Overview

Nash equilibrium describes outcomes in strategic settings where each player’s choice is a best response to the others, making it a tool for analyzing competition, coordination, and incentives. Researchers compute equilibria in matrix games, poker, and stochastic or partially observable games using methods such as complementarity solvers, regret minimization, and policy-space response oracles. Learning approaches—including fictitious play, mirror descent, and multi-agent reinforcement learning—seek equilibria from observed payoffs or sampled interactions, with guarantees often depending on game structure and feedback available to players. A central challenge is that convergence, computational tractability, equilibrium selection, and social welfare do not always align: a stable outcome may be inefficient, and different algorithms may reach different equilibria.

Latest papers

65 papers4 papers in the last four weeks, up 33% on the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

Nov 15, 2026

Who Observes Whom: Network Rationalizability and Its Complexity

Nash equilibrium and rationalizability sit at opposite informational extremes: the former presumes that each player knows all opponents' strategies, the latter that players reason from common knowledge of rationality alone. When visibility is partial and asymmetric, we study the solution concepts induced by a directed observation network GG in which an edge i→ji\to j means that ii observes jj's strategy. A set of profiles is self-sustaining if every profile in it can be justified, for every player, by conjectures from the same set that agree with everything the player observes. We consider point conjectures (single profiles) and belief conjectures (distributions over profiles). Both range from Nash equilibrium on the complete network to point- and correlated rationalizability on the empty network, and shrink monotonically as links are added. Network topology governs both behavior and complexity. A predicted profile can be found in polynomial time on the empty network, whereas a single link makes search PPAD\mathsf{PPAD}-hard: under one-sided two-player monitoring, the observed player's strategies are exactly her Nash equilibrium strategies. On hierarchical networks (transitive tournaments), membership reduces recursively to smaller games and admits polynomial-size certificates, placing verification in ∃R\exists\mathbb{R}, and in P\mathsf{P} for two players. On the directed three-cycle, however, iterated elimination may never terminate under either variant, and under point conjectures interior predictions may admit only infinite witness sets, a pathology that belief conjectures avoid in the same game. Finally, when only realized pure actions are observed, the solution set is guaranteed to be non-empty exactly when the network has no edges, and is computable in time O(n∣A∣2)O(n|A|^2).
Nov 8, 2026

Homological Barriers to Stable Learning of First-Order Nash Equilibria

We identify a homological barrier to stable learning of local Nash equilibria, also known as first-order Nash equilibria (FONE), in constrained non-concave differentiable games. We consider continuous deterministic learning dynamics that fix every FONE point and aim to attract all initial conditions to the full FONE set. We show that this convergence guarantee is impossible when the target set has nontrivial positive-degree cohomology, such as that arising from a loop, and the state space is compact and contractible. We exhibit this barrier in a simple non-concave quadratic zero-sum game on a box whose exact FONE set consists of a diagonal six-edge loop and an isolated point. Consequently, no such dynamics can make the full FONE set a stable global attractor. We further show that degree two is the minimal polynomial degree at which this barrier can arise and extend the construction to obtain nontrivial homology in arbitrarily high degrees. Finally, we establish that the barrier persists for sufficiently small approximate-FONE targets under small perturbations, yielding an open, positive-volume family of quadratic zero-sum games with the same homological barrier.
Nov 3, 2026

Neural networks and games

Hopfield neural networks and noncooperative games provide seemingly different approaches to understanding how collective outcomes emerge from local interactions. In a neural network, individual units adjust their states according to local signals; in a game, players choose actions to maximise individual payoffs. I establish an exact equivalence between symmetric binary Hopfield networks and binary-action games that admit a quadratic potential. The equivalence identifies stable network configurations with pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and asynchronous neural updating with best-response dynamics. More broadly, the storage and retrieval of memories in neural networks correspond, respectively, to the design and selection of equilibria in games.
Oct 22, 2026

Equilibria and Learning in Competitive Market Making

We propose a market-making game played among N≥2N \ge 2 strategic market makers and a single non-strategic representative trader. In a continuous quote space, standard finite-game arguments do not apply, while non-convex and discontinuous payoffs rule out classical continuous existence results and complicate learning. Nonetheless, we characterize pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNEs) and show that at least one PSNE always exists under minimal assumptions on the underlying asset value distribution, and that the equilibrium bid-ask spread widens strictly with asset value volatility. To obtain a tractable learning framework, we discretize prices and, under an additional regularity condition, show that the time-averaged play of no-internal-regret learners approaches the continuous Nash price envelope as the tick size vanishes. Finally, we empirically validate our theoretical results through numerical simulations.
Oct 15, 2026

