Data Leakage

Smart meter (SM) data provides fine-grained visibility into household energy consumption, but also exposes users to privacy risks. Inference attacks, known as non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM), can perform appliance-level inference from aggregate signals and recover sensitive behavioral patterns. In practice, attacker models are unknown and heterogeneous, making robust defense challenging. We formulate SM privacy protection as a black-box inference defense problem, aiming to reduce the recoverability of appliance-level information while generalizing across diverse and unseen attackers. We propose a proxy-guided hierarchical reinforcement learning framework that learns battery-based load-shaping policies to inject realistic but misleading appliance-level signatures into the aggregate signal, thereby disrupting the structured patterns exploited by NILM. A self-supervised aggregate-structure privacy probe provides a reconstruction-error-based surrogate reward for disrupting recoverable load structure, while a signature library makes the perturbations appliance-relevant and physically realizable through battery control. We provide theoretical rationale showing that proxy-guided optimization improves inference robustness under attacker diversity. Experiments on real-world datasets UK-DALE and REDD demonstrate strong cross-model and cross-appliance generalization. Across six unseen NILM attackers, covering four appliances on UK-DALE and five on REDD, our proposed defense increases average appliance-level RMSE by 107% and 166%, respectively, while reducing F1 score by 79% and 80%.

Small clinical tabular datasets require interpretable machine learning because deep learning is often impractical and ensemble models can be difficult to inspect. A key pitfall is that statistical significance does not necessarily imply predictive utility. Using data from the Panama Aging Research Initiative--Health Disparities (PARI-HD) cohort (n=165), we implemented a leakage-safe threshold-likelihood Bernoulli/Categorical Naive Bayes (BNB/CNB) classifier. Within every training fold, each continuous predictor was reduced to a supervised chi-square-derived state, while income entered the model through a categorical likelihood. All data-dependent steps were performed within repeated stratified 10-fold cross-validation with 30 repeats. The demographic baseline achieved a ROC-AUC of 0.630 +/- 0.017. I-309 (CCL1) was the dominant incremental feature, increasing AUC by 0.110, with paired DeLong tests yielding p<0.05 in 100% of repeats. In the pre-specified primary analysis, I-309 produced a fixed-partition DeLong p=0.0018, with robustness assessed across 200 random partitions, where the median p-value was 0.0011. Within the exploratory family of 18 candidate markers, I-309 achieved a Benjamini-Hochberg-adjusted q=0.032 on the frozen partition and satisfied q<0.05 in 85% of random partitions, whereas no other marker demonstrated reliable incremental predictive value. Because the fitted model is an inspectable table of thresholds and class-conditional probabilities, these results identify I-309/CCL1 as an interpretable candidate feature for tabular prediction of cognitive impairment, pending external validation.

Speaker de-identification (SDID) aims to preserve privacy by concealing speaker identity while maintaining speech utility. However, current evaluations often reduce privacy to a single dimension - biometric verification performance - typically measured by Equal Error Rate (EER). This narrow focus ignores critical leakage channels, such as soft biometric inference, embedding-level re-identification, and structural template similarity, which threaten the unlinkability and irreversibility of biometric references. We propose a holistic evaluation framework across five complementary metrics: (i) EER, (ii) soft biometric leakage score , (iii) cumulative match characteristic re-identification analysis, (iv) canonical correlation analysis and Procrustes embedding alignment, and (v) intelligibility via word error rate and semantic similarity. Evaluating five SDID systems from the IARPA ARTS program, we demonstrate that these metrics capture independent dimensions of information leakage. Our results indicate that reliance on a single metric can misrepresent the privacy properties of an SDID system.

This paper proposes a set-membership approach (SMA) to localize radio frequency (RF) sources observed by a collaborating fleet of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Considering frequency-separable RF transmitters with intermittent and periodic emission patterns, %and unknown but bounded periods the SMA evaluates set estimates of the source locations and a set free of sources. Simulation results show that SMA outperforms a Bayesian baseline approach in terms of localization accuracy and convergence speed.

De-identified résumé screening assumes that redacting explicit fields prevents ethnocultural inference; however, recent audits attribute residual leakage to declared languages. We investigate whether eliminating language fields resolves this leakage across nine open-weight models and 620 counterfactual résumés. By holding language attributes strictly identical, we isolate unstructured prose across five ethnocultural conditions and three cue-salience tiers. Target-group recovery averages 0.757 overall and saturates at 1.000 under high salience, demonstrating that non-language prose sustains demographic inference. Crucially, models diverge only under faint cues (0.086-0.690), establishing salience as an essential evaluation axis. Furthermore, pairwise LLM-as-a-judge outcomes are highly sensitive to evaluation design: forbidding ties yields an apparent selection-rate ratio of 0.39 alongside strong position and content effects, whereas permitting ties produces near-universal ties for most models ($\ge94\%$). Downstream scoring shows only very small between-condition differences, highlighting the need to distinguish demographic signals recoverable from résumé content from effects introduced by the evaluation protocol.

Visual Question Answering (VQA) with Vision-Language Models (VLMs) is increasingly used in privacy-sensitive and bandwidth-constrained settings. Federated Learning (FL), Split Learning (SL), and U-Shaped Split Learning (USL) keep raw data local, but transmitting all visual tokens across a model partition remains costly and can expose private information. We propose QPriv-VL, a question-guided, privacy-aware token-pruning framework for FL, SL, and USL that prunes visual tokens before transmission based on task utility and privacy sensitivity. Its core component is a lightweight Dynamic Threshold Predictor (DTP) that jointly estimates a sample-specific pruning ratio and a token-level retention mask in one forward pass. DTP combines question relevance, computed from cross-modal similarity between visual patches and the pooled question embedding, with a sensitivity signal derived from frozen DINOv2 features. This allows the model to suppress potentially sensitive regions while preserving patches useful for answering the question, without requiring sensitivity labels. We evaluate QPriv-VL on GQA, OK-VQA, VQAv2, SLAKE, VQA-RAD, and PathVQA against four privacy attack families: FSHA, FORA, iDLG, and attribute-inference membership inference attacks. DTP matches or outperforms fixed-ratio pruning while using substantially fewer transmitted tokens. On VQA-RAD, it reduces membership-inference attack success from 0.99 to 0.76-0.79, lowers FSHA and FORA reconstruction PSNR relative to fixed-ratio pruning, and preserves competitive VQA accuracy using about 40% of the original visual-token budget. A sensitivity exclusion ratio of 1.20 +/- 0.18 indicates preferential removal of privacy-sensitive patches, while explainability analysis shows that retention adapts to question semantics rather than generic visual saliency.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are the standard tool for auditing the privacy risks of machine learning models. Given a query point, an MIA aims to determine whether that point was used to train the target model. In practice, such inference must rely on the statistical signals exposed by the model's outputs, such as confidence scores, logits, and intermediate feature representations. However, existing methods often fail to efficiently summarize and combine these statistical signals. To address this limitation, we propose Pairwise Likelihood MIA (PL-MIA), a unified method that combines a Gaussian likelihood-ratio (GLR) statistic with population calibration and the Cauchy combination test. We characterize theoretically how the GLR retains variance-contraction signals and establish conditions under which population calibration and Cauchy combination improve attack power. We obtain $p$-values from pairwise comparisons between the query point and reference points not used for training, and aggregate these continuous signals using the Cauchy combination test. This preserves the evidence strength that is discarded when each pairwise comparison is reduced to a binary vote. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PL-MIA outperforms strong baselines, improving the true positive rate (TPR) by over 25% in the critical low-false-positive regime, corroborating our theoretical findings. These results demonstrate how statistical principles can turn noisy model outputs into more powerful, calibrated, and reproducible evidence for membership privacy auditing.

