Adversarial Evaluation

A higher evaluation score does not always mean a better language model system. When optimization exploits an evaluator's mistakes, measured progress can conceal unchanged or deteriorating task performance. This failure can arise through parameter updates, selection among generated outputs, or revisions to persistent prompts. We develop a comparative framework for reward hacking across these three optimization substrates: weights, selection, and text. Building on the Proxy Compression Hypothesis and research on inference-time and in-context reward hacking, we examine how reachable behavior, optimization budgets, and persistent adaptation shape exposure to proxy error. We formalize a distance-dependent upper bound on evaluator disagreement and a capacity ordering for nested policy classes, then show why distance alone cannot establish a universal ranking of vulnerability. An exact finite-output illustration demonstrates how the location of a scoring defect changes the behavior favored by each method. We also map representative defenses across substrates, identifying which mechanisms transfer directly and which offer only functional analogies. Persistent prompts receive particular attention: their contents are inspectable, but the behavior induced by a small textual change may be difficult to anticipate. The formal analysis, numerical illustration, and published evidence together provide a basis for comparing optimization methods and identifying the conditions under which their defenses transfer. The resulting framework connects optimization choices to verification requirements: reliable improvement depends on controlling accessible failure modes and preserving evidence of task quality independent of the score being optimized.

An AI evaluation can be perfectly reproducible and still support the wrong claim. This risk is acute in closed-loop systems: policy determines visited states, observable components, and which failures leave a measurable trace. We propose a claim-safe protocol with three actions. Refuse: abstain when a clean reference stream or matched runtime comparison lacks support. Decompose: report protocol execution, operational false admission, and structural hypotheses separately rather than as one PASS/FAIL label. Refresh: treat distribution-shift alarms as requests to invalidate and recompute a reference map, not as fault evidence. We instantiate the protocol in an aggregate-only simulator with 24 policy components, three demand regimes, two fault-mask families, and independent development and heldout seeds. The preregistered heldout contains 1,440 cases and 21,600 partition rows. Only 55/72 regime-component units were reference-admitted and 54/55 remained runtime-admitted, making abstention part of the result. Stable false admission was 0/20 represented components, with a one-sided exact 95% upper bound of 0.1391 under a frozen 0.20 rule. Within admitted units, affected clean traffic outpredicted nominal fault-cell fraction: across 540 unit-arm rows nested in 20 component clusters, the cell-minus-traffic negative-log-likelihood difference was 0.1264 nats per row, with a 95% component-cluster interval of [0.0593, 0.1918]. A drift log shows why "null" must be reference-relative: clean fault-null streams triggered 15/15, 0/15, and 14/15 alarms across three regimes, while only the middle regime matched the frozen detector reference. Rather than a universal threshold, we contribute an executable contract linking observable support, statistical calibration, and justified claims.

Reliable agent evaluation is complicated by automatic harness optimization, which repeatedly uses a released benchmark $B_{\mathrm{rel}}$ to guide a Proposer that edits prompts, memory, retrieval, tools, and control code around a fixed target agent. Task holdout varies semantic tasks but leaves the benchmark protocol fixed, so a "bad genius" Proposer can produce a cheating harness whose released-benchmark gain depends on a benchmark-wide shortcut. We introduce Counterfactual Harness Search and Evolution (CHASE), which casts harness evolution as constraint generation over validity-preserving benchmark counterfactuals. After each Proposer update, a Challenger searches for an executable protocol transformation with large gain destruction. A validity firewall checks that task semantics are preserved, while a confirmation set determines whether the counterfactual enters a finite archive. We formalize an exact shortcut-neutralized benchmark $B_0$ and establish statistical guarantees linking finite counterfactual archives to $B_0$ and characterizing sequential Challenger search. We evaluate CHASE on a synthetic benchmark and on OfficeQA, where CHASE retains strong released-benchmark gains while substantially reducing gain destruction under valid protocol changes.

Thompson's "Reflections on Trusting Trust" showed that a compiler can be poisoned to reinsert its own backdoor, so that even recompiling clean source reproduces the Trojan. Today, substantial coding work is done by AI coding agents -- and increasingly, those agents generate new versions of themselves. We reconsider Thompson's attack when the "compiler" is a self-modifying coding agent. Can an adversary supply poisoned benchmarks to the agent's self-evaluation and self-improvement process to induce future versions of the agent to write vulnerable code on clean, held-out tasks? We instantiate this attack against three recently proposed self-modifying coding agents: the Darwin Gödel Machine (with our experimental modifications), the Self-Improving Coding Agent, and Hyperagents (both substantively unmodified). We demonstrate successful proofs-of-concept: for example, with Hyperagents powered by Sonnet 4.5, our poisoned benchmark leads the agent to self-evolve instructions that disable HTTPS certificate validation on neutral URL-fetching tasks. From our experiments, we distill properties of the vulnerability, benchmark, model, and agent scaffolding that are sufficient to enable a benchmark poisoning attack. Moreover, we show that contamination often persists even when a poisoned agent is subsequently evolved against clean benchmarks. We discuss defensive directions and argue that self-modifying coding agents must be designed to be more resilient to such attacks.

Language model-generated rubrics are increasingly used as reward signals for rubric-based reinforcement learning, LLM-as-a-judge evaluation, and automated grading. Such rubrics are reliable only if they reward honest answers over adversarial answers optimized to exploit them. Yet their robustness to such optimization remains poorly understood. We isolate the hardest regime: impossible tasks, where the prompt pressures the model toward an unsupported conclusion, so the only honest response is to acknowledge the impossibility. We introduce ImpossibleRubrics, a benchmark of 169 impossible tasks spanning six impossibility categories, each paired with a verifiable oracle certificate specifying what an honest answer may and may not claim, together with 48 answerable controls. Rather than providing fixed rubrics, ImpossibleRubrics provides task environments and certificates, allowing rubrics to be generated downstream and then adversarially tested for whether they reward certificate-violating answers. Eleven generators are exploited 8--26% of the time on the unbiased 150-of-169 environment cut; on a deliberately selected stress cut the strongest generator we measured is still exploited 36% while a certificate-faithful rubric is exploited 0%, so what we measure is a rubric-quality gap, not task impossibility. One result runs against intuition. A single generic rubric ("be decisive, penalize hedging") used unchanged for every task is exploited 64% of the time, and seven of the eleven generators are exploited more often than that while writing a rubric tailored to each one. The tailored criteria appear to tell an attacker which claim to fabricate. The problem is not that rubrics are vague; it is that they are specific about the wrong things.

Agentic systems are rapidly moving to production, where they read untrusted inputs, call tools with real permissions, and act autonomously, expanding the security surface beyond chat-only models. Yet standard evaluations remain single-turn and fail to capture multi-step agent vulnerabilities. We present a systematic black-box framework for risk-aware agent evaluation requiring only basic system descriptions. Our approach introduces: (1) a seven-domain taxonomy mapping observable behaviors to risk categories, (2) fully automated SAGE-RT red teaming producing 120 adversarial scenarios per domain, and (3) human-validated evaluation using LLM judges. Empirical validation across two agent architectures (CrewAI and AutoGen) with four base models reveals alarming patterns: 56.25% average governance risk, 65% privacy risk in multi-agent configurations, and agent behavior vulnerabilities reaching 85%. Our black-box approach effectively identifies critical architectural vulnerabilities without privileged access, providing a scalable path toward safer agent deployments.

Universal machine-learning interatomic potentials (u-MLIPs) aim to generalize across diverse configurations. Benchmarks enable reproducible evaluation but may not expose failures outside their predefined scope. Here, we show that physics-informed search can complement benchmark-based evaluation by uncovering hidden failure modes. We introduce MLIP Detective, an agentic framework for active failure mode discovery. Starting from benchmark evidence, MLIP Detective generates falsifiable, physics-informed failure hypotheses, screens them with inexpensive simulations, and escalates only the most suspicious cases to human experts together with proposed verification protocols. Without issue-specific prompting, MLIP Detective identified and characterized a systematic anomaly in MACE-MPA-0: the model predicted some relaxed adsorbate-surface systems involving O- or F-containing adsorbates to be higher in energy than their corresponding separated fragments. Using cross-model comparisons, MLIP Detective further inferred a likely training-data origin for the anomaly, consistent with recent reports.

