Computational Cognitive Modeling

We demonstrate how emotional valence influences the order-dependent structure of children's recognition memory: correct recall of a sequence of emotionally-valenced toys depended not just on the valence of a given toy itself, but also on the valence of the toys shown before and after it. Whilst standard psychological models confirm that order-dependence differs across an event (a set of toys shown in sequence), accuracy is low and the model does not reflect how memory for an emotional object influences others in the set. A classical tensor network model factoring in valence is able to achieve a 77.98% accuracy in modelling the results of the study. While not strictly a ``quantum cognition'' model, this massive increase in accuracy shows the value of quantum-inspired methods for modelling order-dependent phenomena, such as emotional memory. Further, the task protocol we introduce presents a novel, real-world tool for exploring emotional temporal memory in children for analysis using classical and quantum-like models of cognition.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) tend to produce longer reasoning traces for problems on which humans also spend more time. This correspondence suggests a shared sensitivity to difficulty, yet difficult problems can invite both persistence and withdrawal. We distinguish difficulty registration, expressed in which problems elicit more deliberation, from the allocation of further work. We examine their relation in matched human and LRM data from visual abstraction, intuitive physics, and relational reasoning. On visual abstraction, model trace length tracks the human ordering of problems by duration. After item identity is controlled, successful human attempts last longer than failed attempts, while failed LRM attempts have longer traces than successful ones in the pooled model analysis. The estimated outcome slopes follow the same pattern in intuitive physics. In relational reasoning, successful attempts are longer in separate human and model analyses. Fitting the two groups together with shared item effects yields a human-LRM difference in the relation between duration and outcome. Human grid actions connect longer attempts with sustained task engagement. Failed LRM traces contain more hedging or repetition after length is controlled, with the form of the difference varying across tasks. A resource-rational account explains how the expected reducibility of uncertainty and the value assigned to further computation can produce different patterns of persistence despite similar sensitivity to difficulty. Agreement about which problems require more deliberation can therefore coexist with different patterns of persistence on those problems.

AI-based scientific automation is increasingly possible by using agents to generate hypotheses, design experiments, and analyze data. Data collection is a major bottleneck in this pipeline, however. Psychology, and computational cognitive science in particular, is well-positioned to benefit from AI experimentation because theories are often represented as code and crowdsourcing platforms enable programmatic human data collection at scale. Here, we apply automated discovery techniques to the project of generating theories in computational cognitive science, with an agent-based system collecting human data independently through crowdsourced survey experiments. As a testbed, we use a classic case study from cognitive psychology: judging which sequences of coin flips seem subjectively more random. Our system, auto-psych, uses nested agent-based discovery loops to generate explanatory theories of human behavior. The inner loop conjectures, fits, and critiques probabilistic cognitive models; the outer loop designs experiments to test these models, launches them online, and analyzes the data. This system can quickly and reliably recover ground-truth theories from synthetic data via systematic experimentation, but the nested structure is critical to model performance. Further, in three independent sequences of human experiments, the system finds theories that fit the data better than theories generated from the scientific literature. This work thus demonstrates the feasibility of automated data collection and theory discovery in computational cognitive science.

Across the sciences, autonomous systems are increasingly being used in closed-loop discovery, proposing new theories and designing and running experiments to test them. This approach is yet to be applied in the field of cognitive science, where the central bottleneck is theory-building: the creative step of turning the accumulated failures of existing models into better ones. Theory generation has remained manual even as data collection, modeling, and experiment design have been automated. We present the Automated Cognitive Scientist (AutoCog), a fully autonomous agentic-AI system that closes this loop. Large-language-model agents advocate competing theories, each expressed as an executable cognitive model, design experiments that best discriminate them, collect behavioral data from participants recruited online, score theories against collected data based on their generative performance, diagnose why they fail, and synthesize a better successor. Repeating this cycle allows them to search the space of theories, models, and experiments. In the domain of decision-making, AutoCog recovered known decision-making strategies from simulated behavior, including unconventional ones, showing that its discoveries are ultimately driven by the data rather than strictly bound by the priors of the underlying language models. When run with human participants, it produced theories that outperformed the established theories it was seeded with and generalized to held-out studies in two different experimental settings. It also surfaced a novel theory of multi-cue decision-making in which choices show diminishing sensitivity to feature values. The distinctive predictions of this theory were confirmed in a preregistered study with new participants. AutoCog demonstrates how an automated discovery system can be used to turn cognitive theory-building into an explicit, executable, and cumulative science.

