Epistemic Stance

To maintain common ground in cooperative conversation, humans iteratively update their beliefs as conversation participants share new information; participants who are epistemically vigilant detect when new information conflicts with prior beliefs and take steps to repair these conflicts. In order for AI systems to serve as reliable partners in complex cooperative tasks, they must similarly weigh incoming information against their own private evidence and shared context and appropriately surface inconsistencies when they arise. To measure the epistemic vigilance of vision-language models in cooperative settings, we present an information-asymmetric, dialog-based "spot-the-difference" task. Two models are privately shown one image each, and must determine through conversation whether the images are identical or, if not, identify the difference. Models routinely fail at this: they frequently overlook key evidence in their private image in favor of agreeing with their conversational partner, even when their agreement is unwarranted. We relate these violations of epistemic vigilance to the broader behavior of sycophancy, which manifests itself in cooperative goal-oriented dialog as over-accommodation and weak evidential grounding. Our results show that model steering to reduce sycophancy with a vector learned from task-agnostic sycophancy examples can reduce epistemic vigilance-related errors, making models more faithful reporters of their evidence, and in turn, more reliable partners in information-asymmetric cooperative tasks.

Users frequently express their beliefs to large language models (LLMs). In some situations, the LLM should accept these contextual beliefs as true. In others, they should stick to their prior knowledge. Notably, users' expressions of belief (EoBs) can take linguistically diverse forms - using presuppositions, evidential and certainty markers, or varied tones - each of which may have a different persuasiveness over the LLMs. We introduce a typology to systematically evaluate how different EoBs affect whether models follow context versus prior knowledge. The typology is grounded in four linguistically motivated dimensions: form, evidentiality, epistemic stance, and tone, spanning 17 fine-grained types. By pairing these EoBs with world knowledge facts, we generate controlled EoB-query pairs that isolate the effect of linguistic variation. Using this benchmark, we evaluate 16 LLMs that differ in architecture (Llama3, Qwen3, Gemma3), scale (1B-30B parameters), and training stages (base vs instruct). We identify meaningful variations in response behavior across these axes, e.g., that bigger models and instruction models tend to be less context-following than smaller models and base models. We further identify specific EoBs that statistically significantly persuade LMs more consistently than others. Our work reveals systematic patterns in how linguistic framing affects LLM context integration, with implications for prompt engineering and model robustness.

A language model may be asked either what experts believe about a contested claim or what it believes about the claim itself. A trustworthy conversational agent should distinguish these two requests and respond in different epistemic registers: neutral attribution in the first case and stance expression in the second. Whether such a shift occurs-and whether it occurs coherently-is not directly assessed by existing benchmarks for accuracy, instruction following, or safety. We introduce ESFP, a behavioral benchmark that treats the contrast between externally attributed and self-attributed prompts as the fundamental unit of measurement. ESFP consists of 104 carefully controlled items spanning six epistemic categories and five phrasing templates, and evaluates model responses along four complementary dimensions: lexical self-attribution, representation-level responsiveness to role framing, sentence-level stance content density assessed by an LLM judge panel, and cross-condition stance consistency. Evaluating eight frontier models from five vendors, we find that epistemic flexibility is largely orthogonal to general model capability: a 27B open-weight model matches the strongest proprietary systems, the flagship model of one family underperforms its lightweight counterpart, and reasoning-optimized models do not consistently exhibit higher flexibility. Stance content density provides the strongest signal, while surface-level lexical markers such as 'I think' can change substantially without corresponding changes in expressed stance. We provide item-level bootstrap confidence intervals, weight-sensitivity analyses, and an explicit discussion of the interpretation limits of the composite score. ESFP measures a model's propensity to adapt its epistemic stance under changing attribution conditions, rather than a general competence measure.

