cognitive state transitions. We compare transition energies derived from real and synthetic EEG collected during Stroop tasks and demonstrate strong agreement across group and participant-level analyses. These results indicate that synthetic EEG preserves the transition structure required for SBP-based modeling, enabling its use in data-efficient neuroadaptive systems. We further present a framework in which SBP-derived cognitive energy serves as a control signal for adaptive human-machine systems, supporting real-time adjustment of system behavior in response to user cognitive and affective state.

People infer rich social information from others' actions. These inferences are often constrained by the physical world: what agents can do, what obstacles permit, and how the physical actions of agents causally change an environment and other agents' mental states and behavior. We propose that such rich social perception is more than visual pattern matching, but rather a reasoning process grounded in an integration of intuitive psychology with intuitive physics. To test this hypothesis, we introduced PHASE (PHysically grounded Abstract Social Events), a large dataset of procedurally generated animations, depicting physically simulated two-agent interactions on a 2D surface. Each animation follows the style of the Heider and Simmel movie, with systematic variation in environment geometry, object dynamics, agent capacities, goals, and relationships (friendly/adversarial/neutral). We then present a computational model, SIMPLE, a physics-grounded Bayesian inverse planning model that integrates planning, probabilistic planning, and physics simulation to infer agents' goals and relations from their trajectories. Our experimental results showed that SIMPLE achieved high accuracy and agreement with human judgments across diverse scenarios, while feedforward baseline models -- including strong vision-language models -- and physics-agnostic inverse planning failed to achieve human-level performance and did not align with human judgments. These results suggest that our model provides a computational account for how people understand physically grounded social scenes by inverting a generative model of physics and agents.

Why do we forget? Why do we remember things that never happened? The conventional answer points to biological hardware. We propose a different one: geometry. Here we show that high-dimensional embedding spaces, subjected to noise, interference, and temporal degradation, reproduce quantitative signatures of human memory with no phenomenon-specific engineering. Power-law forgetting ($b = 0.460 \pm 0.183$, human $b \approx 0.5$) arises from interference among competing memories, not from decay. The identical decay function without competitors yields $b \approx 0.009$, fifty times smaller. Time alone does not produce forgetting in this system. Competition does. Production embedding models (nominally 384--1{,}024 dimensions) concentrate their variance in only ${\sim}16$ effective dimensions, placing them deep in the interference-vulnerable regime. False memories require no engineering at all: cosine similarity on unmodified pre-trained embeddings reproduces the Deese--Roediger--McDermott false alarm rate ($0.583$ versus human ${\sim}0.55$) with zero parameter tuning and no boundary conditions. We did not build a false memory system. We found one already present in the raw geometry of semantic space. These results suggest that core memory phenomena are not bugs of biological implementation but features of any system that organizes information by meaning and retrieves it by proximity.

When learning a novel complex task, people often form efficient reusable abstractions that simplify future work, despite uncertainty about the future. We study this process in a visual puzzle task where participants define and reuse helpers -- intermediate constructions that capture repeating structure. In an online experiment, participants solved puzzles of increasing difficulty. Early on, they created many helpers, favouring completeness over efficiency. With experience, helper use became more selective and efficient, reflecting sensitivity to reuse and cost. Access to helpers enabled participants to solve puzzles that were otherwise difficult or impossible. Computational modelling shows that human decision times and number of operations used to complete a puzzle increase with search space estimated by a program induction model with library learning. In contrast, raw program length predicts failure but not effort. Together, these results point to online library learning as a core mechanism in human problem solving, allowing people to flexibly build, refine, and reuse abstractions as task demands grow.