Predicting the timing of individual and collective panic emotional arousal before manifestation is essential for timely emergency intervention. Existing methods incorporate cognitive elements but none of them model emotion in the generative direction of the arousal process, leaving arousal timing undetermined. We argue that grounding prediction in appraisal emotion theory is necessary because it models this process explicitly in its natural generative direction, but three problems must be solved. (1) Appraisal theory posits that emotion arises from simultaneous evaluation across multiple threat dimensions, yet no prior work fuses these inputs into risk perception; (2) Existing models are trained in the opposite, behavior-bridged direction, recovering emotion merely as a post-hoc correlate of behavior; (3) Approaches that adopt LLMs as the primary decision-maker yet overlook the fragility and hallucination-proneness of their outputs. We introduce PanicCognitivePath (PCP) to address all three. A Psychological Safety Distance (PSD) model, grounded in psychological distance theory, maps four-domain signals (physical, social, cognitive, and informational) into a unified risk metric that gates entry to cognitive reasoning. An explicit Emotion node grounded in appraisal emotion theory is introduced into BDI, forming a novel Belief-Desire-Emotion-Intention (BDEI) pathway that couples threat appraisal directly to emotional arousal. Inverting the conventional LLM-as-decision-maker paradigm, PCP confines the LLM to parameter estimation for the Belief-to-Desire transition, restricting hallucinations to a single step and curbing their accumulation across steps. Experiments on Hurricane Sandy show PCP improves individual prediction accuracy by 10.68% over baselines, reduces peak count error to 7.07%.

The recent successes of neural networks producing human-like language have caused significant stir in cognitive science, with many researchers arguing that classical puzzles about human cognition and challenges to artificial intelligence are being solved by neural networks. A notable case is the argument from systematicity due to Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn, argues that humans display systematic biconditional dependencies. For example, someone can understand the sentence "John saw Mary" just in case that they understand the sentence "Mary saw John." Symbolic systems explain this systematicity of language and thought, while neural networks offer no immediate explanation. Several recent articles argue that this challenge has now been met by neural networks. In particular, Brenden Lake and Marco Baroni argue that their meta-learning for compositionality protocol matches and perhaps explains human systematicity. We demonstrate that these conclusions are premature. Among other results, we found that their model struggles to learn rules that are even slightly out of distribution compared to their training data. Furthermore, the model behaves unsystematically even on many within-distribution problems. We conclude that Fodor and Pylyshyn's challenge to neural networks remains unmet.

Human decision-making often involves choosing between multi-attribute alternatives, yet classical models assume fully compensatory utility aggregation despite evidence that people reject options with poor performance on critical attributes. We propose a bounded trade-off reasoning framework in which decisions are governed by a screening process that evaluates the balance between gains and losses across attributes. The model introduces a trade-off tolerance parameter that controls acceptable imbalance and can vary across contexts. Through simulation, we show that this mechanism produces preference patterns that differ from standard utility-based models and captures context-dependent variation in trade-off behavior. These results establish bounded trade-off screening as a plausible computational mechanism for multi-attribute choice and generate testable predictions for future behavioral studies.

Inferring others' beliefs requires more than reading surface signals; it requires tracking who told them what, in what order, and how credibly. The Theory of Mind Utility (ToM-U) formalizes this epistemic state inference problem at the computational level of analysis, specifying what mentalizing computes and why without commitment to algorithmic or neural implementation. ToM-U achieves this by constructing Local Epistemic World Models (LEWMs) -- directed typed graphs that represent agents, state nodes, and the epistemic relationships among them -- and evaluating discrete candidate LEWMs against observed behavior until one achieves sufficient confidence. Five formal definitions specify the LEWM structure, agent node properties including ordered information access history, a bounded proliferation mechanism for recursive mentalizing, three inference procedures, and a residue function that captures the structured trace left by failed mentalizing attempts. ToM-U differs from Bayesian Theory of Mind and adjacent formal accounts, which presuppose rather than derive belief states, and from simulation theory and theory-theory, which lack a formal apparatus for epistemic state inference. The architecture generates directional, falsifiable predictions about mentalizing failure that follow from structural properties of the model rather than auxiliary assumptions, and positions ToM-U as a domain-agnostic mechanism upstream of goal inference and other downstream social cognitive processes.

