AI Governance

Environmental controversies in global supply chains pose significant risks for global buyers. This study examines whether overseas suppliers' exposure to buyers' artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled environmental governance reduces supplier environmental controversies. Drawing on organizational information processing theory and signaling theory, we investigate how suppliers' exposure to AI-enabled governance influences their environmental controversies and the institutional contingencies under which this effect varies. Using text analysis to measure buyer AI-enabled environmental governance, we analyze panel data on 2,505 suppliers of U.S.-listed firms across 41 countries from 2020 to 2024 with multidimensional fixed-effects models. We find that suppliers' exposure to buyer AI-enabled environmental governance is negatively associated with supplier environmental controversies in the following year. This negative relationship is stronger in supplier countries with higher AI readiness and regulatory quality. The study contributes to research on AI-enabled sustainability governance and sustainable supply chain risk management.

Claims that Artificial Intelligence systems improve decisions, broaden access, reduce harm, or empower users can exceed what their evaluation establishes. Predictive performance alone does not establish safety, the presence of oversight does not establish meaningful control, and faster task completion does not establish understanding or choice. Evaluation must account for unreliable outputs and uneven performance, but also for overreliance, weakened recourse, and displaced human expertise. The harder questions are what the evidence warrants, which relations of power remain unexamined, and where measurement must stop. Assessing improvement requires examining what institutions value and the conditions AI is asked to address. AI is both revelation and intervention. Its use can reveal unmet human needs and assumptions about what matters. Once deployed, it can repair, compound, substitute for, or conceal existing failures. We develop a rupture test that evaluates deployment against explicit human and non-AI baselines. Drawing on Pope Leo XIV's Magnifica Humanitas, we examine dignity and the common good alongside questions of who owns AI infrastructure and who controls its use. These commitments shape judgments about improvement; evidence alone cannot establish moral or political legitimacy. We distinguish evidence-bounded deployment, which limits claims to what has been evaluated, from measurement-bounded governance, which records constraints that favorable evidence cannot override. RISE AI provides an evidence architecture for making bounded claims about Responsibility, Inclusivity, Safety, and Empowerment. It records what is claimed, who answers for it, what evidence supports it, and what would require the claim to be qualified, revised, or withdrawn.

AI literacy provides foundational competencies that support ethical, transparent, and sustainable technological development, although higher-order capabilities such as governance, critical evaluation, and strategic decision-making extend beyond basic literacy into advanced levels of AI competency. This study positions AI literacy as a governance capacity that complements and strengthens all 17 SDGs. It introduces a six-level taxonomy of artificial intelligence reasoning and ethics that extends traditional learning models by incorporating ethical judgement and strategic foresight. This taxonomy forms the foundation of an integrated framework linking education, governance, and sustainable development. A survey of 300 participants from diverse professional backgrounds within a national context which reveals strong technical awareness but limited ethical and governance readiness, highlighting critical gaps in public capacity to manage artificial intelligence responsibly. Findings show that ethical reasoning and reflective thinking are the strongest predictors of sustainable and trustworthy artificial intelligence use. The study proposed to embed literacy-based competencies into curricula, institutional policies, and governance mechanisms to accelerate equitable and responsible progress toward sustainable development goals

Compute governance today is a governance of training: the thresholds, reporting requirements, and frontier-AI regimes now in force attach to training compute and treat the trained model as the regulatory unit. That picture is incomplete: capability increasingly migrates to the deployment stage through inference-time scaling, agentic scaffolding, and compression onto consumer hardware. This paper asks which mechanisms are available once the regulatory object shifts from the training run to the inference call. We develop a feasibility taxonomy of twenty inference-time mechanisms across monitoring, verification, and enforcement, each rated on a four-point readiness scale against a documented four-vendor evidence base. We then stress the taxonomy against a two-dimensional adversary model (three capability tiers crossed with four adversary roles) and map each mechanism to four governance scenarios (domestic regulation, bilateral or multilateral coordination, industry self-regulation, and compute-marketplace governance). Fifteen of the twenty mechanisms have commercial technical substrates in production today, although governance-grade assurance and adversarial robustness vary substantially. The adversary analysis shows that this readiness holds only against a cooperative deployer and a low-to-medium-capability user: no mechanism rates adequate against a high-capability state-level deployer, and fine-tuning removes the model-internal components of the enforcement cluster, although platform-external controls can persist. A substitution analysis connects the taxonomy to a companion hardware paper as a conditional substitution principle describing when inference-stage and hardware-stage mechanisms provide comparable regulatory coverage under stated conditions. A second-rater reliability check on a random subset of the readiness ratings returned a quadratic-weighted Cohen's kappa of 0.74.

