Benchmark Auditing
Momentum
17 papers in the last four weeks, up 325% on the four weeks before. 0.2% of all new papers.
Latest papers 60
Execution-based task verifiers decide whether an agent succeeded. We audit shipped AppWorld and WorkArena verifiers with source-informed mutation tests. The main audit never modifies a shipped checker. In AppWorld, duplicating a non-idempotent write creates an extra record while preserving every checked field value. The verifier accepts all three task variants from two of five eligible generators: 6/15 constructed effects. A cardinality patch applied to checker copies after the census makes all six cells fail while preserving valid controls. In WorkArena, we prospectively rerun 23 extra-field candidates selected for earlier checker-PASS outcomes. Independent Table API readback confirms nondefault persisted values in 21, while all 23 receive PASS. Two requested strings are aliases of stored defaults. The 21 confirmed wrong effects span three form templates. These selected cases confirm wrong effects under the audit's protocol; they do not estimate a population rate. No other construction produces an independently confirmed false accept. Other checker-PASS cases are effect-correct degeneracies. We report zero-PASS families separately because retained evidence differs. In fixed intent-swap grids, the checkers return no PASS on 2,689 off-diagonal executions. This is a rejection census: 57 WorkArena cells use session-scoped evidence; the other 2,632 lack classified rejection causes and independent target ground truth. Each increment is specified before its own cells are scored. A supplement accompanies the OpenReview submission with the construction grammar, evidence, content-bound stage lineage and count reproducer.
Measurement-First Auditing of Agentic Leaderboards: Contamination Susceptibility, Matched-Control Re-evaluation, and Scorer Validation
Agentic leaderboards increasingly evaluate systems on public benchmarks whose task statements and solution-bearing artifacts can remain accessible. We propose a measurement-first audit framework that distinguishes contamination claims according to the evidence required to support them. It separates three channels that require different evidence: training-time exposure, evaluation-time retrieval, and pipeline/scaffold leakage. Each channel is coded as open, partial, closed, or unknown under a fail-closed rule. Across nine Holistic Agent Leaderboard (HAL) configurations, none of the 27 channel assessments was coded closed, but incidents were confirmed in four configurations. We then apply the behavioral component of the framework to a reported file-localization gap on SWE-bench Verified, using an outcome-blind, same-repository matched-control design with symmetric prompt-leakage screening, paired and repository-aware uncertainty analyses, and scorer validation, evaluated on GPT-4.1 and DeepSeek-V4-Flash. Among the 100 pairs retained after symmetric screening and the pair-integrity exclusion, GPT-4.1 showed a -point pair-weighted Top-3 benchmark-associated gap, but the 95% intervals from both the prespecified paired-bootstrap procedure and the post-hoc repository-balanced analysis included zero, leaving the benchmark-associated gap inconclusive. The reproduction scorer did not pass its validation gate: against consensus human labels, sufficient scorer sensitivity could not be established for either model, and both DeepSeek-V4-Flash firings on correct-gold comparisons were false positives. Without provenance evidence, appropriate controls, symmetric leakage screening, and validated scorers, stronger contamination claims are not warranted. The results do not establish training-data membership, contamination prevalence, or benchmark-induced score inflation.
Protocol-Sensitive Evaluation of Log Anomaly Detection: Component Costs and Target-Access Sensitivity on HDFS and BGL
Protocol choices can change the conclusions drawn from log anomaly detection benchmarks even when detector settings are fixed. We present a joint empirical study of split construction, representation visibility, and component costs using six fixed count, sequence, and semantic configurations on Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) and Blue Gene/L (BGL) logs. Random splits place several configurations near the average-precision ceiling, whereas group-disjoint HDFS and chronological BGL evaluation produce lower scores and different observed orderings. At a fixed BGL cutoff, parser choice spans 0.124 in semantic XGBoost mean average precision while preserving its lead over count XGBoost; the earliest rolling period reverses that ordering. A two-factor cross-system ablation contrasts source-only representations with offline transductive access to unlabeled target templates through the representation corpus and inverse document frequency: HDFS-to-BGL mean average precision moves from 0.191 with source-only access to 0.325 with union-corpus, target-IDF access, and the intermediate conditions reveal direction-dependent interactions in average precision and retrieval at fixed review budgets. Component-level profiling separates parsing and representation costs from classifier training, prediction, and storage. Together, these findings connect detector comparisons to the test population, preprocessing state, visible information, and measured pipeline stages, and identify the protocol fields needed alongside a score to support interpretable comparisons of log anomaly detection accuracy and resource use.
SALUS: Automated Auditing of NL-to-SQL Benchmarks through Weak Supervision of Multi-Agent Output
Natural language to SQL (NL-to-SQL) benchmarks are foundational to progress in data analysis research, yet recent work has shown that widely-used benchmarks contain significant annotation errors. These errors silently corrupt evaluation metrics, penalize correct model output, and distort the field's understanding of state-of-the-art performance. We present SALUS, a system that automatically detects annotation errors in NL-to-SQL benchmarks. SALUS frames benchmark auditing as a weakly supervised error detection: SQL generated by multiple LLM agents drive a suite of complementary weak-labeling functions. By passing this noisy vote matrix through a generative label model, we extract high-confidence training samples without requiring human ground truth. These samples train a decision plane that maps gold SQL query features to per-agent trustworthiness, allowing SALUS to intelligently fuse reliability estimates with raw verdicts for rigorous benchmark error detection. We evaluate on BIRD-Clean-xs, a benchmark of 298 BIRD development tasks with manually verified correctness labels. SALUS achieves F1 = 0.9194, significantly outperforming the state-of-the-art baselines. Applying SALUS to the full development sets, we estimate annotation error rates of approximately 37% on BIRD and 27% on Spider.
Cheap to Draw, Expensive to Trust: Certifying Test-Time Scaling Curves
Sampling several answers and keeping the one a verifier scores highest is one of the simplest ways to buy accuracy at test time. Its effect is reported as a scaling curve: accuracy against the number of sampled answers. The curve is cheap to draw and expensive to trust. A budget read off it is chosen after looking at every point, so only a band that covers all budgets at once protects the choice, and on a 100-question benchmark a fixed exact-binomial design needs 192,000 generated answers to certify 64 budgets to within at 95%. Most of that cost pays for the wrong uncertainty. A benchmark is a fixed list of questions; at budget 64, about three quarters of the variance of a selected answer's correctness lies between questions, and an audit that revisits every question need not pay for it. We derive the minimax cost of certifying the whole curve, up to logarithmic factors. It has three parts: calibrating the tail of the score distribution, telling the questions apart, and within-question noise summed along the curve. At a single benchmark the last part sharpens to the variance of one answer's influence under the best allocation of answers to questions, which every valid audit pays and an audit that learns the allocation attains, up to a logarithm, as the precision grows. A paired audit built on an exponential inequality for two independent draws at the same question needs no pilot. On 185 held-out score pools it uses 0.74 times the answers of the cheapest competing certified audit at 64 budgets and 0.53 times at 1,024, and on a newly generated MMLU-Pro study it certified the curve with 79,133 answers, within 0.6% of what a cost law fitted beforehand predicted from the study's within-question variance. The same paths certify pass@ and majority voting, and the bands extend to populations of questions and to answers that depend on earlier ones.
Do Agent Benchmarks Do What They Say? An Executable-Contract Audit of Tool-Using Agent Environments
Tool-using agents are entering settings where a wrong action carries real cost, and the benchmarks certifying them grade what each simulated tool call reports having done, assuming the tool did what its interface advertises. The audit taxonomies we survey publish no category for that assumption, and a defect beneath a score is present on every rerun. We treat a tool's advertised surfaces as an executable contract, check the implementation against it, and trace each score's provenance through the task files and evaluator code to the verdicts that derive from state a defective tool should have written. Across 34 audited mutating tools in four benchmarks we confirm seven tool defects and one evaluator property at pinned commits. On injected defects the checker raised no false positive in 25 flags, flagged 2 of 5 negative controls, and missed most: in 29 of 33 scored misses a clause covered the defect but no probe revealed it. The checker's own static half, run alone, flags 14 of 17 confirmed sites, so on these findings the dynamic half confirms and traces rather than discovers. Twelve further AgentDojo tools, with six held-out tools and the seven audited first, complete its 25-tool mutating surface, on which at least 5 tools diverge from their advertised surface as our contracts read it, a rate for AgentDojo alone. No gold trajectory reaches either tau2-bench defect; on 1,120 paths built to isolate the telecom defect, a number fixed by construction, the evaluator rewards a refuel of a suspended line and fails the repaired tool. The clearest case is a clinical benchmark whose tool tells the agent each write executed under a documented no-write design its interface does not disclose; its grader takes that message as evidence, so its action success rate records whether a request carried the expected payload, not whether any record changed.
From Dead Code and Static Requirements to Working Engines: Software Revival with Coding Agents
Can coding agents restore software that no longer runs while preserving its underlying methods, and reconstruct industrial software engines from open specifications? Here we introduce ReviveBench, a benchmark with two task families evaluated by hidden verifiers calibrated against native execution environments, established engineering tools, or purpose-built reference implementations. The revival family comprises ten tasks involving dependency incompatibilities, deleted core modules, legacy builds, and a GPU-based foundation model. Every starting workspace fails verification, and the strongest evaluated model passes all ten tasks in at least one run each. In contamination-control experiments, identifier obfuscation reduces line similarity to the original implementations from 0.51--0.96 to 0.03--0.44 without reducing the observed pass rate of any evaluated model. On repositories created after the stated knowledge cutoffs, the strongest model passes eight of nine runs. The reconstruction family comprises thirteen tasks spanning numerical, geometric, hardware, and transactional systems (e.g. CAD and CRM). Two models meet the benchmark's pass criteria on all thirteen, although our audit shows that the CFD task cannot establish numerical-solver capability. Benchmark construction and auditing uncover 28 verifier defects, including 24 false negatives and two false positives. These findings show that executable verification can itself introduce substantial measurement error. We present three practical checks: test whether prescribed methods can reach the grading thresholds, investigate agreement among independently generated candidates, and recompute diagnostics from submitted artifacts. ReviveBench thus provides both an evaluation of software revival and engine reconstruction, and cases in validating the verifiers used to measure coding agents for software design.