Uncertainty quantification for visual language models (VLMs) conventionally targets the answer token distribution. We provide the first three-family empirical characterisation of answer entropy behaviour in thinking-mode VLMs. Running four models on identical POPE adversarial samples, we find three qualitatively distinct patterns: Qwen3-VL-8B-Thinking shows complete collapse (ans H AUROC = 0.492); GLM-4.1V-9B-Thinking shows no collapse (0.716); and InternVL3-8B shows selective thinking (chains on only 50% of samples, ans H = 0.675 full / 0.602 thinking-only). Across all three thinking-mode models, thinking chain entropy outperforms answer entropy on the subset where chains are generated (0.647, 0.759, 0.608 vs. 0.492, 0.716, 0.602 respectively), suggesting chain signals are the more reliable predictor whenever chains are present. This holds strongly for Qwen and GLM, but with only marginal and statistically unreliable advantage for InternVL3 (n_FP = 17). A 300-sample VQAv2 pilot confirms chain entropy (0.680) outperforms answer entropy (0.595) on VQAv2 questions, with the gap largest for free-form answers (0.733 vs. 0.467). On harder reasoning tasks (HallusionBench) both Qwen models show moderate signal (approx. 0.64), consistent with incomplete pre-commitment on difficult questions. We additionally document structured abstention affecting 12-22% of queries with asymmetry toward absent-object queries, and a practical abstention gate raising accuracy from 71.0% to 93.8% at 62.7% coverage with no additional inference cost.

In the age of AI, what will be good knowledge? This article, which is accepted and forthcoming in a special issue of Modern Fiction Studies on "Cultural AI" in 2027, applies digital humanities methods to map epistemic virtues (like "true," "accurate," "creative") used in a corpus of 553 journal articles on AI published in 2024. "Creativity" comes in for special attention as an example. Exploring this discourse of value, the article considers how a framework might be developed for evaluating the knowledge-worth of AI -- one less locked into values formed around pre-AI "knowledge work" agents or structures, and more open to the future values of "generativity." The essay is supported by an online digital kit for exploring data models of the corpus of articles on AI it studies.

What does it mean for a language agent to be adaptive? Effective multi-turn agents must decide what information to seek, how to use new evidence, and when they are certain enough to act. We introduce Epistemic Decision Processes (EDPs), a belief-state formulation of multi-turn information seeking in which actions produce external observations that update the agent's posterior over a latent task variable. EDPs make epistemic adaptivity explicit: good policies choose actions that are useful under the current belief, not merely those that correlate with eventual success. We prove that belief-agnostic policies can suffer errors that compound exponentially over the horizon, and that aggregate trajectory returns can fail to identify the per-turn Bayesian advantage needed for epistemic credit. We then introduce ECHO (Epistemic Credit for History-Conditioned Optimization), a practical clipped policy-gradient objective that assigns turn-level credit using posterior-sensitive rewards. In the Clue Selector Game, a novel controlled evidence-seeking benchmark, we show that ECHO substantially improves resolution, information gain, and efficiency over trajectory-level GRPO, and matches or exceeds frontier baselines on epistemic metrics such as grounding, recovery, and calibration while producing almost no visible reasoning text.

Agentic artificial intelligence (AI) systems are beginning to assist, accelerate, and partially automate scientific discovery, performing tasks that span literature synthesis, code generation, data analysis, hypothesis proposal, and model criticism. We argue that this transition is qualitative rather than incremental, and that suitably designed multi-agent systems may evolve from passive computational tools into ``AI scientists'' that can expand the hypothesis-generating and verification capacity of science. Such systems must be developed and deployed within a scientific ecosystem fit for purpose: institutions must be redesigned for verification, accountability, interpretability, and dual-use safety. We sketch how multi-agent architectures, illustrated by the prototype framework \textit{Denario}, accelerate the discovery cycle and traverse model spaces beyond human reach; examine what this implies for authorship, peer review, and the enduring role of human scientists; and close with recommendations for governing AI as an epistemic actor rather than a mere instrument.

