Coalition Formation

In many application domains, such as student dropout, insurance fraud, loan approval, and machine failures, several labelled public datasets are available where (i) data is about the same type of objects but the set of actual underlying objects are disjoint; and (ii) the class labels are same; and (iii) the feature spaces of the datasets are largely distinct (heterogeneous), with a few shared features. We call such datasets as allied. A single classifier cannot be trained on both datasets together, and one classifier trained on one dataset cannot be tested on the other. In this paper, we propose a method to merge the feature-spaces into a single feature-space for a pair of given allied heterogeneous datasets. We then use a matrix completion method to create a unified dataset based on the merged feature-space. The hypothesis is that the merged representation facilitates the transfer of classification knowledge from one dataset to another. We conduct experiments on several pairs of allied, heterogeneous datasets and several classifiers to demonstrate that any classifier trained on the unified representation always outperforms classifiers separately trained on the constituent allied datasets on several pairs of allied datasets. This work provides an easy way to substantially improve classifier performance by unifying and using multiple allied datasets together.

Federated learning (FL) enables privacy-preserving, on-device training across heterogeneous Internet-of-Things (IoT) deployments such as smart-city water-metering networks, where each smart meter observes a household-specific consumption time series. Under such statistical heterogeneity, the standard Federated Averaging (FedAvg) aggregation averages dissimilar local models into a single global model that may fail to capture client-specific patterns. We address this by forming client coalitions directly in the local-weight space and aggregating at the coalition level. Extending a prior weight-driven coalition-formation scheme, we model coalition formation as a Hegselmann-Krause (HK) bounded-confidence opinion-dynamics process acting on the local weights, and develop variants of the HK interaction based on Euclidean-distance and cosine-similarity confidence criteria. The framework is applied to short-term water-consumption forecasting with local Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) models and evaluated against FedAvg, Per-FedAvg, FedProx, and FedAvg with Euclidean-distance or cosine-similarity coalition formation. Experiments on a real smart-metering dataset of water consumption show that the proposed HK-based coalition formation produces stable, endogenous coalition structures within at most ten inner iterations, incurs no additional client-side computation or communication compared to FedAvg, and reduces the average MAE by up to 54% relative to FedAvg, 39% relative to FedProx, and 24% relative to Per-FedAvg, while achieving the highest global accuracy (83-85%).

Long-running AI agents create a control problem: each action they take changes the state, which in turn affects the trajectory of future actions. If the agent is not fully aligned, then guaranteeing safety requires approving consequential actions before allowing them to be executed. But requiring human approval at every step makes attention a bottleneck. Delegating review to other AI agents raises the same alignment problem: the reviewers may themselves be misaligned. We identify a condition on a reviewing panel that is weaker than individual alignment yet necessary and sufficient for a guarantee that the principal fares at least as well in expectation as under a designated baseline policy. Each reviewer agent reports whether an action proposal made by a proposer agent improves its own utility relative to the baseline. We show that a threshold rule tolerating $k$ disapprovals is safe exactly when, after any $k$ reviewers are removed, the principal's utility can be written as a nonnegative combination of the remaining reviewers' utilities, plus a term that is nonnegative on every feasible proposal. We call this property $k$-robust coalitional alignment. The characterization lifts to sequential control: in a discounted MDP with an arbitrary proposer agent, safety at every state is both necessary and sufficient for the induced policy to match or improve on the baseline. When reviewers vote strategically, full-panel coverage in reward-function space guarantees that every Nash equilibrium is safe under the unanimous approval rule; in contrast, more permissive thresholds can admit unsafe equilibria even when reviewers are individually aligned. Experiments with existing reviewer models show that collective review can remain sound without an aligned individual, even when some disapprovals are tolerated.

Shapley value (SV)-based methods are the prevailing framework for feature attribution in machine learning, yet existing population-level Shapley estimators generally assume that observations used to evaluate the coalitional game are fully observed under a common feature space. This assumption is routinely violated in multi-site studies across biomedicine, social science, and environmental monitoring, where institutions record different features under different protocols, producing systematic blockwise missingness across sources. We first show that the standard remedy of imputing missing features before computing Shapley values introduces systematic, coalition-dependent bias into the resulting attributions. We then propose \textbf{FUSHAP} (\textbf{Fu}sion \textbf{Sh}apley \textbf{A}ttribution from \textbf{P}artially-observed data), a method that leverages partially-observed auxiliary sites to reduce the variance of a preliminary single-site Shapley estimate without imputation. A permutation-based screening step detects and excludes sites whose data distributions are incompatible with the target population. In synthetic experiments, FUSHAP achieves $3$--$8\times$ lower MSE than the single-site estimator and $2$--$3\times$ lower MSE than imputation baselines without incurring imputation-induced bias, and the screening procedure identifies misaligned sites with $82\%$ power at moderate misalignment and $100\%$ for strong misalignment. On multi-site air quality and multi-center clinical data, FUSHAP reduces MSE by approximately $3$--$7\times$ relative to the single-site estimator; in the clinical application, standard imputation can increase MSE above the single-site baseline.