Breakthroughs in large language models and multimodal generation technologies have propelled the digital reconstruction of human mental traits, emotional patterns, and long-term memory from science fiction toward engineering practice. Yet current research and industry practices at the intersection of AI and digital humans remain hampered by fundamental conceptual ambiguities: the essential differences between next-generation intelligent agents and traditional virtual humans, the construction pathways for digital entities possessing self-identity, and the core technical and ethical challenges confronting this domain all demand urgent clarification. This paper systematically examines the transformative logic underlying the transition from traditional virtual humans to the Soul Computing'' paradigm, driven by frontier AI technologies. We first analyze the evolutionary patterns of human consciousness and memory mechanisms, reassessing the core value of massive multimodal digital fragments in the reverse reconstruction of individual mental worlds. On this basis, we formally delineate the academic connotations of narrow and broad Soul Computing for the first time, clarifying its academic boundaries and essential distinctions from Affective Computing, Historical Reconstruction, and Mortal Computation. We argue that Soul Computing systems must architecturally construct an Intensional'' core rather than serving as purely ``Extensional'' functional carriers, thereby enabling the fundamental transition of AI from toolhood to living agency.

Classical theories of cognition describe problem solving as exploratory search through structured problem spaces in which repeated interaction gradually compresses search into efficient representational structures. Predictive artificial intelligence systems introduce a distinct regime in which stabilization may occur before exploratory diversification unfolds, supplying solutions and decision trajectories prior to internally generated search. This paper develops a geometric dynamical framework in which attention evolves over a landscape of strategies shaped by stabilizing drift, endogenous exploratory perturbation, and responsiveness-gated learning. Predictive assistance is modeled as a process of exogenous exploratory compression that stabilizes trajectories before self-generated exploration broadens the accessible regions of strategy space. The framework yields three main results. First, sustained predictive stabilization reduces exploratory responsiveness by attenuating the effective influence of intrinsic perturbations even when exploratory variability remains present. Second, curvature accumulates and relaxes asymmetrically, producing hysteresis and delayed recovery of exploratory mobility after assistance withdrawal. Third, developmental outcomes depend critically on the timing of stabilization, with early intervention narrowing future exploratory traversal before broad representational diversification has occurred. The framework generates empirically testable predictions concerning exploratory entropy, premature convergence, and delayed recovery following predictive stabilization. More broadly, the results suggest that predictive systems may reshape the geometry of exploratory cognition itself.

Nearby neurons in cortex share similar response profiles, producing systematic spatial organization across sensory and cognitive systems. Recent topographic models reproduce aspects of this structure but remain unimodal and spatially constrain each layer separately, yielding fragmented maps that capture neither the contiguity of cortical processing streams nor their integration across modalities. We introduce Topo-Omni, a topographic multimodal model in which visual, auditory, and language/cognitive processing share a single contiguous in-silico sheet. Built by fine-tuning a pretrained foundation model with a spatial smoothness objective, this architecture develops clusters across modalities that are consistent with human neuroimaging, from sensory to cognitive systems. Driving or suppressing a cluster selectively biases or impairs perception, paralleling human intervention studies. Finally, we use our model to screen for novel clusters in-silico and discover new natural landscape and animal networks which we validate in human data. A single spatial principle thus organizes representations across modalities and processing stages, yielding testable hypotheses about cortical organization.