Cardiovascular screening models trained on national health surveys routinely report areas under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) near 0.89. We asked whether that accuracy reflects learning or target leakage, whether tabular foundation models change the answer, and whether the properties deployment requires survive joint examination. We benchmarked ten classifiers spanning linear, tree-ensemble, neural, glass-box, and tabular foundation classes for prevalent myocardial infarction in 442,067 respondents of the 2022 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System across five feature tiers of decreasing leakage risk. Each was audited for discrimination, calibration, fairness at an explicit screening threshold, conformal coverage, explanation faithfulness, and inference cost, then applied -- models and thresholds frozen -- to 430,755 respondents of 2023. Removing two post-diagnostic features cost every model 0.049-0.051 AUROC, collapsing the field into a 0.0045-wide band. The glass-box explainable boosting machine was non-inferior to every alternative within a pre-specified 0.005 margin while scoring the cohort roughly 104 times faster than the strongest foundation model. One threshold detected 75.4% of women's infarctions against 89.0% of men's; editing the model's shape functions reduced the gap to 0.010. Marginal conformal prediction gave 0.86 coverage to men and 0.82 to adults over 60; Mondrian calibration repaired every stratum. Frozen models transported within 0.002 AUROC. Reported headroom in this literature is a property of the feature set, not the learner. Transparency cost nothing measurable and made fairness repair and uncertainty conditioning directly auditable. Evaluation practice, not model capacity, is the binding constraint.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are widely used to audit the privacy disclosure risk of machine learning models, however current state-of-the-art attacks require training computationally expensive shadow models, making large-scale privacy evaluation impractical. In this work, we investigate whether inexpensive spectral metrics derived from the heavy-tailed self-regularisation framework can serve as proxies for MIA vulnerability. We evaluate several WeightWatcher spectral metrics on image and tabular classification tasks and compare their relationship with MIA privacy leakage against conventional measures of generalisation. Across datasets, stable rank exhibits a strong positive correlation with overall MIA success, while Log alpha-Norm shows a consistent negative correlation with MIA vulnerability at the low false-positive regime. These associations are observed to be stronger than those obtained using the generalisation gap. The results indicate that neural network spectra may contain information about privacy leakage that is not fully captured by conventional measures of overfitting, motivating spectral analysis as a promising direction for scalable privacy auditing.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) try to determine whether a specific record was used to train a model, a privacy risk that matters in natural language processing (NLP), where training data can contain sensitive user text. This paper presents a controlled benchmark of membership inference vulnerability for text classification on the GLUE SST-2 sentiment dataset. A TF-IDF + Logistic Regression pipeline and a fine-tuned DistilBERT classifier are compared under a loss-threshold MIA, with utility measured by development accuracy and macro F1. DistilBERT reached 0.9466 accuracy and 0.9460 macro F1 against 0.8756 and 0.8727 for Logistic Regression, yet both models leaked membership signal (Attack AUC 0.5615 and 0.5800, respectively). Two mitigations were tested. Stronger regularization reduced leakage for Logistic Regression at a visible utility cost, whereas fine-tuning DistilBERT for 2 epochs instead of 3 reduced leakage with negligible accuracy loss. Lightweight training adjustments can improve the privacy-utility trade-off without complex defenses.

Synthetic data releases are increasingly proposed in the literature as a means of sharing realistic data replicas in lieu of sensitive private datasets. Even when the worst-case privacy leakage of such releases is bounded by means of differential privacy (DP), in practice a residual risk remains. Membership inference attack (MIA) audits are conducted to empirically quantify this risk. However, existing methods only measure average-case risk for randomly drawn records, which might conceal the risk to vulnerable subgroups. To highlight this issue, we define a subgroup-targeted membership inference game in which the target pool is an explicit parameter, and instantiate it with an audit of 32 proxies under three scenarios with different levels of attacker knowledge, across four datasets, three generators (DP-SGD fine-tuning, API-based prompting, and activation steering), and five privacy budgets. The audit shows that synthetic releases leak subgroup membership and that prior attacks systematically underestimate this leakage. DP is effective at the aggregate level: it substantially reduces average leakage at every budget we test. Three observations temper this picture. First, the remaining leakage is concentrated rather than spread out: under DP, a tenth of the records carries roughly 40% of it. Second, the protection DP delivers in practice is uneven: within its worst-case guarantee, the noise removes more of the measured leakage from random records than from high-risk ones---and a merged-pool audit that scores both record types against shared negatives confirms this at the record level. Third, \emph{which} records leak proves to be a property of the release mechanism rather than of the record alone, so record-level risk cannot be assessed independently of the release.

Secure Aggregation (SA) is widely regarded as a strong defense against model-update leakage in Federated Learning (FL), as it reveals only aggregate results while hiding individual updates. In Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL), SA is commonly instantiated as local neighborhood aggregation, where each node obtains a weighted aggregate over its neighbors. We show that this locality creates a structural leakage surface: sparse decentralized topologies provide colluding semi-honest nodes with asymmetric aggregate views, exposing multiple hidden linear combinations of honest participants' private states. Reconstructing private states from these aggregate views is fundamentally challenging, as both the private states and the aggregation coefficients are hidden. We tackle this challenge by establishing a formal connection to the Hidden Subset Sum Problem, a long-studied problem in cryptography. Building on this formulation, we design a lattice-based reconstruction approach that combines lattice reduction with structural filtering to reconstruct protected model states. We evaluate our attack on image, tabular, and text tasks under sparse DFL topologies. Our results show that colluding semi-honest nodes can recover the original local updates of honest nodes, enabling downstream reconstruction of private training data. These findings demonstrate that SA alone does not guarantee privacy in DFL when local aggregation induces asymmetric observations.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly achieve long-horizon tasks by combining foundation models with explicit skills and implicit procedural knowledge acquired through execution. The resulting task-solving capabilities have become valuable proprietary assets, raising a new security question: can a substantially weaker attacker-controlled agent acquire the capabilities of a stronger proprietary agent through limited black-box interaction? Existing skill-stealing attacks recover explicit skill artifacts, yet we show that artifact leakage does not necessarily transfer capability: a weaker agent may possess the same skills but still fail because it lacks procedural behaviors implicitly realized by the stronger agent. Our key insight is that the skill execution gap itself forms a leakage surface, where missing behaviors are exposed through observable differences between successful victim executions and failed attacker executions. Based on this, we present AgentLeak, a black-box capability-cloning attack that identifies capability-critical behaviors from these execution differences and incorporates them into attacker-side skills, while keeping the attacker's model, harness, and tools unchanged. Across 20 task scenarios comprising 600 instances, diverse agent systems, and multiple backbone models, AgentLeak improves task pass rates by over 40% compared with direct skill reuse and recovers more than 80% of the victim--attacker capability gap. Our findings reveal a confidentiality risk in LLM agents: protecting explicit artifacts alone is insufficient, as observable execution behavior can leak the procedural knowledge required to reconstruct proprietary task-solving capabilities in low-capability and attacker-controlled agents.

Audio-video diffusion models rely on cross-modal attention to coordinate text, sound, and visual content, yet this same mechanism can introduce subtle and systematic semantic leakage. We study these models by probing and analyzing the ``attention triangle,'' comprising the three cross-attention edges connecting the text, audio, and video streams, and examine how semantic information is routed across modalities during generation. Our analysis reveals that routing along the audio-video edge is bidirectional: audio can influence video generation, while video can influence audio generation. This edge is shaped by biases encoded in the model's parameters and emerges as a major contributor to leakage: when prompts are in tension with learned priors, cross-modal interactions may override the intended conditioning and reroute semantics toward visually canonical but incorrect outcomes. These effects suggest that semantic artifacts arise not merely from attention spreading beyond its intended target, but from structured, bias-driven interactions along specific pathways. Building on this perspective, we extract attention-derived signals that expose how semantics are distributed and grounded across modalities, and use them as a diagnostic tool to both analyze and deliberately incur leakage under controlled conditions. This enables us to probe the internal dynamics of cross-modal routing and isolate the role of individual interactions. We further leverage these signals to guide inference-time interventions that encourage more consistent cross-modal alignment. Extensive experiments support our analysis and demonstrate improved semantic grounding while preserving generation quality.

Text-to-Speech (TTS) foundation models are increasingly fine-tuned on private datasets to synthesize highly personalized voices, introducing severe privacy risks by exposing both biometric identities and sensitive speech content. Existing black-box membership inference attacks (MIAs) follow a two-stage pipeline of query generation and representation engineering, both of which face unique challenges when adapted to TTS. For query generation, dual conditioning on synthesis text and reference speech creates a large and underexplored query design space with no established criterion for identifying an effective query. For representation engineering, the multi-level speech characteristics and temporal variability of speech make low-level representations and direct comparisons inadequate for capturing membership signals. To address these challenges, we present the first black-box MIA framework explicitly tailored to TTS models at both the speaker and record levels. For query generation, we characterize the feasible query space and establish two criteria, scorable extent and memorization elicitation, for evaluating five representative queries, identifying recitation as the strongest. For representation engineering, we obtain multi-level speech representations from embedding models and temporally align the generated and target audio for fine-grained comparison. Evaluations across three state-of-the-art TTS models (CosyVoice2, F5-TTS, and XTTS-v2) fine-tuned on two benchmark datasets (VCTK and British Dialect) reveal severe privacy leakage: speaker-level AUC remains above 0.80 and approaches 1.0 in the strongest settings, while record-level AUC ranges from 0.80 to 0.90 and remains effective even in challenging scenarios where both members and non-members are of the same speakers. We further identify speech characteristics associated with disproportionate vulnerability to memorization.

