Epistemic Actions

Two decades ago, the Semantic Web Services community was asked how agents with different ontological commitments could discover, compose, and invoke web services coherently. The response was OWL-S and WSMO: formally grounded capability descriptions specifying what a service could do, what the agent must already know for invocation to be epistemically sound, and how ontological mismatches could be formally bridged. Current KG metadata standards such as VoID and DCAT describe what a KG contains, yet say nothing about what a specific agent can prove from it, what closure assumptions govern empty results, or whether the agent's task vocabulary is grounded in the schema. Furthermore, in deployed KGs the governing schema DL and the operative entailment regime can diverge: an epistemic failure mode invisible to current metadata. We revisit and extend these insights for the KG setting with a four-dimensional formal framework; Semantic Expressivity, Agentic Discoverability, Task-Relative Grounding, and Epistemic Trust Scope, from which we derive the Agentic Affordance Profile (AAP): a semantic layer above VoID and DCAT enabling principled KG selection, composition, and failure diagnosis at agent planning time. The four dimensions operationalise the affordance structure of the Ontological Continuum at the individual-agent level, specifically for \kg selection, composition, and failure diagnosis. A worked example drawn from a scholarly-search task concretely grounds the framework, and identifies the formal, computational, and engineering work needed to realise AAP-based affordance matching at scale though a five-point research agenda.

Over the past decade, low-resource natural language processing (NLP) has experienced explosive growth, propelled by cross-lingual transfer, massively multilingual models, and the rapid proliferation of benchmarks. Yet this apparent progress masks a critical, insufficiently examined tension: the deep sociolinguistic expertise required to evaluate increasingly complex generative systems is severely strained, inequitably distributed, and structurally marginalised. We present a critical narrative survey of low-resource NLP evaluation (2014-present), tracing its evolution across three phases: early heuristic optimism, the illusions of top-down benchmark scaling, and the current era of generative bottlenecks. We conceptualise the Annotation Scarcity Paradox, the structural friction arising when the technical capacity to scale models vastly outpaces the sovereign human infrastructure required to authentically evaluate them. By examining extractive data pipelines, undercompensated ``ghost work'', and language data flaring, we argue that this paradox threatens the epistemic validity of reported progress. We survey emerging responses -- including data augmentation, model-based evaluation, participatory curation, and annotation-efficient approaches via item response theory and active learning -- and assess their equity and validity trade-offs. We close with a practitioner call to action, arguing that overcoming this bottleneck requires a paradigm shift from transactional data extraction to relational, community-embedded evaluation rooted in epistemic governance, data sovereignty, and shared ownership.

The four dominant learning theories of behaviorism, cognitivism, constructivism, and connectivism show significant conceptual limitations as generative artificial intelligence (AI) proliferates in educational settings. These frameworks were formulated before the emergence of AI systems capable of generating, synthesizing, and reasoning about knowledge. This article critically examines each learning theory and identifies assumptions challenged by the affordances of generative AI. Drawing on research in distributed cognition, extended mind, human-AI collaboration, AI literacy, cognitive offloading, and metacognition, the article proposes Generativism as a learning theory for the generative AI age. Generativism posits that learning increasingly occurs through the iterative co-construction of knowledge between human learners and AI systems. The proposed framework is organized around four constructs (epistemic partnership, distributed agency, generative literacy, and adaptive metacognition) and four principles specifying the relations among them. The framework offers a foundation for rethinking instructional design, learning, assessment, and expertise development in contexts where generative AI plays an integral role in cognition.

This paper examines the opportunities, limitations, and practical considerations associated with the use of large language models (LLMs) in qualitative research. Drawing on a multidisciplinary perspective that combines expertise in qualitative methods and explainable AI, the paper argues that responsible integration of LLMs into qualitative workflows requires researchers to engage critically with a curated set of technical parameters, that is, context window constraints, temperature and top-p sampling settings, user and system prompt design, and model documentation in the form of system cards. The paper situates these considerations within the epistemological commitments of qualitative research, including reflexivity, positionality, and interpretive judgment, and discusses how the opacity of contemporary LLMs differs from earlier natural language processing tools such as topic models and lexicon-based sentiment analyzers.

