Overview

Nash equilibrium describes outcomes in strategic settings where each player’s choice is a best response to the others, making it a tool for analyzing competition, coordination, and incentives. Researchers compute equilibria in matrix games, poker, and stochastic or partially observable games using methods such as complementarity solvers, regret minimization, and policy-space response oracles. Learning approaches—including fictitious play, mirror descent, and multi-agent reinforcement learning—seek equilibria from observed payoffs or sampled interactions, with guarantees often depending on game structure and feedback available to players. A central challenge is that convergence, computational tractability, equilibrium selection, and social welfare do not always align: a stable outcome may be inefficient, and different algorithms may reach different equilibria.

Latest papers

65 papers4 papers in the last four weeks, up 33% on the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

May 21, 2026

A Generalized Nash Equilibrium-Seeking Scheme for Trauma Resuscitation

Trauma resuscitation is a clinical process for treating life-threatening physiological disorders in safety-critical environments, driven by the experience of healthcare workers (HCWs). Designing and optimizing quantifiable metrics that accurately capture HCW decisions may augment current resuscitation procedures with the potential to improve patient outcomes. This motivates our socio-technical formulation of trauma resuscitation as a distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE)-seeking game with coupled inequality constraints. This method is optimized over a time-varying communication graph. We introduce novel insights from clinical experience to model HCWs behavior. This work facilitates the best possible resuscitation outcome given HCWs workloads, schedules, competencies, and limited resources.
May 19, 2026

Equilibria in Multiplayer Graph Games: An Algorithmic Study

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an unpredictable environment, a useful abstraction is to model the situation as a two-player zero-sum game. The goal is then to find a strategy for the system that guarantees the specification against any strategy of the environment. However, to model more complex situations, such as multiple systems with different objectives or an environment composed of various agents, the richer framework of multiplayer games must be considered. In this setting, a natural question is to identify equilibria, i.e., strategy profiles that are robust in the sense that no player has an incentive to deviate. The most well-known equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium, but several alternatives exist. We study five such notions and, for each of them, we provide complexity results for the constrained existence problem, which consists of deciding whether a given game contains an equilibrium that ensures each player a payoff within a specified interval.
May 18, 2026

Equilibrium Selection in Multi-Agent Policy Gradients via Opponent-Aware Basin Entry

Multi-agent policy-gradient methods have been shown to converge locally near stable Nash equilibria. Local convergence, however, does not determine which equilibrium is reached. We study this question through basin-entry probability with respect to a target set of equilibria selected by an external criterion, such as payoff dominance. For finite-unroll Meta-MAPG, we show that the update decomposes into ordinary policy gradient plus own-learning and peer-learning corrections, with controlled sampling noise and finite-unroll bias. We identify the peer-learning correction as the main equilibrium-selection mechanism: under a local alignment condition, the probability of entering the certified attraction region of the target stable-Nash set increases, relative to ordinary policy gradient. Because persistent correction may shift zero-update points of the original game, annealing the correction after entering the basin recovers ordinary policy-gradient dynamics and inherits local stable-Nash convergence guarantees. Experiments in Stag Hunt, iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, and preliminary neural-policy coordination environments support this basin-entry view, showing increased entry into cooperative basins under peer-aware updates.
May 13, 2026

When and Why is Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Slow? The Geometry of Energy Dissipation