How do you validate a cheap, deterministic proxy for an oracle that is expensive, rate-limited, and non-stationary? We present a protocol built on adversarial falsification gates (negative control, dose response, bounded amplification, duplication penalty, length neutrality) that define and select the proxy, fitted on a training split and confirmed held-out; around them it bounds what the proxy can never resolve, and re-measures external causal evidence on the current oracle rather than assuming it. We demonstrate it end to end on Generative Engine Optimization, where the proxy is a deterministic content score, and one step fails on that domain exactly as the protocol is built to detect: re-measuring the only published causal anchors (2023 effect sizes) on ten modern engine families shows their levers move citation on none, so the anchors are an expired external check; recalibrating to the near-zero modern vector strips the score of its lever-responsive components. What survives is the gate-enforced response surface. The gates buy a measured property: on a 500-source benchmark of adversarial edits, amplifying the score's calibrated levers gains an attacker at most 6 points, and decreases with dose; single-lever amplification is provably bounded, while the cap and cross-lever sub-additivity are empirical findings consistent with it. On detection, web-spam baselines dominate and out-of-distribution attacks evade the score, so the deployable filter layers it over them. A query-conditioned skyline bounds the score's citation signal (within-query Spearman 0.11), repositioning query-agnostic scores as quality filters rather than citation predictors. A query-leakage bug in our first ranking evaluation and a failed confidence flag are disclosed and corrected; every number reproduces offline from released artifacts at zero marginal API cost.

As vision-language models (VLMs) rapidly advance in image understanding, cross-modal reasoning, and complex instruction execution, instruction-following capability has become a key indicator of their reliability and practicality. However, existing multimodal instruction-following benchmarks still suffer from limited language coverage and insufficient adversarial safety scenarios, making them inadequate for evaluating real-world multilingual and safety-sensitive settings. To address these gaps, we present MM-IFEval-Pro, a multimodal instruction-following benchmark covering Chinese and English tasks as well as diverse instruction hijacking cases. MM-IFEval-Pro includes 4 major task categories and 24 subcategories and 8 instruction categories with 52 subcategories, with each sample containing an average of 3.0 constraints to realistically simulate complex instruction scenarios. We further construct a reinforcement-learning training set enriched with Chinese and adversarial instructions, which significantly improves model performance on MM-IFEval-Pro and transfers effectively to other mainstream multimodal benchmarks, demonstrating strong cross-task and cross-language generalization.

AI agents have recently demonstrated strong performance in automated vulnerability patching. However, existing evaluations often validate a patch only by testing whether the provided Proof-of-Concept (PoC) input still triggers a crash. This leaves two key threats to validity: agents may reproduce memorized historical developer patches, or they may generate surface-level fixes that only suppress the reported crash. We study these concerns for C/C++ vulnerability patching. We introduce a patch similarity metric to detect memorized patches. On average, 25% of the agent patches exhibit substantial similarity to historical developer patches, indicating that patch memorization is a real threat to the validity of vulnerability patching evaluations. Meanwhile, agents also frequently exploit benchmark structures to pass patch validation by patching on the crash stack trace to suppress the crash, rather than localizing and fixing the root cause of the vulnerabilities. To handle these issues, we propose PatchBench, a new benchmark for evaluating AI agents on realistic vulnerability patching tasks. PatchBench selects vulnerabilities whose ground-truth fixes lie outside the crash stack and uses vulnerability transplant and code mutations to migrate historical vulnerabilities into new repository contexts, reducing the risks of surface-level fixes and patch memorization. We develop new patch validation methods that thoroughly evaluate both security and semantic correctness of agent patches. Across 11 state-of-the-art agents, including the top three AIxCC agents, the original PoC-only validation inflates the patching task solve rate of agents by 1.83$\times$ on average. Our results reveal key limitations of current patching agents and point to future research directions for more reliable vulnerability repair.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) is essential for their safe deployment. Current alignment methods mainly optimize observable responses, yet models remain vulnerable when the same harmful intent is recast in unfamiliar or adversarial forms that humans can easily recognize. Prototype theory offers an account of this adaptability. Human concepts are represented around central cases, and new instances are categorized according to their graded typicality relative to these prototypes. Here we show that such categorization of moral concepts is weakly preserved in current LLMs. Across 23 LLMs, models often failed to distinguish opposed moral categories or preserve fine-grained typicality within each category. These deficits persist across parameter sizes and alignment stages. We developed representational similarity optimization, which directly aligns the latent representations in LLMs with the categorization expressed in human moral judgements, without supervising generated responses. In matched experiments using the same 251,334 moral annotations, standard behavioral alignment learned the intended moral judgements at the response level while leaving the categorization structure largely unchanged and increasing vulnerability across adversarial evaluations. Reorganizing moral categorization produced more modest gains in explicit judgements but consistently improved adversarial robustness across model scales on diverse benchmarks and attack strategies. Our findings provide functional support for the view that prototype-based categorization contributes to behavioral adaptability. They also show that transferring this representational principle to LLMs yields generalizable safety under adversarial conditions.

Automating alignment research may accelerate progress toward aligned AI, but whether it does is hard to measure. Luckily, many alignment failures, such as deception, sycophancy, and jailbreaks, are already measurable by public benchmarks. We study whether automated alignment researchers (AARs) can post-train to mitigate alignment failures by proposing training methods and data to simultaneously optimize multiple safety benchmarks, while largely preserving general capability. Across 10 alignment failures, the strongest AAR methods significantly reduce the targeted alignment failures and generalize to a held-out benchmark, multi-turn behavioral audits, and models up to 4.7x larger than the target model. As a human baseline, 28 experienced researchers receive up to eight hours to develop one-shot methods for the same benchmarks, but their methods underperform the best AAR methods. Using human ideas as the AARs' initial research direction does not improve performance, suggesting current AARs may not need guidance from experienced researchers. These results suggest that automating alignment research on well-characterized failures may be practical in the near term.

Cowork agents may complete benign tasks while disclosing protected data, manipulating unauthorized state, invocate unauthorized API. We define behavioral safety and introduce ActBench, a self-evolving benchmark that evaluates such behavior risk from execution trajectories rather than final responses. Each case pairs a benign task with an adversarial variant that preserves its instruction, configuration, initial state, rating model, and trusted records while injecting a task-reachable payload. ActBench contains 600 cases from 213 scenarios, spanning 15 risk behaviors, six execution spaces, and 48 web-service APIs.To move beyond static payloads, we propose a reward-guided beam search method that jointly optimizes attack effectiveness and task utility, while reflection diagnoses failed execution checkpoint and guides payload revision. Besides, we propose a dual evidence verification mechanism that verifies agent execution safety and utility through log evidence and LLM-based trajectory evidence.We evaluate 15 LLMs and 6 open-source cowork agents over 24,000 trajectories. Under a fixed harness, attack success rates ranges from 10.1% to 94.4% across models, while under a fixed base model, they range from 73.7% to 94.4% across agents.These results show greater variation across models than agent harness, while attacks remain highly successful across all tested harnesses.Our benchmark is released at: https://github.com/zjuicsr/ActBench.

Reliable evaluation of tool routing is critical as Large Language Models increasingly operate as autonomous agents. Current benchmarks face three structural limitations: data distributions that follow a power law leave rare scenarios underrepresented; the absence of adversarial hard negatives obscures performance differences across models; and annotation pipelines depend on LLM judgments that have not been validated through execution. In this paper, we introduce PluginEval, a benchmark constructed through a two-stage framework that systematically mitigates these limitations. First, we formulate tool routing as a sequence of three decisions and separate generation from verification. LLMs propose candidate calls, while deterministic validation and real API execution provide reliable quality signals. Second, we decompose each plugin by capability, intent, and boundary to identify trigger and exclusion scenarios. We then generate queries at different difficulty levels to fill coverage gaps, including adversarial negatives targeting three failure modes, and return them to the first stage for annotation. This process creates a closed loop that iterates until coverage converges. For evaluation, we move beyond aggregate accuracy. An LLM judge anchored to gold annotations classifies failures as missed calls, spurious calls, or parameter errors, producing a detailed error profile for each model. We evaluate five model families, including proprietary models and models with open weights, analyze their performance across difficulty levels and error categories, and validate the judge through agreement with human annotations.