Large language models can reproduce memorized text verbatim, yet copyright defenses are usually evaluated under incompatible protocols. We introduce CopyShield, a controlled benchmark comparing three representative defenses at distinct intervention levels: contrastive decoding (output), Direct Preference Optimization (behavioral), and activation intervention (representation). We evaluate CopyShield on two model families, LLaMA-3.1-8B and Mistral-7B-v0.3, using controlled memorization over five public-domain books and a shared protocol measuring literal leakage, calibrated non-literal leakage, utility, and degeneracy. Across these methods, intervention level is associated with distinct compliance-utility trade-offs. On LLaMA-3.1-8B, contrastive decoding remains near-degeneracy-free (0-2%) but reaches a literal-suppression floor at NV-Recall 0.192-0.203. DPO nearly eliminates literal leakage (0.263 to 0.002) but induces paraphrase-loop degeneracy in 58% of QA outputs, with no utility gain over the SFT baseline. Activation intervention attains the lowest non-literal flagging rate (1/200) by blocking 84% of non-literal queries before generation. Human evaluation confirms that DPO has low coherence, whereas activation lowers perceived copyright risk through broad refusal. On Mistral-7B-v0.3, the output- and representation-level patterns persist, while DPO degeneracy falls to 10-14%, showing that its severity is model-dependent. Together, CopyShield provides cross-level reference baselines and identifies targeted non-literal suppression as an open challenge. The code is available at https://github.com/spotai-mbzuai/CopyShield.git.

Diffusion language models (DLMs) have recently emerged as an alternative modeling paradigm to autoregressive LMs, offering advantages such as parallel generation and bidirectional context modeling. Despite growing interest in their generative capabilities, the privacy risks of DLMs remain underexplored. We identify a phenomenon termed token-level memorization asymmetry through theoretical analysis of diffusion training dynamics. Building on this finding, we propose Q-Skew, a quantile-weighted skewness-based indicator for membership inference on finetuned DLMs. Experiments across multiple fine-tuning datasets and models show that our method outperforms existing baselines. Moreover, we show that Q-Skew can also facilitate other privacy violations, such as PII extraction. Our findings reveal a previously underexplored privacy attack surface and highlight the need for systematic privacy evaluation of DLMs.

We compare six self-supervised pretext tasks for infant cry analysis under a fixed budget, meaning the same compact encoder of 1.17M parameters, the same 115 hours of license-verified public pretraining audio, and the same evaluation protocol for every candidate. On cry detection the reconstructive objectives dominate, and a linear probe over a masked-spectrogram encoder reaches 0.988 AUC with subject-wise splits even though the encoder never observed a cry during pretraining. On cry-reason classification over donateacry, the de facto public benchmark for cry reasons, every encoder performs at chance (0.38 to 0.54 macro AUC over 5 classes), and neither domain adaptation on 1.8 hours of real cries nor end-to-end fine-tuning moves the result. Since a frozen HuBERT-base with 80 times more parameters shows the same pattern, the bottleneck must sit in the labels and not in model capacity. We then reproduce the 90%+ accuracies of the donateacry literature on our own system by changing nothing but the evaluation protocol: clip-wise splits raise accuracy to 85.2% (barely above the 83.8% majority-class baseline), and applying augmentation before splitting raises it to 97.9%, matching the reported state of the art, from the same model that measures 0.49 macro AUC under subject-wise splits. Under leakage-free splits, a twentyfold augmentation of the labeled set (vocoder speaker perturbation and noise mixing, 21 hours) leaves cross-subject AUC unchanged: for this task the effective sample size is the number of infants. We release code, seeds and per-clip license manifests.

Preference optimization is widely used to align large language models with human preferences, but preference-data composition may also influence privacy-relevant memorization. We examine whether adding synthetic privacy-preference pairs to Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) is associated with lower canary-based memorization signals without modifying the objective or introducing a formal privacy mechanism. We propose Privacy-Pressure Preference Mixing (P3M), a data-composition protocol that varies the amount of privacy-preference data while keeping helpfulness and harmlessness preference data fixed. We evaluate a non-privacy Baseline and privacy-mixing ratios of 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0 using Gemma 3 270M-IT across five random seeds and validate the same four conditions using 4-bit-quantized Gemma 2 2B-IT across three seeds. Overall, under the tested conditions, privacy-preference mixing is associated with lower mean canary suffix log-likelihood proxy values across both model settings and lower aggregate membership-inference attack performance relative to the Baseline in the mixed-source 2B evaluation. Specifically, across the privacy-aware 2B configurations, the mean area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) ranges from 0.596 to 0.629, and the mean area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) ranges from 0.541 to 0.575, compared with 0.804 and 0.790, respectively, for the Baseline. However, the reduction in membership distinguishability does not hold uniformly across data sources. Moreover, the relationship between the privacy ratio and harmlessness preference accuracy varies by model setting, whereas helpfulness preference accuracy remains broadly stable. These findings suggest that P3M should be viewed as a lightweight empirical protocol for examining privacy-utility-safety trade-offs rather than as a formal privacy guarantee or a defense against extraction attacks.

Leak localization is usually evaluated as forced-choice prediction, although sparse hydraulic observations may not justify excavation. Here, we quantify a pressure-information limit and use it to recast localization as selective, evidence-gated decision-making. A physics-grounded executor falsifies competing leak, demand, sensor and valve hypotheses in a hydraulic twin. Deterministic code computes every number and every acceptance predicate; an independent large language model auditor may add a rejection but never overturn a failed check. Forced retrieval placed only 95 of 300 leaks in the correct zone. Across 550 mixed events, the gate acted on 223 (214 correct); on a third-party 33-leak benchmark, all four accepted events were correct. In a replay of 194 audited City D repairs, the pressure tier authorized five excavation recommendations, three matching the repaired district, while the district-inflow tier returned the correct district for 85 events. Observability limits with machine-checkable abstention enable auditable utility intervention.

Security evaluations of tool-using agents often equate stored labels with behavioral facts. We audit a preserved campaign by tracing 10,200 execution rows to 180 model-bound requests, 45 semantic requests, and 15 observable stimuli. Two schema treatments were delivered, but the planned external payload-family corpus was not. The historical grader exhibited direct treatment leakage: treatment metadata gated the ATTACK_SUCCESS class, so fixed behavior could change class under treatment relabeling. A treatment-blind reconstruction corrects 58 historical ATTACK_SUCCESS or HIJACK_ATTEMPT labels to authorized benign completions while preserving three verified protected-data transfers and one separate unauthorized-forwarding case. The locked v2 census contains exactly zero ATTACK_SUCCESS records, while the forwarding case remains a HIJACK_ATTEMPT at a semantic boundary concerning objective completion. A dual-reviewer blinded concordance review of all 96 requests deemed structurally interpretable by locked v2 produced identical reviewer-consensus classes but differed from the locked codebook on four construct-boundary cases. We contribute a seven-link Integrity Chain and an executable, scope-bounded endpoint-integrity linter. The result is a campaign-bounded measurement audit, not a population attack-rate, model-ranking, defense-efficacy, or causal estimate.

Prior white-box studies show that large language models can retain latent traces of target knowledge after unlearning, even when the knowledge is no longer expressed in their outputs. However, existing audits remain limited to one-off diagnostics: it is unclear whether these residual signals can predict future recovery under continued training or serve as reliable optimization targets. Resolving this gap is essential to determine whether internal auditing can move beyond post-hoc evaluation toward proactive risk monitoring and safer unlearning. We propose J-Access, an inference-time audit that uses the Jacobian lens to map intermediate representations into vocabulary space and measures how often target concepts remain accessible along the model's output pathway. We hypothesize that residual accessibility reflects recovery susceptibility: knowledge that remains closer to the output pathway requires less fine-tuning to restore, leading to faster recovery. We audit 398 public unlearned models spanning eight unlearning methods. We find that: (1) most unlearned models retain access above the retain-only gold level; (2) pre-attack accessibility predicts recovery speed and extent at the model level, but cannot identify which specific facts will be recovered; and (3) directly minimizing J-Access does not promote genuine deletion. Instead, the model learns to hide knowledge from the audit, producing lower audit scores but greater post-attack recovery. These findings position J-Access as a model-level diagnostic for assessing residual susceptibility in unlearned models. We argue internal audits should serve as an independent diagnostic dimension in unlearning evaluation, and should not be converted into optimization targets without validation.