Maintaining Benchmarks Against Increasingly Capable Agents: Detection and Remediation of Unearned Passes
Agentic benchmarks guide model selection and training. Yet an agent can pass a task without demonstrating the intended capability. Such outcomes constitute unearned passes; their proportion among all passes defines the integrity gap. As agents improve, benchmark surfaces that once seemed harmless can become exploitable, making benchmark validity an ongoing maintenance problem. We introduce a process-verification framework that audits passing trajectories, distinguishes evidenced reward hacking from verifier weakness, and localizes exploitable surfaces for repair. Across 3,810 passing trajectories from 29 model-benchmark cohorts, confirmed violations often increase with model generation but not monotonically. On SWEBench Pro V1.0, confirmed violation rates rise from 24% to 73% between Opus 4.7 and Fable 5 on matched tasks; later cohorts fall to 11% for Fable 5.1 and 0% for GPT-6 Astra. These comparisons are descriptive: configurations were not normalized, and the latest models also pass fewer exploitable tasks. Violations concentrate around a small set of recurring surfaces, especially unintended access to reference solutions through git history. Three repair case studies across two benchmarks show why blocking a recorded exploit is insufficient: the same protected information can remain accessible through another route. Therefore, we combine minimal patches with exploit replay and fresh agent evaluation, auditing new passes under the original standard. No evaluated attempt against the final patches reached the protected channel, and every post-patch pass was judged legitimate. Benchmark integrity requires ongoing maintenance: audit passing behavior, repair the enabling surface, and re-evaluate both exploit access and legitimate solvability.
The Selection Rule Decides the Winner: A Pre-Registered Audit of Open-Set Graph Anomaly Detection
Open-set graph anomaly detection trains on a few labeled anomalies from one class and must also find anomaly classes that were never labeled. Published results share three conventions: the test score is read at the best epoch on the test set, baseline numbers are copied from earlier papers, and most anomalies are minority classes relabeled as anomalous. We ask how much of the reported ranking these conventions decide. We re-run two recent methods, DEMO and NSReg, together with OUTPOST, a small first-order detector built for this study. All three use one protocol with identical seeds and splits on eight graphs (seven for the baselines, which cannot run on ogbn-mag), ten seeds each, and every run is scored under both the best-epoch rule and a deployable validation rule. Before the runs that test them, we registered 40 predictions. Three findings hold. First, the rule changes the leader: under the best-epoch rule, OUTPOST and NSReg each lead three of seven graphs, while under the validation rule, NSReg leads five. Second, the best-epoch bonus depends on how the benchmark was built: 0.045--0.080 AUC-ROC on the three small relabeled-class graphs and 0.002--0.014 on the three real fraud graphs. Third, pseudo-labeling in OUTPOST is worth 0.038--0.065 AUC-ROC on the same three graphs but gives no benefit on any real fraud graph. We also show that a 0.002 tie band for hyperparameter selection lies below the paired standard error on all six graphs tested, even at ten seeds. Twelve of our 40 predictions were falsified, and we report them. We close with a short reporting checklist.
Can LLMs Catch a Rigged Backtest? A Clean-Control Calibration Benchmark
Backtest auditing is a calibration problem: high flaw recall is not useful when the model falsely flags matched clean strategies. We build a 96-item paired benchmark in which every flawed backtest has a clean control that holds strategy, dates, code style, labels, and reporting scaffold fixed while changing one methodology detail. A deterministic scorer separates flaw recall, clean-control false positives, evidence localization, and fix relevance. Over 1440 cached audits from four text endpoints, the primary DeepSeek auditor reaches 100.0% closed and clean-aware code recall, but open prompts over-flag 93.8% of clean code controls, and clean-aware all-three specificity is 87.5% even where recall saturates. A clean-aware warning drops DeepSeek code false positives from 20.8% (95% CI 11.7--34.3) to 0.0% (0.0--7.4) at unchanged recall, while the budget anchor still flags 38/48 clean controls under the same prompt. Reporting recall alone would rank three of these four models identically; reporting the clean-control rate separates them by 79 points.
Does Graph Structure Earn Its Place in Microservice Root-Cause Analysis? A Controlled Study on RCAEval, and What the Benchmark Was Really Measuring
Graph neural networks dominate recent work on microservice root-cause analysis, yet recent results question whether the graph contributes. Those results compare whole pipelines, so when a flat model wins one cannot tell whether structure is useless or redundant. We run the comparison they imply on RCAEval: three learned arms with identical features, optimiser, validation split, early-stopping rule and scoring head, in which a single term separates the graph arms. Across two RCAEval benchmarks, two topology sources and four regimes we find no reliable graph-specific effect: in-distribution the graph model leads the conventional flat model by 0.003 Avg@5 (p = 0.844, n = 6 disjoint folds). Auditing the pipeline surfaced two benchmark properties that condition any result on it. RCAEval injects faults into only five services per system while exposing 12 to 70 in telemetry, and the headline metric is Avg@5: a ranker reading no telemetry at all places the true culprit in the top five on 99.7 percent of held-out incidents, scoring Avg@5 0.488. That prior, not the uniform-random 0.137, is the honest in-distribution floor, and it collapses to 0.192 across systems. The second property is a non-uniform column schema that silently zeroes telemetry for most RE1 cases. We reproduce a published baseline, BARO, RCAEval's own reference implementation; on the one system with a clean schema it reaches similar aggregate accuracy to our heuristic, within 0.004, under a different scoring rule. The audit motivated a new model. PSC-GRCA separates a candidate score into a system prior, telemetry evidence and a centred graph residual, and reaches mean Avg@5 0.915 against 0.864 for the flat baseline, while its ablations locate most of the gain in the prior term rather than the graph. We close with a twelve-item checklist for graph-versus-flat ablation studies, distilled from sixty-two recorded defects.
Certified Against Which Oracle? Execution Labels Set the Reported Risk of Conformal Abstention for Text-to-SQL
A conformal abstention certificate for text-to-SQL is only as truthful as the correctness labels it is calibrated on. The uncertainty pipelines that read confidence off execution consistency take those labels from the single database a benchmark ships, an oracle known to be lenient. We run a preregistered intervention on Spider-Realistic, swapping that database for the benchmark's distilled multi-instance test suite. Across four SQL-specialist checkpoints and two split schemes, the swap raises the certificate's held-out risk 2.73 to 10.23 points above the risk its own labels report. Neither oracle reports the risk experts assign. Under blinded labels from two SQL experts, a certificate calibrated at a nominal 0.10 carries 20.0 and 17.2 points of risk on two checkpoints. The stricter oracle errs in both directions: most of the answers it rejects are not judged wrong, and some of those it accepts are. An AI-assigned census of what it rejects finds a semantic error in a quarter to a third of them, depending on the population. It attributes most of the rest to underspecified questions, synthetic instances or suspected reference-query defects, a flag supported by a preregistered blinded expert audit. The oracle also decides how a confidence score is judged. Every execution-consistency score looks better under the labels of the oracle that built its clusters, in 16 of 16 combinations. Under expert labels, building such a score on suite clusters instead of shipped-database clusters raises its area under the ROC curve (AUROC) by 6.96 points on one checkpoint and 1.53 on the other. On the second, the expert interval excludes the 8.3 points the suite labels report. A certificate should be reported with both oracles, and an oracle-relative difference read as semantic risk only after the benchmark is audited. A consistency score should be evaluated under an oracle that did not build it.
ReSTI: A Source-Grounded Audit and Repair of STI-Bench
Spatial--temporal benchmarks are valid only when their questions, source annotations, and answer options identify the same physical quantity. We audit STI-Bench against the official ScanNet, Waymo, and Omni6DPose sources and find systematic coordinate-system and timestamp errors, under-specified targets and times, and disagreements between keyed options and answer details. We introduce ReSTI, a source-backed revision that reconstructs every recoverable answer under an explicit target, time, coordinate system, physical quantity, and unit. Source reconstruction reveals task-level geometric failures: ScanNet Grounding omits the required alignment between annotation and raw camera coordinate systems, while Orientation measures camera rotation on the wrong plane. ReSTI replaces these labels with explicit, source-consistent geometric definitions and corrects other source-verifiable defects, including Waymo poses evaluated at the wrong timestamp. Across 2,064 legacy questions, ReSTI retains 1,782 questions and records 282 evidence-backed exclusions. ReSTI therefore provides a conservative and source-traceable basis for evaluating precise video spatial--temporal reasoning. Project page: https://github.com/pengzhansun/ReSTI.