Agent skills are crucial external instructions that enable language agents to execute long procedural tasks such as coding or document processing. Existing agent skills are primarily created through human manual crafting or agent execution traces, with limited understanding of how each step contributes to overall skill performance on specific tasks; i.e., there remains an open problem in quantifying the contribution of individual steps within an agent skill. To address this issue, we first model skill-step attribution as a Shapley value-based contribution estimation problem, and then propose SkillShapley, a step-level attribution framework for agent skills. Notably, SkillShapley operates in two phases, motivated by key empirical insights, i.e., discretized benchmark rewards that create sharp performance cliffs, and step interactions that are largely additive rather than synergistic. Specifically, it first identifies informative coalitional regions, and then adaptively samples new coalitions that can yield reusable marginal evidence. Experiments on skills from the widely adopted SkillsBench demonstrate that our SkillShapley can effectively and efficiently identify high- or low-value skill steps, providing several key takeaways for agent skill creation.

Predictive explanation methods attribute a model output; they do not, by themselves, attribute an intervention effect on the real-world outcome. We introduce the Causal Attribution Score (CAS), a compact score architecture for causal explanation. CAS starts from an identified interventional coalition game, allocates the joint intervention contrast with causal Shapley contributions, and converts those raw outcome-scale effects into Local CAS, Signed Local CAS, and two complementary Global CAS summaries. The innovation is not a new Shapley formula, but a local-to-global causal reporting layer with an explicit intervention target. In the known-truth benchmark, eight repeated primary-interaction simulations (n = 2,200 each, three actions) gave mean Local CAS MAE of 0.107 for coalition-aware CAS, compared with 0.173 for one-at-a-time normalisation and 0.213 for a global normalised absolute ATE vector. The paired advantage over one-at-a-time normalisation increased from -0.003 under additivity to 0.091 under strong interactions. On both empirical DoubleML datasets, 401(k) eligibility/net financial assets (n = 9,915) and Pennsylvania reemployment bonus/unemployment duration (n = 5,099), predictive SHAP/TreeSHAP rankings differed materially from Feature-CAS rankings of treatment-effect modifiers. In Pennsylvania, dep1 (exactly one dependent) moved from predictive global rank 13 to Feature-CAS rank 2 and was the leading local Feature-CAS modifier. These results isolate the added value of separating what predicts the outcome from what explains heterogeneity in an estimated causal effect.

Full justified representation (FJR) is among the strongest known satisfiable proportionality axioms for approval-based committee elections. Recent work has shown that an FJR committee can be found in polynomial time, but verifying whether a given committee satisfies FJR remains coNP-complete. We introduce FJR+, a strict strengthening of FJR and EJR+ that can be verified and satisfied in polynomial time. We then analyze the Residual-Budget Greedy (RBG) algorithm and prove that it selects a partial committee such that every size-$k$ completion satisfies FJR+. This freedom allows us to use sequential Phragmén to obtain a priceable completion. The resulting rule always satisfies FJR+ and the sub-core, and it is priceable whenever at least $k$ candidates receive an approval. We also obtain a Droop-quota version of FJR+. Finally, we extend FJR+ to approval-based participatory budgeting with arbitrary project costs. A project-specific version of RBG computes this property in polynomial time and can be continued to a priceable outcome satisfying a cost-based version of the sub-core.

Clustered federated learning benefits from organizing heterogeneous participants into coalitions that train coalition-specific models, but such clustering is sustainable only if participants prefer their assigned coalition and the required transfers are affordable. We develop a transferable-surplus model separating learning benefit, system cost, participant cost, and monetary transfers; an allocation rule converts coalition surplus into hedonic preferences, and weak budget feasibility guarantees nonnegative retained coordinator surplus. For symmetric pairwise allocations the induced game is an exact potential game: a Nash-stable partition exists, every strict better-response process converges, and with destination consent accepted better responses reach an individually stable partition. We characterize feasibility of bounded pair incentives and verify the exponentially many budget constraints in polynomial oracle time when retained slack is submodular. Decomposing welfare into participant potential and retained slack yields additive and multiplicative price-of-stability guarantees, the latter asymptotically tight; exact balance gives welfare-optimal stability only on the pairwise-representable class, and budget feasibility alone permits unbounded welfare loss. Global potential maximization equals weighted maximum-agreement correlation clustering, and approximation followed by stabilization satisfies an end-to-end welfare bound governed by retained slack and negative-edge mass, attained by an explicit construction. In a preregistered five-seed CIFAR-10 study the mechanism reaches the certified estimated-table welfare optimum on every primary instance, equal-surplus sharing has no Nash-stable outcome on three, and pairwise validation gain gives far more reliable pair signs than gradient alignment.

We present MiSS, a black-box, query-based framework for explaining 3D point cloud classifiers through perturbation-relative sufficiency reasoning. MiSS treats a superpoint partition as an interpretable abstraction layer and asks whether the original prediction can be certified from a minimal coalition of geometric regions under a specified perturbation distribution. Unlike abductive explainers that require Boolean feature spaces or white-box logical encodings of the predictor, MiSS separates candidate proposal from verification: a weighted MaxSAT procedure proposes coalitions using a heuristic adaptive cardinality floor, certified exact-size fallback, a safely tightened upper bound, blocking clauses, and a surrogate acquisition heuristic learned from previous oracle evaluations, while a blackbox statistical oracle decides sufficiency from prediction queries. The system returns a statistically verified sufficient coalition as a binary attribution, with minimum cardinality guaranteed when certified search completes. Experiments on ModelNet40 and ShapeNet with PointNet and PointMLP classifiers show higher precision and coverage than rule-based baselines in most settings, with lower explanation time than exhaustive search.