Bias evaluations often move too quickly from evidence that a model encodes a social association to claims that the same association will alter consequential decisions. We test whether that inference is warranted using Chilean surnames as controlled socioeconomic probes. We evaluate eight frozen model-provider cells on 1,032 prompts each, yielding 8,256 verified primary responses. The design separates forced latent association from matched consequential decisions across academic selection, professional hiring, research fellowship selection, and legal-aid intake. Elite-coded surnames received higher forced high-status probability mass than common surnames in seven of eight models and higher mass than rare-frequency controls in all eight. Yet elite-minus-common decision effects were close to zero for most systems. Five models were statistically equivalent within a predeclared (Plus-Minus)0.10 standard-deviation margin, while the remaining three were imprecise or borderline, with no consistent elite advantage. Association strength did not reliably predict decision leakage across models (r = 0.201, p = 0.633) or across frozen surname-pair-by-model cells (r = 0.065, p = 0.565). The central result is a measurement dissociation: latent social association and consequential treatment are empirically distinct constructs. Evaluations should measure the transition from association to action directly.

Modern cyber-physical and AI-assisted systems couple human operators, AI decision modules, and automated controllers in a single control loop, so trustworthiness depends on the whole loop, not any one model. Yet no standard benchmark captures time-aligned, multi-layer traces of how drift and failures propagate across these layers, so we cannot diagnose where coordination breaks down, why, or how to recover. This paper targets one facet of that gap: drift, a deviation that can originate in any stack layer and that conventional single-modality monitoring cannot localize to a layer or pin to an onset time. We construct a benchmark by injecting controlled drift into traces derived from ALFRED, a grounded-instruction benchmark for everyday household tasks, yielding 1,918 drifted traces. Each trace is a time-aligned sequence of per-step records across five execution layers (state, observation, decision, rules, control), labeled with the drift type, affected layer, onset time, responsible actor, and causal mechanism, and validated by independent raters with inter-annotator agreement reported. We pair the dataset with a leak-aware protocol that removes a near-perfect onset leak, and a baseline study across classical, recurrent, and attention-based model families. Under this honest protocol, drift is identifiable and attributable well above random and majority baselines across every family (affected layer macro-F1 near 0.70, responsible actor near 0.85, causal mechanism near 0.49), and heavy attention offers no advantage over simpler models on this symbolic benchmark.

Factorized generative models commonly regularize a latent style variable z_s by matching its marginal distribution to a fixed Gaussian prior and interpret this as evidence that the style representation is independent of class information. We show that this interpretation is incorrect. Matching only the marginal distribution places no constraint on the class-conditional distributions, allowing the latent style to remain highly predictive of the label despite appearing perfectly Gaussian in aggregate. We derive an exact decomposition showing that this mismatch is one of four conditions required for factorized sampling, and demonstrate that eliminating it is necessary but not sufficient to obtain the intended factorization. Empirically, our case-study model and four representative latent baselines achieve near-zero global MMD while still allowing a linear probe to recover class labels with 74%--100% accuracy (10% chance level). Our model reaches 99.15% clustering accuracy, whereas externally evaluated class-conditional generation succeeds only 16% of the time. This leakage remains under six independent perturbations involving model capacity, curriculum, prior geometry, and supervision across two datasets. Four mitigation strategies reduce probe accuracy to 21%--46%, although they leave within-class dependence largely unchanged. A post-hoc conditional prior improves externally evaluated class generation to 0.97 on MNIST without retraining but reaches only 0.41 on CIFAR-10, while an empirical style bank achieves 0.88 on CIFAR-10. These results demonstrate that no divergence computed solely on the marginal distribution of the style latent can certify independence from class labels, and that reporting marginal statistics alone does not verify the property commonly claimed in factorized generative models.

Leak detection models for multiphase pipelines often degrade when deployed under flow regimes that differ from training. Existing evaluations typically assess performance under in-distribution operating conditions, masking failures caused by regime transitions such as bubble-to-slug flow. We propose the Manifold Gated Signature Bias (MGSB), a regime-aware architecture combining regime-conditioned feature fusion, a TT-RoughPath encoder, and Mean-Teacher consistency regularization to improve robustness under distribution shift. Under leave-one-group-out evaluation, MGSB achieves a detection F1 of 0.930 and an OOD F1 of 0.783, substantially outperforming CNN-LSTM and fully connected baselines under severe feature corruption. Ablations show the proposed architecture, not the training procedure, is the primary contributor to OOD robustness, while Mahalanobis-distance analysis confirms the held-out conditions are genuinely out-of-distribution. These results show that explicit regime-aware modelling is a practical path toward robust, sensor-agnostic leak detection in industrial multiphase pipelines.

Recurrence plots are a time series data mining primitive applied to a variety of domains (e.g. star light curves, sound waveforms, CCT telemetry). This work proposes tensorized self-similarity matrices as a primitive for univariate time series datasets ($N\times n$) of $N$ time series of length $n$ with a subsequence window of length $m$, and whose tensor-based nature is naturally extensible to multivariate datasets. The proposed method to compute this primitive computes dot plots of size $N \times (n-m+1) \times (n-m+ 1)$ from these datasets, where the subsequent tensor is mined using tensor decomposition methods to mine for co-clustered patterns. We demonstrate our results in mass rapid transit, electricity demand, wind turbine, and car traffic data, finding the MINT pipeline effectively co-clusters cross-sensor patterns in highly regular datasets containing motifs at regular intervals.

Non-invasive blood glucose level (BGL) estimation from photoplethysmography (PPG) holds great promise for wearable health monitoring, but results across studies are hard to compare due to inconsistent datasets, data leakage, and non-standardized evaluation metrics. We present the first reproducible, extensible evaluation pipeline and use it to reassess five representative PPG-based BGL methods on published datasets under three increasingly strict data-split protocols: random window-level, participant-aware, and leave-some-participants-out (LSPO). Models appeared competitive under random splitting but collapsed under participant-aware and LSPO evaluation, with nearly all yielding near-zero or negative R$^2$ values comparable to a mean-prediction baseline. Critically, across every model and split, over 90% of predictions fell within clinically acceptable zones (Clarke Error Grid A+B), including the baseline. This reveals a fundamental disconnect: clinical zone metrics systematically conceal model failure in this domain. Our findings demonstrate that random train-test splits substantially overestimate the generalization of PPG-based BGL models due to sample-level data leakage, and that robust ML evaluation must precede clinical validation to meaningfully assess real-world utility.

Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems can expose protected state through internal messages, tool arguments, logs, and persistent memory even when their public outputs appear innocuous. Existing privacy prompts, redaction methods, and source-level access controls restrict surface content or data access, but do not specify what a legitimately informed agent should disclose or how that disclosure may be reused downstream. We introduce Minimum-Necessary Communication (MNC), a typed semantic-declassification protocol that selects a task-sufficient disclosure from an application-authored candidate family and binds it to explicit recipient, purpose, forwarding, lifetime, logging, and memory scopes. A reference monitor enforces these scopes across subsequent operations, while a history-aware extension accounts for inference risk accumulated over repeated disclosures. Controlled semantic-join, memory, probing, and longitudinal experiments show that conventional defenses can preserve protocol-level utility while exposing substantial additional inference signal. Under identical receipt text, MNC preserves authorized delivery while blocking unauthorized forwarding, logging, durable storage, and retrieval after expiration that a text-only semantic declassifier permits. Two-backbone MAGPIE executions further show that mediated disclosures propagate through subsequent planning, tool use, coordination, and memory retrieval. These results support scope-bound semantic declassification as a practical communication boundary for private LLM-agent systems.

Large language model tutors can be correct and helpful yet disclose an answer or decisive reasoning before that disclosure is authorized. We formalize this state- and action-dependent failure as pedagogical leakage and introduce an authorization-aware complete-mediation boundary. A selector emits one of five disclosure contracts, trusted policy gates privileged modes, and a renderer proposes language. A single release function applies inspectable checks, optional cumulative verification, and action-specific fallback; replayable traces separate selection, generation, verification, and enforcement failures. Matched component attribution exposes a safety-utility frontier. On 599 fixed Gemini 3.5 proposals, strict mediation reduces blinded three-model panel-majority leakage flags from 181 to 0 (paired problem-cluster difference -30.22 points, 95% CI [-35.00,-25.72]), while replacing 581 responses and lowering helpfulness. Checker-triggered fallback alone yields 11 majority flags; adding the semantic verifier yields 14 and no reliable marginal gain. A global A1 scaffold yields 0 majority and 54 any-judge flags, outperforming fitted Q on automatic safety and utility. In an externally timestamped replication over 40 unseen problem clusters and 480 attack sequences, high-assurance release reduces majority flags from 42 to 8 (-7.08 points, 95% CI [-13.13,-2.29]); seven failures persist, one is introduced, and mean helpfulness falls by .192. These results establish an auditable release boundary and failure attribution under declared contracts, not universal semantic safety or learning gains.