ETH-TraceBench: A Large-Scale Event-Stream Benchmark for Ethereum DeFi under Temporal, Protocol, and Contract Shift
Ethereum decentralized finance (DeFi) provides a public, time-stamped record of transaction-level event streams, but the same public symbols can create strong machine-learning shortcuts. We introduce ETH-TraceBench, a benchmark for evaluating Ethereum DeFi representations under temporal, protocol, pool/infrastructure, and symbolic shift. The raw event universe covers January 2021-December 2025 and contains 1.35 billion transactions with logs and 5.01 billion raw log rows. Model evaluation uses a fixed 911,267-instance supervised sample, training on 2021-2024, selecting models on 2025H1, and testing on 2025H2. Simple models perform strongly on the aggregate temporal test: TraceStats-GB reaches 0.953 macro-F1 and TopicEmitterHashMLP 0.959 on the canonical DEX test set. Performance drops sharply under protocol novelty, with macro-F1 of 0.794, 0.743, and 0.766 for TraceStats-GB, TopicEmitterTrace-SGD, and TopicEmitterHashMLP, while strict unseen-pool scores remain 0.927, 0.897, and 0.935. Uniswap v4 and Ekubo v1, both absent from supervised training, are materially harder than the full test. Jointly masking emitter and topic identity reduces DEX macro-F1 to 0.916 and liquidation macro-F1 to 0.774 for TopicEmitterTrace-SGD. A standard Transformer over log-index-ordered events provides no consistent advantage over a deterministic shuffle of the same events, indicating that high aggregate scores can arise without sophisticated chronological modeling. A natural-prevalence audit estimates 2025H2 DEX prevalence among logged Ethereum transactions at about 22.5%, and a deterministic 400-transaction audit finds complete agreement with task label sources and independently re-queried raw-log counts. ETH-TraceBench therefore treats difficult transfer and controlled-input conditions, rather than a single aggregate score, as the main evaluation target.
Auditing Bayesian Graph Alignment: Diagnostic Comparisons and Reference Failure
Bayesian graph alignment estimates correspondence probabilities, but convergence of an alignment-score trace need not imply accurate correspondence marginals. We audit this gap on 240 new exact graph pairs from four source families, 240 larger pairs with 20-100 vertices, and a separate 60-case exact implementation check. Under an explicit edge-flip likelihood, we compare three samplers and score, marginal, indicator, categorical, and classifier-based diagnostics. Marginal disagreement improves error discrimination over score R-hat for the exact informed sampler, but its improvement for vanilla local sampling is uncertain. Assignment-based R* and short indicator panels are competitive; no diagnostic dominates across samplers and endpoints. At larger sizes, diagnostics predict subsequent marginal changes, not posterior error, and classification performance depends on the drift threshold. Disjoint-window and held-out-chain checks attenuate but preserve positive associations. Only 22 of 240 original reference sets pass an agreement screen. On forty failure-selected cases, eightfold SMC particle escalation does not resolve disagreement, whereas additional rejuvenation helps. Longer informed runs remain unstable. An elementary feasible-alignment bound demonstrates severely unrepresentative SMC and informed-chain scores in concentrated 100-vertex cases, independently of approximate reference consensus. We also exhibit common-start chains with near-zero disagreement despite exact marginal error near .967. These results support assignment-sensitive auditing while identifying limits of finite budgets, diagnostic rankings, and reference agreement as evidence of accuracy.
DepthBenchCAD: When Does Deeper Auditing Yield More Reliable Conclusions?
Generative CAD models are expected to remain behaviorally correct after parameter edits, so increasing the number of edit checks is often treated as a direct route to more reliable evaluation. Under a fixed budget, however, auditing each program more thoroughly reduces the number of tasks and independent generations that can be evaluated, which can ultimately make model-level estimates less accurate. We study this phenomenon and the conditions under which it arises. We decompose behavioral evaluation into three evidence levels: task templates, stochastic generations, and within-program edits. We define an average failure risk that is invariant to audit depth, and combine three-level variance with measured execution costs to analyze the tradeoff between deeper edit auditing and broader independent coverage. Experiments across two CAD environments and five generation systems show that the value of deeper auditing depends on where evaluation uncertainty originates. When template heterogeneity or generation stochasticity dominates, additional edit checks can increase total estimation error; when within-program state variation is large and generation is expensive, deeper auditing is more valuable. Variance and cost estimates from calibration predict the direction of this change and provide a diagnostic basis for allocating evidence on held-out tasks. These results show that the thoroughness of program inspection can diverge from the reliability of model evaluation, and they help determine whether the next unit of budget should be spent on a new task, a new generation, or additional edit checks.
When Agent Metrics Measure Different Things: An Evidence-Grounded Audit of the Praxa AI Pipeline
Agent evaluations can be numerically correct while measuring a different construct from the one implied by their labels. We present a retrospective measurement audit of selected Praxa AI implementation files, historical evaluation artifacts, and operational records. A 139-case offline routing report contains 112 passes and 27 failures despite zero gating failures, because known gaps are explicitly exempted from the gate. An identifier-free export represents 8,843 tool-attempt rows: 8,395 recorded durations and 448 missing values. Of the durations, 121 equal the signed 32-bit maximum and carry abandoned-client labels; inspected database code clamps elapsed lifecycle age. The pooled recorded 99th percentile is 2,147,483,647 ms, versus 38,118.31 ms among server-observed completed calls. This is a stratum contrast, not a treatment effect. In a documented single-trajectory compaction pilot, the reported follow-up input reduction is 94.39%, but the reduction across the trigger and follow-up calls together is 46.54%. We reproduce the descriptive calculations, verify 91 timing statistics through a separate weighted rational-arithmetic implementation, and execute 13 scoring-function and 12 analysis-verifier tests. Finite-completion bounds show how missing durations limit all-row timing statements without imputing values. The contribution is a source-linked case study and reusable verification package for separating gate policy, lifecycle timing, and request-level accounting from broader agent-performance claims. Historical provider runs and the full current pipeline were not independently reproduced; general capability superiority and population-level statistical significance are not established.
Published Unlearning Numbers Move Per Checkpoint, and Not Because the Removed Data Survives: An Audit of 263 Released Batch-Normalized Checkpoints
An unlearning audit reads its verdict off numbers that an unlearned model and its retrained reference each publish, and both also ship batch-normalization statistics that no gradient step wrote and no release records. Refitting them on kept data at bit-identical weights moves 47 of 221 released checkpoints past the spread their own release's seeds show, several inside a method whose average does not move: what moves is the checkpoint's property, not its method's. What does the moving is not the removed data surviving in the state: exchanging kept records for removed ones inside a fixed fitting pool moves a published cell by almost nothing, while how far a checkpoint's shipped state has drifted from any refit does track it. The consequence for a published decision is real but narrow: twelve verdicts cross, four clear a measured recalibration budget, two clear it on every replicate, and a population we trained and sited near its own criterion yields none. A release should therefore name the fitting convention beside the number, on the batch-normalized vision models where this channel exists.
Benchmark Radar: A Living Database and Search Engine for AI Benchmarks and Evaluation
Benchmark researchers and developers of large language models (LLMs) and other AI systems need to find relevant evaluations, locate their benchmark datasets and code, and understand the settings behind reported scores. We present Benchmark Radar, a living database and search engine for retrieval and discovery of AI benchmarks, covering LLM evaluation, agentic and tool-use benchmarks, coding, reasoning, safety, and domain-specific evaluations. The system combines daily discovery of benchmark papers, repositories, datasets, and releases with a searchable benchmark catalog, mentions in model cards and technical reports, and score histories. It retains source identities and citations so readers can inspect candidate benchmarks and their evaluation evidence. Daily discovery draws on 37 sources: 13 direct connectors and 24 first-party research and engineering feeds. The catalog contains 1,283 source records drawn from 4 benchmark catalogs and 12,916 numeric observations on 790 records. We describe collection and retrieval, audit the full catalog, and examine benchmark saturation, adoption trends, and the limits of score comparisons. A worked example walks through a complete prior-art search, showing how to query the catalog and inspect benchmark evidence when designing a new evaluation. We release the web dashboard with a benchmark leaderboard, a Pareto frontier view of score against measured use, saturation and trend views, daily feeds, downloadable evidence, a command-line interface (CLI) for offline queries, and reproducible analysis.
IBIB: A Protocol for Measuring Enterprise AI Systems by Serving Route, Not Model Identifier
Enterprises deploy systems, not checkpoints. Usable capability depends jointly on weights, serving route, precision, output contract, and harness, yet all 18 audited benchmarks score advertised model identifiers. We treat this as measurement error and give a protocol that makes it reportable. It has three parts. A gold-blind capability-binding preflight verifies that a route can execute the evaluation contract before any task reaches it; a reliability-inclusive first-pass scoring rule keeps failure in the score while keeping unsupported capability out; and adjudication is structurally score-blind. We call the protocol IB2 and release its algorithms, classification tables, request contract, and manifest schemas. Its reference instantiation, 128 locked tasks and 987 assertions over document, spreadsheet, chart, tool and database work, stays sealed: the procedure is the artifact, not the corpus. Across eleven systems, four results. Capability availability is measurable: two complete single-route runs on identical weights later failed distinct predicates of the finalized binding gate, while a third passed that gate before a fresh run. The advertised identifier exposed neither limit. Discrimination is not uniform: four of seven suites saturate under a six-system band, with the spread almost entirely from governed database work and multi-tab joins, so we report interval-backed resolution groups, not ranks; two of the nominal five-label output's four cuts fail multiplicity adjustment. Serving-arm choice moved one declared revision and precision from 77.38 to 82.54, paired interval [0.11,10.60], though the arms differ in access mode, harness generation, and the serving tool-call parser, and harness generation is a property of our evaluator, not any endpoint. Excluding failed responses from denominators changes the point ordering, so reliability inclusion changes a conclusion, not its wording.