Digital learning environments record learners' responses to individual items, making it possible to study the development of specific skills rather than overall scores. Drawing conclusions about learning from these data requires a model that links responses to latent skills and tracks how mastery changes over time. When the skills measured by each item are unknown, the analyst must decide whether to estimate this structure, the Q-matrix, jointly with the learning process, or to establish it first and study learning afterwards. We show that this decision can change substantive conclusions about how learners develop. Using dynamic cognitive diagnostic models, we analyse data from two reading games measuring vocabulary and comprehension from Grade 2 to Grade 3, with item-text embeddings providing prior information for the unknown Q-matrix. A joint analysis and a bias-corrected stepwise analysis agree that most learners move toward mastering both skills, but disagree about how many remain only partially proficient at Grade 3, changing how reading progress would be reported. A simulation study identifies when the two analyses diverge and shows that joint analysis is more reliable when the item-skill structure is uncertain and the item pool changes between grades. We provide R code for both analyses.

The prefrontal cortex (PFC) maintains goal information for action planning, but how recurrent circuits preserve it in an action-usable form over behavioral timescales remains unclear. Here we ask whether short-term synaptic plasticity (STP) can stabilize goal information as action-usable, goal-conditioned dynamics. We incorporated STP into a PFC-inspired reservoir computing model with basal-ganglia-inspired temporal-difference readout learning, and evaluated paired models with and without STP across 100 independently generated networks in a multistep goal-directed action-selection task with delayed execution. Goal identity was highly decodable during the delay even without STP, so STP was not required to form a linearly readable goal representation. Under state noise, however, success without STP fell from 75.8% to 49.5%, whereas the model with STP remained essentially unchanged (91.8% without noise versus 89.2% under noise; paired Cohen's dz=1.31). Time-resolved decoding, state-space separability, and action-value-difference analyses showed that STP preserved goal information as action-relevant goal-conditioned dynamics available at later action opportunities. Gain-matched and STP-state perturbation controls argued against a simple fixed recurrent-scaling explanation and supported online, history-dependent synaptic modulation. Effective-connectivity analyses showed delay-period goal-specific patterning that increased toward the later part of the trial with STP, where it should be read as goal- and task-state-conditioned patterning; effective connectivity without STP was time-invariant. A grid search identified a facilitation-dominant range of STP time constants associated with high success rates. These results suggest that STP supports robust goal-conditioned dynamics through dynamic modulation of goal-dependent effective recurrent connectivity.

It has been proposed that the brain integrates flexible, computationally expensive cortical processing with simpler, lower-cost subcortical mechanisms to achieve resource-efficient performance greater than that of either system alone. Despite the allure of this perspective, satisfying theoretical frameworks that explore this hypothesis are still limited. We extend existing frameworks in which a model-based module and model-free module learn in tandem by explicitly constraining the memory resources of the model-based module, and investigate the impact of this constraint in a simple decision-making setting. Memory constraints naturally give rise to strategies for allocating memory resources. We evaluate the performance of different strategies in different situations and demonstrate that when the rewarded states change often, it can be advantageous for the model-based module to focus its memory resources not on exploiting the current reward, but on capturing general structure of the environment. This work provides a theoretical foundation for a functional dissociation between cortical and subcortical systems during learning: the cortex supports general structure learning, while subcortical circuits specialize in reward-based learning. We further detail how these hypotheses can be tested on experimental data.

Modern societies possess more information than ever before, yet they do not converge toward a single shared understanding. The same events, facts, laws, technologies, or risks can be interpreted as evidence of freedom, danger, exclusion, injustice, responsibility, or unrealized possibility. Existing discussions often treat such disagreement as a conflict of values, preferences, or beliefs. This paper argues that disagreement is already a late-stage phenomenon. The central premise is simple but not trivial: observation is not yet inference. Not every observation becomes inferentially relevant, and not every possible object in an observation sequence becomes an estimation target. A possible target becomes admissible only when a state representation can be constructed that is approximately sufficient for prediction, evaluation, or action with respect to that target. This paper develops a world-model theory of cognitive diversity and alignment by reconstructing recognition as the construction of such approximate sufficient statistics under finite informational, representational, observational, and action constraints. It formulates this position as the Multi-Phase Inference Assumption (MIA) and defines its core internal mechanism as the Multi-Phase Inference Mechanism (MIM). The framework introduces alignment maps and transformation loss to analyze how heterogeneous world models communicate without being collapsed into a single representation. World-model alignment is therefore processability, not agreement: the design of AI systems that help heterogeneous forms of intelligence remain mutually processable while preserving their distinct error-detection capacities.