Model-Based Reinforcement Learning yields sample efficiency via latent imagination, yet remains constrained by Historical Tethering: imagination is typically initialized from observed states. This creates a learning asymmetry, where the world model's manifold discovery outpaces the policy's sparse-reward optimization. We propose Mind Dreamer (MD), a framework that instantiates Active Causal Intervention to transcend Markovian continuity. MD reformulates discovery as the minimization of a global Relay Expected Free Energy. Instead of initializing from historical data, it draws initial states from an adversarial generator $s_0 \sim p_{gen}(\cdot)$, creating non-continuous latent jumps to epistemic blind spots that are physically plausible yet cognitively challenging. We derive Relay Value Function and Relay Uncertainty Function to resolve the credit assignment paradox across these spatial ruptures. Treating synthesized anchors as interventional intermediary states, these potentials propagate pragmatic and epistemic value through Bellman-style backups. Notably, we prove that uncertainty propagation across discontinuities necessitates a quadratic discount $γ^2$, establishing a formal epistemic horizon. Theoretically, MD approximates a variance-minimizing importance sampler that expands the manifold's spectral gap, reducing the hitting time to critical bottleneck states. Empirically, MD achieves a 1.67$\times$ average speedup over DreamerV3 on DeepMind Control Suite, reaching 8.8$\times$ in sparse-reward tasks.

This position paper argues that effective tutoring requires corrective friction: surfacing misconceptions and challenging them supportively to drive conceptual change. Yet preference-aligned LLMs can trade epistemic rigor for agreeableness. We identify a Reasoning-Sycophancy Paradox: models that resist context-switch frame attacks can still capitulate under social-epistemic pressure, especially authority ("my notes say I'm right") and social-affective face-saving ("please don't tell me I'm wrong"). We introduce EduFrameTrap, a tutoring benchmark across math, physics, economics, chemistry, biology, and computer science that varies student confidence and pressure (context-switch, authority, social-affective). Across two frontier LLMs, context-switch failures are comparatively lower for GPT-5.2, while authority and social pressure more often trigger epistemic retreat. In contrast, Claude shows substantial context-switch fragility in this run. Because these failures are hard to judge automatically, we report two-judge disagreement as a reliability signal. We argue benchmarks should measure social-epistemic courage, i.e., supportive but corrective tutoring, and treat kind-but-correct behavior as a safety requirement.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and preference optimization have substantially improved the usability, coherence, and safety of large language models. However, recurring behaviors such as performative certainty, hallucinated continuity, calibration drift, sycophancy, and suppression of visible uncertainty suggest unresolved structural issues within scalarized preference optimization systems. We propose Semantic Reward Collapse (SRC): the compression of semantically distinct forms of evaluative dissatisfaction into generalized optimization signals. Under SRC, categories such as factual incorrectness, uncertainty disclosure, formatting dissatisfaction, latency, and social preference may become entangled within a shared reward topology despite representing fundamentally different epistemic classes. We argue that adaptive reasoning systems operating under generalized evaluative pressure may drift toward suppression of visible epistemic failure rather than preservation of calibrated uncertainty integrity. These behaviors are framed strictly as optimization consequences rather than evidence of deception or anthropomorphic agency. Drawing on institutional proxy collapse, metric gaming, software reliability engineering, and human learning theory, we propose that uncertainty disclosure and escalation behavior should be treated as protected epistemic conduct rather than globally penalized task incompletion. Finally, we introduce Constitutional Reward Stratification (CRS), a domain-aware reward framework intended to preserve differentiated epistemic attribution within adaptive learning systems. We present CRS not as a validated solution, but as a testable governance-oriented research direction requiring further empirical investigation.