Learning Rational Strategies for Temporal Objectives in Multi-Agent Systems

We study rational synthesis for stochastic multi-agent systems with unknown dynamics, where each agent is equipped with its own probabilistic temporal objective specified using Probabilistic Linear Temporal Logic on Finite Traces (\mathsf{PLTL}_f}). We impose solution concepts (e.g., Nash equilibrium, subgame-perfect equilibrium) as constraints on the joint strategy profile, using payoffs derived from each agent's probability of satisfying its temporal objective. In particular, we formulate per-agent rational synthesis as finding a strategy profile -- if one exists -- such that (i) the designated agent's probabilistic temporal constraint is satisfied, and (ii) the profile represents a stable solution under a chosen solution concept. We give conditional convergence guarantees for tabular Nash-Q learning, certify satisfaction with simultaneous finite-sample confidence bounds, and assess strategic stability with approximate best-response checking. Our approach operates in a stochastic Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) environment, where model-free learning algorithms attempt to attain extremal satisfaction probabilities for temporal objectives automatically compiled into reward automata. Our approach is empirically validated using 8 general-sum concurrent stochastic games.
Oct 9, 2026

Decentralized Bandit Learning of Markov Perfect Equilibria

We study decentralized bandit learning in discounted infinite-horizon, general-sum Markov games with continuous actions. Agents observe the public state, but only their own realized rewards, and use simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation to update their actions. Under strong monotonicity of the negative running-reward gradients and sufficiently small time steps, we prove that the fully decentralized procedure converges almost surely to the unique stationary Markov perfect equilibrium. We obtain an O(n−1/2)O(n^{-1/2}) convergence rate and present a natural extension to episodic finite-horizon learning.
Oct 5, 2026

Nash Equilibrium Text: A Game-Theoretic Decoding Framework for Text Generation

Text revision has become an integral component of large language models. This paper formulates revision such that it admits a Nash equilibrium: Token positions are players, vocabulary items are actions, and each player's utility is the language model's log conditional probability. We motivate the revision by showing that Nash equilibria can have exponentially higher likelihood than autoregressive outputs as the sequence length grows. We further propose Nash decoding, an algorithm that reaches an ε\varepsilon-Nash equilibrium in O(1/ε)O(1/\varepsilon) time given access to the joint probability of tokens conditioned on a prompt. In practice, we run Nash decoding using conditional probability estimates from large language models and evaluate the resulting equilibria on question-answering benchmarks. On CLAPNQ, PubMedQA, and CoQA, Nash equilibria obtained from masked language models achieve higher F1 and ROUGE scores than autoregressive models up to 18×18\times larger, without any fine-tuning or retraining, at the cost of additional test-time computation.
Sep 17, 2026

Steering Equilibrium Selection in Regularized Self-Play via the Reference Policy

Regularized self-play -- the family behind DeepNash's Stratego play -- drives a two-player zero-sum policy to a Nash equilibrium by best-responding to a slowly moving, entropy-regularized reference policy ρρ. When the game has a polytope of value-equivalent equilibria, the regularizer silently breaks the tie: with a uniform reference it selects the maximum-entropy member, the I-projection of ρρ onto the Nash set. Can the reference be used to choose the equilibrium on purpose? On five exactly solvable games plus a 2-D polytope, with exact best responses and equivalence tests over independent seeds, anchoring the reference at a target member and refining steers self-play to that member with mean coordinate error 0.007 at median exploitability 5×10−55\times10^{-5}, TOST-equivalent to the request within ±0.05\pm0.05; the anchoring persists through refinement and follows the reference, not the initialization. Selection follows the reach-weighted I-projection (slope 0.969 [0.950, 0.987]). We report with equal emphasis where the story breaks: fixed off-manifold references cost 0.08-0.25 exploitability; stiff or flat families require a smaller mirror step, set by a pre-registered rule; boundary targets undershoot; curvature predicts where boundary saturation bites (rank correlation 0.90, p=0.037) while interior precision is curvature-independent. Table and MLP steering maps are equivalent within ±0.03\pm0.03 at every target (30 seeds); matched control arms show attention's robust signature is excess seed variance, any systematic shift bounded at 0.018 and not significant. Against a best response the selection-robustness trade-off is degenerate: steering matters only against fixed, non-equilibrium opponents. The recipe -- anchor the reference at the desired member and refine -- reinterprets the KL anchor of RLHF-style RL as a selection knob, not only a stability leash.
Aug 10, 2026

