AI and Labor

Momentum

4 papers in the last four weeks, against 2 the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

Jul 13Week of Sep 28

Latest papers 41

Oct 5, 2026cs.AI

From Token-Max to Outcome-Max: How You Use AI Determines Its Productivity

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) models can perform increasingly complex tasks, yet greater AI usage does not necessarily translate into proportional productivity gains. We identify token-max as one source of this inefficiency: when token consumption is treated as productive effort, agents are encouraged to over-exert and expend computation beyond what is necessary. We instead propose outcome-max, which rewards independently verified task completion per unit cost and induces a principled stopping rule. Then, to study these objectives, we develop a three-level simulation framework spanning immediate interaction, long-run behavioral adaptation, and organizational collaboration. Across all three levels, outcome-max improves the efficiency of AI-assisted production while largely preserving verified task performance. To further align these incentives with outcome-max, we introduce OutcomeShare, an incentive mechanism. Theory and simulation show that OutcomeShare can induce participation while generating shared gains for employees, firms, and LLM providers. Together, our results suggest that AI productivity not only depends on model capability, but also on how to construct the objectives governing AI use.
Sep 25, 2026cs.HC

Cognitive Skills in the Age of AI: Computing Students and Experts Perceptions

AI is becoming increasingly integrated into daily workflows, especially in computing. We are gradually shifting towards an AI-rich future, an impending yet unknown one. One important emerging concern is whether we are accordingly preparing our future computing workforce. Further, we need to know what the important cognitive skills are to remain relevant in the computing workforce and if there are changes in cognitive skill importance. To investigate this direction, we conducted a mixed-methods study, collecting perceptions from computing students and computing experts regarding the importance of cognitive skills in the past, present, and future. We report that the perceived importance of most cognitive skills will decrease in the future, with an AI-rich environment, but critical thinking skills remain important. Further, we report reasons collected through interviews on why the importance of cognitive skills will change and how future computing students can prepare for it.
Sep 24, 2026cs.GT

Can Labor Markets Function in the Age of AI? The Evaluation Bottleneck in Hiring

AI-assisted job-search tools have become increasingly popular by making it easier to find and apply to jobs. But by making it easier for applicants to generate and tailor application materials, they can also reduce how informative those materials are about applicant fit. We study this tradeoff in a hiring market where applicants differ in experience and latent match quality and firms use noisy application materials to decide whom to screen. We ask how AI affects downstream screening and hiring, and which applicants are most adversely affected. As application materials become less informative, a Bayesian firm rationally relies more heavily on coarse observables such as prior experience. Among the four applicant types defined by experience and compatibility for the job, inexperienced-compatible applicants are the most exposed: they lack observable experience and lose the individualized information that could distinguish them from other inexperienced candidates. When screening is costly, these changes can also generate inefficient screening failures in which firms screen no applicants or screen only experienced applicants. We then show that multistage hiring can arise as an endogenous firm response: a relatively inexpensive intermediate assessment allows firms to acquire new evidence of fit before costly full screening. This can restore screening opportunities that disappear under one-stage hiring and give inexperienced-compatible applicants a path to screening. Our results show how AI can shift the central friction in hiring from submitting applications to obtaining credible evaluation, creating entry barriers for high-fit workers without prior experience. Multistage hiring can endogenously arise in response, restoring evaluation opportunities that would otherwise disappear and helping preserve market functioning.
Sep 24, 2026cs.HC

Working with Agentic `Teammates': When a New Organizational Actor Collides with the Human Ecosystem of Work

Enterprise AI is transitioning from single-user, reactive tools toward proactive, multi-user 'teammates,' but our empirical understanding of this transition is limited. In this paper, we present an in-situ qualitative study of a persistent, proactive AI agent 'teammate' deployed across multiple teams in a large technology company. Our findings reveal the boundaries of the human-agent workplace are actively in flux, triggering breakdowns and negotiations across: 1) tacit rules of collaborative human workflows, 2) the relational boundaries of this new non-human actor, and 3) the redistribution of trust and human agency. We use these early micro-negotiations as signals to chart a new research, design, and organizational agenda that intentionally preserves human agency in a workplace shared with non-human organizational actors.
Sep 14, 2026cs.AI

When Does AI Augment Work? A Workflow-Level Framework for Human-Agent Collaboration