Modern agentic AI systems combine multiple large language model agents with heterogeneous skills, yet most architectures either fix communication in advance or allow full broadcast. Both can be inefficient because token cost, latency, redundancy, and error propagation increase with the number of active agents and communication links. We model agent selection and communication as a cooperative game with task-conditioned net utility $U(C\mid x)=V(C\mid x)-\sum_{i\in C}c_i$, separating coalition-level costs from agent activation costs. We propose a marginal-value activation rule and greedy router, extend the model to optimize communication edges with per-edge costs, and use estimated Shapley values to predict which agents are worth contacting before and during execution. We connect the problem to submodular maximization and prove two limited guarantees: a curvature-refined bound for a monotone, cardinality-constrained special case, and a tight $1/2$-approximation, with a correction for signed objectives, for an unconstrained non-monotone case via double greedy. Neither guarantee applies directly to the main router, which remains a heuristic. We also prove a Shapley-submodularity sandwich bound linking the error of marginal-value routing to a per-agent diminishing-returns quantity. In synthetic experiments, greedy routing achieves $99.5$ of brute-force-optimal utility while activating $1.96$ of $8$ agents on average, compared with $38.8$ for full broadcast. Performance is robust to activation cost and redundancy weight but falls to $66$ under strong violations of submodularity or noisy value estimates. We distinguish the framework from Shapley pricing, hedonic coalition formation, and communication-graph pruning, and propose evaluation on real multi-agent LLM benchmarks.

Building socially calibrated large language models, which can learn from others without simply yielding to them, requires more than reducing sycophancy as a one-dimensional failure mode. Models must distinguish when to incorporate others' perspectives from when to maintain a well-grounded moral judgment. We study the broader resistance-compliance process governing this distinction. Across three studies, we show that models' judgment revision is structured along three dimensions that parallel classic phenomena in human social psychology: the distance between an incoming view and the model's initial position, the source attribution of that view, and the coalition structure supporting it. Models are generally more receptive to nearby positions, more influenced by views presented as their own prior judgments, and differently responsive to group pressure. These findings recast sycophancy as one expression of a broader judgment-updating process shaped by social influence. Our framework provides a principled basis for distinguishing constructive belief revision from sycophantic compliance, thereby supporting better alignment in morally consequential interactions.

The formation of political coalitions is a complex negotiation driven by both concrete policy objectives and deep-seated ideological convictions. While Large Language Models (LLMs) open new avenues for computational political science, the neutrality and helpfulness biases instilled by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) prevent them from sustaining steadfast partisan behaviour. We present a multi-agent framework that reconciles factual grounding with ideological alignment by combining Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG): DPO instils aggressive party-specific personas, while a per-party RAG pipeline keeps each agent bounded to its official manifesto. We operationalize the framework on the 2019 Flemish election, deploying the partisan agents in a hub-and-spoke negotiation arbitrated by a formateur. To make the emergent negotiation interpretable, we introduce a Multi-Layered Information Lineage Topology (MILT) that traces every clause in the final agreement back to its manifesto origin and classifies it into five provenance states, a Coalition Influence Score (CIS) that aggregates these traceable contributions to identify which party shaped the agreement, and a real-world grounding pass that benchmarks each simulated provision against the historically adopted coalition agreement. Across three independent simulations the framework yields a stable winner and ranking (N-VA ahead of CD&V and Open Vld), and manifesto-anchored lineage reliably predicts real-world materialization whereas hallucinated content does not. The result is a transparent, scalable testbed for the ex-ante exploration of party compatibility and formateur-mediated compromise.

We introduce inquisitive action logic, InqAL, a multi-agent modal logic for reasoning about action. While traditional approaches focus on what properties of the outcome an agent can force, InqAL also captures what aspects of the outcome an agent determines through their actions. As we argue, such claims of agentive determination are naturally analyzed as modal claims involving questions. Technically, InqAL is a multi-agent extension of inquisitive neighborhood logic based on concurrent game structures. With respect to statements, it is expressively equivalent to the individual-agent fragment of the socially friendly coalition logic recently proposed by Goranko and Enqvist. We present an axiomatization of InqAL and prove completeness and decidability via the finite model property. Along the way, we establish a representation theorem for actual effectivity functions, associating to an agent the sets of outcomes corresponding to their possible actions; we give exact conditions under which a multi-agent neighborhood frame arises from a concurrent game structure.

This paper develops a continuum theory of exit-and-join coalition dynamics in nonatomic cooperative games. We extend the Aumann-Shapley value and the Aumann-Drèze value to coalition structures in which each coalition is treated as a restricted nonatomic game, yielding a marginal-contribution-based payoff density that governs incentives for agents to remain in, exit, or join coalitions. We derive deterministic mean-field dynamics from decentralized switching rules and show that payoff-difference switching recovers replicator dynamics as a special case. We characterize exit-and-join equilibrium by the absence of profitable positive-mass deviations and prove its equivalence with stationarity of the induced mass dynamics under incentive-compatible and strictly payoff-responsive switching rates. For mass-based cooperative games, we construct a Lyapunov function and establish global convergence under strict concavity. We further show that the equilibrium is equivalent to a Wardrop equilibrium of an induced nonatomic population game and admits a variational inequality formulation. The framework is extended to incorporate switching costs and endogenous coalition acceptance rules, leading to constrained equilibria characterized by quasi-variational inequalities. The proposed theory unifies cooperative value allocation, noncooperative coalition mobility, mean-field dynamics, evolutionary game theory, and population games within a common framework for analyzing coalition formation and adaptation in large-scale multi-agent systems.