Different types of reasoning impose different structural demands on representational systems, yet no systematic account of these demands exists across psychology, AI, and philosophy of mind. I propose a framework identifying four structural properties of representational systems: operability, consistency, structural preservation, and compositionality. These properties are demanded to different degrees by different forms of reasoning, from induction through analogy and causal inference to deduction and formal logic. Each property excludes a distinct class of reasoning failure. The analysis reveals a principal structural boundary: reasoning types below it can operate on associative, probabilistic representations, while those above it require all four properties to be fully satisfied. Scaling statistical learning without structural reorganization is insufficient to cross this boundary, because the structural guarantees required by deductive reasoning cannot be approximated through probabilistic means. Converging evidence from AI evaluation, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience supports the framework at different levels of directness. Three testable predictions are derived, including compounding degradation, selective vulnerability to targeted structural disruption, and irreducibility under scaling. The framework is a necessary-condition account, agnostic about representational format, that aims to reorganize existing debates rather than close them.

Simulation-based inference (SBI) with neural networks has accelerated and transformed cognitive modeling workflows. SBI enables modelers to fit complex models that were previously difficult or impossible to estimate, while also allowing rapid estimation across large numbers of datasets. However, the utility of SBI for iterating over varying modeling assumptions remains limited: changes to parameterizations, generative functions, priors, and design variables all necessitate model retraining, thereby diminishing the benefits of amortization. To address these issues, we pilot the CogFormer, a meta-amortized framework for cognitive modeling. Our framework trains a transformer-based architecture that remains valid across a combinatorial number of structurally similar models, allowing for changing data types, parameters, design matrices, and sample sizes. We present promising quantitative results across families of decision-making models for binary, multi-alternative, and continuous responses. Our evaluation suggests that CogFormer can accurately estimate parameters across model families with minimal amortization offset, making it a potentially powerful engine that catalyzes cognitive modeling workflows.

Transformers underlie almost all state-of-the-art language models in computational linguistics, yet their cognitive adequacy as models of human sentence processing remains disputed. In this work, we use a surprisal-based linking mechanism to systematically evaluate eleven autoregressive transformers of varying sizes and architectures on a more comprehensive set of English agreement attraction configurations than prior work. Our experiments yield mixed results: While transformer predictions generally align with human reading time data for prepositional phrase configurations, performance degrades significantly on object-extracted relative clause configurations. In the latter case, predictions also diverge markedly across models, and no model successfully replicates the asymmetric interference patterns observed in humans. We conclude that current transformer models do not explain human morphosyntactic processing, and that evaluations of transformers as cognitive models must adopt rigorous, comprehensive experimental designs to avoid spurious generalizations from isolated syntactic configurations or individual models.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

Users often struggle to locate an item within an information architecture, particularly when links are ambiguous or deeply nested in hierarchies. Information scent has been used to explain why users select incorrect links, but this concept assumes that users see all available links before deciding. In practice, users frequently select a link too quickly, overlook relevant cues, and then rely on backtracking when errors occur. We extend the concept of information scent by framing navigation as a sequential decision-making problem under memory constraints. Specifically, we assume that users do not scan entire pages but instead inspect strategically, looking "just enough" to find the target given their time budget. To choose which item to inspect next, they consider both local (this page) and global (site) scent; however, both are constrained by memory. Trying to avoid wasting time, they occasionally choose the wrong links without inspecting everything on a page. Comparisons with empirical data show that our model replicates key navigation behaviors: premature selections, wrong turns, and recovery from backtracking. We conclude that trial-and-error behavior is well explained by information scent when accounting for the sequential and bounded characteristics of the navigation problem.

Operator situation awareness is a pivotal yet elusive determinant of human reliability in complex nuclear control environments. Existing assessment methods, such as SAGAT and SART, remain static, retrospective, and detached from the evolving cognitive dynamics that drive operational risk. To overcome these limitations, this study introduces the dynamic Bayesian machine learning framework for situation awareness (DBML SA), a unified approach that fuses probabilistic reasoning and data driven intelligence to achieve quantitative, interpretable, and predictive situation awareness modeling. Leveraging 212 operational event reports (2007 to 2021), the framework reconstructs the causal temporal structure of 11 performance shaping factors across multiple cognitive layers. The Bayesian component enables time evolving inference of situation awareness reliability under uncertainty, while the neural component establishes a nonlinear predictive mapping from PSFs to SART scores, achieving a mean absolute percentage error of 13.8 % with statistical consistency to subjective evaluations (p > 0.05). Results highlight training quality and stress dynamics as primary drivers of situation awareness degradation. Overall, DBML SA transcends traditional questionnaire-based assessments by enabling real-time cognitive monitoring, sensitivity analysis, and early-warning prediction, paving the way toward intelligent human machine reliability management in next-generation digital main control rooms.