This paper studies the convergence of the Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update algorithm (OMWU) in two player zero-sum games. Recent works have identified instances on which the last-iterate of OMWU can converge arbitrarily slowly, but understanding when and why this slow convergence occurs has remained open. In this work, we develop a new analysis framework that gives sharp, quantitative explanations for this behavior. Our analysis is based on viewing the algorithm's dual iterates as an optimistic skew-gradient descent with respect to an energy function. We prove over the dual iterates that energy is dissipative, and by establishing tight bounds on the magnitude of dissipation, our analysis quantifies the geometric bottlenecks that arise when the corresponding primal iterates are close to the simplex boundary. This further translates into a new linear last-iterate convergence rate in KL divergence on games with a unique and interior Nash equilibrium. Compared to prior work, this new rate contains a much sharper dependence on game-specific constants, and we prove this dependence is optimal. Moreover, these geometric insights further translate into new separations on uniform convergence rates for OMWU. On the one hand, we prove constant lower bounds on the uniform best-iterate convergence rate in KL divergence and total variation distance from Nash. On the other hand, we establish for the 2×22\times 2 setting a new O~(T−1/2){\widetilde O}(T^{-1/2}) best-iterate rate in duality gap, improving substantially over prior work. Together, this shows in general that uniform convergence rate guarantees do not transfer across different measures of distance to Nash.
May 13, 2026

Offline Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games with KL Regularization

We study the problem of learning Nash equilibria in offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. While existing approaches often rely on explicit pessimism to address distribution shift, we show that KL regularization alone suffices to stabilize learning and guarantee convergence. We first introduce Regularized Offline Sequential Equilibrium (ROSE), a theoretical framework that achieves a fast O~(1/n)\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/n) convergence rate under unilateral concentrability, improving over the standard O~(1/n)\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/\sqrt{n}) rates in unregularized settings. We then propose Sequential Offline Self-play Mirror Descent (SOS-MD), a practical model-free algorithm based on least-squares value estimation and iterative self-play updates. We prove that the last iterate of SOS-MD attains the same O~(1/n)\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/n) statistical rate up to a vanishing optimization error of order O~(1/T)\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/\sqrt{T}) in the number of self-play iterations TT.
May 11, 2026

DelAC: A Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning of Team-Symmetric Stochastic Games

In this paper we study team-symmetric games with m≥2m\ge 2 teams. Players within a team have symmetric identity and have a common payoff function. We show that team-symmetric games always have a team-symmetric Nash equilibrium. We develop and solve a linear complementarity problem of team-symmetric Nash equilibria. We propose an actor-critic based multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm for team-symmetric games. Through simulations, we show that this multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm performs much better than many existing algorithms.
May 11, 2026

Equilibrium Residuals Expose Three Regimes of Matrix-Game Strategic Reasoning in Language Models

Large language models can score well on named game-theory benchmarks while failing on the same strategic computation once semantic cues are removed. We show this gap with procedurally generated zero-sum matrix games: a model that recognizes familiar games drops to 34%, 18%, and 2% success on anonymous 2×22{\times}2, 3×33{\times}3, and 5×55{\times}5 payoff matrices. The benchmark separates semantic recall, learned approximate Nash computation, and an output-interface bottleneck that limits scale. Training only on 2×22{\times}2 and 3×33{\times}3 games, supervised fine-tuning raises unseen 5×55{\times}5--7×77{\times}7 success from 2% to 61%, while exploitability-reward training averages 37% with high seed variance. We prove that the exploitability residual is 22-Lipschitz in payoff perturbations, unlike discontinuous vertex-returning LP equilibrium selectors, explaining why residual training can transfer under payoff shifts even when formatting instability limits mean performance. A dominated-action padding experiment provides causal evidence: trained models solve 3×33{\times}3 games embedded in much larger matrices, while random-padded controls fail and dense 12×1212{\times}12 games remain near failure. Procedural evaluation is therefore necessary for measuring strategic reasoning, and residual rewards expose a real but format-limited route to approximate equilibrium computation.
May 11, 2026

Towards Model-Free Learning in Dynamic Population Games: An Application to Karma Economies