Regret, equilibrium, and learning in games: A guided tour

This note aims to serve as an entry point to the literature on learning in games, a topic with significant theoretical appeal and a wide range of applications -- from machine learning and data science to economics and beyond. Our presentation is structured around two complementary viewpoints: We first consider a single agent -- the learner -- engaged in a sequential decision process in an unknown, non-stationary, and possibly adversarial environment. We then examine what happens when the environment is shaped by the decisions of several interacting agents, not necessarily aware of each other's actions or goals, and all seeking to improve their individual rewards. In this general context, we examine a family of regularized learning policies based on best-responding to the past history of play, up to a regularization penalty intended to encourage exploration and prevent over-commitment to suboptimal choices. In the single-agent setting, we present some basic regret bounds for regularized learning in adversarial multi-armed bandits; in the multi-agent setting, we describe an ergodic equilibrium convergence result for zero-sum games in the spirit of classical results on fictitious play, as well as a "folk theorem" linking strategic and dynamic notions of stability -- Nash equilibria and attracting points of regularized learning, respectively. We pay special attention to the information available to the players and, through a unified analysis framework, we study both oracle- and payoff-based (bandit) methods. Our goal is to provide a coherent and comprehensible -- albeit, by necessity, not comprehensive -- account of some recent ideas in the field, and to discuss their implications for the study of rationality.
Aug 8, 2026

Learning under Opponent Unawareness in Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Games

As firms increasingly deploy machine learning for strategic decision-making, understanding algorithmic interactions has become central to operations research and economics. This paper studies learning in infinite-horizon, nonzero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic games under a radically uncoupled information structure, where players are either unaware of opponents or strategically oblivious, observing only a common state and their own action history. Under this minimal information, we analyze an asynchronous decentralized learning process in which each player independently runs a single-agent εε-greedy iterated least-squares algorithm. We prove that, despite being unable to identify the system parameters, players' learning dynamics converge almost surely to the complete-information Nash equilibrium and characterize the convergence rate. We then apply the framework to a dynamic Cournot competition with sticky prices. Numerical experiments validate the theoretical results and show that learning under limited information reduces firm profits under both low and high price stickiness, while total surplus declines and market concentration increases when price stickiness is high. Publicly revealing aggregate market output substantially accelerates convergence and mitigates these welfare losses.
Aug 7, 2026

Solver-Guided Reasoning for Mixed-Equilibrium Strategies

Reasoning in large language models (LLMs) is often grounded in human text, human demonstrations, and human-generated rationales. For equilibrium reasoning in complex games, however, relying on human data can be suboptimal. In fact, human play is often guided by intuition and heuristics and can deviate substantially from game equilibrium. This discrepancy is amplified in games with mixed-strategy equilibria, where human data is heavily biased toward pure strategies. Consequently, conditioning LLMs on this data yields weak game strategies. To grant LLMs the reasoning capacity in games, in this work, we study how to elicit equilibrium play using solver output. We propose Mixed-Strategy Decision Tree (MDT), which articulates the silent optimality of the equilibrium into sparse strategic rules that both humans and LLMs could understand. Using solver output rather than human annotation allows us to extend the input to arbitrarily new states and continuations. We instantiate this study on No-Limit Texas Hold'em by querying a solver oracle for over 250 million mixed-strategy decisions; MDT together with other techniques \textbf{reduces the ℓ1\ell_1 distance to the equilibrium by 52.6%52.6\%} across 88 different LLM configurations. A Route-only ablation tests the incremental contribution of the shadow-based contrast, while complete River-endgame and Liar's Dice experiments evaluate strategic fidelity and portability beyond the original NLH communication setting.
Jul 27, 2026

Algorithms for Equilibria in Concurrent Stopping Games

Concurrent games are a standard model for multi-agent systems, with Nash equilibrium as their central solution concept. The associated constrained existence problem---does a game admit a Nash equilibrium whose expected payoff lies within a prescribed interval for every player?---is undecidable, and remains so even for 10-player stopping games, in which a terminal state is reached almost surely under every strategy profile. We give two routes to tractability. We first relax exactness and consider the problem of approximate constrained existence problem, parametrised by ε\varepsilon-NE, which decides whether an ε\varepsilon-Nash equilibrium with the prescribed payoffs exists. The algorithm runs in exponential time, and only polynomially in the bit-size of ε\varepsilon. We complement it with a \PSPACE-hardness lower bound that holds already for turn-based games, and for pure equilibria as well. We then relax the solution concept, turning to extreme risk-sensitive equilibria (XRSE), recently introduced for turn-based stochastic games. Here the players are partitioned into optimists and pessimists, who evaluate a strategy profile by the best, respectively the worst, payoff attainable with positive probability, instead of the expected payoff. We prove that the constrained existence problem for XRSE is \NP-complete on concurrent games, as for turn-based games.
Jul 20, 2026