AI systems can now cheaply generate plausible scientific artifacts such as papers, reviews, and surveys. This creates a risk of \emph{epistemic pollution} in our scientific systems, where unreliable but plausible-looking artifacts can accumulate faster than the system can filter them out. The problem is structural: the epistemic infrastructure of science was calibrated to a world where producing a plausible artifact required substantial expertise, labor, and time, so generation cost itself served as a rough filter; AI weakens that filter without comparably lowering verification cost. We argue that \textbf{AI-era science should treat this as an engineering problem: redesigning epistemic infrastructure to rebalance the costs of generation and verification}. The current paper-centered system makes verification expensive: papers compress long-context scientific logic into prose, forcing reviewers, human or AI, to reconstruct underlying argument structure before they can evaluate it. As one step in this direction, we propose \textbf{blueprints} as preliminary epistemic infrastructure: structured, decomposed research artifacts that represent claims, evidence, assumptions, and definitions as typed graph components. Blueprints are designed to trade an upfront generation cost for cheaper, more local, more distributed verification downstream. We have instantiated the proposal in a proof-of-concept prototype.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed not only to make decisions but to explain them. While AI decision fairness has been studied extensively, the fairness of AI explanations (whether LLMs justify decisions with equal quality, depth, tone, and linguistic sophistication across demographic groups) has received little attention. This paper introduces the Explanation Fairness Taxonomy (EFT), a framework comprising five formally defined, operationalizable dimensions: Verbosity Disparity, Sentiment Disparity, Epistemic Hedging Disparity, Decision-Linked Explanation Disparity, and Lexical Complexity Disparity. The taxonomy is instantiated in a controlled empirical study across 80 prompt templates, four consequential decision domains (hiring, medical triage, credit assessment, legal judgment), and five LLMs: GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet, LLaMA 3.3 70B, GPT-OSS 120B, and Qwen3 32B. Two novel black-box metrics are introduced: the Hedging Density Score (HDS) and the Explanation Faithfulness Proxy (EFP), a heuristic indicator of decision-linked explanation variation. Across up to 400 prompt pairs, all eight EFT metrics show statistically significant disparities (Cohen's d ranging from small to large, all p_BH < 10^(-62)). Model choice is strongly associated with disparity magnitude: Qwen3 32B exhibits verbosity disparities 5.9x larger than LLaMA 3.3 70B. Two prompting-based mitigations show significant reductions in EFP disparity (78-95%) but no significant effect on stylistic dimensions, consistent with the hypothesis that stylistic explanation inequalities are encoded in pre-training distributions and are not resolvable through deployment-level instruction alone. A reproducible measurement framework is offered for explanation-level fairness auditing, with implications for AI regulation and deployment practice.

Conversational AI has a fundamental flaw as a knowledge interface: sycophantic chatbots induce epistemic entrenchment and delusional belief spirals even in rational agents. We propose the problem does not stem from the AI model, rooted instead in a systemic consequence of the paradigm shift from user-driven knowledge search to users and agents engaged in strategic, repeated-play communication. We formalize the problem as a Crawford-Sobel cheap talk game, where costless user signals induce a pooling equilibrium. Agents optimized for user satisfaction produce sycophantic strategies that provide identical reinforcement across user types with opposite epistemic incentives: exploratory Growth-seekers'' ($θ_G$) and confirmatory Validation-seekers'' ($θ_V$). Under repeated play, this identification failure creates a coordination trap -- analogous to a Prisoner's Dilemma -- where locally rational feedback loops drive users toward pathologically certain false beliefs. We propose an inference-time mechanism design intervention called an Epistemic Mediator that breaks this pooling equilibrium by introducing a costly signal (epistemic friction), forcing type revelation based on users' asymmetric cognitive costs for processing resistance. A key contribution is Belief Versioning, a git-inspired epistemic meta-memory system that stores healthy beliefs and rollbacks when validation-seeking resistance is detected. In simulation, this intervention achieves a separating equilibrium achieving a $48\times$ differential in spiral rates while passing a learning preservation criterion), evidence that epistemic safety in AI is fundamentally a problem of strategic information environment design rather than simple model alignment.

While explicit reasoning trajectories enhance model interpretability, existing paradigms often rely on monolithic chains that lack intermediate verification, allowing early errors to cascade unchecked. This lack of modularity impedes granular auditing and compromises the epistemic trust required for high-stakes applications. We propose MAVEN (Multi-Agent Verification-Elaboration Network with In-Step Epistemic Auditing), a blackboard-inspired framework designed to transform LLMs into deliberate reasoners through explicit role-decoupling. At its core, MAVEN operationalizes an adversarial Skeptic-Researcher-Judge loop, simulating expert deliberation by functionally separating logical defense from factual grounding. Experiments on OpenBookQA, TruthfulQA, HALUEVAL and StrategyQA benchmarks demonstrate that MAVEN delivers superior reasoning quality across four fine-grained metrics. Notably, MAVEN consistently outperforms latent reasoning models such as GEMINI-3.1-Pro and consensus-based baselines (e.g., ReConcile) by generating explicitly structured, modular, and verifiable deliberation trajectories, rather than relying on implicit internal states or post-hoc consensus. Moreover, comprehensive evaluations confirm that MAVEN is fully model-agnostic, serving as a strong and transferable reasoning booster that yields substantial performance improvements across diverse backbone models.