We aim to characterise the value of artificial intelligence in the workplace. Current studies largely measure this value in terms of the current automation capabilities and public adoption of AI. However, such metrics ignore the greater impacts of human--agent collaboration in transforming the nature of work. To account for this, we must expand the scope of our analysis beyond atomised tasks of today, and instead focus on how AI can augment entire workflows of the future. To ground this analysis, we establish a precise definition of AI augmentation comprising six conditions, spanning durable net value, meaningful human control, accountability and recovery, and long-term human development through learning, career pathways, and job purpose. We elaborate on these conditions and apply the framework in a case study of AI-mediated social surveys. We conclude by outlining how organisations, researchers, and government leaders can use this framework to make sense of the future of work.
Sep 2, 2026cs.AI

AI Contextual Measurement for Recovering Individual and Group-Level Effects: Validation Against Survey Measures and an Occupational Application

Researchers increasingly use artificial intelligence to construct measures of social, organizational, and occupational characteristics that are absent from conventional surveys. We propose AICOME, AI COntextual MEasurement, a framework for evaluating whether AI-derived respondent-level measures can recover individual and group-level effects in contextual models. The key idea is that an AI measure constructed at the respondent level can be used to derive its group-level aggregate and its individual deviation, allowing researchers to estimate both between-group and within-group associations rather than treating AI measurement as response prediction alone. We validate the framework using the 2022 China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), where occupations provide the empirical grouping structure and several job-related survey variables provide validation benchmarks. For computer use, foreign-language use, weekly hours, and management responsibilities, we compare survey measures with AI-derived measures in response-level, model-level, contextual, and boundary-condition validations. The results show that AI contextual measurement can recover much of the contextual-model information contained in observed survey variables when rich respondent and job characteristics are available. Weekly hours provides the strongest validation case, with AI-derived measures reproducing the large negative between- and within-occupation associations with satisfaction observed in CFPS. The framework also identifies clear boundary conditions: performance deteriorates when information is restricted to occupation and basic demographics, and recovery is weaker when several related concepts are treated as simultaneously unobserved. The findings suggest that AICOME is most useful for recovering a limited number of theoretically important constructs from rich existing datasets.
Aug 19, 2026cs.AI

Who Delegates to AI? Evidence from Agent Configurations in Github

A growing body of literature measures the extent to which occupations are exposed to AI, yet existing measures capture where AI could perform tasks rather than whether workers have actually adopted it. We introduce a distinct tier of exposure, delegated exposure, which records whether a worker has committed a task to AI by embedding it into a structured workflow. We operationalize this concept through the Agentic Adoption Index (AAI), measuring how closely an occupation's tasks align with the agentic routines that practitioners have built and shared. Using semantic embeddings of roughly 888,000 agent skill specifications from public GitHub repositories, we compute their similarity to nearly 18,000 O*NET task statements and aggregate these scores to the occupational level. We present three main findings. First, the occupations where task delegation concentrates differ sharply from those identified as most vulnerable by pre-AI automation frameworks. Second, the AAI aligns more closely with measures of technical capability than with measures of current conversational LLM use. Third, for occupations requiring a bachelor's degree or less, the AAI increases alongside average wage levels; however, this relationship reverses for occupations requiring a master's degree or higher, where adoption declines among higher earners. These patterns replicate on an independently collected corpus of agent skills from the Manus Skills Marketplace. This lower adoption among highly educated, high-earning workers may reflect tasks that inherently resist advance specification or professional discretion over the pacing of workflow codification. Distinguishing these mechanisms will require longitudinal measurement.
Aug 9, 2026cs.AI

Unaccountable Delegation, Fading Skills: Mapping the Risks of Workplace AI Agents

To anticipate socio-technical risks from AI agents, organizations need taxonomies to classify them. However, existing AI risk taxonomies focus on broad risks and do not capture job-specific risks introduced by agents. To address this gap, we make three main contributions. First, we developed a multi-layer framework from a literature review of AI agents. The framework models three core components and their interactions: agents, goals, and environment. Second, we embedded this framework in a structured prompt and applied it to descriptions of 2,078 job tasks from the O*NET database, producing 8,356 risk scenarios labeled by severity and deployment mode (automation or augmentation). We validated these scenarios with 45 workers across 10 job roles and an independent LLM judge, confirming their plausibility and alignment with job tasks. Finally, we extended an existing taxonomy to create a 15-category taxonomy of workplace AI agent risks that covers all our risk scenarios. Our analysis highlights four findings. First, augmentation is not inherently safe because overreliance on agents can gradually erode workers' skills and oversight. Second, Erroneous Agent Actions accounts for the largest share of risk scenarios and has the highest concentration of severe risks. Many arise at the human-agent boundary. Third, automation is associated mainly with organizational risks, while augmentation is associated mainly with risks to workers. Fourth, workers found our taxonomy easier to use for a risk classification task than two other taxonomies and preferred it in 64% of non-tied comparisons with a recent generative AI risk taxonomy. These findings show that workplace AI agent risks do not arise from agents alone; they also depend on how people work with agents and how agents are deployed. Safer workplaces require not only safer agents but also carefully designed human-AI agent collaboration.
Aug 7, 2026cs.AI

