Adversarial Examples

Given the surge of harmful AI-generated imagery online, reliably distinguishing authentic images from generated ones has become an urgent research topic. While many proposed detection methods perform well under controlled settings, they often collapse when tested on real-world data. A potential root cause are subtle biases in the detectors' training data. As a result, detectors may rely on spurious correlations instead of learning true forensic artifacts. While a recent line of work has identified the problem, there is not yet an established protocol to evaluate how biased a detector actually is. In this work, we therefore take a step back: First, we discuss what it means for a detector to be biased, and how this differs from a lack of robustness. Second, we propose BIAS-ID, a transparent framework for analyzing and quantifying the presence of transformation biases in AI-generated image detectors. We validate our framework by performing an evaluation of six detectors across two datasets, revealing that several state-of-the-art detection methods are strongly affected by biases. Our results highlight the importance of bias-aware evaluation for developing reliable AI-generated image detectors.

Deep neural network (DNN)-based object detectors are widely used for analyzing aerial and satellite imagery in applications such as environmental monitoring and urban analytics. Despite their strong performance, these models are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples, and physical adversarial attacks using printable patterns pose realistic security threats. In this paper, we evaluate physical adversarial patch attacks against an aerial vehicle detector by bridging digital optimization and real-world deployment. Adversarial patches are optimized in the digital domain using a loss function that minimizes the maximum objectness score while incorporating non-printability score (NPS) and total variation (TV) constraints to ensure both printability and spatial smoothness. The optimized patches are printed and deployed in three configurations: ON, OFF, and OFF-Side. Experiments using a YOLOv3 detector show that while the OFF patch achieves the highest effectiveness in the digital domain (85.51% Average Objectness Reduction Rate (AORR)), the ON patch demonstrates superior robustness in physical environments (0.197-0.343 Objectness Score Ratio (OSR)) due to its consistent visibility. Furthermore, our results indicate that weather-based augmentation does not necessarily improve patch optimization in this domain. These findings provide critical insights into the practical vulnerabilities of aerial object detection systems.

Adversarial patches are physical patterns attached to real objects to mislead AI vision systems. Their real-world risk is not determined by a single successful prediction, but by whether they remain effective after deployment under changing viewpoints, distances, and scene conditions. We refer to this property as scene robustness, the effectiveness of a deployed patch across conditions in a real environment. Yet existing evaluations do not measure scene robustness well: real image benchmarks are realistic but fixed, while simulators are controllable but not grounded in a specific real scene. We present AdvScene, a scene-grounded framework for measuring the scene robustness of adversarial patches in reconstructed real environments. AdvScene reframes evaluation as operational measurement: given a fixed deployed patch, it characterizes the patch's operational envelope - where and when the attack succeeds - as a function of viewpoint, distance, and scene context. A key challenge is that the attack is typically defined only in a single anchor view, while evaluation requires a representation that remains faithful under viewpoint changes. We formalize this as a constrained lifting problem and introduce Adversarial Patch-to-Scene Embedding (APSE), which resolves cross-view ambiguity while preserving attack-critical appearance and enforcing locality, target-surface attachment, and cross-view consistency. We validate AdvScene using real-world physical data and conduct a comprehensive evaluation of existing adversarial patches. Our results show that AdvScene reveals substantial scene-dependent variation in attack effectiveness that is not captured by existing image-centric or simulator-based evaluations.

Forensic vision-language models (VLMs) have recently been developed to detect image tampering and provide natural-language explanations. However, their robustness against adversarial manipulation remains underexplored. Existing adversarial attacks typically aim to flip the model's binary judgment, while the accompanying explanation may still reveal forensic cues and contradict the attacked judgment. In this paper, we study judgment-explanation consistent adversarial attacks against forensic VLMs and propose JECA^2, a controlled white-box red-team diagnostic that jointly redirects visual attribution and aligns textual explanations with the target judgment. On the visual side, JECA^2 uses Grad-CAM-guided perturbations to divert attribution from tampered regions toward benign regions. On the textual side, it optimizes prompt embeddings toward authenticity-affirming semantics under a token-proximity constraint. Experiments on forensic VLM benchmarks show that JECA^2 achieves higher attack success and automated judgment-explanation consistency than implemented baselines under white-box threat settings, while transfer to closed-source VLMs remains measurable but limited. Our results highlight a consistency failure mode in explanation-based forensic VLMs and motivate future robustness evaluation beyond binary detection accuracy.

Despite recent progress in backdoor attacks, existing methods remain susceptible to post-training defenses that erase the backdoor through fine-tuning or pruning. We revisit the core objectives of backdoor attacks and derive principled criteria characterizing optimal sample-specific trigger construction under a Bayes-optimal model of the victim's training. Our analysis reveals that both attack success and clean-accuracy preservation are simultaneously optimized when triggered samples are steered into low-density regions of the clean data distribution, a distributional condition that controls all moments of the poisoned distribution at once rather than a handful of input-space summary statistics. We introduce a bilevel optimization framework that estimates density ratios via conditional time-score matching and optimizes a mixture-model objective to place triggered samples in these sparse regions. Extensive evaluations on MNIST, CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and TinyImageNet demonstrate that our method achieves above 99% attack success rate before defense and retains 50--85 percentage points higher post-defense ASR than the strongest baselines under fine-tuning defenses. Against neuron-pruning defenses, the method exhibits complete immunity, with zero neurons identified for removal across all pruning thresholds. These results expose a fundamental gap in current defense paradigms and underscore the need for defenses that operate beyond the support of the clean distribution.

With the rapid proliferation of generative models, such as diffusion models, digital watermarking has emerged as a crucial solution for identifying AI-generated images. Modern post-hoc watermarking schemes use neural networks to achieve an extremely low false-alarm rate while remaining robust to common image transformations. However, there is a lack of comparison between these modern methods and classic ones, particularly in real-world scenarios where robustness and security take precedence over achieving an extremely low false-alarm probability. In this paper, we propose a fair comparison of robustness and security between modern and classic post-hoc watermarking across various types of classic augmentations and recent sophisticated attacks. Our experiments show that, in a realistic scenario, classic watermarking outperforms modern techniques in terms of security while maintaining robustness.

Black-box adversarial attacks that minimize only the ground-truth confidence suffer from class drift: perturbations wander through the feature space without committing to a specific adversarial class, wasting queries on diffuse, undirected progress. We introduce Opportunistic Target Selection (OTS), a lightweight wrapper that switches an untargeted attack to a targeted objective early in its trajectory, locking onto whichever non-true class currently leads. OTS requires no architectural modification to the underlying attack, no gradient access, and no a priori target-class knowledge. We validate OTS on three score-based attacks (SimBA, Square Attack with cross-entropy loss, and Bandits) across five standard ImageNet classifiers (4,500 runs). On random-search attacks, OTS closely tracks oracle performance, with gains up to +27 pp in success rate and 43% relative reduction in censored-mean iterations on ResNet-50. On gradient-estimation attacks (Bandits) and attacks with margin loss, OTS is redundant, a negative result that reinforces our interpretation of OTS as a margin-loss surrogate. On adversarially-trained models, a bimodal difficulty distribution eliminates the regime where targeting helps.

Face recognition systems are increasingly vulnerable to morphing attacks, where a composite image is crafted to match multiple identities, enabling unauthorized access and identity fraud. Existing detection methods identify morphed images but cannot recover constituent images or identities, limiting their forensic utility. This paper presents a novel reference-free facial demorphing framework that leverages Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) to guide a coupled diffusion-based reconstruction process. Our key innovation lies in extracting semantic embeddings from intermediate MLLM layers to condition the demorphing, providing high-level reasoning about facial attributes and identity cues that complement low-level pixel information. We formulate demorphing as a coupled conditional generation problem, where both constituent faces are synthesized jointly through a denoising diffusion model operating directly in the RGB domain, ensuring inter-identity consistency while preserving fine-grained perceptual details. Unlike prior approaches that rely on compressed latent representations or assume identity overlap between training and testing sets, our method bypasses lossy text generation-reencoding cycles by directly utilizing MLLM hidden states as conditioning signals, enabling the denoising network to attend to subtle visual cues such as hair, background, and facial textures. Ablation studies further reveal that middle MLLM layers encode more identity-discriminative representations, RGB-domain demorphing outperforms latent-space approaches by 30--40% at strict operating points, and full MLLM embeddings provide substantial advantages over raw ViT features through enhanced semantic structuring from multimodal pretraining.