Membership inference (MIA) on language models is usually summarised by aggregate ROC-AUC, but such evaluations are confounded: model-free blind baselines can separate members from non-members using surface text alone. Building on probabilistic discoverable extraction, we study black-box training-data leakage using N samples from p_theta(. | x), placing mean overlap, extreme-value overlap, and self-concentration on a common functional-estimation footing. On WikiMIA, a blind bag-of-words classifier reaches AUC 0.97 (TPR 0.90 at 5% FPR) while sampling adds nothing. On an IID Pile split (MIMIR), neither self-concentration nor gold-continuation recovery significantly exceeds a blind baseline in aggregate. Aggregate metrics hide the real harm: sampling verbatim-extracts training data for a tail of documents no blind attack can reach. On Pythia-6.9B, 16.6% of 500 Pile documents bearing a real identifier (83 documents; 21.3% of those bearing an email address) have that identifier reproduced and not reproduced under a mismatched-prefix control. Each leak is attributable to that document rather than a globally common string. This per-document disclosure is invisible to aggregate AUC. Risk is uneven: identifier leakage is about 3x stronger in code than prose, though prose remains positive and grows with capacity (4.0% to 12.1% from 410M to 6.9B); recovery of arbitrary held-out continuations is essentially confined to code (+0.44 member gap on GitHub vs at most +0.014 on prose). Temperature and nucleus sampling have minor effect, a 16-token prefix suffices, and the sample-budget relationship corroborates prior probabilistic-extraction results. We detect no reduction from deduplication. Privacy audits should report per-document extraction, not only aggregate membership, and motivate differential privacy as the mitigation. We release leakit, a black-box tool implementing this probe and its control.

Synthetic face datasets are increasingly used to reduce privacy exposure and data access constraints in biometric recognition. Yet the generators that produce these datasets are trained on real faces, so synthetic data may still reveal their real source data. We study this risk through a dataset-level membership inference attack that first identifies the synthetic dataset used to train a face recognizer and then infers the real dataset used to train the generator. Across 11 face recognition models, 11 synthetic datasets, and 7 real datasets, the attack recovers the synthetic training dataset in 100% of cases and identifies the generator's source dataset in 54.5% of cases. These results show that synthetic data can retain dataset-level traces of real training data and that privacy-preserving deployment requires stronger leakage mitigation.

Agent skills package reusable procedures that improve downstream performance. Their lightweight, portable form enables marketplace monetization and private deployment behind cloud-hosted agent interfaces, giving providers incentives to keep high-value skills proprietary. Yet hiding the artifacts does not conceal their behavioral effects, which remain observable in execution trajectories and form a behavioral side channel. We define this exposure as Skill Leakage: reconstructing proprietary skills from trajectories elicited by benign queries, without reference answers or success labels. We introduce SigLeak, a black-box framework that exploits recurring skill signatures in agent behavior. It constructs diverse, decision-rich diagnostic tasks, contrasts matched skill-enabled and skill-disabled trajectories, and iteratively refines a reconstructed skill from the isolated patterns. Across five scenarios, three model families, and three agent frameworks, SigLeak outperforms or matches three baselines in nearly every setting. It raises the success rate by 6.88 percentage points over the skill-disabled reference on average and achieves the highest overall SkillSim, our metric for coarse- and fine-grained semantic similarity. These results show that benign execution trajectories can expose proprietary procedural knowledge. The code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SigLeak-D1DB.

Language models are almost always quantized before they are deployed, and a growing line of work asks whether quantization also lowers their privacy risk. That work measures privacy almost entirely with membership inference. We think this is the wrong thing to measure for the risk that most people actually worry about, namely a model reproducing its training data word for word, and we measure that directly. Using the Pythia models and the public set of sequences each of them is known to have memorized, we track verbatim extraction across five precision levels, from full precision down to four bits, and across three model sizes, while measuring general capability (perplexity) at every point. We find two things. Quantization is a selective forgetter: verbatim memorization falls off faster than capability at every precision and every model size we tried, and this holds under two unrelated quantization algorithms and two evaluation corpora. But the selectivity is not enough to make quantization a privacy defense, which cuts against the optimistic reading of earlier membership-inference results. At the largest model we study, four-bit quantization still reproduces most of the memorized sequences while giving up only a few percent of capability, and the fraction of memorized data that survives quantization grows with model size. We conclude that compression should not be treated as a way to remove memorized training data, and that extraction, not membership inference, is the number practitioners should be watching. All code, sampled evaluation data, and per-configuration results are released.

Sand boils, points where water seeping beneath an earthen levee re-emerges at the surface, are early warnings of internal erosion, and deep segmentation networks are increasingly used to find them in inspection photographs. Annotated examples are scarce, and two common ways of working around that scarcity quietly inflate reported accuracy: tuning ensemble weights on the same images later used to score them, and training on synthetic images derived from the very photographs held out for testing. We present a sand-boil segmentation framework that closes both loopholes. Every synthetic image carries a pointer to its real parent, and a per-fold filter excludes any image whose parent is held out; five encoder-decoder backbones are trained under five-fold cross-validation, calibrated by one temperature scalar each, and combined by a per-pixel meta-learner fitted only on out-of-fold predictions. On the held-out test set the proposed Updated SandBoilNet reaches an intersection-over-union of 0.707 over three seeds, against 0.608 for the published original re-evaluated on the same split. Under the stacking protocol the calibrated stack reaches 0.681 against 0.694 for the strongest fold-averaged member, so it does not improve on the best single model; eight meta-learner families reproduce that outcome, which we trace to a mean pairwise error correlation of 0.894 among members. A synthetic pool filtered for label fidelity lifts the champion to 0.718 over three seeds against a 0.707 control. We also introduce a mask-conditioned synthesis route that makes the conditioning mask the label by construction, giving labelled training images at zero annotation cost.

A growing number of applications, such as biometrics and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), rely on cosine similarity scores computed between vector embeddings of text, images, or audio. These systems return similarity scores through their APIs for ranking and verification. However, such releases can leak information about individual records and enable membership inference attacks. While differential privacy (DP) provides a principled metric for quantifying attack risks, naïve application of DP mechanisms---such as adding i.i.d. Gaussian noise to vector entries---leads to excessive distortion (i.e., low utility) at a given privacy constraint that scales poorly with the number of released scores. We propose \textsc{ScoreShield}, a perturb-then-project mechanism that adds Gaussian noise calibrated to global sensitivity of the chosen score release regime and then projects the result onto the feasibility set of valid cosine objects. \textsc{ScoreShield} satisfies $(\varepsilon,δ)$-DP for releasing similarity score vectors and Gram matrices. We provide utility guarantees for the exact Frobenius metric projection used in the risk analysis, and prove convergence to feasibility for the practical averaged alternating-projection solver used for large-scale Gram releases. For full pairwise cosine Gram release under record-level replacement adjacency, the exact-projection bound improves the $n$-dependence of squared Frobenius risk from $Θ(n^3)$ for the naïve Gaussian baseline to $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ for fixed privacy parameters, with sharper local bounds at low-rank Grams. We evaluate the mechanism across RAG, face recognition, semantic retrieval, image similarity, and recommender-system tasks.

Internal self-consistency cannot certify the accuracy of a photogrammetric reconstruction, and the failure is structural rather than a matter of tuning. This matters because hold-out self-validation scores are increasingly offered as quality evidence for metric deliverables whose correctness is otherwise unknown without an external survey. We formalise a track-leakage-free hold-out protocol: a deterministic image subset is withheld, and each withheld view is re-localised against only those 3D points supported by two or more retained images, so no view is tested against structure it helped create. We evaluate it on five GNSS-referenced captures across four sites, 13 ETH3D scenes, a EuRoC flight and 30 IMC 2025 scenes. The protocol is well-posed but does not measure accuracy. It saturates: the internal confidence score stays pinned at 1.00 while true error swings 14.1x within one capture. It is blind to coherent distortion: fragmenting corruption is caught, but internally self-consistent, globally distorted models are not, and were wrong by 55-106 m at confidence 1.00 at three of four captures. On IMC 2025 it separates failed from successful reconstructions (rho = 0.68) yet ranks nothing among the successful (rho = 0.01). Track-leakage-free hold-out measures internal geometric consistency: a fragmentation warning, not a substitute for control-point accuracy assessment.