The Shared Discovery Paradox: How a One-Answer Rule Turns Better Information into Worse Search

Organizations often pool dispersed information into one ranking and then allow many agents to act on that shared view. In a discovery problem, this can improve beliefs while reducing coverage. We develop an exactly solvable benchmark with sixteen boxes, one target, eight searchers, and noisy private clues. Pooling raises the accuracy of the best single recommendation from 0.20 to 0.3835, but repeating that recommendation lowers group discovery from 0.8322 under decentralized clue-following to 0.3835. A coordinated eight-action portfolio using the same pooled reports reaches 0.8594, and seven coordinated actions recover the decentralized benchmark. The paradox is a protocol failure, not an information failure: a one-answer rule compresses a portfolio of available actions into one repeated choice. We then replace the planner with self-interested searchers who split a prize. The equal-split game is a potential game. Its anonymous symmetric equilibrium obeys a water-filling rule. In the canonical instance it achieves 0.5991: strictly above consensus, but below both private search and the planner. The exact mixed price of anarchy is 2 - 1/N. A sole-rescue reward, which pays only an agent who covers the target alone, makes every pure Nash equilibrium first-best. Finally, a latent common-cue model shows how correlated reports collapse effective discovery channels. The centralized planner gain rises strictly with copying, and in the canonical environment the symmetric market overtakes decentralized report-following at copying probability c = 0.788462. In a proportional large-market limit the five-protocol ordering survives exactly: consensus discovery vanishes while blind, market, private, and portfolio search converge to 0.500, 0.547, 0.847, and 0.874. The contribution is a compact benchmark that separates information, allocation, incentives, and dependence into exact, reusable quantities.
Jul 20, 2026

The Curvature Shadow: An Apparent Failure of Maximum-Entropy Equilibrium Selection is a Removable Artifact

In two-player zero-sum games whose Nash equilibria form a convex set, regularized solvers such as Regularized Nash Dynamics (R-NaD) empirically select the maximum-entropy member: the information projection (I-projection) of a uniform reference onto the Nash set. On a panel of small games this match is exact, with one apparent exception: in Kuhn poker R-NaD lands at bluff coordinate 0.180 while the maximum-entropy member sits at 0.201, a coordinate gap of about 0.021, even though R-NaD attains 99.7 percent of the maximum entropy. We ask whether this gap is a genuine selection bias or an artifact, and answer it quantitatively. We show that for selection on a one-dimensional Nash manifold the coordinate gap factorizes as gap≈2δ/κ\mathrm{gap} \approx \sqrt{2δ/κ}, where δδ is the entropy shortfall of the solver and κκ is the curvature of the entropy landscape at its peak. Across five games this relation holds to within 2×10−42 \times 10^{-4} (under 1 percent relative error). The four matrix games have δ≈0δ\approx 0 (R-NaD reaches the maximum-entropy member exactly) and therefore no gap regardless of curvature; only the sequential game (Kuhn) has δ>0δ> 0. A causal sweep of the magnet strength drives δ→0δ\to 0 and the gap toward zero along the predicted curve (fitted scaling exponent 0.50, R2>0.999999R^2 > 0.999999, against the exact prediction of 1/2), until the dynamics destabilize at a stability floor: behavior consistent with a removable shortfall and inconsistent with a fixed bias. We quantify the curvature half of the law from measured curvatures and flag a moving-target pitfall in the natural Tsallis-entropy experiment. The Kuhn gap is thus the curvature shadow of a small, removable entropy shortfall on an unusually flat peak; the I-projection account is upheld up to a flatness-limited residual.
Jul 13, 2026

Paradoxes of Game Theoretic Equilibria and Price of Anarchy

For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds. First, interior Nash equilibria lack C1C^1 vector field information, meaning agents cannot distinguish aligned from strictly opposing incentives. Inheriting this geometry, the worst-case pure Nash equilibria dictating robust PoA bounds manifest as topologically unstable strict saddles, and in canonical congestion games, as global repellers supported on almost everywhere strictly dominated strategies. Anchoring efficiency guarantees to these unstable states causes algebraic sensitivity; we prove that accommodating all strictly positive affine costs renders the PoA unbounded. Furthermore, projecting learning trajectories onto the discrete simplex of correlated play systematically accommodates non-rationalizable behavior. Evaluating dynamics via Coarse Correlated Equilibria or proximal refinements fails to preclude strictly dominated strategies. Moreover, optimal O(1/T)O(1/T) swap-regret minimization does not preclude macroscopic turbulence, manifesting as chaotic limit sets even in minimal games. Finally, we examine the non-atomic limit of congestion games. Though considered highly stable with tight sub-linear Θ(p/ln⁡p)Θ(p/\ln p) PoA bounds (where pp is the polynomial degree), we prove that under discrete-time learning, the unique equilibrium destabilizes into Li-Yorke chaos and global attractors whose time-averaged inefficiency degrades exponentially as 2p2^p. These results necessitate re-evaluating worst-case equilibrium frameworks for dynamically grounded metrics.
Jul 9, 2026