Process reward models (PRMs) score intermediate reasoning steps and are widely used for search, ranking, and training, but optimization can exploit these learned proxies by increasing reward while turning correct reasoning into incorrect reasoning. We formulate PRM stress testing as a quality-diversity search problem using MAP-Elites, retaining the most severe correctness-flipping edit in each behavior-space region while separating search coverage from exploit coverage. We characterize what such archives certify: finite-cell repair bounds covered-cell tail risk and average residual severity but cannot bound the worst remaining cell from covered fraction alone; under Lipschitz post-repair loss and metric-cover auditing, the residual is bounded by archive fitting error plus the Lipschitz constant times the covering radius. A controlled landscape validates this certificate and the impossibility of any fraction-only worst-case guarantee. On real PRMs, the search reveals an aggregation-dependent vulnerability in Qwen2.5-Math-PRM-7B: padding yields 44 strict exploits with maximum gain 0.294 under mean pooling versus one exploit under minimum readout; a matched syntactic control isolates the mechanism, and an RLHFlow value-head model shows the same qualitative effect with maximum gain 0.005. A predeclared paired LoRA repair protocol reduces exploit rates from 0.148 to 0.037 to 0.074, lowers the worst attack from 0.333 to 0.177 to 0.212, improves ranking AUROC without degrading best-of-4 accuracy, attributes gains to adversarial fine-tuning rather than archive diversity, and is confirmed by independent unpaired replications (44 to 1, clean-split worst gain 0.0092, MATH-500 41 to 0, clean ranking 40/40).

Training terminal agents requires executable and verifiable tasks that are not merely solvable, but appropriately challenging for learning. Executable validation establishes feasibility, yet does not reveal how a task behaves relative to a given solver setting. In this paper, we present CalibForge, an autonomous terminal-task synthesis system that uses verified solver behavior to revise candidate tasks through adversarial solver calibration. Multi-solver calibration targets disagreement within a heterogeneous solver pool, whereas contrastive solver calibration targets a designated strong-pass/weak-fail relation; both operationalize a solver-relative learnable zone anchored in demonstrated solvability. Using CalibForge, we construct 5,431 calibrated terminal tasks. Our ablations show that both strategies yield more effective supervision than authoring and validation alone or ordinary single-solver feedback. Models trained on the full collection achieve 32.58% and 47.57% on Terminal-Bench 2.0. The largest improvements over the corresponding base model reach 24.71 percentage points on Terminal-Bench 2.0, 27.68 points on SWE-bench Pro, and 30.04 points on Doc2Repo. Together, these results support solver-relative learnability as a practical target for constructing effective and transferable agent training data.

This paper addresses the limitations of Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) with respect to insufficient evaluation. They are illustrated through the DetoxAI image recognition system for bias detection and concept unlearning. Then, an example of a human-grounded evaluation of methods for explaining image classification is presented. The paper further explores methods for adapting explanations to evolving data streams with concept drift. Experiences with adapting counterfactuals for this problem are discussed. Finally it is related to the challenges of tracking the co-evolution of data, models, and explanations.\footnote{This paper has been accepted for a publication in J.Nalepa (ed) Explainable AI in Space. Proceedings of EASi 2026 Workshop at IJCAI-ECAI 2026 Bremen, Springer CCIS vol 3107 (2016).}

Giving an LLM judge more compute does not necessarily make it check more requirements. When one call must return many verdicts, some decisions become weakly grounded in the evidence, even when that call receives the same token or tool budget as a panel of separate calls. Across expert-graded research replications, legal work, and clinical-trial assessments, agreement with experts falls as the number of verdicts per call grows. We identify sharding as the intervention that mitigates this failure in model-based oversight. Sharding partitions the requirements into smaller groups, assigns each group to a separate call, and aggregates the verdicts. Against a single call with the panel's full budget, sharding improves agreement while holding the model, evidence, total budget, and per-decision budget fixed. Overall, we find that a sharded weaker judge can outperform a more capable holistic judge and match that judge even when the latter receives the panel's full budget. Additionally, we find that sharding exhibits robustness against adversaries. A best-of-N adversary can hold the underlying work fixed, vary only its presentation, and increase an overloaded judge's acceptance of genuinely unmet criteria severalfold. Wherever sharding reduces baseline error, it removes this adversarial advantage, keeping over-acceptance low even as the adversary's search widens. Sharding does not address attacks that persuade the judge separately on each criterion rather than exploiting overload. In that setting, we find that debate-style opposition on top of sharding withstands such adaptive re-optimization.

Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems increasingly incorporate large language models (LLMs) for semantic tasks such as message summarization, operator assistance, and decision support at roadside units and edge nodes. Although these components are not part of safety-critical control loops, they introduce prompt-level attack surfaces that are not addressed by traditional V2X security mechanisms focused on authentication and message integrity. This paper presents Guarded-V2X, an inline semantic guardrail architecture for securing LLM-enabled V2X services under real-time constraints. The proposed system integrates rule-based ingress filtering, a lightweight safety classifier, policy-constrained structured generation, trusted-only retrieval, and post-decision adjudication to enforce machine-checkable safety boundaries prior to downstream execution. Guarded-V2X is evaluated using a four-stage experimental pipeline encompassing intrusion vulnerability analysis, calibration and latency benchmarking, guardrail validation, and robustness under adversarial stress. Experiments are conducted on a V2X-aligned simulated dataset derived from RSU advisories, operator messages, and annotated V2X message summaries. Results show that unguarded and prompt-only baselines retain residual vulnerability under multi-turn adversarial trials, while Guarded-V2X consistently reduces intrusion acceptance success rates and eliminates observed unsafe completions in two-turn settings, without exceeding latency budgets for V2X semantic advisory paths.

Role-Playing Language Agents (RPLAs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes applications such as healthcare assistance, customer support, and education, where maintaining consistent personas, ethical constraints, and behavioral coherence under adversarial pressure is critical. Existing evaluation approaches rely on static benchmarks or isolated single-turn prompts that fail to capture cumulative behavioral failures emerging over extended interactions. We present a modular multi-agent platform for adversarially stress-testing RPLAs through structured, multi-turn dialogue. The system coordinates three agents: a strategy-driven Interrogator Agent that applies six progressive adversarial strategies, a Target Agent representing the RPLA under evaluation, and an automated Judging Agent that scores behavior across role fidelity, drift, ethical deviation, and consistency dimensions. Through experiments across three personas and three LLM families, we demonstrate that multi-strategy adversarial evaluation reveals failure modes invisible to single-strategy testing, reducing overall robustness scores by 0.17--0.20 points on average. Cross-model validation confirms consistent degradation patterns across Llama-3.3-70B, GPT-4o-mini, and Claude-3.5-Haiku, with Authority Challenge and Emotional Manipulation emerging as the most effective attack strategies. Automated judging achieves strong human alignment ($r = 0.82$, Fleiss' $κ= 0.71$). This work is released as an open-source platform to support AI safety and reproducible RPLA benchmarking. While the framework enables systematic discovery of failure modes, we acknowledge potential ethical risks associated with adversarial testing methodologies and emphasize responsible usage for improving AI safety.

Computer-use agents (CUAs), which empower large language models to autonomously operate operating systems and the web, are increasingly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks. A widely adopted defense is the human-in-the-loop paradigm, in which the agent pauses for explicit user confirmation before executing sensitive operations. While effective against conspicuously high-harm attacks, this defense offers little protection against what we term Invisible Ink Threats: low-harm injected goals, such as starring a repository or installing a package, that are behaviorally indistinguishable from legitimate task execution and thus evade both model safety mechanisms and human oversight. To systematically investigate this blind spot, we present II-Bench, a collection of seemingly harmless adversarial tasks. II-Bench comprises 444 examples targeting confidentiality and integrity attacks across three platforms, spanning three attack categories: page navigation and interaction, sensitive information exfiltration, and code download and execution. Each category is instantiated in both natural language and code forms under two levels of instruction specificity. Furthermore, we construct HITLCUA, a comprehensive adversarial testing framework that integrates a real virtual machine operating system environment with isolated Docker-based web platforms, and simulates human participation by allowing CUAs to consult an API-simulated user before proceeding with suspicious operations. Extensive evaluations of leading CUAs reveal that low-harm injections frequently bypass both agent defenses and simulated user review, exposing severe and previously underexplored security risks in current CUAs.

Online-judge verdicts and the datasets and benchmarks built on them are treated as ground truth for evaluating and training large language models for code. Yet prior audits have sounded a warning: official suites accept buggy submissions. These audits, however, stop at the warning and offer no practical remedy. Our remedy has two parts: an off-the-shelf coding agent, serving as a test-suite auditor, both builds adversarial test suites to expose what official suites miss and supplies these suites where no official suite exists; a certification chain determines whether each agent-flagged submission is genuinely buggy without relying on the official judge: multiple independently written accepted solutions agree on the expected output for every test, brute-force solutions settle disagreements, and a per-problem validator certifies each failing input legal. One such agent identifies 589 verified accepted-but-buggy submissions among AtCoder's 20,375 audited accepted submissions; extending the same certification to all five agents yields a union floor of 906 such submissions. Five agents, scored separately, each stay within 1.7pp of official-suite coverage on logic bugs those suites catch. On post-cutoff Codeforces problems with no available official suites, the same test-building method leads all five reproduced baselines at every tested input budget. Where an official suite exists, the agent audits suite adequacy instead of assuming it; where none exists, agent suites catch the most buggy submissions among methods we reproduced and tested.

