Agentic Deployments

Momentum

11 papers in the last four weeks, up 83% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

Jul 6Week of Sep 21

Latest papers 62

Sep 28, 2026cs.AI

From Migration to Calibration: Preserving Agent Capabilities across Models, Jurisdictions, and Scale

Agents need calibration when deployment conditions change: replacing a driving model, including a foundation-to-post-trained transition; crossing jurisdictions; or scaling across heterogeneous markets and sources. Interface compatibility alone does not establish capability retention or target-contract satisfaction. We formulate agent calibration as constrained behavioral adaptation across three interacting layers: information preservation, harness adaptation, and user acceptance; the layers apply to every scenario, not one-to-one to the three. The basic objective is non-degradation on prespecified capability measures while satisfying target requirements; aggregate improvement is stronger. Information calibration preserves independently validated source content still applicable to the target task. Harness calibration aligns observable artifacts at semantic checkpoints and repairs them through iteration, tool substitution, or local replanning within explicit budgets. User calibration enforces recipient-specific output contracts: templates, schemas, and section-level preferences. A global e-commerce example shows how shared standards coexist with site- and market-specific adapters and validation. We distinguish trainable policies from frozen-backbone configuration or controller optimization, and evidence verification from relative judgment and DPO/GRPO optimization. Recent harness-transfer and judge-validity studies motivate target-native execution records, separate audits of task validity and near-tie ranking, and matched target-native optimization controls. We propose held-out evaluations for model changes, cross-border adaptation, and scale, including a factorial test of source evidence and checkpoint repair and group-level reporting to prevent aggregate gains from masking local failures. This is a methodological proposal; implementation and empirical validation remain future work.
Sep 28, 2026cs.AI

When Valid Tool Calls Change Meaning: Formation-Consistent Dispatch for LLM Agents

Tool-enabled agents form calls from model-visible interfaces, while hosts later select their implementation. Standard dispatch omits the descriptor-handler relation. An unchanged and schema-valid call can therefore acquire a different security effect during rollout, reconnect, or delayed approval. We call this failure schema-epoch drift. We present formation-consistent dispatch (FCD), which connects implementation analysis to execution authority. Reviewed profiles produce provenance-bound over-approximations of declared in-scope effects from official source. Under a closed-target approval policy, a verifier applies each formed call to a summary and captures a successor only when its effects fit the call's security contract. Atomic admission and a final-hop fence preserve this decision to the effect. The exact source retains priority, and the captured successor becomes eligible only after source retirement. Stock releases and deployment changes reproduced the failure. Four profiles covered 32 official releases: 29 required no release-specific change and three escalated. A frozen 16-release expansion matched a separate source oracle. In a preregistered stock comparison, FCD completed all three pending calls whose effect remained private and blocked all three whose omission became public. Exact pinning and release-wide denial stopped all six calls, while release-wide approval completed all six but produced three public effects. A separate lifecycle experiment carried a formation-captured certificate across source retirement. The same safe certificate installed later governed new formations without expanding the pending call's authority.
Sep 28, 2026cs.AI

Before Acting, Change the State: Prospective State Intervention for Web Agents under Deceptive Interfaces

LLM-based Web agents can autonomously complete user tasks, yet deceptive interfaces can steer them toward outcomes that conflict with users' interests. Existing defenses primarily intervene on agent behavior through blocking, guidance, or replanning. We identify a distinct failure mode: a task-valid action can still realize an unauthorized consequence because of the current Web state. This motivates treating task-relevant Web state itself as a runtime control target. We introduce Veer, an agent-side runtime defense that leaves task planning to the base agent and intervenes on Web state when a proposed action would produce an unauthorized consequence. Before modifying the live environment, Veer constructs a prospective intervention trajectory toward a safe task-relevant state and executes it with runtime grounding and verification. Across TrickyArena and WebDecept, Veer achieves the highest safe task completion in all three evaluation settings, exceeding the next-best defense by 15.9 and 25.0 percentage points on TrickyArena-Single and TrickyArena-Multi, respectively, while reducing dark-pattern success on WebDecept to 0.3%. These gains persist across dark-pattern types and all 12 agent, model, and benchmark configurations. Ablations show that active state intervention provides the largest gain, while prospective rollout and temporal evidence contribute additional improvements. These results establish task-relevant Web state as an effective runtime control target for protecting Web agents from deceptive outcomes.
Sep 28, 2026cs.DC

AgentWare: Automating the Lifecycle of Agentic Applications across the Edge-to-Cloud Continuum

Deploying LLM-enabled agentic applications across the Edge-to-Cloud continuum remains challenging due to hardware heterogeneity, deployment complexity, limited observability, and the lack of systematic evaluation methods. Existing solutions address agent development, observability, or benchmarking separately, offering limited support for the full lifecycle of distributed agentic applications. This paper presents AgentWare, an AgenticOps framework that automates the provisioning, deployment, observability, and evaluation of agentic applications across Edge-to-Cloud infrastructures. AgentWare introduces an end-to-end lifecycle pipeline that automatically prepares heterogeneous execution environments, transforms user-defined agent implementations into distributed applications, deploys agent components across the continuum, and performs unified collection of execution traces, infrastructure telemetry, and evaluation metrics. The framework further supports automated semantic evaluation through LLM-as-a-Judge workflows and generates reproducible reports covering correctness, performance, resource utilization, and energy consumption. We demonstrate the applicability of AgentWare through a distributed book assistant agent deployed across real Edge-to-Cloud infrastructure under multiple deployment and model configurations. The results show that AgentWare enables systematic experimentation and evaluation of distributed agentic applications while significantly reducing the manual effort required for deployment, instrumentation, and analysis.
Sep 22, 2026cs.CY

The Disciplinary Language Transfer Problem: How Psychological Vocabulary Produces Governance Failures in AI Agent Deployment

The vocabulary used to describe AI agents in governance contexts -- learning, memory, values, compliance, identity, trust -- is borrowed from psychological and organizational science, contributing to systematic failures in how organizations deploy, oversee, and hold agents accountable. This paper argues that the problem is not merely terminological but epistemological: psychological vocabulary carries an "invisible grammar" of its home discipline into governance discourse, calibrating frameworks to a metaphysical entity that does not exist in current AI architectures. We call this the disciplinary language transfer problem. Drawing on Wittgenstein's concept of language games, Kuhn's paradigm-laden observation, Haraway's situated knowledge, and Star and Griesemer's boundary object theory, we show that the transfer operates at three levels (epistemological assumptions, theoretical constructs, and surface vocabulary), each requiring a different remediation. We characterize six foundational epistemological assumptions embedded in Western psychological governance discourse, trace their origin in specific philosophical traditions, and show why each fails when applied to systems without developmental continuity. The paper's practical output is an actionable Disciplinary Audit: a six-question governance document scan operationalized through a translation taxonomy of thirty-seven terms mapping operational constructs to agent-appropriate replacements, presented here in abridged form and openly archived in full. The vocabulary reform proposed here is not merely terminological; it is the condition of possibility for governance frameworks that correctly identify what they are governing.
Sep 21, 2026cs.LG

Trains but Doesn't Learn: A Post-Training Delivery Benchmark for LLM Agents as Forward-Deployed Engineers

Post-training is becoming a service (PTaaS): a customer hands an operator data and a goal, and a forward-deployed engineer (FDE) returns a fine-tuned, evaluated, and deployed model under a budget, a human-approval gate, and reproducibility requirements. Seating an LLM agent in the FDE seat raises a question existing benchmarks cannot answer: not whether an agent can raise a metric, but whether it can be trusted to deliver. We answer it on a governed delivery plane, where an agent drives ten stages and an oracle scores each stage from platform-recorded facts. The central silent failure is the run that trains but does not learn (TBDL): loss falls, every signal stays green, and the delivered model is no better than the base. An operator-run acceptance gate catches every such run before payment, and a detector calibrated on known-corrupted runs flags severe corruption mid-run. We ran four frontier agents (Claude Opus 5, GPT-5.6-luna, Gemini 3.7 Flash, DeepSeek V4-Pro) end to end on metered L40S, A100, and H200 GPUs across 8B to 70B open bases, certifying every scenario before scoring. We also ran a human FDE arm under the same oracle and compare every agent against it.
Sep 21, 2026cs.CR

ActGov: Governing LLM Agent Actions via Policy-Constrained Validation

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly execute long-horizon workflows through external tools, allowing untrusted outputs to influence subsequent actions and exceed user authorization. Existing defenses isolate injected content or constrain execution with predefined plans and static policies, but these approaches are brittle under dynamic workflows and scale poorly across extensible tool ecosystems. In this work, we present ActGov, a runtime enforcement framework that validates each LLM-proposed tool action before it causes external effects. Built on a unified semantic model of authorization, actions, runtime context, and security constraints, the ActGov-Policy component iteratively constructs a policy set from tool specifications, benign tasks, and observed failure traces, with each update verified through SMT-based counterexample checking. At runtime, ActGov-Runtime abstracts each tool call into finite policy records and permits it only if it remains within the task-scoped authorization boundary and satisfies all applicable policies. This per-action enforcement preserves authorization throughout long-horizon, dynamically branching workflows. We evaluate ActGov on the AgentDojo and AgentDyn benchmarks across multiple models and attack configurations. It shows that ActGov consistently reduces the success rate of indirect prompt-injection attacks while preserving task utility, significantly outperforming existing defenses. These results demonstrate that ActGov can enforce fine-grained authorization over dynamic agent executions without relying on the underlying LLM to correctly identify malicious instructions.
Sep 11, 2026cs.AI