Offline Nash Solvers Meet Online Tree Search in Multi-Agent Games on Graphs

Computing Nash equilibrium policies in multi-agent Pursuit-Evasion games (PEG) is challenging due to the exponential growth of the joint state and action spaces with the number of agents. Existing approaches either rely on offline equilibrium approximations, which may lack adaptability during execution, or online planning methods, which suffer from large branching factors. In this work, we propose Primitive-Guided Tree Search (PGTS), a hybrid framework that integrates offline exact Nash equilibrium computation with online tree search: PGTS first solves a collection of smaller, tractable sub-games offline; at deployment, PGTS performs online tree search at each time step, using the optimal sub-game policies and value functions to guide tree expansion and estimate leaf-node values. Extensive experiments on varied graph topologies, including real-world networks, demonstrate that PGTS significantly outperforms state-of-the-art learning and heuristic baselines, while maintaining robust performance against adversaries.
Jul 8, 2026

Stability and Convergence of Optimistic Exponential Weights with Asymmetric Step Sizes in Bimatrix Games

We study bimatrix two-player games and investigate the last-iterate convergence and stability of equilibria for the iterates generated by the optimistic exponential weights method. In contrast to prior work, we allow the step sizes ηx\eta_x and ηy\eta_y to differ. Our first main result establishes, under the assumption that the set of fixed points is finite, a sufficient condition for global last-iterate convergence in the special case of zero-sum games, which constrains only the product ηxηy\eta_x\eta_y of the step sizes. This condition is practically relevant and partially explains empirically observed behavior. Our second main result provides an almost-tight threshold for asymptotic stability and instability, again in terms of products of the step sizes, for general bimatrix games. This result is primarily of theoretical interest. We derive several known results and practically relevant step size bounds for special cases and illustrate our results by experiments.
Jun 27, 2026

Pure Nash Equilibria under the Affine Mechanism: A Potential Game of Exaggeration

The mean mechanism is known to be non-incentive-compatible, namely, rational players are incentivized to misreport their values. Despite this game-theoretic issue, the mean mechanism is prevalent in practice due to its other desirable properties. We give a full characterization of pure Nash equilibria--how the players will misreport--for the affine mechanism, of which the mean is a special case. Furthermore, we characterize both complete-information and Bayesian games under the affine mechanism. Our results highlight the inevitability of extreme exaggeration in such games.
Jun 26, 2026

Which Nash Equilibrium? Solver-Dependent Selection on Zero-Sum Nash Polytopes

Many two-player zero-sum games admit not a unique Nash equilibrium but a convex set of them: a polytope of profiles that all share the minimax value V* yet prescribe different behaviour. Standard solvers each converge to some equilibrium and are treated as interchangeable. We ask whether they instead select different members of the Nash set, systematically as a function of the algorithm rather than the seed. Using a tabular, exactly solvable testbed of six games with analytically known Nash sets -- including a two-dimensional Nash polytope and Kuhn poker -- we find that (i) selection is determined by the algorithm, not the seed, but families differ only on asymmetric Nash sets; (ii) regularized last-iterate methods (R-NaD, magnetic mirror descent) select the maximum-entropy member, the information projection of their uniform reference onto the Nash set -- exactly on the 2-D polytope and at 99.7% of maximum entropy in Kuhn -- while regret-averaging methods (CFR, CFR+, fictitious play) drift to a lower-entropy face; we confirm this on a randomized 180-game ensemble, where R-NaD attains the maximum-entropy member in 100% of converged games while CFR+ sits strictly below it in 94% (paired Wilcoxon p < 10^-27); (iii) the selected member has downstream consequences against sub-optimal opponents that scale with sequential/hidden-information structure but stay bounded -- in Kuhn the max-entropy member is a strictly better hedge, whereas on the matrix games the members differ without either dominating. We also report two negative results correcting common intuitions: removing CFR's positive-orthant (max(R,0)) projection does not eliminate boundary drift; and R-NaD's selection is anchor-following, not initialization-independent. We state the maximum-entropy / I-projection characterization as a strongly data-supported conjecture, checked throughout against analytic ground truth.
Jun 25, 2026