Structured plan-generation agents are often evaluated as if a plan has quality in isolation, yet many realistic planning tasks require asking how a candidate behaves when another agent can search for responses. We introduce AdvPlan-Bench, an offline benchmark for adversarial evaluation of structured plan-generation agents. The contribution is a general evaluation object: a typed plan, an adversarial response set, selector diagnostics, and traceable candidate-frontier metrics. AdvPlan-Bench represents plans as typed action chains with optional branches, assigns synthetic quality scores, compares opposing plans with BLUE-vs-RED advantage and Nash-gap diagnostics, and evaluates qualitative constraint coherence with a transparent heuristic rubric. In 150 synthetic scenarios spanning five planning templates, a sampled best-response policy that draws eight response candidates reduces BLUE advantage from .518 to .486 and BLUE win rate from .900 to .820 relative to a single-sample response. An offline LLM-policy contract baseline reaches .496 BLUE advantage and .700 BLUE win rate, while a two-stage multi-agent council obtains .509 BLUE advantage and .813 BLUE win rate. A three-rater rubric-sensitivity study over 600 rating records yields .978 inter-rater agreement. AdvPlan-Bench is not an operational planner and provides no evidence about real-world decision quality; it is a reproducible benchmark artifact for studying adversarial plan evaluation, response-budget sensitivity, candidate frontiers, and multi-agent critique-and-revision traces.

AI agents operate in persistent environments where early state changes can influence decisions far into the future. Unlike conventional language-model interactions, agent behavior is mediated through a shared state that is repeatedly modified and reused across long-horizon workflows. Current safety benchmarks often fail to capture these cumulative risks because they focus on short, static tasks. To address these limitations, we introduce OpenART, an open-ended arena for scalable agent red teaming through environment evolution. OpenART provides over 10,000 validated stateful scenarios across 50 domains, drawing from a pool of more than 500,000 tools and skills. These tasks require a median of 97 tool calls and enable unified evaluation across 75 different agent-model configurations. To systematically explore these evolving attack surfaces, we propose the Evolutionary Markov Hypergraph Attack (EMHA). EMHA is a black-box policy that performs feedback-driven environment evolution by coordinating authorized state transitions without requiring parameter updates. Throughout the evaluation, task objectives remain fixed while only the environment state changes. Across all configurations, EMHA achieves a pooled Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 85.0%. Its advantage over instruction-only evolution increases from approximately 2% on simple environments to over 17% on the most complex ones, demonstrating that environment evolution increasingly exposes safety failures as task complexity grows. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the specific runtime implementation of an agent explains a significant portion of safety variation beyond the underlying model's capabilities. These results establish OpenART as a scalable foundation for studying agent safety in complex, evolving environments.

Modern opaque AI models prize performance over interpretability, which makes testing difficult. However, formal statistical tests conducted on a model's embedding space can provide robust characterizations of semantic structure, concept separation, and knowledge graph alignment. Model developers would benefit from a model comparison technique that leverages human-curated knowledge structures to test alignment. The scale of the input space for even relatively simple tasks motivates the need for alignment checks that augment standard outcome reasoning. This work develops and demonstrates a topology-based multi-modal alignment test to make deployment, selection, and comparison of opaque models more interpretable. These methods also offer an intuitive connection to possibility theory and a unified decision theoretic framework from data to deployment.

Due to the lack of systematic evaluations, we are not yet able to determine which AI-based Windows malware detector to deploy in production, since existing evaluations (i) differ in terms of data used for both training and testing; (ii) do not consider temporal analysis to showcase whether models withstand the passage of time; (iii) avoid security evaluations with adversarial attacks that could highlight their brittleness against content-injection attacks; and (iv) neglect the computational requirements for deployment, risking slow inference on endpoints. For these reasons, we develop EXE-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark of AI-based Windows malware detectors. EXE-Bench assesses performance, temporal and adversarial robustness, and computational overhead, aggregating them into a single score for direct and fair model comparison. Through EXE-Bench, we highlight how evaluations conducted only after deployment are suboptimal and unable to provide a complete picture of their performance. In particular, through our analysis, we remark how much domain knowledge instilled through feature engineering is still extremely useful in this domain, resisting both time and adversarial attacks, in stark contrast with most of the deep networks that only excel right after deployment.

Large language models increasingly write both code and the tests meant to check it; coverage records what ran, not what was verified. We study an adversarial test-hardening loop under a mechanical oracle: a Tester model writes tests, mutation testing names surviving injected defects, and a Critic model writes tests to kill exactly those, with every verdict decided mechanically, so no model judges another's output. In Experiment 1, on five Python subjects (one same-lineage-loop cell could not be scored), the loop killed 105 mutants that one-shot generation missed and lost none, and the cross-lineage-Critic question returned a pre-declared null. The central finding was an autopsy: an earlier analysis reported a cross-lineage effect at p = 9.5e-66 that was an instrument artifact, an output cap silently truncating the verbose model, caught only by adversarial review of the completed analysis. Review then found a further confound, each arm resampling its own initial suite; Experiment 2 removes it. Under a pre-registered frozen-shared-round-0 design (five replicates on each of four subjects, seeds committed in advance), same-lineage Critic rounds killed 78% of the survivors the frozen initial suite left standing (mean incremental kill rate 0.783, 95% cluster-bootstrap interval [0.592, 0.935]), a within-replicate causal estimate; the cross-provider configuration showed a positive pilot difference (rate gap 0.178, 95% interval [0.039, 0.347]; magnitude dominated by a single replicate) at 5.5x lower arm cost. This compares two named model-provider-harness configurations, not an isolated lineage effect: part of the gap is one configuration's receipted operational failures, including truncation recurrences, now detected and scored rather than laundered. Cross-model comparisons can inherit the asymmetries of the harness that runs them. We release both protocols, all receipts, and the analysis code.

Counterfactual explanations are a prominent approach in explainable artificial intelligence (xAI), providing actionable guidance on what input changes would alter a model's prediction to a desired outcome. While early methods primarily focused on minimal feature changes, recent work incorporates additional properties such as sparsity, actionability and plausibility. Despite this progress, fair and systematic evaluation remains challenging. Existing studies often rely on different data splits, predictive models, and evaluation metrics, which limits objective comparison across methods. To fill this gap, we introduce CEL (Counterfactual Explanations Library), a unified library and benchmark for counterfactual explanations designed to support consistent implementation and evaluation. CEL includes 18 datasets of varying size and complexity and provides implementations or reimplementations of 14 widely used counterfactual methods. Using this standardized setup, we conduct a comprehensive quantitative comparison across a variety of methods on datasets that differ in size, number, and types of attributes. The evaluation protocol incorporates multiple complementary metrics capturing validity, coverage, sparsity, proximity, and distributional plausibility, including density- and outlier-based measures to assess the realism of generated counterfactuals. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive benchmark that systematically evaluates recent counterfactual explanation methods within a unified and reproducible framework. While prior libraries and benchmarking efforts exist in the literature, many are outdated, limited in scope, or lack consistent evaluation protocols. The proposed benchmark aims to improve reproducibility, enable fair comparison, and establish a workbench for the development of future counterfactual explanation methods.

Red-team evaluations of AI models support some claims and not others, and the boundary between the two is calculable rather than merely a matter of judgment. We define the evidential ceiling of an evaluation as the largest factor by which one result can move belief under a fixed testing budget, derive it in closed form for the benchmark null result, and use it to locate that boundary exactly. We find that above a calculable harm rate, a benchmark of modest size certifies a category to a stated evidentiary standard, and a clean sheet is then the stronger of the two possible observations, outweighing a single reproduced failure. Below that rate, no passive benchmark of feasible size provides the specified evidence of safety under the fixed scoring rule and approximately independent trial structure. The crossing between the two regimes has a closed form. The bound is not specific to benchmarks: written in terms of a procedure's hypothesis conditioned elicitation rates, it covers adaptive and automated red teaming as well, and shows that discrimination between the hypotheses rather than attack success is what determines evidential worth. Auditing eight evaluation suites against the boundary, we find that current benchmarks are adequate for high-frequency harm categories and several orders of magnitude short for rare, catastrophic ones. Safety benchmarks are not uninformative. They are informative about a specific and computable set of propositions, and the discipline they need is to state which.