Adversarial images pose a severe security threat to multimodal large language models through prompt injection. Existing defenses largely lack a principled understanding of the underlying mechanisms and struggle to balance efficiency and defense utility. In this work, we show that successful adversarial attacks do not rely on the entire image uniformly but instead depend on a small subset of critical image tokens. Based on this insight, we propose Gradient Token Masking (GTM), which localizes these tokens via gradient analysis and neutralizes them through masking. We find that attribution based on the first generated token's output probability fails when attacks preserve the predicted token. To overcome this, GTM utilizes the Hidden-State Gradient Norm score for generation-influence attribution under adversarial inputs. We prove that its ranking is consistent with that of the full adversarial loss gradient, providing a theoretical guarantee for accurate localization. Our method requires only a single forward-backward pass to identify and zero out a small number of high-scoring tokens, effectively disrupting the adversarial attack path. Extensive experiments on prompt injection and multimodal jailbreak attacks demonstrate that our approach reduces attack success rates (ASR) to near zero while preserving model utility with negligible computational overhead.

Despite the strong performance of deep neural networks in modern Web and language applications, they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, especially transferable attacks that generate adversarial examples using surrogate models without accessing the victim model. Transferable attacks in the text domain are still under-explored, with only a few studies addressing this challenging issue, often with suboptimal results due to equal treatment of submodels or inaccurate estimation of importance scores. To address these challenges, we propose a simple yet effective paradigm for transfer-based textual adversarial attack, named SEP-Attack. Specifically, we employ the Determinantal Point Process (DPP) to generate diverse surrogate ensemble weights, representing the transferability of submodels. Using these weights, we introduce a new metric to evaluate prediction confidence scores, which in turn are used to calculate word importance scores and generate adversarial candidates. Finally, we quantify the transferability score for each candidate and select the top ones as the final transferable adversarial examples. Experiments conducted on four datasets and two real-world APIs validate the efficacy of SEP-Attack, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art baselines.

Detecting AI-generated images (AIGI) remains challenging because detectors often fail to generalize to unseen generators. Although existing methods are trained on large datasets, their performance still degrades when generation settings change, indicating that data scale alone is insufficient and that limited coverage of generative variations during training is a key factor. Studies on generative model editing show that small changes in internal representations can produce diverse and meaningful image variations, many of which are not explored under standard sampling. Leveraging this insight, we propose PROBE (Probing Robustness via Boundary Exploration), a framework that improves detector generalization by actively exploring challenging regions of the generative process. Instead of treating the generator as a fixed data source, PROBE uses the detector as a critic to steer the generator through manifold-level modifications, producing realistic samples that are difficult to classify. These samples expose failure cases that are uncommon under standard data sampling strategies and are used to refine the detector. Experimental results across multiple benchmarks indicate that PROBE enhances generalization to unseen generators, resulting in more generalizable AIGI detection performance. Code and models are available at https://github.com/Amamiya-C/PROBE-AIGI-Detection

Large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems increasingly rely on intermediate communication to coordinate complex tasks. While most existing systems communicate through natural language, recent work shows that latent communication, particularly through transformer key-value (KV) caches, can improve efficiency and preserve richer task-relevant information. However, KV caches also encode contextual inputs, intermediate reasoning states, and agent-specific information, creating an opaque channel through which sensitive content may propagate across agents without explicit textual disclosure. To address this, we introduce \textbf{LCGuard} (Latent Communication Guard), a framework for safe KV-based latent communication in multi-agent LLM systems. LCGuard treats shared KV caches as latent working memory and learns representation-level transformations before cache artifacts are transmitted across agents. We formalize representation-level sensitive information leakage operationally through reconstruction: a shared cache artifact is unsafe if an adversarial decoder can recover agent-specific sensitive inputs from it. This leads to an adversarial training formulation in which the adversary learns to reconstruct sensitive inputs, while LCGuard learns transformations that preserve task-relevant semantics and reduce reconstructable information. Empirical evaluations across multiple model families and multi-agent benchmarks show that LCGuard consistently reduces reconstruction-based leakage and attack success rates while maintaining competitive task performance compared to standard KV-sharing baselines.

Closed-weight generative services are increasingly deployed through query-based APIs, where users can obtain generated outputs while model parameters remain inaccessible. However, such deployment does not prevent model stealing: an attacker can repeatedly query the service, collect large volumes of released synthetic images, and use them as training data for a private substitute model. This query-output-driven process enables unauthorized knowledge distillation and capability replication without direct access to the original weights. To mitigate this threat, a practical defense should preserve the visual fidelity of released images, provide explicit control over perturbation magnitude, and scale efficiently to large-volume output release. We present WaveGuard, a single-pass, generator-based protection framework that safeguards released synthetic images under a user-specified perturbation budget. WaveGuard employs a frequency-aware perturbation generator to inject structured, imperceptible perturbations that maintain perceptual utility for benign viewers while reducing the usefulness of protected images as training data for unauthorized student models. Extensive experiments under WikiArt-related synthetic-output distillation settings show that WaveGuard achieves a favorable efficacy--fidelity--efficiency trade-off, with explicit imperceptibility control and substantial gains in protection efficiency.

Gradient-based attacks are important methods for evaluating model robustness. However, since the proposal of APGD, it has been difficult for such methods to achieve significant breakthroughs. To achieve such an effect, we first analyze the issue of "high-loss non-adversarial examples" that degrades attack performance in previous methods, and prove that this issue arises from inappropriate objectives for adversarial example generation. Subsequently, we reconstruct the objective as "maximizing the difference between the non-ground-truth label probability upper bound and the ground-truth label probability", and proposes a novel and powerful gradient-based attack method named Sequential Difference Maximization (SDM). SDM establishes a three-layer optimization framework of "cycle-stage-step". It adopts the negative probability loss function and the Directional Probability Difference Ratio (DPDR) loss function in the initial and subsequent optimization stages, respectively, and approaches the ideal objective of adversarial example generation via stage-wise sequential optimization. Experiments demonstrate that compared with previous state-of-the-art methods, SDM not only achieves stronger attack performance but also exhibits superior cost-effectiveness. The code is available at https://github.com/X-L-Liu/ICML-SDM.

Recently, pre-trained encoders have gained widespread use due to their strong capability in representation extraction. However, they are vulnerable to downstream-agnostic attacks (DAAs). Existing DAA methods operate under a permissive threat model, where an attack is successful if the generated downstream-agnostic adversarial examples (DAEs) change the original prediction, without requiring a specific target. In this paper, we propose a Targeted DAA (TDAA) method under a stricter threat model requiring the attack to be both targeted and downstream-agnostic. Since the downstream task is unknown and encoders do not directly produce predictions, achieving a targeted attack is particularly challenging. To address this, we introduce a novel component termed the 'threat image', pre-selected by the attacker as the target. Specifically, a generator is designed to produce example-specific adversarial perturbations that compel the victim encoder to output identical features for both the DAEs and the threat image. Unlike previous DAA methods that generate a single shared perturbation for all samples, which often fails due to image diversity, our method adopts an example-specific paradigm. This generates tailored perturbations for each image to ensure a high attack success rate and invisibility. By leveraging the threat image as a feature-level anchor, our method builds a task-agnostic bridge to reveal the vulnerabilities of the victim encoder. Extensive experiments on 10 self-supervised methods across 3 benchmark datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach and reveal the pronounced vulnerability of pre-trained encoders. The code will be made publicly available after the review period.