The Capability Ladder: A Curriculum-Modernization Framework for Workforce Readiness in the AI Era

Artificial intelligence is changing the task composition of computing work faster than curricula and training typically adapt. This is a curriculum-framework paper, grounded in a structured narrative review of labor-market and software-engineering evidence and illustrated through an exploratory pilot course: the review supports the framework, and the pilot illustrates it rather than serving as primary evidence. The central claim is that near-term change is task reallocation rather than full replacement: routine implementation is increasingly automated while verification, systems thinking, security, and the ability to supervise and orchestrate AI (keeping a human in the loop) gain value. We organize the response as a capability-assurance framework anchored by a Capability Ladder: a five-level progression (trigger, automation, workflow, AI agent, agent team) that classifies the operational autonomy of AI-augmented work and the human supervision it requires. We map the ladder to course-level updates, workload-aware assessment, and stackable workforce credentials, and illustrate it through a two-semester pilot of a team-based, no-code course enrolling computing and business students. We argue for targeted modernization around durable capabilities rather than wholesale curriculum replacement, and we are explicit about evidence limits: labor signals are confounded by non-AI forces, industry reports are directional, and the pilot is exploratory.
Jul 22, 2026cs.AI

The Human-AI Substitution Principle: When will you be replaced by AI in your organization?

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming organizations, raising a fundamental organizational and economic question: when will a human employee be replaced by AI? We present an analytical model for studying Human--AI Task Allocation (HAT) in hierarchical organizations. A central feature of the HAT model is that it formally encodes the economic asymmetry between human skill acquisition and AI capability scaling. The HAT model allows us to derive how risk-adjusted costs, skills, organizational depth, deployment scale, strategic adaptation, and risk jointly determine when, where, why, and under what structural conditions human--AI replacement occurs. A key result is the Human--AI Substitution Principle, which provides a precise condition --- grounded in the formal asymmetry assumption --- under which AI replaces human labor. Building on this result, we show that AI adoption can produce abrupt workforce transitions, hybrid human--AI organizations, including cases where risk heterogeneity sustains human and AI roles without requiring a minimum-human-fraction constraint, and flatter managerial hierarchies with wider spans of control. The HAT model identifies structural conditions under which middle-management roles exhibit elevated vulnerability to automation, and shows that the vulnerability of highly skilled workers depends on a skill threshold shaped by organizational depth, baseline costs, and risk differentials. More broadly, the paper connects automation economics, organizational design, AI governance, and workforce planning into a unified theory of AI-driven organizational transformation.
Jul 22, 2026econ.GN

Google's AI & Economy ATLAS v1.0: Mapping Gemini Usage in the Economy

This paper introduces the AI & Economy ATLAS (Activity, Task, Landscape, and Adoption Study), an ongoing economic research initiative using Google AI usage data. The first iteration of ATLAS is built on 15 million de-identified interactions across the Gemini App, Google AI Mode, and Gemini API. Using privacy-preserving algorithms as well as established and bespoke classification methods, we map AI usage to over 800 occupations, 4000 tasks, 300 household activities, 150 countries, and 140 languages. We then make a number of observations on what the data reveals about AI's diffusion, and its usage at work and in day-to-day life. In the workplace, we show that while AI adoption spans occupations covering just above 88% of US employment, penetration remains shallow and overwhelmingly collaborative in nature, with end-to-end task automation limited in scope. Outside of work, AI spans activities making up about 98% of Americans' non-sleep time, with disproportionately high use in high-friction tasks such as engaging with government and professional service providers, likely delivering economic value that standard national accounts may miss. Globally, adoption scales with national wealth and has broad linguistic distribution, with English queries representing only around a third of volume. As we build upon ATLAS and expand its scope and capabilities, we will continue to provide large-scale empirical evidence to inform the public, policy and academic questions about the ongoing AI transformation.
Jul 17, 2026cs.MA