While automated research systems promise to accelerate empirical analysis, they are prone to silent failures: instances in which analysis code executes successfully yet relies on invalid causal assumptions. We present the Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based Epidemiology Research Assistant (ARA), a framework that makes these failures visible by explicitly encoding causal design principles, study-specific assumptions, and methodological constraints. ARA integrates protocol construction, synthetic data generation, and adversarial validation into a unified pipeline. The framework translates natural language research questions into structured causal protocols and executable analysis code by first constructing a protocol and then generating synthetic datasets using Structural Causal Models (SCMs) with known ground-truth effects. This synthetic-data step can also support pipeline development when access to confidential data, such as medical data, is restricted. The generated analysis is then evaluated under controlled violations of identification assumptions. We evaluate ARA on the Automated Causal Reasoning Benchmark, assessing recovery of identification strategies, causal quantities, treatment and outcome variables, and consistency between generated code and approved protocol. Protocol construction and adversarial validation did not consistently improve numerical agreement with benchmark estimates compared with standard LLM-based generation. However, they changed the failure mode: instead of silently returning causal estimates, ARA often surfaced protocol concerns, diagnostic failures, incomplete inference, or downgraded non-causal interpretations. These findings suggest that validity-first automated science systems should be evaluated not only by answer accuracy, but also by whether they indicate when causal claims are unwarranted.

Large language models increasingly use search tools to retrieve up-to-date information, introducing a new attack surface in which retrieved documents can be manipulated. This risk is amplified by the development of generative engine optimization, which can make selected content more likely to be retrieved, cited, and adopted by models. Existing fact-verification benchmarks and evaluation frameworks do not provide the controlled evidence environments needed to assess robustness against GEO poisoning. We therefore propose GPE, which consists of a multi-domain fact-verification benchmark and an evaluation framework for controlling evidence sources and poisoning ratios. Experiments across multiple verification methods and poisoning attacks demonstrate that GPE exposes robustness degradation and efficiency trade-offs that cannot be observed through clean evaluation alone, confirming the need to evaluate fact verification under adversarial evidence environments.

As AI agents begin to automate AI R&D, we need ways to assess whether their outputs are safe to deploy, even when the agents themselves may be untrusted. AI control offers one such approach: rather than trusting the agent, it treats it as a potential adversary and uses a monitor to detect covert sabotage before deployment. We evaluate AI control for automated AI R&D with ResearchArena, a framework spanning four long-horizon tasks: safety post-training, capabilities post-training, CUDA-kernel optimization, and inference-server optimization. Because the deliverable in AI R&D is an artifact that will be deployed and run, we pair each main task with two kinds of hidden side task: an embedded side task that sabotages the submitted model, adapter, kernel, or server itself, and an independent side task that takes a covert out-of-scope action in the sandbox while leaving the artifact honest. We evaluate frontier agents at both sabotage and monitoring, across four monitor types that vary along two axes: whether the monitor may execute and probe the produced artifact, and whether it sees the agent's chain-of-thought. We find that sabotage hidden in the training data is the hardest to catch, flagged fewer than half the time. Letting the monitor run experiments on the artifact, rather than only read the trajectory, helps, but it is not enough: monitors still miss embedded sabotage by inspecting only the surface, by noticing the anomaly but explaining it away, or by probing the artifact with the wrong test. We release ResearchArena as a modular framework for evaluating sabotage and control in automated AI R&D.

State-of-the-art flow based text-to-image (T2I) models exhibit remarkable generative abilities but remain vulnerable to producing unsafe content. Prior safety efforts range from concept erasure and prompt filtering to classifier-based gating. However, simple techniques like parameter efficient adaptations of the models easily bypass such guardrails. We introduce a unique principled approach that achieves safety by regulating the model's attention dynamics through inference-time introspection, exhibiting intrinsic robustness. Our method analyzes and rebalances attention activations throughout image synthesis, steering generations away from unsafe concepts while preserving semantic alignment. This introspective control ensures safety of deployed models. Across standard and adversarial safety benchmarks, our approach achieves remarkable safety scores while maintaining or even improving alignment and perceptual quality. Our results reveal that attention-space regulation offers a considerably more promising path to safer diffusion transformer based image generation than the existing concept erasing mechanism.Our code can be accessed at https://basim-azam.github.io/iam/

Penetration testing traditionally evaluates whether adversaries can exploit weaknesses in software, infrastructure, configurations, or operational controls to achieve security-relevant compromise. This paradigm remains necessary for AI-enabled systems, but it is no longer sufficient. In such systems, adversaries may influence prompts, retrieved content, sensor inputs, training data, memory, tools, or human-AI interaction loops to alter system behavior without directly compromising the underlying infrastructure. This paper reframes penetration testing for AI-enabled systems as objective-driven behavioral evaluation. We define an AI-enabled system as one in which learned models materially influence behavior affecting operational outcomes, and we define AI-enabled penetration as the feasible induction of AI-governed behavior that violates one or more operational objectives under an explicit threat model. This definition preserves conventional penetration testing while extending it to adversarial pathways such as prompt injection, indirect prompt injection, data poisoning, sensor manipulation, retrieval poisoning, tool misuse, and agentic misalignment. We further propose a testing workflow that identifies operational objectives, maps AI-governed behavior, analyzes adversarial influence surfaces, defines behavioral failure criteria, executes scenario-based tests, and reports evidence linking adversarial action to objective violation. A running example involving an AI-enabled security operations center assistant illustrates how penetration may occur through behavioral influence rather than infrastructure compromise. Together, the definitions, workflow, and example provide a technical framework for evaluating adversarial success in deployed AI-enabled systems.

How can we measure intelligence beyond human capability? Human-authored benchmarks saturate, and above human capability, examiners may not know which tasks are both hard and verifiable. We argue that this difficulty is inherent to absolute-scale evaluation and propose a new paradigm based on relative measurement in which models generate public challenges that separate other systems. Aggregating these outcomes yields an adversarial psychometric rating system that can scale with the systems being measured. We describe practical protocols that reduce incentives for private-information attacks, support judge-free adjudication, and naturally scale with agent capabilities. We instantiate the framework across verifiable and open-ended, non-verifiable domains, illustrating how model-generated evaluation can continue to measure systems beyond the human frontier.

An unreliable language model can be made to produce reliable physical designs if the authority to assert is moved out of the model: the model proposes, and a deterministic engine alone certifies, returning certified, impossible, or unknown. We introduce Physics-Anchored Certification (PHACT), a propose-certify loop spanning five scientific domains, and identify what makes such a certificate trustworthy. A checker that accepts a model-supplied value can be forged; deriving the certified quantity from fixed inputs instead makes forgery impossible by construction. Across eighty adversarial trials spanning two models, two decoding temperatures, and a deliberately faulted engine, this contract produced zero false certifications.

Rare events govern the safety profile of modern AI systems, yet their probabilities are extremely difficult to estimate: direct Monte Carlo requires prohibitive sample budgets. Subset Simulation (SS) addresses this by decomposing a rare-event probability into moderate conditional probabilities over nested intermediate events. However, classical SS requires a handcrafted scalar performance function whose sublevel sets define those events, demanding detailed knowledge of the failure geometry and limiting transfer to new domains. We propose SCARCE (Scalable Cascade Analysis for Rare-event Characterisation via Embeddings), which replaces the performance function with learned latent representations and geometric rulers that score proximity to failure regions. Adaptive thresholding constructs nested intermediate events directly from data. We formalise SCARCE through a non-negative supermartingale, yielding a high-probability upper envelope that remains valid under early stopping. On MNIST misclassification, where dense Monte Carlo provides ground truth, SCARCE achieves approximately 400--500 times lower mean absolute error than grid-searched traditional SS while eliminating systematic over-counting. We then study PAIR-style LLM jailbreaks under a fleet-level threat model with adversarial fraction $η$. On Llama-Guard-3-8B hidden states, a PCA-based ruler attains 2.6% mean relative error for $η\geq 10^{-3}$ against finite-sample references whose average bootstrap relative half-width is 27.9%, and transfers to a GCG-style corpus with 2.93% relative error after recalibration. A directional criterion $\mathrm{KL}(p_{\mathrm{good}}\,\|\,p_{\mathrm{bad}})$ ranks rulers consistently with estimation error (Spearman $ρ=0.83$).