We present a miniature brain transformer architecture that extends the attention-coupled latent memory framework with four additional brain-region analogues: a thalamic relay, an amygdaloid salience module, a prefrontal working-memory (PFC) buffer, and a cerebellar fast-path, all coupled by inhibitory callosal cross-talk between lateralized hippocampal banks. We evaluate on a two-domain benchmark -- MQAR (Multi-Query Associative Recall; episodic domain) and modular arithmetic (+1 mod 10; rule-based domain) -- using a seven-variant additive ablation. The central empirical finding is a surprise: inhibitory callosal coupling alone never lateralizes the banks (variants 1-5 maintain D_sep ~ 0.25 and P_ct ~ 0.25 for all 30 epochs). Functional lateralization requires the synergy of PFC and inhibition: only when the PFC buffer is added (variant 6) does a sharp, discontinuous phase transition fire -- at epoch 11 for the PFC-only variant and epoch 10 for the full model -- collapsing P_ct from 0.25 to ~0.002 and more than doubling D_sep from 0.251 to 0.501 in a single gradient step. The PFC buffer acts as a symmetry-breaker: its slowly drifting domain context creates the initial asymmetry that the inhibitory feedback loop then amplifies irreversibly. The cerebellar fast-path accelerates the transition by one epoch (epoch 10 vs. epoch 11) with no asymptotic change, confirming its convergence-acceleration role. The result constitutes a novel, falsifiable prediction -- no lateralization without working memory context -- and a principled, neurobiologically motivated blueprint for hierarchical persistent memory in sequence models.

Cognitive impairment is becoming a major public health challenge. Cognitive Stimulation Therapy (CST) is an effective intervention for cognitive impairment, but traditional methods are difficult to scale, and existing digital systems struggle with group dialogues and cognitive stimulation principles. While Large Language Models (LLMs) are powerful, their application in this context faces key challenges: cognitive stimulation dialogue paradigms, a lack of therapeutic reasoning, and static-only user modeling. To address these issues, we propose a principle-driven adaptive policy actualized through a Group Cognitive Stimulation Dialogue (GCSD) system. We first construct a dataset with over 500 hours of real-world CST conversations and 10,000+ simulated dialogues generated via our Principle-Guided Scenario Simulation strategy. Our GCSD system then integrates four core modules to overcome LLM limitations: (i) a multi-speaker context controller to resolve role confusion; (ii) dynamic participant cognitive state modeling for personalized interaction; (iii) a cognitive stimulation-focused attention loss to instill cognitive stimulation reasoning; and (iv) a multi-dimensional reward strategy to enhance response value. Experimental results demonstrate that GCSD significantly outperforms baseline models across various evaluation metrics. Future work will focus on long-term clinical validation to bridge the gap between computational performance and clinical efficacy.