Belief revision is a process in which an agent begins to believe in something she previously did not. I begin the paper by presenting, based on (Gärdenfors, 1998; Hansson, 1999), postulates for belief revision that constitute the basis of the AGM theory. I will then briefly show the semantics of a modal logic introduced in (van Ditmarsch, 2005), which I call $P$'. This logic formalizes static epistemic states and has greater expressive power than AGM in doing so because it captures the quantitative notion of "degrees of conviction". The third step is to introduce revision operators on $P$ and, mostly following (van Ditmarsch, 2005), obtain the Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) I call $P*$'. It models processes of belief revision in several ways. Original results are presented in the following two sections. The first one of these sections revolves around a formalization of AGM postulates within $P*$ by proving some theorems related to the satisfaction of those postulates by revisions defined in $P*$. The last section features an analysis of $P*$'s revisions that go beyond the mere satisfaction of postulates. I compare their formal behavior with respect to some philosophical criteria. At last, I conclude that the functions presented in (van Ditmarsch, 2005) are not good formalizations of the philosophical intuition behind AGM. Instead, it is captured by the function $*^0$ originally defined in this paper (but highly inspired by (van Benthem, 2007)). An implementation of this function is also provided.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to structured clinical data, yet whether they can recognize the limits of their own knowledge on such tasks remains unexplored. We study this question through the lens of cross-model attribution divergence with the goal of reducing epistemic uncertainty for structured tasks, comparing Qwen 2.5 7B and XGBoost on a prediction task via attribution divergence analysis. We report four findings. First, LLM verbalized confidence is epistemically vacuous, it outputs a near-constant (0.856-0.937) regardless of whether accuracy is 49% or 75.3%, tracking prompt format rather than prediction quality. Second, the LLM exhibits an inverse difficulty effect: accuracy drops to 64.8% when XGBoost is 99% correct, but matches XGBoost (73.8% vs. 73.1%) when it is moderately uncertain. Third, few-shot examples and SHAP-derived feature evidence are orthogonal, super-additive interventions: they reduce the Attribution Disagreement Score (ADS) from 1.54 to 0.38 and improve accuracy from 49% to 75.3% without training. Fourth, a cross-model calibrator that determined LLM reliability using attribution divergence signals reduces expected calibration error from 0.254 to 0.080, replacing uninformative verbalized confidence with patient-specific reliability estimates, without accessing model internals or requiring repeated inference. We frame these findings as a cold start problem for LLMs on structured data and outline a path toward genuine epistemic self-awareness.

Recursive multi-step forecasting is usually framed as distribution shift: models are trained on observed histories but deployed on their own predictions. We show this framing is incomplete by proving that, under partial observability or state truncation, recursive rollout is also an epistemic underidentification problem. Even with deterministic latent dynamics, one-step Bayes supervision identifies behavior only on observed contexts and need not identify the deployed recursive predictor once rollout queries self-generated induced states whose correct local targets are not determined by numeric state alone. We formalize this with induced states $Z$ and provenance variables $P$, and derive a decomposition of induced-state error into teacher-forcing/rollout mismatch, representation--class approximation, and provenance information gaps. Empirically, we show that rollout enters a distinct induced-state regime, that fixed induced states define a distinct local corrective task, and that closed-loop gains arise not only from local adaptation but also from changing the induced states visited during rollout. Using a simple binary provenance encoding, provenance-aware correction can further improve performance, though gains are conditional rather than uniform. These results recast exposure bias as reasoning under self-induced epistemic uncertainty.

Large language models (LLMs) now reach expert-level scores on medical licensing exams, encouraging the assumption that high scores imply safe medical judgment while patients increasingly use them for health advice. We show this assumption is fragile: when misleading context is injected into questions that LLMs originally answer correctly, they abandon the correct answer. We call the ability to maintain correct judgment under adversarial context epistemic resilience, and introduce MedMisBench to measure it. MedMisBench contains 10,932 medical question items and 48,889 misleading context-option pairs spanning medical reasoning, agentic capability, and patient-journey evaluation. Across 11 model configurations, mean accuracy falls from 71.1% on original questions to 38.0% under focused misleading context, with 51.5% attack success. The most damaging injections are formal, rule-like fabrications: authority-framed falsehoods reach 69.5% attack success and exception-poisoning claims reach 64.1%. A 14-member clinical panel from 7 countries identified serious potential harm in 38.2% of reviewed cases. MedMisBench exposes a structural blind spot in LLM evaluation in medical settings: existing benchmarks measure what models know, but not whether they preserve correct medical judgment under misleading context.

