Incident Response

AI-generated RTL verification plans can satisfy a provider schema yet fail at the boundary to trusted execution. We present SecTB-RTL, an auditable framework covering 31 tasks and 124 authored hardware-security regressions. A deterministic non-AI baseline killed 36, 75, and 78 mutants at increasing resource limits. The first confirmatory run (C1-R2) failed before model execution because the provider rejected its response schema. After a schema-only repair made without viewing outcomes, a separately frozen follow-up run (C1-R3) completed 1,860 calls. The provider accepted 1,857 responses, but only nine passed the production semantic validator. The generation and execution rules did not match. We therefore preserve the run as an instrument-validation incident and report no prompt-effect estimate. This incident shows that provider or schema acceptance does not establish execution validity. Compilation and coverage are only diagnostics; the exact saved artifact must pass the full production path. A subsequent follow-up is excluded because it did not satisfy the preregistered evidence-completeness gate and is treated only as future work. We release the benchmark, failure-preserving contract, incident provenance, and governance controls needed to prevent infrastructure behavior from being misreported as model behavior.

Cyberattacks against Operational Technology (OT) systems, which monitor and control industrial processes, pose an increasing threat to essential societal services. For this reason, developing automated intrusion response strategies is highly important. In this paper, we present a formal model of an OT intrusion response use case using the POMDP framework. It includes a realistic model of partial observability that is based on traffic measurements. This approach allows us to develop tractable, learning-based solution methods for automated intrusion response, which are based on PPO. We evaluate the obtained response strategies on an emulated OT system and find that they are effective against several types of MITRE attacks for the studied use case.

Process mining has long turned event logs into process knowledge: discovered models, conformance evidence, bottleneck diagnoses, and runtime predictions. Agentic AI changes the target. Process-aware agents will not only ask what happened. They will ask whether a proposed action should be taken, given the available evidence, privacy budget, organizational authority, and downstream risk. This BlueSky paper proposes event-to-action process mining: a process-mining agenda for transforming heterogeneous operational event data into governed action. The goal is not another dashboard, a generic enterprise simulator, or a language interface over logs. We argue that the community needs four mineable artifacts: event-object representations, action evidence packages, governance contracts, and benchmarks where act, defer, ask, and refuse are all valid outputs. This agenda is timely because agentic business process management (BPM), LLM-assisted process mining, object-centric event standards, causal process monitoring, and privacy-preserving learning are maturing separately. Bringing them together defines a data-mining target inside process mining: mining logged organizational behavior for accountable action, not only retrospective insight.

Long-horizon agents execute thousands of actions, resulting in sequential failures rather than isolated errors. When a coding agent deletes a production database or a prompt injection spreads across agents, the incident raises questions of causality, authority, and non-repudiable third-party verification. The Agent Flight Recorder captures each agent action as a structured, canonically serialized event binding eight semantic fields from intent through execution to provenance. Hash chaining and Merkle batching provide tamper evidence and compact inclusion proofs. For cross-organizational disputes where no party's infrastructure qualifies as neutral ground, periodic on-chain anchoring of epoch roots lets any verifier with the disclosed payload and Merkle proof check the record independently, without pre-agreeing on a trusted intermediary. The on-chain footprint is minimal: each anchor stores a 32-byte epoch root and a back-pointer, and no event content touches the chain. We evaluate the system across five cumulative ablation configurations on synthetic agent workloads. The full system adds ~48 microseconds median per-event latency and 512 bytes per event. L2 anchoring costs $2.30 per 100K events at 100-event epochs. The full integrity stack detects edit, delete, reorder, and fork tampering at 100% with zero false positives. Structured forensic queries achieve 1.0 precision on guardrail and delegation lookups where unstructured text search yields 0.013 and 0.077 respectively.

Incident response planning is critical for restoring compromised software systems after cyberattacks. Common practice relies on expert-driven playbooks that encode fixed response procedures, but these static workflows struggle to adapt to evolving incident states, changing recovery objectives, and execution feedback. Recent LLM-based planners and tool-using agents improve automation, yet they remain unstable in long-horizon response because they lack a unified basis for maintaining incident state, aligning actions with the current recovery stage, and reusing historical experience. We present STAIR, an end-to-end agentic planning framework for incident response. The framework maintains the current incident as Graph-as-State, uses a Stage Router to dispatch planning to stage-specialized agents, and retrieves historical experiences to guide action selection. An Execution Harness executes actions, returns feedback to update the incident state, and validates action effects for future experience reuse. Across 100 Docker-based cyber ranges, our framework achieves a normalized defense score of 0.94 and improves over the strongest baseline by 9.5%.

Microservice root cause analysis (RCA) requires correlating failures across heterogeneous telemetry within complex service dependency graphs. Existing methods often rely on a single telemetry modality; recent LLM-based approaches can suffer from unconstrained exploration and hallucination; and most systems stop at fault ranking without producing actionable incident response. We present GALA+, a graph-augmented LLM agentic framework centered on graph-guided investigation, which uses service dependencies to bound exploration and refine diagnosis through localized multi-modal evidence. For initial hypothesis generation, GALA+ combines complementary telemetry signals with STRIX, a novel trace- and graph-structure-aware scoring module. GALA+ then produces ranked diagnoses, incident summaries, and stratified action recommendations. We further introduce SURE-Score, a human-guided evaluation framework co-developed with industry SRE experts for assessing RCA-specific output quality beyond conventional text similarity metrics. On two microservice benchmarks, GALA+ consistently achieves the strongest overall results, surpassing the best LLM-based baseline by more than 25 percentage points in AC@1, while also receiving the highest ratings from both SURE-Score and independent human SRE evaluation.

AI systems are increasingly involved in decisions and actions that may later require investigation. When an AI related incident occurs, investigators need to reconstruct what the system did, why it behaved that way, and which part of the system or supply chain contributed to the outcome. Existing work on AI forensics remains fragmented, often focusing on a specific system type, artifact, or analysis technique. This paper argues that investigator access is a useful starting point for organizing the field. We distinguish white box, grey box, and black box access and show how each access level changes what can be collected, preserved, analyzed, and reported. Based on this distinction, we propose a process model matrix for AI forensics across four phases: collection, preservation, analysis, and reporting. We also introduce an order of volatility for AI systems, covering runtime state, context windows, logs, retrieval stores, model artifacts, and training lineage. From this matrix, we derive an access conditioned examination framework and identify open research problems, including black box preservation, model version attestation, uncertainty quantification for surrogate based analysis, and chain of custody for mutable AI artifacts.