When Not to Automate: A Formal Protocol for Human Preservation in AI-Optimized Organizations

Standard automation ROI misses four categories of systemic risk -- tacit knowledge erosion, resilience reduction, regulatory exposure, and socio-institutional capital degradation -- that affect long-term organizational performance. PHP-AIO (Protocol for Human Preservation in AI-Optimized Organizations) is a five-gate sequential decision protocol with a final composite check that quantifies these unpriced systemic risks at the role level and produces auditable automation decisions. A closed-form automation-debt measure (ρ(P)ρ(P)) formalises how role-level decisions accumulate across multi-step processes; its warning is neutralised only by a regulator-mandated human-in-the-loop anchor. Applied to stylised profiles of representative internal roles, PHP-AIO produces distinct outcomes -- automate, augment, hybrid, and preserve -- for candidates that standard cost-benefit analysis would uniformly automate. Threshold sensitivity analysis confirms the gate decisions are robust to upward perturbations of at least 14% in three of four representative cases. Keywords: AI governance, automation decision, human oversight, tacit knowledge, organizational resilience, financial services
Jul 3, 2026cs.GT

Teaming Up with AI: Coordination and Cooperation

Successful diffusion of AI in the workforce hinges on the economic value that AI brings to human endeavors. Bringing AI into the workforce is more than deploying a powerful new technology -- it is launching a new form of collaboration. Each human worker is now endowed with a team of AI agents; work can be delegated to these agents, and the role of the human shifts towards managing and monitoring. How can we maximize the economic value from collaboration with AI in the workforce? How can we make it a "true" collaboration that empowers human workers rather than replacing them? We take an approach that combines the fields of theoretical computer science and economics, highlighting the potential of algorithmic tools grounded in economic principles to improve the effectiveness of human-AI collective work. We consider two tiers of tools: (1) tools for better coordination, via algorithmic management of interdependencies; (2) tools for better cooperation, via contractual incentive alignment. We show how a principled approach based on algorithmic and economic research enhances both coordination and cooperation, charting a pathway for future research to inform AI markets.
Jun 27, 2026cs.AI

Managing the Human Fallback: Skill Investment Under Improving AI and Worker Mobility

When firms deploy autonomous AI, they must decide how much work to leave to the system and how much to keep workers engaged. This decision affects current output and future human capital. We develop a parsimonious two-period model in which AI may outperform the worker when it functions, but may fail with positive probability. A firm chooses worker engagement; engagement lowers current output for below-benchmark workers, but changes future skill through learning and erosion. We distinguish two dimensions of AI progress: capability, the system's output when it works, and reliability, the probability that it works. In a single-firm benchmark, engagement is valuable only as fallback investment. The firm engages the least-skilled workers most, because they have the largest skill gaps and are least costly to bring toward a useful fallback level. With worker mobility, engagement also affects labor-market sorting: workers prefer jobs that build more valuable skill trajectories. This sorting motive targets higher-skill workers near the AI frontier, where skill gains are more valuable and engagement is less costly. Mobility can therefore reverse the engagement pattern, shifting investment from the least-skilled toward the most-skilled workers below the AI benchmark. Mobility also reshapes how AI progress affects engagement: greater capability raises engagement by increasing the value of the skill trajectory a firm offers, whereas greater reliability can raise or lower it because it reduces fallback need while also changing learning opportunities. Under worker mobility, human-AI work design becomes a problem of human-capital investment, in which allocating work today shapes future skill.
Jun 27, 2026cs.CL

Can LLMs Hire Fairly? Racial Bias in Resume Screening

We audit fourteen mainstream large language models (LLMs) for hiring discrimination using the paired-resume methodology of Kline, Rose, and Walters (2022). The sole 2023-vintage model reproduces the pro-White callback gap documented in field experiments on labor market discrimination (+2.12+2.12 pp, significant at the 1% level). Every model released in 2024 or after shows either a null gap or a significant pro-Black reversal (up to −3.01-3.01 pp). The same pattern holds on the gender axis. Based on 24,024 paired postings per model across 14 models, our results document a reversal in the direction of algorithmic hiring bias across model generations.
Jun 22, 2026cs.AI