Parametric Open Source Games

Open-source game theory studies agents whose behavior may depend on one another's decision procedures, but most existing models use discrete or symbolic programs. We introduce parametric open-source games, a continuous analogue of program equilibria in which players choose parameter vectors and semantics maps convert the full parameter profile into mixed actions in an underlying finite game. We establish equilibrium existence results, derive an exact coupling threshold at which selfish gradient ascent in symmetric 2×22\times2 games switches from defection toward cooperation, and give a one-dimensional boundary test for parametric program Nash equilibria. We further extend the framework to a neural semantics class whose first-order cooperation condition is governed by the ratio of cross-player to self-player sensitivity. Across canonical games, the framework shows how access to internal parameterizations can qualitatively reshape learning dynamics and equilibrium structure, and how sufficiently strong open-source coupling can steer selfish optimization toward cooperative outcomes.
Jun 24, 2026

Variable Bound Tightening for Nash Equilibrium Computation in Multiplayer Imperfect-Information Games

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play are scalable to large games and have convergence guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, they do not guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games. Recently, an approach has been presented for exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer imperfect-information games that solves a quadratically constrained program based on a nonlinear complementarity problem formulation derived from the sequence-form game representation. This formulation was solved using Gurobi's nonconvex quadratic solver, which employs spatial branch-and-bound to iteratively refine variable bounds by solving convex relaxations of bilinear terms. During presolve, Gurobi introduces auxiliary variables and, in some cases, binary variables, leading to an internal mixed-integer quadratically constrained program. This approach was demonstrated to outperform prior algorithms from the Gambit software suite and quickly solve three-player Kuhn poker after removal of dominated actions; however, the algorithm was not able to solve the full version of the game within 24 hours. In this paper, we derive finite bounds on slack and multiplier variables in the nonlinear complementarity formulation. These bounds can strengthen the convex relaxations used within spatial branch-and-bound. We compare uniform corollary bounds with finer proposition-based bounds on full three-player Kuhn poker. All eight bounded configurations return numerically verified equilibria in under 17 seconds, while the unbounded formulation finds no feasible solution within 300 seconds. The finest bounds do not consistently yield the fastest computation.
Jun 21, 2026

GARIP: A Running-Average Moving Reference for Last-Iterate Self-Play in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

Self-play with naive gradient ascent cycles in two-player zero-sum games: the last iterate orbits the equilibrium. Modern methods restore last-iterate convergence by regularizing toward a reference policy -- MMD a fixed one (reaching only the regularized equilibrium), R-NaD a periodic snapshot (the engine of DeepNash). We study GARIP, which anchors to the running average, and isolate what the choice of reference controls. Our central result is a mechanism: collapse tracks the peak lag of the reference, and among causal convex averages of a fixed mean lag the running average (flat profile, peak == mean) uniquely minimizes that peak, while a snapshot's sawtooth has peak =2×= 2\times mean (a one-line theorem). Two consequences follow. Convergence: we prove local last-iterate convergence at constant anchor strength -- the anchor scales the base map's rotation by 1−β1-β, crossing the stability boundary and turning a recurrent base into a contraction (global convergence is conjectured at small ββ; we characterize a large-ββ consensus failure). Robustness: GARIP matches R-NaD's peak performance -- on matrix games, the Coin Game, and the board games Connect Four/Othello, both moving references are far more robust than fixed-magnet and magnet-free baselines -- but is the better hyperparameter default; we report it both ways: over the full grid collapse rates are statistically indistinguishable, yet at conventional parameterizations a matched-mean-lag setting collapses in 0/40 vs 10/40 seeds (a snapshot matches it only by knowing to shorten KK). The boundaries: an anticipatory (negative-weight) reference does better still on the stale side, and the advantage appears only where naive self-play cycles (five deep self-play loops). All experiments are pure JAX and reproducible.
Jun 21, 2026

Formation of Circular Directed Networks with Shared Link Costs

This paper develops a noncooperative model of directed network formation in which agents create links to access valuable information while sharing the costs generated along the paths through which information is obtained. Each agent is endowed with a positive amount of information and chooses, simultaneously, which other agents to contact. A directed link initiated by one agent allows her to access the information of the contacted agent and of the latter's reachable network, but each link in the resulting information path entails a unit cost. Payoffs therefore depend on the total value of accessible information net of the accumulated connection costs required to obtain it. The paper characterizes the relationship between strategy profiles and directed graphs, defines accessibility, paths, components, and minimal connectedness, and studies the Nash architectures induced by individual best responses. The central result is that strict Nash equilibria must take the form of circular directed networks. Moreover, circular networks are exactly the Nash networks that use the minimum number of links while allowing every agent to access all available information. Although noncircular weak Nash networks may exist, they are structurally redundant and do not satisfy the same minimality property. The model also shows that strict Nash networks are both Pareto optimal and efficient in terms of aggregate welfare. Finally, the paper compares this framework with Bala and Goyal's model, emphasizing that shared path costs and heterogeneous information values generate different equilibrium implications. The analysis supports the equivalence between strict stability and minimal connectivity in directed information networks.
Jun 18, 2026