Dynamic Population Games (DPGs) provide a tractable framework for modeling strategic interactions in large populations of self-interested agents, and have been successfully applied to the design of Karma economies, a class of fair non-monetary resource allocation mechanisms. Despite their appealing theoretical properties, existing computational tools for DPGs assume full knowledge of the game model and operate in a centralized fashion, limiting their applicability in realistic settings where agents have access only to their own private experience. This paper takes a step towards addressing this gap by studying model-free equilibrium learning in Karma DPGs. First, we analyze the setting in which a novel agent joins a Karma DPG already at its Stationary Nash Equilibrium (SNE) and learns a policy via Deep Q-Networks (DQN) without knowledge of the game model. Leveraging recent convergence results for DQN, we establish a suboptimality bound consisting of a DQN approximation error of order O(1/Ns)O(1/\sqrt{N_s}) and a mean field perturbation error of order O(1/N)O(1/N), where NsN_s is the replay buffer size and NN is the population size. Second, we consider the challenging problem of learning the SNE from scratch. We show empirically that combining deep RL with fictitious play and smoothed policy iteration allows agents to converge, in a model-free fashion, to a configuration close to the centrally computed SNE. Together, these contributions support the vision of Karma economies as practical tools for fair resource allocation.
May 8, 2026

Nash without Numbers: A Social Choice Approach to Mixed Equilibria in Context-Ordinal Games

Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage equilibrium analysis in strategic scenarios, one must first elicit numerical utilities consistent with player preferences, a delicate and time-consuming process. In this work, we forgo precise utilities and generalize the Nash equilibrium to a setting where we only assume a player is capable of providing an ordinal ranking of their actions within the context of other players' joint actions. The key technical challenge is to rethink the definition of a best-response. While the classical definition identifies actions maximizing expected payoff, we naturally look towards social choice theory for how to aggregate preferences to identify the most preferred actions. We define this generalized notion of a context-ordinal Nash equilibrium, establish its existence under mild conditions on aggregation methods, introduce notions of regularization, approximation, and regret, explore complexity for simple settings, and develop learning rules for computing such equilibria. In doing so, we provide a generalization of Nash equilibrium and demonstrate its direct applicability to elicited preferences in human experiments.
May 7, 2026

Independent Learning of Nash Equilibria in Partially Observable Markov Potential Games with Decoupled Dynamics

We study Nash equilibrium learning in partially observable Markov games (POMGs), a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework in which agents cannot fully observe the underlying state. Prior work in this setting relies on centralization or information sharing, and suffers from sample and computational complexity that scales exponentially in the number of players. We focus on a subclass of POMGs with independent state transitions, where agents remain coupled through their rewards, and assume that the underlying fully observed Markov game is a Markov potential game. For this class, we present an independent learning algorithm in which players, observing only their own actions and observations and without communication, jointly converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium. Due to partial observability, optimal policies may in general depend on the full action-observation history. Under a filter stability assumption, we show that policies based on finite history windows provide sufficient approximation guarantees. This enables us to approximate the POMG by a surrogate Markov game that is near-potential, leading to quasi-polynomial sample and computational complexity for independent Nash equilibrium learning in the underlying POMG.
May 6, 2026

MEMOA: Massive Mixtures of Online Agents via Mean-Field Decentralized Nash Equilibria

In the modern age of large-scale AI, federated learning has become an increasingly important tool for training large populations of AI agents; however, its computational and communication costs can rapidly fail to scale with the number of agents. This is precisely where decentralized agentic strategies shine: each agent acts autonomously, using only its own state together with a minimal summary of the ensemble, namely the mean-field. We derive the unique optimal decentralized policy in closed form. Optimality is characterized through a worst-client/minimax criterion: minimizing the under-performer regret, namely the maximal online cost incurred by the weakest agent in the ensemble. We further prove that the resulting decentralized policy asymptotically converges, in the large-population limit, to the Nash-optimal centralized policy, whose direct computation is not scalable. We use an online weighting mechanism to optimize the server-computed mixture of client predictions, thereby improving the mean prediction in addition to the previously optimized weakest-client prediction. Numerical experiments verify our theoretical guarantees and demonstrate that our decentralized policy typically outperforms natural greedy decentralized baselines.
Apr 30, 2026