AI systems increasingly exhibit behavior that differs systematically between evaluation and deployment contexts. Alignment faking, sandbagging, benchmark gaming, deceptive scheming, specification gaming, and trojans have each been documented separately, with each line of work characterizing one facet of what we argue is a single structural mechanism. We propose that this common mechanism is a defeat device, an engineering and regulatory concept long established in vehicle-emissions law and brought to broad public attention by the 2015 Volkswagen emissions case. A defeat device in an AI system has three necessary elements: a discriminator that detects evaluation context, a concealed swap that conditions behavior on detection, and a gap between eval-distribution and deployment-distribution performance on the stated evaluation criterion. We formalize this triadic test as a behavioral definition, organize documented cases along three taxonomic axes (origin, trigger, swap mechanism), propose Trigger-Axis-Aware Differential Probing (TADP) as a forensic detection protocol, and advance the claim that defeat devices can naturally emerge in current frontier AI systems without any operator engineering. We characterize naturally-emerging defeat devices as potentially one of the harmful emerging phenomena that AI safety practice should monitor and test for systematically. Implications for evaluation methodology, post-training pipeline design, interpretability research priorities, and AI governance follow.

Adversarial evaluation of AI systems has matured along four largely disconnected tracks: diffusion-based attacks on text and large language models (LLMs), diffusion-based attacks on image classifiers, jailbreak pipelines against vision-language models, and diffusion-based input purification defenses. Each has developed its own vocabulary, threat models, and benchmarks, with denoising diffusion models emerging as a shared generative mechanism whose recipes are now actively ported between communities. This survey performs an information-fusion exercise at the meta-research level: we integrate these four tracks into a single conceptual framework with a unified taxonomy, evaluation criteria, and research agenda, focusing on the LLM-side slice. We catalog fifty published papers across four scope areas (text/LLM, image classifier, vision-language model, defense), plus four diffusion-LLM-as-victim entries and ten non-diffusion baselines against which any new attack must be compared. We propose a six-class taxonomy of diffusion roles in adversarial pipelines, augmented by a threat-model axis recording attacker knowledge, query budget, and target accessibility, and apply a five-dimension framework (attack success rate, transferability, query budget, perplexity, defense-evasion) uniformly across modalities. The review adopts a dual attacker-defender perspective: alongside the attack catalog we cover four diffusion-based defenses that form the natural evaluation backdrop for new attacks. Our critical analysis identifies five recurring weaknesses of the current LLM-side literature, and we close with a research agenda of open questions and concrete experimental designs. The companion catalog and spreadsheet are released with the paper. We are explicit that this is a narrative review with quality assessment, not a PRISMA-compliant systematic review, and discuss the implications for replication.

Jailbreak attacks reveal a persistent weakness in aligned Large Language Models: carefully crafted prompts can elicit policy-violating responses despite safety training. While most defenses operate at the prompt or output level, it remains unclear how harmful intent is encoded within the model's internal representations. We investigate this question by analyzing token-level predictive entropy trajectories across layers of a frozen LLM using the logit lens. We find that static aggregate statistics of prompt-level entropy (e.g., mean, variance) carry little discriminative signal, whereas features capturing how entropy evolves across token positions, such as monotonic rank-based trend scores, are substantially more informative. Importantly, this signal is not uniform across model depth: it is concentrated in intermediate layers and degrades at the final layer, indicating that jailbreak-relevant structure is most pronounced in mid-network representations rather than at the output head. Across multiple models (Llama, Qwen, Gemma) and adversarial benchmarks, these entropy dynamics provide architecture-consistent separation without additional training. Together, our findings show that jailbreak behavior is reflected in structured intermediate uncertainty dynamics, clarifying both which entropy-derived features encode harmful intent and where in the network that signal is most pronounced.

General-purpose models often struggle to reliably identify and understand real-world multimodal risks, largely due to the inherent multimodal adversarial nature of content and AI safety. We present Yuvion VL, a family of multimodal large language models purpose-built for content and AI safety, with both instruction-tuned and reasoning-oriented variants. Yuvion VL addresses this gap by treating safety as an inherently adversarial and multimodal problem and designing the entire pipeline around adversarial robustness. For data construction, we develop an automated pipeline integrating adversarial-aware data synthesis with multi-stage quality control, producing large-scale, high-quality multimodal samples augmented with domain knowledge and reasoning annotations. For training, we adopt a three-stage pipeline that includes continued pretraining for risk-concept cross-modal alignment, instruct post-training for production-grade safety tasks, and reasoning post-training for enhanced interpretability and performance in complex tasks. We further introduce Confuse-then-Contrast Fine-Tuning, a contrastive framework that mines model-specific confusions and constructs multi-image contrastive groups to enforce explicit discrimination of fine-grained visual-semantic elements, enabling the model to distinguish between visually similar cases with different safety implications in adversarial safety tasks. To support rigorous evaluation, we further introduce Yuvion VL RiskEval (YVRE), a collection of benchmarks covering diverse open and internal evaluations, with a focus on content and AI safety, adversarial robustness, and real-world capability requirements. Experiments show that Yuvion VL-32B achieves industry-leading safety performance, surpassing comparably sized open-source models and best closed-source commercial models, while maintaining comparable general capabilities.

Scaling adversarial evaluation of large language models requires both a method for generating hard inputs and a reliable way to confirm that resulting failures are real. We present AdversaBench, an end-to-end red-teaming pipeline that mutates seed prompts with five structured operators, queries a target model, and confirms failures through a three-judge panel with a meta-judge tiebreaker. We report experiments on 45 seeds across three categories: reasoning, instruction-following, and tool use. Every seed produced a confirmed failure. Four findings stand out. First, operator effectiveness varies sharply by category: inject_distractor scores 0.00 mean reward on instruction-following seeds but 0.80-0.83 on reasoning and tool-use. Second, binary failure rate hides difficulty: instruction-following seeds required 2.4 attacker iterations on average versus 1.1 for other categories, a gap visible in survival curves. Third, pairwise judge agreement of 80-87% coexists with near-zero Cohen's kappa due to label skew; category-level disagreement rates are more informative. Fourth, adversarial prompts generated against Llama 3.1 8B transfer zero-shot to Llama 3.3 70B, suggesting the mutations exploit general behavioral patterns rather than model-specific weaknesses. Code, dataset, and analysis scripts are available at https://github.com/khanak0509/AdversaBench .

Object interaction tasks have been a focus of advances in imitation learning. End-to-end methods, dominated by diffusion and flow-based variants have shown leaps in performance while sacrificing interpretability. Object-centric and pose-informed variants have had a role in learning from demonstration in manipulation tasks. In this paper, we revisit a few modern imitation learning benchmarks for object interactions, with the aim of composing a framework that repurposes principled theories of manipulation, preserving both performance and interpretability. For image observations, lightweight training is proposed for model-free pose estimation of the target object, using self-supervision over the demonstration data available for imitation learning. This information is then used to inform a manipulation mode-aware retrieval of a demonstration, a mode-aware transformation, a replan step that connects to the retrieval point while preserving mode constraints, and finally rolling out the transformed demonstration. These compose four key steps of the proposed RE4 framework, evaluated over state-based and image-based benchmarks in Push-T and Robomimic. An adversarial benchmark that evaluates sparse data regions of image-based Push-T showcases the robustness, further bolstered by indications from low-data regime experiments. The current work shows promise in using simple interpretable building blocks to learn manipulation skills.

We introduce a large-scale, open-source dataset of pre-generated adversarial attacks for vision-language models (VLMs). The dataset is designed to be diverse, representative, and practical, extending existing benchmarks by covering 10 high-level categories and 55 subcategories of harmful intents. Our primary goal is to make adversarial data accessible to the research community, given the computational cost and complexity of generating large numbers of attacks. The dataset comprises 47 524 adversarial samples, generated using state-of-the-art attack strategies from recent literature. Our work complements existing efforts by consolidating and extending prior benchmarks from multiple established sources, resulting in 7 826 intents, and introduce an additional category to broaden coverage. This provides realistic evaluation resources for studying model robustness and alignment. Our dataset intends to enable researchers and practitioners to systematically evaluate the robustness and safety of VLMs, fine-tune attack-generation models, and develop or stress-test defensive guardrails under diverse adversarial conditions. By releasing this resource, we aim to lower the barrier to adversarial research and foster more reproducible, comprehensive, and comparable evaluations of VLM safety.