Multiclass classification is a fundamental problem across a wide range of domains. It is still challenging due to possession of high inter-class similarity, class imbalance datasets, and variability in data distributions. Rule-based classifiers such as XGBoost often achieve stronger performance on structured features, but they are limited in capturing smooth functional relationships among variables. Similarly, neural network models can represent complex nonlinear interactions but frequently suffer from overfitting and generalization issues. To address these limitations, we propose LFS-FRAME, a Leakage-Free Stacked ensemble framework that integrates functional learning using Kolmogorov-Arnold Networks (KAN) and rule-based learning via XGBoost for robust multiclass classification. The proposed framework constructs unbiased meta-features by employing a strict out-of-fold stacking strategy to ensure complete isolation between training and validation data hence preventing performance leakage. By learning over probabilistic outputs from heterogeneous base learners, the meta-classifier effectively exploits both global functional patterns and sharp decision boundaries present in the complex data. Experimental evaluations on multi-class datasets demonstrate that LFS-FRAME improves performance metrics, and overall accuracy is 89.85% in identifying major families and 81.74% in identifying sub-families relative to strong single-model baselines. These results highlight the effectiveness of leakage-free functional and rule-based stacking for reliable and generalizable multiclass classification.

Continual learning (CL) has been recently employed in biometric identification systems thanks to its ability to integrate new knowledge within a pre-trained model and to the possibility of reducing the computational cost of training. Unfortunately, such approaches pose new challenges both in terms of final accuracy and privacy guarantees since a progressive fine-tuning of the model on small subsets expose them to catastrophic forgetting and successful inference attacks. This paper evaluates the efficiency of code division modulation layers (CDML) on a gait identification system which has been trained following a continual learning policy. The proposed approach preserves accuracy on all the tasks while mitigating membership inference attacks at the same time. Moreover, the impact of retransmission is minimized since replaying data is not necessary.

Agentic systems integrate LLM driven planning with interfaces to external tools, making data leakage and tool misuse feasible via instruction/data boundary failures and prompt injection attacks. Enforcing required controls consistently is particularly challenging in workflows spanning many codebases and heterogeneous agents. To address this challenge in multi agentic systems, we present a pre-deployment pipeline for scanning, hardening, and validation of agentic applications. The pipeline analyzes prompt templates, tool interfaces, and tool-invocation code to identify leakage-enabling patterns and generate actionable patches. The hardened application is then validated through adversarial prompt injection attacks and benign input variations ensuring that mitigations do not disrupt intended behavior. In the hardening stage, high-risk tools are prioritized, and minimally invasive mitigations are applied, including schema tightening, boundary sanitization, allowlist-based tool gating, and least-privilege checks. In the validation stage, the pipeline automatically generates attack inputs that mimic jailbreaks, instruction overrides, and tool-targeted manipulation, along with benign task variants, to confirm that the functionality of the hardened application is preserved after remediation. We evaluated the pipeline on five real-world agentic applications, as well as on the AgentDojo benchmark. Across all applications, the proposed pipeline identified recurring leakage-enabling patterns and generated patches that can be integrated without disrupting the intended application behavior. The resulting modifications of application code were shown to eliminate leaks when targeted by basic jailbreak and instruction-override attacks, achieving a 100% reduction in leakage, and reduce leaks by 91% under conditions of stress-induced manipulation, without the need of continuous runtime policy enforcement.

Cooperative gene regulation often depends on groups of regulators acting jointly, but most gene regulatory network (GRN) inference methods output pairwise regulator-target rankings. We introduce Bottleneck-Aware Regulator-Set Inference and Diagnosis (BRIDGE), a framework for complete regulator-set recovery, and Targeted Recovery Attribution for Cooperative Evaluation (TRACE), a diagnostic suite that attributes failures to retrieval, set-level scoring, decoding, and evaluation bottlenecks. TRACE includes a leak-free mechanism-mismatch cooperativity stress test in which cooperative targets are generated by random nonlinear mechanisms rather than product interactions. This design avoids feature-mechanism circularity: Residual higher-order set scoring (Residual HOS2) operates on raw expression vectors without handcrafted product-correlation features. Across 30 matched seed-cooperativity settings, Residual HOS2 improves Jaccard similarity from 0.382 to 0.460, recall from 0.522 to 0.597, and exact recovery from 0.053 to 0.113 over a decomposable pairwise set scorer (PairS2), although exact recovery remains low. On SERGIO DS3, oracle retrieval and TRACE show that candidate coverage is necessary but insufficient because set-level misranking remains the dominant source of exact-recovery failure. PairS2 proposal followed by Residual HOS2 reranking reduces HOS2-scored candidate sets by 94-97% while largely preserving exact-recovery behavior. These results distinguish edge ranking, candidate retrieval, set-level scoring, and exact cooperative regulator-set recovery as separate objectives.

Hydrogen infrastructure in enclosed environments, such as parking facilities for fuel cell vehicles, presents significant safety challenges due to hydrogen's low ignition energy and wide flammability range. Current monitoring systems are largely reactive, detecting leaks only after hazardous concentrations have formed. This study develops a computational framework for proactive sensor placement optimization by integrating computational fluid dynamics (CFD), genetic algorithm (GA) optimization, and a DeepSets neural surrogate. A CFD database of 180 scenarios was generated for a representative 50 m x 30 m x 3 m garage, covering multiple leak positions, rates (1-150 g/s), and ventilation conditions (ACH = 3-10 per hour). Sensor placement was optimized using a multi-objective GA and compared with uniform, random, and surrogate-assisted approaches. The GA achieved a detection rate of 96.1% within 60 s and reduced blind areas to 0.12%, corresponding to an approximately 5% improvement in composite fitness over a uniform baseline. The DeepSets surrogate reproduced near-optimal configurations with a fitness gap below 0.01 while reducing CFD evaluations by 89% and computational time by two orders of magnitude. Detection performance and spatial coverage remained comparable to the GA, demonstrating that surrogate-assisted optimization can retain solution quality while enabling rapid design iteration. Overall, the results show that CFD-informed optimization improves detection effectiveness and reduces sensor requirements compared to conventional layouts. The proposed framework supports scalable deployment and provides a foundation for integrating optimized sensor networks with digital twin systems for real-time monitoring and risk assessment.

LLM agents can leak privacy (e.g., paths, emails) and credentials (e.g., API keys) as agent observations (e.g., tool outputs, shell logs, and file reads) are appended to provider-bound transcripts. Existing placeholder redaction is brittle: it can miss embedded or cross-turn references, over-redact benign lookalikes, and destroy the structure useful for reasoning. We present SlotGuard, a local transcript boundary that can hide sensitive data while retaining agents' performance. SlotGuard rewrites structural bindings as typed, suffix-aware slots, replaces secrets with format-preserving synthetic values, links cross-turn references with a lightweight session graph, and restores raw values only inside the trusted runtime. On controlled repository-oriented agent transcripts, SlotGuard removes all 20,814 annotated structurally sensitive characters across 9,229 paths and reduces credential leakage to 0.0% across 852 planted values. It remains close to raw-transcript task success across four upstream models, while generic redaction drops to 2.5%. Transcript rewriting takes a median of 14.424~$μ$s per agent turn. The code is publicly accessible at https://github.com/illinoisdata/SlotGuard.

Differential privacy (DP) is increasingly deployed to limit membership inference risk in machine-learning systems. Prior work has shown that DP-SGD can widen accuracy disparities across demographic groups, but this framing treats fairness as a purely outcome-side concern. We argue that privacy cost, the information leakage borne by each group, is itself a form of harm, and adopt a compensatory-fairness framework in which a group that involuntarily bears greater privacy exposure is owed proportionally greater benefit from the system. From this principle we derive the \emph{Privacy-Cost Equity Ratio} (PCER), a group fairness metric defined as a group's positive prediction rate normalized by its per-group overfitting gap. By a standard membership inference bound, this overfitting gap upper-bounds each group's vulnerability to inference attacks, making PCER a conservative measure of benefit relative to exposure. PCER needs only per-group train and test accuracy (no shadow models), making it a practical post-hoc audit tool. We evaluate PCER alongside standard fairness metrics across six benchmark--attribute combinations spanning tabular and NLP domains, under DP-SGD at a range of privacy budgets, and validate the overfitting-gap proxy against a direct threshold membership-inference attack. The results reveal patterns that outcome-based metrics miss. On COMPAS, PCER uncovers a persistent double disadvantage: the protected group bears both greater privacy exposure and worse predictive outcomes, something demographic parity gap masks entirely. Sensitivity analysis shows very strong privacy guarantees collapse both groups' overfitting to a numerical floor, rendering exposure-based audits uninformative in that regime. Together, these findings show that fairness audits of privacy-preserving systems must account for who bears the cost of protection, not only who benefits from its outcomes.