Incident response is currently managed by security operators using predefined playbooks, resulting in slow, labor-intensive security decision-making processes. Consequently, there is a growing need for automated incident response planning. Decision-theoretic approaches based on control, optimization, and reinforcement learning have been proposed to automate such planning tasks with well-grounded approaches, yet most of which, while guaranteeing strong performance, are limited to abstract models and cannot be directly applied to operational systems. A promising approach to mitigate this limitation is to use the security knowledge embedded in large language models (LLMs) to develop agentic response systems. However, current agentic approaches rely on repeated invocations of the LLM to generate a response plan, which is unreliable and limits the planning horizon due to hallucination. In this paper, we develop a principled LLM-based planning method by combining decision-theoretic planning with LLM-generated response commands. The proposed agentic incident response approach uses a rollout planner to compute a high-level response strategy that allocates security resources (the tactical scale), which is then translated into executable commands by a lightweight LLM agent (the operational scale). Within this architecture, we use a digital twin that supports tactical planning through simulation and operational execution through emulation. Across three attack scenarios, our agentic approach reduces recovery execution time by 15.1% on average and increases the recovery rate by 33.6% over frontier LLM baselines.

Modern organizations rely on data, machine learning, and software delivery pipelines to move data, train models, deploy applications, refresh dashboards, and support business-critical decisions. However, these pipelines often fail because of data quality issues, schema changes, upstream source changes, infrastructure problems, orchestration failures, and model workflow issues. Existing ZeroOps, observability, and AI operations platforms can help teams detect incidents, investigate root causes, and in some cases recommend or execute fixes. However, many of these solutions are expensive, vendor-specific, or difficult for smaller teams to adapt across different tools and environments. This paper first compares existing off-the-shelf solutions for AI-assisted pipeline monitoring, root-cause analysis, and automated remediation, including their strengths, limitations, and practical trade-offs. Based on this comparison, we find that the main gap is architectural rather than technological: the required ingredients for self-healing pipelines already exist, but they are fragmented across vendor-specific platforms, observability tools, incident systems, and open-source components. We therefore propose an affordable, vendor-agnostic reference architecture for agentic self-healing pipelines using open-source and low-cost tools. The proposed architecture combines monitoring, pipeline metadata, incident history, deterministic policy checks, AI-assisted diagnosis, approval workflows, and controlled remediation actions to help teams detect, diagnose, repair, verify, and learn from pipeline issues with less manual effort. The goal is to provide a practical reference architecture that can be adapted across data engineering, machine learning operations, and software delivery environments.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly adopted in real-world security operations with access to host artifacts and command-line interfaces (CLIs), making it critical to thoroughly assess their security capabilities. However, existing cybersecurity benchmarks focus on pre-compromise settings where agents are placed in a clean and idealized environment before an attack occurs. This leaves the post-compromise setting underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce SecRespond, the first benchmark for evaluating LLM agents on the post-compromise incident-response workflow. Given a forensic disk snapshot of a compromised host together with the alerts, vulnerability scans, and baseline checks reported by a host security product, agents are required to produce forensic reports on intrusions, baseline risks, and vulnerability risks, together with a remediation plan. We instantiate this task across 10 cyber ranges, each constructed from a distinct compromised cloud host, spanning 4 entry-point types, 21 ATT&CK techniques, and 5 operating systems. We evaluate 23 frontier LLMs on the OpenCode agent harness. Experimental results show that although current agents can reliably uncover the problems exposed by alerts, they struggle to proactively investigate the disk for silent intrusions and to produce comprehensive, verified remediation plans, with no model achieving complete detection and remediation on any single range. This reveals a fundamental bottleneck in building agents for real-world incident response. The benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/Alibaba-NLP/qqr/tree/main/data/secrespond.

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are difficult to detect and interpret due to their multi-stage and stealthy nature. While recent autonomous defense systems leverage provenance graphs and learning-based models for detection and mitigation, their outputs remain largely machine-oriented and difficult for analysts to interpret. Large language models (LLMs) offer a promising interface for report generation, but often produce hallucinated or weakly grounded content. In this paper, we propose DeepFaith, an evidence-grounded framework for faithful incident reporting in multi-stage APT defense. DeepFaith transforms structured outputs from autonomous defense and explainability modules into natural-language reports that are explicitly aligned with underlying system evidence. The framework integrates a unified evidence representation, evidence-grounded prompting, faithfulness-aware generation, and post-generation verification to ensure that all generated statements are supported. Experiments in a realistic enterprise testbed demonstrate that DeepFaith improves faithfulness from 0.68 to 0.92, reduces unsupported claims from 0.32 to 0.08, and increases temporal consistency from 0.6 to 0.88, while maintaining concise reports and lower error rates than existing template-based and LLM-based solutions. These results show that evidence-grounded generation enables reliable, interpretable, and actionable reporting for security operations centers.

Cloud telemetry arrives at a scale that, paradoxically, makes intrusion understanding harder rather than easier. Attackers operate through legitimate identity, federated session tokens, and cloud native APIs indistinguishable from routine administration, and analysts spend an incident reconstructing context the logs already contain. We present Cloud Decoy AI Agent, a framework pairing a high fidelity cloud decoy with an autonomous language model agent that compresses the path from suspicious activity to an analyst ready report. Connecting a decoy to an agent is not a wiring exercise. The unit of investigation is the session rather than the event, and the session key is obscured by the identity layering federated credentials introduce. The agent's evidence horizon must be bounded, since an agent free to query full control plane history inherits the cost and false positive profile deception was meant to remove. And cloud telemetry is partly adversary authored, since object keys and user agent strings are attacker chosen values providers record verbatim, which makes any log to prompt path an indirect prompt injection channel that a decoy widens rather than narrows. We address the first two with a session aggregation operator over a pivot tuple drawn only from provider derived fields, and with dynamic prompt generation, a two stage prompt assembly enforcing a grounding invariant by carrying only fields the agent observed. We identify the third as an unaddressed exposure in this class of system, specify the mitigation it requires, and note our prototype does not implement it. Across ten controlled AWS S3 scenarios, nine were reconstructed completely, no report contained an assertion untraceable to an observed artifact, and latency was four to five minutes. We also state what this evaluation does not establish and name the comparisons that would settle it.