AI Exposure Scores: what they measure, what they miss, and what comes next

A set of exposure scores calculated in 2023 has become a central empirical input to the future of work debate. Produced by Eloundou et al. (2023) and referred to here as the GPTs are GPTs scores, they define exposure as the share of occupational tasks a large language model can assist with. This work is a genuine methodological contribution, but as the scores travel from the time and place they were produced, the limitations the authors named do not always travel with them. Two gaps have widened as a result. The first is structural, between what static exposure scores measure and what policy questions actually require. Taking the diffusion of these scores as a case study, we show how their temporal, geographic, and ontological limitations compound in policy-facing analyses, and we survey five families of research responding to these limits: dynamic and benchmark-based measures, ensemble methods, task-framework extensions, worker-centered metrics, and adoption and usage data. The second gap is the one we argue needs more attention: the coordination between researchers and policymakers. The policy-relevant work which ask who is harmed, who benefits, how, and when, continues to reference the static GPTs are GPTs scores without engagement with the methodological updates that would let these questions be answered more reliably. We then ask what additional steps towards navigating uncertainty remain: ex-post frameworks and the deliberate, political work of reimagining what futures are worthy of building towards are. Closing the research-policy gap is a shared task: policymakers must widen their evidence base, engage workers as epistemic partners, and shift from prediction to preparedness; researchers must build data infrastructure, adopt participatory methods, and write with policymakers in mind. Better measurement matters, but it will not close the second gap alone.
Jun 8, 2026cs.CY

The Jagged Global Economy: Frontier AI Unevenly Exposes National Economies

Frontier AI's labor-market effects matter to workers, firms, and policymakers, but current evidence generally comes from a handful of high-income economies. The capabilities of frontier AI are jagged across work tasks and national economies diverge in how they allocate human labor. We introduce a national AI exposure metric that combines occupation-level exposure scores and international employment data for 141 countries. We find that high income countries are substantially more exposed than low income countries and that Europe and Central Asia are 50 percent more exposed than Sub-Saharan Africa. We also find a gender gap: women are more exposed than men in 91 percent of countries, driven by their concentration in white-collar and sales occupations. The exceptions are countries where women's employment remains concentrated in agriculture and household enterprises. We validate our national AI exposure estimates by showing they predict national AI adoption statistics published by Anthropic, Microsoft, and OpenAI. Beyond direct exposure, we identify a new mechanism for indirect exposure due to cross-country income dependencies. Some nations such as Tajikistan depend heavily on foreign workers remitting money back to their home countries: Tajikistan's direct exposure to frontier AI is below-average but because 37 percent of Tajikistan GDP is Russian remittance and Russia is very exposed, Tajikistan's remittance-accounted exposure becomes above-average. Our research shows that national variation in exposure is large enough that policy responses calibrated to U.S. or European labor markets will not generalize.
Jun 3, 2026cs.LG

Worker Utility as Hysteresis: A Preisach Model of Transaction Acceptance in Gig Labour Markets

Worker utility is not observed -- only its consequence is. Each gig transaction produces a single bit: accepted or rejected. We argue this structure points directly to the Preisach hysteresis model as the natural representation of latent worker preferences. The Preisach operator models aggregate output as an integral over a population of binary threshold elements -- precisely the structure that emerges when heterogeneous workers each carry a private acceptance wage. We estimate two latent utility surfaces: acceptance utility U_1(X) and rejection utility U_0(X), via a dual-output neural network (shared layers 256->128, margin loss enforcing U_1 >= U_0). Classification reduces to the Preisach gap U_1(X) - U_0(X), passed into an XGBoost classifier alongside clip-stabilised price-to-threshold encodings. On 36,891 gig transactions, this pipeline achieves Jaccard = 0.827 and ROC AUC = 0.799. The price-to-threshold encoding accounts for +11.0 pp AUC over raw utility features. The model confirms the directional asymmetry hysteresis predicts: price decreases depress completion rates more than equivalent increases raise them. Applied to the full dataset, the model's recommendations simultaneously reduce the total wage bill by 21.3% and increase expected fill rate by 9.7 pp. For 74.2% of transactions, P(accept) already exceeds 0.80; reducing the wage keeps it above threshold (mean post-cut P = 0.972), releasing cost savings (median 31%). For the remaining 25.4%, a median 7% wage increase recovers +43 pp acceptance. A model without an explicit indifference zone cannot execute both moves simultaneously.
May 31, 2026cs.CY