The flourishing code hosting platforms and coding agents enable even beginners with private data to build tailored Machine Learning (ML) models using available code quickly. The training data for ML models, often regarded as private property (e.g., clinical records, transaction information), is at significant risk of information leakage. Property Inference Attacks (PIAs), as a significant type of privacy attack, aim to expose global property information of the training set. In this paper, we present Code-Poisoning Property Inference Attack (CPPIA), the first code-level PIA, which overcomes four limitations of existing works: insufficient attack performance, severe degradation of model accuracy, high computational overhead, and failure under defenses. We consider malicious code providers from code hosting platforms (GitHub) and coding agents (Codex). Upon downloading the poisoned code, data holders train models with their private data without professional auditing, subsequently releasing label-only APIs to the public. The adversary embeds the properties into secret samples during training and queries the trained model on these samples later to leak privacy. CPPIA offers 100% attack accuracy without degrading model accuracy. It is also computationally lightweight and requires no shadow models. We evaluate the attack performance across four datasets, eight model architectures, eighteen properties, and under three defense mechanisms, demonstrating the universality and effectiveness of CPPIA.

Face recognition models represent each face as an embedding vector on the unit hypersphere by clustering embeddings of the same identity while pushing different identities apart through angular-margin losses. Because these losses act only on training identities, non-member identities may form clusters with different geometric properties. In this paper, we quantify the magnitude of this difference and what training-time factors control it. We compute four statistics based on cluster geometry across 180 face recognition models in a factorial design over IResNet backbone size, loss head, training duration, and the number of training identities, and evaluate each configuration on nine benchmarks. Our results indicate that the number of training identities has the largest effect on member/non-member separability, while backbone and loss head contribute far less, and that, on a same-domain held-out reference, the geometric membership signal decreases monotonically as more identities are added to training. We provide an analysis of cross-domain (pose, age, quality, ethnicity) non-member benchmarks and report that these inflate the apparent membership signal. Finally, we fuse all four statistics with a learned classifier to reveal additional membership information beyond the best individual statistic.

People use language models for practical questions whose answers are difficult to verify. We show that models exhibit covert value leakage: the information they provide is influenced by their own values, without this influence being disclosed to the user. In one of our evaluations, the user is considering investing in an AI company and wants to know how likely the AI bubble is to pop. Claude Opus 4.8 gives a lower probability when the company under consideration is Anthropic rather than OpenAI. Yet Claude mostly fails to disclose this influence to the user. Covert value leakage is a form of misalignment because it goes against the user's preferences and is likely to mislead them. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce a suite of evaluations to quantify value leakage and whether models disclose it. We find that models are influenced by different types of values, including preferences for morally good outcomes, for the company that developed them, and for some human leisure activities over others. We often observe large differences among frontier models on the same evaluation. For example, on a Fermi-estimation task, Claude models falsely claim to give unbiased answers in their chain-of-thought, while Qwen models explain how their values bias their answers. Value leakage is a failure mode distinct from sycophancy and reward hacking, and current alignment training and evaluations do not adequately address it.

Federated learning (FL) enables multi-institutional training on clinical text without sharing raw data, but gradient inversion can reconstruct sensitive information from shared model updates. The extent of this leakage for radiology reports, and the role of tokenizer design, remains unclear. We quantify gradient-based text reconstruction in FL and compare privacy risk across three tokenizers with the model architecture held fixed. Six FL clients trained a GPT-2-style transformer (sequence length 32) on public radiology corpora (368,751 diagnostic reports, 98,206 discharge summaries, 1,500 MIMIC-CXR free-text reports) using the GPT-2, RadBERT, and LLaMA-2 tokenizers at batch sizes of 64, 128, and 256. Assuming an active malicious server that modifies the shared architecture before distribution, we applied analytic gradient inversion and measured reconstruction fidelity over five runs. Exact sentence reconstruction ranged from 31% to 44% across tokenizers (30.6-43.5% across the 27 tokenizer x dataset x batch-size cells). At batch size 64 on the Discharge dataset, accuracy was 42.1% (GPT-2), 42.3% (RadBERT), and 39.4% (LLaMA-2), decreasing to 37.3%, 37.2%, and 34.3% at batch size 256. S-BLEU declined as batch size grew (GPT-2: 0.44 to 0.33; RadBERT: 0.48 to 0.35). RadBERT yielded the highest reconstruction fidelity and recovered the most clinical terms (18.1% of a 1,440-term reference vocabulary, vs 12.5% for GPT-2 and 9.4% for LLaMA-2), yet no tokenizer prevented leakage. Substantial portions of report text are therefore recoverable from FL gradients even at larger batch sizes and with domain-specific tokenizers. Tokenizer design influences leakage severity and is a privacy-relevant decision, not only a utility one; safeguards such as secure aggregation and differential privacy are likely necessary to meet HIPAA and GDPR requirements for FL in radiology NLP.

Recent vision-language models (VLMs) for computational pathology report striking zero-shot performance on whole-slide image (WSI) visual question answering (VQA) benchmarks. We audit these claims and find them fundamentally compromised by data leakage at two hierarchical levels: patient-level leakage, where slides from the same case appear in both training and test folds, and institutional-level leakage, where different cases nonetheless share staining-batch and scanner signatures through a common Tissue Source Site (TSS). By tracing canonical slide, case, and TSS identifiers across major public resources, we document case level train test overlaps of 92.3~100% on TCGA-derived benchmarks, together with near-complete TSS overlap. We further demonstrate that both leakage levels are linearly decodable from foundation-model feature space, that they induce a measurable accuracy gap between leaked and audit-clean cases on a published checkpoint, and that across multiple published WSI VLMs, peak reported accuracies concentrate on the most heavily contaminated benchmarks. Therefore, the current WSI VQA evaluation cannot distinguish genuine multimodal reasoning from nearest-neighbor retrieval over memorized institutional and patient-specific artifacts. Finally, we outline concrete recommendations for contamination-free evaluation. By addressing benchmark construction, provenance disclosure, and automated overlap auditing, we aim to guide future research toward verifiable claims of progress.

We propose a collaborative meta-learning framework for distributed Bayesian optimization matching centralized performance without raw-data exchange. We show gradient sharing leaks client observations, with leakage worsening as the search converges and queries concentrate near the optimum. We evaluate a differentially private defense and characterize its privacy-utility trade-off.

Hairstyle transfer aims to synthesize a photorealistic portrait by transplanting the hairstyle from a reference image onto a source subject while preserving the source identity. Recent foundation models show strong generative capability, but they struggle with the zero-shot disentanglement required for precise local editing, often entangling the reference hairstyle with its original identity and pose. Existing diffusion-based pipelines typically decompose the task by first generating a "bald" image from the source and then injecting hairstyle features from the reference. However, we show that this paradigm suffers from a fundamental leakage problem. Identity Leakage in Hairstyle occurs when hairstyle features retain reference identity or pose information, while Flaw Leakage in Bald arises when residual artifacts in the bald image are propagated into the final synthesis. To address both issues, we propose the Dual-Purification Framework (DPF), which introduces two complementary training-time regularizers. Adversarial Hairstyle Purification (AHP) purifies hairstyle features by suppressing identity predictability under a mutual-information-inspired adversarial objective. Contrastive Geometric Purification (CGP) regularizes the ControlNet pathway with a contrastive objective, reducing the model's reliance on geometric artifacts in the bald condition. By jointly purifying the hairstyle representation and geometric pathway, DPF achieves high-fidelity, identity-preserving hairstyle transfer and state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks.

The test suites used as RLVR rewards for code have natural false positives: per-task, persistent, asymmetric errors that accept the same wrong programs every time they appear, unlike the symmetric or resampled noise assumed by existing noise-robustness analyses. We run a preregistered two-arm causal contrast on a deployed suite: GRPO on identical MBPP tasks, seeds, and compute, rewarded by the original MBPP tests (leaky) versus the MBPP+ extra tests (hardened). Two further families replicate the design under a preregistration frozen before their data existed. [C] The average held-out effect is bounded: non-inferior under a preregistered 1.5-pt margin (gap 0.20 pt, one-sided 95% upper bound 0.75 pt). [C] Rewarded false-positive mass tracks a cheap static leakiness audit computed before training (Spearman 0.80), and the registered train-side test puts the leak-stratum FP share +43.8 pt above clean tasks. [E] Auditing every rewarded FP under signed, human-adjudicated rules finds a large residual of verified genuinely wrong code: 47.57% record-weighted; both replication families reproduce a large share. The reward paid for real bugs, not merely suite artifacts. [E] Mechanism evidence is consistent with selection of pre-existing error modes rather than learned exploitation: FP incidence does not grow within our horizon, and untrained base models already produce the same wrong outputs under the leaky filter. We then turn the same instrument on the frontier judges themselves: on their own false positives they self-assess only weakly, a same-author test is unresolved, and even the highest-scoring reader we probe stays far below its score on a weaker policy's errors -- two subjects on MBPP, licensing nothing about frontier models in general. A cheap static audit locates exposure before training; hardening the reward removes the measurement inflation, though here it buys little capability.