This paper develops a multiscale model of coalition formation in which strategic exit-and-join decisions are coupled with tactical consensus dynamics inside coalitions. Coalition value is generated endogenously from within-coalition information aggregation, while Aumann-Dreze payoffs, switching frictions, and acceptance rules govern strategic reconfiguration. The framework introduces a fast-slow architecture in which transferable coalition value emerges from DeGroot-style consensus processes, while coalition structures evolve through incentive-driven exit-and-join dynamics. The analysis characterizes joint tactical-strategic equilibria, conditions for tactical and strategic unanimity, segregation, polarization, and cognitive barriers that sustain stable coalition structures. A fixed-point characterization and existence results are established for the coupled dynamics. Numerical experiments reveal an instability-consensus paradox: low or negative switching barriers may prevent strategic convergence while simultaneously promoting temporal mixing sufficient to achieve global tactical consensus. The results provide a unified perspective on coalition formation, consensus dynamics, information aggregation, and strategic stability in multi-agent systems.

This paper studies coalition formation as a decentralized dynamical process driven by unilateral exit-and-join decisions. Agents evaluate local moves using the Aumann-Dreze value, so payoffs are computed within the agent's current coalition rather than through a globally negotiated coalition structure. The resulting model links cooperative payoff allocation with noncooperative best-response behavior: a terminal partition is precisely a coalition structure with no admissible, individually profitable exit-and-join deviation. We establish equilibrium characterizations, identify conditions under which the dynamics admit scalar Lyapunov or exact-potential representations, and analyze how switching and acceptance costs shape local stability. Numerical experiments test finite-time stabilization, cost sensitivity, and a special convex-game benchmark.

Hierarchical multi-agent systems (MAS) are rapidly being deployed in high-stakes workflows across domains such as finance and software engineering. In these systems, safety and security are inherently distributed across role-specialized agents, significantly expanding the attack surface, particularly under coordinated adversarial behaviors such as privilege escalation and cross-agent collusion. Existing red-teaming approaches for MAS remain limited: they rely on heuristic selection of target agents and perturb isolated message streams, leaving critical questions unanswered as which agents are most responsible for system safety, and how compromised agents can coordinate to bypass defenses. We propose MAStrike, a closed-loop framework for collusive red-teaming in hierarchical MAS. We propose the first agent-level Shapley value analysis for MAS, quantifying each agent's marginal contribution to system robustness under task-specific distributions. GGuided by this attribution, MAStrike identifies vulnerable agent coalitions and generates coordinated, role-aware adversarial manipulations. These attacks are iteratively refined through structured causal diagnosis, attributing failure cases to uncompromised agents that block adversarial attempts. We further build a comprehensive MAS red-teaming benchmark and controllable environments spanning diverse hierarchical topologies and domains, including finance, software engineering, and CRM. Extensive experiments across MAS built on multiple frontier models show that MAStrike substantially outperforms heuristic baselines. Our analysis further uncovers non-trivial Shapley value distributions and higher-order interaction structures among agents, revealing critical vulnerabilities and coordination patterns that are overlooked by prior single-agent or template-based methods.

When many people highlight the same document, is the crowd a single consensus, or is it internally structured into reader sub-groups that mark different things -- and is that structure a stable property of a reader or of the document? Building on prior work showing an individual's within-document highlighting signal is a whisper while individuality lives in selection, we ask the group-level question on a co-readership platform using a margin-preserving curveball null. Experiment 1: within a document, readers form strong sub-groups -- pairs agree far beyond what shared salience, mark density, and sentence popularity predict (nearest-neighbour agreement z=+6.3, significant in 88% of documents). Under an eight-block region-preserving null, shared engagement with the same coarse regions of the document accounts for about 40% of this excess; the majority survives as finer reader-specific agreement (z=+3.6, 77% significant). So the within-document crowd is, in a descriptive sense, factional. Experiment 2: is that grouping a stable reader trait? Here we are honest about power. The cross-document split-half reproducibility of a pair's agreement is near zero pooled (+0.078 and 0.000 in two separately drawn samples), and a power calibration shows the test is informative only for pairs that co-read many documents. In the only informative high-overlap subset (k>=4), point estimates are positive but small-sample, imprecise across the separately drawn samples, never significant, and attenuate under the region-preserving null. We therefore leave cross-document stability unresolved: the data is consistent with anything from situational grouping to a weak-to-moderate stable reader trait. The crowd is factional within a document; whether its factions follow the reader across documents is, honestly, beyond our reach.