Humans exhibit remarkable flexibility in abstract reasoning, and can rapidly learn and apply rules from sparse examples. To investigate the cognitive strategies underlying this ability, we introduce the Cognitive Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (CogARC), a diverse human-adapted subset of the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC) which was originally developed to benchmark abstract reasoning in artificial intelligence. Across two experiments, CogARC was administered to a total of 260 human participants who freely generated solutions to 75 abstract visual reasoning problems. Success required inferring input-output rules from a small number of examples to transform the test input into one correct test output. Participants' behavior was recorded at high temporal resolution, including example viewing, edit sequences, and multi-attempt submissions. Participants were generally successful (mean accuracy ~90% for experiment 1 (n=40), ~80% for experiment 2 (n=220) across problems), but performance varied widely across problems and participants. Harder problems elicited longer deliberation times and greater divergence in solution strategies. Over the course of the task, participants initiated responses more quickly but showed a slight decline in accuracy, suggesting increased familiarity with the task structure rather than improved rule-learning ability. Importantly, even incorrect solutions were often highly convergent, even when the problem-solving trajectories differed in length and smoothness. Some trajectories progressed directly and efficiently toward a stable outcome, whereas others involved extended exploration or partial restarts before converging. Together, these findings highlight CogARC as a rich behavioral environment for studying human abstract reasoning, providing insight into how people generalize, misgeneralize, and adapt their strategies under uncertainty.

Attitudes toward STEM develop from the interaction of conceptual knowledge, educational experiences, and affect. Here we use cognitive network science to reconstruct group mindsets as behavioural forma mentis networks (BFMNs). In this case, nodes are cue words and free associations, edges are empirical associative links, and each concept is annotated with perceived valence. We analyse BFMNs from N = 994 observations spanning high school students, university students, and early-career STEM experts, alongside LLM (GPT-oss) "digital twins" prompted to emulate comparable profiles. Focusing also on semantic neighbourhoods ("frames") around key target concepts (e.g., STEM subjects or educational actors/places), we quantify frames in terms of valence auras, emotional profiles, network overlap (Jaccard similarity), and concreteness relative to null baselines. Across student groups, science and research are consistently framed positively, while their core quantitative subjects (mathematics and statistics) exhibit more negative and anxiety related auras, amplified in higher math-anxiety subgroups, evidencing a STEM-science cognitive and emotional dissonance. High-anxiety frames are also less concrete than chance, suggesting more abstract and decontextualised representations of threatening quantitative domains. Human networks show greater overlapping between mathematics and anxiety than GPT-oss. The results highlight how BFMNs capture cognitive-affective signatures of mindsets towards the target domains and indicate that LLM-based digital twins approximate cultural attitudes but miss key context-sensitive, experience-based components relevant to replicate human educational anxiety.

Temporarily ambiguous garden-path sentences ("While the team trained the striker wondered... ") are known to cause processing difficulty, which can manifest itself in a variety of reading behaviors (in-situ slowdowns, rereading), as well as in miscomprehension or outright rejection of the sentence as ungrammatical. Which types of reading behavior are observed critically depends on the experimental method used to collect the data, which makes comparing results between reading paradigms difficult. To address this problem, we present a latent-process multinomial processing tree (MPT) model of human reading and comprehension/judgment behavior in garden-path sentences that we fit to combined data from four different reading paradigms (eye tracking, uni- and bidirectional self-paced reading, Maze). The model distinguishes between the probability of adopting an incorrect initial analysis, the cost of encountering an incompatible continuation, and the cost of syntactic reanalysis. By taking into account trials with inattentive reading, more realistic estimates of the cost parameters are obtained. Cross-validation reveals that the MPT model has a better predictive fit to human reading patterns and end-of-trial task data than a model based solely on LLM-derived surprisal values. We also test several models that assume an influence of surprisal within the MPT architecture, and find that adding surprisal as an additional predictor or reading time and/or garden-path cost further improves predictive fit.

Motivated by the observed human-like behaviours in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), this paper introduces a comprehensive taxonomy to characterise atomic reasoning steps and analyse the reasoning behaviours of LRMs. Grounded in human cognitive processes, we propose a taxonomy comprising five groups and seventeen categories. Through this taxonomy, we conduct an in-depth analysis of contemporary LRMs and distil four actionable takeaways for model optimisation. Most notably, we reveal that prevailing post-answer ``doublechecks'' are largely superficial and rarely yield substantive revisions. A targeted intervention further shows that explicitly eliciting richer reflection processes can substantially improve failed self-correction. To support this largescale study, we propose CAPO, an automated annotation method used to construct a dataset of 277,534 reasoning steps with strong agreement with human expert annotations. We further validate the main behavioural patterns on a newer reasoning model and a coding domain, demonstrating the broader applicability of the proposed taxonomy. All source code and data are available at https://github.com/hehepig4/psyche.