Measuring the Occupation-Level Impact of AbbVie Intelligence: AI Applicability Analysis, 2024-2025

This paper presents an empirical analysis of AbbVie Intelligence's measurable impact on employee work activities across 192 distinct occupations in 2024 and 2025. Drawing on 598,744 de-identified AI conversations classified according to the O*NET Intermediate Work Activity (IWA) taxonomy, we compute occupation-level AI Applicability Scores that quantify the extent to which AI tools can meaningfully assist or automate real work at scale. Three convergent analyses are conducted: (1) longitudinal year-over-year trends from 2024 to 2025, (2) a quasi-experimental pre-post evaluation of the AbbVie Intelligence version 3 platform release in August 2025, and (3) a pre-post evaluation of the AbbVie AI Learning Summit held in November 22025. Results demonstrate statistically significant improvements across all three dimensions. Mean AI Applicability Scores rose substantially from 2024 to 2025; the platform release product a +10.0% gain (p<0.001); and the AI Learning Summit produced a +6.68% gain (p<0.001). These findings establish that both technological platform enhancements and structured enterprise AI eduction programs independently and substantially expand the reach of AI across the AbbVie workforce.
May 28, 2026cs.CL

Attention Asymmetry in AI Layoff Discourse on X: A Computational Analysis of Capital vs Labour Amplification

When workers lose jobs to AI-driven restructuring, two very different conversations happen on X (formerly Twitter) at the same time. Tech executives and AI researchers talk about productivity, transformation, and opportunity. Laid-off workers and labour critics talk about job loss, uncertainty, and fear. This paper asks a simple question: which conversation gets more reach? We report three studies using two collection methods and 763 tweets from 20 named public accounts. Study 1 used keyword-based collection (n=392) and found no significant difference between corpora (p=0.891), revealing that keyword search is too noisy for this task. Study 2 used account-based collection (n=96) and found a 3.12x mean amplification advantage for capital discourse over labour discourse (p=0.000003, Cohen's d=0.555). Study 3 combined both methods (n=763) and confirmed the finding at 4.18x mean and 10.77x median amplification ratio (p<0.000001). Critically, after normalising for follower count, the asymmetry persists at 2.69x (p=0.000009, Cohen's d=0.491), demonstrating that the effect is not simply a consequence of capital accounts having larger audiences. The finding is robust across all tested amplification metric weightings. We introduce the Amplification Ratio and Amplification Normalisation Index as simple metrics for measuring platform-level discourse inequality. A cross-platform replication on Reddit (n=647 posts) did not replicate the finding, suggesting the asymmetry may be specific to X's account-based amplification architecture. We discuss the methodological implications for cross-platform discourse analysis.
May 27, 2026cs.HC

AI in the Workplace: The Impact of AI on Perceived Job Decency and Meaningfulness

The proliferation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in workplaces is transforming how we work. While existing research on human-AI collaboration at work often prioritizes performance, less is known about their experiential outcomes. Through interviews with 24 employees across Information Technology (IT), service-based, and healthcare sectors, this paper examines AI's impact on job satisfaction via perceptions of job decency and meaningfulness, now and in the future. Our results reveal that the anticipated impact of AI on overall job satisfaction varies with the occupational domain, with differing perceptions of its underlying decency and meaningfulness. For instance, IT and healthcare anticipate increased satisfaction with decency aspects like working hours but decreased satisfaction with meaningfulness aspects like social image due to misconceptions about AI handling most of their tasks. Conversely, service workers foresee no improvement in their working hours but a higher social standing due to the perceived status boost associated with working with AI.
May 25, 2026cs.AI

JobBench: Aligning Agent Work With Human Will

Current benchmarks for occupational AI agents are scoped primarily by economic values, telling a replacement story. We introduce JobBench, which evaluates AI agents on the workflows that experts identify as high-priority for delegation, empowering humans based on their needs instead of replacing them with GDP value. JobBench covers 130 agentic tasks across 35 occupations. Each task is packaged as a workspace of heterogeneous reference files, requiring the agent to reason through the cluttered information streams of real professional work. Outputs are graded by a fact-anchored chain of rubrics, averaging 35.6 binary criteria per task. We evaluate 36 models; the strongest, Claude Opus~4.7 under Claude Code, reaches only 45.9 %. We hope JobBench shifts the community's target labour-market effect from replacement to enhancement: building agents that do what humans actually want delegated, not only what is most economically valuable.
May 23, 2026cs.CY