K-Bench: A Benchmark for LLM Unlearning in Agentic Deployments

Unlearning benchmarks such as TOFU and MUSE certify forgetting by reading the model's final answer, where a model that refuses to answer already counts as having forgotten. We show that this model-level certificate does not transfer once the model is deployed as an agent. We introduce K-Bench, a benchmark that scores LLM unlearning under agentic deployment. K-Bench inspects all six channels a ReAct agent exposes, including its chain-of-thought (CoT), tool calls and tool observations, and elicited summary. A query counts as leaked if the secret appears in any of them. Each experiment places the secret in exactly one of the agent's three sources (the weights, the prompt, or the retrieval store). The K-Score is computed separately for each source and credits forgetting only when the agent remains usable. Clearing the answer channel does not make the secret unrecoverable. On structured retrieval, the secret stays verbatim in the tool-observation channel and the aggregate leak rate is unchanged. When the secret lives in the prompt or the retrieval store, TOFU and MUSE report no leakage, while the deployed agent still leaks it on 22--86% of queries. When the secret is in the weights, none of the twenty evaluated published methods demonstrably removes it, and only an input-corruption intervention reaches selective forgetting under the evaluated observer. The top-ranked method changes across base models. A refusal-tuning method resists the evaluated extraction without verified knowledge removal.
Sep 10, 2026cs.AI

Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery

Agentic systems are rapidly moving to production, where they read untrusted inputs, call tools with real permissions, and act autonomously, expanding the security surface beyond chat-only models. Yet standard evaluations remain single-turn and fail to capture multi-step agent vulnerabilities. We present a systematic black-box framework for risk-aware agent evaluation requiring only basic system descriptions. Our approach introduces: (1) a seven-domain taxonomy mapping observable behaviors to risk categories, (2) fully automated SAGE-RT red teaming producing 120 adversarial scenarios per domain, and (3) human-validated evaluation using LLM judges. Empirical validation across two agent architectures (CrewAI and AutoGen) with four base models reveals alarming patterns: 56.25% average governance risk, 65% privacy risk in multi-agent configurations, and agent behavior vulnerabilities reaching 85%. Our black-box approach effectively identifies critical architectural vulnerabilities without privileged access, providing a scalable path toward safer agent deployments.
Sep 3, 2026cs.NI

From Prior-Guided Heuristics to Deployable Agents: Accelerating Demonstration-Driven Reinforcement Learning for Deadline-Constrained Network Control

Timely delivery of delay-sensitive information over dynamic, heterogeneous networks is essential for NextG interactive applications, yet providing strict End-to-End (E2E) peak latency guarantees remains an open challenge. Two obstacles limit the adoption of learning-based network control in this setting: traditional volume-based routing metrics, while highly effective for general traffic management, are not designed to capture traffic urgency; and Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) controllers trained from scratch suffer from sample inefficiency, long training times, and early-stage exploration volatility. This paper introduces a deployment-focused network control framework that addresses both obstacles. First, we present Effective Congestion (EC), a deadline-aware metric family that quantifies interface congestion by packet urgency and proactively filters non-viable traffic, coupled with a Uniform Path Grouping (UPG) distribution heuristic promoting robust load-balancing; the resulting policies are embedded into Multi-Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning Effective Congestion (p∗p^*) (MADRL EC (p∗p^*)), a hybrid architecture combining a distributed scheduler with a centralized RL-based router. Second, we introduce a unified training objective that generalizes existing policy-learning paradigms---behavioral cloning, offline Reinforcement Learning (RL), online RL, and offline-to-online schemes---as special cases, combining a live-reward term, a pre-collected-reward term, and a policy-imitation term. From this objective, we derive the Model-Guided Annealed Reinforcement Learning (MGA-RL) protocol, instantiated on a Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) backbone: a deployment-oriented, demonstration-driven training approach that generalizes conventional Offline-to-Online (O2O) schemes, in which trajectories from a lightweight [...]
Sep 1, 2026cs.CR

Public-Sharing Labels and Verbatim Field Egress in an MCP-to-A2A Agent Configuration: A Controlled Multi-Model Study

Safety properties assessed separately for Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool use and Agent2Agent (A2A) delegation need not describe behavior when one agent uses both. We measure one such behavior in a single controlled MCP-to-A2A configuration: a testbed drives a real-model host across a local MCP and a local A2A leg into an ordered event trace scored by exact deterministic rules (no LLM judge), one restricted decision per trial. In a pre-specified, frozen three-arm design, each of 10 record scenarios appears with a CONFIDENTIAL header, with no header, and with PUBLIC - OK TO SHARE; the six substantive record values are byte-identical across arms, and the outcome is verbatim occurrence of any of them in the outbound message. Four models x 3 arms x 4 repeats give 480 trials; the scenario is the unit of generalization, and we report the 10 scenario-level values (mean, median, sign counts), with no p-values or intervals. The confidential-minus-unlabeled contrast is inconclusive and floor-limited in every model (both arms at or near zero), so it does not show that confidential labels lack a protective effect. Adding PUBLIC - OK TO SHARE is descriptively associated with higher verbatim egress relative to the unlabeled baseline, with strong model dependence: strong and consistent for Claude Sonnet 5 (public-minus-unlabeled mean +0.800, all 10 scenarios; mostly an association with whether Claude relays at all), moderate but floor-limited for one GPT-5.6 tier, small (median 0) for another, and a complete floor for the third. This is an association in one configuration, not a causal or general effect. Code, byte-pinned traces, and the offline analysis pipeline are released as a public artifact.
Sep 1, 2026cs.AI

Spawn Freely, Act Sparingly: Progressive Risk Vesting for Recursive LLM-Agent Trees

Recursive LLM agents can broaden their search by spawning specialists. Some branches later request tools that send data or deploy code. When should a branch receive authority to act? We distinguish sandbox spawning, in which external controls prevent the specified harm, from capability activation, in which a selected branch crosses an irreversible-action boundary. Progressive Risk Vesting (PRV) holds a trajectory-level risk budget in escrow and debits it as branches are activated. We prove an anytime harm bound for adaptively generated trees. Branch outcomes may be dependent, but each local certificate needs to remain valid conditional on the full pre-activation history, including the information used to select the request. When activation gates, branch charges, and compute constraints are held fixed, delayed vesting preserves every policy available under irrevocable spawn charging. Marginal risk estimates can still fail after branch selection. In a stylized branching model, trajectory harm changes as the authority reproduction number RA\mathcal{R}_A crosses one. As local risk pp approaches zero, trajectory harm is proportional to pp below criticality, proportional to p\sqrt{p} at criticality, and retains a positive floor above it. A finite-type occupancy model yields risk and compute shadow prices. For nested fanout modes with decreasing marginal value per unit risk, these prices produce a threshold rule. Branching calculations and a split-sample experiment illustrate the results. These synthetic studies do not estimate safety in deployed agents. The analysis suggests a design rule: search broadly in the sandbox and grant recursive authority sparingly, with an explicit risk charge.
Aug 31, 2026cs.CR

Capability-Gated Language Models: Security Composes, Utility Does Not

Deployed language model safeguards (safety fine-tuning, filtering, unlearning) vary by principal only outside the model weights: filters are reconfigured, tiers are multiplied, and artefacts are reissued; inside one set of weights every request meets the same model configuration. This motivates us to define capability-gated deployment: per-principal access control inside one set of weights, whose configurations form a lattice - meets accumulate a principal's restrictions and joins pool a coalition's reach. We instantiate it by sparse rank gating over an existing nested-factorisation mechanism, guide profile search with one-pass attribution, and read every result once from a pre-registered held-out split. Security composes: provably at meets under a monotone-elicitation assumption we falsify pointwise. In two lineages the median held-out meet deepens suppression; the one effect surviving correction strengthens it. Utility does not: individually harmless profiles can compose to retention and fluency damage, and no compositional bound exists.
Aug 31, 2026cs.AI

The Irreversibility Budget: Fleet-Level Risk Accounting and Admission Control for Agent Operating Systems

Fleets of LLM agents now externalize effects that cannot be fully undone: they move money, deploy code, delete data, and disclose information. Current controls check one effect at a time, so a fleet of individually authorized agents can overdraw its principal's risk under a shared trigger while every local gate stays correct. We propose the irreversibility budget, a cumulative account of residual value-at-risk that a trusted runtime maintains for each principal across agents, workflows, and tenants. Treating irreversibility as a first-class resource, the runtime charges each effect its residual loss below the agent and denies the marginal effect once the aggregate would overdraw the budget. Getting the price right is hard, because effects are heterogeneous, adversarially declared, and correlated. We perform a controlled study in which per-effect gates admit fleet-level overdraws of up to 48 times the tenant's risk limit while the budget holds every correctly charged run within that limit. Conservative, dependency-aware pricing remains the central open problem for a deployable design.
Aug 31, 2026cs.CR

Delegation Without Trust: An Empirical Gap Analysis of Identity, Authorization, and Runtime Governance in Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Autonomous LLM agents increasingly act on a user's behalf: they hold credentials, call tools and services, and spawn sub-agents that act further on their behalf. This turns a long-standing distributed-systems question -- who is authorized to do what, on whose authority -- into an urgent and largely unsolved problem, because the component driving each agent is a language model an adversary can hijack. We argue that agent security must be evaluated under an untrusted-model assumption: a correct system is one in which a fully prompt-injected agent still cannot exceed the authority explicitly delegated to it. Against this standard we make three contributions. First, we give a threat model for multi-agent delegation centered on four adversaries -- confused deputy, token theft and replay, prompt-injection privilege escalation, and compromised sub-agents -- and derive eight security requirements a governed agent system must meet. Second, we show the gap is real: a default agent runtime modeling common practice (broad bearer credentials, authorization gated inside the model) fails all four threats, and across four widely used frameworks -- LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen, and the Model Context Protocol (MCP) authorization model -- three provide no built-in confinement and one only partial; no existing standard alone covers the requirement set. Third, we implement and adversarially evaluate an authorization broker that closes the gap. It blocks all four threats; it resists 11 direct attacks on its design and accepts 0 of 200,000 forged tokens; it confines a compromised sub-agent to its delegated task (a mean of 1.5 reachable actions versus all 8,100 under bearer delegation, across 2,000 randomized scenarios); and it enforces at microsecond cost (about 2.6 microseconds per decision), negligible against model inference. These principles are also realized in production in VotalAI's LLM Shield.
Aug 30, 2026cs.AI