Active sensing links behavior and learning through an action-perception loop: actions determine the observations used to update internal predictive models of perception, which subsequently guide the next actions. Predictive-coding frameworks provide a natural way to model this process, since internal representations are continuously updated to predict future observations. Here, we ask how exploratory and exploitative behavioral strategies shape these internal predictive representations. We build an online learning agent in a tree-like maze with a controllable parameter regulating the balance between exploratory and exploitative regimes. The agent updates a predictive-coding-based perception model from experience generated by its own behavior. The model predicts both future maze states and reward probability, allowing the agent to select actions either by expected information gain during exploration or by predicted reward during exploitation. We show that the resulting internal predictive representations depend strongly on the agent's behavioral regime. Exploratory agents develop representations that are more spatially organized and better preserve the structure of maze transitions in latent space. In contrast, exploitative agents learn less organized representations. We then train this predictive model on natural trajectories of water-deprived mice navigating the same maze and compare the resulting representations with those learned from agent trajectories. More exploratory mice show representational geometries that closely match those of exploratory agents, whereas mice with more restricted visitation patterns resemble reward-driven, exploitative agents. Together, these findings suggest that exploration enables predictive models to form generalized internal representations by organizing latent space around both spatial location and transition context in artificial agents and animals.

How do people build abstract, reusable knowledge from sequential experience under bounded cognitive resources? To answer this question, we integrate rate-distortion theory with recent advances in program induction to describe how prior knowledge shapes which future structures are cheap to encode and easy to discover. We formalize this in a hierarchical Adaptor Grammar (HAG) with distinct local (within-task) and global (across-task) libraries, governed jointly by constraints on memory and computation. In simulations, HAG achieves better rate-distortion trade-offs and stronger generalization than fixed grammars or shallow chunking methods. In an online melodic sequence-learning experiment, participants' recall errors reflected systematic simplifications and reaction times increased at inferred program boundaries. Trial-by-trial fits further showed that hierarchical libraries best explained individual differences in both recall and out-of-sample continuation choices, outperforming all alternative models. These findings cast structured learning as bounded program induction in which the order of experience shapes future abstractions a learner builds.

Cognitive science remains split between cognitivism - which accounts for recursion and language but cannot ground formal symbols in meaning - and 4E approaches - which ground cognition in the body but rarely specify the body's architecture in enough detail to support generativity. We argue the impasse stems from an incomplete account of the embodied agent's architecture, and propose one: the Sensation Modulating Network (SMN), the cognitive agent conceived as the whole body, organized at every anatomical scale by opponent dynamics, built from Sensation Modulators that sense and act through one substrate, paired into Coordinated Action Zones routed by a body-wide broadcast network. Three commitments give the SMN its purchase. Haltability - the recruitment of antagonistic affordance into co-activated equilibrium - provides the architectural locus that object-directed phenomenology, in Husserl's sense, requires: opponency enables co-activation, co-activation enables halt, halt enables attention, attention enables intentional directedness, with no module added on top. The dual-signal property of self-modulatable action patterns (SMAPs) makes the self/world distinction a structural feature of the wiring rather than a category the agent applies. And a four-level action-pattern hierarchy - Basal, Haltable, Negotiable, Transactional - gives a single trajectory from autonomic regularity to public conventionalization, locating the conditions for grammar-grounded generativity as architectural transitions. The SMN reconciles the cognitivism-4E debate: recursion lives in the modifiable dynamics of Negotiable Action Patterns, embodiment in the opponent substrate that supports them. A tentative formalism and eight predicted registers (seven testable, one hypothetical), with reference simulations, are given in an appendix.