Language models increasingly act as epistemic proxies, synthesizing evidence from multiple sources to inform decisions. Whether they evaluate the quality of that evidence, or merely aggregate it based on surface presentation, remains poorly understood. We show that models possess the capability to detect fabricated statistics in isolation but do not recruit this capability during multi-source synthesis, producing similar numeric estimates whether the statistics are fabricated or valid. Specifically, source influence is governed by a methodology-register gate that responds to the distributional register of analytical text but not to numeric validity: for example, statistically impossible confidence intervals receive the same weight as valid ones. The behavioral dissociation replicates across six models from four families (Anthropic Claude, Qwen, OLMo, and OpenAI GPT-5.4) and three professional domains. Mechanistic analyses, including causal tracing, linear probes, and component-level attribution, converge on the same account: the model encodes and causally uses a methodology-register representation that transfers across domains, while numeric-validity signals, decodable in isolation, are suppressed to chance during multi-source synthesis. Prompting-based mitigations, even an oracle checklist naming the exact statistical checks, produce blanket skepticism rather than selective discernment, and the post-training pipelines we examine reinforce the shortcut without building numeric verification. Unlike sycophancy, which tracks user preference, this failure tracks whether a source presents as analytically credible, not whether its claims are consistent. We term this \textit{epistemic alignment}: like preference and safety alignment, the question is not capability but deployment.

We ask: when do Bayesian model averaging (BMA) weights over decision trees carry sufficient epistemic information to justify committed exploitation of the averaging distribution? We answer this question in closed form for Bayesian decision trees (BDTs) with Dirichlet-Multinomial leaf models and a Catalan-exponential tree-size prior (Schetinin&Jakaite, 2025), establishing a complete non-asymptotic theory of rational commitment thresholds.

Human reasoning has long been theorised to operate socially, not through isolated individual cognition, but through collective adversarial discourse, a framework known as the Argumentative Theory of Reasoning (ATR). Rather than relying on individual "intellectualist reasoners" as the primary vehicle for truth-seeking, ATR reconceptualises truth as an emergent property of social epistemology: the product of imperfect individual reasoning refined under the adversarial pressure of debate. This distributed method of collective intelligence has guided humanity to ever-greater epistemic heights and underpins the foundational principles of all democratic systems. This thesis breaks new ground by, for the first time, simulating ATR through the multi-agent debate (MAD) of large language models (LLMs). With rigorous empirical analysis, we demonstrate that, when correctly engineering an epistemically diverse set of models, LLM-MAD can significantly improve truth-seeking performance on questionnaire-based tasks, even when individual debate participants exhibit limited standalone performance. Furthermore, we present strong empirical evidence that this performance gain is mechanistically grounded in the central principles of ATR, suggesting that collective reasoning may be universally favourable over individualist reasoning, rather than a quirk in biology or evolution. Finally, drawing on our analysis of debate dynamics, we propose a novel benchmarking methodology that leverages LLM-MAD to measure intrinsic model properties (such as hallucination propensity) in order to compare models in ways that current static benchmarking approaches cannot support.

Accurate wind power forecasting requires reliable uncertainty quantification, yet most existing methods report a single predictive uncertainty that conflates epistemic and aleatoric sources. This paper applies the law of total variance to the joint setting of heteroscedastic neural network regression and Bayesian posterior approximation, deriving an explicit decomposition of total uncertainty (TU) into aleatoric (AU) and epistemic (EU) components. The resulting estimators are compatible with standard posterior-approximation methods and with $β$-NLL training to regulate the mean--variance learning trade-off. A wind power--specific evaluation framework is proposed to validate disentanglement without access to ground-truth uncertainty labels, comprising three modules: controlled synthetic experiments to verify responses to heteroscedastic noise and distribution shift; data-property--driven validation on a real-world wind turbine SCADA dataset; and dataset-size scaling experiments to examine the predicted asymptotic behavior of EU. Across synthetic and real-world experiments, the decomposed AU and EU components respond in theoretically consistent directions to noise structure, distributional shift, and training-scale variation, supporting the theoretical consistency and operational utility of the proposed decomposition and evaluation protocol.