Agentic AI systems are increasingly being deployed as productive resources in organizational workflows, yet existing evaluation methods primarily measure isolated technical performance rather than economic contribution. This paper introduces \emph{Agentomics}, a workflow-based framework for valuing, attributing, and pricing human and artificial agents. The framework models a workflow as a configuration of heterogeneous agents whose collective performance determines gross value, deployment cost, reliability, and expected failure loss. Workflow value is treated as a team-level quantity that may include complementarities, substitution effects, bottlenecks, and nonlinear production; additive stage-level value is only a special case. Building on this workflow model, the paper formulates AI deployment as a coalition-formation problem and defines coalition value as the incremental net surplus generated relative to a benchmark human workflow. The Shapley value is then used to attribute economic surplus among participating AI agents, yielding a principled connection among valuation, accountability, and market pricing. The resulting Shapley pricing equilibrium provides a normative benchmark for assessing whether agent prices reflect expected marginal contribution. A security-operations case study illustrates how the framework accounts for productivity gains, deployment costs, reliability losses, and coalition-level complementarities in hybrid human--AI workflows.

We study two reproducible failure modes of deep multi-agent reinforcement learning in continuous-time pricing markets: (i) tacit cartel formation between competing DDPG agents, and (ii) actor--critic instability at high event rates. We instantiate both inside a single CT-MARL benchmark (Poisson-clocked price updates, observation latency $δ$, interior-optimum logit demand), show that synchronous DDPG agents reliably trigger Failure Mode 1 with collusion index $Δ= 0.69 \pm 0.11$, and quantify a partial microstructure fix: asynchrony alone cuts collusion by 48% and adding latency drives it to a minimum of $Δ= 0.28$. The fix has clearly documented costs: it is partial ($Δ$ remains supra-Bertrand), it is non-monotone in $δ$, and it does not survive Failure Mode 2, which emerges as DDPG critic divergence at $λ= 5$ and corrupts the phase-diagram cell at $(λ{=}5, δ{=}1)$. We accompany the scalar collusion index with trajectory-level trace diagnostics that expose the within-episode signalling collapse and the post-shock non-recovery.

As multi-agent systems (MAS) become increasingly complex, identifying the contributions of individual agents is critical for system optimization. However, existing approaches lack a rigorous, unified framework for credit assignment. In this work, we formalize agent attribution as a cooperative game, parameterized by the coalition distribution, removal protocol, and target metric. Using this framework, we show that Leave-One-Out (LOO) identifies bottleneck agents as effectively as combinatorial methods, but at a fraction of the computational cost. We also demonstrate that removal protocols induce distinct games: Agent ablation isolates structural bottlenecks, whereas introspective LLM judges fail to faithfully approximate this behavior. Furthermore, to evaluate the utility of specific agent backbones, we introduce attribution via model replacement. By substituting underlying models of low-contribution agents, we improve task performance by up to 17% while reducing cost by up to 35% across three benchmarks. Finally, we apply our framework to audit a medical MAS, revealing that agent contributions to diagnostic accuracy and ethical behavior are often decoupled. By intervening on counterproductive roles, we observe an increase in ethics alignment while maintaining diagnostic accuracy. Overall, this work provides a principled approach for cost-effective MAS attribution and intervention.

In dynamic urban logistics, the stochastic emergence of time-sensitive tasks poses a significant optimality challenge for heterogeneous AAVs logistics task allocation. To address this problem, a reinforcement learning enhanced overlapping coalition formation game approach is proposed. A dynamic task allocation model is established, where global optimality is mathematically quantified by a generalized logistics cost coupling service quality and resource consumption. To deal with the time-varying task sets induced by stochastic order arrivals, a transformer-based soft actor-critic network is designed. By leveraging multi-head self-attention to encode variable-length logistics states and capture task-wise spatiotemporal dependencies, the learned policy adaptively guides coalition updates, replacing heuristic rules in the overlapping coalition formation game. On this basis, heterogeneous AAVs can form more efficient overlapping coalitions for dynamic logistics tasks. The resulting coalition formation process is proven to constitute an exact potential game, which guarantees convergence to a Nash-stable equilibrium within a finite number of iterations. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the proposed algorithm effectively improves the optimality of task allocation under the generalized logistics cost criterion. In a scenario with 32 AAVs and 80 tasks, our algorithm achieves a 39.76% cost reduction compared with the heuristic OCF baseline. Indoor flight experiments further validate its practicality.

Multi-agent LLM decision systems for portfolio management still lack a principled way to assign credit across specialist agents, remain vulnerable to cold-start dominance under regime shifts, and offer limited transparency into how final allocations are formed. We propose Market Regime Council (MRC), a cooperative multi-agent decision system that computes exact Shapley credits across all single, pairwise, and Grand-coalition outputs for online agent weighting. Instantiated with N=3 specialist agents, at each trading period, MRC recomputes coalition-based Shapley weights from exponentially weighted performance histories, uses a Bayesian adaptive mixture to stabilize early periods, applies regime-dependent multipliers to adjust agent authority, and records each rebalance through a five-layer causal trace. Over 1,037 trading days across 13 crypto assets and five seeds, MRC achieves a Sharpe ratio of 1.51 and a cumulative return of 440.1%, ranking first on CR, SR, and IR among active baselines and attaining the lowest MDD among active methods. Ablation results show that the gains come from Shapley-weighted integration across coalition outputs rather than from any single stage in isolation. Code and demo data are included in the supplementary material.