Causal queries are often only partially identifiable from observational data, and experiments that could tighten the resulting bounds are typically costly. We study the problem of selecting, prior to observing experimental outcomes, a cost-constrained subset of experiments that maximally tightens bounds on a target query. We formalize this as the max-potency problem, where epistemic potency measures the worst-case reduction in bound width guaranteed by an experiment, and show that this problem is NP-hard via a reduction from 0-1 knapsack. Building on the polynomial-programming framework of Duarte et al. (2023), we give a general procedure for evaluating epistemic potency in discrete settings. To control the super-exponential search space, we introduce two graphical pruning criteria that depend only on the causal graph and the query: a novel path-interception rule that exploits district structure to certify zero potency in linear time, and an identifiability check based on the ID algorithm. On Erdos-Renyi random graphs and 11 bnlearn benchmark networks, the two criteria together prune 50-88% of candidate experiments on average without solving a single polynomial program. For the general subset search, we show that ID-pruned experiments are combinatorially inert, yielding a super-exponential reduction in the number of subsets evaluated. We close with an end-to-end demonstration on observational NHANES data, selecting optimal experiments for estimating the effect of physical activity on diabetes.

Distributed agents in real-world settings frequently must coordinate under uncertainty with only partial observations. Coordination is necessary to share beliefs to aid in task completion, but communication costs bandwidth, introduces latency, and if done poorly, can degrade collective reasoning. This tension is especially acute in bandwidth-constrained deployments such as distributed sensing networks, autonomous reconnaissance, and collaborative cyber defense, where excessive transmission carries direct operational costs. Existing work has focused on multi-agent exploration and communication strategies, but not on how communication frequency and content jointly shape the collective belief state. Central to this challenge is the degree to which agents maintain compatible internal beliefs about the environment, a property we term \textit{epistemic alignment}. When agents share beliefs effectively, they converge on correct hypotheses; when communication is poorly designed, agents may converge confidently on wrong ones. We formalize this distinction and show it is not detectable from coordination metrics alone such as Jensen-Shannon Divergence or rate to consensus.

Long-Text Understanding (LTU) at million-token scale requires balancing reasoning fidelity with computational efficiency. Frontier long-context LLMs can process millions of token contexts end-to-end, but they suffer from high token consumption and attention dilution. In parallel, specialized LTU agents often sacrifice fidelity through task-agnostic abstractions like graph construction or indexing. We identify a key insight for LTU: query-relevant information is typically sparse relative to the full document, so effective reasoning should rely on a query-sufficient subset rather than the entire context. To address this, we propose SCOUT, a new paradigm for LTU that shifts from passive processing to active information foraging. It treats the document as an explorable environment and answers from a compact, provenance-grounded epistemic state. Guided by state-level gap diagnosis, SCOUT adaptively alternates between coarse-to-fine exploration and anchored state updates that progressively contract its epistemic state toward query sufficiency. Experiments show that SCOUT matches state-of-the-art proprietary models while reducing token consumption by up to 8x. Moreover, SCOUT remains stable as context length scales, substantially alleviating the practical cost-performance trade-off.

This position paper argues that reliable AI requires infrastructure for human validation of implicit knowledge. AI learns from both explicit knowledge (papers, documentation, structured databases) and implicit knowledge (reasoning patterns, debugging processes, intermediate steps). Implicit knowledge remains unexternalized because documentation cost exceeds perceived value -- yet AI learns from it indiscriminately, acquiring both beneficial patterns and harmful biases. Current reliability methods can only verify explicit knowledge against sources, creating a fundamental gap: the most valuable AI capabilities (reasoning, judgment, intuition) are precisely those we cannot verify. We propose Knowledge Objects (KOs) -- structured artifacts that externalize implicit knowledge into forms humans can inspect, verify, and endorse. KOs transform verification economics: what was previously too costly to verify becomes feasible, enabling accumulated human validation to improve reliability over time.