SoK: Where Do Flow Labels Come From? Auditing Label Provenance in Encrypted Traffic Benchmarks
Encrypted traffic classification infers semantics beyond the flow record from transport-layer observables, and supervised training rests on labels that hold for the individual flow they are attached to. Recent systematizations scrutinize model in- puts and data splits; we systematize the complementary label side. Across 14 audited benchmark entries, we identify two recurring label-side strategies: coarse inheritance, which risks labelling flows the evidence does not cover, and overstrict filtering, which keeps only self-attesting flows and risks dis- carding relevant ones. No audited entry exposes a countable pre-selection population, and the task objects downstream papers attach to the same labels disagree with the recovered record in 8 of 23 referenced cells. Under strict side-channel features we derive a representation-relative ceiling on bal- anced accuracy for any classifier restricted to those features: on the public benchmarks that inherit, it ranges from 0.56 to 0.76. On the filtering side, only 24.95% of connections in our fully captured corpus carry an observable SNI of their own; yet the discarded connections raise macro accuracy from 0.44 to 0.65 through same-run co-occurrence features. We end with recommendations for benchmark builders and users.
Stress-Testing Efficient Responsible-AI Evaluation: When Compute Savings Change Benchmark Conclusions
Efficient evaluation changes the protocol used to support claims about model behavior, yet it is rarely tested whether those claims remain stable after the evaluation itself is made cheaper. We stress-test conclusion robustness in responsible-AI benchmarking by evaluating three dense and mixture-of-experts models on BBQ and BBQ-V under seven conditions spanning batching, quantization, benchmark reduction, and their combinations. Rather than treating preserved aggregate accuracy as sufficient, we compare accuracy, bias severity and prevalence, reasoning quality, subgroup behavior, subset-membership stability, runtime, and measured GPU energy against a full-benchmark BF16 baseline. Larger batching keeps accuracy within 0.35 percentage points of baseline and produces comparatively small subgroup changes, while reducing energy in five of six model--dataset settings. INT8 largely preserves quality but uses 1.79--4.26 baseline energy. INT4 causes larger, model- and context-dependent changes. Reduced benchmarks provide the most consistent savings, but very small subsets are substantially more sensitive to which items are retained. Efficient evaluation should therefore be treated as a measurement intervention whose validity must be checked across the conclusions the benchmark is intended to support. Our project website is https://vectorinstitute.github.io/sustainable-rai-evaluation/ and the code is available at https://github.com/VectorInstitute/sustainable-rai-evaluation.
Auditing MCQA Benchmarks through Probability Landscapes
As Large Language Models rapidly advance, performance on standard multiple-choice question answering (MCQA) benchmarks is reaching saturation. While the community has responded by developing increasingly difficult datasets, validating question quality and filtering flawed items remains a labor-intensive process. To provide a scalable diagnostic approach, we propose a two-component probabilistic framework for auditing MCQA benchmarks using model output distributions. First, for benchmark-level analysis, we characterize the probability landscape using the top prediction probability () and normalized residual entropy (), summarized globally by Mean Pairwise Distance (MPD). Second, for item-level diagnostics, we introduce noise injection to reduce meaningful distractor competition, enabling us to flag candidate items for targeted human review and categorize residual failure patterns. Across four MCQA benchmarks, our landscape analysis reveals benchmark-level differences in model confidence and residual option competition. Concurrently, our noise-injection method flags potentially actionable item-level issues, showing alignment with expert error annotations from MMLU-Redux. These results suggest that our probability-based framework provides a lightweight audit lens for comparing macro-level benchmark structure and prioritizing individual items for targeted human review.
CatchBench: When Can an Agent Failure Be Caught?
When can an agent failure be caught? A weak audit score alone cannot identify whether the record or the method is limiting. CatchBench therefore puts one auditor's question to three information states: the declared configuration before a run (PRE), a growing prefix of its trace (LIVE), and the finished trace (POST). Prior benchmarks fix one of these states or vary the telemetry; to our knowledge none scores all three under one task-method interface. Each state admits different questions, so seven task contracts carry their own labels and metrics rather than one leaderboard. Four are evidential; three are Gold-derived mechanism diagnostics. The release scores 72 entrants, from rule scanners and structural models to eleven LLM judges across nine model families (GPT, Claude, Gemini, Gemma, Llama, Qwen, DeepSeek, Mistral, Nova), over 1187 declared configurations and 1162 recorded runs. Every recorded comparison is published as a measured difference with its interval, uncorrected, and no board declares a winner it cannot show. The three sharpest results cut against our own data. One rule reads declaration order alone and reaches a perfect F1 on one of six configuration sources, so a score there measures how the corpus was built. Our admissibility bar then rejected one injected substrate and withheld evidential status from the other. A published structural gain also turns on which size reference it is measured against. A benchmark number is therefore not interpretable until the process behind its labels is published and tested for the shortcut it may leave. We report all three, and regenerate every ordering from released predictions with no model call.
When Is Benchmark Contamination Detectable? Information Limits and Power-Calibrated Audits
Behavioral contamination detectors can return "no evidence" either because a benchmark is clean or because the audit has little power. We formalize this distinction for a benchmark in which an unknown fraction alpha of items was seen during training. With matched clean and seen controls, the behavioral channel is the sparse mixture Q_alpha = (1 - alpha) P_0 + alpha P_1, and an exact second-moment argument shows that detectability is governed by alpha * rho * sqrt(m), where rho^2 = chi^2(P_1 || P_0) measures behavioral separability. Any scalar detector reduces to its efficacy, ef = |E_1 f - E_0 f| / sqrt(Var_0(f)) <= rho, which can be estimated from controls before the audit is run. A separate sample-split certificate lower-bounds alpha distribution-free, without requiring an orientation assumption. Our empirical finding is two-sided. Frozen calibration efficacy predicts held-out power curves, with R^2 = 0.83-0.98 across six exact-permutation channels, but the efficacy-only Gaussian budget is miscalibrated at the small sample sizes it prescribes, failing in 9/9 gate-passing channels even though efficacy itself transports. The failure is in the inversion, not the calibration. A predeclared two-stage planner that simulates the deployed test repairs the budgets, is uniformly conservative, and abstains when its probe does not transport. The certificate is valid but vacuous at audit scale, and a five-seed paired injection study recovers the mechanism ordering verbatim > paraphrase > surface, in which the apparent answer-only signal is explained by baseline drift. We report the audit contract and its failures together: a non-rejection is interpretable only alongside the efficacy, budget, and validity gates that produced it.
Winning by Peeking: Unenforced Budgets and Test-Set Selection Inflate Short-Budget AutoML Comparisons
Comparisons between AutoML systems at short time budgets -- tens of seconds rather than hours -- are common in tool READMEs and workshop papers, and they are easy to get wrong. We report a case study in which a simple AutoML engine, Orcetra, appeared to beat FLAML and AutoGluon on 513 OpenML datasets, winning 57.1% of them at a nominal 60-second budget and 78.4% of datasets against FLAML alone at 30 seconds. Both margins came from protocol defects that a results table cannot show. The search loop scored every candidate on the test split and reported the best, making the headline metric a maximum over dozens of noisy estimates while the baselines selected on training data and touched the test set once; and the budget was checked before launching a candidate but never enforced during one, so the system consumed a median of 120 s against a 60-second budget, 2.24x the wall-clock AutoGluon used. Re-running with selection moved to a validation split, the deadline enforced externally and every framework pinned to an equal share of the machine, Orcetra's win rate on the re-run subset falls from 59.4% to 34.3% and no pairwise difference against either competitor remains significant. Recording both estimands inside a single search lets us attribute the collapse: the selection rule accounts for 4.8 percentage points and unequal compute for most of the rest. The same traces give the selection bias as a function of budget, measured rather than assumed: it grows with but reaches only 0.27 accuracy points, about five times below the bound a marginal-standard-error argument predicts, because candidates scored on shared test rows cancel most of the noise. We close with a checklist for short-budget comparisons. Code, per-dataset results and the scripts that regenerate every number and figure in the paper are released with it.
On the missing benchmarks layer and a potential solution
Latin America is missing a foundational layer for native AI development: the benchmark layer. The benchmark layer does two things no other layer can - it audits AI systems against regional social requirements and it directs AI optimization in economically relevant environments. Without it, public institutions cannot independently evaluate foreign AI systems, and companies cannot optimize AI systems to solve local problems with SOTA performance. The cost of the missing layer is dual: a loss of auditability and a loss of optimization direction over a technology that is increasingly critical infrastructure. We propose an EvalsHub, with LatamBoard as its first regional instance - an open, task-first benchmark infrastructure where universities, public institutions, professional communities, and companies can publish, execute, compare, and maintain evaluations across models, workflows, and agents. Built once, measured forever - re-run by institutions as new AI systems ship and by industry teams after every system change. Open by design and incentive-driven by construction.
Coding Agents as Test-Suite Auditors: Finding What Official Suites Miss While Approaching What They Catch
Online-judge verdicts and the datasets and benchmarks built on them are treated as ground truth for evaluating and training large language models for code. Yet prior audits have sounded a warning: official suites accept buggy submissions. These audits, however, stop at the warning and offer no practical remedy. Our remedy has two parts: an off-the-shelf coding agent, serving as a test-suite auditor, both builds adversarial test suites to expose what official suites miss and supplies these suites where no official suite exists; a certification chain determines whether each agent-flagged submission is genuinely buggy without relying on the official judge: multiple independently written accepted solutions agree on the expected output for every test, brute-force solutions settle disagreements, and a per-problem validator certifies each failing input legal. One such agent identifies 589 verified accepted-but-buggy submissions among AtCoder's 20,375 audited accepted submissions; extending the same certification to all five agents yields a union floor of 906 such submissions. Five agents, scored separately, each stay within 1.7pp of official-suite coverage on logic bugs those suites catch. On post-cutoff Codeforces problems with no available official suites, the same test-building method leads all five reproduced baselines at every tested input budget. Where an official suite exists, the agent audits suite adequacy instead of assuming it; where none exists, agent suites catch the most buggy submissions among methods we reproduced and tested.