Algorithmic outputs now populate the digital environments through which contemporary life is organized. The role of law in facilitating and constituting (rather than merely responding to) these processes is gaining increasing traction across scholarly accounts. This inquiry traces the evolution of algorithmic outputs attending to their legal underpinnings and social implications, surfacing the mutations of machine speech. The first mutation redefined speech as data to be queried: search engines transformed the web from a space of information retrieval into an economic regime of algorithmic visibility. The second mutation reframed speech as engagement: social media platforms fused moderation with amplification, turning expression into a metric of attention, governed by corporate architectures. The third mutation emerges in conversational systems and interfaces, where generative text displaces information retrieval, bringing with it dense technolegal entanglements and profound epistemic consequences. Scholars of freedom of expression, informational privacy, and communication studies have long grappled with these dynamics, yet their implications for broader legal thought have also become urgent. This piece seeks to organize and clarify the evolving debate around algorithmic speech, making this critical but often fragmented discourse more accessible to wider legal and interdisciplinary audiences. In doing so, it bridges the gap between observing technological transformation and critically assessing the constitutive role of law within it, offering a conceptual resource for researchers, students, policymakers, and practitioners navigating and contesting this evolving landscape.

Generative and agentic AI are reshaping both the production and evaluation of scientific research. These developments are often studied separately, as questions of how AI can produce research and how AI can review it. We argue that this separation misses an increasingly important feature of scholarly publishing: changes on one side alter the incentives, constraints, and behavior of the other. We synthesize 230 scholarly publications and institutional records using a taxonomy of six connected dynamics: production scaling, evaluation automation, evaluation manipulation, defense mechanisms and policy responses, evasion and side effects, and long-horizon ecosystem feedback. The literature shows an emerging progression in which cheaper and faster research production increases pressure on evaluation, AI-mediated evaluation becomes more scalable and repeatable, participants can exploit evaluator regularities, and institutions respond with technical safeguards and policy controls. These responses can in turn induce evasion, redistribute errors and workload, and shape the scholarly records reused by future research and evaluation systems. Evidence is strongest for production and evaluation at scale, reproducible manipulation, and institutional response, while post-policy adaptation and artifact-level long-horizon feedback remain less directly observed. This systems view shifts attention from isolated AI capabilities toward how scholarly actors and AI systems adapt to one another over time.

Artificial intelligence in recruitment has shifted the object being automated from profile pairs and ranked lists to multi-stage workflows that retrieve evidence, compare candidates, and support or execute actions. This systematized narrative review traces that development from bilateral retrieval and behavioral ranking through neural person--job matching, large language model (LLM) components, and tool-using recruiting agents. Using a purposive search and coding protocol updated through 23 July 2026, plus targeted updates through 2 September 2026, we organize 40 representative works with supporting industrial and legal sources. This synthesis is not a prevalence estimate. We analyze three coupled transitions: from similarity to reciprocal suitability, from a model to a compound workflow, and from offline prediction to evidence- and productivity-aligned evaluation. Across document understanding, retrieval, ranking, assessment, interviewing, sourcing, and human handoff, we distinguish field-, pair-, list-, case-, trajectory-, and outcome-level evidence. Persistent gaps arise because behavioral labels confound exposure, preference, and qualification; private and synthetic data limit external validity; final-output scores conceal pipeline failures; and, within the coded set, privacy is not directly evaluated and no row jointly evaluates utility, fairness, privacy, and security. These observations describe the coded set rather than the field as a whole. We therefore introduce a staged mapping from evaluation evidence to the strongest defensible claim, together with an agenda for reciprocal, evidence-grounded, temporally controlled, selective, and auditable systems. Progress should be judged by whether workflows retrieve the right evidence, preserve uncertainty, support contestable decisions, and improve outcomes under explicit cost and risk constraints.