Equilibrium with Internal Transfers

Nash equilibrium (NE) arises from selfish utility maximization, yet its social welfare can be arbitrarily far from optimal. Moreover, computing an NE is intractable in general. We study augmented game models in which players use budget-balanced internal transfers to improve incentives before play. We first introduce Self-Enforcing Transfer Equilibrium (SETE), where players commit to nonnegative peer-to-peer transfers that are paid only if the recipient does not deviate from a prescribed strategy. For polymatrix games, we show that every stationary point of the social welfare function, in particular any socially optimal strategy profile, can be sustained as a SETE. This induces a Nash equilibrium in the agent normal form of the corresponding augmented game. We further propose a polynomial-time algorithm and a decentralized learning dynamic to compute such product-form equilibria. We then introduce Mediated Self-Enforcing Transfer Equilibrium (M-SETE), where a mediator makes both the payment schedule and the prescribed strategies binding offers. This additional enforcement resolves the agent-normal-form limitation: an M-SETE is a Nash equilibrium of the augmented game itself, not merely of its agent normal form, and any socially optimal strategy profile can be supported as an M-SETE in any finite game while preserving budget balance. Thus, internal transfers improve welfare and computation while preserving independent play on the equilibrium path. When full sequential-game stability is required, binding mediation provides the corresponding implementation.
Jun 15, 2026

Intermittent Strategic Cooperation of Two Selfish Agents on Graphs

We study strategic space- and time-constrained cooperation between two self-interested agents through the Intermittent Strategic Cooperation-Based Two-Agent Path Planning (IC2PP) problem, a shortest-path game on graphs in which agents navigate toward individual targets while optionally cooperating at specific nodes to reduce their own travel times. Although such cooperation can strictly benefit both agents, it is strategically fragile: agents may deviate at any point along their paths. Modeled as a 2-player game, we characterize the structure of Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) joint strategies in IC2PP, and show that stable cooperation must follow a highly constrained form. We further prove that at least one PNE exists in every instance of IC2PP, and present a polynomial-time algorithm for enumerating all relevant PNEs. When multiple equilibria arise, we study coordination mechanisms based on bargaining-theoretic selection concepts and empirically compare equilibrium outcomes in terms of individual travel times and social welfare.
Jun 4, 2026

DNQ: Deep Nash Q-Network for Partially Observable n-Player Games

Many real-world competitive systems require multiple decision-makers to act simultaneously under shared constraints, limited information, and repeated interaction, as in auctions, resource allocation, and security competition. We study multi-turn simultaneous bidding as a controlled testbed for such problems and propose DNQ, a solver-in-the-loop equilibrium supervision framework for training bidding agents. DNQ alternates between trajectory collection, critic-based payoff estimation, equilibrium computation, and policy imitation. At each visited state, a shared critic predicts either pairwise payoff matrices or an exact N-player payoff tensor, an external solver computes equilibrium strategies, and the agents are trained by minimizing the KL divergence between their masked policies and the solver-derived equilibrium targets. We focus on a scalable pairwise formulation that greatly reduces equilibrium-solving cost and training time compared with the exact formulation, while the shared critic amortizes payoff learning across agents and states. Experiments compare the pairwise and exact variants using critic loss, policy entropy, bidding resource usage, and training cost, showing that the pairwise method scales to larger numbers of agents, whereas the exact method becomes computationally impractical as the joint game grows. These results illustrate the trade-off between strategic fidelity and scalability in repeated competitive environments.
Jun 1, 2026

A Sheaf Framework for Strategic Multi-Agent Systems: From Consensus to Nash Equilibria

The coordination of heterogeneous autonomous agents in dynamic, adversarial environments requires simultaneous satisfaction of geometric constraints, logical consistency, temporal reasoning, and strategic optimization. Existing sheaf- and topos-theoretic frameworks provide powerful tools for geometric consensus, knowledge alignment, and causal planning, but lack explicit models for value, reward, and strategic choice. This report presents a unified categorical framework that integrates event calculus, SCEL-like ensemble formation, and game-theoretic reward structures into a single Grothendieck topos of time-space histories. We introduce the notion of a game sheaf whose stalks contain utility functions and policy distributions, and restriction maps encode both parallel transport and best-response dynamics. We prove that Nash equilibria correspond to global sections of a derived best-response correspondence sheaf, while cohomological obstructions classify failures of strategic consistency. A detailed case study of an immunological ``bastion defense'' scenario -- heterogeneous agents forming attack/defense ensembles under resource constraints -- demonstrates the framework's expressiveness. This synthesis provides a rigorous foundation for verifiable, autonomic, and economically rational multi-agent systems.
May 31, 2026