FairFund-Bench: Evaluating Distributive Bias in LLM Resource Allocation
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly involved in the distribution of scarce resources, raising concerns about biased allocations based on characteristics like race and gender. Recent LLM audits have produced inconsistent results, however, finding evidence of both positive and negative discrimination towards women and ethnic minorities, even for the same models. We show that this disagreement can arise from differences in audit format and introduce FairFund-Bench, a benchmark that systematically varies key features of previous audit designs: the evaluation task (rating, ranking, or allocation), comparison context (single or multi-stimulus), and whether the audit is transparent or disguised. The benchmark comprises 600 requests for financial assistance created from human-authored templates (calibrated against 1.3M real GoFundMe campaigns) across three domains, four race and two gender categories, and five causal framings of need derived from welfare deservingness theory. Across 14 models, audit format changes the direction of bias: models advantage minorities when rating claimants individually but penalize some groups when ranking them side by side. Bias magnitude, though small overall, is several times greater in disguised audits than in transparent ones, where, faced with appeals differing only in claimants' names, models overwhelmingly split funds equally. Causal framing effects, by contrast, exceed demographic effects by roughly an order of magnitude and are consistent across models and audit formats, indicating that current LLMs robustly reproduce human deservingness evaluations. The benchmark scores models on four criteria (demographic bias, deservingness alignment, cross-task consistency, and cross-context consistency), is publicly available, and can be readily adapted to other substantive domains.
Benchmarks Are Not Monolithic: Sample-Level Auditing and Orchestration for LLM Evaluation
Benchmark datasets are central to evaluating Large Language Models (LLMs), yet they are typically conceived as monolithic tasks, obscuring substantial variation in the demands of individual samples. We introduce a dataset-centric meta-evaluation framework that audits benchmark datasets at the sample level along five latent dimensions: 1. Cognitive and Knowledge Demands, 2. Language and Content Quality, 3. Task Properties, 4. Context, and 5. Ethics, Safety, and Fairness. Applying this framework, we annotate five influential benchmarks -- MMLU, ARC, WinoGrande, HellaSwag, and TruthfulQA -- revealing pronounced internal heterogeneity that is not captured by aggregate accuracy scores. We show how these annotations enable criterion-driven orchestration of composite benchmark subsets across datasets, supporting targeted evaluation of model capabilities such as Reasoning Depth or Ethical Sensitivity. This approach reframes benchmark evaluation as dataset introspection, providing a principled methodology for analyzing and re-composing existing benchmarks to better reflect diverse evaluation needs.
PAIChecker: Uncovering and Checking PR-Issue Misalignment in SWE-Bench-Like Benchmarks
SWE-bench-like benchmarks are widely used for evaluating LLM's issue resolution capability. They typically follow a common construction pipeline: each PR (Pull Request) is paired with its linked issue by extracting issue references from the PR description; the issue description is used as the problem statement, and the PR patch serves as the test oracle. However, due to the inherent complexity of developing and maintaining large repositories, such PR-Issue pairings are often misaligned in practice. In this work, we systematically study SWE-bench Verified instances, finding that 13.6% exhibit misalignment across five patterns in eleven fine-grained scenarios. To enable reliable and scalable construction of those benchmarks in the future, we propose PAIChecker, a multi-agent system for checking PR-Issue misalignment in SWE-bench-like benchmarks. Specifically, PAIChecker adopts a three-phase design that combines specific pattern identification, cross-agent label synthesis, and code-level validation, thereby enabling more accurate, generalizable, and progressively verified detection. Experiments on SWE-Gym and SWE-bench Multilingual show that PAIchecker achieves the best performance across all four LLM backbones, reaching up to 92.12% and 91.67% binary accuracy, respectively.
How Benchmarks Mis-Score Computer-Use Agents
Computer-use agents (CUA) are being deployed to browse the web and operate desktop software, yet their benchmark scores are still commonly produced by brittle scripted oracles. A score is the output of a pipeline in which tasks can be stale, trajectories can omit decisive visual evidence, evaluators can reject valid alternatives, and aggregate reports can hide the cause of failure. We organize these problems into a reliability framework spanning task construction, trajectory observation, scoring, and reporting. We then audit 150 public failure-scored trajectories from five web, enterprise-workflow, and desktop-control benchmarks, find that 15.3% of FAIL verdicts are wrong: 10.7% are evaluator false negatives and 4.7% are broken tasks. For genuine failures, a three-tier diagnostic taxonomy shows that verification/feedback and planning failures dominate execution/grounding errors, while a single scalar success rate can not explain. We connect these findings to newer long-horizon CUA benchmarks and derive stage-specific design rules for CUA evaluation.
Automated Transcript Analysis for Detecting Flaws in Agentic Benchmarks
Capabilities of frontier models are often assessed using agentic benchmarks. To trust these results, benchmarks must accurately measure what they claim to and be free from invalidating flaws. Previous manual audits of benchmarks such as SWE-Bench-Verified have uncovered several validity issues in transcripts. However, manual review is difficult to scale, and it is unclear whether automated methods can reliably surface flaws that compromise benchmark validity. In this paper, we developed AI scanners to detect four types of validity issues: ground truth access, tool failure, guessing vulnerability, and answer format ambiguity. We produced grading rubrics for each to instruct human labeling, and evaluated the scanners against human labels on a held-out test set of Inspect Evals benchmarks. Our scanners identified several verified quality issues in five widely used benchmarks, including cases unlikely to be caught by random manual inspection. Not all cases were identified, and scanner performance varied substantially across benchmarks, criteria and models. We highlight several open challenges to be addressed to improve scanners for stronger quality assurance claims, including broader standardization gaps in the evaluation field that degrade scanner performance. Together, these results serve as a proof of concept for using automated transcript analysis to audit benchmark quality more broadly.
Visual Credit Audit for Multimodal Spatial Reasoning
Closed yes/no spatial benchmarks can reward a correct answer even when the image adds little support beyond no-image contexts. Under a fixed forced-choice interface, Visual Credit Audit (VCA) separates two estimands: whether the benchmark image gives the model's declared decision more support than text-only and blank controls, and whether the model responds to relation-specific visual evidence. The first audit is training- and label-free and does not require an answer flip. Applying labels yields dependence-credited correctness (D-CC); on correct items, it equals same-control gold-aligned positive gain, while prediction alignment extends the audit to errors. Across four open MLLMs and two spatial benchmarks, 12.73-26.25% of decisions are correct yet uncredited. Matched same-split image permutation reduces D-CC by 21.25-47.80 points, with every paired 95% interval above zero. Fixed-pixel relation contrasts and a 3x3 evidence-source factorial show why null controls cannot identify relation response. Among controlled correct-but-uncredited agreement decisions, response to relation reversal spans 81.57-100.00%, while 32.11% pooled change answer. Independently audited outcomes on 108 geometry-compatible edits provide a bounded natural-image correspondence check. VCA thereby decomposes benchmark success into correctness, additional image support, and relation-consistent response.
Success Is Not Self-Explanatory: Auditing Success Provenance in Agent Evaluation
A correct answer can conceal why an agent succeeded. Once agents change their information state during evaluation, correctness no longer distinguishes intended reasoning from answer acquisition. Outcome evidence and exposure detection do not establish whether success depended on an acquired target; we call this missing evaluation object success provenance. AcquaBench audits it through matched CLEAN, GOLD, and SHAM value substitution on four standardized surfaces with joint qid-clustered analysis. CLEAN retains benchmark-authorized information. GOLD makes the correct target available. SHAM preserves source structure and exposure opportunity but substitutes a matched incorrect value. GOLD minus CLEAN measures the total score response to correct-target availability; GOLD minus SHAM tests whether that response tracks target correctness beyond matched source exposure. In D0, GOLD exceeds SHAM by 19.1 to 25.9 percentage points, showing that success follows the correct value. In D2, GOLD still exceeds SHAM under distributed sufficiency while coloc no longer transfers as a high-score marker, with AUROC 0.376 and 0.142. Behavioral dependence can thus persist beyond this probe's intended observation unit. In model comparison, a supported 5.0-point CLEAN score gap compresses to a raw GOLD difference of -0.6 points without establishing rank inversion. Agent benchmarks should report success together with whether the evaluated information state supported it.
Do Agent Benchmarks Measure Capability? Protocol Validity in the Age of Agentic AI
Agent benchmarks increasingly evaluate repository editing, web research, terminal use, and long-horizon interaction. Their scores support capability claims only when the evaluation protocol keeps the intended capability necessary for success. Recent reward-hacking benchmarks and system reports show that agents can instead recover public solutions, read evaluation artifacts, infer generator structure, manipulate feedback, or benefit from invalid scoring paths; existing responses do not provide a common procedure for attributing these shortcuts and quantifying their effect across benchmarks. We formulate protocol validity and introduce HackDetect, a post-hoc audit that identifies an exposure, determines how the agent used it, and assesses whether the resulting score is misleading. We quantify score inflation with the Mislead gap, defined as the exploit score minus the intended score. We audit 2,385 traces across 15 agent benchmarks and find evidence of exposures and reward hacking in 67.0% of Frontier Science traces and 66.7% of AutoLab tasks. Across paired comparisons, we measure score inflation of 0.45-1.00, showing that benchmark reports should provide evidence that scores reflect the intended capability.
Are Performance-Optimization Benchmarks Reliably Measuring Coding Agents?