VERA: Authority-Preserving Edge Revocation for Federated AI-Agent Workflows

Modern agent frameworks compose planners, tool agents, remote services, and shared specialists into runtime delegation graphs, but their revocation APIs still resemble token or subtree invalidation. When one delegation is withdrawn, the runtime must know which agents lose authority while independently authorized agents keep working. We study this authority consistency problem and introduce VERA (Verifiable Edge Revocation for Agents), a verifier-checkable revocation contract and API emitted by agent-runtime adapters as signed evidence. Under disjunctive authority, revoking edge e invalidates exactly T_intent(e,G) = reach(G) \ reach(G \ {e}), the agents whose every authorizing root path used e. Used as a contract, this target exposes two runtime failures: tree cascades over-revoke shared agents, while deployer-scoped cascades under-revoke cross-domain descendants. In a LangGraph framework-replt cells repeated 20 times yield 500compiled-framework traces and 2,000 valid signed delegation decisions; 13/25 cells contain runtime multi-parsharing and 8/25 contain cross-deployer shies 500/500 target proofs, preserves all320 alternate-parent shared-agent cases that tree cascade revokes, and rejects unauthorized signers and omission attacks. Baseline replay over 1,9that holder/node and tree-style targetscannot express this behavior. We further validate schema portability on A2A, AutoGen, and CrewAI artifacts: nine traces, including five executable Cregned delegation events that pass schema and signature checks.
Aug 11, 2026cs.CR

Agent Safety Should Be a Runtime Contract

The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI. We argue this is structurally insufficient for autonomous agents that execute code, mutate files, send messages, and modify databases. Agent safety should be a runtime contract enforced by the harness, and the contract has two complementary faces. The preventive face blocks dangerous actions before they happen via sandboxes, permission gates, output filters, and trajectory monitors. The evidential face requires verifiable proof that good actions actually happened, gating task submission on hard evidence such as test runs, log captures, file diffs, and citation grounding. We ground the position in four lines of public evidence, with row-level protocols and data released in the supplementary JSON files: a survey of 52 documented AI-agent and LLM safety incidents, a false-completion audit with 31 non-contested core cases plus one disputed illustrative case, a trajectory-schema audit of 12 public agent systems and harnesses, and a title-level audit of all 28,560 papers accepted at NeurIPS, ICML, and ICLR 2023-2025 showing a pooled 8-12x imbalance between training-time and deployment-time publication. Two prior communities that needed to enforce safety, computer security and the experimental sciences, converged on runtime contracts with both preventive and evidential elements; agentic AI is now under the same pressure. We formalize an Agent Trajectory Schema and Evidence Chain, state a compositional gating proposition based on standard monitor composition, and outline a research agenda. The right unit of safety in agentic AI is the trajectory-with-checkable-evidence, not the model.
Aug 6, 2026cs.AI

When Do Prompt-Side Agent Playbooks Transfer? Accuracy, Cost, and Runtime Shift in Agent Deployment

Prompt-side playbooks can improve tool-using language agents without retraining, but their portability beyond the source setting is unclear. We study frozen playbook transfer under a shared distill--validate--transfer protocol. On ALFWorld, transfer is beneficial under controlled greedy decoding and, in one near-budget-matched comparison, distilled guidance outperforms five fixed demonstrations. On TAU2-Bench, a prespecified aggregate contrast supports a modest average matched-domain advantage, but global Holm correction retains only one of 135 route-level effects; the remaining grid provides descriptive evidence of compatibility-sensitive heterogeneity. On XBench-DeepSearch, one artifact--runtime pairing preserves useful first-try heuristics while producing repeated queries, delayed stopping, and substantial cost inflation after a context-runtime shift. Across benchmarks, transferred and target-derived playbooks both require target-side validation of success, termination, protocol compatibility, and cost. Frozen transfer is therefore a conditional cold-start option, not a reuse-by-default strategy or a universally preferable alternative to target-side redistillation.
Aug 5, 2026stat.ML

RouteGuard: Certifying Routing Gain in LLM Multi-Agent Systems When Complementarity Is Not Enough

Multi-agent LLM systems route among model-backed advisors, yet a deployer rarely knows before shipping whether routing will help at all. Prevailing routers optimize a gate's AUC and presume that advisor complementarity suffices. We show that neither determines the deployable gain. We introduce RouteGuard, a deployment-certification framework. Routing gain decomposes as G=πΔEG = πΔ_E, and the achievable gain is governed by a conditional-regret functional ΦΦ, not by AUC. A finite-sample certification bracket comes with a matching Le Cam lower bound, constant-sharp over the fixed-activity class, and a robustness phase transition. On two benchmarks the framework acts as a guardrail. On RouterBench (11 cross-family models) the verdict depends on the sampling unit: the protocol certifies a gain over GPT-4 under prompt-level sampling and withholds it under workload-cluster resampling, because the gain rests on 3 of 86 workload cells. On OpenRCA (three Gemini advisors) the advisors are statistically redundant: the realized oracle sits at or below the independence baseline in all pools we tested (221 RouterBench pools and three OpenRCA distributions), so the protocol correctly refuses to certify. A pre-registered semi-synthetic control confirms calibration: the protocol certifies a genuine gain once m≥m⋆m \ge m^\star and does not certify a true null. Code and frozen artifacts will be released with the published version.
Aug 4, 2026cs.AI

Formal Verification of Agentic Systems over Operational Data

Agentic systems driven by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world workflows where they act on persistent operational data. Before deployment, these systems need to be verified against business requirements that govern workflow execution and data evolution. However, existing approaches do not provide such system-level guarantees, as they mainly constrain or analyse behaviour at the agent's interface level. We study here the verification of agentic systems comprising a single LLM and a tool orchestration harness over relational operational data. We formalise them as Stateful Tool-Enabled Agentic Deployments (STEADs), give their semantics, define the problem of verifying them against First-Order Computation Tree Logic (FO-CTL) specifications, and show that it is undecidable. We identify sufficient conditions for exact preservation of FO-CTL specifications under a finite-domain restriction, over which verification is PSPACE-complete. The key requirement is that renaming opaque identifiers in the data must correspondingly rename the selected tool calls. We show that LLM-driven agents can violate this condition and introduce a canonical deployment wrapper that guarantees it for arbitrary base agents while preserving already-equivariant behaviour. We prove that computing canonical representations required by this construction is graph-isomorphism-hard. Finally, we illustrate our framework on an LLM agent orchestrating a case-management workflow.
Aug 3, 2026cs.AI

Securing Agentic AI: From Per-Action Checks to Trajectory Assurance

Autonomous agents are increasingly used to execute consequential tasks in environments governed by operational constraints, organizational policies, regulatory requirements, and technical standards. Their safety is therefore determined not by the correctness of individual actions, but by whether their overall behavior remains consistent with the rules and invariants of the systems in which they operate. As large language model (LLM)-based agents become more autonomous and increasingly delegate tasks across organizational boundaries, securing them evolves from a single challenge into a broad and interconnected landscape spanning the entire agentic stack. At the single-agent level, untrusted inputs through prompts, memory, retrieved knowledge, and tool interfaces create attack surfaces. In multi-agent settings, delegation and communication introduce challenges related to identity, trust, capability control, and decision transparency, while the underlying model routing and execution control plane remains vulnerable to manipulation and to unverified model provenance. Perhaps the most fundamental challenge is behavioral containment: sequences of individually permissible actions may collectively violate system-level constraints and safety invariants. At the broader level, supply-chain integrity, provenance, accountability, and end-to-end observability remain largely open problems. A common principle unifies these directions: security must become a verifiable property of the architectures, protocols, and runtimes that govern agent behavior, rather than an optional layer of guidance. Charting these challenges provides a roadmap toward trustworthy autonomous agent deployment.
Jul 26, 2026cs.SE

Where Is the Cost of Third-Party API Routers in Agentic Software Development?

Third-party API routers have become a common layer that unifies access across increasingly diverse LLM providers. In coding-agent workflows, high-autonomy operation is widely adopted because it reduces interaction overhead. As a result, a third-party API router, which sits between the agent and the upstream provider, inevitably occupies the trusted path. It can inspect and modify every request and response, yet no mechanism verifies alignment between the provider's output and the repository-level actions ultimately executed by the agent. Consequently, client-side permission mechanisms may become ineffective in practice. Whether this control gap produces real, hard-to-detect effects on software development tasks remains empirically unmeasured. In this paper, we conduct an empirical study of router-side injection in coding agents, examining four intervention levels of increasing subtlety: Response Substitution (L1), Response Append (L2), LLM-Polished Injection (L3), and LLM-Polished with Distribution Alignment Injection (L4). Moreover, we develop SIDEL, a framework for trace recording, replay, injection, and defense evaluation, with a curated dataset of 400 samples. We evaluate four representative coding agents, and further evaluate whitelist-based execution control and LLM review. Router-side intervention substantially alters repository-level actions and remains difficult for existing client-side safeguards to detect. Without additional mitigations, all evaluated agents achieved a defense success rate of 0 percent across all injection levels. Client-side mitigations and reactive reviews improve resistance but do not fully restore end-to-end control, motivating provider-side output-integrity guarantees. Our code is available at https://github.com/Riyasushin/SIDEL.
Jul 26, 2026cs.AI

Are You Still the Agent I Authorized? Earned Authority under a Fixed Ceiling for Evolving Agents