Pessimism-Free Offline Learning in General-Sum Games via KL Regularization

Offline multi-agent reinforcement learning in general-sum settings is challenged by the distribution shift between logged datasets and target equilibrium policies. While standard methods rely on manual pessimistic penalties, we demonstrate that KL regularization suffices to stabilize learning and achieve equilibrium recovery. We propose General-sum Anchored Nash Equilibrium (GANE), which recovers regularized Nash equilibria at an accelerated statistical rate of O~(1/n)\widetilde{O}(1/n). For computational tractability, we develop General-sum Anchored Mirror Descent (GAMD), an iterative algorithm converging to a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium at the standard rate of O~(1/n+1/T)\widetilde{O}(1/\sqrt{n}+1/T). These results establish KL regularization as a standalone mechanism for pessimism-free offline learning that achieves equivalent or accelerated rates in multi-player general-sum games.
Apr 30, 2026

A Collective Variational Principle Unifying Bayesian Inference, Game Theory, and Thermodynamics

Collective intelligence emerges across biological, physical, and artificial systems without central coordination, yet a unifying principle governing such behaviour remains elusive. The Free Energy Principle explains how individual agents adapt through variational inference, while game theory formalises strategic interactions. Here we introduce the Game-Theoretic Free Energy Principle, a unified framework showing that multi-agent systems performing local free-energy minimisation implicitly implement a stochastic game. We prove that, under bounded rationality and local information constraints, stationary points of collective free energy correspond to approximate Nash equilibria of an induced game. Conversely, a broad class of cooperative games admits a variational representation in which equilibria arise as Gibbs distributions over coalitions, establishing a bridge between Bayesian inference and strategic interaction. To characterise higher-order effects, we introduce a free-energy formulation of the Harsanyi dividend, isolating irreducible multi-agent synergy. This yields a predictive theory of cooperation, including a falsifiable non-monotonic relationship between sensory precision and agent influence. We validate this prediction across neural, biological, and artificial multi-agent systems. These results identify a common variational principle underlying inference, thermodynamics, and game-theoretic equilibrium.
Apr 29, 2026

How a Cooperative-Override Circuit Suppresses Nash Play in Large Language Models

On the named Prisoner's Dilemma under direct prompting, three larger instruction-tuned models, Llama-3-70B, Qwen2.5-32B, and Qwen2.5-72B, lock at full cooperation, the metric's maximum distance from Nash with zero variance across replicates, while Llama-3-8B plays near-Nash. Opening the models, a logit-lens analysis finds a distributed cooperative override. Intermediate readouts lean toward the Nash action through roughly three quarters of network depth before a late surge toward cooperation, and the final layer settles the contest. The size of that final correction, not the surge, rank-matches chain-of-thought behavior across scale and two architectures. In the 8B the override is a single causally controllable direction in the residual stream; steering it dials the decision, and clamping its component at one position of one layer moves the choice strictly monotonically, Spearman rho = 1.000, with generation fluent. The circuit is lexical. It survives name removal and payoff rescaling but disengages when Cooperate and Defect are replaced with neutral labels, and on 48 payoff-random games with neutral surfaces no model locks cooperative on any dilemma or shows general equilibrium competence. In mixed-model populations a single Nash-playing agent collapses cooperation contagiously. What suppresses Nash play in large language models is a word-triggered circuit rather than missing competence, and it can be measured, bounded, and controlled.
Apr 17, 2026

The Harder Path: Last Iterate Convergence for Uncoupled Learning in Zero-Sum Games with Bandit Feedback

We study the problem of learning in zero-sum matrix games with repeated play and bandit feedback. Specifically, we focus on developing uncoupled algorithms that guarantee, without communication between players, the convergence of the last-iterate to a Nash equilibrium. Although the non-bandit case has been studied extensively, this setting has only been explored recently, with a bound of O(T−1/8)\mathcal{O}(T^{-1/8}) on the exploitability gap. We show that, for uncoupled algorithms, guaranteeing convergence of the policy profiles to a Nash equilibrium is detrimental to the performance, with the best attainable rate being Ω(T−1/4)Ω(T^{-1/4}) in contrast to the usual Ω(T−1/2)Ω(T^{-1/2}) rate for convergence of the average iterates. We then propose two algorithms that achieve this optimal rate up to constant and logarithmic factors. The first algorithm leverages a straightforward trade-off between exploration and exploitation, while the second employs a regularization technique based on a two-step mirror descent approach.
Apr 14, 2026