The ORBIT (Operations Responses and Business Intelligence Toolkit) project was initiated to assess agentic AI for the upcoming ESnet 7 initiative and to address persistent operational pain points in the Network Operations Center (NOC) workflow. ESnet operators experience slow retrieval from siloed data sources, incidents described in lengthy and difficult-to-parse tickets, and context loss across shift handoffs. These challenges increase cognitive load and prolong incident resolution times. ORBIT therefore targets routine automation, cross-source synthesis, and actionable insights delivered directly within operators' existing tooling. ORBIT is an agentic AI system integrated into ServiceNow, ESnet's primary incident management platform. The design uses a modular, layered architecture comprising a centralized reasoning hub, tool access via MCPs for ESnet data sources, a semantic search layer, and an operator-facing chat interface. To manage the complexity and stochasticity of the AI toolchain, ORBIT follows industry best practices by structuring task logic as versioned, tested "skills" that guide the system in performing bounded responsibilities. This improves reliability and predictability compared to fully unconstrained agent behavior. Key results show that ORBIT successfully delivered all six initial tasks, and the architecture enabled rapid development of two additional tasks proposed by NOC engineers. We observed strong organic adoption of general-purpose infrastructure components, especially the chat interface and LiteLLM model gateway, including high request volumes from outside the project. Experiments with skills indicate that this approach can reduce task completion steps while eliminating observed error modes.

Purpose: Understanding how much of routine policing involves vulnerable people could inform resourcing, training, and multi-agency response, yet administrative data provide limited insight. We explore whether an LLM-based classification pipeline, developed on open-source US police data, can be adapted to estimate the prevalence of four vulnerability indicators - mental ill health, substance misuse, alcohol dependence, and homelessness - in UK police incident narratives, and when outputs can be treated as defensible measurements. Methods: We analyse nearly 3,000 de-identified incident logs from a UK police force, using a multi-stage pipeline combining repeated model inference, label aggregation, structured human review, and statistical correction. The pipeline runs on a locally hosted open-weight LLM, reflecting the secure environments police must work in. Results: LLMs can produce meaningful, if imperfect, prevalence estimates at scale. Mental ill health indicators are present in approximately one in five incidents, with lower prevalence for other indicators. However, naive LLM deployment is unreliable: single-pass classifications are unstable, and aggregated outputs systematically over-assign indicators relative to human judgement. Correcting these biases required substantial human input and statistical adjustment, leaving considerable uncertainty. Conclusions: While LLMs can extract information from unstructured police data, their outputs cannot be treated as valid measurements without careful methodological support. At the population level, defensible estimates are achievable but resource-intensive; at the individual level, errors remain frequent and unpredictable, limiting suitability for operational decisions. This study highlights both the potential and the constraints of LLM-based measurement in applied settings.

Cyber-physical systems built on deterministic edge inference, such as on-vehicle flood detection for agricultural fields, produce structured decision logs that must be interpreted differently by heterogeneous stakeholders. Pairing such systems with large language models (LLMs) to generate stakeholder-specific reports introduces a tension: the generative layer is non-deterministic, while the edge plane must remain replayable and auditable. We propose an architectural pattern resting on two invariants: unidirectional consumption, in which the generative layer is a strict read-only consumer of the deterministic plane and never writes back, and persona-as-configuration, in which stakeholder adaptation is a versioned prompt-template artifact rather than runtime improvisation. We instantiate the pattern as a context-aware dashboard layer over the JSON decision logs of a previously published edge-based standing-water detection system, and analyse how the integration boundary admits standard generative-reliability mitigations as configuration- or middleware-level extension points. A structured expert review rated the pattern favourably across five ISO/IEC 25010-aligned quality dimensions, with strongest agreement on separation of concerns. End-user evaluation with agricultural stakeholders is planned for future work.

As automated decision-making and data-driven technologies pervade society and are used to manage consequential outcomes, understanding the technology's capabilities, limitations, and attendant risks in context requires analysis of full sociotechnical systems. Sociotechnical analysis of risks in highly complex systems provides clear lessons for the design and evaluation of AI systems, transcending a technical focus on reliable or "responsibly designed" components to understand risks at a systems level. Human-made catastrophes have been studied for decades because of the severity of these events: consider Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Fukushima-Daiichi, Bhopal, the Challenger disaster. A common misconception is that these kinds of events are freak accidents, resulting from the inherently unforeseeable interactions in complex systems. Closer examination reveals that the risks and hazards were well-known beforehand but not acted upon due to social structural, political and economic factors. We outline several areas where the development and use of AI can benefit from learning these unlearned lessons: improved risk perception, communication, and analysis at the organizational level; traceability of requirements and responsibilities; and holistic approaches to responsibility and safety that include social and organizational dynamics as first-order engineering concerns. For each area, we offer concrete unlearned lessons and exemplify how they led to failure in prior accidents as well as examples of how these lessons remain unlearned for modern computing systems, particularly AI.

AI agents deployed for IT operations are typically permanent cost centers because every execution requires full LLM inference, even for previously solved problems. This paper introduces progressive crystallization, a lifecycle that treats agent exploration as a discovery mechanism rather than a permanent execution model. It defines a three-stage execution taxonomy, from fully agent-orchestrated to hybrid to fully deterministic workflows, together with an evidence-based promotion mechanism that converts repeatedly validated agent behaviors into cheaper and more reproducible deterministic workflows, while automatically demoting workflows that regress. Evaluated on a production cloud networking AIOps system processing tens of thousands of incidents per month, the approach increased deterministic execution from 0% to 45% over eight months, reduced per-incident agent costs by more than 70% despite doubling incident volume, and improved safety through greater reproducibility and auditability. The paper also presents the execution taxonomy, promotion and demotion criteria, trace extraction methodology, economic model, safety considerations, and discusses limitations and threats to validity.