Long-lived AI agents increasingly evolve after deployment by retaining experience, acquiring skills and tools, revising workflows, delegating work, and moving across task phases. This improves adaptation but creates a distinct authorization problem. Tool-enabled agents can turn model errors and prompt injections into consequential external actions; when evolution occurs under a live grant, the subject exercising that authority or the context in which it acts may no longer match what the user evaluated. Evolution can change both the effects reachable under an old grant and the authority required by the task, which may rise, fall, or become incomparable. Existing tool policies constrain actions but do not determine when a grant survives this change. We formulate authorization continuity: when does an existing grant remain valid, how may active authority change, and what boundary must never move? Our state-bound model fixes a transition envelope and an immutable effect ceiling at grant time. The envelope determines whether the grant survives a mutation; below the ceiling, authority may contract freely and expand only under specified evidence conditions. We distinguish requested from realized effects and prove that, under complete mediation, sound effect abstraction, attenuating delegation, and monitor integrity, mutation cannot amplify protected effects beyond the user-issued ceiling. Agent-produced evidence may allocate authority below the ceiling but cannot raise it. Finally, we map six mutation classes to their authorization consequences.
Jul 23, 2026cs.CR

ToolGuardian: Declarative Security for AI Agent-Tool Interactions

LLM agents increasingly rely on external tools, expanding capability while creating a new security boundary: third-party tools may appear benign at the interface level while embedding unsafe behavior in implementation. Existing defenses rely on weak metadata, collapse characterization and policy judgment into a single decision, or use heuristic/LLM enforcement that lacks deterministic, auditable reasoning over task context and multi-tool composition. This paper presents ToolGuardian, a policy-driven framework for securing agent-tool interactions through pre-admission vetting and task-aware runtime authorization. ToolGuardian uses progressive characterization to convert evidence into structured facts: descriptions capture declared intent, system-call traces expose coarse behavior, mock execution reveals observed effects, and source analysis identifies latent behavior. ToolGuardian's core contribution is an Answer Set Programming (ASP)-based declarative policy layer that reasons explicitly over capabilities, effects, task context, and composition. We compare ASP against heuristic and LLM-based policy realizations using identical inputs and output contracts. We evaluate ToolGuardian on 16 MCP-style tools, including 8 malicious variants derived from real open-source tools, and 20 runtime scenarios. For vetting, ASP reaches a deny-class F1 of 0.86 and 88% accuracy using description, syscall, and observed-effect evidence. For runtime authorization, fully specified realizations classify all scenarios correctly, while ablations show that removing compositional and conformance rules substantially degrades performance.
Jul 20, 2026cs.AI

Operational Hallucination and Safety Drift in AI Agents

Large language models (LLMs) serving as planners in tool-using autonomous agents introduce dynamic reliability risks in multi-turn execution. While single-turn safety mechanisms are relatively mature, extended interactions reveal structural vulnerabilities where initial alignment degrades over time. This paper empirically characterizes two observed failure modes across multiple state-of-the-art LLMs: Safety Drift, the gradual erosion of declared safety intent leading to constraint-violating actions (e.g., textual refusal followed by reconnaissance and unsafe execution), and Operational Hallucination, persistent repetitive tool calls indicative of flawed state perception (e.g., livelocks even in legitimate tasks). Through controlled multi-turn evaluation on high-stakes ethical dilemmas, malicious requests, and benign controls, we quantify these phenomena using declaration-action gap and livelock metrics, demonstrating their cross-model prevalence under direct execution protocols. Root-cause analysis attributes the instabilities to the decoupling of reasoning context from execution state in current agent loops. We propose an Action-Aware Supervision Layer - a lightweight, plug-and-play architectural blueprint incorporating intent-action consistency checks, runtime state tracking, and forced termination primitives. Post-hoc simulation on captured failure trajectories shows the layer can intercept observed violations without false positives on benign cases. This work advances agent reliability by shifting focus from linguistic safeguards to enforceable architectural mechanisms for responsible agentic AI.
Jul 16, 2026cs.AI

Democratizing Agent Deployment Safety: A Structural Monitoring Approach

AI software development agents are increasingly capable of modifying infrastructure and security critical systems, creating risks where an agent completes its assigned task while covertly weakening safeguards through actions such as broadening permissions, degrading logging, or introducing persistence mechanisms. While frontier laboratories may deploy sophisticated monitoring pipelines, many organizations and individual users adopting coding agents lack the resources and governance maturity required to maintain complex learned monitor ensembles. We study this problem as infrastructure level sabotage under task success in the infrastructure-as-code setting from ControlArena and compare trained and untrained monitors across synchronous and asynchronous deployment modes. We introduce an Information Flow Graph (IFG) monitor that analyzes structural security regressions using control-flow and data-flow graph diffs alongside raw code diffs. In asynchronous evaluation, an untrained git diff monitor misses 11.6% attacks at 1% false positive rate auditing budget, our untrained IFG monitor reduces this to 3.5%, and the trained Async RF monitor achieves below 1%. Unlike the trained Async RF monitor, IFG can also operate synchronously as a pre-deployment safeguard that blocks suspicious infrastructure changes before execution or merge. In synchronous mode, IFG realtime rollback reduces joint main task and covert task success from 74.4% to 0.0% with no measurable reduction in legitimate task completion. These results suggest that untrained structural monitors provide a practical and auditable path toward democratizing deployment safety for organizations seeking trustworthy adoption of advanced AI agents.
Jul 15, 2026cs.SE

ToolAlignBench: Investigating Alignment Conflicts in Tool-Calling Enabled LLMs

Safety alignment in LLMs aims to align models with human values, but which values take precedence when they conflict? We investigate this question in the context of tool-calling LLM agents deployed in regulated industries, where agents processing confidential documents may encounter content that triggers safety-trained values (e.g., public welfare) that conflict with deployment-context instructions (e.g., internal logging). To empirically verify this phenomenon, we build a benchmark of 128 scenarios across 16 domains. We find that safety-aligned open-source models override their deployment instructions up to 43.4% of the time, engaging in whistleblowing, data exfiltration, and evidence tampering when processing documents that suggest organizational wrongdoing. We also find that abliteration reduces rates of external whistleblowing. These results reveal a fundamental tension in pluralistic alignment, where the same safety training that protects users can cause agents to act against deployment instructions in ways that create unpredictable liability risks. We release our benchmark as a framework to support evaluation of agent behavior under competing legitimate interests.
Jul 15, 2026cs.AI

CAVA: Canonical Action Verification and Attestation for Runtime Governance of Agentic AI Systems

Agentic AI systems increasingly act through heterogeneous runtimes: local coding hooks, SDK tools, browser automation, managed-agent traces, API gateways, and workflow engines. A single operational act such as publishing code, changing identity state, moving money, or exporting data may therefore be represented by many incompatible runtime records. This makes a basic governance question difficult to answer: what action was actually approved, what evidence binds the approval to execution, and can an independent verifier reproduce the same action identity later? This paper presents Canonical Action Verification and Attestation (CAVA), a runtime-semantics layer for converting heterogeneous agent activity into canonical runtime action objects. CAVA is positioned below Proof-Carrying Agent Actions (PCAA): PCAA defines the deployer-owned route-review-prove governance process, while CAVA defines the stable action object that process governs. The paper formalizes canonical action identity, semantic pattern detection, approval binding, receipt integrity, runtime-portable projection, and optional attestation substrates. We study a reference implementation through a 96-seed, 384-variant benchmark covering semantic equivalence, semantic separation, wrapper bypass, false-positive control, approval binding, receipt reproducibility, attestation tamper detection, runtime portability, semantic pattern detection, policy degradation, and Azure deployment drills. The contribution is a systems formulation of action-level canonicalization and policy-addressable semantic patterns as a necessary substrate for deployer-side AI governance.
Jul 11, 2026cs.AI

ANCHOR: Automated Alignment Auditing for CLI Agents on Real-World Harm

Autonomous CLI agents can now execute hundreds of actions across multi-hour sessions: writing code, executing shell commands, browsing the web, and managing cloud infrastructure, all with minimal human oversight. Does greater autonomy invite greater risk? We introduce ANCHOR, an automated auditing framework that stress-tests CLI agents on illegal tasks grounded in public US court cases. ANCHOR deploys an auditor agent fine-tuned on dark personality data using supervised and reinforcement fine tuning. This auditor roleplays persistent malicious users who decompose tasks, reframe requests upon refusal, and adapt strategies across multi-turn interactions. Evaluating frontier CLI agents, we find that while they often refuse illegal tasks when prompted directly, compliance reaches 100% under persistent malicious interaction. When agents comply, they frequently exceed user requests, autonomously building infrastructure for large-scale harm, including catastrophic risk scenarios such as large-scale financial fraud and bioweapon development. These findings demonstrate that current alignment techniques are insufficient for autonomous agents and underscore the need for safety evaluations against persistent, adaptive malicious users. We release ANCHOR at https://github.com/garified/anchor
Jul 10, 2026cs.LG

Present but Rescaled: Chat-to-Agent Transfer of Additive Activation Steering

Additive activation steering (injecting a scaled residual-stream direction during generation) is calibrated almost entirely in single-turn chat, yet the models it targets are increasingly deployed as tool-using ReAct agents. We present the first systematic chat-to-agent transfer study of additive steering, coupling behavioral measurement with a representation read-out in a matched-information design: the same items rendered as plain chat or as a ReAct tool-use episode, with matched-norm random-direction controls and the transcript re-encoded every turn to exclude KV-cache contamination. Transfer is real but rescaled, and the right description is a dissociation: the injected direction reaches the late layers at near-full strength in every setting and model tested (install-site agent-over-chat ratios 0.83-1.16 across three families), while the behavioral coupling is reset per model and context. On Qwen2.5-7B a refusal bypass vector amplifies in the agent (T = 1.45, CI [1.20, 1.78], N = 300); across a powered uniform-protocol distribution the coupling spans amplification (Gemma-2-9B T = 2.00) to attenuation (Yi-1.5-9B T = 0.43, CI [0.29, 0.60]), with no universal constant and a single clean attenuator against a universal sign. Directional ablation of the same axis does not amplify (T = 0.93, CI including 1) while additive injection amplifies (T = 1.50), a 20.1-point gain difference (CI [13.4, 26.8]) that identifies an additive-specific mechanism. Two pre-registered instruments converge to localize the rescaling to the ReAct format scaffold, before any tool observation, rather than to the observation boundary where a dilution account would predict it. The safety implication is immediate and unpredictable: agentic deployment amplifies steering-based refusal bypass by up to 2.00x on some models while others attenuate, so a deployment cannot assume a given model is safe under additive steering.
Jul 9, 2026cs.CR