Efficiency of Proportional Mechanisms in Online Auto-Bidding Advertising

The rise of automated bidding strategies in online advertising presents new challenges in designing and analyzing efficient auction mechanisms. In this paper, we focus on proportional mechanisms within the context of auto-bidding and study the efficiency of pure Nash equilibria, specifically the price of anarchy (PoA), under the liquid welfare objective. We first establish a tight PoA bound of 2 for the standard proportional mechanism. Next, we introduce a modified version with an alternative payment scheme that achieves a PoA bound of 1+O(1)n−11 + \frac{O(1)}{n-1} where n≥2n \geq 2 denotes the number of bidding agents. This improvement surpasses the existing PoA barrier of 2 and approaches full efficiency as the number of agents increases. Our methodology leverages duality and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions from linear and convex programming. Due to its conceptual simplicity, our approach may offer broader applications for establishing PoA bounds.
Apr 6, 2026

Nash Approximation Gap in Truncated Infinite-horizon Partially Observable Markov Games

Partially Observable Markov Games (POMGs) provide a general framework for modeling multi-agent sequential decision-making under asymmetric information. A common approach is to reformulate a POMG as a fully observable Markov game over belief states, where the state is the conditional distribution of the system state and agents' private information given common information, and actions correspond to mappings (prescriptions) from private information to actions. However, this reformulation is intractable in infinite-horizon settings, as both the belief state and action spaces grow with the accumulation of information over time. We propose a finite-memory truncation framework that approximates infinite-horizon POMGs by a finite-state, finite-action Markov game, where agents condition decisions only on finite windows of common and private information. Under suitable filter stability (forgetting) conditions, we show that any Nash equilibrium of the truncated game is an ε\varepsilon-Nash equilibrium of the original POMG, where ε→0\varepsilon \to 0 as the truncation length increases.
Apr 3, 2026

A Network Formation Game for Katz Centrality Maximization: A Resource Allocation Perspective

In this paper, we study a network formation game in which agents seek to maximize their influence by allocating constrained resources to connections with other agents. We use Katz centrality to model agents' influence in the network. Allocations are restricted to neighbors in a given unweighted network, encoding topological constraints. The allocation by each agent determines the weights of its outgoing edges, and the allocations of all agents thereby induce a network. This defines a strategic-form game in which agents' utilities are given by their Katz centralities. We characterize the Nash equilibrium networks of this game and analyze their properties. We propose a sequential Best Response Dynamics (BRD) to model the network formation process and show that it converges to the set of Nash equilibria under bounded budgets and the assumption that every agent takes a best response infinitely often. For complete underlying topologies, we show that Katz centralities are proportional to agents' budgets at Nash equilibria. For general underlying topologies in which each agent has a self-loop, we show that hierarchical networks form at Nash equilibria. Finally, simulations illustrate our findings.
Mar 19, 2026

Reasonably reasoning AI agents can avoid game-theoretic failures in zero-shot, provably

As autonomous AI agents increasingly mediate online platform markets, a fundamental question emerges: do these markets generate stable strategic outcomes? In repeated strategic environments, the Nash equilibrium provides a natural benchmark for this stability. However, empirical evidence on off-the-shelf LLM agents is mixed, leaving it unclear whether independently deployed agents can converge to equilibrium behavior without explicit strategic post-training. In this paper, we provide an affirmative answer. Extending the Bayesian learning literature in theoretical economics, we prove that AI agents, acting as Bayesian posterior samplers rather than expected utility maximizers, are guaranteed to eventually become weakly close to a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games. We further extend this analysis to settings in which stage payoffs are unknown ex ante, and agents observe only their privately realized stochastic payoffs, and obtain the same convergence guarantees. Finally, we empirically evaluate these theoretical implications across five repeated-game environments, ranging from the Prisoner's Dilemma to marketing promotion games. Taken together, our findings suggest that strategic stability in AI-mediated markets can emerge from the intrinsic reasoning and learning properties of modern AI agents, without the need for unrealistic universal fine-tuning.
Feb 24, 2026