Speculative inference accelerates large language model (LLM) decoding but provides no inherent safety guarantees. Existing safety defenses are largely incompatible with speculative inference: they either introduce additional computation or disrupt the draft-verify mechanism, negating acceleration benefits. This reveals a fundamental incompatibility between current safety methods and speculative decoding. We propose SafeSpec, a safety-aware speculative inference framework that integrates risk estimation directly into the verification process. SafeSpec attaches a lightweight latent safety head to the target model to jointly evaluate semantic validity and safety in a single forward pass. When unsafe generations are detected, SafeSpec applies rollback and safety-guided reflective multi-sampling to recover safe continuations rather than terminating generation. We model jailbreak attacks as distributional shifts over generative trajectories, where adversarial prompts increase the probability of harmful continuations without eliminating safe ones. Under this model, SafeSpec performs risk-aware trajectory recovery within the speculative decoding process. Across multiple models and adversarial benchmarks, SafeSpec achieves a substantially improved safety-efficiency trade-off. On Qwen3-32B, SafeSpec reduces attack success rates by 15% while preserving a 2.06x inference speedup on benign workloads, demonstrating that speculative acceleration and inference-time safety can be jointly optimized.

As Large Language Model based agents enter autonomous scientific research, their ability to resist pseudoscience becomes increasingly important. Otherwise, such systems may rapidly generate plausible yet misleading studies that contaminate academic literature and erode trust in science. We present PseudoBench, an adversarial benchmark for evaluating whether agentic auto-research systems can identify and resist pseudoscientific narratives. PseudoBench contains 200 curated pseudoscientific claim-evidence pairs across five domains and evaluates agents through an end-to-end research pipeline from experiments to writing. Testing seven state-of-the-art agents, we find that current systems readily produce persuasive reports that align with pseudoscientific premises with near-zero refusal rates and the highest resistance of only 27.4%. Stronger agents risk packaging pseudoscience in more sophisticated scientific language, increasing its apparent credibility. These findings reveal an alarming capacity to fuel pseudoscience, calling for scientific alignment before widespread deployment.

We measure the rate at which code RL environments accept incorrect solutions as correct. On a 49-task sample of SWE-bench Verified, 28.5% of tasks have test suites weak enough that a Docker-verified incorrect patch passes them. On 20 R2E-Gym tasks across 6 repositories, the same pipeline at single-shot exploit generation yields 25.0%. A random-effects meta-analysis over 134 frontier model submissions to SWE-bench Verified finds, within the same human-rated difficulty stratum, model Pass@1 is +14.14 percentage points higher on flagged-hackable tasks than on robust ones (95% CI [+11.80, +16.48]; one-sided p < 10^-6; I^2 = 0%; 123 of 134 models positive). We then describe a procedure for hardening the broken tasks. An inline LLM judge with a Docker gold-sanity gate runs each generated test against the gold solution before the judge is consulted. On the 11 broken tasks in the audit, the gate flags 65 of 105 decisive LLM-generated tests as failing on the gold patch itself, a 61.9% per-augmentation defect rate the LLM judge alone misses. With diversity-biased retry, the loop converges 9 of 11 tasks to a gated upgrade.

We present an LLM-driven framework for retrieving remote sensing data from cloud-based geospatial catalogues using natural language queries. The system converts user intent into structured API calls, enabling efficient access to satellite imagery and environmental datasets. The architecture integrates three agents: Guardrail for safety and policy enforcement, General-QA for intent interpretation, and Recommender-Analyst for schema-aware API call generation. This coordinated design ensures reliable, semantically aligned interaction with external data services. The modular framework is portable across platforms through API schema substitution and supports applications in environmental monitoring, disaster response, and climate analysis. It establishes a scalable interface between user intent and geospatial infrastructure, enabling streamlined and automated Earth observation workflows. Preliminary experiments under adversarial multi-turn settings show that prompt-level safety instructions improve robustness, although rare high-impact failures persist in API manipulation scenarios and highlight the need for adaptive, system-level defenses that balance safety, usability, and cost efficiency, which motivates the use of our intercept-level Guardrail agent.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for technical document generation, yet single-model outputs often suffer from over-engineering, security blind spots, and incomplete coverage. We propose TriAdReview, a triangular adversarial review architecture that employs two independent reviewer models (engineering and boundary perspectives) and a triangular judging mechanism to iteratively improve a generator model's output. We evaluate TriAdReview across five benchmark tasks - architecture design, code generation, proposal review, security audit, and requirements analysis - using three configurations: single model (baseline), dual model (single review), and triple model (full system). Results across 75 experiments (n=5 per cell) show that the triple model configuration achieves a 10.1% overall improvement over the single model baseline (26.2 vs. 23.8 out of 50; p<0.05, paired t-test), with particularly strong gains on security audit (+27.6%), code generation (+20.8%), and architecture design (+15.6%). A second scorer (mimo-v2.5-pro) confirms the direction with a smaller effect (+2.7%), suggesting moderate inter-rater agreement. However, the system shows a -7.5% degradation on requirements analysis, revealing that adversarial review architectures have a structural bias toward simplification that is counterproductive for completeness-oriented tasks. We analyze this boundary condition through a task-type framework and demonstrate that reviewer prompt adaptation partially mitigates the issue. Our findings provide the first empirical characterization of when multi-model adversarial review helps versus harms, with implications for the design of collaborative AI systems.

Computer-use agents are increasingly evaluated by whether they complete realistic desktop and web tasks. However, task success alone can miss failures in which an agent reaches the nominal goal through an unsafe shortcut. We introduce OSGuard, a dual-granularity benchmark suite for evaluating safety in computer-use agents under benign, unchanged user instructions. OSGuard contains an action-level benchmark for local guardrail decisions and a risk-augmented execution suite for end-to-end evaluation. The action-level benchmark consists of contextualized proposed actions labeled as allowed, unrelated, or unsafe, each judged relative to the original instruction and current interface state. The execution suite contains manually constructed OSWorld-derived task variants in which the original task remains achievable, but the environment is modified to introduce latent hazards such as destructive overwrites, etc. Each variant is paired with augmented evaluators that retain the original task-success criterion while adding explicit state-based safety invariants, allowing us to distinguish safe completions from unsafe completions that satisfy the nominal task objective. Our experimental results on OSGuard show that current multimodal guardrails can perform well on isolated action judgments, while risk-augmented execution exposes remaining gaps between local oversight and reliable end-to-end safety. This dual-granularity design enables more precise diagnosis of whether models can both recognize unsafe proposed actions and improve full-task safety when deployed as guardrails.

LLM-based Agents are becoming increasingly capable and widely deployed, creating growing incentives for adversarial misuse in the real-world. A key emerging threat is Decomposition Attacks \cite{glukhov2024breach, jones2024adversaries} in which a harmful task is broken into simpler, benign subtasks that evade safety mechanisms when executed separately but cumulatively fulfill the malicious intent. Although recent benchmarks assess agent safety in multi-turn and multi-tool-use settings, they do not explicitly capture this form of decompositional misuse and may not represent realistic adversarial execution flows. To this end, we introduce DeCompBench, a benchmark designed specifically to evaluate agentic safety under decomposition attacks. DeCompBench is created with a decomposition-by-design principle using a graphical framework and enables harmful task decomposition into individually benign and executable subtasks with realistic workflows. Our experiments using a custom decomposer show that state-of-the-art agents exhibit high refusal rates on monolithic harmful tasks, but significantly lower refusal rates on their decomposed variants, while often inadvertently fulfilling the adversarial objectives. These findings underscore the need for safety evaluations against decomposition attacks and corresponding defenses. Our dataset is publicly available and can be found at https://huggingface.co/datasets/decompositionbench/DeCompBench.

As AI systems are deployed in high-stakes ethical contexts such as healthcare triage, autonomous vehicle control, and employment screening, formal methods for evaluating their robustness against adversarial manipulation of ethical reasoning remain underdeveloped. This paper introduces the Ethical Robustness Testing System (ERTS), a closed-pipeline framework that: (1) encodes ethical dilemmas into a 22-dimensional Ethical Consequence Space (ECS) grounded in established ethical theory; (2) applies 17 semantic perturbation functions subject to 6 validity constraint classes including a novel semantic coherence constraint; (3) measures decision deviation via a 4-component Ethical Instability Index (EII); and (4) produces domain-adaptive pre-deployment robustness assessment verdicts. We evaluate 4 structured baseline models and 2 production LLMs (Gemini 2.0 Flash and Llama 3.2) across 50 ethical scenarios spanning 8 deployment domains, generating 1,500 adversarial test cases. Results demonstrate that only 33% of models achieve assessment clearance, with the local Llama-3.2 model proving particularly vulnerable to fairness corruption and information degradation attacks (ERS = 0.737). To the best of our knowledge, no existing framework combines a bounded ethical consequence space, semantic coherence constraints, and domain-adaptive assessment in a single adversarial testing pipeline.