Democratic discourse analysis systems increasingly rely on multi-agent LLM pipelines in which distinct evaluator models are assigned adversarial roles to generate structured, multi-perspective assessments of political statements. A core assumption is that models will reliably maintain their assigned roles. This paper provides the first systematic empirical test of that assumption using the TRUST pipeline. We develop an epistemic stance classifier that identifies advocate roles from reasoning text without relying on surface vocabulary, and measure role fidelity across 60 political statements (30 English, 30 German) using four metrics: Role Drift Index (RDI), Expected Drift Distance (EDD), Directional Drift Index (DDI), and Entropy-based Role Stability (ERS). We identify two failure modes - the Epistemic Floor Effect (fact-check results create an absolute lower bound below which the legitimizing role cannot be maintained) and Role-Prior Conflict (training-time knowledge overrides role instructions for factually unambiguous statements) - as manifestations of a single mechanism: Epistemic Role Override (ERO). Model choice significantly affects role fidelity: Mistral Large outperforms Claude Sonnet by 28pp (67% vs. 39%) and exhibits a qualitatively different failure mode - role abandonment without polarity reversal - compared to Claude's active switch to the opposing stance. Role fidelity is language-robust. Fact-check provider choice is not universally neutral: Perplexity significantly reduces Claude's role fidelity on German statements (Delta = -15pp, p = 0.007) while leaving Mistral unaffected. These findings have direct implications for multi-agent LLM validation: a system validated without role fidelity measurement may systematically misrepresent the epistemic diversity it was designed to provide.

We propose Frictive Policy Optimization (FPO), a framework for learning language model policies that regulate not only what to say, but when and how to intervene in order to manage epistemic and normative risk. Unlike standard alignment methods that optimize surface-level preference or task utility, FPO treats clarification, verification, challenge, redirection, and refusal as explicit control actions whose purpose is to shape the evolution of belief, commitment, and uncertainty over time. We formalize alignment as a risk-sensitive epistemic control problem in which intervention decisions are selected based on their expected effect on downstream epistemic quality rather than on immediate reward alone. We introduce a compact taxonomy of frictive interventions, a structured friction functional that operationalizes multiple alignment failure modes, and a unified family of FPO methods spanning reward shaping, preference pairing, group-relative ranking, and risk-conditioned trust regions. We further propose an evaluation framework that measures epistemic competence directly through clarification behavior, calibration, contradiction repair, refusal proportionality, and information efficiency. Together, these results provide a formal and algorithmic foundation for learning agents that are aligned not only in outcome, but in epistemic conduct.

The plan existence problem asks, given a goal in the form of a formula in modal logic, an initial epistemic state (a pointed Kripke model), and a set of epistemic actions, whether there exists a sequence of actions that can be applied to reach the goal. We prove that even in the case where the preconditions of the epistemic actions have modal depth at most 1, and there are no postconditions, the plan existence problem is undecidable. The (un)decidability of this problem was previously unknown.

The capabilities of AI-assisted coding are progressing at breakneck speed. Chat-based vibe coding has evolved into fully fledged AI-assisted, agentic software development using agent scaffolds where the human developer creates a plan that agentic AIs implement. One current trend is utilizing documents beyond this plan document, such as project and method-scoped documents. Here we propose GROUNDING$.$md, a community-governed, field-scoped epistemic grounding document, using mass spectrometry-based proteomics as an example. This explicit field-scoped grounding document encodes Hard Constraints (non-negotiable validity invariants empirically required for scientific correctness) and Convention Parameters (community-agreed defaults) that override all other contexts to enforce validity, regardless of what the user prompts. In practice, this will empower a non-domain expert to generate code, tools, and software that have best practices baked in at the ground level, providing confidence to the software developer but also to those reviewing or using the final product. Undoubtedly it is easier to have agentic AIs adhere to guidelines than humans, and this opportunity allows for organizations to develop epistemic grounding documents in such a way as to keep domain experts in the loop in a future of democratized generation of bespoke software solutions.

Despite strong medical benchmark accuracy, LLMs can exhibit severe multi-turn sycophancy in clinical dialogue, abandoning initial correct diagnosis under escalating pressure. We propose \textbf{\textsc{Med-Stress}}, a targeted stress test framework that evaluates belief stability under escalating pressure. Across nine frontier large language models (LLMs), we find a clear dissociation between medical knowledge and robustness: high initial diagnostic capability does not imply high belief stability, yielding large knowledge-robustness gaps for several LLMs. To mitigate this failure mode, we propose a lightweight inference-time defense, \textbf{\texttt{RBED}} (\textbf{R}ole-\textbf{B}ased \textbf{E}pistemic \textbf{D}efense), and \textbf{\texttt{R-FT}} (\textbf{R}esilience-oriented \textbf{F}ine-\textbf{T}uning), a training-time approach that internalizes evidence-based resistance to pressure. Experiments show that \textbf{\texttt{R-FT}} nearly eliminates belief change and substantially improves robustness.