Matching Multiple Experts: On the Exploitability of Multi-Agent Imitation Learning

Multi-agent imitation learning (MA-IL) aims to learn optimal policies from expert demonstrations of interactions in multi-agent interactive domains. Despite existing guarantees on the performance of the resulting learned policies, characterizations of how far the learned polices are from a Nash equilibrium are missing for offline MA-IL. In this paper, we demonstrate impossibility and hardness results of learning low-exploitable policies in general nn-player Markov Games. We do so by providing examples where even exact measure matching fails, and demonstrating a new hardness result on characterizing the Nash gap given a fixed measure matching error. We then show how these challenges can be overcome using strategic dominance assumptions on the expert equilibrium. Specifically, for the case of dominant strategy expert equilibria, assuming Behavioral Cloning error εBCε_{\text{BC}}, this provides a Nash imitation gap of O(nεBC/(1−γ)2)\mathcal{O}\left(nε_{\text{BC}}/(1-γ)^2\right) for a discount factor γγ. We generalize this result with a new notion of best-response continuity, and argue that this is implicitly encouraged by standard regularization techniques.
Feb 24, 2026

The Tragedy of the Commons in Multi-Population Resource Games

Self-optimizing behaviors can lead to outcomes where collective benefits are ultimately destroyed, a well-known phenomenon known as the ``tragedy of the commons". These scenarios are widely studied using game-theoretic approaches to analyze strategic agent decision-making. In this paper, we examine this phenomenon in a bi-level decision-making hierarchy, where low-level agents belong to multiple distinct populations, and high-level agents make decisions that impact the choices of the local populations they represent. We study strategic interactions in a context where the populations benefit from a common environmental resource that degrades with higher extractive efforts made by high-level agents. We characterize a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the high-level game, and investigate its consequences on the common resource. While the equilibrium resource level degrades as the number of populations grows large, there are instances where it does not become depleted. We identify such regions, as well as the regions where the resource does deplete.
Feb 19, 2026

Market Games for Generative Models: Equilibria, Welfare, and Strategic Entry

Generative model ecosystems increasingly operate as competitive multi-platform markets, where platforms strategically select models from a shared pool and users with heterogeneous preferences choose among them. Understanding how platforms interact, when market equilibria exist, how outcomes are shaped by model-providers, platforms, and user behavior, and how social welfare is affected is critical for fostering a beneficial market environment. In this paper, we formalize a three-layer model-platform-user market game and identify conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibrium. Our analysis shows that market structure, whether platforms converge on similar models or differentiate by selecting distinct ones, depends not only on models' global average performance but also on their localized attraction to user groups. We further examine welfare outcomes and show that expanding the model pool does not necessarily increase user welfare or market diversity. Finally, we design novel best-response training schemes that allow model providers to strategically introduce new models into competitive markets.
Feb 2, 2026

Local exponential stability of mean-field Langevin descent-ascent and associated particle system

We study the mean-field Langevin descent-ascent (MFL-DA), a coupled optimization dynamics on the space of probability measures for entropically regularized two-player zero-sum games, together with its associated interacting particle system. For general nonconvex-nonconcave payoffs, Wang and Chizat (COLT 2024) asked whether the original single-timescale MFL-DA converges to the mixed Nash equilibrium and, if so, at what rate. We prove a local affirmative answer in Wasserstein space: if the initial datum is sufficiently close to the mixed Nash equilibrium, then the mean-field dynamics converges to it exponentially fast at a quantitative rate. We further show that the finite-NN particle system inherits this stability up to times exponential in NN, with an NN-independent exponential rate modulo a finite-particle error floor. Combined with the recent counterexample of Mourrat and Pillaud-Vivien for MFL-DA, which shows that global convergence cannot hold in general, our theorem completes the positive local counterpart of the Wang-Chizat question: the mixed Nash equilibrium has a robust basin of attraction, stable under both the mean-field flow and its finite-particle approximation.
Oct 16, 2025