Federated learning is increasingly presented as a privacy-preserving advance: personal data remain on the device, and only model updates are shared. It borrows the vocabulary of the federated social web, yet inverts its logic, distributing computation while the resulting model stays with whoever convened the training. We argue that federation is not in itself a remedy for extractive AI, because outcomes depend on who governs the data and the model and who has agency over the practices that shape them. We describe three layers at which a creative community can hold its work: storage, circulation, and learning. Examining artist-governed trusts, cooperatives, and consent infrastructures, we show that creator governance is established at storage and circulation but stops at learning: contributors can consent to training, yet have little say over the resulting model or its federation. We map the research space this opens, pairing technical open problems with the human questions from which they unfold. We propose four design principles for a creative data commons that governs models and their federation, not only datasets: govern the model, not only the corpus; make the terms legible at the moment of contribution; design for refusal as a first-class state; and decide stewardship in the open and account for it.

Frontier AI systems function as \emph{constitutional institutions}: each deployed model encodes an implicit ranking among safety, helpfulness, honesty, autonomy, and equity. We ask whether the supply of frontier constitutional types covers human demand. Combining a paraphrase-controlled audit of the as-shipped default constitutions of $23$ frontier LLM archetypes with a pairwise-tradeoff study of $1{,}649$ US participants on the same instrument, we report three facts. \emph{Demand is broad}: it spans all five values, with the largest constituency under one-third. \emph{Supply is narrow and drifting}: the $23$-archetype hull occupies ${\sim}2\%$ of the demand hull under conservative noise-matched estimation ($0.10\%$ at full audit precision), no archetype puts helpfulness or autonomy first ($37\%$ of users are constitutionally homeless), and across six model families autonomy decreases in $5/6$, equity increases in $5/6$, and safety increases in $4/6$, with monotone within-family version trends (order-permutation $p = 0.013$) and the autonomy decline concentrated in scenarios where safety is not at stake. The drift's importance is directional: \emph{away} from a value already undercovered, mechanically worsening the welfare floor for the least-served users. \emph{The fix is sparse}: a $2$-vertex menu $\{e_{\mathrm{HON}}, e_{\mathrm{AUT}}\}$ beats the full $23$-archetype frontier by $47\%$ on mean regret (CI $[43\%, 52\%]$); three vertex additions cut mean/worst-group regret by up to $81\%$/$64\%$. We formalize these findings as a budgeted-pluralism trilemma, show the binding regime is empirically realized, and verify the conclusions are robust to distance-based welfare and to degraded routing. The instrument and audit harness are described in full in the appendices.

Enterprise artificial intelligence is increasingly embedded in decisions that must remain lawful, explainable, adaptable, and accountable despite personnel turnover, model replacement, regulatory change, and shifting organizational incentives. Existing governance frameworks provide important principles but do not by themselves supply a compact mathematical language for evaluating whether an institution can preserve sound judgment over time. This paper develops a design-science framework for institutional legacy: the durable capacity of a decision system to continue producing beneficial, lawful, explainable, and adaptable outcomes after its original designers have stepped away. The framework contributes: (i) a normalized Legacy Score based on a penalized geometric mean of knowledge retention, governance, human oversight, adaptability, feedback learning, and jurisdictional fidelity; (ii) Decision Confidence and Decision Risk models separating evidentiary confidence from consequence; (iii) authority-aware retrieval and calibrated abstention; (iv) Decision Memory for governed organizational learning; (v) Regulatory Change Velocity mapping change exposure to review intervals; and (vi) a federated regulatory knowledge-graph architecture preserving provenance and legal hierarchy. The paper also proposes eight AI Decision Integrity Rules, an evaluation protocol, and a reproducible computational demonstration. The demonstration combines a deterministic stress test with 200 Monte Carlo replications of 10,000 synthetic decisions each, illustrating Legacy Score non-compensation and comparing consequence- and authority-aware routing with a matched-coverage confidence-only baseline. The contribution remains conceptual rather than field-validated; the simulation tests internal behavior, not production performance, and all parameters require context-specific calibration.