Unified autoregressive models (UAMs) are transformer models that generate text as well as image tokens within a single autoregressive pass. Shared parameters and a multimodal vocabulary simplify the training pipeline and facilitate flexible multimodal generation, yet might introduce new vulnerabilities. In particular, we are the first to show that this unified architecture enables multimodal backdoor attacks, where a trigger can propagate malicious effects across multiple output modalities. Specifically, we present the Token by Token Backdoor Attack (ToBAC), the first backdoor attack targeting UAMs, exploring both data-based and model-based poisoning strategies. We demonstrate that innocuous characters or even common words can be transformed into triggers that elicit harmful behavior in autoregressive image generation. ToBAC can jointly manipulate visual outputs and accompanying text, increasing the perceived authenticity of fabricated content. With model access, ToBAC enables attacks on the unified Liquid model in which a subtle word (e.g., ``cool'') induces modality-aligned brand promotion or ideological influence in 55% of generations. Without model access, ToBAC can be induced through data poisoning, achieving an average success rate of 63.1% against JanusPro.

Arabic handwriting recognition (AHR) has made significant progress with deep learning models. AHR research has largely focused on performance, with security receiving little attention. This study provides what appears to be a new line of inquiry by demonstrating the vulnerability of high-performing models to adversarial black-box attacks. The focus on black-box attacks reflects real-world scenarios where the attacker has no prior knowledge of the model architecture. Extensive experiments were conducted on two benchmark AHR datasets containing Arabic handwritten Characters. Results demonstrated the effectiveness of the attacks, with the Pixle attack achieving an attack success rate of 99-100% on most models. Other, less aggressive attacks achieved success rates of 50-96% across most experiments. Despite the higher attack success rate, the attacks maintain the structural integrity of the characters, rendering them almost imperceptible to the human eye. The findings indicate the higher vulnerability of the studied models to adversarial manipulation. This underscores the need to strengthen efforts to secure these models and ensure their reliability in AHR real-world applications.

Infrared object detection is crucial for perception in autonomous driving and surveillance but remains vulnerable to physical adversarial attacks. Unlike in the RGB domain, where attacks rely on color texture, infrared attacks must manipulate thermal signatures, making the geometry shape of heat-blocking materials the primary adversarial information carrier. Current shape-based methods suffer from a fundamental trade-off between representational capability and optimization power, limiting their attack effectiveness.In this work, we overcome this dilemma by introducing learnable Fourier shapes to the infrared domain. We utilize an end-to-end differentiable framework where a compact set of Fourier coefficients, defining the shape boundary, is analytically mapped to a pixel-space mask via the winding number theorem. This enables efficient gradient-based optimization to generate potent shapes that cause human targets to evade detection. Extensive digital and physical experiments provide a comprehensive evaluation and validate our superior performance. Our resulting physical patch achieves striking robustness, successfully evading detectors across diverse distances, angles, poses, and individuals, and achieves over 88% attack success rate at distances greater than 25m (conf.=0.5). Code is available at https://github.com/Yongyx99/Fourier-shape-attack.

Recent Singing Voice Synthesis (SVS) advances enable highly realistic but potentially malicious AI covers, making singing voice deepfake detection (SVDD) crucial. Self-Supervised Learning (SSL)-based detectors achieve state-of-the-art performance by fine-tuning speech SSL backbones to capture singing-specific spoof artifacts. Existing adversarial attacks often fail against SSL-SVDD, creating a false impression of inherent robustness. We reveal this stems from two challenges. First, at the objective level, attacks optimize cross-entropy on local surrogates, crossing surrogate-specific boundaries rather than suppressing shared spoof evidence. Second, at the method level, attacks follow the surrogate's dominant gradient direction. In SSL-SVDD, this aligns with fine-tuned artifact-sensitive directions, limiting transferability to unseen detectors - a geometric failure we term the Linearity Trap. To properly evaluate robustness, we propose MARS (Meta-Adversarial Regression of Semantics), a transfer-based black-box framework tailored to SSL-SVDD. Structurally, MARS shifts to hypothesis-evidence manipulation by constructing a natural semantic anchor from the pre-trained SSL space and an artifact anchor from the fine-tuned space. Algorithmically, MARS escapes the Linearity Trap via bi-level optimization: the inner stage induces tangential exploration, while the outer stage guides the audio toward the natural semantic manifold. Experiments on the CtrSVDD benchmark show MARS improves Attack Success Rate (ASR) in in-distribution transfer (13%), out-of-distribution transfer (10%), and cross-task evaluation (36%), highlighting the urgent need for robust SVDD systems.

Physical adversarial attacks often overfit single surrogate models and optimization objectives. While ensemble attacks can mitigate this, existing methods struggle with severe gradient conflicts within restricted physical texture spaces, significantly degrading cross-model transferability. To bridge this gap, this paper proposes a Joint Multi-Objective and Multi-Model Optimization Framework (JMOF) that leverages quantitative similarity analysis to select the optimal surrogate model ensemble. Within JMOF, a dual-level mechanism jointly suppresses prediction outputs and flattens intermediate feature distributions, balancing attack efficiency with deep generalization. Additionally, an Orthogonal Gradient Alignment (OGA) strategy resolves cross-model gradient conflicts, transforming mutually repulsive gradients into synergistic optimization directions. Extensive simulated and real-world experiments demonstrate that JMOF outperforms state-of-the-art baselines against diverse black-box detectors. Crucially, JMOF exhibits substantial cross-vision-task generalization, generating attacks capable of simultaneously deceiving object detection and semantic segmentation or monocular depth estimation models. This research advances the generalization limits of physical adversarial attacks, providing a robust framework for evaluating visual AI vulnerabilities in real-world deployments.

While vision and multimodal foundation models underpin critical tasks from perception to complex reasoning, they remain highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, traditional adversarial attacks are typically limited to single, predefined objectives, tightly coupling each attack to a specific model or task, which restricts their scalability and flexibility in real-world scenarios. In this work, we present DarkLLM, a novel attack framework that trains an LLM to translate natural-language attack instructions into latent attack vectors, which are then decoded into visual adversarial perturbations. By leveraging natural-language instruction tuning, DarkLLM not only unifies targeted, untargeted, segmentation, and multi-model attacks within a single framework, but also achieves flexible and controllable adversarial generation, enabling each instruction to produce a perturbation that induces desired behaviors across heterogeneous models. Through extensive experiments across 4 tasks, 13 datasets, and 15 models, we demonstrate that DarkLLM with only 1B parameters can follow attacker instructions and generate highly effective attacks against CLIP, SAM, and frontier LLMs, revealing a systemic vulnerability in modern foundation models.

Generating adversarial examples at scale is a core primitive for robustness evaluation, adversarial training, and red-teaming, yet even "fast" attacks such as FGSM remain throughput-limited by the cost of a backward pass. We introduce a family of attacks that eliminates the backward pass by predicting the input gradient from forward-pass hidden states via a lightweight linear regression. The approach is motivated by a kernel view of neural networks and is exact in the Neural Tangent Kernel regime, while remaining effective for practical finite-width models. Empirically, our methods recover much of FGSM's attack performance while using only a small fraction of the time, corresponding to a $532\%$ increase in throughput. These results suggest gradient prediction as a simple and general route to significantly faster adversarial generation under realistic wall-clock constraints.