AI systems may produce failures after deployment that pre-deployment safety assessments do not anticipate. Managing these failures requires what we refer to as adequate \textit{AI incident governance}, where having good definitions, taxonomies, monitoring practices, reporting mechanisms, and incident analysis is essential. We examine existing frameworks related to AI incident governance by regulatory bodies and independent efforts, and find that while there are frameworks that describe how individual functions can be performed, there is a lack of consistency within the aspects of definitions, classification, monitoring, and reporting. These inconsistencies apply to the types of incident data that is collected and reported, the ways in which they are categorised, and as a result, the depth, representativeness, and accuracy of analysis that can be performed.

Large language models are no longer only text generators. They are increasingly embedded in retrieval pipelines, enterprise assistants, coding environments, robotic systems, security-operation workflows, and autonomous agents that can read private data, call tools, write files, execute code, and act across organizational boundaries. This shift changes the security problem: risks do not arise from the model weights alone, but from the full lifecycle and application stack through which data, prompts, model outputs, tools, memories, and user authority interact. This paper systematizes the literature on vulnerabilities in large language model systems through a lifecycle and application-stack lens. We organize attacks across eight stages: data collection, pretraining, post-training alignment, model packaging and supply chain, retrieval and memory, prompting and inference, tool/agent execution, and deployment/maintenance. For each stage, we analyze attacker capabilities, affected security objectives, representative attacks, practical risks, evaluation practices, and defenses. We further map LLM-specific vulnerabilities to confidentiality, integrity, availability, safety, privacy, fairness, accountability, and agency-control objectives. Unlike taxonomies that list isolated attack names, the proposed systematization emphasizes where trust boundaries fail, how untrusted data becomes executable instruction, how delegated authority amplifies model errors, and why point defenses rarely compose. We close with a research agenda for secure LLM systems, including compositional security, provenance-aware retrieval, tool-call containment, long-horizon agent evaluation, privacy-preserving adaptation, realistic red teaming, and deployment-grade incident response.

Flaw reporting for deployed AI systems is fundamental to identifying system failures and improving AI safety. Yet the AI reporting ecosystem is fragmented: researchers who identify flaws often do not know what or where to report, and groups who receive reports rarely share them with other relevant stakeholders. As a result, good-faith reporters duplicate effort by submitting many different forms, and recipients lack standardized, triage-ready information. We audit 12 reporting systems published by AI developers, cybersecurity groups, and AI flaw aggregators, identifying five recurring design challenges spanning discoverability, scope, information collection, coordination, and guidance for strict-liability cases. Building on this analysis and feedback from 49 experts across 32 organizations representing developers, security researchers, and ecosystem coordinators, we introduce FLARE-AI, an open-source AI flaw reporting system designed for interoperability with existing systems. FLARE-AI streamlines flaw report creation by collecting triage-relevant information through conditional logic and early classification, then enables optional dissemination of standardized, machine-readable reports to multiple developers, coordinators, and incident registries from a single submission. By lowering barriers to reporting AI flaws and improving interoperability across stakeholders, FLARE-AI helps break down silos and accelerate remediation across the AI ecosystem.

Physically localizing unauthorized wireless devices remains a critical bottleneck in cyber-physical security operations, where rogue access points can provide entry points for lateral movement and persistent compromise. While such devices can often be detected through network-side mechanisms, determining their physical location typically requires dense sensing infrastructure, site-specific RF fingerprinting, or manual inspection, limiting timely incident response. We investigate whether a single commodity robot can autonomously detect and localize rogue wireless devices under zero-configuration constraints, without RF fingerprinting, pre-installed sensors, or site calibration. We present RogueRover, an end-to-end system in which a quadruped robot autonomously patrols, collects spatially labeled RSSI measurements via a standard 802.11 interface, and estimates device locations offline. We evaluate the system across 11 patrol runs in a real indoor environment, with 6 rogue devices deployed under heterogeneous propagation conditions. Across 62 AP-patrol sessions, RogueRover achieves a median single-patrol localization error of 1.62 m without prior RF knowledge. Under multi-run aggregation, five of six devices are localized within 1 m. A blind trial validates the full pipeline, correctly identifying rogue devices among 73 observed BSSIDs and localizing them with errors of 0.34 m and 1.84 m. Across environments, simple weighted-centroid estimators perform comparably to, or better than, parametric path-loss models, indicating that measurement coverage from autonomous patrols is the primary determinant of localization accuracy under zero-prior constraints. Our results demonstrate that infrastructure-free, autonomous localization is feasible in practice, enabling rapid physical incident response in cyber-physical environments without additional sensing infrastructure.

Large language models can produce fluent root cause analyses, but fluent final answers alone are insufficient evidence for accountability in high-stakes operations. In real incident response, engineers need to know what evidence supported a diagnosis, which alternatives were considered, where contradictions remained, and whether the system resolved the case or preserved uncertainty. We address this gap with JustDiag, a diagnostic justification engine for RCA that maintains an explicit process state over evidence, findings, competing hypotheses, conflicts, and next checks. We evaluated the system on 66 real-world incidents using a two-layer protocol that separately scores final-answer quality and process quality. Relative to a matched control without diagnostic justification, JustDiag achieved stronger outcome and process scores, while accepting slightly lower terminal completion due to more calibrated non-closure. These results suggest that accountable RCA requires explicit diagnostic justification artifacts and process-aware evaluation, not only fluent final answers.

Enterprise intrusion response still depends on static playbooks and analyst-driven triage, creating delay between alert generation and containment. We present Agentra, a supervisable multi-agent Intrusion Response System (IRS) framework that converts alerts from IDS, EDR, and XDR platforms into structured incident response plans grounded in MITRE ATT&CK, MITRE D3FEND, and NIST CSF 2.0. Agentra decomposes response reasoning across role-scoped agents, validates proposed plans through a bounded Planner--Validator review loop, screens retrieved threat intelligence through a Moderator security gateway, gates actions through an Action Catalog and risk score, and records decisions in an append-only audit log. We evaluate Agentra against a static OASIS CACAO v2.0 cyber-playbook baseline on a 120-event corpus drawn from ThreatHunter-Playbook, Splunk BOTSv3, and DARPA OpTC. The strongest configuration improves FP-aware IRS F1 from 0.61 to 0.84 and restores the projected harmful-action rate to the static baseline level of 0.0% after Planner-only configurations introduce unsafe overreaction. These results indicate that multi-agent response planning can improve ontology-grounded IRS coverage while preserving analyst approval and auditability.