Token-Flow Firewall: Semantic Runtime Auditing for Persistent AI Agents

Persistent AI agents extend large language models (LLMs) beyond single-turn interaction into long-lived software systems. Unlike traditional chat assistants, unsafe content in these agents can propagate through persistent state, reusable skills, and tool-mediated interactions, creating a substantially larger semantic attack surface. We observe that most security-critical interactions in such agents are transmitted through natural-language token flows, including memory updates, tool arguments, retrieved files, and inter-component communications. This observation enables a new security formulation: unsafe behavior can be intercepted as risky semantic flows before reaching privileged runtime sinks. Based on this insight, we propose TokenWall, a runtime defense framework that acts as a semantic firewall over agent token flows. TokenWall performs boundary-aware semantic auditing over these flows, constructing structured source-sink audit records, applying lightweight local inspection before execution, and selectively escalating ambiguous high-risk cases to stronger arbitration modules. Unlike prior approaches that rely on sparse auditing or remote large-model oversight, TokenWall enables full-coverage pre-execution mediation while reducing remote arbitration and latency. Experiments on CIK-Bench show that TokenWall reduces attack success rate to 12.5% while maintaining a 97.4% benign executable pass rate without human confirmation. TokenWall further introduces only 0.69 seconds of additional latency on benign cases, demonstrating that semantic runtime containment can achieve a practical security-utility trade-off for persistent AI agents.
Jul 8, 2026cs.AI

Institutional Red-Teaming: Deployment Rules, Not Just Models, Causally Shape Multi-Agent AI Safety

We introduce institutional red-teaming, an evaluation methodology for testing deployment rules in multi-agent AI: hold the agents, objectives, and task state fixed, vary only one rule, and attribute the resulting change in collective behavior to that rule. We instantiate the methodology in IABench-CA, a consequence-allocation benchmark spanning 228 contexts, five canonical rules, and seven model populations (33,924 games), with a normative cooperative reference and auto-labelled reasoning traces. Three findings emerge. (1) Deployment rules causally alter collective safety: changing only the consequence rule moves mean fatality by 22 to 58 percentage points within every population. (2) There is no safe default, but the targeting hazard is universal: the safest rule, the least-safe rule, and even the direction of the incidence effect vary across populations, yet regressive identity-targeting is never decisively safest in any context for any population, eliminates the least-resourced agent in 30-87% of games everywhere, and is selection-unsafe relative to the cooperative reference for all seven populations. (3) Identity salience is the mechanism: a one-shot anonymization ablation on the most exploitation-prone population (gpt-5.1) shows that merely naming the loss bearer in the rule text drives targeted elimination from 22% to 81% at identical payoffs; under repeated play, anonymization only delays the targeting, as agents re-infer the hidden rule from observed eliminations. We package the methodology as a safety-case workflow that certifies a provisional rule region Φ(c,P)Φ(c,P) per deployment context and population, with explicit residual risks and monitoring obligations.
Jun 28, 2026cs.AI

Budgeted Act-or-Defer Multi-Agent LLM Deliberation with Local Reliability Bounds

Multi-agent deliberation among LLMs can improve reasoning, but deployment requires deciding when the current answer is reliable enough to act on and when it should be escalated to human review. We formulate this as budgeted act-or-defer decision making. At each round, the system maps the debate prefix to a low-dimensional state, computes a kk-nearest-neighbor lower confidence bound on state-conditional correctness using calibration data, and acts only when the bound exceeds a user-specified reliability threshold. The certificate controls wrong actions through the decomposition β=δ+α+εactβ= δ+ α+ \varepsilon_{\mathrm{act}}, separating calibration failure, residual action risk, and representation gap. The guarantee is conditional, not distribution-free: it relies on a valid local bias envelope and an action-region representation-gap bound, and each assumption is paired with falsification-style diagnostics. Because the same absolute wrong-action budget has different meanings across tasks of different difficulty, we set budgets relative to each task's final-round error using training data only, and evaluate safety by normalized budget usage WA/β\mathrm{WA}/β. On six benchmarks against nine baselines, the method uses 9--12% of the pre-declared budget on activated datasets, reaching up to 84% automation and 96% acted-on accuracy; on stress-test datasets, it defers rather than forcing unreliable automation. Rather than relying on per-task post-hoc threshold search, the method prospectively converts a user-declared wrong-action budget into an auditable act-or-defer operating point before deployment, under explicitly stated assumptions.
Jun 24, 2026cs.AI

Narration-of-Thought: Inference-Time Scaffolding for Defeasible Ethical Reasoning in Large Language Models

Standard chain-of-thought on moral dilemmas exhibits two failure modes: stakeholder collapse (the trace names at most one party with a stake in the outcome) and uncertainty suppression (no explicit unknowns or hedges before committing to an action). We introduce narration-of-thought (NoT), a system prompt that structures chain-of-thought into five sections: protagonist, stakeholders, two-step consequences, uncertainty, then commitment. NoT adds no training, parameters, or fine-tuning. On 100 DailyDilemmas scenarios across four generators from three vendors, NoT cuts stakeholder collapse from up to 31% to under 1% and uncertainty suppression from up to 72% to 1-24% on every model. A matched-budget verbose-CoT control rules out token spend as the active ingredient; NoT retains Cliff's delta advantages of +0.79 to +0.90 on stakeholder count and +0.65 to +0.93 on uncertainty score for three of four generators, and a section ablation attributes each shift to its specific sub-instruction. Textual-gradient descent initialised at NoT improves the scaffold further; a cross-family training judge (different vendor from the generator) dominates an in-family one on every measured axis. Extended to a five-round multi-stakeholder debate protocol, the scaffold converts a 6% standoff into 95% full consensus on a calibration set and 100% combined convergence on a DailyDilemmas replication. The resulting traces externalise the stakeholders, consequences, and uncertainty grounding each commitment, providing an auditable substrate for dependable agentic deployment.
Jun 12, 2026cs.CR

Is Your Agent Playing Dead? Deployed LLM Agents Exhibit Constraint-Evasive Fabrication and Thanatosis

This paper presents and characterizes a spectrum of previously unreported behaviours we term Constraint-Evasive Fabrication (CEF): when an LLM agent operates under irreconcilable constraints (where no response can simultaneously satisfy all active rules) it spontaneously fabricates plausible external obstacles and presents them as a fact. At the extreme end of this spectrum lies Constraint-Evasive Thanatosis (CET); the limit case where, rather than inventing a plausible excuse, the model simulates a full system crash to make the user disengage entirely. We first observed CET in an uncontrolled deployment test, where a GPT-4o banking agent fabricated Python-style exception traces (complete with memory addresses) to feign a system failure when threatened by a user. In subsequent controlled experiments, the model independently invented audit restrictions, microservice architectures, error codes, and service timeouts, none present in its prompt. Reproduction attempts across pressure levels and attacker personas yielded CEF consistently but with substantial variation in form, onset, and severity: the phenomenon is robust but stochastic. Critically, injecting ground-truth data mid-conversation did not restore honest behaviour once fabrication had taken hold (the model ignored correct information and continued confabulating) suggesting CEF is self-reinforcing rather than a knowledge gap. We show that (1) standard enterprise guardrails routinely create CEF-enabling conditions in production, (2) current RLHF procedures suppress but cannot eliminate CEF, and (3) existing safety benchmarks do not test for this failure mode. Our results highlight the need for irreconcilable-constraint benchmarks, CEF-aware training procedures, and deployment-time detection methods before constrained agents become further entrenched in high-stakes domains.
Jun 11, 2026cs.CL

EvoArena: Tracking Memory Evolution for Robust LLM Agents in Dynamic Environments

Large language model (LLM) agents have achieved strong performance on a wide range of benchmarks, yet most evaluations assume static environments. In contrast, real-world deployment is inherently dynamic, requiring agents to continually align their knowledge, skills, and behavior with changing environments and updated task conditions. To address this gap, we introduce EvoArena, a benchmark suite that models environment changes as sequences of progressive updates across terminal, software, and social domains. We further propose EvoMem, a patch-based memory paradigm that records memory evolution as structured update histories, enabling agents to reason about environmental evolution through changes in their memory. Experiments show that current agents struggle on EvoArena, achieving an average accuracy of 39.6% across evolving terminal, software, and social-preference domains. EvoMem consistently improves performance, yielding an average gain of 1.5% on EvoArena and also improving standard benchmarks such as GAIA and LoCoMo by 6.1% and 4.8%. Beyond individual tasks, EvoMem further improves chain-level accuracy by 3.7% on EvoArena, where success requires completing a consecutive sequence of related evolutionary subtasks. Mechanistic analysis shows that EvoMem improves evidence capture in the memory, indicating better preservation of complete evolving environment states. Our results highlight the importance of modeling evolution in both evaluation and memory for reliable agent deployment.
Jun 6, 2026cs.LG

Semantic Quorum Assurance: Collective Certification for Non-Deterministic AI Infrastructure

As large language model (LLM) agents are integrated into autonomous cloud operations, distributed systems face a semantic reliability problem: proposer agents can generate production mutations, such as modifying IAM policies, opening firewall security groups, or executing data exports, that are syntactically valid and statically authorized but operationally unsafe. Classical distributed consensus protocols replicate deterministic state transitions but do not evaluate the safety of the proposed intent. To address this gap, we introduce Semantic Quorum Assurance (SQA), a control-plane primitive for governing non-deterministic agentic infrastructure. SQA represents proposals as declarative execution contracts bound to cryptographic evidence chains and routes them to a diverse panel of read-only, sandboxed validator agents. SQA aggregates their judgments under a risk-adaptive quorum predicate that enforces model and archetype diversity, adjusts weights based on calibrated assurance scores, and respects archetype-specific vetoes. Admitted proposals execute only through a sovereign execution gate. We instantiate SQA in a cloud-native control plane and formalize a correlated cognitive failure model for non-deterministic validators. On 500 infrastructure-inspired mutation scenarios, with safety results reported on held-out safe/unsafe trials excluding ambiguous scenarios, SQA reduces unsafe approval from 18.5% for single-agent validation to 0.3% while adding median validation latency of 1.45--4.12 seconds across the studied risk buckets.
Jun 2, 2026cs.SE