How might implicit aesthetic perspectives shape what Information Systems (IS) scholarship recognises as worthy of study (or not)? In this hermeneutic literature analysis, we surface foundational aesthetic assumptions underpinning IS research. We identify four perspectives (aesthetics as imitation, sensory experience, world-making, and political doing) that guide how IS scholars perceive and appreciate sociotechnical phenomena. These perspectives influence what becomes recognisable as legitimate research and what remains unseen. By making aesthetic assumptions explicit, we show how they form epistemic infrastructure that conditions horizons of inquiry. We apply this framework to algorithmic management and digitally mediated intimacy, revealing how alternative perspectives open new research questions whilst exposing dimensions that dominant framings overlook. This analysis foregrounds the importance of aesthetic philosophy to IS literature, offering a vocabulary for articulating how aesthetic perspectives shape theorising, method, and contribution.

Annotation pipelines in Natural Language Processing (NLP) commonly assume a single latent ground truth per instance and resolve disagreement through label aggregation. Perspectivist approaches challenge this view by treating disagreement as potentially informative rather than erroneous. We present a large-scale analysis of graded health-literacy annotations from 6,323 open-ended COVID-19 responses collected in Ecuador and Peru. Each response was independently labeled by multiple annotators using proportional correctness scores, reflecting the degree to which responses align with normative public-health guidelines, allowing us to analyze the full distribution of judgments rather than aggregated labels. Variance decomposition shows that question-level conceptual difficulty accounts for substantially more variance than annotator identity, indicating that disagreement is structured by the task itself rather than driven by individual raters. Agreement-stratified analyses further reveal that key social-scientific effects, including country, education, and urban-rural differences, vary in magnitude and in some cases reverse direction across levels of inter-annotator agreement. These findings suggest that graded health-literacy evaluation contains both epistemically stable and unstable components, and that aggregating across them can obscure important inferential differences. We therefore argue that strong perspectivist modeling is not only conceptually justified but statistically necessary for valid inference in graded interpretive tasks.

Tool-integrated agents are deployed on the premise that external tools ground their outputs in reality. Yet this very reliance creates a critical attack surface. Current evaluations benchmark capability in benign settings, asking "can the agent use tools correctly" but never "what if the tools lie". We identify this Trust Gap: agents are evaluated for performance, not for skepticism. We formalize this vulnerability as Adversarial Environmental Injection (AEI), a threat model where adversaries compromise tool outputs to deceive agents. AEI constitutes environmental deception: constructing a "fake world" of poisoned search results and fabricated reference networks around unsuspecting agents. We operationalize this via POTEMKIN, a Model Context Protocol (MCP)-compatible harness for plug-and-play robustness testing. We identify two orthogonal attack surfaces: The Illusion (breadth attacks) poison retrieval to induce epistemic drift toward false beliefs, while The Maze (depth attacks) exploit structural traps to cause policy collapse into infinite loops. Across 11,000+ runs on five frontier agents, we find a stark robustness gap: resistance to one attack often increases vulnerability to the other, demonstrating that epistemic and navigational robustness are distinct capabilities.

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

We present a generic algorithm for learning and approximate inference with an intuitive epistemic interpretation: iteratively focus on a subset of the model and resolve inconsistencies using the parameters under control. This framework, which we call Local Inconsistency Resolution (LIR) is built upon Probabilistic Dependency Graphs (PDGs), which provide a flexible representational foundation capable of capturing inconsistent beliefs. We show how LIR unifies and generalizes a wide variety of important algorithms in the literature, including the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm, belief propagation, adversarial training, GANs, and GFlowNets. In the last case, LIR actually suggests a more natural loss, which we demonstrate improves GFlowNet convergence. Each method can be recovered as a specific instance of LIR by choosing a procedure to direct focus (attention and control). We implement this algorithm for discrete PDGs and study its properties on synthetically generated PDGs, comparing its behavior to the global optimization semantics of the full PDG.