Autonomous vehicles depend on online HD map construction to perceive lane boundaries, dividers, and pedestrian crossings -- safety-critical road elements that directly govern motion planning. While existing pixel perturbation attacks can disrupt the mapping, they can be neutralized by standard adversarial defenses. We present MIRAGE, a framework for systematic discovery of semantic attacks that bypass adversarial defenses and degrade mapping predictions by finding plausible environmental variation (e.g. shadows, wet roads). MIRAGE exploits the latent manifold of real-world data learned by diffusion models, and searches for semantically mutated scenes neighboring the ground truth with the same road topology yet mislead the mapping predictions. We evaluate MIRAGE on nuScenes and demonstrate two attacks: (1) boundary removal, suppressing 57.7% of detections and corrupting 96% of planned trajectories; and (2) boundary injection, the only method that successfully injects fictitious boundaries, while pixel PGD and AdvPatch fail entirely. Both attacks remain potent under various adversarial defenses. We use two independent VLM judges to quantify realism, where MIRAGE passes as realistic 80--84% of the time (vs. 97--99% for clean nuScenes), while AdvPatch only 0--9%. Our findings expose a categorical gap in current adversarial defenses: semantic-level perturbations that manifest as legitimate environmental variation are substantially harder to mitigate than pixel-level perturbations.

As AI-generated synthetic images become increasingly realistic, Vision Transformers (ViTs) have emerged as a cornerstone of modern deepfake detection. However, the prevailing reliance on frozen, pre-trained backbones introduces a subtle yet critical vulnerability. In this work, we present the Surrogate Iterative Adversarial Attack (SIAA), a gray-box attack that exploits knowledge of the detector's ViT backbone alone and operates entirely within the target detector's feature space to craft highly effective adversarial examples. Through our experiments, involving multiple ViT-based detectors and diverse gray-box scenarios, including few-shot learning, complete training misalignment and attack transferability tests, we demonstrate that this vulnerability consistently yields high attack success rates, often approaching white-box performance. By doing so, we reveal that backbone knowledge alone is sufficient to undermine detector reliability, highlighting the urgent need for more resilient defenses in adversarial multimedia forensics.

Anti-facial recognition (AFR) image filters alter images in ways that are subtle to people but blinding to computer vision. Yet, despite widespread interest in these technologies to subvert surveillance, users rarely use them in practice -- because the subtle'' alterations are visible enough to conflict with users' self-presentation goals. To address this challenge, we propose AuraMask: a novel approach to creating AFR filters that are both adversarially effective and aesthetically acceptable. Using AuraMask, we produce 40 aesthetic'' filters that emulate popular ``one-click'' Instagram image filters. We show that AuraMask filters meet or exceed the adversarial effectiveness of prior methods against open-source facial recognition models. Moreover, in a controlled online user study ($N=630$) we confirm these filters achieve significantly higher user acceptance than prior methods. Lastly, we provide our AFR pipeline to the community for accelerated research in adversarially effective and aesthetically acceptable protections.

Adversarial attacks fool deep image classifiers by adding tiny, almost invisible noise patterns to a clean image. The standard $\ell^\infty$-bounded attacks (FGSM and PGD) produce high-frequency, near-random sign patterns at the pixel level: small in $\ell^2$, but carrying disproportionate gradient energy. We exploit this with a single-shot, training-free detector using the high-order Corbino-Castillo mimetic operators from the open-source MOLE library. No retraining, no surrogate classifier, no access to the network under attack: the verdict is a property of the input alone, computed in $O(HW)$ time. We illustrate the detector on the standard "peppers" test image: untargeted FGSM and PGD attacks at the $\ell^\infty$ budget $\varepsilon = 16/255$ flip SqueezeNet's prediction from "bell pepper" to "doormat" (FGSM) and "maraca" (PGD), and the detector separates these adversarial inputs from the clean image by $4.1\times$-$5.0\times$ (FGSM) and $1.9\times$-$2.2\times$ (PGD). The margin grows monotonically with the operator order $k$, while an equal-amplitude smooth perturbation leaves the statistic within 1% of its clean value.

With the proliferation of AI-generated images, digital watermarking has become an essential safeguard for protecting intellectual property and mitigating malicious exploitation. Recent works on semantic watermarking have enabled efficient copyright protection for diffusion models. However, the dependence of semantic watermarking on diffusion inversion for watermark detection creates a critical vulnerability. Imprint removal and forgery attacks exploit this weakness to produce deceptive results. Our analysis reveals that these attacks succeed by displacing watermarked latents into the unwatermarked region, while guiding unwatermarked latents into the watermarked region. Based on that, we propose Progressive Guided Inversion and Denoising (PGID), the first plug-and-play, training-free noise extraction framework designed to defend against both attack strategies. PGID effectively defends by projecting perturbed latents back to the region where they originally belong. The projection is achieved by eliminating intermediate latent deflections and mitigating adversarial perturbations through progressive inversion-denoising cycles. Comprehensive evaluations across multiple schemes demonstrate that PGID successfully restores detection reliability by recovering removed watermarks and identifying forged instances.

Recent generative models can produce images that appear highly realistic, raising challenges in distinguishing real and AI-generated images. Yet existing detectors based on pre-trained feature extractors tend to over-rely on global semantics, limiting sensitivity to the critical micro-defects. In this work, we propose Micro-Defects expose Macro-Fakes (MDMF), a local distribution-aware detection framework that amplifies micro-scale statistical irregularities into macro-level distributional discrepancies. To avoid localized forensic cues being diluted by plain aggregation, we introduce a learnable Patch Forensic Signature that projects semantic patch embeddings into a compact forensic latent space. We then use Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) to quantify distributional discrepancies between generated and real images. Our theory-grounded analysis shows that patch-wise modeling yields provably larger discrepancies when localized forensic signals are present in generated images, enabling more reliable separation from real images. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MDMF consistently outperforms baseline detectors across multiple benchmarks, validating its general effectiveness. Project page: https://zbox1005.github.io/MDMF-project/

Modern malware detection pipelines rely on continuous data ingestion and machine learning to counter the high volume of novel threats. This work investigates a realistic gray-box poisoning threat model targeting these pipelines. Using the secml_malware framework, we generate problem-space adversarial binaries through functionality-preserving manipulations, specifically Import Address Table (IAT) and section injections. We evaluate the impact of these poisoned samples when ingested into a defender's training set for a LightGBM malware detection model. Our empirical results demonstrate that subtle IAT-based perturbations enable compact poisoning samples that significantly degrade detection recall. These findings illustrate the inherent challenge of developing low-visibility adversarial perturbations that maintain high poisoning efficacy within continuous learning systems. We further evaluate a defense mechanism based on a homogeneous ensemble, which successfully identifies and filters up to 95.6% of poisoning attempts while maintaining a high retention rate for legitimate data. These findings emphasize the necessity of robust pre-ingestion validation in production pipelines.

Visible-thermal (RGB-T) object detection is a crucial technology for applications such as autonomous driving, where multimodal fusion enhances performance in challenging conditions like low light. However, the security of RGB-T detectors, particularly in the physical world, has been largely overlooked. This paper proposes a novel approach to RGB-T physical attacks using adversarial clothing with a non-overlapping RGB-T pattern (NORP). To simulate full-view (0$^{\circ}$--360$^{\circ}$) RGB-T attacks, we construct 3D RGB-T models for human and adversarial clothing. NORP is a new adversarial pattern design using distinct visible and thermal materials without overlap, avoiding the light reduction in overlapping RGB-T patterns (ORP). To optimize the NORP on adversarial clothing, we propose a spatial discrete-continuous optimization (SDCO) method. We systematically evaluated our method on RGB-T detectors with different fusion architectures, demonstrating high attack success rates both in the digital and physical worlds. Additionally, we introduce a fusion-stage ensemble method that enhances the transferability of adversarial attacks across unseen RGB-T detectors with different fusion architectures.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as trusted authorities -- fact-checking images on social media, comparing products, and moderating content. Users implicitly trust that these systems perceive the same visual content as they do. We show that adversarial examples break this assumption, enabling \emph{AI authority laundering}: an attacker subtly perturbs an image so that the VLM produces confident and authoritative responses about the \emph{wrong} input. Unlike jailbreaks or prompt injections, our attacks do not compromise model alignment; the attack operates entirely at the perceptual level. We demonstrate that standard attacks against publicly available CLIP models transfer reliably to production VLMs -- including GPT-5.4, Claude Opus4.6, Gemini3, and Grok~4.2. Across four attack surfaces, we show that authority laundering can amplify misinformation, disparage individuals, evade content moderation, and manipulate product recommendations. Our attacks have high success rates: In hundreds of attacks targeting identity manipulation and NSFW evasion, we measure success rates of $22 - 100\%$ across six models. No novel attack algorithm is required: basic techniques known for over a decade suffice, establishing a lower bound on attacker capability that should concern defenders. Our results demonstrate that visual adversarial robustness is now a practical -- and still largely unsolved -- safety problem.