AI compute verification is one of the first tangible and tractable points for international policy aimed at AI governance. Determining whether frontier labs, or any operator, comply with agreements requires the regulating authority to discern how their compute is used. The elementary building block of AI compute is the GPU, and any activity it executes leaves a physical trace. Here, we show that an external observer can identify the class of the workload running on an NVIDIA H200 from its power draw. Unlike on-chip NVML telemetry, which can be spoofed or replayed, such a physical channel can in principle be observed independently of operator cooperation. We recorded $930$ five-second traces at $\sim 10$ MHz, covering seventeen open LLM families and twenty-five non-AI workloads. Over this corpus we separate training from inference and from non-AI computation with an accuracy of $97\%$ and a macro-averaged F1 score of $0.955$, evaluated on model families unseen during training. AI workload spectral content predominantly lies below $\sim 20$kHz and training is particularly recognizable through the memory-bound optimizer update. The GPU operator is then treated as adversarial and able to reshape the physical computation itself. Four evasion strategies are tested to disguise training as inference, producing an additional 680 adversarial traces. A detector hardened against evasion strategies, with the tested strategy held out, catches training $\geq 99\%$ of the time for three of the four strategies. The fourth, diluted low-rank adaptation (LoRA), is detected $48$--$88\%$ of the time with a hardened classifier, rising to $\geq 98\%$ with an additional rescue rule. While these attacks are not a comprehensive evaluation against adversarial behaviour, they offer initial insights beyond genuine activities and a dataset for developing and testing stronger evasion mechanisms.

Artificial intelligence (AI) and natural language processing (NLP) are increasingly used to extract, integrate, and interpret biomedical knowledge relevant to cancer genomics, yet their translation into routine clinical oncology has been comparatively slow. The central challenge is not computational capability alone, but trustworthy integration into clinical workflows. This review examines how NLP and AI support the cancer genomics pipeline, from literature mining and automated variant interpretation to clinical trial matching, knowledge graph construction, and multimodal data integration. We identify four interrelated translational failure domains: evidence inconsistency, explainability and uncertainty, data governance and reproducibility, and interoperability. Rather than considering these challenges in isolation, we take a systems-level view, focusing on their interaction across the translational pathway. We propose a conceptual framework and roadmap for addressing these domains through rigorous validation, uncertainty-aware methods, interoperable infrastructures, regulatory alignment, and human oversight across the AI lifecycle. Progress toward routine clinical use will depend less on further improving model capability than on systematically addressing these interacting failure domains from development through deployment and post-deployment monitoring.

As artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly integrated into social-emotional learning (SEL) initiatives, the need for evidence-based policy has become paramount. We systematically reviewed 65 peer-reviewed papers that examine the intersection of AI and SEL to investigate how these studies articulate policy implications. Our analysis revealed a substantial "policy deficit" in the current AI x SEL literature: nearly three-quarters of the studies did not mention policy implications at all. Using the "WH-question" framework (Who, What, Why, When/Where, and How), we map the policy implications narratives present in the literature and show that they often lack the specificity and actor-oriented guidance required for effective evidence-informed policymaking. We find a significant association between publication venue and policy engagement, suggesting that current academic incentive structures may prioritize technical innovation and pedagogical feasibility over explicit engagement with governance and regulation. This study identifies a "techno-solutionist" trap, where technical potential is foregrounded while the institutional conditions for responsible implementation remain under-specified. We conclude by proposing a shift from "implication-as-afterthought" to "implication-as-methodology" and offer a set of actionable guidelines for researchers, editors, reviewers, and policymakers to bridge the gap between AI innovation and educational governance. Rather than presenting policy as a generic ethical horizon, we argue that AI-SEL studies should systematically specify Who should act, What actions are recommended, Why these actions are needed, When and Where they apply, and How strongly they are framed, thereby strengthening the translation of AI x SEL innovation into educational policy and practice.

A small number of firms based in two states produce the most capable frontier AI models. The governments of those states have shown both the legal power and the political will to decide which other countries may use these systems. In June 2026 the United States required a leading developer to obtain licences before releasing its most advanced models to any foreign person, including foreign nationals resident in the United States. The affected models were withdrawn worldwide at short notice, partly because the restriction proved impractical to administer. This followed within months of the first documented case of a largely autonomous, AI-run cyber espionage campaign, and coincided with mounting evidence that frontier models alter the economics of both cyber attack and cyber defence. This article examines how these two developments interact, and situates them within the unusual market dynamics now driving large-scale AI development. It argues that access to frontier AI is becoming part of national cyber defence, that such access can be revoked, and that the obvious remedy of sovereign capability remains only partly feasible for all but a handful of states. Drawing on evidence about training costs, the concentration of computing power and the support offered by national AI programmes, it asks what sovereignty can realistically mean for small and middle powers, and for large powers as well. The article proposes a layered strategy: negotiated access guarantees, sovereignty at the level of inference, hedging with open-weight models, pooled regional capability, sustained talent development and continued investment in basic cyber resilience. The open-weight hedge proves at once more capable and more politically exposed than is commonly assumed. Much of the near-term risk lies in how capable models are deployed and contained rather than in their apparent performance.