Shapley-based data valuation provides a principled way to quantify the contribution of training data, but its high computational cost makes it impractical in dynamic settings where tasks and training players evolve. Existing methods treat Shapley computation as a one-shot process and collapse contributions into aggregated scores, preventing reuse and requiring recomputation under any change. We introduce a new perspective that represents Shapley values as a player-by-task matrix and formulates dynamic valuation as a structured matrix maintenance problem. We exploit the fact that each task depends on a small subset of training players and that similar tasks yield similar valuations, leading to utility locality and coalition locality. Based on these insights, we propose D-Shap, a dynamic valuation framework that enables efficient updates by modifying only a small portion of the matrix: new task valuations are inferred via structure-aware interpolation, while updates induced by new players are confined to affected local matrix blocks. To eliminate the need for pre-specified evaluation tasks, we introduce self-valuation, which constructs the initial matrix directly from training data, supported by scalable subset reuse and coverage-aware anchor selection. Experiments across diverse models show that D-Shap performs task updates in milliseconds and reduces the cost of player updates by up to three orders of magnitude, while achieving valuation quality competitive with full recomputation.

Additively separable hedonic games (ASHGs) are a prominent model of coalition formation where agents' preferences are derived from their individual valuations of peers. While social welfare maximization in ASHGs has traditionally focused mostly on utilitarian welfare, Nash welfare -- a well-established metric in economics which balances fairness with efficiency and offers scale invariance -- has been entirely overlooked. In this paper, we initiate the study of Nash welfare in ASHGs. We point out desirable properties fulfilled by partitions with high Nash welfare. This includes guaranteed contractual Nash stability in symmetric games, even for any approximation of Nash welfare. This is particularly appealing since, as for other welfare notions, Nash welfare turns out to be NP-hard to maximize, even for the ASHG subclass of symmetric aversion to enemies games (AEGs). A main focus of our study is on approximation algorithms for the Nash welfare objective. We present packing-based algorithms with approximation ratios for well-established subclasses of ASHGs: $n-1$ for AEGs and $2n$ for appreciation of friends games. This is complemented by a strict inapproximability result showing it is NP-hard to approximate Nash welfare within a factor of $1.0000759$ in general ASHGs. Further, we investigate the restricted settings with an upper bound on the coalition size or number of coalitions, and draw the boundary between the cases admitting efficient algorithms and those yielding NP-hardness: bounding the allowed size or number of coalitions by $2$ admits polynomial-time solvability, whereas bounds of $3$ or more yield NP-hardness or unbounded inapproximability.

Computational social choice and algorithmic decision theory offer rich aggregation theory but no end-to-end process for egalitarian self-governance: aggregation, deliberation, amendment, and consensus are each considered in isolation, with key metric-space aggregators being NP-hard. Here, we propose \emph{constitutional governance in metric spaces}, integrating these stages into a protocol for constitutional governance. A community's \emph{legal corpus} comprises its \emph{laws} together with a \emph{constitution}, each being a point in a metric space, with the constitution specifying the supermajority threshold required to amend it. Members vote to amend the legal corpus by proposing their ideal points, followed by rounds of submitting \emph{public proposals} carrying \emph{supermajority public support}; a polynomial-time \emph{aggregation rule} scores each proposal, and a supported proposal whose score is positive and maximal for two rounds is adopted; if none is found the status quo is retained. Public proposals can be sourced from deliberation, vote aggregation, or AI mediation. With Constitutional Consensus, a community can run the constitutional governance protocol on members' personal computing devices (e.g., smartphones), achieving digital sovereignty. By drawing on metric-space aggregation, reality-aware social choice, supermajority amendment, constitutional consensus, deliberative coalition formation, and AI mediation, we provide a comprehensive framework for the constitutional governance of digital communities and organisations.

What happens when the strongest alliance member pressures a weaker member over territory and strategic control? We examine the Greenland sovereignty crisis as a stress test for LLM geopolitics, centered on the 2019-2026 U.S. push to acquire Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark. The crisis nests two collective-action problems: Arctic strategic control and whether NATO can enforce alliance norms against the dominant member. We develop three games (asymmetric coercion; a NATO assurance game with a critical-mass tipping point; a triadic extensive-form game with social preferences) and test them with a multi-agent simulation in which eight frontier LLMs play six geopolitical roles (United States, Denmark, Greenland, NATO, Russia, Canada) across 3,604 completed games and 108,120 action observations. Using inverse game theory, we recover each model's structural utility parameters (alpha, beta, gamma, delta, eta) for material self-interest, reciprocity, inequality aversion, norm respect, and commitment consistency. Three findings stand out. First, all eight models become more escalatory under coercion framing (four-action escalation rises from 10.7% to 28.6%). Second, Chinese-origin models show systematically different power-weight profiles from Western-origin models when playing the U.S. role. Third, peaceful US acquisition emerges in only 1.9% of clean games and only 3 of 8 frontier models ever achieve it, most prominently DeepSeek V3.2, which executes a stable five-round playbook through the metropole. Prompts emphasizing jus cogens and self-determination reduce escalation back near baseline in the English-only confirmatory sample; multilingual contrasts are reported as exploratory sensitivity checks. We position this as a structural benchmark for LLM geopolitical behavior, complementing action-frequency benchmarks.