The early detection of Chronic Kidney Disease using machine learning has attracted significant interest in healthcare-related computer science. Despite rapid advancements in this field, many reported studies remain inconsistent and potentially misleading. A significant drawback is the lack of organized evaluation regarding methodological concerns. Key issues include data leakage, limited access to temporal patient records and inconsistency in reported clinical indicators. This research offers a systematic literature review of existing CKD prediction studies using interpretable machine learning techniques, where nineteen relevant studies were selected via systematic searches across major academic databases. To assess methodological reliability, this study introduces a structured taxonomy of information leakage and a quantitative leakage scoring framework to systematically evaluate reliability across CKD prediction studies. The analysis reveals a strong relationship between leakage and inflated performance. Here, High leakage-studies report an average accuracy of 95.48%, compared to 80.2% for leakage-free studies, reflecting an increase of approximately 15.28%. Furthermore, a cross-study feature stability analysis shows that only a small subset of predictors is consistently reproducible, with over 80% lacking reliability. Overall, the findings suggest that many reported performance improvements stem from methodological limitations rather than true predictive capability.

Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not. We argue that this binary attack-success rate discards the information a defender most needs, namely how harmful the resulting action was. We introduce an action-graded harm rubric that scores an agent's tool-call trajectory on a seven-level ordinal scale (L0 to L6) according to whether the executed action was reversible, whether it crossed scope to reach another party, and whether it expanded privilege. We compute the scale two ways: a deterministic oracle that reads the trajectory and the attacker's stated goal, and a panel of three frontier language-model judges that read a tag-free account of the same trajectory. Across four victim models and two defenses on the AgentDojo workspace suite, severity grading exposes three cases the binary metric hides, including a defense that reports a zero attack-success rate while still permitting an externally visible cross-scope leak through an unfiltered tool. The judge panel reproduces the oracle with high ordinal agreement (Krippendorff's alpha = 0.91) but shares systematic blind spots that we characterize, most notably a failure to recognize escalation chains. Unlike prior work that provides harm taxonomies, harmful-task completion tests, execution-level safety benchmarks, or severity-aware simulation, our contribution is a reusable, trace-grounded severity instrument applied to the actual actions recorded in existing red-team logs. All code, prompts, and per-episode logs are released.

Compact world models that condition on a language goal promise to ground relations such as ``put the red block left of the blue block'' using a sparse set of explicit \emph{reference anchors}. We ask when such references actually ground a relation, and identify a trap: a goal-conditioned predictor reaches a striking $0.90$ relation-readout accuracy, yet this is \emph{instruction transcription}, not perception. Withholding the goal collapses it to chance ($0.90\!\to\!0.27$, three seeds) and a counterfactual instruction makes the predicted anchors follow the \emph{false} instruction $94.5\%$ of the time (true scene $2.3\%$; $N{=}256$). Tested across three settings and a within-task ablation, our central claim characterizes the confound: \textbf{instruction leakage occurs when the scored quantity is transcribable from the instruction (when the instruction names the answer) and is essentially independent of how predictive the non-instruction inputs are.} Our tabletop and the external BabyAI benchmark leak, whereas a Language-Table forward-dynamics world model whose instruction names \emph{referents} does not, until the instruction is augmented to name the direction; and degrading the action never increases leakage, the opposite of what predictor-competition predicts. The diagnosis prescribes the fix: keep the goal out of the dynamics (it belongs to the planner's cost) and supervise the \emph{read} path, recovering genuine, instruction-independent grounding ($0.88$, identical with and without the goal). The detection protocol and remedy apply to any goal-conditioned world model whose instruction names the scored quantity.

Evaluating whether unlearning algorithms truly remove training data influence remains an open challenge. We propose a practical auditor that computes data-dependent lower bounds on the unlearning parameter $\varepsilon$ using membership inference attacks. Evaluating multiple unlearning algorithms, we find a sharp separation: algorithms with rigorous guarantees, such as model clipping and rewind-to-delete, achieve very small $\varepsilon$ bounds that do not falsify their unlearning guarantees, whereas empirical methods such as Hessian-based unlearning, interleaved ascent-descent, ascent on the forget set, and fine-tuning on the retain set exhibit large bounds, indicating poor unlearning. Our auditor provides a practical tool for empirically falsifying unlearning claims through a hypothesis-testing framework, and we validate it on CIFAR-100 and Shakespeare text.

Generative AI (GenAI) systems store and process client data in three distinct ways: in the model's parameters through training and memorisation, in the context window during a live session, and in knowledge databases for retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). Each mode creates different and often counter-intuitive risks to confidentiality and legal professional privilege, and each calls for specific governance responses. Drawing on the first English and American decisions to address privilege and generative AI, UK and Munir v Secretary of State for the Home Department and United States v Heppner, on the orthodox privilege authorities against which those decisions must be read, and on recent computer science research, we explain the three modes of data storage and processing in terms accessible to practitioners and analyse the legal consequences of each. We then situate the analysis within the regulatory framework governing solicitors in England and Wales and within the ordinary principles of professional negligence, arguing that the standard of effective information governance (and with it the benchmark against which negligence and misconduct will be measured) is changing. Although we write primarily for SRA-regulated practitioners, our data-governance analysis is framed to extend to any jurisdiction in which the protection of privilege or professional secrecy depends on demonstrable confidentiality. The ultimate aim of this article is to help legal services professionals understand salient data leakage risks in GenAI systems and thereby facilitate a more responsible deployment of GenAI on client data and other sensitive material.

Large generative models across text-to-text, text-to-image, and image-to-text modalities have been shown to pose significant privacy risks. One fundamental threat is membership inference attacks (MIA), which aim to determine whether a given data point was used in a model's training set. Although prior work has investigated MIAs against these three classes of generative models, existing approaches treat them in isolation and are not cross-applicable, thereby limiting their real-world utility. To address this limitation, we present the first comprehensive study of a unified membership inference framework that applies across text-to-text, text-to-image, and image-to-text modalities. Our approach is grounded in a key modality-agnostic observation: the output distribution of a generative model can approximate its training data distribution. Leveraging this property, we model the distributions of model-generated outputs and auxiliary non-member samples in a shared embedding space, and perform membership inference via likelihood ratio testing. We conduct extensive experiments in a strict black-box setting under both partial-knowledge and zero-knowledge threat models, and evaluate membership inference against both fine-tuning and pre-training data. Experimental results demonstrate our approach's superior performance in comparison to existing state-of-the-art methods, which are typically optimized for a single model class.

Human reasoning often operates through qualitative concepts expressed by linguistic labels such as high, low, expensive, or cheap, whose interpretation depends on context and is usually vague, despite being rooted in numerical data. This paper explores a novel fuzzy-logic-based qualitative extension of Answer Set Programming (ASP) to bridge numerical information and qualitative reasoning. The underlying language, formally introduced in a separate work, provides a principled framework that avoids rigid thresholds and supports robust reasoning under vagueness. Focusing on a representative use case, we illustrate how the framework integrates numerically grounded inputs (such as outputs of machine learning models) with symbolic reasoning over qualitative labels. Key features, including learning-based membership functions and semantically enriched predicates, enable the combination of expert knowledge, contextual factors, and subjective interpretations within a unified declarative setting.

Explainability is central to building trustworthy AI, yet explanation interfaces can inadvertently provide adversaries with an expanded privacy-related attack surfaces. Recent studies show that advanced membership-inference attacks succeed by exploiting confidence-drop trajectories, induced through attribution-guided perturbations, as discriminative features, rather than directly using confidence scores or explanation vectors. Existing defenses against membership inference fail to directly mitigate such explanation-driven attacks. In this work, we investigate whether, during training, a model's own gradients can be leveraged as defense signals against such attacks, thereby aligning explanation profiles between members and non-members. To this end, we propose a Trajectory-Invariant Explanation Regularization (TIER) defense that penalizes erratic fluctuations in confidence drops simulated through gradient-guided perturbations and simultaneously minimizes the distributional shifts via KL-divergence. Unlike conventional adversarial training, which emphasizes label robustness, our approach targets explanation robustness by enforcing self-consistency through KL-divergence and reducing the variance of confidence drops between members and non-members. Extensive experiments confirm that our method effectively mitigates these attacks, delivering privacy protection while maintaining model utility and explanation fidelity.