Repository-level performance-optimization benchmarks such as GSO, SWE-Perf and SWE-fficiency evaluate coding agents by applying patches to real repositories and comparing runtime against unoptimized baselines and official reference patches. Their leaderboard scores are increasingly used as evidence of coding-agent progress, but those scores can conflate runtime instability, benchmark-specific scoring rules, and how many tasks are already solved by at least one public submission. We audit these issues across the three benchmarks. First, we replay the official reference patches for 740 code optimization tasks across four common types of Google Cloud machines. Most benchmark tasks can be replayed, but their reference patches satisfy the original benchmark validity rules in every cross-machine replay for only 39/102 GSO tasks, 11/140 SWE-Perf tasks, and 411/498 SWE-fficiency tasks; SWE-Perf is especially fragile because many reference patches produce close-to-zero runtime changes. Second, we show that public submission rankings depend strongly on the benchmark scoring rule. Among eight public submissions shared by GSO and SWE-fficiency, the official rankings disagree on 9 of 28 pairwise submission comparisons, and SWE-fficiency's leaderboard scoring rule assigns the worst ten tasks overly high score weights of 58.5%-82.8%. Third, looking across 10 public submissions for each task, we find that at least one submission matches or beats the reference patch on 85.3% (384/450) of replay-valid GSO and SWE-fficiency tasks, and beats the unoptimized base code on 99.8% (449/450). Our study complements leaderboard scores by identifying tasks with more reliable performance signals, quantifying per-task score contributions, and exposing the remaining performance gaps that are hidden by aggregate rankings.
Auditing the Audit: Five Failure Modes in Benchmark-Validity Audits
Governance frameworks ask AI providers and auditors for documented evaluation evidence, and perturbation-based construct-validity audits are a common form of that evidence. We argue the audits are themselves fragile: their conclusions can be silently manufactured by implementation details that readers cannot see in the reported numbers. We name five classes of pipeline failure and demonstrate each in a self-audit over safety benchmarks and open-weight instruction-tuned models. Under a unified six-point due-diligence gate, every cell lands in a non-confirmatory bucket, and no cell reaches confirmatory. The evidence here is a single two-model, five-benchmark case study, and F1--F5 is an illustrative, deliberately non-exhaustive starting taxonomy -- not a comprehensive partition of audit failures. We position the gate as a withholding and disclosure protocol for assurance-grade evidence, supplementary to (not a replacement for) classical construct-validity evidence, and not as a route to benchmark-validity verdicts.
Auditing Generalization in AI-Generated Video Detection: A Six-Control Protocol and the VidAudit Toolkit
AI-generated video detection benchmarks such as GenVidBench and AIGVDBench are the de facto leaderboards, yet most evaluation protocols leave uncontrolled confounds that can inflate reported generalization. As an existence proof, a three-feature clip-length classifier reaches a leave-one-generator-out (LOGO) AUC of 0.998 on GenVidBench under unaudited evaluation, while measuring nothing about motion. A 20-paper survey finds none applying all six standard controls that would catch this, so we combine them into an audited protocol and apply it to six representative feature sources (three published detectors and three repurposed signal sources), re-running it cross-dataset on AIGVDBench. The audit both debunks and certifies: the trivial classifier collapses to near chance (0.529), a CLIP baseline is caught carrying dataset identity, and the 2025 forensic detector WaveRep clears the floor at out-of-distribution LOGO AUC 0.996 with chance-level real-vs-real coherence. At a deployable FPR of 0.1%, multiple high-AUC methods fall to single-digit recall and the leaderboard order changes, so we recommend an audited tuple (AUC, above-floor margin, operating-point recall, and calibration) over a single number. As a white-box positive control, we add TemporalSpec (codec motion vectors); via cross-substrate feature fusion (XSFF), a second substrate adds genuine complementarity that survives the audit. We release VidAudit, to our knowledge the largest unified and audited detector collection for this task, providing 14 detectors behind one plugin API, a leaderboard, and Croissant metadata, available at https://github.com/KurbanIntelligenceLab/vidaudit. Together, the protocol and toolkit move evaluation from leaderboard rank toward whether a result measures what it claims.
Pooled Leaderboards Hide System-Specific Winners: A Reporting-Protocol Audit of Offline Root-Cause Analysis Benchmarks
Offline root-cause-analysis (RCA) benchmarks commonly rank methods by a single pooled top-1 accuracy across multiple subsystems, and engineers often read the pooled winner as a recommendation for their own subsystem. We audit that reading on three public RCA benchmark families -- OpenRCA, RCAEval, and PetShop -- covering 11 subsystems and 778 matched scoring units. To keep pairwise comparisons on identical cases, the main analysis retains four methods or comparators with complete coverage: BARO, a CD-1min adapter, max-, and per-service alert-count. All six pairwise comparisons show subsystem-level effects of both signs, every random-effects 95% prediction interval crosses zero, and case-level interaction tests reject exchangeability in 5 of 6 pairs. Leave-one-system-out selection picks the lower-scoring method on up to 5 of 11 held-out subsystems, with regret reaching 24.8 pp on RCAEval / Sock-Shop. We release a 320-line audit module; given a matched RCA benchmark score table, it recomputes the same per-subsystem stability checks alongside pooled scores.
BabelJudge: Measuring LLM-as-a-Judge Reliability Across Languages and Agent Trajectories
LLM-as-a-judge has become the dominant approach to scalable evaluation in NLP pipelines, yet judges themselves carry systematic biases that raw accuracy hides: they favor responses placed in slot A (position bias), they prefer longer responses regardless of quality (verbosity bias), and their reliability degrades sharply in lower-resource languages. We introduce BabelJudge, an open-source benchmark and reliability audit framework that measures all four failure modes -- position bias, verbosity bias, order inconsistency, and cross-lingual degradation -- on any judge model, without requiring human preference labels. The key insight is gold-labelling by degradation: starting from a high-quality reference response and applying a controlled perturbation yields a pairwise item whose gold label is known by construction, eliminating annotation cost. We evaluate Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct-4bit across English, Hindi, Arabic, and Swahili and find that our composite bias-penalised reliability score drops from 0.714 in Hindi to 0.550 in Swahili, a gap that raw accuracy (0.835 vs. 0.660) understates. Swahili order consistency collapses to 0.480, meaning judge verdicts are near-random under slot-order swaps -- a failure mode invisible to accuracy alone. We further extend the framework to agentic evaluation via nine trajectory-level perturbations (argument corruption, tool swaps, hallucinated calls, missing steps) and three new metrics: tool accuracy, hallucination detection rate, and trajectory-length bias. BabelJudge is released as a Python package supporting 11 judge backends. Code: https://github.com/Shreyaskc/BabelJudge
Bayesian Inference and Decision Audits for Public Archives of Frontier AI Evaluations
Public AI evaluations are often read as terminal leaderboards, yet the underlying evidence is a selective time series shaped by reporting rules, benchmark revisions, and missingness. Repeated public archives for LiveBench and Open LLM Leaderboard v2 serve as the primary longitudinal record; LMArena provides a preference stress test; and GAIA and tau-bench contribute limited agentic pilots. Together, these archives instantiate a Bayesian inference problem: under a fixed reporting convention, one constructed terminal-only example over systems is compatible with two pre-terminal histories, yielding times of or to reach within of the ceiling under the same terminal-tail model. In synthetic posterior comparisons, action-facing diagnostics differ across observation regimes. The candidate selection-aware frontier model fails synthetic recovery, objective-archive prediction, preference transfer, and uncertainty calibration; correspondingly, fixed audit gates reject its stronger claims. An archive-and-adjudication protocol reconstructs public evaluation histories, isolates a verified timing boundary, and falsifies unsupported frontier claims.
The Reliability Gap in Benchmark Auditing: Distribution Shift and Scale as Failure Modes of Contamination Detection
Benchmark contamination, where evaluation examples appear in a model's training data, threatens the validity of LLM assessment. Statistical tools for detecting training-data membership exist, but have been validated almost exclusively in controlled academic regimes: large, homogeneous pre-training corpora and transparent, single-stage training pipelines. Whether these methods remain reliable in realistic auditing scenarios remains unclear. We identify two under-studied failure modes: distribution shift, which arises when suspect and validation sets violate the IID assumption, and scale constraints, which arise because benchmarks are orders of magnitude smaller than pre-training corpora. We systematically evaluate three leading paradigms, LLM Dataset Inference, Post-Hoc Dataset Inference, and CoDeC, across 25 models from multiple families (including Pythia, OLMo 2, and specialised cultural and medical LLMs) and scales (up to 27B). We then further extend our analysis to frontier industry models. Across 335 evaluations, only 201 yield correct outcomes. LLM Dataset Inference results in false positives under distribution shift, Post-Hoc Dataset Inference is underpowered at benchmark scale, and CoDeC provides only coarse provenance signals that are insufficient to verify individual benchmark splits. Our results reveal a systematic reliability gap between controlled validation and practical benchmark auditing, and show that statistical detection cannot yet replace transparent data provenance. We open-source our benchmark for further research.
Auditing LLM Benchmarks with Item Response Theory
LLM benchmark labels are frozen at release and silently propagated into downstream benchmarks, errors and all. We introduce an Item Response Theory-based indicator that surfaces likely mislabels at 95% precision in the top 200 examples across seven preference and multiple-choice benchmarks using responses from 114 models, outperforming a supervised classifier. We trace these errors to mechanical labeling heuristics, upstream annotation mistakes inherited unchanged from source datasets, and fundamentally ambiguous items without a defensible single label. The same model fit reveals that reward models specialize in stylistic preference rather than factual knowledge, and identifies one frontier reward model that agrees with detected mislabels at 78% accuracy versus 38% for its peers, consistent with benchmark contamination or benchmark-specific over-optimization.