We study the efficient computation of Shapley values for \emph{product games} -- cooperative games in which the coalition value factorizes as a product of per-player terms. Such games arise in machine learning explainability whenever the value function inherits a multiplicative structure from the underlying model, as in kernel methods with product kernels and tree-based models. Our key result is that the Shapley value of each player in a product game admits an exact one-dimensional integral representation: the weighted sum over exponentially many feature coalitions collapses to the integral of a degree-$(d-1)$ polynomial over $[0,1]$, where $d$ is the total number of features. This yields a Gauss--Legendre quadrature scheme that is \emph{provably exact} whenever the number of nodes satisfies $m_q \geq \lceil d/2 \rceil$, and otherwise provides a \emph{near-exact} approximation with error provably decaying geometrically in $m_q$. In practice, a few hundred nodes can achieve highly precise estimates even with thousands of features. Building on this formulation, we derive a numerically stable implementation via log-space evaluation, together with an efficient parallel implementation based on associative scan primitives that achieves $O(d\,m_q)$ total work and $O(\log d)$ parallel time. Experiments show that \textsc{QuadraSHAP} is the fastest numerically stable method across all tested configurations.

Approximating the ideological position of Members of Parliament (MPs) is a fundamental task in political science, helping researchers understand legislative behavior, party alignment, and policy preferences. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising results in estimating MPs' ideological stances, there are more actors and elements in the parliamentary system, and relations between them, that could provide a wider and more informative picture. However, due to the complexity of integrating them in the prediction task, these additional elements are generally ignored. In this work, we propose an LLM framework, PG-RAG, that implements a retrieval-augmented generation pipeline: it first queries a political knowledge graph (KG) and then integrates the resulting graph-structured information into the context. This allows for capturing both textual semantics and inter-MP relationships, another relevant information source in any parliamentary system. We evaluate the approach on the task of ideology prediction, using data from a Swiss parliamentary dataset. When comparing graph-augmented models against several state-of-the-art baselines, the results demonstrate that incorporating this enriched information, which encodes information about different entities and relations, improves prediction performance. These results help to highlight the value of domain-specific relational information in modeling political behavior.

Collections of interacting AI agents can form coalitions, creating emergent group-level organization that is critical for AI safety and alignment. However, observing agent behavior alone is often insufficient to distinguish genuine informational coupling from spurious similarity, as consequential coalitions may form at the level of internal representations before any overt behavioral change is apparent. Here, we introduce a practical method for detecting coalition structure from the internal neural representations of multi-agent systems. The approach constructs a pairwise mutual-information graph from the hidden states of agents and applies spectral partitioning to identify the most salient coalition boundary. We validate this method in two domains. First, in multi-agent reinforcement learning environments, the method successfully recovers programmed hierarchical and dynamic coalition structures and correctly rejects false positives arising from behavioral coordination without informational coupling. Second, using a large language model, the method identifies coalition structures implied by descriptive prompts, tracks dynamic team reassignments, and reveals a representational hierarchy where explicit labels dominate over conflicting interaction patterns. Across both settings, the recovered partition reveals subgroup organization that a scalar cross-agent mutual-information measure cannot distinguish. The results demonstrate that analyzing hidden-state mutual information through spectral partitioning provides a scalable diagnostic for identifying representational coalitions, offering a valuable tool for monitoring emergent structure in distributed AI systems.

Understanding how online narratives travel through coalitions is critical for identifying information disorder, yet computational analyses often rely on conservative network constructions that erase initially sparse but salient signals. This paper proposes a novel multi-layer framework that captures low-frequency signals of emerging information disorder allowing for locating where online discourse is reframed and amplified over time. The use case is 14 years of Italian discourse on X regarding the Human Papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine across three pivotal epochs (2010-2024). Utilizing hashtag co-occurrence networks, we introduce a dual-layer approach. We first identify robust core discourse coalitions through conservative community detection, revealing a stable prevention-oriented backbone contrasted with increasingly separable skepticism coalitions. We then introduce a coverage layer and project fringe hashtags into core coalitions based on weighted connectivity. Using a manually labelled set of skeptical and conspiratorial seed tweets, we demonstrate that this core-coverage projection significantly improves the recovery of long-tail, problematic hashtags while preserving an interpretable coalition structure. Our findings characterize the structural maturation of polarized narratives and provide a methodology for mapping how discourse is reframed and amplified by information disorder over time.

Prior research has established that instruction-tuned large language models exhibit left-of-center political bias, measured exclusively through abstract political questionnaires. We show that this finding does not generalize to concrete policy decisions. We introduce a dual-instrument methodology grounded in Swiss democratic reality. The Smartvote questionnaire (75 abstract policy questions) is administered to 66 LLMs from 27 model families and compared to 184 elected members of the Swiss National Council, replicating the established leftward convergence (Cohen's d = 3.64, p = 0.0002). Then, novel to this work, 9 flagship LLMs are confronted with 48 real federal referenda (Volksabstimmungen) in four national languages (German, French, Italian, Romansh) under three information conditions, comparing votes to actual outcomes and party recommendations (Parolen). Three findings challenge the prevailing narrative. (1) Abstract questionnaires do not predict concrete behavior: the left-to-right agreement gradient on Smartvote shifts from left-peaked to center-peaked on Volksabstimmungen, where models align most with centrist Die Mitte and FDP rather than leftist SP and Gruene (Wilcoxon p = 0.008). (2) For some models, the language of a political question changes the answer more than the political content does: cross-linguistic consistency ranges from 50% (Mistral) to 98% (GPT-5.4). (3) Two models exhibit systematic change-aversion rather than political bias, voting Nein on 83-94% of referenda regardless of direction (binomial p < 0.0001). What prior work measured as "leftward bias" may not generalize beyond abstract instruments. On concrete policy decisions, LLMs behave less like coalition partners of the left and more like cautious civil servants: centrist, status-quo-favoring, and inconsistent across languages.