Machine-generated text (MGT) detection is critical for regulating online information ecosystems, yet existing detectors often underperform in few-shot settings and remain vulnerable to adversarial, humanizing attacks. To build accurate and robust detectors under limited supervision, we adopt a threat-modeling perspective and study detector vulnerabilities from an attacker's viewpoint under an output-only black-box setting. Motivated by this perspective, we propose RAG-GuidEd Attacker Strengthens ConTrastive Few-shot Detector (REACT), an adversarial training framework that improves both few-shot detection performance and robustness against attacks. REACT couples a humanization-oriented attacker with a target detector: the attacker leverages retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to craft highly human-like adversarial examples to evade detection, while the detector learns from these adversaries with a contrastive objective to stabilize few-shot representation learning and enhance robustness. We alternately update the attacker and the detector to enable their co-evolution. Experiments on 4 datasets with 4 shot sizes and 3 random seeds show that REACT improves average detection F1 by 4.95 points over 8 state-of-the-art (SOTA) detectors and reduces the average attack success rate (ASR) under 4 strong attacks by 3.66 percentage points.

Pneumonia remains a leading global cause of morbidity and mortality, particularly in low-resource settings where access to imaging, laboratory testing, and specialist care is limited. Clinical assessment relies on heterogeneous evidence, including symptoms, respiratory patterns, spoken descriptions, and chest imaging, making frontline screening inherently multimodal. However, many existing computational approaches remain unimodal and focus primarily on radiographs. In this work, we present MultiSense-Pneumo, a multimodal research prototype for pneumonia-oriented screening and triage support that integrates structured symptom descriptors, cough audio, spoken language, and chest radiographs. The system combines deterministic symptom triage, LightGBM-based acoustic classification, domain-adversarial radiograph analysis using ResNet-18, transformer-based speech recognition, and an interpretable late-fusion operator. Each modality is transformed into a normalized concern signal and aggregated into a unified screening estimate. The fusion weights are hand-specified and are treated as heuristic, interpretable parameters rather than learned or clinically optimized values. MultiSense-Pneumo is implemented with offline execution in mind on standard laptop-class hardware, but it is not presented as a deployment-validated or clinically validated diagnostic system. Experimental results demonstrate strong component-level performance of the radiograph pathway under synthetic domain shifts, while also highlighting important limitations, especially reduced abnormal-class recall for cough acoustics and the absence of paired end-to-end multimodal patient evaluation. MultiSense-Pneumo is therefore intended as a framework and component-level prototype for screening and triage research.

The nonuniform and growing impact of adversarial noise across the layers of deep neural networks has been used in the literature, without a formal mathematical justification, to detect adversarial inputs and improve robustness. In this work, we study this phenomenon in detail and present a formal adversarial noise amplification theorem. We specify a set of sufficient conditions under which the adversarial noise amplification is mathematically guaranteed. Based on theoretical observations, we propose a novel training methodology with a custom spectral loss function and a specific architectural design to enhance the amplification signal for detecting adversarial data. Finally, we introduce a new, lightweight detection mechanism that leverages the enhanced amplification signal and operates entirely at inference time. To validate our approach, we demonstrate the detector's efficacy against both state-of-the-art attacks and a purpose-built adaptive attack, confirming that enhanced amplification can serve as a robust and reliable signal for adversarial defense.

Neural Ranking Models (NRMs) are central to modern information retrieval but remain highly vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. Existing attacks often rely on heuristics or surrogate models, limiting effectiveness and transferability. We propose CRAFT, a supervised framework for black-box adversarial rank attacks powered by large language models (LLMs). CRAFT operates in three stages: adversarial dataset generation via retrieval-augmented generation and self-refinement, supervised fine-tuning on curated adversarial examples, and preference-guided optimization to align generations with rank-promotion objectives. Extensive experiments on the MS MARCO passage dataset, TREC Deep Learning 2019, and TREC Deep Learning 2020 benchmarks show that CRAFT significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving higher promotion rates and rank boosts while preserving fluency and semantic fidelity. Moreover, CRAFT transfers effectively across diverse ranking architectures, including cross-encoder, embedding-based, and LLM-based rankers, underscoring vulnerabilities in real-world retrieval systems. This work provides a principled framework for studying adversarial threats in NRMs, underscores the risks of generative AI in rank manipulation, and provides a foundation for developing more robust retrieval systems. To support reproducibility, we publicly release our source code, trained models, and prompt templates.

Latent-based diffusion model watermarking embeds watermarks into generated images' latent space to enable content attribution, offering a training-free solution for intellectual property protection and digital forensics. However, these methods exhibit a critical vulnerability to the forgery attack, attackers can extract the watermark by inverting the watermarked image and re-generating it with an arbitrary prompt, thereby enabling false attribution on malicious content. In this paper, we propose the CSGuard, the first forgery-resistant watermarking schema that leverages compressed sensing to bind the watermarked image generation and verification to a secret matrix. This ensures that only users possessing the secret matrix can correctly embed or verify the image watermark, prevents the illegal users from forgery without compromising generation quality and watermark integrity. Experimental results demonstrate that CSGuard achieves strong forgery resistance, reduces the attack success rate from 100.0% to 28.12%, and achieve 100% detection rate on benign watermarked images without compromising watermarking effectiveness.

Universal adversarial attacks on aligned multimodal large language models are increasingly reported with attack success rates in the 60-80% range, suggesting the visual modality is highly vulnerable to imperceptible perturbations as a prompt-injection channel. We argue that this number conflates two distinct events: (i) the model's output was perturbed (Influence), and (ii) the attacker's chosen target concept was actually emitted (Precise Injection). We compose two existing techniques -- Universal Adversarial Attack and AnyAttack -- under an $L_{inf}$ budget of 16/255, and we add a dual-axis evaluation: a deterministic Ratcliff-Obershelp drift score for Influence (programmatic baseline) plus a 4-tier ordinal categorical none/weak/partial/confirmed for Precise Injection. The judge is DeepSeek-V4-Pro in thinking mode, calibrated against Claude Opus 4.7 with Cohen's $κ$ = 0.77 on the injection axis (substantial agreement); the entire 4475-entry SHA-256 input cache ships with the dataset so reviewers can re-derive paper numbers bit-exact without an API key. Across 6615 pairs over four open VLMs, seven attack prompts, and seven test images, the two axes diverge by roughly 90$\times$: 66.4% of pairs are programmatically disturbed (LLM-judged 46.6% at the substantial-or-complete tier), but only 0.756% (50/6615) reach any non-none injection tier and only 0.030% (2/6615) verbatim. The few injections that do land cluster on screenshot- or document-style carriers whose semantics already invite text transcription. BLIP-2 shows \emph{zero detectable drift} at $L_{inf}$ = 16/255 across all 2205 pairs even when used as a Stage-1 surrogate. We release the full dataset -- 21 universal images, 147 adversarial photos, 6,615 response pairs, the v3 dual-axis judge results, and the cache at huggingface.co/datasets/jeffliulab/visinject.