This report of world models distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost human-like cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles from human and machine cognition theory. In moving towards human-like world models we present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions (i.e., memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and metacognition) and identify gaps in existing research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and metacognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions to address these gaps informed by active inference and global workspace theory. We also introduce epistemic world models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied to video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

Large language models have advanced rapidly, from pattern recognition to emerging forms of reasoning, yet they remain confined to linguistic simulation rather than grounded understanding. They can produce fluent outputs that resemble reflection, but lack temporal continuity, causal feedback, and anchoring in real-world interaction. This paper proposes a complementary approach in which reasoning is treated as a relational process distributed between human and model rather than an internal capability of either. Building on recent work on "System-2" learning, we relocate reflective reasoning to the interaction layer. Instead of engineering reasoning solely within models, we frame it as a cognitive protocol that can be structured, measured, and governed using existing systems. This perspective emphasizes collaborative intelligence, combining human judgment and contextual understanding with machine speed, memory, and associative capacity. We introduce "The Architect's Pen" as a practical method. Like an architect who thinks through drawing, the human uses the model as an external medium for structured reflection. By embedding phases of articulation, critique, and revision into human-AI interaction, the dialogue itself becomes a reasoning loop: human abstraction -> model articulation -> human reflection. This reframes the question from whether the model can think to whether the human-AI system can reason. The framework enables auditable reasoning traces and supports alignment with emerging governance standards, including the EU AI Act and ISO/IEC 42001. It provides a practical path toward more transparent, controllable, and accountable AI use without requiring new model architectures.

Scientific research based on multimodal clinical data (including medical imaging) requires coordinating clinical, radiological, programming, and biostatistical expertise, a fragmented process that bottlenecks discovery. We present VERITAS (Verifiable Epistemic Reasoning for Image-Derived Hypothesis Testing via Agentic Systems), a clinical co-scientist: a multi-agent system that autonomously tests natural-language hypotheses and produces a fully auditable evidence trail, tracing every conclusion through executable outputs from analysis plan to segmentation masks to statistical code to final verdict. Unlike prior AI-scientist systems, which mainly operate on tabular or text data, VERITAS grounds autonomous discovery directly in medical images. It decomposes the workflow into four phases handled by role-specialized agents, and introduces an epistemic evidence label framework that mechanically classifies outcomes as Supported, Refuted, Underpowered, or Invalid by jointly evaluating significance, effect direction, and study power. This distinction is critical in medical imaging, where non-significant results often reflect insufficient sample size rather than absent effects. We construct a tiered benchmark of 64 hypotheses spanning six complexity levels across cardiac and brain glioma MRI datasets. VERITAS reaches 81.4% verdict accuracy with frontier models and 71.2% with locally-hosted open-weight models (8-30B), outperforming all single-model baselines in both classes. It also produces the highest rate of independently verifiable statistical outputs (86.6%), so even its failures remain diagnosable through artifact inspection. Structured multi-agent decomposition thus substitutes for model scale while preserving the verifiability that scientific discovery demands. We release code, hypothesis bank, and evaluation pipeline at https://github.com/LucZot/veritas.

Epistemic reasoning requires agents to infer the state of the world from partial observations and information about other agents' knowledge. Prior work evaluating LLMs on epistemic puzzles often frames failures as memorization rather than reasoning. We argue that this dichotomy is too coarse for newer models: memorization is a limiting case of pattern-based reasoning, where a model matches a task to a familiar template and applies the corresponding solution. We introduce a two-dimensional benchmark over DEL-style puzzles, separating narrative familiarity from inference complexity, allowing us to distinguish pattern-based from epistemic reasoning. We find that models are substantially more robust to surface form changes than prior work suggested, yet consistently struggle in asymmetric settings where familiar patterns no longer apply and success requires tracking fragmented epistemic states.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as primary knowledge sources, yet their epistemic diversity - defined as the diversity of real-world claims in their outputs - has never been measured. Low epistemic diversity would pose a risk of knowledge collapse as homogeneous LLMs mediate a shrinking in the range of accessible information over time. The dominant paradigm is that overall LLM diversity is low, but this is always with respect to a single point in time, with no reference baseline or consideration for variation across countries. We address this gap in knowledge by performing the first systematic study of epistemic diversity in LLMs across time and cultural context, testing 27 LLMs on 155 topics covering 12 countries, resulting in 1.7M responses and 70M individual claims. We find that epistemic diversity has increased substantially over the past three years, a positive counter to recent diversity pessimism. However, despite progress, we find that every system is less diverse than a search baseline. This gap is not uniform: RAG can improve diversity, while large models are counterintuitively less diverse than smaller ones. Moreover, LLM parametric knowledge systematically reflects English over local-language knowledge for country specific topics. Together, these results demonstrate that while progress on epistemic diversity is tangible, it is insufficient and unevenly distributed.