AI-assisted software development has moved from line-level autocomplete to agents that can plan changes, edit files, and submit pull requests with limited human supervision. Open-source software, however, evolves through a process designed for humans: contributor agreements, codes of conduct, and review norms all assume a legally accountable person who can attest to provenance and answer reviewer questions. Autonomous and semi-autonomous AI contributors strain those assumptions, and the 2025-2026 record of agent-driven incidents, AI-generated nuisance volume, and platform-level shutdowns shows that the gap is operationally consequential. Several open-source organisations have responded with contribution policies, but the result is fragmented, and its alignment with emerging AI governance frameworks (EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF with the UC Berkeley Agentic AI Profile, ISO/IEC 42001 and 23894) is unmapped at the contribution level. We compare policies across six organisations (SymPy, LLVM, matplotlib, OpenInfra, the Apache Software Foundation, and the Linux Foundation) using Most-Similar Systems Design with indicator-based coding and process tracing for SymPy and LLVM. From this we derive a six-dimensional taxonomy (disclosure, responsibility, human oversight, licensing, enforcement, maintainer workload), an ordinal Policy Maturity Score, and a mapping of documented agent incidents onto the dimensions each policy fails to govern. Aligning the dimensions with the regulatory frameworks above identifies overlapping gaps neither side currently closes, and we close by sketching the shape of a harmonised tiered framework and the empirical evaluation needed to calibrate it.

Can a learned model capture how faults propagate through a large-scale network and use this knowledge to causally attribute customer impact to its underlying root cause? Existing root cause analysis techniques often rely on static rules, correlation heuristics, or topology-local reasoning, which struggle to generalize in dynamic environments where faults propagate across complex physical and logical dependencies. We present NetCause, a self-supervised learning-based framework that models network incidents as graph-temporal processes and uses counterfactual simulation to rank candidate root causes. This approach produces an interpretable ranking of root cause hypotheses and integrates naturally with operator-defined mitigation and remediation actions. We train the model on over 1,500 incidents collected over six months from a leading cloud provider's production network and evaluate it on 31 expert-labeled incidents. NetCause consistently improves root cause ranking quality in the regime most relevant to operational decision-making, achieving a 16.1% accuracy improvement over a rule-based heuristic baseline. While training is computationally intensive, inference is lightweight, requiring only seconds of GPU runtime per incident (well below typical telemetry collection latencies).

Cloud network infrastructure at hyperscale presents unique operational challenges where traditional human-driven incident response cannot keep pace with the volume, velocity, and complexity of failures. This paper presents an agentic AI architecture for autonomous incident resolution in large-scale network operations. Our system employs a multi-agent orchestration framework where specialized AI agents collaborate to detect, diagnose, and remediate network incidents without human intervention. We describe the architectural principles, including hierarchical agent decomposition, skills-based tool invocation via standardized protocols, structured knowledge encoding from operational runbooks, progressive autonomy with safety boundaries, and closed-loop verification. The architecture has been deployed in production at a major cloud provider, demonstrating that agentic AI systems can achieve autonomous resolution rates exceeding 90% for common incident categories while maintaining safety guarantees through layered authorization and rollback mechanisms. We discuss design tradeoffs, failure modes, and lessons learned from operating autonomous AI agents at scale.

The quality of software engineering is still under a challenge due to disjointed processes between requirements, testing, and production, which hinders the opportunity to implement quality strategies in consecutive releases. Existing approaches tend to be fixed-model or single-optimization approaches and lack production feedback learning mechanisms. The paper at hand proposes a closed-loop reference architecture of continuous software quality intelligence with AI enhancements. The model synthesizes requirement feature mining, risk-based test prioritization, defect prediction, and production incident analysis as an element of a feedback-based pipeline. A limited feedback learning model is introduced that is used to propagate the production signal-based on defect severity and incident impact- to the following release to ensure stability, and the time. The method is evaluated using a semi-synthetic test dataset of 4,500 requirements, 27,049 test cases, 13,089 defects and 7,841 incidents in six release cycles. The experimental results show that the proposed system reduces the defect leakage by 0.19 to 0.13, increases the effectiveness of the detection system to 0.72 to 0.84, and shortens the test execution by up to 35 percent compared to the non-adaptive baselines. The changes are stable release to release. The findings indicate that through the integration of feedback-based learning in a closed-loop architecture, it can be continued to enhance quality process, which offers practical foundation of adaptive quality engineering of software.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly deployed across socially consequential domains, reports of AI-related harms and failures have grown in frequency and diversity. Although existing governance frameworks articulate high-level principles for responsible AI, large-scale empirical resources for tracking and analyzing real-world AI risk incidents remain limited. Existing incident collections are often manually curated, relatively small in scale, and insufficient for continuous, data-driven monitoring and downstream computational analysis. To address this need, we present RiskNet, a large-scale dataset of AI risk incidents constructed from large-scale multilingual news sources. RiskNet applies a structured pipeline for AI risk news identification, event-level report screening, incident alignment, and multi-dimensional incident classification. The resulting resource organizes dispersed news reports into incident-centered records and provides benchmark datasets for event classification, incident alignment, and incident-level risk labeling. In its current release, RiskNet covers hundreds of millions of source records and yields a large-scale collection of AI risk-related reports, including aligned incident clusters and annotated benchmark subsets. The dataset is also accessible through an online platform for browsing and exploration. We describe the data sources, processing workflow, taxonomy design, and technical validation of the resource. RiskNet is intended to support downstream research on AI safety, governance, risk analysis, and benchmarking, as well as longitudinal and cross-source analyses of AI-related harms. By providing a structured and reusable empirical resource, RiskNet helps bridge the gap between high-level governance principles and the documented realities of AI risk incidents.