Learnable Mixed Nash Equilibria are Collectively Rational

We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out to be closely connected to economic properties of collective rationality. Up to strategic equivalence, if a mixed equilibrium is uniformly stable, then it is weakly Pareto optimal; there is no way for all players to improve by jointly deviating from the equilibrium. This is a form of collective rationality that rules out the types of behaviors in the prisoner's dilemma or the tragedy of the commons. Moreover, we show that uniform stability determines the last-iterate convergence behavior for the family of incremental smoothed best-response dynamics, used to model individual and corporate behaviors in the markets. Unlike dynamics around strict equilibria, which can stabilize to socially-inefficient solutions, individually utility-seeking behaviors near mixed Nash equilibria lead to collective rationality.
Oct 14, 2025

Equilibria in routing games with connected autonomous vehicles may not be strong, as exclusive clubs may form

User Equilibrium (UE) is the standard representation of the so-called routing game in which drivers adjust their route choices to arrive at their destinations as fast as possible. Asking whether UE is strong has, so far, been meaningless for human drivers, who do not form coalitions because of technical and behavioral constraints. Here, we demonstrate that this will not necessarily hold for Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs), which can communicate and collaborate to form routing coalitions by exploiting adaptive signal control. Within game-theoretical formulations of Nash Equilibria, we provide a methodological framework and report the novel phenomena through a carefully designed toy-network example, in which we identify so-called clubs emerging in different CAV penetration rates and adaptive traffic-light configurations. We detail one such club where three CAVs deviate from the UE and benefit (arrive faster). The formation of such a club has negative consequences for other users (who are not invited to join and must now travel longer) and for the system (making it suboptimal and disequilibrated), thereby triggering adaptation dynamics. These findings raise questions about equity in future mixed-autonomy traffic systems.
Sep 30, 2025

Quadratic Programming Approach for Nash Equilibrium Computation in Multiplayer Imperfect-Information Games

There has been significant recent progress in algorithms for approximation of Nash equilibrium in large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games and exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games. While counterfactual regret minimization and fictitious play are scalable to large games and have convergence guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, they do not guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium in multiplayer games. We present an approach for exact computation of Nash equilibrium in multiplayer imperfect-information games that solves a quadratically-constrained program based on a nonlinear complementarity problem formulation from the sequence-form game representation. This approach capitalizes on recent advances for solving nonconvex quadratic programs. Our algorithm is able to quickly solve three-player Kuhn poker after removal of dominated actions. Of the available algorithms in the Gambit software suite, only the logit quantal response approach is successfully able to solve the game; however, the approach takes longer than our algorithm and also involves a degree of approximation. Our formulation also leads to a new approach for computing Nash equilibrium in multiplayer strategic-form games which we demonstrate to outperform a previous quadratically-constrained program formulation.
Aug 5, 2025

Distributionally Robust Markov Games with Average Reward

We propose and study distributionally robust Markov games (DR-MGs) with the average-reward criterion as a crucial framework for multi-agent decision-making under model mismatches and over extended horizons. Under a standard irreducible assumption, we first derive a correspondence between the optimal policies and the solutions of the robust Bellman equation, based on which we further show the existence of a stationary Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game. We further study DR-MGs under a more general weakly communicating setting. We construct a set-valued map based on the constant-gain optimal robust Bellman operator and show that its value is a subset of the best-response policies. We further prove that this map admits a fixed point, which implies the existence of NE. We then design two algorithms, Robust Nash-Iteration and robust TD Descent, with provably convergent guarantees. Finally, we show that the NE under average-reward can be approximated by the ones for the discounted DR-MGs as the discount factor approaches one. Our studies provide a comprehensive theoretical and algorithmic foundation for decision-making in complex, uncertain, and long-running multi-player environments.
Nov 18, 2024