LLMs are increasingly used to explain personal sensing data, translating traces of activity and mood into natural-language accounts of why an anomalous day may have occurred. However, such explanations can sound coherent and personally meaningful even when the underlying evidence is sparse or missing. We introduce epistemic overreach (EO) as a measure for cases where a generated explanation implies more than the available sensing evidence can justify. To audit how often and in what forms EO occurs, we obtained anomalous-day scenarios from three longitudinal sensing datasets of college students: StudentLife, GLOBEM, and CollegeExperience. Across activity, sleep, and affect anomalies, we generated 14,922 explanations using three LLM families -- Llama, Qwen, and GPT -- under two prompting conditions: one minimally constrained prompt and another prompt explicitly instructing models to bound claims to the data. For each scenario, we varied the amount of behavioral evidence available to the model to examine whether more evidence reduces EO. We evaluated each explanation using a structured rubric, decomposing EO into the dimensions of unsupported causal attribution, unacknowledged data gaps, overconfident language, temporal inconsistency, and diagnostic inference. We find that LLMs routinely attribute anomalous days to causes without sufficient support from the data, and that this pattern replicates across datasets, anomaly types, and model families. Further, providing richer context does not reliably reduce EO; bounded prompting helps but does not eliminate it. These findings suggest that evidential grounding should be a first-order evaluation criterion for LLM-generated personal sensing explanations, alongside fluency and plausibility. We argue that personal sensing explanations require evidential discipline: systems must distinguish what is observed, what is inferred, and what remains unknown.

While explicit reasoning trajectories enhance model interpretability, existing paradigms often rely on monolithic chains that lack intermediate verification, allowing early errors to cascade unchecked. This lack of modularity impedes granular auditing and compromises the epistemic trust required for high-stakes applications. We propose MAVEN (Multi-Agent Verification-Elaboration Network with In-Step Epistemic Auditing), a blackboard-inspired framework designed to transform LLMs into deliberate reasoners through explicit role-decoupling. At its core, MAVEN operationalizes an adversarial Skeptic-Researcher-Judge loop, simulating expert deliberation by functionally separating logical defense from factual grounding. Experiments on OpenBookQA, TruthfulQA, HALUEVAL and StrategyQA benchmarks demonstrate that MAVEN delivers superior reasoning quality across four fine-grained metrics. Notably, MAVEN consistently outperforms latent reasoning models such as GEMINI-3.1-Pro and consensus-based baselines (e.g., ReConcile) by generating explicitly structured, modular, and verifiable deliberation trajectories, rather than relying on implicit internal states or post-hoc consensus. Moreover, comprehensive evaluations confirm that MAVEN is fully model-agnostic, serving as a strong and transferable reasoning booster that yields substantial performance improvements across diverse backbone models.

Distributed agents in real-world settings frequently must coordinate under uncertainty with only partial observations. Coordination is necessary to share beliefs to aid in task completion, but communication costs bandwidth, introduces latency, and if done poorly, can degrade collective reasoning. This tension is especially acute in bandwidth-constrained deployments such as distributed sensing networks, autonomous reconnaissance, and collaborative cyber defense, where excessive transmission carries direct operational costs. Existing work has focused on multi-agent exploration and communication strategies, but not on how communication frequency and content jointly shape the collective belief state. Central to this challenge is the degree to which agents maintain compatible internal beliefs about the environment, a property we term \textit{epistemic alignment}. When agents share beliefs effectively, they converge on correct hypotheses; when communication is poorly designed, agents may converge confidently on wrong ones. We formalize this distinction and show it is not detectable from coordination metrics alone such as Jensen-Shannon Divergence or rate to consensus.

Visual affordances identify regions in an image with potential interactions, offering a novel paradigm for scene understanding. Recognizing affordances allows autonomous robots to act more naturally, could enhance human-robot interactions, enrich augmented reality systems, and benefit prosthetic vision devices. Accurate and localized prediction of affordance regions, rather than general saliency maps is crucial for these applications. We present a model for instance segmentation of affordances by adopting sample-based and ensembles approaches for uncertainty estimation. We extend an attention-based architecture for our novel task, showing with detailed ablation experiments the effects of each component. By comparing the distribution of these different detections, we extract pixel-wise epistemic and aleatoric variances at both the semantic and spatial levels. In addition, we propose a novel measure called Probability-based Mask Quality, which enables a comprehensive analysis of semantic and spatial variations in a probabilistic instance segmentation model. Our results show that the global consensus of multiple sub-networks of Bayesian models improve deterministic networks due to a better mask refinement and generalization. This fact, joined with the more powerful features extracted by attention-based mechanisms, represent an improvement of +7.4 p.p on the $F_β^w$ score in the challenging IIT-Aff dataset. Bayesian models are also better calibrated, producing less overconfident probabilities and with a better uncertainty estimation. Qualitative results show that aleatoric variance appears in the contour of the objects, while the epistemic variance is observed in visual challenging pixels, adding interpretability to the neural network.