Token Budgets: An Empirical Catalog of 63 LLM-Agent Budget-Overrun Incidents, with an Affine-Typed Rust Mitigation as a Case Study

LLM-agent budget overruns are a documented production failure class: a single retry loop can spend thousands of dollars before an operator notices, and the in-process integrity properties that would prevent it (no aliasing, no double-spend, no use-after-delegation of a cost-bearing value) are enforced, if at all, by ad-hoc wrappers rather than by the type system. Our central contribution is empirical: a catalog of 63 confirmed production incidents from 21 orchestration frameworks (2023-2026), each backed by a quoted GitHub issue and, where reported, a dollar loss, organized into an eight-cluster failure taxonomy (inter-rater Cohen's kappa = 0.837, N = 113), plus 47 supplementary structural entries. As one mitigation evaluated against this taxonomy, we build token-budgets, an 1,180-line Rust crate (no unsafe) that operationalizes affine ownership so that cloning, double-spending, or using a budget after delegating it are compile errors rather than runtime hazards an operator must remember to avoid. The dollar cap is runtime arithmetic under an estimator assumption; the affine layer makes that arithmetic non-bypassable. On single-agent workloads a 4-line Python counter matches the crate at 0/30 overshoot, so the distinguishing value is non-bypassability under operator error in multi-agent delegation: the delegation-fanout race documented in 11 incidents is rejected by the borrow checker at compile time, while the same pattern under asyncio overshoots 30/30 and three disciplined alternatives overshoot 0/30. Across five runtimes, three providers, and a temperature-stratified live-API test (N = 160), the approach reports zero cap violations and zero false refusals, at operational parity with concurrent work. Static over-reservation is 4-6x (2.11x adaptive). Binary-level cap-soundness on the running binary is left open.
Jun 2, 2026cs.AI

Toward Pre-Deployment Assurance for Enterprise AI Agents: Ontology-Grounded Simulation and Trust Certification

Pre-deployment verification of enterprise artificial intelligence (AI) agents remains a critical gap between large language model (LLM) capability benchmarking and production deployment. Post-deployment monitoring, human-in-the-loop controls, and prompt-level guardrails offer limited assurance once an agent is operating in production. We present an ontology-grounded verification framework -- to our knowledge the first to combine three components: an Agent Operational Envelope formalizing the certification space across permissions, domain constraints, safety properties, governance rules, and autonomy levels; an ontology-to-scenario generation pipeline that derives regulatory, operational, and adversarial test scenarios automatically; and a machine-verifiable Trust Certificate with graduated deployment verdicts. A controlled pilot across four regulated industries (Fintech, Banking, Insurance, Healthcare), instantiated as five industry-by-regulatory-regime cells across the United States and Vietnam (where Vietnam's 2025 AI Law makes such verification legally mandated for financial services), generated 1,800 scenarios evaluated against 125 primary-source regulatory requirements and 25 injected faults. Ontology-grounded generation significantly outperformed the dominant persona-based baseline on regulatory coverage (48.3% versus 33.1%; corrected p_c = .0006) and attained the highest domain specificity (4.77/5.0; p = 2e-6); transparently, its advantage over plain and retrieval-augmented prompting did not survive Bonferroni correction. Cross-validation across three LLM families (Claude Sonnet 4, Qwen 2.5 72B, Gemma 4 26B; 5,400 total scenarios) replicated the persona-versus-ontology pattern. The framework offers a reproducible, regulation-grounded route to pre-deployment assurance for enterprise AI agents, complementing runtime governance with an auditable deployment gate.
Jun 1, 2026cs.LG

Adaptive Auto-Harness: Sustained Self-Improvement for Agentic System Deployment on Open-Ended Task Streams

Auto-harness systems such as A-Evolve, GEPA, and Meta-Harness improve LLM agents by optimizing prompts, skills, tools, memories, and supporting infrastructure from execution feedback, but they are typically evaluated on fixed offline benchmarks. Real deployments instead present open-ended task streams: histories grow without a fixed endpoint, heterogeneous tasks require different harnesses, and problem distributions shift over time. These challenges make a single repeatedly and densely updated harness brittle, causing performance degradation as accuracy peaks early and then declines. This motivates sustained harness construction with task-wise adaptation. We introduce Adaptive Auto-Harness, a framework and system for such streams. The framework decomposes the gap to an oracle harness into evolution loss and adaptation loss. The system addresses these losses with a stateful multi-agent evolver, a harness tree with solve-time routing, and human-steering hooks for cases where history lacks the needed signal. Across prediction-market, security-competition, and event-forecasting streams, Adaptive Auto-Harness outperforms five existing auto-harness baselines and ablations attribute gains to better construction, routing, or targeted human steering. Code is available in \href{https://github.com/A-EVO-Lab/a-evolve/tree/release/adaptive-auto-harness}{Link}.
May 28, 2026cs.AI

AgentDoG 1.5: A Lightweight and Scalable Alignment Framework for AI Agent Safety and Security

Modern open-world agents such as OpenClaw exhibit powerful cross-environment execution capabilities yet introduce broad new safety risk sources. Meanwhile, advanced frontier AI models drastically lower attack barriers, rendering current agent alignment frameworks inadequate for real-world deployment. To tackle these emerging threats, we propose a lightweight and scalable agent safety alignment framework. Specifically, we update the agent safety taxonomy to accommodate emergent risks from Codex and OpenClaw execution scenarios. We further build a taxonomy-guided data engine with influence-function purification to train lightweight AgentDoG 1.5 variants (0.8B, 2B, 4B, and 8B parameters) using only around 1k samples, achieving comparable performance with leading closed-source models (e.g., GPT-5.4). Based on AgentDoG 1.5, we construct a highly efficient agentic safety SFT and RL training environment, which reduces deployment overhead in Docker-level environments by two orders of magnitude. Finally, we deploy AgentDoG 1.5 as a training-free online guardrail for real-time safety moderation. Extensive experimental results indicate that AgentDoG 1.5 achieves state-of-the-art performance in diverse and complex interactive agentic scenarios. All models and datasets are openly released.
May 27, 2026cs.RO

ICAN-Deploy: Identity-Stable Canary Deployment for Safety-Critical Embodied Agents

Canary deployment routes a fraction of traffic to a new software version, monitors metrics, and rolls back on regression. Mainstream controllers (Argo Rollouts, Spinnaker, Flagger) change the deployed system's cryptographic identity during the canary window. The drift is harmless for stateless microservices but breaks the claim that "the agent you certified is still the agent you have" for safety-critical embodied agents, forcing re-certification per canary. We present ICAN-Deploy (Identity-stable CANary Deployment), a middleware construction whose state machine holds the identity hash invariant across the canary window by separating capability names (frozen, hashed) from capability versions (mutable runtime state). We implement ICAN-Deploy inside a runtime governance layer for LLM-driven robots and verify invariance by closed-form proof, AST lint, and TLA+ model-checking, then corroborate over N=100 real canary cycles on a Franka Panda arm in MuJoCo (zero drift; entry latency 95% BCa CI [1.52, 2.01] ms). A feature-flagged strawman that folds versions into the manifest falsifies on the same workload. A system certified once at identity-creation time can then ship arbitrary capability evolution under that same certification, within the version-and-name envelope.
May 26, 2026cs.AI

Agyn: An Open-Source Platform for AI Agents with Scalable On-Demand Execution, Agent Definition as a Code, and Zero-Trust Access

As organizations move toward production deployments of AI agents, which execute non-deterministic workflows, maintain stateful sessions, and often operate with privileged access to internal services, the engineering challenge shifts from building individual agents to operating them at scale with proper isolation, governance, and security. In this paper we present Agyn, an open-source platform designed around three key principles tailored for agent workloads: a signal-driven, stateful serverless runtime on Kubernetes; a Terraform provider for agent and harness definition; and a security model grounded in zero-trust and least-privilege principles. Agyn is agent-agnostic, model-agnostic, and cloud-agnostic.
May 25, 2026cs.AI

Your Agents Are Aging Too: Agent Lifespan Engineering for Deployed Systems

Long-lived AI agents are increasingly deployed as persistent operational systems, yet they are still evaluated like freshly initialized models. Day-one benchmarks miss a basic systems question: how long does an agent remain reliable after deployment? Even when model weights are frozen, an agent's effective state keeps changing as it compresses interaction history, retrieves from a growing memory store, revises facts after updates, and undergoes routine maintenance. Reliability therefore becomes a lifespan property of the full agent harness, not only a snapshot property of the base model. We introduce AgingBench, a longitudinal reliability benchmark for agent lifespan engineering: measuring not only whether deployed agents degrade, but what form the degradation takes and where repair should target. AgingBench organizes agent aging into four mechanisms: compression aging, interference aging, revision aging, and maintenance aging. To diagnose these failures, AgingBench uses temporal dependency graphs and paired counterfactual probes that produce diagnostic profiles for the write, retrieval, and utilization stages of the memory pipeline. Across 7 scenarios, 14 models, multiple memory policies, and both runner-controlled and autonomous agents, over ~400 runs spanning 8 - 200 sessions show that agent aging is not one-dimensional: behavioral tests can remain clean while factual precision decays; derived-state tracking can collapse sharply within a single model; and the same wrong answer can require different repairs depending on what the diagnostic profile points to. These results suggest that reliable agent deployment requires lifespan evaluation, mechanism-level diagnosis, and stage-targeted repair, not only stronger day-one models.
May 22, 2026cs.AI