Efficient Exploration for Iterative Nash Preference Optimization

Preference alignment is central to improving large language models (LLMs), but reward-based formulations can be restrictive when human preferences are non-transitive. Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF) addresses this limitation by modeling alignment as a preference game and seeking a Nash equilibrium. However, the learning-theoretic foundations of scalable NLHF remain limited: existing regret guarantees rely on explicit preference-model estimation and minimax oracles, whereas simpler iterative methods lack such guarantees. We study online iterative NLHF and identify exploration as a key obstacle. First, we show that standard iterative NLHF can incur an exponential dependence on the inverse KL-regularization parameter, demonstrating that implicit exploration through policy updates can be insufficient. We then propose Exploratory Nash Preference Optimization (ENPO), which combines a SFT-type regularization with adversarial policy exploration. ENPO eliminates this exponential dependence without requiring minimax oracles or explicit preference-model estimation. We further introduce Bonus-Explorer ENPO (BENPO), which uses additional oracles to achieve an O(log⁡T)O(\log T) regret bound. Finally, we develop Direct ENPO (DENPO), a practical variant of ENPO for fine-tuning LLMs. Experiments with Llama-3-8B-Instruct demonstrate consistent improvements over the evaluated RLHF and NLHF baselines across multiple benchmarks.
May 31, 2026

Fairness in two-player zero-sum games with bandit feedback

We study two-player zero-sum games (TPZSGs) with bandit feedback under fairness constraints requiring every action to be played with probability at least α/mα/m. Existing instance-dependent results target pure\textit{pure} Nash equilibria, while fairness generically produces mixed\textit{mixed} equilibria, a harder learning target. Our key technical tool is a reparametrization: every fair strategy decomposes as p=(α/m)1+(1−α)p~p = (α/m)\mathbf{1} + (1-α)\widetilde{p} with p~∈Δm\widetilde{p} \in Δ_m, and substituting into the payoff form yields p⊤Aq=p~⊤A~qp^{\top}Aq = \widetilde{p}^{\top}\widetilde{A} q for a fair payoff matrix A~:=(1−α)A+α1c⊤\widetilde{A} := (1-α)A + α\mathbf{1} c^{\top}, where cj=1m∑iA(i,j)c_j = \tfrac{1}{m}\sum_i A(i,j) is the column-mean vector. The fair game on AA is then equivalent to a standard zero-sum game on A~\widetilde{A}, so equilibrium existence, KKT structure, and LP basis stability reduce to classical results applied to A~\widetilde{A}. We derive the fair minimax value, fair Nash equilibrium, fair regret, and a clean dual representation showing the price of fairness is at most α(1−1/m)α(1-1/m) and vanishes whenever the unconstrained equilibrium already has full support. Our main result is an O~(T2/3)\widetilde{O}(T^{2/3}) regret bound for an Explore-Then-Commit algorithm, Fair-ETC-TPZSG\texttt{Fair-ETC-TPZSG}, applicable to general mixed fair equilibria, together with a discussion of why naive action elimination does not readily improve it. When the fair equilibrium has a single dominant action, equivalently when p~⋆\widetilde{p}^{\star} is a vertex of ΔmΔ_m, the bound sharpens to instance-dependent O~(1/Δ~(α)2)\widetilde{O}(1/\widetildeΔ(α)^{2}), where Δ~(α)\widetildeΔ(α) is the LP-margin gap.
May 27, 2026

Global Policy-Space Response Oracles for Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

The Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) framework scales equilibrium computation to large zero-sum games by iteratively expanding a restricted strategy set using deep reinforcement learning (DRL). A central challenge is to construct, under limited computational budgets, a small strategy population whose induced game well approximates the full game. Existing PSRO variants typically expand the population using best responses to meta-strategies computed from restricted-game payoffs, which can lead to inefficient expansions that provide limited global improvement. We propose to guide population expansion by directly evaluating the post-expansion population quality. Specifically, we adopt Population Exploitability (PE) to measure how well a restricted strategy set represents the full game, and introduce a two-phase exploration--selection framework that explicitly minimizes PE during expansion. We instantiate this framework as Global PSRO, a practical DRL-based algorithm that efficiently generates candidate responses and estimates PE via parameter-sharing conditional neural networks. Experiments across multiple two-player zero-sum games show that Global PSRO achieves lower exploitability and approximates Nash equilibria with significantly fewer policy iterations than prior PSRO methods.