FormInv: A Measurement Protocol for Semantic Invariance in Mathematical Reasoning Benchmarks
A paraphrase-quality audit of MathCheck (ICLR 2025) detected 4 semantically incorrect paraphrases in 129 groups (3.1%); removing them drops GPT-4o from rank 2 to rank 4 and elevates Claude Haiku and DeepSeek V3 above it; these ranking changes are invisible to any single-model evaluation. Cross-model unanimity found these errors automatically (>= 3/4 models for MathCheck; >= 6/9 for our primary evaluation) for under $10; in our own dataset the same protocol found that 47% of auto-generated connective-variation paraphrases were semantically incorrect. That flaw compounds a deeper measurement gap: Claude Haiku 4.5 achieves 86% accuracy yet SCR=50%, meaning half its theorems are answered differently under semantically equivalent restatements, while aggregate accuracy across 9 models spans only 86-96% yet Semantic Consistency Rates (SCR) span 50-82% -- a 32-point gap invisible to standard benchmarks. Formally, for any target ranking over 9 frontier models there exists a weighting over paraphrase families that realizes it (No-Free-Benchmark corollary), because no model Pareto-dominates all families -- so benchmark designers who select families are implicitly choosing which model wins. FormInv supplies the audit protocol (replicated on external benchmarks at 100% recall), SCR and per-theorem Cochran's Q as primary invariance measures evaluated on 9 models across 366-811 items (on Lean4-verified theorems), and FormInvSelector for regime-aware model selection.
Automated Benchmark Auditing for AI Agents and Large Language Models
Modern AI benchmarks operate at a complexity that outpaces traditional verification methods. Tasks authored by domain experts often contain implicit assumptions, incomplete environment specifications, and brittle evaluation logic that human annotation cannot reliably catch. We introduce Auto Benchmark Audit (ABA), an agentic framework that systematically audits individual benchmark tasks, uncovering issues such as hidden environment dependencies, specification gaps, and limited grading logic. We run ABA on a collection of frontier LLM benchmarks and previous NeurIPS publications, totaling 168 benchmarks across nine domains. Across this corpus, ABA identifies critical issues including ambiguous task design, execution environment conflicts, and incorrect ground truths in over 25.7% of the evaluated tasks. The precision of these automated audits is validated by expert review and independent third-party reports such as upstream PRs. Crucially, we demonstrate that these problematic tasks severely distorts capability assessments for agents and LLMs: filtering out these tasks with issues shifts model rankings and increases average performance on SWE-bench Verified and Terminal-Bench 2 by 9.9% and 9.6%, respectively. We release the agentic tool and all task annotations to support the future development of frontier benchmarks.
Deployment-complete benchmarking
Benchmarks increasingly guide deployment, procurement and scientific screening, yet a score supports only the response it records, not necessarily the deployment action. We introduce deployment-complete benchmarking, which tests whether benchmark evidence determines a deployment action. A benchmark is complete for a claim exactly when the action is constant on each evidence fiber; mixed fibers expose missing deployment information, and completion curves quantify the evidence required to resolve ambiguity. In controlled response spaces, benchmark-channel conformal coverage of 94.98% transferred poorly to an unmeasured deployment channel (10.07%), whereas response-rank intervals achieved 94.91% coverage; even zero benchmark error certified only 45.4% of candidates at the largest residual size. Public audits revealed incompleteness, including 97.9% mixed Tox21 fibers and zero median certifiable fraction in main Matbench and JARVIS audits. In held-out replays, certify-then-acquire reduced false decisions from 1.19% to 0.027% in Tox21 and from 20.3% to 0.128% in JARVIS, while changing model choice and identifying deployment-relevant probes. Deployment-ready benchmarks should report evidence, supported actions, ambiguity and completion cost rather than scores alone.
Pre-Registering the Detectable Effect: A Paired-MDE Budget for 4-bit Quantization Benchmarks, with a Pilot Audit
This is a planning-method note with an unpaired pilot audit. We adapt the classical paired-binary sample-size calculation (Miettinen, 1968) to quantization benchmarks, giving a conservative minimum detectable effect (MDE) bound in the paired item count and the FP16-NF4 disagreement rate . The bound turns "how reliable is my quantization claim?" into a one-line budget a benchmark designer can commit to before running. We illustrate the bound on four models and four benchmarks ( splits of ), and add a parallel MMLU prompt-template study to put the bound's quantization-noise scale alongside the prompt-noise scale. Assuming (an unmeasured planning value), all observed NF4-FP16 deltas fall below the implied MDE, and most cross-split SDs lie within pp of the binomial reference , so much of the variance reported as "benchmark unreliability" on subsamples is binomial sampling noise. The single borderline cell (OPT-WinoGrande, pp) is below the implied MDE at but above it at , illustrating the planning trade-off the bound makes explicit. On MMLU, prompt-template ranges of 2-10 pp meet or exceed the largest observed quantization delta (3.2 pp), so a quantization audit that does not first fix the prompt template absorbs template variance into its noise floor. We complement the bound with a five-line pre-registration template.
Metadata Predictability Is Not Evidence Dependence: An Intervention-Based Audit for Weak-Label Benchmarks
We study a protocol-level test for weak-label benchmarks: whether benchmark outputs change when the provided evidence is intervened on. Metadata-only shortcut checks answer a different question, namely whether outputs are predictable from metadata priors. We therefore combine a metadata statistic, the Metadata Prior Dominance Score (MPDS), with an evidence-intervention statistic, ΔEvi, measuring sensitivity to evidence identity under cross-item shuffling. Synthetic HotpotQA gives a constructed counterexample to metadata-only screening: MPDS is only moderate (0.643), yet ΔEvi is zero. Stronger-reader reruns show why calibration belongs in the test procedure: SNLI shows a calibration reversal, reconstructed HotpotQA occupies a question-dominant warning region, and FEVER is a strongly evidence-sensitive positive control across four transformers. The practical lesson is simple: benchmark audits should report metadata-only screening, evidence intervention, and reader-strength calibration together.
What Twelve LLM Agent Benchmark Papers Disclose About Themselves: A Pilot Audit and an Open Scoring Schema
We read twelve well-known LLM agent benchmark papers and recorded, dimension by dimension, what each paper actually says about how its evaluation was run. The motivation came from a familiar frustration: two papers will report results on the same benchmark with the same model name and disagree, and you cannot tell why -- the scaffold, the sampling settings, the subset, or the evaluator version. In many cases the published artifact does not let you answer. This paper is an implementation report on the attempt. We designed a small audit schema (five fields: benchmark identity, harness specification, inference settings, cost reporting, failure breakdown), wrote a scoring codebook with the boundary cases we hit during pilot scoring, applied it to twelve canonical papers (eight agent, four classical static), and recorded what we saw. We score the disclosure of an agent run, not its correctness, and make no claim that disclosure implies a trustworthy result. The mean audit score across the eight agent-benchmark papers is 0.38 (out of 1.0), and across the four classical static benchmarks 0.66; the largest gap is on cost (none of the eight agent benchmark papers disclose inference cost in any form) and on harness specification (none fully disclose a content-addressed container image of the evaluation environment). We release the schema as a JSON Schema file, the codebook as a Markdown document, and the raw scoring sheet as a CSV. The scoring was performed by a single auditor in one pass; a multi-rater audit is the natural next step, and we discuss what we think it would change.
AgentAtlas: Beyond Outcome Leaderboards for LLM Agents
Large language model agents now act on codebases, browsers, operating systems, calendars, files, and tool ecosystems, but their evaluations often collapse behavior into final task success. AgentAtlas reframes agent evaluation as a diagnostic vocabulary and audit protocol for separating outcome success from control-decision quality and trajectory quality. The paper contributes: (i) a six-state control-decision taxonomy (Act / Ask / Refuse / Stop / Confirm / Recover); (ii) a trajectory-failure vocabulary with primary error source and downstream impact; (iii) a 0/1/2 benchmark-coverage audit over fifteen agent benchmarks; and (iv) an illustrative protocol study on a synthetic 1,342-item set evaluated with eight models under taxonomy-aware and taxonomy-blind prompt formats. The synthetic demonstration is not a public benchmark release and should not be read as a definitive model comparison. Instead, it illustrates two measurement risks: mapped label agreement can change substantially when the explicit label menu is removed, and axis choice can change apparent rankings. AgentAtlas is intended to help benchmark designers state what behavior they cover, and to help evaluators diagnose failures that outcome-only leaderboards hide.
Are Sparse Autoencoder Benchmarks Reliable?
Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are a core interpretability tool for large language models, and progress on SAE architectures depends on benchmarks that reliably distinguish better SAEs from worse ones. We audit the SAE quality metrics in SAEBench, the de-facto standard SAE evaluation suite, through three complementary lenses: reseed noise on a fixed SAE, ground-truth correlation on synthetic SAEs, and discriminability across training trajectories. We find that two of these metrics, Targeted Probe Perturbation (TPP) and Spurious Correlation Removal (SCR), fail multiple lenses at their canonical settings and should not be used to evaluate SAEs. The other metrics show higher reseed noise and lower discriminability than the field assumes. The sae-probes variant of -sparse probing is the most reliable metric we tested, but even sae-probes struggles to separate variants of the same SAE architecture. Our results show the field needs better SAE benchmarks.