An agent must act on the situation before it, learn what it cannot yet represent, and model other agents well enough to coordinate. These faculties are usually realized by separate mechanisms, yet they share a failure mode: the situation can exceed what the agent can currently represent, and the honest response is then a principled refusal that says what was missing. We develop a small cognitive architecture in which these limits arise from a single quantity. An Interpretation-Decision Unit (IDU) interprets a content vector through a family of regimes - local representational frames with private bases - and decides which actions it licenses; a scalar residual of the content against the active regimes' representational scope drives the unit. Low residual with a clean licensing emits an action; otherwise the unit re-interprets, attempts a description-length-justified expansion, or halts with a typed, witnessed terminal. We prove the unit is total and deterministic: for any content and fixed configuration it halts in finitely many bounded-cost steps with a unique terminal witness, so abstention carries its cause by construction. By binding the architecture's open parameters without changing its mechanics, the same residual-against-scope constraint recovers three documented phenomena at three scopes: the typology of not-knowing (typed abstention); a forced misunderstanding between agents, localized to one shared concept and invisible to the agent committing it (bounded empathy); and prerequisite dependence in learning derived from a bounded focus window rather than posited (developmental prerequisites). Each instantiation is worked for a natural and an artificial agent and states a falsifiable prediction, so one constraint can model limits in both human and machine cognition. The account contributes a unification and a notion of accountable abstention, typed and witnessed by construction.

In The Algebraic Mind, Gary Marcus identified three components essential for any adequate cognitive architecture: operations over variables, recursively structured representations, and a distinction between mental representations of individuals and kinds. He argued that standard multilayer perceptrons supported none of these, acknowledging that a neural implementation using registers and treelets, constructed via developmental programs rather than gradient descent, remained a programmatic conjecture. Twenty-five years later, the required substrate is now available. Our newly developed PyVaCoAl/VaCoAl is a hyperdimensional computing architecture organized end-to-end around a single algebraic primitive: XOR-and-shift over GF(2), implemented by primitive-polynomial linear-feedback shift registers. The architecture supports reversible variable binding via Bind(R,F) = R XOR shift(F), non-commutative compositional bundling that distinguishes "the dog bites the man" from "the man bites the dog," and address-space individual/kind separation under the same algebra. A companion perspective argues that the dentate gyrus-CA3 circuit is a biological homologue of this same engine, with developmentally specified mossy-fiber targeting supplying the innate microcircuitry Marcus anticipated. In this paper, we map the correspondence between Marcus's three pillars and the operational commitments of PyVaCoAl/VaCoAl. We reinterpret the treelet as an algebraic register set indexed by a primitive generator polynomial, arguing that this architecture provides a functional neural substrate meeting Marcus's specifications far more closely than the tensor products, circular convolution, or temporal synchrony available in 2001. We also demonstrate how this substrate naturally extends to Pearl's rung-3 counterfactual reasoning, a capability the original treelet program did not directly target.

We automatically generate feedback causal fuzzy cognitive maps (FCMs) from text by teaching large-language-model agents to break the text into overlapping chunks of text. Convex mixing of these chunk FCMs gives a representative cyclic FCM knowledge graph. The text chunks can have different levels of overlap. The chunk FCMs still mix to form a new FCM causal knowledge graph. The mixing technique scales because it uses light computation with sparse causal chunk matrices. The mixing structure allows an operator-level type of Bayesian inference that produces "de-chunked" or posterior-like FCMs from the mixed FCM. These de-chunked FCMs are useful in their own right and allow further iterations of Bayesian updating. We demonstrate these mixing techniques on the essay text of Allison's "Thucydides Trap" model of conflict between a dominant power such as the United States and a rising power such as China. The FCM dynamical systems predict outcomes as they equilibrate to fixed-point or limit-cycle attractors. Seven out of 8 FCM knowledge graphs predicted a type of war when we stimulated them by turning on and keeping on the concept node that stands for the rising power's ambition and entitlement. Gemini 3.1 LLMs served as the chunking AI agents.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) generate chain-of-thought traces whose length tracks human reaction times across cognitive tasks, but recent debate questions whether this alignment reflects genuine computational structure or surface verbosity. We test whether the alignment varies with inference-time reasoning effort. Across GPT-OSS-20B and GPT-OSS-120B, three effort levels, and six reasoning tasks, within-task and cross-task alignment remain invariant: Bayes Factors lean toward the null, and mean alignment is numerically near-identical across conditions. A manipulation check reveals that the effort parameter sets an upper budget on generation rather than driving real-time allocation, suggesting that the allocation policy is crystallized at training time. Arithmetic complexity contrasts further show that token allocation tracks fine-grained, format-dependent human difficulty patterns, with model scale improving the match. Cognitive cost alignment between LRMs and humans appears to be a training-time achievement, robust to inference-time perturbations, supporting a compiled rather than online account of LRM problem-solving.