Future AI-integrated Radio Access Networks (AI-RAN) will combine open programmability with learning-enabled xApps, rApps, and control functions that act on shared parameters and key performance indicators (KPIs). For conflict monitoring, it is not enough to know which applications are deployed; the system must also know whether the parameter--KPI dependencies assumed by runtime diagnosis remain valid under the current operating regime. This paper studies a lightweight monitoring primitive for that purpose: tracking an interpretable dependency representation from streaming telemetry events. We represent active dependencies by a Boolean matrix and use Boolean matrix multiplication to check whether recent parameter-activity and KPI-response events are consistent with the current estimate. We propose a sliding-window inference procedure that reuses the estimate when it remains consistent and recomputes it when recent observations indicate structural change. The tracker is intended as an explainable signal for conflict diagnosis and slow-loop model refresh, not as an autonomous mitigation mechanism. Experiments on controlled Boolean event streams show efficient and accurate tracking under dependency changes and Boolean observation noise.

AI losses that arise through an insured organization's generative or agentic AI system require state reconstruction, not merely event reconstruction, because the relevant state changes as the system reasons, retrieves, calls tools, and acts. The relevant question is not only what loss occurred, but what the system was allowed to do, what it actually did, and whether that reconstructed loss can support insurance claim recovery. This paper addresses losses in which the insured's AI system is in the causal chain, including externally triggered failures such as prompt injection, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) poisoning, malicious tool output, credential misuse, and data poisoning. Specifically, this paper introduces CER, a use-case-level diagnostic for AI residual risk transfer. C (control boundary) asks whether the system had an enforceable operating envelope. E (evidence reconstruction) asks whether the system state and causal chain can be reconstructed from retained artifacts. R (insurance response) asks whether the reconstructed loss is insured: whether insurance coverage is available in the market and placed for the insured, together with the proof needed to support insurance claim recovery. The paper makes three contributions: it defines the AI-specific reconstruction problem, operationalizes that problem through CER, and specifies claim-grade evidence for AI reconstruction. Public examples include the reported PocketOS and Replit agentic database-deletion incidents and Moffatt v. Air Canada as an adjudicated output/reliance case. Keywords: AI systems; CER framework; residual risk transfer; agentic AI; generative AI; AI insurance; evidence reconstruction.

Recent research demonstrating AI systems exhibiting deception and shutdown resistance suggests that AI loss of control (LOC) is an urgent policy concern , yet current literature focuses almost exclusively on alignment and prevention. To address this gap, this paper introduces a foundational framework and taxonomy for managing catastrophic AI LOC incidents. The taxonomy's first level distinguishes between scenarios where regaining control is 'extremely costly' versus 'impossible'. While impossible scenarios demand immediate resilience investments to fundamentally restrict an AI's attack surface , extremely costly scenarios require active incident management via Containment and Threat Neutralization. The framework further categorizes these manageable events into accidental LOC (requiring automated circuit-breaker responses) and adversarial LOC (requiring graduated escalatory measures). By mapping three severity classes to specific scenario matrices, this paper provides a concrete, proportional guide for managing unprecedented AI risks.

Multi-agent systems built on large language models (LLMs) require many coordination choices that are difficult to fix a priori: which skill protocol to invoke, which agent role should perform a subtask, which model to bind to each role, how roles should interact, when to use retrieval or verification, and when to omit a step entirely. These choices interact with task regime and operational constraints, so static pipelines and one-off model comparisons provide only a limited view of the design space. This paper introduces AgensFlow, an open-source framework that treats multi-agent coordination as an online policy-learning problem under partial observability. The framework makes coordination decisions observable and learnable from repeated trajectories, rather than treating skill, role, model, topology, and evaluation choices as fixed pipeline design. AgensFlow is evaluated on two corpora: distributed-systems incident tasks and security-advisory tasks. The evaluation shows three main results: learned routing reaches a higher-quality operating point than a fixed pipeline baseline on coordination-heavy classes; skip:X isolates topology compression as a meaningful part of the substrate; and warm-started policy graphs can reduce exploration cost while preserving plateau quality. Overall, the results support that learned, auditable routing can improve coordination-heavy multi-agent workflows over static wiring.

Security risk analysis typically treats control effectiveness as a static input, yet controls degrade through configuration drift, depend on monitoring systems that may themselves be degraded, and compete for finite remediation budgets. The FAIR Controls Analytics Model (FAIR-CAM) provides the theoretical framework for these dynamics but has so far remained theoretical. We present the first agent-based model to operationalize the core FAIR-CAM dynamics, making control physiology computationally observable, and release the implementation as open source. The simulation implements eight agent types, a multiplicative defense-in-depth susceptibility formula, a three-source variance model, budget-constrained remediation, and a narrative causation engine that produces a complete causal trace for every loss event. In a hospital ransomware scenario (N=1,000 iterations), three organizational dynamics emerge that static analysis cannot represent. First, emergent operational efficacy diverges from the analytical FAIR-CAM formula by approximately 17 percent, driven by correlated extrinsic variance; the divergence grows linearly with extrinsic frequency and vanishes under purely intrinsic drift. Second, a sharp queueing regime transition in the remediation pipeline approximately 2.8x expected loss when budget falls below a scenario-specific threshold (5-10 engineer-hours/month). Third, cascading monitoring failures propagate through the VMC topology: a single degraded VMC silently compounds undetected variance across the controls it manages. These dynamics are structural properties of the FAIR-CAM architecture and should generalize beyond the specific scenario studied.

Complex operational workflows coordinating personnel, tools, and information are central to system operations, yet end-to-end automation remains challenging due to extensive human input requirements and limited ability to adapt over time. We present GraphMind, a system that constructs, executes, and evolves action-centric workflow graphs with minimal human effort. The system operates in three phases. First, a scalable offline pipeline extracts structured workflow graphs from large volumes of human resolution traces, capturing problems, actions, and their causal relationships. Second, an online multi-agent traversal engine navigates the graph to dynamically construct and execute workflows, combining graph-guided retrieval with LLM-driven reasoning at each step. Third, Adaptive Traversal Reinforcement (ATR) reinforces successful traversal paths, enabling execution-informed graph adaptation. GraphMind has been deployed across four production cloud database services for incident investigation. Evaluated on 93 held-out incidents and validated via blind expert review, the system outperforms an Agentic Summary-RAG baseline in mitigation reach, hallucination rate, and diagnostic throughput while requiring 8x less retrieval context. The ATR layer reduces hallucination rate by 26%, demonstrating that workflow graphs can learn from execution feedback. A 12-week field study confirms practical value: 97% of scored conversations yield actionable results within interactive latency.