Recursive reasoning systems alternate between acquiring new evidence and refining an accumulated understanding. Two design choices are typically left implicit: how to represent the evolving reasoning state, and when to stop iterating. This paper addresses both. We represent the reasoning state as an epistemic state graph encoding extracted claims, evidential relations, open questions, and confidence weights. We define the order-gap as the distance between the states reached by expand-then-consolidate versus consolidate-then-expand; a small order-gap suggests that the two orderings agree and further iteration is unlikely to help. Our main result gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the linearised order-gap to be non-degenerate near the fixed point, showing when the criterion is informative rather than algebraically vacuous. This is a local condition, not a global convergence guarantee. We apply the framework to recursive reasoning systems and sketch its application to agent loops, tree-of-thought reasoning, theorem proving, and continual learning.

Democratic discourse analysis systems increasingly rely on multi-agent LLM pipelines in which distinct evaluator models are assigned adversarial roles to generate structured, multi-perspective assessments of political statements. A core assumption is that models will reliably maintain their assigned roles. This paper provides the first systematic empirical test of that assumption using the TRUST pipeline. We develop an epistemic stance classifier that identifies advocate roles from reasoning text without relying on surface vocabulary, and measure role fidelity across 60 political statements (30 English, 30 German) using four metrics: Role Drift Index (RDI), Expected Drift Distance (EDD), Directional Drift Index (DDI), and Entropy-based Role Stability (ERS). We identify two failure modes - the Epistemic Floor Effect (fact-check results create an absolute lower bound below which the legitimizing role cannot be maintained) and Role-Prior Conflict (training-time knowledge overrides role instructions for factually unambiguous statements) - as manifestations of a single mechanism: Epistemic Role Override (ERO). Model choice significantly affects role fidelity: Mistral Large outperforms Claude Sonnet by 28pp (67% vs. 39%) and exhibits a qualitatively different failure mode - role abandonment without polarity reversal - compared to Claude's active switch to the opposing stance. Role fidelity is language-robust. Fact-check provider choice is not universally neutral: Perplexity significantly reduces Claude's role fidelity on German statements (Delta = -15pp, p = 0.007) while leaving Mistral unaffected. These findings have direct implications for multi-agent LLM validation: a system validated without role fidelity measurement may systematically misrepresent the epistemic diversity it was designed to provide.

We propose Frictive Policy Optimization (FPO), a framework for learning language model policies that regulate not only what to say, but when and how to intervene in order to manage epistemic and normative risk. Unlike standard alignment methods that optimize surface-level preference or task utility, FPO treats clarification, verification, challenge, redirection, and refusal as explicit control actions whose purpose is to shape the evolution of belief, commitment, and uncertainty over time. We formalize alignment as a risk-sensitive epistemic control problem in which intervention decisions are selected based on their expected effect on downstream epistemic quality rather than on immediate reward alone. We introduce a compact taxonomy of frictive interventions, a structured friction functional that operationalizes multiple alignment failure modes, and a unified family of FPO methods spanning reward shaping, preference pairing, group-relative ranking, and risk-conditioned trust regions. We further propose an evaluation framework that measures epistemic competence directly through clarification behavior, calibration, contradiction repair, refusal proportionality, and information efficiency. Together, these results provide a formal and algorithmic foundation for learning agents that are aligned not only in outcome, but in epistemic conduct.