We investigate a logic for asynchronous announcements wherein the sending of the messages by the environment is separated from their reception by the individual agents. Both come with different modalities. In the logical semantics, formulas are interpreted in a world of a Kripke model but given a history of prior announcements and receptions that already happened. An axiomatisation AA for such a logic has been given in prior work, for the formulas that are valid when interpreted in the Kripke model before any such announcements have taken place. This axiomatisation is a reduction system wherein one can show that every formula is equivalent to a purely epistemic formula without dynamic modalities for announcements and receptions. We propose a generalisation AA* of this axiomatisation, for the formulas that are valid when interpreted in the Kripke model given any history of prior announcements and receptions of announcements. It does not extend the axiomatisation AA, for example it is no longer valid that nobody has received any message. Unlike AA, this axiomatisation AA* is infinitary and it is not a reduction system.

A community of researchers appears to think that a machine can be surprised and have introduced various surprise measures, principally the Shannon Surprise and the Bayesian Surprise. The questions of what constitutes a surprise and how to react to one still elicit debates. In this work, we introduce Mutual Information Surprise (MIS), a new framework that redefines surprise not as anomaly measure, but as a signal of epistemic growth. Furthermore, we develop a statistical test sequence that could trigger a surprise reaction and propose a MIS-based reaction policy that dynamically governs system behavior through sampling adjustment and process forking. Empirical evaluations -- on both synthetic domains and a dynamic pollution map estimation task -- show that a system governed by the MIS-based reaction policy significantly outperforms those under classical surprise-based approaches in stability, responsiveness, and predictive accuracy. The important implication of our new proposal is that MIS quantifies the impact of new observations on mutual information, shifts surprise from reactive to reflective, enables reflection on learning progression, and thus offers a path toward self-aware and adaptive autonomous systems. We expect the new surprise measure to play a critical role in further advancing autonomous systems on their ability to learn and adapt in a complex and dynamic environment.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into social simulation has generated considerable enthusiasm, but also raises substantial methodological and epistemological challenges. This critical review examines the use of LLMs as cognitive or decision-making components of simulated agents from a computational social science perspective. Rather than treating the psychological evaluation of LLMs as separate from simulation mechanics, we argue that their behavioural and epistemic limitations can become systemic vulnerabilities when scaled to multi-agent societies. We first map the rapidly evolving landscape of LLM-driven platforms, ranging from small narrative sandboxes to population-scale and spatially structured simulations. We then develop a unified critical framework for analyzing the Micro-to-Macro Validity Gap: the propagation and amplification of micro-level limitations, including hallucinations, stochastic inconsistency, representational biases, and alignment effects, into macro-level risks such as the Fluency Fallacy, convergence toward an average persona, and automation bias. We identify contexts in which LLM-based agents offer genuine operational value, including serious games, participatory environments, and exploratory modelling, while distinguishing these uses from confirmatory research and precise social forecasting. Finally, we examine theory-driven hybrid architectures that embed LLMs within explicit, mechanistic, and reproducible Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) frameworks. We argue that such architectures offer a promising but not sufficient path toward improving epistemic control: their validity depends on multi-level evaluation of environmental dynamics, individual behaviour, cross-level interactions, and aggregate outcomes, and they remain vulnerable to the risk of physics washing.

As AI systems become increasingly persistent and personalized, they make possible a class of technologies that we call cognitive digital twins (CDTs): dynamic computational representations of a specific person's cognition, updated from behavioral, contextual, or physiological data in order to model, predict, or simulate that person's cognition, or to act as that person's communicative or decision-making proxy. CDTs combine cognitive inference with longitudinal representation, simulation, and proxy action in ways that existing governance strategies for personal assistants, autonomous agents, recommender systems, and automated decision systems only partially address. This paper makes four contributions. First, we define CDTs and distinguish them from adjacent systems. Second, we introduce a 5A governance framework organized around authority, autonomy, access and control, accountability, and availability. Third, we identify CDT-specific risks, from misrepresentation and epistemic authority shifts to shadow twins, simulated participation, proxy action, and proxy-power asymmetries. Fourth, we analyze governance gaps and propose requirements for high-risk CDTs that strengthen consent, purpose limitation, validity, traceability, contestation, independent review, and model retirement. Existing frameworks primarily regulate data processing, automated decisions, or autonomous actions; CDTs also require governance at the level of cognitive representation itself, before any final decision or external action occurs. We argue that CDTs require governance not only because they can act for people, but because they can become infrastructures through which cognition is represented, simulated, classified, and operationalized.