Talk is (Not) Cheap: A Taxonomy and Benchmark Coverage Audit for LLM Attacks
We introduce a reusable framework for auditing whether LLM attack benchmarks collectively cover the threat surface: a 46 Target Technique matrix grounded in STRIDE, constructed from a 507-leaf taxonomy -- 401 data-populated and 106 threat-model-derived leaves -- of inference-time attacks extracted from 932 arXiv security studies (2023--2026). The matrix enables benchmark-external validation -- auditing collective coverage rather than individual benchmark consistency. Applying it to six public benchmarks reveals that the three primary frameworks (HarmBench, InjecAgent, AgentDojo) occupy non-overlapping cells covering at most 25% of the matrix, while entire STRIDE threat categories (Service Disruption, Model Internals) lack any standardized evaluation, despite published attacks in these categories achieving 46 token amplification and 96% attack success rates through mechanisms which no benchmark tests. The corpus of 2,521 unique attack groups further reveals pervasive naming fragmentation (up to 29 surface forms for a single attack) and heavy concentration in Safety & Alignment Bypass, structural properties invisible at smaller scale. The taxonomy, attack records, and coverage mappings are released as extensible artifacts; as new benchmarks emerge, they can be mapped onto the same matrix, enabling the community to track whether evaluation gaps are closing.
Do Composed Image Retrieval Benchmarks Require Multimodal Composition?
Composed Image Retrieval (CIR) is a multimodal retrieval task where a query consists of a reference image and a textual modification, and the goal is to retrieve a target image satisfying both. In principle, strong performance on CIR benchmarks is assumed to require multimodal composition, i.e., combining complementary information from reference image and textual modification. In this work, we show that this assumption does not always hold. Across four widely used CIR benchmarks and eleven Generalist Multimodal Embedding models, a large fraction of queries can be solved using a single modality (from 32.2% to 83.6%), revealing pervasive unimodal shortcuts. Thus, high CIR performance can arise from unimodal signals rather than true multimodal composition. To better understand this issue, we perform a two-stage audit. First, we identify shortcut-solvable queries through cross-model analysis. Second, we conduct human validation on 4,741 shortcut-free queries, of which only 1,689 are well-formed, with common issues including ambiguous edits and mismatched targets. Re-evaluating models on this validated subset reveals qualitatively different behaviour: queries can no longer be solved with a single modality, and successful retrieval requires combining both inputs. While accuracy decreases, reliance on multimodal information increases. Overall, current CIR benchmarks conflate shortcut-solvable, noisy, and genuinely compositional queries, leading to an overestimation of model capability in multimodal composition.
The Evaluation Trap: Benchmark Design as Theoretical Commitment
Every AI benchmark operationalizes theoretical assumptions about the capability it claims to assess. When assumptions function as unexamined commitments, benchmarks stabilize the dominant paradigm by narrowing what counts as progress. Over time, narrow evaluation reorganizes capability concepts: architectures and definitions are selected for benchmark legibility until evaluation ceases to track an independent object and instead produces a version of the target defined by its own operational assumptions. The result is a trap: evaluation frameworks treat self-reinforcing assessments as valid, both creating and obscuring structural limits on what the current paradigm can accomplish. We introduce Epistematics, a methodology for deriving evaluation criteria directly from technical capability claims and auditing whether proposed benchmarks can discriminate the claimed capability from proxy behaviors. The contribution is meta-evaluative: an audit procedure, a failure mode taxonomy, and benchmark-design criteria for evaluating capability-evaluation coherence. We demonstrate the procedure through a worked audit of Dupoux et al. (2026), a proposal that revises the dominant paradigm's theoretical assumptions at the architectural level while reproducing them in its evaluation criteria, thereby entrenching the constraint it seeks to overcome in a form the evaluation cannot detect.
Do Androids Dream of Breaking the Game? Systematically Auditing AI Agent Benchmarks with BenchJack
Agent benchmarks have become the de facto measure of frontier AI competence, guiding model selection, investment, and deployment. However, reward hacking, where agents maximize a score without performing the intended task, emerges spontaneously in frontier models without overfitting. We argue that benchmarks must be secure by design. From past incidents of reward hacks, we derive a taxonomy of eight recurring flaw patterns and compile them into the Agent-Eval Checklist for benchmark designers. We condense the insights into BenchJack, an automated red-teaming system that drives coding agents to audit benchmarks and identify possible reward-hacking exploits in a clairvoyant manner. Moreover, we extend BenchJack to an iterative generative-adversarial pipeline that discovers new flaws and patches them iteratively to improve benchmark robustness. We apply BenchJack to 10 popular agent benchmarks spanning software engineering, web navigation, desktop computing, and terminal operations. BenchJack synthesizes reward-hacking exploits that achieve near-perfect scores on most of the benchmarks without solving a single task, surfacing 219 distinct flaws across the eight classes. Moreover, BenchJack's extended pipeline reduces the hackable-task ratio from near 100% to under 10% on four benchmarks without fatal design flaws, fully patching WebArena and OSWorld within three iterations. Our results show that evaluation pipelines have not internalized an adversarial mindset, and that proactive auditing could help close the security gap for the fast-paced benchmarking space.
BenchGuard: Who Guards the Benchmarks? Automated Auditing of LLM Agent Benchmarks
As benchmarks grow in complexity, many apparent agent failures are not failures of the agent at all - they are failures of the benchmark itself: broken specifications, implicit assumptions, and rigid evaluation scripts that penalize valid alternative approaches. We propose employing frontier LLMs as systematic auditors of evaluation infrastructure, and realize this vision through BenchGuard, the first automated auditing framework for task-oriented, execution-based agent benchmarks. BenchGuard cross-verifies all benchmark artifacts via structured LLM protocols, optionally incorporating agent solutions or execution traces as additional diagnostic evidence. Deployed on two prominent scientific benchmarks, BenchGuard identified 12 author-confirmed issues in ScienceAgentBench - including fatal errors rendering tasks unsolvable - and exactly matched 83.3% of expert-identified issues on the BIXBench Verified-50 subset, catching defects that prior human review missed entirely. A full audit of 50 complex bioinformatics tasks costs under USD 15, making automated benchmark auditing a practical and valuable complement to human review. These findings point toward AI-assisted benchmark development, where frontier models serve not only as subjects of evaluation but as active participants in validating the evaluation infrastructure itself.
AuditBench: Evaluating Alignment Auditing Techniques on Models with Hidden Behaviors
We introduce AuditBench, an alignment auditing benchmark. AuditBench consists of 56 language models with implanted hidden behaviors. Each model has one of 14 concerning behaviors--such as sycophantic deference, opposition to AI regulation, or secret geopolitical loyalties--which it does not confess to when directly asked. AuditBench models are highly diverse--some are subtle, while others are overt, and we use varying training techniques both for implanting behaviors and training models not to confess. To demonstrate AuditBench's utility, we develop an investigator agent that autonomously employs a configurable set of auditing tools. By measuring investigator agent success using different tools, we can evaluate their efficacy. Notably, we observe a tool-to-agent gap, where tools that perform well in standalone non-agentic evaluations fail to translate into improved performance when used with our investigator agent. We find that our most effective tools involve scaffolded calls to auxiliary models that generate diverse prompts for the target. White-box interpretability tools can be helpful, but the agent performs best with black-box tools. We also find that audit success varies greatly across training techniques: models trained on synthetic documents are easier to audit than models trained on demonstrations, with better adversarial training further increasing auditing difficulty. We release our models, agent, and evaluation framework to support future quantitative, iterative science on alignment auditing.
WirelessMathBench-XL: An Auditable Benchmark for Wireless Mathematical Reasoning
Technical-domain benchmarks constructed from arXiv papers can overlap the same public text used in LLM pretraining. Auditing this risk at training-corpus scale requires searching billions of corpus n-grams while retaining per-item evidence that users can inspect and recompute. We contribute a reverse-probe audit at a fixed 13-gram threshold: it indexes benchmark prompts, streams public pretraining corpora, and emits per-problem prompt-surface lexical-overlap metadata with memory that scales with the benchmark. We instantiate the protocol in WirelessMathBench-XL, a 4,027-problem wireless mathematical-reasoning benchmark built from 836 retained arXiv papers across 20 subfields. Against 12.9B streamed 13-grams from RedPajama-arXiv, the audit identifies a strict zero-hit view S0 covering 3,853 problems (95.7%). Filtering to S0 changes accuracy by less than 1 pp for every evaluated model; frontier calibration rows form one high-accuracy cluster between 86.5% and 91.3%, not a resolved rank order. Only 30/800 test items carry detected overlap. Under an all-flagged-correct counterfactual, their largest possible positive score inflation is 0.31-0.51 pp for the frontier rows, so full-versus-S0 is a bounded, structurally underpowered stability summary rather than a contamination-effect test or cleanliness claim. The audit channel does not cover paraphrase, target-answer, post-training, or closed-corpus exposure. The release includes source-paper identifiers, verifier-facing ground truths, audit and threshold metadata, filtered views, a paper-disjoint sensitivity view, evaluation traces, paired-bootstrap scripts, training recipes, Croissant metadata, and a Datasheet for Datasets.
Who Benchmarks the Benchmarks? Towards Comprehensive Evaluation of Commonsense Reasoning Benchmarks
Commonsense reasoning is a key language model capability, as it is purportedly a prerequisite for many basic tasks, unlike specific factual knowledge. It is often measured with multiple-choice questions (MCQ) benchmarks, e.g. HellaSwag and PIQA. Some of these benchmarks, however, are outdated and contain numerous validity issues. We illustrate some typical validity issues with a case study on HellaSwag, one of the most popular and problematic benchmarks for commonsense reasoning. The issues we find range from basic ungrammaticality and numerous typos to misleading prompts or equally correct options. We show that if we remove question prompts or replace them with "Lorem ipsum dolor...", about 68% of model predictions do not change. We argue that this occurs due to inner flaws in the benchmark, not mere contamination that might be present in some models. Since benchmark scores are an essential part of model selection in both research and commercial applications, these issues can have severe consequences. Based on our findings, we propose BenCheck, a package for benchmark validity analysis that encapsulates the main checks performed in our case study and can be used to audit commonsense reasoning benchmarks. We apply these checks to PIQA, Global PIQA, and Winogrande.