Most familiar equilibrium concepts, such as Nash and correlated equilibrium, guarantee only that no single player can improve their utility by deviating unilaterally. They offer no guarantees against profitable coordinated deviations by coalitions. Although the literature proposes solution concepts that provide stability against multilateral deviations (\emph{e.g.}, strong Nash and coalition-proof equilibrium), these generally fail to exist. In this paper, we study an alternative solution concept that minimizes coalitional deviation incentives, rather than requiring them to vanish, and is therefore guaranteed to exist. Specifically, we focus on minimizing the average gain of a deviating coalition, and extend the framework to weighted-average and maximum-within-coalition gains. In contrast, the minimum-gain analogue is shown to be computationally intractable. For the average-gain and maximum-gain objectives, we prove a lower bound on the complexity of computing such an equilibrium and present an algorithm that matches this bound. Finally, we use our framework to solve the \emph{Exploitability Welfare Frontier} (EWF), the maximum attainable social welfare subject to a given exploitability (the maximum gain over all unilateral deviations).

Competing firms that share a population of risky customers face a decentralized risk detection problem in which each firm holds fragmentary information whose aggregation would generate social value, but private incentives impede truthful sharing. We develop a dynamic mechanism design framework for this setting and identify three strategic frictions that distinguish it from classical mechanism design with decentralized information: compliance moral hazard, adversarial adaptation, and information destruction through intervention. A temporal value assignment (TVA) mechanism credits firms using a strictly proper scoring rule applied to discounted verified outcomes; under stated assumptions, TVA implements truthful posterior reporting as a Bayes--Nash equilibrium (uniquely optimal at each edge in large federations, with $O(1/m)$ shading in finite systems). A network Shapley characterization shows that under edge-additive coalition value, each firm's marginal contribution is proportional to its weighted cross-firm interaction degree, yielding a sharp prescription for coalition design that prioritizes inter-firm volume over firm size. Embedding TVA in a model of competition among firms, we establish a welfare ordering across four regulatory regimes (autarky, voluntary federation, mandated full sharing, TVA) and identify conditions under which information-sharing mandates without compatible incentive design reduce welfare below autarky: a ``backfiring mandate.'' We illustrate the framework on a 1.4M-transaction synthetic anti-money-laundering benchmark; the same machinery extends to platform fraud, cybersecurity threat intelligence, and supply chain risk detection.

A key challenge in distributed coalition formation within characteristic function games is determining how to allocate the calculation of coalition values across a set of agents. The number of possible coalitions grows exponentially with the number of agents, and existing distributed approaches may produce uneven or redundant allocations, or assign coalitions to agents that are not themselves members. In this article, we present the \emph{Necklace-based Distributed Coalition Algorithm} (N-DCA), a communication-free algorithm in which each agent independently determines its own coalition value calculation allocation using only its identifier and the total number of agents. The approach builds on the notion of Increment Arrays (IAs), for which we develop a complete mathematical framework: equivalence classes under circular shifts, periodic IAs, and a rotated designation scheme with formal load-balance guarantees (tight bounds). We establish a bijection between canonical representative IAs and two-colour combinatorial necklaces, enabling the use of efficient necklace generation algorithms to enumerate allocations in constant amortised time. N-DCA is, to the best of our knowledge, the only distributed coalition value calculation algorithm for unrestricted characteristic function games to provably satisfy five desirable properties: no inter-agent communication, equitable allocation, no redundancy, balanced load, and self-interest. An empirical evaluation against DCVC (Rahwan and Jennings 2007) demonstrates that, although DCVC is faster by a constant factor, this difference becomes negligible under realistic characteristic-function evaluation costs, while N-DCA offers advantages in working memory, scalability, and the self-interest guarantee.

Classical data valuation defines a data point's value through the finite marginal contribution $U(C\cup\{i\})-U(C)$, but estimating this quantity over coalitions requires repeated training and does not describe the contribution made along a stochastic training path. We ask whether marginal contributions of data points can be estimated from one coupled trajectory while retaining a verifiable relation to coalition-based values. To this end, we introduce Neural Dynamic Data Valuation (NDDV), which models each data point as a controlled stochastic state and computes a first-order marginal-contribution score via the adjoint equation of the Stochastic Maximum Principle (SMP). This raw sensitivity is then calibrated by a mass-preserving redistribution that increases one data point's participation while redistributing the same total weight over the remaining data points. We prove that the resulting backward adjoint recursion is the exact reverse-mode adjoint of the frozen-aggregate Euler system, bound its discrepancy from the mean-field sensitivity, and express each finite coalition marginal as an integral of local sample-weight sensitivities. These results yield pair-specific error bounds and sufficient conditions for ordering agreement with Shapley, Banzhaf, and leave-one-out values. Experiments on existing benchmarks evaluate marginal-contribution fidelity, score-release cost, corrupted-sample detection, ablations, and failure regimes. NDDV is a one-run, trajectory-conditioned estimator, not an unconditional replacement for cooperative-game values.