Understanding why some sequential planning problems are harder than others requires models that go beyond average performance. They should capture the specific pattern of which problems are hard, and ideally fail in the same way people do when planning capacity is reduced. We apply AICON, a reactive gradient-descent framework developed for robotic manipulation, to the Tower of London test, a cognitive test used to assess planning in Parkinson's disease, mild cognitive impairment, and stroke. Without any lookahead planning or knowledge of human cognition, AICON reproduces the fine-grained human difficulty ordering across 24 problems better than structural task parameters and generalizes to held-out problems in a leave-two-out evaluation. Crucially, AICON outperforms a planning baseline for groups with reduced planning capacity while the planning baseline better captures healthy controls. This dissociation was predicted by the original AICON paper, which noted that the model's failure modes resemble those of Parkinson's patients who struggle with goal hierarchies but not move counts. This suggests that as planning capacity is reduced, human behavior shifts toward the reactive mode AICON models. The finding extends a broader pattern: AICON, originally built for robotics, now captures aspects of biological behavior across perception, eye movements, and sequential planning, suggesting its core abstraction reflects something real about how biological systems are organized.

This paper provides an algebraic exposition of the theory of dyadic morality (TDM), a psychological model of moral judgment grounded in a simple two-node template: an intentional agent causing harm to a vulnerable patient. We formalize TDM using structural causal modeling (SCM) notation and identify three psychological operators (typecasting operator, completion operator, and valence-dependent inference mechanism) that extend standard SCM to capture how people compute moral judgments under constraints. We address scalability challenges arising from TDM's dyadic limitation, showing how moral cognition compresses multi-node scenarios through node collapse and sequential processing. Drawing on this algebraic framework, we demonstrate concrete applications to AI policy design: detecting conflicting obligations, structuring helpfulness policies to preserve user agency, and designing post-failure communication as causal interventions. Finally, we recommend scoped, contextual measurement of mind perception over universal averaging to operationalize the theory empirically. This algebraic formalization enables neurosymbolic AI systems to compute morality in a way that is both mathematically rigorous and faithful to human moral cognition.

Humans abstract experiences into structured representations to facilitate pattern inference and knowledge transfer. While the hippocampal-entorhinal (HPC-MEC) circuit is known to represent both spatial and conceptual spaces, the mechanisms for concurrently extracting abstract structures from continuous, high-dimensional dynamics remain poorly understood. We propose a brain-inspired hierarchical model that simultaneously infers latent transitions and constructs a predictive visual world model. Our architecture employs an inverse model for structural extraction alongside an HPC-MEC coupling model that dissociates relational structures (MEC) from integrated episodic scenes (HPC). Using primitive transformation dynamics as a benchmark, we demonstrate the model's capacity for structural abstraction. By leveraging velocity-driven path integration, the framework enables robust prediction and structural reuse across diverse contexts, thereby achieving structural generalization. This work provides a novel computational framework for understanding how brain-inspired, self-supervised learning of world models facilitates the acquisition of reusable abstract knowledge.

Hospital pharmacists make high-stakes decisions to mitigate drug shortages under uncertainty, time pressure, and patient risk. Interviews revealed that pharmacists focus attention on a small subset of drugs, limiting cognitive effort to the most urgent cases. Motivated by these findings, we formalize a bounded-rational, attention-guided decision framework that dynamically decomposes drugs into a subset for high-cost reasoning and a complementary subset for low-cost monitoring. We develop two agents: an Expert Agent that applies attention weights derived from pharmacist interviews, and a Learner Agent that adapts attention allocation over time through experience. Across simulated scenarios spanning short to long horizons, we show that attention-guided planning supports stable decision-making without complete state reasoning. These results suggest that a primary decision is not what action to take, but where to allocate cognitive effort, and that attention-guided, satisficing strategies can reduce problem complexity while maintaining stable performance.