Algorithm registers have been championed as a means of providing transparency on the use of algorithms in public services. Yet potential publics differ in their expectations of what should be made transparent and how, as well as in their interest in and ability to parse the information currently published in the registers. Moreover, it remains unclear how these instruments can represent the sociotechnical systems in which these algorithms are embedded, and how system-level transparency can facilitate accountability. In this paper, we ask, what do algorithm registers reveal (and occlude) about the sociotechnical systems governing algorithmic systems, and how can diverse stakeholder perspectives inform a more pluralistic system-theoretic safety analysis? To do this, we probe the municipal algorithm register of a Dutch city through a case study of a decision-support tool for caseworkers' assessment of citizens' welfare benefits eligibility based on legal automation through a business rule engine. Through interviews, surveys, and participatory system mapping workshops (with municipal staff, civil society organisations, and ombudsmen, N=8), we seek to understand to what extent the register allows stakeholders to map the algorithmic system in question. These maps inform a System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) that situates the register within a wider sociotechnical governance structure. Participants' contributions allow us to identify potential safety hazards which would not have been possible to see using the algorithm register alone, including benefits eligibility denial, system performance deterioration, and inability to contest wrongful decisions. By engaging both direct and indirect stakeholders, we reflect on the normative dimensions of algorithm governance efforts and how politics shape the practice of system safety analysis.

The growing role of AI-generated content and AI-enabled systems in public communication has led regulators to demand clear disclosure of content provenance and AI involvement. But the effects of such disclosures remain uncertain. We test two disclosure approaches in their impact on an AI chatbot's persuasive appeal. In a preregistered experiment, 1,500 UK adults held a short conversation with a persuasive chatbot about one of 60 policy issues. The chatbot was identical for everyone. We randomized the disclosure that people received: nothing (control), a prominent disclosure that they were interacting with an AI (T1), or that disclosure plus the chatbot's persuasive intent and instructions (T2). The chatbot shifted attitudes by 12.6 points on a 100-point scale in the control group. The AI-identity disclosure was practically equivalent to no disclosure, with a 13.1-point shift, whereas the additional intent disclosure cut the persuasive effect roughly in half to 6.3 points. It also made participants view the campaign's methods as less acceptable and support stronger penalties against it. For direct chatbot interactions, transparency about AI identity alone does not meaningfully impact its influence. While current rules emphasize what a system is, our results show why the regulation of persuasive AI must also address what the system is trying to do.

Financial institutions are delegating consequential decisions to agentic AI systems that decompose goals, coordinate models and tools, and act with little oversight. Yet agentic AI governance in FinTech is under-investigated. We argue the binding governance constraint is not capability but verifiability. We define the Verifiability Gap as the shortfall between the verification delegated authority demands and the explainability and reproducibility retained after a decision. It is indexed to a verifier, evidentiary standard, and audit lag. We develop a multilevel governance theory for agentic AI and test its mechanisms in three studies over nine model versions, from a three-billion-parameter local model to a commercial frontier system. Study 1 shows that provider releases alter historical financial actions, and that the controls replay needs belong to the provider: the frontier model rejects temperature, top_p and top_k outright and exposes no random seed. Under the tightest controls each endpoint allows, a local model reproduced 320 of 320 executions, hosted models 319 of 320 and 959 of 960. Study 2 shows that orchestration is a latent policy layer. Architecture changes final actions, and no execution record repeated in any configuration at any scale. The frontier model reproduces its own actions more often than the local ones, its record no better, and loses a comparable share of its differentiation. Capability buys a higher starting point, not auditability. Study 3 shows two deterministic credit-model versions each reproduce their current action perfectly, yet the current cannot recover a historical one. We conceptualize reproducibility as a governance profile, not a scalar, yielding evidence-contingent delegation: authority is defensible only while retained evidence substantiates its exercise. Beyond finance, the framework extends to other high-stakes domains requiring auditability.