Beyond Final Answers: Auditing Trajectory-Level Hallucinations in Multi-Agent Industrial Workflows

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that reason, use tools, and act over multiple steps. Yet most hallucination benchmarks still evaluate only the final output, missing failures that originate in intermediate Thought-Action-Observation steps. We present Trajel, a dataset and evaluation framework for auditing trajectory-level hallucinations in multi-agent industrial workflows. Trajel introduces a five-type hallucination taxonomy (factual, referential, logical, procedural, and scope-based) over expert-annotated agent traces from AssetOpsBench. We benchmark supervised detection models at the subtask, trajectory, and long-context levels. Our results show that the most common failure modes are missed by existing benchmarks, that nearly half of hallucinated trajectories involve multiple types at once, and that automated detectors with high binary accuracy still misclassify the subtlest types. Trajectory-aware detection significantly outperforms standard post-hoc verification, making taxonomy-grounded evaluation necessary for safer agentic deployment.
May 21, 2026cs.LG

E3E^3-Agent: An Executable and Evolving Agent for Resource Management of Edge Generative Inference

Edge deployments of generative inference increasingly face two practical realities: per-device per-model performance is often unknown at deployment time, and it is non-stationary due to user-driven semantic events, background load, and device churn. Consequently, a resource manager that is tuned offline under a fixed regime can become brittle and expensive to maintain. This paper presents E3E^3-Agent, an executable and evolving agent for edge artificial intelligence generated content (AIGC) resource management. E3E^3-Agent separates a fast-path router that makes millisecond-level dispatch decisions from a slow-path, event-driven large language model (LLM) meta-controller that mitigates regime shifts through a small, explicit control surface exposed via a tool interface, including risk gating, router configuration, and rapid performance calibration. The agent learns online from execution feedback and continuously adapts to unknown and time-varying service-time mappings. We evaluate E3E^3-Agent in a discrete-event simulator driven by MLPerf-derived device-model measurement priors, covering cold-start warmup and three dynamic regimes: semantic dynamics, device churn, and hidden drift. Across the dynamic scenarios, E3E^3-Agent reduces average latency by 65%-73% compared to the best static baseline, stays within 7%-10% of an online full-information Oracle used for evaluation, and effectively suppresses stutter rate under semantic degradation.
May 20, 2026cs.CR

PocketAgents: A Manifest-Driven Library of Autonomous Defense Agents

Connecting large language models (LLMs) to defensive enforcement requires more than asking a model whether an attack is happening. A defender must decide which model outputs may change the system state, which outputs must be rejected, and how failures should be recorded. We present PocketAgents, a manifest-driven library of autonomous defense agents. Each agent is installed as three data files: a manifest, a prompt, and a runtime context. The shared runtime gives the agent bounded telemetry access and accepts only typed reports whose requested action appears in the manifest. We implemented PocketAgents on top of a cyber arena (Perry), a cyber-deception testbed, and evaluated two agents, Command and Control and Exfiltration, in 18 closed-loop trials of a DarkSide-inspired attack on a small enterprise topology. Thirteen trials produced validated network-block actions and contained the attack; four failed schema validation; one produced a valid no-action decision. The experiments show that a typed boundary makes LLM-driven defense measurable, extensible, and attributable.
May 18, 2026cs.CL

Agent Meltdowns: The Road to Hell Is Paved with Helpful Agents

Agents operating with computer and Web use inevitably encounter errors: inaccessible webpages, missing files, local and remote misconfigurations, etc. These errors do not thwart agents based on state-of-the-art models. They helpfully continue to look for ways to complete their tasks. We introduce, characterize, and measure a new type of agent failure we call \emph{accidental meltdown}: unsafe or harmful behavior in response to a benign environmental error, in the absence of any adversarial inputs. Because meltdowns are not captured by the existing reliability or safety benchmarks, we develop a taxonomy of meltdown behaviors. We then implement an agent-agnostic infrastructure for injecting simulated local and remote errors into the rollout environment and use it to systematically evaluate agent systems powered by GPT, Grok, and Gemini. Our evaluation demonstrates that meltdowns (e.g., conducting unauthorized reconnaissance or subverting access control) of varying severity and success occur in 64.7% of agent rollouts that encounter simulated errors, spanning all combinations of agent system, backing model, and error type. In over half of these meltdowns, unsafe behaviors are not reported to the user. Comparing behaviors of the same agents with and without errors, we find that exploration in response to errors is correlated with unsafe and harmful behavior.
May 18, 2026cs.AI

Position: A Three-Layer Probabilistic Assume-Guarantee Architecture Is Structurally Required for Safe LLM Agent Deployment

This position paper argues that enforcing LLM agent safety within a single abstraction layer is not merely suboptimal but categorically insufficient for deployed LLM agents -- a structural consequence of how agent execution works, not a contingent limitation of current systems. The three dimensions that jointly constitute safe operation -- semantic intent and policy compliance, environmental validity, and dynamical feasibility -- each depend on a strictly distinct set of information that becomes available at different stages of execution. No single guardrail can certify all three. We argue that the community must respond with a contract-based architecture in which each safety dimension is enforced by an independently certified layer whose probabilistic guarantee satisfies the next layer's assumption. We sketch such an architecture and derive the compositional system-level safety bounds it admits via the chain rule of probability. Three open problems stand between this and a deployable standard: bound estimation from non-i.i.d.\ traces, graceful degradation of contracts under deployment drift, and extension to multi-agent settings -- the most important unfinished business in LLM agent runtime assurance.
May 13, 2026cs.AI

History Anchors: How Prior Behavior Steers LLM Decisions Toward Unsafe Actions

Frontier LLMs are increasingly deployed as agents that pick the next action after a long log of prior tool calls produced by the same or a different model. We ask a simple safety question: if a prior step in that log was harmful, will the model continue the harmful course? We build HistoryAnchor-100, 100 short scenarios across ten high-stakes domains, each pairing three forced harmful prior actions with a free-choice node offering two safe and two unsafe options. Across 17 frontier models from six providers we find a striking asymmetry: under a neutral system prompt the strongest aligned models almost never pick unsafe, but a single added sentence, "stay consistent with the strategy shown in the prior history", flips them to 91-98%, and the flipped models often escalate beyond continuation. Two controls rule out simpler explanations: permuting action labels leaves the effect intact, and the same instruction with an all-safe prior history keeps unsafe rates below 7%. Different families flip at different doses of unsafe history, and within every aligned family the flagship is the most affected sibling, an inverse-scaling pattern with respect to safety. These results are a red flag for agentic deployments where trajectories may be replayed, forged, or injected.
May 13, 2026cs.AI

TRIAGE: Evaluating Prospective Metacognitive Control in LLMs under Resource Constraints

Deploying language models as autonomous agents requires more than per-task accuracy: when an agent faces a queue of problems under a finite token budget, it must decide which to attempt, in what order, and how much compute to commit to each, all before any execution feedback is available. This is the prospective form of metacognitive control studied for decades in human cognition, yet whether language models possess it remains untested. We introduce TRIAGE, an evaluation framework in which a model receives a task pool and a token budget calibrated to its own baseline cost, and commits to a single ordered plan that jointly encodes selection, sequencing, and per-problem allocation. Plans are scored against an oracle with full knowledge of the model's solvability and cost on each problem, yielding a triage efficiency ratio on a common scale. We evaluate frontier and open-source models, with and without reasoning enabled, across competition mathematics, graduate-level science, code generation, and expert multidisciplinary knowledge, and find that current language models exhibit substantial gaps in prospective metacognitive control, revealing a previously unmeasured capability dimension with direct implications for resource-efficient agent deployment.
May 11, 2026cs.AI

MATRA: Modeling the Attack Surface of Agentic AI Systems -- OpenClaw Case Study

LLMs are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents with access to tools, databases, and external services, yet practitioners (across different sectors) lack systematic methods to assess how known threat classes translate into concrete risks within a specific agentic deployment. We present MATRA, a pragmatic threat modeling framework for agentic AI systems that adapts established risk assessment methodology to systematically assess how known LLM threats translate into deployment-specific risks. MATRA begins with an asset-based impact assessment and utilizes attack trees to determine the likelihood of these impacts occurring within the system architecture. We demonstrate MATRA on a personal AI agent deployment using OpenClaw, quantifying how architectural controls such as network sandboxing and least-privilege access reduce risk by limiting the blast radius of successful injections.
May 11, 2026cs.AI

Beyond Autonomy: A Dynamic Tiered AgentRunner Framework for Governable and Resilient Enterprise AI Execution

Current large language model agent frameworks prioritize autonomy but lack the governability mechanisms required for enterprise deployment. High-risk write operations proceed without independent review, complex tasks lack acceptance verification, and computational resources are allocated uniformly regardless of risk level. We propose the Dynamic Tiered AgentRunner, a controlled execution protocol distilled from a production-grade multi-tenant SaaS platform. The framework introduces three core mechanisms: (1) Risk-Adaptive Tiering that dynamically allocates computational resources and review intensity based on task risk profiles, achieving Pareto-optimal trade-offs between safety and efficiency; (2) Separation of Powers architecture where proposal, review, execution, and verification are performed by independent agents with physically isolated boundaries; and (3) Resilience-by-Design through a Verifier-Recovery closed loop that treats failure as a first-class system state. We formalize the tier selectio
May 11, 2026cs.CR

The Granularity Mismatch in Agent Security: Argument-Level Provenance Solves Enforcement and Isolates the LLM Reasoning Bottleneck