According to the theory of constructed emotion, the brain actively forms emotion categories by integrating multimodal bodily signals, and constructs emotional experiences by using these categories to predict and interpret sensory inputs. While research has advanced in modeling individual emotion construction, the social process of co-construction-how a shared understanding of emotions emerges between individuals-remains computationally underexplored. This study investigates this process by modeling emergent communication between two embodied agents using the Metropolis-Hastings Naming Game (MHNG), grounded in the Collective Predictive Coding (CPC) framework. Our experiments, using visual, auditory, and simulated interoceptive inputs, yield two main findings. First, MHNG-based communication significantly improves the alignment, clarity, and inter-agent agreement of the learned emotion categories compared to non-communicative and non-selective baselines, with the alignment effect concentrated at the symbolic layer rather than the perceptual latent representation. Second, even when the two agents have systematically divergent interoceptive dynamics, communication still produces robust categorical alignment, with distinct, category-specific reshaping patterns of each agent's emotion categories-consistent with the constructed-emotion view that interoceptive heterogeneity is constitutive of, rather than an obstacle to, shared emotional meaning. These findings provide computational support for the co-constructionist view of emotion and extend the CPC framework from physical to socially-grounded domains.

In this (work in progress) paper, we present Bounded Pragmatic Listener (or BPL), a cognitively grounded Bayesian framework for modelling susceptibility to information disorder. BPL extends Rational Speech Act theory with three cognitively motivated bounds derived from the bounded rationality literature with a) a recursion depth bound (that emphasises working memory limits);b) a prior compression parameter (which is oriented at capturing information bottleneck); and c) an availability sample size (that operationalises importance sampling with saliency-weighted proposals). This allows us to test predictions about misinformation susceptibility, annotator disagreement, and the differential vulnerability to mis-, dis-, and mal-information as defined in the Information Disorder framework. We validate BPL on the LIAR and MultiFC benchmarks showcasing competitive veracity classification and experimental support for the depth-mismatch paradox.

Are certain cognitive biases mathematically inevitable consequences of sequential information processing? We prove that primacy effects, anchoring, and order-dependence are architecturally necessary in autoregressive language models due to causal masking constraints. Our three impossibility theorems establish: (1) primacy bias arises from asymmetric attention accumulation; (2) anchoring emerges from sequential conditioning with provable information bounds; and (3) exact debiasing by permutation marginalization requires factorial-time computation, with Monte Carlo approximation feasible at constant per-tolerance overhead. We validate these bounds across 12 frontier LLMs ($R^2 = 0.89$; $Δ$BIC $= 16.6$ vs. next-best alternative). We then derive quantitative predictions from the framework and test them in two pre-registered human experiments ($N = 464$ analyzed). Study 1 confirms anchor position modulates anchoring magnitude ($d = 0.52$, BF$_{10} = 847$). Study 2 shows working memory load amplifies primacy bias ($d = 0.41$, BF$_{10} = 156$), with WM capacity predicting bias reduction ($r = -.38$). These convergent findings reframe cognitive biases as resource-rational responses to sequential processing.

How do retrieval bounds compare between human episodic memory and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems under semantic interference? We present a unified signal detection theory (SDT) framework that applies to both, and use it to fit behavioral and computational data in matched paradigms. Both systems show logarithmic accuracy decline with association count (fan), but humans exhibit lower interference sensitivity ($α/σ= 0.41$) than dense passage retrieval ($α/σ= 0.67$), with cognitively-inspired HippoRAG falling between the two ($α/σ= 0.44$). Behavioral experiments ($N = 112$) and simulations validate the framework; parameter recovery confirms identifiability ($r \geq .93$) and model comparison favors the logarithmic specification over a power-law alternative ($Δ$BIC $> 15$). We discuss encoding specificity, temporal context binding, and retrieval gating as candidate mechanisms whose causal role remains to be established. Six falsifiable predictions connect cognitive memory research with AI retrieval evaluation.