Governments worldwide have responded to the rapid expansion of AI by publishing national and regional AI strategies. Comparing national and regional AI strategies to identify their convergences and divergences can uncover their common practices, understand regional variations, and provide policy designers a comprehensive set of policy design elements for their ongoing AI strategy developments. Yet, existing work has not examined their underlying policy design elements or assessed whether those elements are horizontally (country-to-country) or vertical (region-to-country) converging or diverging over time. This paper addresses that gap by coding and analyzing 74 national and 3 regional AI strategies drawn from a global scan of all 205 UN member and non-member states. The coding used a latent-inductive approach organized around three functional policy design elements: goals, approaches, and principles. Two research questions guided the analysis: to what degree are national AI strategies becoming horizontally convergent or divergent over time; and to what degree are national strategies becoming vertically convergent or divergent with those countries' regional AI strategy. Results indicate strong horizontal convergence around economic competitiveness, research support, and ethical AI use, alongside persistent divergence in human rights goals, participatory governance approaches, and human-centric principles. Across the three regions, the AU exhibits the highest vertical convergence, the EU demonstrated strong alignment on regulatory and economic priorities but diverges on human-centric values, and the Nordic-Baltic Region displays mixed vertical convergence. These findings offer policy designers a comprehensive evidence base for identifying emerging AI policy design choice norms as AI strategies are developed and updated.

The increasing use of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) in journalism raises concerns about possible detrimental effects both on journalism and its democratic function. We explore these risks through a case study of GenAI in Norwegian Newsrooms during the 2025 parliamentary election campaign. Based on interviews with managers and journalists over a ten-month period, we analyse how ambitious visions fared in the face of technological and practical challenges. We highlight the risk of an internal threat stemming from the journalists' own use of AI, contrasting the dominant focus on external disinformation threats. We show how newsroom managers shared sociotechnical imaginaries resulting in unrealistically optimistic beliefs about the capabilities of the technology and the pace of development, leading to plans for audience-facing GenAI services collapsing and giving way to more mundane uses of GenAI tools internally in the newsrooms. Furthermore, we identify a vulnerability in the newsroom's resilience against GenAI influence: a GenAI Catch-22. In order to monitor the GenAI tools and prevent errors and undue influence, newsrooms rely on human expertise. But by using GenAI extensively, the newsrooms risk a deterioration of human expertise, preventing them from monitoring the GenAI systems adequately.

Two instruments of EU digital law place inference at their centre and mean different things by it. Article 3(1) of the AI Act uses the capability to infer constitutively: it is the central feature separating the regulated category from conventional software. The GDPR never defines inference, yet governs it protectively: the consequences follow from the processing of personal data and from what the inference says about, or does to, a person, whether or not the technology that produced it qualifies as an AI system. The two perimeters are not concentric. Their non-coincidence remained invisible in single-shot systems; agentic architectures make it operationally acute. The thesis: inferential capability does not determine legal scope, and its absence does not create immunity. The framework is two-level. Inference performs two legal functions, constitutive and protective; the protective function operates through three pathways - identificatory, attributive and decisional. Composition is not a fourth pathway but a cross-cutting architectural dimension which, with reach, persistence and reviewability, is what agentic architectures modify. Three concepts support it: the inferential threshold, the inferential reach and the inferential chain, mapped onto the chain of imputation. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 left the constitutive criterion untouched and inserted a provision contemplating outputs that influence the inputs of future operations, without supplying any rule of aggregation. The article proposes an interpretive rule, a compositional-effects test identifying the decision unit under Article 22 GDPR together with the allocation of the burden of establishing it, and documentation duties calibrated to inference chains.

Responsible AI (RAI) has become a central concern for technology companies, regulators, and the public. How industry practitioners interpret, implement, and sustain RAI work directly shapes the design and deployment of AI systems. As empirical scholarship examining RAI practices in industry has rapidly expanded, findings are dispersed across studies that focus on different roles, organizational contexts, and interventions. This work synthesizes current knowledge through a literature review of 161 empirical studies spanning six years, each engaging industry practitioners via interviews, surveys, workshops, ethnographies, and other methods. Our synthesis reveals both meaningful progress and persistent challenges in industry RAI practice. Practitioner awareness has increased, RAI activities have become more professionalized, and interventions such as toolkits and guidelines are more widely adopted. At the same time, practitioners continue to face substantial barriers, including limited training, uneven organizational support, and a lack of interventions tailored to day-to-day work practices. By consolidating and organizing these findings, we provide a more complete account of industry RAI than any single study to date. We conclude by discussing implications for RAI researchers, practitioners seeking to adopt effective practices, and policymakers aiming to ground governance efforts in the realities of industry contexts.