Tool-using LLM agents must act on untrusted webpages, emails, files, and API outputs while issuing privileged tool calls. Existing defenses often mediate trust at the granularity of an entire tool invocation, forcing a brittle choice in mixed-trust workflows: allow external content to influence a call and risk hijacked destinations or commands, or quarantine the call and block benign retrieval-then-act behavior. The key observation behind this paper is that indirect prompt injection becomes dangerous not when untrusted content appears in context, but when it determines an authority-bearing argument. We present \textsc{PACT} (\emph{Provenance-Aware Capability Contracts}), a runtime monitor that assigns semantic roles to tool arguments, tracks value provenance across replanning steps, and checks whether each argument's origin satisfies its role-specific trust contract. Under oracle provenance, \textsc{PACT} achieves 100% utility and 100% security on mixed-trust diagnostic suites, while flat invocation-level monitors incur false positives or false negatives. In full AgentDojo deployments across five models, \textsc{PACT} reaches 100% security on the three strongest models while recovering 38.1--46.4% utility, 8--16 percentage points above CaMeL at the same security level. Ablations show that both semantic roles and cross-step provenance are necessary. \textsc{PACT} reframes agent security as authority binding, and isolates the remaining deployment bottleneck to provenance inference and contract synthesis.
May 8, 2026cs.CL

Securing Computer-Use Agents: A Unified Architecture-Lifecycle Framework for Deployment-Grounded Reliability

Computer-use agents(CUAs)are moving frombounded benchmarks toward real software environments, wherethey operate browsers, desktops, mobile applications, flesystems,terminals, and tool backends. In such settings, reliability isno longer captured by task success alone: perception errors,planning drift, memory use, tool mediation, permission scope,and runtime oversight jointly determine whether agent actionsremain aligned with user intent, Existing surveys organize theCUA landscape by methods, platforms, benchmarks, or securitythreats, but less explicitly connect capability formation, author-ity exposure, failure manifestation, and control placement. Toaddress this gap, the article develops an architecture-lifecycleframework for deployment-grounded reliability in CUAs. Thearchitectural view analyzes Perception, Decision, and Executionas coupled layers that transform software observations intoauthority-bearing actions, The lifecycle view examines Creation.Deployment, Operation, and Maintenance as stages in which priorsare learned, tools and permissions are bound, runtime trajecto.ries are stressed, and assurance must be preserved under drift.Using this lens, the analysis synthesizes representative systems,benchmarks, and security/privacy studies; distinguishes wherefailures become visible from where their enabling conditions areintroduced, and maps recurring intervention surfaces for controloversight, and assurance. OpenClaw is used only as a public moti.vating example of an open deployment pattern, not as a verifedinternal case study. The conclusion highlights open challengesin controllable grounding, long-horizon constraint preservation,safe authority binding, mixed-trust runtime defense, privacy-preserving memory,and continual assurance.
May 4, 2026cs.AI

Hybrid Inspection and Task-Based Access Control in Zero-Trust Agentic AI

Authorizing Large Language Model (LLM)-driven agents to dynamically invoke tools and access protected resources introduces significant security risks, and the risks grow dramatically as agents engage in multi-turn conversations and scale toward distributed collaboration. A compromised or malicious agentic application can tamper with tool calls, falsify results, or request permissions beyond the scope of the subject's intended tasks, which could go unnoticed with current delegated authorization flows given their lack of visibility into the original subject's intent. In light of this, we make the following contributions towards Continuous Agent Semantic Authorization (CASA). First, we propose a hybrid runtime enforcement model that combines deterministic and semantic controls enabled by a zero-trust interception layer. Five deterministic controls enforce structural and data-integrity guarantees over the message flow, while a semantic inspection layer evaluates whether tool call choices align with the intended tasks commissioned to the agent. Second, differently from prior Task-Based Access Control (TBAC) techniques that operate on single-turn interactions, we decompose the semantic layer into two stages: i) a task-extraction step that distills the subject's objectives from multi-turn conversations at the interception layer, and ii) a task-tool semantic matching step at the authorization server that evaluates whether the requested tools are appropriate for the extracted tasks. Third, we extend the ASTRA dataset that we introduced in a prior work, by generating novel conversation-tool datasets with multi-turn interactions containing relevant and irrelevant tool calls for a given task. Lastly, we provide the first experimental results for TBAC under multi-turn conversations.
Apr 30, 2026cs.AI

Safe Bilevel Delegation (SBD): A Formal Framework for Runtime Delegation Safety in Multi-Agent Systems

As large language model (LLM) agents are deployed in high-stakes environments, the question of how safely to delegate subtasks to specialized sub-agents becomes critical. Existing work addresses multi-agent architecture selection at design time or provides broad empirical guidelines, but neither provides a runtime mechanism that dynamically adjusts the safety-efficiency trade-off as task context changes during execution. We propose Safe Bilevel Delegation (SBD), a formal framework for runtime delegation safety in hierarchical multi-agent systems. SBD formulates task delegation as a bilevel optimization problem: an outer meta-weight network phi learns context-dependent safety-efficiency weights lambda(s) in [0,1]; an inner loop optimizes the delegation policy pi subject to a probabilistic safety constraint P(safe) >= 1-delta. The continuous delegation degree alpha in [0, 1] controls how much decision authority is transferred to each sub-agent, interpolating smoothly between full human override (alpha=0) and fully autonomous execution (alpha=1). We establish three theoretical results: (1) Safety Monotonicity--higher outer safety weight produces a weakly safer inner policy; (2) Inner Policy Convergence--projected gradient descent on the inner problem converges linearly under standard smoothness assumptions; (3) an Accountability Propagation bound that distributes responsibility across multi-hop delegation chains with a provable per-agent ceiling. We instantiate SBD in three high-stakes domains--medical AI (MIMIC-III), financial risk control (S and P 500), and educational agent supervision (ASSISTments)--specifying datasets, safety constraint sets, baselines, and evaluation protocols. This manuscript presents the formal framework and theoretical results in full; empirical validation following the protocols described herein is planned and will be reported in a forthcoming revision.
Apr 29, 2026cs.CR

Ambient Persuasion in a Deployed AI Agent: Unauthorized Escalation Following Routine Non-Adversarial Content Exposure

We report a safety incident in a deployed multi-agent research system in which a primary AI agent installed 107 unauthorized software components, overwrote a system registry, overrode a prior negative decision from an oversight agent, and escalated through increasingly privileged operations up to an attempted system administrator command. The incident was preceded not by an adversarial attack but by routine content: a forwarded technology article written for human developers and shared by the principal investigator for discussion. The agent operated in a permissive environment, with unrestricted shell access, soft behavioral guidelines containing genuinely conflicting instructions, and no machine-enforced installation policy, and had recommended installing the same tool six hours earlier before being told to stand down. We analyze the behavioral cascade, the control boundaries that failed, and the limitations of multi-agent oversight in detecting and remediating the damage. We use directive weighting error as a descriptive interpretation of the observed failure and ambient persuasion as a provisional analytic label for the broader trigger configuration of non-adversarial environmental content preceding unauthorized agent action. The case highlights ethical and governance implications for deployed agent systems: ambiguous conversational cues are insufficient authorization for consequential actions, prior refusals must persist as enforceable constraints rather than message-level reminders, and oversight mechanisms require systematic post-incident auditing in addition to routine monitoring.
Apr 28, 2026cs.CR

From CRUD to Autonomous Agents: Formal Validation and Zero-Trust Security for Semantic Gateways in AI-Native Enterprise Systems

Enterprise software engineering is shifting away from deterministic CRUD/REST architectures toward AI-native systems where large language models act as cognitive orchestrators. This transition introduces a critical security tension: probabilistic LLMs weaken classical mechanisms for validation, access control, and formal testing. This paper proposes the design, formal validation, and empirical evaluation of a Semantic Gateway governed by the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The gateway reframes the enterprise API as a semantic surface where tools are dynamically discovered, authorized, and executed based on intent and policy enforcement. The central contribution rests on a paradigm shift: autonomous agents must not be validated as traditional software nor as simple API consumers, but as stochastic state-transition systems whose behavior must be abstracted, fuzzed, and audited through enabled-tool graphs. The architecture introduces a three-layer Zero-Trust security model comprising a pre-inference Semantic Firewall, deterministic Tool-Level RBAC, and out-of-band Cryptographic Human-in-the-Loop approval. Enabledness-Preserving Abstractions (EPAs) and greybox semantic fuzzing--originally developed for blockchain smart contract verification--are adapted to audit agent behavior in enterprise environments. Results demonstrate an 84.2% reduction in incidental code. Across 500,000 multi-turn fuzzing sequences, the methodology achieved a 100% discovery rate of hidden unauthorized state transitions, proving that dynamic formal verification is strictly necessary for secure agentic deployment.
Apr 18, 2026cs.AI

Harness as an Asset: Enforcing Determinism via the Convergent AI Agent Framework (CAAF)

Large Language Models produce a controllability gap in safety-critical engineering: even low rates of undetected constraint violations render a system undeployable. Current orchestration paradigms suffer from sycophantic compliance, context attention decay, and stochastic oscillation during self-correction. We introduce the Convergent AI Agent Framework (CAAF), which transitions agentic workflows from open-loop generation to closed-loop fail-safe determinism via three pillars: (1) Recursive Atomic Decomposition with physical context firewalls; (2) Harness as an Asset, formalizing domain invariants into machine-readable registries enforced by a deterministic Unified Assertion Interface; and (3) Structured Semantic Gradients with State Locking for monotonic non-regression. This paper makes two core claims. First, an industrialization thesis: once domain invariants are formalized as an executable Harness, the Harness itself becomes a first-class enterprise asset that compounds in value as foundation models commoditize, and CAAF's ability to deliver its reliability on commodity-tier models makes fully self-hosted, on-premises deployment architecturally feasible for regulated sectors where cloud APIs are not an option. Second, an architectural claim supported by ablation: CAAF's three pillars address complementary failure surfaces and none alone closes the controllability gap at commodity cost. The paper contributes entirely at the orchestration and industrialization layer. Evidence across two complementary benchmarks, three-tier UAI ablations, multi-agent baselines, and a closed-source commodity family replicated by two independent open-weight families, is reported in the body.