The Open Source Economic Index of AI Adoption and Capability

We work towards measuring both AI adoption and the capability of AI to perform discrete labor tasks across various occupations. To measure adoption, we develop an open-source economic index that uses publicly available user-LLM chat data and ONET tasks to replicate studies produced by frontier AI labs, finding that occupations in the finance, computer science, and arts sectors are those with the highest adoption rates. To measure capabilities, we build a system that generates benchmark scenarios grounded in ONET occupations, tasks, and model-context-protocol (MCP) servers. We test Kimi-k2.5 with an OpenAI agents SDK harness on scenarios across 9 occupations that appear frequently in our index, finding that AI correctly executes high-level workflows but often errs in the granular details (such as specific tool calls used).
May 22, 2026econ.GN

Generative AI and the Reorganization of Labor Demand

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is expected to transform work, but less is known about how firms reorganize labor demand as the technology diffuses. Existing research has largely focused on which occupations are exposed to AI or whether exposed jobs decline. We extend this debate by examining whether firms adjust by changing where they hire, what jobs contain, or both. Using a nationwide dataset of job postings in the United States, covering all sectors of the economy, we construct a dynamic, posting-level measure of generative AI exposure with a two-stage large language model pipeline. The pipeline identifies the tasks described in each posting and classifies the extent to which generative AI can perform or assist them. We then decompose changes in aggregate exposure into two margins: reallocation of demand across jobs and redesign of tasks within jobs. We document three main findings. First, generative AI exposure is dynamic rather than fixed, changing substantially over time. Second, labor demand adjusts through both margins. Hiring reallocation explains the largest share of the aggregate decline in exposure, accounting for 52% on average, while within-job redesign becomes increasingly important, accounting for 39.5%. A complementary Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition shows that shifts in occupational composition account for about 90% of the exposure change attributable to observable job characteristics. Third, adjustment differs across the job ladder. Senior jobs adjust earlier and mainly through reallocation, whereas junior jobs adjust through a broader mix of reallocation, redesign, and their interaction. These findings suggest that labor-market adjustment to generative AI is a process of organizational reconfiguration, in which firms reshape both hiring demand and the task architecture of work.
May 21, 2026cs.AI

Beyond the Org Chart: AI and the Transformation of Invisible Work

An increasing number of news and research articles report that AI adoption is allowing professionals to blur and extend the boundaries of their corporate roles. With the goal of understanding how work processes might be changing in an AI-forward company, we interviewed 24 product-focused individuals at a large technology firm about how AI has impacted their own work, their work within their product team, and their professional interactions. Our conversations suggest that AI is not only changing formal role responsibilities and collaborations between those roles, but also changing informal cultural practices like professional mentoring that are key to helping professionals settle in their positions, stay engaged with their work, and grow their careers. Some of these changes are positive, such as smoother collaboration between peers, but other changes are more nuanced and put the typical career growth opportunities, like receiving feedback from professional networks and promoting leadership and mentorship, at risk. We propose steps that AI companies can take to make the invisible work more visible. Additionally, we propose efforts that individuals and leaders can take to support their colleagues through AI transformation while preserving healthy company cultures that support diverse thinking, collaboration, and informal interactions.
May 20, 2026cs.AI

Who Uses AI? Platform Selection and the Measurement of Occupational AI Exposure

Conversation logs from AI platforms are increasingly used to measure occupational exposure to artificial intelligence, but the users observed in these logs are not the workforce. We show that platform-derived exposure scores combine task-level AI applicability with the occupational composition of the platform's user base. Holding the empirical design fixed, changing only the platform input changes the post-ChatGPT employment coefficient by a factor of 1.9, and consumer and enterprise channels within the same vendor disagree in sign. We formalize the resulting non-classical measurement error, decompose it into between- and within-occupation selection, and construct workforce-reweighted partial-identification bounds. Reweighting to Bureau of Labor Statistics employment shares attenuates estimates by 42 to 93 percent. The bias captures augmentation among observed users more directly than substitution in the workforce.
May 18, 2026cs.HC

HAAS Studio: A Tool for Simulating, Benchmarking, and Governing Human-AI Work Allocation