With the rapid diffusion of AI-generated content, AI-driven misinformation is becoming increasingly pervasive and difficult to govern, undermining information credibility and social trust. This study models the strategic interdependence among a government regulator, an AI enterprise, and users through a three-party evolutionary game that incorporates heterogeneous rewards and punishments. From the resulting replicator equations, we characterize the evolutionary stability of competing governance and production strategies. The analysis indicates that neither unilateral regulation nor market incentives alone can effectively curb misinformation. Instead, an evolutionarily stable regime of real-information production arises only when regulatory rewards and punishment intensity, enterprise reputation loss, and user adoption incentives collectively surpass critical thresholds. The findings highlight the need for coordinated and adaptive policy mixes that align regulatory instruments with enterprise behavior and user uptake while managing governance costs.

Agentic AI promises a more flexible form of digital agency: systems that can act on users' behalf, from filtering content to negotiating prices to selecting services. Whether it will empower users is an open question, and we argue that the answer depends on more than the technology. We conduct a comparative case analysis of four more mature domains where similar forms of agency arose: browser-based ad blockers, platform recommender systems, financial robo-advisors, and email spam governance. Across the cases, decisions about whose interests agents would serve were resolved through technical arrangements: API choices, protocol governance, industry standards, and default configurations. Beyond their technical form, these were political decisions. We identify this as depoliticization, a concept from political theory, here at work in technological systems. Its most consequential effect is that individual outcomes and collective contestation capacity can move in opposite directions: spam inbox quality improved substantially while the organized capacity to contest spam governance collapsed. Where intermediary institutions sustained adversarial challenge, user-aligned agency proved more durable; where proprietary infrastructure and closed standard-setting absorbed contestation, displacement compounded. We apply this to agentic AI, where governance arrangements consolidating around the Model Context Protocol and the Agentic AI Foundation are settling these configurations before the choices that define what agents can do move outside the reach of users and the public.

The use of e-commerce mobile applications is expanding in Nigeria, creating both opportunities and risks, including fraud and reduced user control over digital technologies, raising concerns about digital sovereignty. This research examines how Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Nigerian mobile applications affects digital sovereignty, examined through platform transparency as a key indicator of user awareness and control. Using an interpretive approach, the research combines the forensic analysis of selected Android applications with contextual document analysis to identify AI features and evaluate disclosure practices. The findings show that AI is widely implemented in the applications, yet transparency about its use remains limited. A socio-economic analysis of Nigeria further shows an increasing dependence on consumer digital platforms, moderate AI awareness, and uneven patterns of interaction. By providing empirical evidence on AI transparency and platform practices, this study advances understanding of individual digital sovereignty and highlights challenges for protecting user control in AI-driven digital environments.

We give a formal mechanism design model for the continuous participatory governance of a deployed AI agent. The mechanism is built on the principle that governance should control an AI agent through resource allocation so as to make authorization self enforcing via compute budgets. The mechanism seeks to establish the Safe AI paradigm that compute is an effective governance lever. We situate our work as a compliance or commons overlay on a deployer. One governance period is an extensive form game in which verified human stakeholders arrive sequentially and contribute, on a provision or a rejection market, in a governance currency that is deliberately distinct from the agents compute. A funding aggregator turns raw contributions into breadth weighted effective supports - a two threshold gate with hysteresis converts net support into a binary authorization that, through a coupling map bounded by an exogenously certified safety ceiling, releases a metered compute budget - realized in hardware as a signed compute license so that the decision is self-enforcing. We characterize the class of agents the mechanism can govern and isolate manipulation of the governing electorate by the governed agent as the central open problem. We also introduce several challenges addressing manipulation of governing electorate by the governed agents.

The life sciences and health research have started to benefit from artificial intelligence, which raises ethical concerns that are real but, we argue, not special. Any science should be governed by values that rest on how the human brain is built and socialised rather than anything distinct to artificial intelligence. Importantly, the human brain has a different, much less costly computational architecture than these machines. This is achieved through the orchestration of a global neuronal workspace, and through reward best described not as a quantity to be maximised but as a continuous cycle of wanting, liking and satiety. As such, this creates the deep tension running through the ethics of the human person, between the universality of ethical judgement and the diversity of morals. The brain networks of the global workspace and emotion are universally shared, but the diversity of content is shaped by epigenetic appropriation of the particulars of the physical, social and cultural world, which makes every person unique. Still, if we were to build machines on these principles rather than the present unaffordable reward maximisers, the question of their governance would change from restraint to upbringing. We set out the institutions such a future would require, together with the questions that remain open.