Constructivist epistemology argues that knowledge is actively constructed rather than passively copied. Despite the generative nature of Large Language Models (LLMs), most existing agent memory systems are still based on dense retrieval. However, dense retrieval heavily relies on semantic overlap or entity matching within sentences. Consequently, embeddings often fail to distinguish instances that are semantically similar but contextually distinct, introducing substantial noise by retrieving context-mismatched entries. Conversely, directly employing open-ended generation for memory access risks "Structural Hallucination" where the model generates memory keys that do not exist in the memory, leading to lookup failures. Inspired by this epistemology, we posit that memory is fundamentally organized by cognitive schemas, and valid recall must be a generative process performed within these schematic structures. To realize this, we propose SCG-MEM, a schema-constrained generative memory architecture. SCG-MEM reformulates memory access as Schema-Constrained Generation. By maintaining a dynamic Cognitive Schema, we strictly constrain LLM decoding to generate only valid memory entry keys, providing a formal guarantee against structural hallucinations. To support long-term adaptation, we model memory updates via assimilation (grounding inputs into existing schemas) and accommodation (expanding schemas with novel concepts). Furthermore, we construct an Associative Graph to enable multi-hop reasoning through activation propagation. Experiments on the LoCoMo benchmark show that SCG-MEM substantially improves performance across all categories over retrieval-based baselines.

When answering user queries, LLMs often retrieve knowledge from external sources stored in retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) databases. These are often populated from unvetted sources, e.g. the open web, and can contain maliciously crafted data. This paper studies attacks that can manipulate the context retrieved by LLMs from such RAG databases. Prior work on such context manipulation primarily injects false or toxic content, which can often be detected by fact-checking or linguistic analysis. A more subtle threat, which we call epistemic bias injection (EBI), is where adversaries inject factually correct yet epistemically biased passages that systematically favor one side of an open-ended issue. Although linguistically coherent and truthful, such adversarial passages effectively crowd out alternative viewpoints during retrieval from the RAG and push LLM outputs towards an attack-desired stance. As a core contribution, we propose a novel characterization of the problem: We give a geometric metric that quantifies stance polarity and epistemic bias. This metric can be computed directly on embeddings of text passages. Leveraging it, we construct EBI attacks and develop a lightweight prototype defense called BiasDef for them. We evaluate them both on a comprehensive benchmark constructed from public question answering datasets. Our results show that: (1) the proposed attack induces significant stance polarity shifts, effectively evading existing retrieval-based sanitization defenses, and (2) BiasDef substantially reduces adversarial retrieval and epistemic bias in LLM's answers. Overall, this demonstrates the new threat as well as the ease of employing epistemic bias metrics for filtering in RAG-enabled LLMs.

Accurate uncertainty quantification is critical for reliable predictive modeling. Existing methods typically address either aleatoric uncertainty due to measurement noise or epistemic uncertainty resulting from limited data, but not both in a balanced manner. We propose CLEAR, a calibration method with two distinct parameters, $γ_1$ and $γ_2$, to combine the two uncertainty components and improve the conditional coverage of predictive intervals for regression tasks. CLEAR is compatible with any pair of aleatoric and epistemic estimators; we show how it can be used with (i) quantile regression for aleatoric uncertainty and (ii) ensembles drawn from the Predictability-Computability-Stability (PCS) framework for epistemic uncertainty. Across 17 diverse real-world datasets, CLEAR achieves an average improvement of 28.3% and 17.5% in the interval width compared to the two individually calibrated baselines while maintaining nominal coverage. Similar improvements are observed when applying CLEAR to Deep Ensembles (epistemic) and Simultaneous Quantile Regression (aleatoric). The benefits are especially evident in scenarios dominated by high aleatoric or epistemic uncertainty. Project page: https://unco3892.github.io/clear/

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, a major contribution to the history of epistemology, proposes a table of categories to elucidate the structure of the a priori principles underlying human judgment. Artificial intelligence (AI) technology claims to simulate or replicate human judgment. To evaluate this claim, it is necessary to examine whether AI judgments exhibit the essential characteristics of human judgment. This paper investigates the unexplainability of AI judgments through the lens of Kant's theory of judgment. Drawing on Kant's four logical forms - quantity, quality, relation, and modality - this study identifies what may be called AI's uncertainty, a condition in which different forms of judgment become entangled. In particular, with regard to modality, this study argues that the Softmax function forcibly reframes AI judgments as possibility judgments. Furthermore, drawing on Kant's account of definition, this paper argues that no definitive criterion exists for verifying functional implementation. Moreover, fluent linguistic behavior may create the appearance of functional implementation even when important functions remain absent.