We present HAAS Studio, a simulation and decision-support tool for policy-aware adaptive task allocation between humans and AI systems. HAAS Studio turns the HAAS framework into an interactive environment for asking a practical deployment question: before introducing AI into a workflow, how can a team compare allocation strategies, inspect governance tradeoffs, and derive a defensible task-level operating model? The tool combines a five-dimensional cognitive representation of subtasks, a five-mode collaboration spectrum, adaptive allocation with multi-armed bandits (UCB1, Discounted UCB, LinUCB, and Thompson Sampling), oracle counterfactual regret analysis, contract-based governance with four independent guards, and a multi-criteria decision-support layer that separates efficient strategies from deployable options. It also models human-AI coevolution across six layers, monitors deskilling risk through sliding-window exposure metrics and benchmark runners, and supports persistent worker modeling through Live Twin and Planning modules. Three domain packs are included: software engineering, manufacturing, and healthcare. Each provides a task catalog, worker profiles, and KPI vocabulary, while the architecture allows new domains to be added without modifying the simulation core. The release includes 16 company profiles and six governance benchmark suites. This paper focuses on the tool, including its modeling assumptions, layered architecture, interaction workflow, built-in evidence assets, task-oriented recipes, case-study protocols, and a compact reproducible demonstration snapshot. A decision-guidance layer translates benchmark outputs into deployment decisions through structured patterns, heuristics, and a decision matrix.
May 18, 2026cs.HC

Toward an AI-Powered Computational Testbed for Workforce Policy

Workforce transformations are difficult to forecast and costly to mismanage. In particular, the integration of artificial intelligence into knowledge work currently affects a substantial share of the global workforce, yet this transition proceeds without tools to forecast how individual employees will respond psychologically and behaviorally. We combine recent advances in LLM-powered generative agents with foundational management science and organizational behavior research to propose dynamic employee agents. Among consenting populations, these agents can be seeded with HR records, validated psychometric measures, and digital activity data to simulate employees' cognitive, emotional, and behavioral trajectories across successive workdays during planned organizational changes. In this article, we detail the computational architecture required to construct this simulation platform and define the privacy, accuracy, and representativeness safeguards necessary for responsible deployment. We argue that establishing this prospective forecasting infrastructure is a critical technical requirement for managing the current global workforce realignment around AI.
May 16, 2026econ.GN

Global Automation Atlas

Automation affects the labour content of work differently across different contexts. Yet, most existing exposure measures assign fixed scores to tasks or occupations, limiting comparisons of automation exposure across countries. We develop a task-based and country-specific approach to classify automation exposure across the world to disentangle labor-substituting from labor-augmenting automation, the relevant technology channel, and the material role of AI. Our measure spans 124 countries, generating an atlas of 2.33 million task-country labels for economies covering 99% of world population and GDP. We present five descriptive results. First, exposure is highly uneven, ranging from 3.3% of tasks in South Sudan to 61.6% in China, and rises strongly with income, although substantial variation remains within income groups. Second, across countries, exposed tasks are skewed towards substitution rather than augmentation, but low-income countries are disproportionately exposed to substitution, whereas middle-income countries are more heterogeneous. Third, less technologically advanced forms of automation account for more than half of exposed tasks in low-income countries but about one quarter in high-income countries; while other more complex channels generally rise with income levels. Fourth, AI tends to be less prevalent in simpler channels of automation, but also more prevalent in labour-substituting margins in lower income settings and to augment labour in higher income settings. Fifth, we find that females seem to be disproportionately more exposed to labour-substituting automation than males. Our methodology provides a basis for comparing automation exposure across development stages, linking it with cross-country data and allowing us to treat exposure levels, labour margins, technological channels and AI involvement as separate dimensions.
May 15, 2026cs.CY

Will AI Agents Free Us From Meaningless Work? A Human-Centered Analysis

Some claim that AI agents will free workers from the boring parts of their jobs, yet little is known about how workers themselves identify which tasks should be automated. Prior research focuses on occupations, overlooking that workers experience varying levels of meaning across tasks within the same role. We address this gap with a task-level analysis grounded in Graeber's theory of bullshit jobs. Using ratings from 202 workers on 171 workplace tasks, we (1) validate a five-item scale of perceived bullshitness, (2) show that perceived bullshitness strongly predicts desire for AI delegation, and (3) find that such tasks are also seen as requiring less human oversight. Together, these findings suggest that tasks perceived as bullshit are natural candidates for AI delegation, aligning worker preferences with perceived feasibility.