AI tools are being increasingly adopted in policing in the UK and worldwide. Racial bias is a known and well-documented risk, yet representatives of affected communities are rarely included in decisions about AI adoption. We present results from a mixed-stakeholder deliberation workshop bringing together 30 community representatives, police officers, and academics to assess the risks of 13 AI use cases in policing, with an explicit focus on racial bias. We found that participants were broadly open to AI adoption, rejecting only three use cases outright, most notably recidivism risk assessment, where objections targeted the premise rather than the implementation. Our analysis reveals that foregrounding racial equity did not narrow the deliberation. Instead, discussions gravitated toward a fundamental set of questions: does this tool actually work, will it deliver genuine benefit, and will that benefit extend to everyone? This integrated reasoning, reminiscent of the curb-cut effect in inclusive design, highlights the benefit of incorporating the racial bias lens into the risk-benefit analysis of AI use cases from the outset.

Large language models are being integrated into critical infrastructure and enterprise workflows at unprecedented scale,yet the lifecycle frameworks governing their development and operations were designed for operational efficiency rather than security analysis. As a result, security-relevant activities such as data provenance verification, artifact signing, agentic permission control, and decommissioning are often left implicit or assumed to receive due care. Governance frameworks, in turn, organise requirements around risk levels or management processes without clearly linking them to the lifecycle stages where they apply. This paper addresses both deficiencies. We propose a lifecycle model for LLM systems that supports security analysis by structuring it around security-relevant boundaries rather than workflow optimisation. The model comprises 32 stages across four core pipeline layers (Data, Model, Distribution, Application), supported by a 12-stage LLMOps pillar and a 9-category governance pillar. Thirteen stages are introduced here as separate units because they expose distinct security concerns that existing frameworks do not clearly distinguish. A governance mapping synthesising the NIST AI RMF, the EU AI Act, and ISO/IEC 42001 reveals a structural property of the current regulatory landscape: governance evidence concentrates at deployment-facing stages, where systems are visible to regulators, while the most consequential decisions, data selection, alignment strategy, and capability boundaries, are made at development-facing stages, where regulatory visibility is lowest.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming high-skilled domains, requiring higher education institutions (HEI) to balance the teaching of foundational principles with the integration of emerging tools to ensure workforce readiness. While HEI are increasingly adopting AI, many continue to grapple with how it should be incorporated into curricula and governed through policy, especially when such policies are set at different levels of an institution. This research analyzes AI policies across HEI from 34 states in the United States to investigate what these policies entail and how policies set across institutions as well as within different levels at an institution differ. Using natural language processing (NLP) to analyze institutional AI policies, we find a clear divergence: university-level policies emphasize data security and risk mitigation whereas school-level policies, when present, focus on pedagogical applications and tool usage. When focusing on business school specific policies, relatively few business schools maintain AI policies distinct from university frameworks, creating misalignment with discipline-specific learning objectives. This gap poses challenges particularly for faculty and students as well as for accreditation purposes. Our insights suggest that guidelines should be aligned with broader institutional policies while addressing discipline-specific learning objectives and evolving workforce demands.

As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to evolve and mature, recent AI practices have moved beyond large language models (LLMs) and text or image generation tasks, increasingly integrating tools, agents, and harnesses to solve real business and industrial problems. However, the power of AI is not verified under these real-world complex systems for various reasons, considering reliability, feasibility, resilience, and responsibility requirements in real commercial and industrial operations. This study synthesizes adjacent research and introduces Enactive AI as a conceptual framework for enterprise and industry reasoning, site-level decision support, and execution feedback. Four complementary roles organize the framework: an Organizational World defines operations management logic and an organizational behavior world model behind an enterprise from a strategic-institutional horizon; a Site World defines a physically bounded industrial optimization and execution world model from an operational-realization horizon; Schema Intelligence provides the coupling mechanism between two world models to weave various AI applications via two models; and Enactive Decision Cycle triggers the self-evolving dynamic process to update and audit the entire framework. By foregrounding decision intelligence in complex systems, Enactive AI expands the frontier of AI from model capability to system-aware action, opening new possibilities for scalable, governable, and socially valuable AI deployment. Enactive AI points toward a future in which AI progress is measured not only by what models can generate or automate, but by how reliably intelligent systems can support consequential action, responsible governance, and durable social value in the complex systems that shape modern life, which we believe will define the next frontier of AI research for enterprise-level and industrial complex systems.