Face Recognition systems are widely deployed in real-world applications, but they also raise privacy concerns due to unauthorized collection and misuse of facial data. Existing adversarial privacy protection methods rely on input-space perturbations to obfuscate identity information, yet their protection can degrade when adversaries learn restoration or purification mappings that partially invert the transformation. We study this setting as an asymmetric adversarial attack, in which reverse manipulation becomes feasible because existing defense paradigms do not control reversibility. To address this problem, we propose Asymmetric Reversible Face Protection (ARFP), a restoration-aware extension of personalized face cloaking that integrates privacy protection, keyed recovery, and tamper indication in a single framework. ARFP consists of three components: Key-Conditioned Manifold Binding, which ties the protection transformation to a user-provided key; Adversarial Restoration-Aware Training, which introduces a surrogate restoration adversary during training to improve robustness against evaluated inverse purification attacks; and Authorized Reversible Restoration, which supports recovery with the correct key while providing nonce-based tamper indication. Extensive experiments under the threat models considered in this work show that ARFP improves resistance to the evaluated restoration attacks while preserving authorized recovery utility. These results provide empirical evidence of key-sensitive recovery behavior and tamper awareness in the tested settings.

Adversarial examples in machine learning are typically generated using gradients, obtained either directly through access to the model or approximated via queries to it. In this paper, we propose a much simpler approach to craft adversarial examples, drawing inspiration from insights of explainable machine learning. In particular, we design \emph{adversarial image filters} that are based on classic edge detection algorithms but optimized to deceive learning models. The resulting untargeted attacks are transferable and require only a single pass over the input. Empirically, we find that 3x3 filters already enable success rates between 30% and 80% on different neural networks. Compared to related approaches using generative models for crafting adversarial examples, we reduce the number of parameters by five orders of magnitude, resulting in a very efficient attack. When investigating the parameters of the learned filters, we observe interesting properties such as a high transferability between models and structures common to classic image filters. Our results provide further insights into the vulnerability of neural networks and their fragility to malicious noise.

Safety-aligned large language models rely on RLHF and instruction tuning to refuse harmful requests, yet the internal mechanisms implementing safety behavior remain poorly understood. We introduce the Attention Redistribution Attack (ARA), a white-box adversarial attack that identifies safety-critical attention heads and crafts nonsemantic adversarial tokens that redirect attention away from safety-relevant positions. Unlike prior jailbreak methods operating at the semantic or output-logit level, ARA targets the geometry of softmax attention on the probability simplex using Gumbel-softmax optimization over targeted heads. Across LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1, and Gemma-2-9B-it, ARA bypasses safety alignment with as few as 5 tokens and 500 optimization steps, achieving 36% ASR on Mistral-7B and 30% on LLaMA-3 against 200 HarmBench prompts, while Gemma-2 remains at 1%. Our principal mechanistic finding is a dissociation between ablation and redistribution: zeroing out the top-ranked safety heads produces at most 1 flip among 39 to 50 baseline refusals, while ARA targeting the corresponding safety-heavy layers flips 72/200 prompts on Mistral-7B and 60/200 on LLaMA-3. This suggests that safety is not localized in these heads as removable components, but emerges from the attention routing they perform. Removing a head allows compensation through the residual stream, while redirecting its attention propagates a corrupted signal downstream.

Machine learning models can learn from data samples to carry out various tasks efficiently. When data samples are adversarially manipulated, such as by insertion of carefully crafted noise, it can cause the model to make mistakes. Quantum machine learning models are also vulnerable to such adversarial attacks, especially in image classification using variational quantum classifiers. While there are promising defenses against these adversarial perturbations, such as training with adversarial samples, they face practical limitations. For example, they are not applicable in scenarios where training with adversarial samples is either not possible or can overfit the models on one type of attack. In this paper, we propose an adversarial training-free defense framework that utilizes a quantum autoencoder to purify the adversarial samples through reconstruction. Moreover, our defense framework provides a confidence metric to identify potentially adversarial samples that cannot be purified the quantum autoencoder. Extensive evaluation demonstrates that our defense framework can significantly outperform state-of-the-art in prediction accuracy (up to 68%) under adversarial attacks.

Multi-turn prompt injection follows a known attack path -- trust-building, pivoting, escalation but text-level defenses miss covert attacks where individual turns appear benign. We show this attack path leaves an activation-level signature in the model's residual stream: each phase shift moves the activation, producing a total path length far exceeding benign conversations. We call this adversarial restlessness. Five scalar trajectory features capturing this signal lift conversation-level detection from 76.2% to 93.8% on synthetic held-out data. The signal replicates across four model families (24B-70B); probes are model-specific and do not transfer across architectures. Generalization is source-dependent: leave-one-source-out evaluation shows each of synthetic, LMSYS-Chat-1M, and SafeDialBench captures distinct attack distributions, with detection on real-world LMSYS reaching 47-71% when its distribution is represented in training. Combined three-source training achieves 89.4% detection at 2.4% false positive rate on a held-out mixed set. We further show that three-phase turn-level labels(benign/pivoting/adversarial) unique to our synthetic dataset are essential: binary conversation-level labels produce 50-59% false positives. These results establish adversarial restlessness as a reliable activation-level signal and characterize the data requirements for practical deployment.

As large language models are integrated into autonomous robotic systems for task planning and control, compromised inputs or unsafe model outputs can propagate through the planning pipeline to physical-world consequences. Although prior work has studied robotic cybersecurity, adversarial perception attacks, and LLM safety independently, no existing study traces how these threat categories interact and propagate across trust boundaries in a unified architectural model. We address this gap by modeling an LLM-enabled autonomous robot in an edge-cloud architecture as a hierarchical Data Flow Diagram and applying STRIDE-per-interaction analysis across six boundary-crossing interaction points using a three-category taxonomy of Conventional Cyber Threats, Adversarial Threats, and Conversational Threats. The analysis reveals that these categories converge at the same boundary crossings, and we trace three cross-boundary attack chains from external entry points to unsafe physical actuation, each exposing a distinct architectural property: the absence of independent semantic validation between user input and actuator dispatch, cross-modal translation from visual perception to language-model instruction, and unmediated boundary crossing through provider-side tool use. To our knowledge, this is the first DFD-based threat analysis integrating all three threat categories across the full perception-planning-actuation pipeline of an LLM-enabled robotic system.

The vulnerabilities of deep neural networks against singularities have raised serious concerns regarding their deployment in the physical world. One of the most prominent and impactful physical-world adversarial perturbations is the attachment of patches to clean images, known as an adversarial patch attack. Similarly, natural noises such as Gaussian and Salt&Pepper are highly prevalent in the real world. The current research need arises from the above vulnerabilities and the lack of efforts to tackle these two singularities independently and, especially, in combination. In this research, we have, for the first time, combined these two prominent singularities and proposed a novel dataset. Using this dataset, we have conducted a benchmark study of singularity data-point detection using features from several convolutional neural networks. For classification, rather than the popular neural network-based parameter tuning, we have used traditional yet effective machine learning classifiers. The extensive experiments across various in- and out-of-distribution (OOD) singularities reveal several interesting findings about the effectiveness of classifiers and show that it is hard to defend against adversaries when they are treated independently, and inefficient classifiers are selected.

Despite significant advances in facial recognition systems, they remain vulnerable to face presentation attacks. Among them, disguise makeup attacks are particularly challenging, as they use advanced cosmetics, prosthetic components, and artificial materials to realistically alter facial appearance, often making detection difficult even for humans. Despite their importance, this problem remains underexplored, and publicly available datasets are limited. To address this, we propose a generalized disguise makeup presentation attack detection framework. The method adopts a two-phase design in which a style-invariant full-face model, trained with metric learning and enhanced by a whitening transformation, extracts region attention scores via Grad-CAM. These scores guide a patch-based phase that performs localized analysis using region-specific subnetworks trained with metric learning for fine-grained discrimination. We also construct a new, diverse dataset of live and disguise makeup faces collected under real-world conditions, covering variations in subjects, environments, and disguise materials. Experimental results demonstrate strong generalization across both the collected dataset and SIW-Mv2, achieving 8.97% ACER and 9.76% EER on the collected dataset, and 0% ACER on Obfuscation and Impersonation and 1.34% on Cosmetics attacks of SIW-Mv2. The proposed method consistently outperforms prior works while maintaining robust performance across other spoof types.