Simulating human reasoning in open-ended tasks has long been a central aspiration in AI and cognitive science. While large language models now approximate human responses at scale, they remain tuned to population-level consensus, often erasing the individuality of reasoning styles and belief trajectories. To advance the vision of more human-like reasoning in machines, we introduce HugAgent (HUman-Grounded AGENT Benchmark), which rethinks human reasoning simulation along three dimensions: (i) from averaged to individualized reasoning, (ii) from behavioral mimicry to cognitive alignment, and (iii) from vignette-based to open-ended data. The benchmark evaluates whether a model can predict a specific person's behavioral responses and the underlying reasoning dynamics in out-of-distribution scenarios, given partial evidence of their prior views. HugAgent combines structured questionnaires with semi-structured think-aloud interviews to collect ecologically valid belief states, belief updates, and reasoning traces from human participants. Our experiments reveal a clear asymmetry: models recover a person's belief state from their own context reasonably well, but struggle to predict belief updates under intervention. Cross-person and cross-domain controls trace this gap to associative matching within a topic rather than identity-consistent reasoning, suggesting that progress requires better-calibrated change detection, not simply more context. We scope the benchmark to self-reported belief reasoning in three policy domains: healthcare, surveillance, and zoning. The benchmark, along with its complete data collection pipeline and companion chatbot, is open-sourced as HugAgent (https://github.com/jajamoa/HugAgent) and TraceYourThinking (https://github.com/jajamoa/trace-your-thinking).

Multimodal large-scale models have significantly advanced the development of web agents, enabling perception and interaction with digital environments akin to human cognition. In this paper, we argue that web agents must first acquire sufficient knowledge to effectively engage in cognitive reasoning. Therefore, we decompose a web agent's capabilities into two essential stages: knowledge content learning and cognitive processes. To formalize this, we propose Web-CogKnowledge Framework, categorizing knowledge as Factual, Conceptual, and Procedural. In this framework, knowledge content learning corresponds to the agent's processes of Memorizing and Understanding, which rely on the first two knowledge types, representing the "what" of learning. Conversely, cognitive processes correspond to Exploring, grounded in Procedural knowledge, defining the "how" of reasoning and action. To facilitate knowledge acquisition, we construct the Web-CogDataset, a structured resource curated from 14 real-world websites, designed to systematically instill core knowledge necessary for web agent. This dataset serves as the agent's conceptual grounding-the "nouns" upon which comprehension is built-as well as the basis for learning how to reason and act. Building on this foundation, we operationalize these processes through a novel knowledge-driven Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning framework, developing and training our proposed agent, the Web-CogReasoner. Extensive experimentation reveals its significant superiority over existing models, especially in generalizing to unseen tasks where structured knowledge is decisive. To enable rigorous evaluation, we introduce the Web-CogBench, a comprehensive evaluation suite designed to assess and compare agent performance across the delineated knowledge domains and cognitive capabilities. Our code and data is open sourced at https://github.com/Gnonymous/Web-CogReasoner

Complexity and limited ability affect how we learn and make decisions under uncertainty. Using finite automata to model belief formation, this paper studies the characteristics of optimal learning behavior in small and big worlds, where the complexity of the environment is low and high, respectively, relative to the cognitive ability of the decision maker. The optimal long-run average payoff and distribution of actions are well approximated by the Bayesian benchmark in very small worlds, but the gap widens as the worlds get bigger. In big worlds, it can be optimal for the decision maker to ignore some states entirely, concentrating limited cognitive resources on a subset of states. This ``optimal ignorance'' is reminiscent of well-documented non-Bayesian learning patterns such as the use of heuristics, correlation neglect, and inattentive learning. The results establish a relationship between complexity, cognitive ability, and the scope for non-Bayesian learning behavior.