AI agents are increasingly deployed to act autonomously in the world, yet there is still no reliable way to trace a harmful agent back to the account that deployed it. This creates the same accountability gap across both ends of the intent spectrum: benign operators may deploy misconfigured or overbroad agents that cause harm unintentionally, while malicious operators may deliberately weaponize agents for scams, harassment, or cyber attacks. In many cases, these agents are powered by vendor-hosted models, a dependency that holds even for sophisticated adversaries such as state actors conducting cyber operations. In either case, affected parties can observe the behavior but cannot notify the responsible operator, stop the session, or identify the account for investigation. We formalize this gap as the problem of agent attribution: linking an observed agent interaction to the responsible account at the hosting vendor. To our knowledge, this is the first work to define the problem and present a practical solution. Our protocol is canary-based: an authorized party injects a canary into the agent's interaction stream, and the vendor searches a narrow window of session logs to recover the originating session and account. Simple canaries suffice in non-adversarial settings. For adversarial operators who filter or paraphrase incoming content, we develop robust canary constructions that cannot be suppressed without degrading the agent's own task performance, yielding a formal asymmetry in the defender's favor. We evaluate a variety of scenarios including real-world agents and show that our attribution method is reliable, robust, and scalable for vendor-side deployment.

Operational disaster response goes beyond damage assessment, requiring responders to integrate multi-sensor signals, reason over road networks, populations and key facilities, plan evacuations, and produce actionable reports. However, prior work largely isolates remote-sensing perception or evaluates generic tool use, leaving the end-to-end workflows of emergency operations underexplored. In this paper, we introduce Disaster Operational Response Agent benchmark (DORA), the first agentic benchmark for end-to-end disaster response: 515 expert-authored tasks across 45 real-world disaster events spanning 10 types, paired with expert-verified, replayable gold trajectories totaling 3,500 tool-call steps. Tasks span five dimensions that cover the operational disaster-response pipeline: disaster perception, spatial relational analysis, rescue and evacuation planning, temporal evolution reasoning, and multi-modal report synthesis. Agents compose calls from a 108-tool MCP library over heterogeneous geospatial data: optical, SAR, and multi-spectral imagery across single-, bi-, and multi-temporal sequences (0.015-10m GSD), complemented by elevation and social vector layers. We comprehensively evaluate 13 frontier LLMs on our benchmark, revealing three persistent challenges: 1) disaster-domain grounding exposes unique failure modes (damage-semantic grounding, sensor-modality mismatch, and disaster-pipeline composition); 2) agents are doubly bottlenecked by tool selection and argument grounding, where gold tool-order hints improve accuracy by only 1.08-4.40%, and alternative scaffolds yield at most a 3.24% gain; 3) compositional fragility scales with trajectory length, the agent-to-gold gap widening from 7% to 56% on long pipelines. DORA establishes a rigorous testbed for operationally reliable disaster-response agents.

As vehicles transition toward higher levels of automation, Driver Monitoring Systems (DMS) have become essential for ensuring human oversight, safety, and regulatory compliance in a vehicle. These systems rely on multimodal sensing and AI-driven inference to assess driver attention, cognitive state, and readiness to take control. While technologically promising, their deployment introduces a complex set of ethical and legal challenges - ranging from privacy and consent to data ownership and algorithmic fairness. While overarching frameworks such as the GDPR, EU AI Act, and IEEE standards offer important guidance, they lack the specificity required for addressing the unique risks posed by in-cabin sensing technologies. This paper adopts a review-to-design perspective, critically examining existing regulatory instruments and ethical frameworks -- such as the GDPR, the EU AI Act, and IEEE guidelines -- and identifying gaps in their applicability to the distinctive risks posed by multimodal, AI-enabled in-cabin monitoring. Building on this review, we propose a modular ethical design framework tailored specifically to Driver Monitoring Systems. The framework translates high-level principles into actionable design and deployment guidance, including user-configurable consent mechanisms, fairness-aware model development, transparency and explainability tools, and safeguards for driver emotional well-being. Finally, the paper outlines a risk analysis and failure mitigation strategy, emphasizing proactive incident response and accountability mechanisms tailored to the DMS context. Together, these contributions aim to inform the development of transparent, trustworthy, and human-centered driver monitoring systems for next-generation autonomous vehicles.

Cloud services experience frequent incidents that require rapid diagnosis and resolution. Troubleshooting guides help engineers respond consistently, but creating them manually is labor-intensive, resulting in incomplete coverage and outdated documentation. We present FixItFlow, an automated system that generates troubleshooting guides from historical incident data using large language models. The system extracts diagnostic patterns from engineer actions, synthesizes structured guides with verified commands, and enforces strict validation to prevent fabricated content. In our evaluation with 26 engineers, generated guides achieved 61.5% positive ratings for clarity and demonstrated a 2.3x reduction in mitigation time for incidents with associated guides. These results indicate that automated guide generation can improve incident response while reducing documentation burden on engineering teams.

AI risk assessment is the primary tool for identifying harms caused by AI systems. These include intersectional harms, which arise from the interaction between identity categories (e.g., class and skin tone) and which do not occur, or occur differently, when those categories are considered separately. Yet existing AI risk assessments are still built around isolated identity categories, and when intersections are considered, they focus almost exclusively on race and gender. Drawing on a large-scale analysis of documented AI incidents, we show that AI harms do not occur one identity category at a time. Using a structured rubric applied with a Large Language Model (LLM), we analyze 5,300 reports from 1,200 documented incidents in the AI Incident Database, the most curated source of incident data. From these reports, we identify 1,513 harmed subjects and their associated identity categories, achieving 98% accuracy. At the level of individual categories, we find that age and political identity appear in documented AI harms at rates comparable to race and gender. At the level of intersecting categories, harm is amplified up to three times at specific intersections: adolescent girls, lower-class people of color, and upper-class political elites. We argue that intersectionality should be a core component of AI risk assessment to more accurately capture how harms are produced and distributed across social groups.