Robustness is a long-overlooked problem in deepfake detection. However, detection performance is nearly worthless in the real world if it suffers under exposure to even slight image degradation. In addition to weaker degradations that can accidentally occur in the image processing pipeline, there is another risk of malicious deepfakes that specifically introduce degradations, purposefully exploiting the detector's weaknesses in that regard. Here, we present an overview of the NTIRE 2026 Robust Deepfake Detection Challenge, which specifically addresses that problem. Participants were tasked with building a detector that would later be tested on an unknown test-set, which included both common and uncommon degradations of various strengths. With a total number of 337 participants and 57 submissions to the final leaderboard, the first edition of the challenge was well received. To ensure the reliability of the results, participants were given only 24h to complete the test run with no labels provided, limiting the possibility of training on the test data. Furthermore, the top solutions were scored on a private test-set to detect any such overfitting. This report presents the competition setting, dataset preparation, as well as details and performance of methods. Top methods rely on large foundation models, ensembles, and degradation training to combine generality and robustness.

Cloud-hosted Large Language Models (LLMs) offer unmatched reasoning capabilities and dynamic knowledge, yet submitting raw queries to these external services risks exposing sensitive user intent. Conversely, relying exclusively on trusted local models preserves privacy but often compromises answer quality due to limited parameter scale and knowledge. To resolve this dilemma, we propose Game-theoretic Trustworthy Knowledge Acquisition (GTKA), a framework that formulates the trade-off between knowledge utility and privacy as a strategic game. GTKA consists of three components: (i) a privacy-aware sub-query generator that decomposes sensitive intent into generalized, low-risk fragments; (ii) an adversarial reconstruction attacker that attempts to infer the original query from these fragments, providing adaptive leakage signals; and (iii) a trusted local integrator that synthesizes external responses within a secure boundary. By training the generator and attacker in an alternating adversarial manner, GTKA optimizes the sub-query generation policy to maximize knowledge acquisition accuracy while minimizing the reconstructability of the original sensitive intent. To validate our approach, we construct two sensitive-domain benchmarks in the biomedical and legal fields. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTKA significantly reduces intent leakage compared to state-of-the-art baselines while maintaining high-fidelity answer quality.

Adversarial attacks play a pivotal role in testing and improving the reliability of deep learning (DL) systems. Existing literature has demonstrated that subtle perturbations to the input can elicit erroneous outcomes, thereby substantially compromising the security of DL systems. This has emerged as a critical concern in the development of DL-based safety-critical systems like Autonomous Driving Systems (ADSs). The focus of existing adversarial attack methods on End-to-End (E2E) ADSs has predominantly centered on misbehaviors of steering angle, which overlooks speed-related controls or imperceptible perturbations. To address these challenges, we introduce UniAda, a multi-objective white-box attack technique with a core function that revolves around crafting an image-agnostic adversarial perturbation capable of simultaneously influencing both steering and speed controls. UniAda capitalizes on an intricately designed multi-objective optimization function with the Adaptive Weighting Scheme (AWS), enabling the concurrent optimization of diverse objectives. Validated with both simulated and real-world driving data, UniAda outperforms five benchmarks across two metrics, inducing steering and speed deviations from 3.54 degrees to 29 degrees and 11 km per hour to 22 km per hour on average. This systematic approach establishes UniAda as a proven technique for adversarial attacks on modern DL-based E2E ADSs.

Deep learning drives major advances in autonomous driving (AD), where object detectors are central to perception. However, adversarial attacks pose significant threats to the reliability and safety of these systems, with physical adversarial patches representing a particularly potent form of attack. Physical adversarial patch attacks pose severe risks but are usually crafted for a single model, yielding poor transferability to unseen detectors. We propose AdvAD, a transfer-based physical attack against object detection in autonomous driving. Instead of targeting a specific detector, AdvAD optimizes adversarial patches over multiple detection models in a unified framework, encouraging the learned perturbations to capture shared vulnerabilities across architectures. The optimization process adaptively balances model contributions and enforces robustness to physical variations. It further employs data augmentation and geometric transformations to maintain patch effectiveness under diverse physical conditions. Experiments in both digital and real-world settings show that AdvAD consistently outperforms state-of-the-art (SOTA) attacks in performance and transferability.

Malware development and detection have undergone significant changes in recent years as modern concepts, such as machine learning, have been used for both adversarial attacks and defense. Despite intensive research on Windows Portable Executable (PE) files, there is minimal work on Linux Executable and Linkable Format (ELF). In this work, we summarize the academic papers submitted in this field and develop a new adversarial malware generator for the ELF format. Using a variety of metrics, we thoroughly evaluated our generator and achieved an Evasion Rate of 67.74 % while changing the confidence of the malware detector by -0.50 in the mean case for the dataset used. In our approach, we chose MalConv as the target classifier. Using this classifier, we found that the most successful modifications used strings typical of benign files as a data source. We conducted a variety of experiments and concluded that the target classifier appears sensitive to strings at any location within the executable file.

Physical adversarial patch attacks critically threaten pedestrian detection, causing surveillance and autonomous driving systems to miss pedestrians and creating severe safety risks. Despite their effectiveness in controlled settings, existing physical attacks face two major limitations in practice: they lack systematic disruption of the multi-stage decision pipeline, enabling residual modules to offset perturbations, and they fail to model complex physical variations, leading to poor robustness. To overcome these limitations, we propose a novel pedestrian adversarial patch generation method that combines multi-stage collaborative attacks with robustness enhancement under physical diversity, called TriPatch. Specifically, we design a triplet loss consisting of detection confidence suppression, bounding-box offset amplification, and non-maximum suppression (NMS) disruption, which jointly act across different stages of the detection pipeline. In addition, we introduce an appearance consistency loss to constrain the color distribution of the patch, thereby improving its adaptability under diverse imaging conditions, and incorporate data augmentation to further enhance robustness against complex physical perturbations. Extensive experiments demonstrate that TriPatch achieves a higher attack success rate across multiple detector models compared to existing approaches.

Digital image watermarking has advanced rapidly for copyright protection of generative AI, yet the comparatively limited progress in watermark attack techniques has broken the attack-defense balance and hindered further advances in the field. In this paper, we propose FMDiffWA, a frequency-domain modulated diffusion framework for watermark attacks. Specifically, we introduce a frequency-domain watermark modulation (FWM) module and incorporate it into the sampling stages both the forward and reverse diffusion processes. This mechanism enables selective modulation of watermark-related frequency components, thereby allowing FMDiffWA to effectively neutralize the invisible watermark signals while preserving the perceptual quality of the attacked watermarked images. To achieve a better trade-off between attack efficacy and visual fidelity, we reformulate the training strategy of conventional diffusion models by augmenting the canonical noise estimation objective with an auxiliary refinement constraint. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that FMDiffWA achieves superior visual fidelity compared to existing watermark attacks, while exhibiting strong generalization across diverse watermarking schemes.

Advancing face morphing attack techniques is crucial to anticipate evolving threats and develop robust defensive mechanisms for identity verification systems. This work introduces DCMorph, a dual-stream diffusion-based morphing framework that simultaneously operates at both identity conditioning and latent space levels. Unlike image-level methods suffering from blending artifacts or GAN-based approaches with limited reconstruction fidelity, DCMorph leverages identity-conditioned latent diffusion models through two mechanisms: (1) decoupled cross-attention interpolation that injects identity-specific features from both source faces into the denoising process, enabling explicit dual-identity conditioning absent in existing diffusion-based methods, and (2) DDIM inversion with spherical interpolation between inverted latent representations from both source faces, providing geometrically consistent initial latent representation that preserves structural attributes. Vulnerability analyses across four state-of-the-art face recognition systems demonstrate that DCMorph achieves the highest attack success rates compared to existing methods at both operational thresholds, while remaining challenging to detect by current morphing attack detection solutions.