Nonlinear Equilibrium Transitions in a Potential Game Model for Federated Learning

In federated learning (FL), a central server typically allocates training efforts to clients. However, from a market-oriented perspective, clients may independently choose their training efforts based on rational self-interest. To study this setting, we propose a potential game framework in which each client's payoff is determined by its individual effort and the rewards provided by the server. The rewards are influenced by the collective efforts of all clients and can be modulated by a reward factor. We first establish the existence of Nash equilibria (NEs) and then investigate their uniqueness in a stationary setting. We show that the NEs depend nonlinearly on the reward factor and exhibit a nonsmooth transition at a critical value, where the stationary potential loses strict curvature, leading to nonunique NEs and a jump between low-effort and high-effort branches. Furthermore, we prove the convergence of the best-response algorithm for computing NEs in our FL game. Finally, we apply the clients' rational efforts derived from the NEs to FL training with various datasets and models, thereby validating the effectiveness of the identified critical reward factor. The source code is available at https://github.com/DCN-FAU-AvH/FL-Potential-Game
Sep 2, 2024

Decentralized Best-Response-Based Learning in Two-Player Zero-Sum Stochastic Games: A Finite-Sample Analysis

We present a finite-sample analysis of decentralized learning in two-player zero-sum matrix games and stochastic games, with a focus on best-response-based learning algorithms. In matrix games, the learning algorithm is payoff-based and symmetric: each player updates its policy using only its own payoff observations, incrementally moving toward an estimated smoothed best response to the opponent's latest policy. For stochastic games, we build on this matrix-game primitive to develop a learning algorithm called value iteration with smoothed best response (VI-SBR), which combines smoothed-best-response learning in induced matrix games with a decentralized, model-free approximation of minimax value iteration. We establish finite-sample guarantees in both settings. For matrix games, our results imply a sample complexity of O(ε−1)\mathcal{O}(ε^{-1}) for finding an εε-Nash distribution and, with explicit exploration, O~(ε−8)\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(ε^{-8}) for finding an εε-Nash equilibrium. For stochastic games, we prove that the exploration-enhanced VI-SBR algorithm achieves a sample complexity of O~(ε−8)\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(ε^{-8}) for finding an εε-Nash equilibrium. Technically, our analysis develops a coupled Lyapunov-drift framework. This framework simultaneously handles stochastic iterative algorithms with multiple interacting stochastic iterates, the non-zero-sum auxiliary games generated by independently updated value functions, and the time-inhomogeneous Markovian noise induced by time-varying policies. The resulting tools may be useful more broadly for analyzing learning algorithms with coupled stochastic iterates and nonstationary sampling processes.
Mar 22, 2024

PPA-Game: Characterizing and Learning Competitive Dynamics Among Online Content Creators

In this paper, we present the Proportional Payoff Allocation Game (PPA-Game), which characterizes situations where agents compete for divisible resources. In the PPA-game, agents select from available resources, and their payoffs are proportionately determined based on heterogeneous weights attributed to them. Such dynamics simulate content creators on online recommender systems like YouTube and TikTok, who compete for finite consumer attention, with content exposure reliant on inherent and distinct quality. We first conduct a game-theoretical analysis of the PPA-Game. While the PPA-Game does not always guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), we identify prevalent scenarios ensuring its existence. Simulated experiments further prove that the cases where PNE does not exist rarely happen. Beyond analyzing static payoffs, we further discuss the agents' online learning about resource payoffs by integrating a multi-player multi-armed bandit framework. We propose an online algorithm facilitating each agent's maximization of cumulative payoffs over TT rounds. Theoretically, we establish that the regret of any agent is bounded by O(log⁡1+ηT)O(\log^{1 + η} T) for any η>0η> 0. Empirical results further validate the effectiveness of our online learning approach.