Real-time detection and mitigation of technical anomalies are critical for large-scale cloud-native services, where even minutes of downtime can result in massive financial losses and diminished user trust. While customer incidents serve as a vital signal for discovering risks missed by monitoring, extracting actionable intelligence from this data remains challenging due to extreme noise, high throughput, and semantic complexity of diverse business lines. In this paper, we present TingIS, an end-to-end system designed for enterprise-grade incident discovery. At the core of TingIS is a multi-stage event linking engine that synergizes efficient indexing techniques with Large Language Models (LLMs) to make informed decisions on event merging, enabling the stable extraction of actionable incidents from just a handful of diverse user descriptions. This engine is complemented by a cascaded routing mechanism for precise business attribution and a multi-dimensional noise reduction pipeline that integrates domain knowledge, statistical patterns, and behavioral filtering. Deployed in a production environment handling a peak throughput of over 2,000 messages per minute and 300,000 messages per day, TingIS achieves a P90 alert latency of 3.5 minutes and a 95% discovery rate for high-priority incidents. Benchmarks constructed from real-world data demonstrate that TingIS significantly outperforms baseline methods in routing accuracy, clustering quality, and Signal-to-Noise Ratio.

Time series question-answering (TSQA), in which we ask natural language questions to infer and reason about properties of time series, is a promising yet underexplored capability of foundation models. In this work, we present ARFBench, a TSQA benchmark that evaluates the understanding of multimodal foundation models (FMs) on time series anomalies prevalent in software incident data. ARFBench consists of 750 questions across 142 time series and 5.38M data points from 63 production incidents sourced exclusively from internal telemetry at Datadog. We evaluate leading proprietary and open-source LLMs, VLMs, and time series FMs and observe that frontier VLMs perform markedly better than existing baselines; the leading model (GPT-5) achieves a 62.7% accuracy and 51.9% F1. We next demonstrate the promise of specialized multimodal approaches. We develop a novel TSFM + VLM hybrid prototype which we post-train on a small set of synthetic and real data that yields comparable overall F1 and accuracy with frontier models. Lastly, we find models and human domain experts exhibit complementary strengths. We define a model-expert oracle, a best-of-2 oracle selector over model and expert answers, yielding 82.8% F1 and 87.2% accuracy and establishing a new superhuman frontier for future TSQA models. The benchmark is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Datadog/ARFBench.

Post-deployment accountability has become central to AI governance, yet little empirical evidence shows whether monitoring, incident reporting, and impact assessment obligations are visible when AI systems fail. This study analyzes real-world AI incidents from the AI Incident Database (2020--2026) and codes them against nine post-deployment provisions from the EU AI Act, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, and the GDPR. The findings show substantial accountability gaps: 77.1% of incidents lack evidence of EU AI Act post-market monitoring, and 99.6% lack documented Data-Protection Impact Assessment evidence. Governance gaps are also systemic, with 9.8% of incidents simultaneously non-compliant under two or more regimes. Incidents detected through internal monitoring show much higher compliance than externally detected incidents (87.5% vs 5.3% under the EU AI Act; 95.8% vs 58.1% under NIST), suggesting that monitoring capacity is a key condition for effective post-deployment governance. Building on these findings, the paper proposes the Proactive AI Governance Compliance Framework (PAGCF), a four-phase lifecycle for pre-deployment assessment, continuous monitoring, incident preparedness, and cross-framework verification.

Cloud-native systems have made operational work both more powerful and harder to automate: incidents unfold across microservices, logs and metrics arrive faster than operators can inspect them, and recovery actions must be coordinated without losing the causal context that makes them safe. We present AOI (AI-Oriented Operations), a context-aware multi-agent framework for autonomous IT operations. AOI separates operational responsibility across an Observer, a read-only Probe, and a guarded Executor, and connects them through dynamic scheduling and a hierarchical memory system with LLM-based context compression. This design turns long-running incident response into an iterative loop of observation, evidence gathering, safe intervention, and memory update. Across AIOpsLab simulations and real-world Loghub-derived scenarios, AOI improves task success to 94.2%, reduces mean time to resolution by 34.4% relative to the strongest baseline, and compresses operational context by 72.4% while preserving 92.8% of diagnostic information. Ablations show that these gains come from the combination of agent specialization, adaptive scheduling, and memory-aware compression rather than from any single module alone. The results suggest that autonomous operations systems can move beyond alert classification toward reliable, context-preserving recovery in complex infrastructure.

Large language models (LLMs) promise to accelerate incident response in production systems, yet single-agent approaches generate vague, unusable recommendations. We present MyAntFarm.ai, a reproducible containerized framework demonstrating that multi-agent orchestration fundamentally transforms LLM-based incident response quality. Through 348 controlled trials comparing single-agent copilot versus multi-agent systems on identical incident scenarios, we find that multi-agent orchestration achieves 100% actionable recommendation rate versus 1.7% for single-agent approaches, an 80 times improvement in action specificity and 140 times improvement in solution correctness. Critically, multi-agent systems exhibit zero quality variance across all trials, enabling production SLA commitments impossible with inconsistent single-agent outputs. Both architectures achieve similar comprehension latency (approx.40s), establishing that the architectural value lies in deterministic quality, not speed. We introduce Decision Quality (DQ), a novel metric capturing validity, specificity, and correctness properties essential for operational deployment that existing LLM metrics do not address. These findings reframe multi-agent orchestration from a performance optimization to a production-readiness requirement for LLM-based incident response. All code, Docker configurations, and trial data are publicly available for reproduction.

AI agents increasingly act through tools and delegated authority, but general incident repositories rarely capture the mechanisms needed to compare public failures with agent-security evaluations. We present the Agent Incident Registry (AIR) (Project page: https://enkryptai.com/air), a source-linked catalog containing 487 records of agent-related events disclosed from 2022 through 2026. Each record includes supporting evidence, a stable identifier, and missingness-aware labels for causal role, disclosure class, mechanism, and outcome. Among the 336 generative-system records in which the agent acted, 81 involved realized harm (24%). Realized outcomes concentrate in in-the-wild and safety-failure records, while responsible disclosures and research demonstrations are overwhelmingly demonstrated; the aggregate share therefore characterizes collection composition rather than deployment risk. After initial curation, a second human reviewer checked all 487 records and their existing labels for completeness and correctness. In a deployment-analogue audit, InjecAgent's 1,054 cases occupy three of AIR's twelve surfaces and are all attacker-triggered, whereas AIR contains 92 no-adversary safety failures. AIR supports source-grounded case retrieval and evaluation-scope auditing, not failure-rate or control-efficacy estimation.