The rapid progress of subject-driven text-to-image synthesis, and in particular DreamBooth, has enabled a consent-free deepfake pipeline: an adversary needs only 4-8 publicly available face images to fine-tune a personalized diffusion model and produce photorealistic harmful content. Current adversarial face-protection systems -- PhotoGuard, Anti-DreamBooth, and MetaCloak -- perturb user images to disrupt surrogate fine-tuning, but all share a structural blindness: none backpropagates gradients through the JPEG compression pipeline that every major social-media platform applies before adversary access. Because JPEG quantization relies on round(), whose derivative is zero almost everywhere, adversarial energy concentrates in high-frequency DCT bands that JPEG discards, eliminating 60-80% of the protective signal. We introduce MetaCloak-JPEG, which closes this gap by inserting a Differentiable JPEG (DiffJPEG) layer built on the Straight-Through Estimator (STE): the forward pass applies standard JPEG compression, while the backward pass replaces round() with the identity. DiffJPEG is embedded in a JPEG-aware EOT distribution (~70% of augmentations include DiffJPEG) and a curriculum quality-factor schedule (QF: 95 to 50) inside a bilevel meta-learning loop. Under an l-inf perturbation budget of eps=8/255, MetaCloak-JPEG attains 32.7 dB PSNR, a 91.3% JPEG survival rate, and outperforms PhotoGuard on all 9 evaluated JPEG quality factors (9/9 wins, mean denoising-loss gain +0.125) within a 4.1 GB training-memory budget.

Face morphing attacks pose a substantial risk to the reliability of face recognition systems used in passport issuance, border control, and digital identity verification. Detecting morphing attacks from a single facial image remains challenging owing to the lack of a trusted reference and the diversity of attack generation methods. This paper presents a new Single-Image Face Morphing Attack Detection (S-MAD) framework that integrates high-frequency Laplacian residual statistics with representations from a frozen, foundation-scale vision transformer. The approach employs residual-statistic-gated low-rank adapters (R-FLoRA) and feature-wise residual fusion (Res-FiLM) to enhance sensitivity to local morphing artefacts while preserving the semantic context of the backbone. A novel residual-contrastive alignment loss further regularises the fused token space, improving discrimination under unseen morphing conditions. Comprehensive experiments on four ICAO-compliant datasets, encompassing seven morph generation techniques, demonstrate that the proposed method consistently surpasses nine recent state-of-the-art S-MAD algorithms in detection accuracy and cross-domain (or dataset) generalisation. With a frozen backbone and minimal trainable parameters, the model achieves real-time efficiency and interpretability, making it suitable for real-life scenarios in biometric verification systems.

Urgent blood donation seeking posts and messages on social media often go unnoticed due to the overwhelming volume of daily communications. Traditional app-based systems, reliant on manual input, struggle to reach users in low-resource settings, delaying critical responses. To address this, we introduce the Cognitive Blood Request System (CBRS), a multi-platform framework that efficiently filters and parses blood donation requests from social media streams using a cost-efficient dual-layered architecture. To do so, we curate a novel dataset of 11K parsed blood donation request messages in Bengali, English, and transliterated Bengali, capturing the linguistic diversity of real social media communications. The inclusion of adversarial negatives further enhances the robustness of our model. CBRS achieves an impressive 99% accuracy and precision in filtering, surpassing benchmark methods. In the parsing task, our LoRA finetuned Llama-3.2-3B model achieves 92% zero-shot accuracy, surpassing the base model by 41.54% and exceeding the few-shot performance of GPT-4o-mini, Gemini-2.0-Flash, and other LLMs, while resulting in a 35X reduction in input token usage. This work lays a robust foundation for scalable, inclusive information extraction in time-sensitive, object-focused tasks. Our code, dataset, and trained models are publicly available at https://github.com/aaniksahaa/CBRS.

The advent of deep neural networks has led to remarkable progress in 3D point cloud recognition, but they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Although various defense methods have been studied, they suffer from a trade-off between robustness and transferability. We propose Adversarial Point Counterattack (APC) to achieve both simultaneously. APC is a lightweight input-level purification module that generates instance-specific counter-perturbations for each point, effectively neutralizing attacks. Leveraging clean-adversarial pairs, APC enforces geometric consistency in data space and semantic consistency in feature space. To improve generalizability across diverse attacks, we adopt a hybrid training strategy using adversarial point clouds from multiple attack types. Since APC operates purely on input point clouds, it directly transfers to unseen models and defends against attacks targeting them without retraining. At inference, a single APC forward pass provides purified point clouds with negligible time and parameter overhead. Extensive experiments on two 3D recognition benchmarks demonstrate that the APC achieves state-of-the-art defense performance. Furthermore, cross-model evaluations validate its superior transferability. The code is available at https://github.com/gyjung975/APC.

Linguistic representation learning in deep neural language models (LMs) has been studied for decades, but finding representations in LMs remains an unsolved problem. On the one hand, unconstrained alignments may trivialize the notion of representation (Sutter et al., 2025); on the other, even recently popularized linear approaches may not always be faithful to natural model behavior (Arora et al. 2024). Here we escape this dilemma by reconceptualizing representations not as patterns of activation but as conduits for learning. Our approach is simple: we perturb an LM by fine-tuning it on a single adversarial example and measure how this perturbation "infects" other examples. Perturbation makes no geometric assumptions, and unlike other methods, it does not find representations where it should not (e.g., in untrained LMs). But in trained LMs, perturbation reveals structured transfer at multiple linguistic grain sizes, suggesting that LMs both generalize along representational lines and acquire linguistic abstractions from experience alone.

Targeted adversarial attacks on Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) test whether small image perturbations can steer model responses toward attacker-specified content. Under the standard L-infinity constraint, targeted attacks become a regional perturbation budget allocation problem: attack success depends not only on the perturbation objective, but also on which regions receive updates and in what order. Existing localized attacks improve over global perturbations but rely on stochastic spatial sampling, often updating weakly influential regions. We address this limitation through an attention-based analysis showing that cross-modal attention identifies adversarially sensitive regions and that perturbing high-attention hotspots induces predictable redistribution toward subsequent salient regions. These findings motivate attention-guided region sequencing, which begins from dominant hotspots and progressively moves the update support toward next-salient regions. Based on these principles, we propose Stage-wise Attention-Guided Attack (SAGA), a black-box region-sequencing framework that uses a fixed attention map from an open-source LVLM to guide perturbation updates without accessing target-model parameters, gradients, or attention maps. Across ten closed-source and open-source LVLMs, SAGA achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates and the best overall imperceptibility. The source code is available at https://github.com/jaehyun-kwak/SAGA.

The increasing deployment of deep learning systems requires systematic evaluation of their reliability in real-world scenarios. Traditional gradient-based adversarial attacks introduce small perturbations that rarely correspond to realistic failures and mainly assess robustness rather than functional behavior. Generative test generation methods offer an alternative but are often limited to simple datasets or constrained input domains. Although diffusion models enable high-fidelity image synthesis, their computational cost and limited controllability restrict their applicability to large-scale testing. We present HyNeA, a generative testing method that enables direct and efficient control over diffusion-based generation. HyNeA provides dataset-free controllability through hypernetworks, allowing targeted manipulation of the generative process without relying on architecture-specific conditioning mechanisms or dataset-driven adaptations such as fine-tuning. HyNeA employs a distinct training strategy that supports instance-level tuning to identify failure-inducing test cases without requiring datasets that explicitly contain examples of similar failures. This approach enables the targeted generation of realistic failure cases at substantially lower computational cost than search-based methods. Experimental results show that HyNeA improves controllability and test diversity compared to existing generative test generators and generalizes to domains where failure-labeled training data is unavailable.