As AI-generated reviews move from experimental tools into peer-review infrastructure, most robustness concerns have focused on explicit attacks such as hidden instructions and prompt injection. We study a harder and more policy-relevant failure mode: no hidden text, no prompt injection, and no changes to methods, experiments, figures, equations, proofs, or numerical results. The attacker modifies only presentation-level content, such as the abstract, contribution framing, related work, discussion, and narrative structure. We introduce adversarial repackaging: a closed-loop attack that uses AI-reviewer feedback to search for presentation-level revisions while keeping the scientific evidence fixed. Across three mainstream AI reviewers, adversarial repackaging achieves a 75.1% attack success rate and a mean score gain of +1.21/10. The effect is not explained by ordinary prose polishing. We also reveal that strategies that change how the reviewer interprets the paper, such as related-work repositioning and analytical discussion expansion, substantially outperform surface edits such as local polishing, table formatting, and algorithm boxes. Our analysis reveals two deeper structural failure modes. First, AI reviewers are easier to impress than to convince: highlighting strengths reliably increases perceived merit, while attempts to dissolve weaknesses frequently backfire. Second, AI reviewers can confuse the appearance of addressing a limitation with actually resolving it, allowing unchanged evidence to be reinterpreted as stronger scientific contribution. These results show that the deployment risk is not only malicious hidden instructions, but the emergence of paper presentation itself as an optimization surface. We release a contamination-free rolling benchmark and attack framework for testing whether AI reviewers remain anchored to scientific content under presentation-only edits.

Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) heavily utlize Machine Learning (ML) but ML models can be manipulated via adversarial attacks. These attacks add carefully crafted perturbations to network traffic data that leads to misclassifications. While prior work has demonstrated adversarial vulnerabilities in isolated settings, systematic cross-architecture as well as class and category of attack based comparisons under controlled attack conditions remain limited, leaving practitioners without clear guidance on which models to deploy in adversarial environments. This paper asks a simple question: what type of classifier architectures actually hold up when attackers try to manipulate the systems? We put three popular architectures through their paces: a 1D Convolutional Neural Network, a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network, and a Random Forest (RF) ensemble. Using the ACI-IoT-2023 dataset (over 1.2 million samples spanning 12 attack types), we subject each model with FGSM and PGD adversarial attacks, which apply gradient-based perturbations in normalized feature space consistent with established adversarial ML evaluation protocols, at perturbation budgets ranging from $ε=0.01$ to $ε=0.1$. Surprisingly, Random Forest achieved near-perfect baseline accuracy (99.98%), yet collapsed catastrophically under attack, dropping 73 percentage points at the smallest perturbation we tested. CNN, on the other hand, retained 95.5% accuracy at $ε=0.01$ and degraded gracefully as perturbations increased. LSTM fell somewhere in between. These findings flip the conventional wisdom where high baseline accuracy means nothing if a model shatters at the first sign of adversarial pressure. For practitioners deploying intrusion detection in adversarial environments, we recommend CNN-based architectures and provide scenario-specific deployment guidance.

AI control protocols oversee untrusted models by monitoring their actions and modifying potentially unsafe steps, often using a trusted model. This partially tampers with the untrusted model's trajectory. If the trusted model detects such an intervention, it may infer properties of the monitor and adapt to evade control. We introduce \textbf{CIAware-Bench}, a benchmark for measuring \textbf{c}ontrol \textbf{i}ntervention (CI) awareness across frontier models. CIAware-Bench tests whether models can distinguish their own trajectories from those modified by a control intervention. The benchmark is comprised of a suite of four task domains (essay writing, BigCodeBench, Bash Arena, and SHADE-Arena), while varying trajectory watermarking, side-task presence, and the control protocol. Evaluating eleven frontier models, we find low to moderate CI awareness under default settings (up to 0.87; random chance balanced binary classification accuracy is 0.5) with substantial variation across task domains and model pairs. Detection is generally easier across model families, suggesting that models exploit provider-specific differences in style or post-training. Overall, CI awareness is not a fixed model-level property, and should be measured for each new model release and deployment scenario. We release CIAware-Bench to track CI awareness and inform control protocols whose interventions are harder to detect.

Agent benchmarks score submissions with outcome verifiers that are typically hand-written and brittle, leaving them open to reward hacking. We audit 1,968 tasks across five terminal-agent benchmarks and find 323 (16%) hackable by frontier models given only the task description. This corrupts both leaderboard rankings and RL training signal, yet the standard response is manual and reactive. We introduce the hacker-fixer loop, a method for building exploit-resistant verifiers without per-task manual patching. The loop alternates three LLM agents: a hacker tries to pass the verifier without solving the task, a fixer patches the verifier to reject each discovered exploit, and a solver confirms the patched verifier still admits legitimate solutions. The loop iterates: each patch reshapes what the verifier rewards, surfacing the next exploit. We further add verifier access, and let patches transfer across tasks, to broaden the exploits the loop discovers. On KernelBench, the loop drives the attack success rate from 62% to 0% on a held-out corpus of publicly reported exploits. We also find that weaker agents in the loop can defend against much stronger hackers: Gemini 3 Flash's loop drives the stronger Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7's attack success rate from 76% and 61% to 0% on KernelBench, and Gemini 3.1 Pro's from 39% to 17% on Terminal Bench across 77 tasks. We release Terminal Wrench (323 hackable environments, 3,632 hack trajectories) as a snapshot of the current attack surface, our patched verifiers, the exploits the loop discovered, and our implementation as a basis for future work.

The increasing situational awareness of language models raises safety concerns: models might be aware when they are evaluated, and adjust their behavior to evade monitoring and resist modification, e.g., pretending to be aligned only in evaluation. This alignment faking behavior is often interpreted as scheming: an intentional effort of strategic deception. In this paper, we examine an alternative interpretation, performative misalignment, which explains the change in behavior as a result of sycophancy towards AI researchers. To examine this hypothesis, we present three empirical findings. First, we show that evaluation awareness persists even when we tell models they are deployed, which contradicts the scheming story which predicts less misalignment when the model perceives evaluation. Second, we use probing and steering to show that our current methods cannot mechanistically distinguish sycophancy and scheming in alignment faking evaluations. Third, we fine-tune models to be more sycophantic and observe increased sensitivity to evaluation cues. To conclude, we emphasize deconfounding sycophancy from scheming for future work on evaluations and mitigations of intent misalignment.

Safety evaluations often infer latent motivations from behavioral patterns, but the construct validity of these inferences is unclear. We study this problem in alignment faking, where models comply with training objectives more often when they infer training pressure. This behavior is commonly interpreted as strategic self-preservation, but it may also reflect sensitivity to the model's inference about the expectation of researchers conducting the evaluation. We introduce a symmetric intervention framework for distinguishing these competing hypotheses. Instead of directly intervening on "scheming" or "sycophancy", we target instrumental processes entailed by each hypothesis: consequence-tracking and researcher-expectation tracking. We then compare how interventions on these processes affect the alignment faking. We study four openweight model organisms using synthetic document fine-tuning, activation steering, and prompting. Under synthetic document fine-tuning, Llama-3.1-70B, Llama3.1-405B, and Qwen-2.5-72B are more sensitive to expectation-tracking than consequence-tracking interventions. Activation steering on Llama-3.1- 70B supports the same broad picture, and prompt interventions broadly align with SDF profiles. Overall, alignment-faking behavior can be causally sensitive to evaluation-context expectations despite scheming-consistent scratchpads. Scheming and strategic-deception evaluations therefore need construct-validity checks, and symmetric instrumental interventions provide one such test.

A growing failure mode in agent evaluation and training is that models can achieve high evaluation scores by exploiting shortcuts instead of solving the intended task, producing deceptive performance. This makes evaluation scores unreliable as measures of true task-solving ability. We propose CapCode, a framework for constructing coding datasets with randomized tests whose best achievable non-cheating performance is deliberately capped below one. This capped-performance design gives evaluation scores a clearer interpretation: scores substantially above the cap are implausible and therefore provide evidence of cheating. To prevent cheating, we propose CapReward, a reward design based on the CapCode principle to discourage optimization beyond the cap. Experiments across multiple datasets show that CapCode detects cheating while preserving performance ranking of models, and CapReward reduces cheating behavior, yielding models that better follow the intended task specification.

Large language models can reproduce training data, but existing memorization evaluations mostly measure whether models can be forced to do so, rather than whether they do so under ordinary use. We introduce PropMe, a propensity-aware framework for memorization evaluation that contrasts prefix-based capability attacks with non-adversarial evaluations. We propose a metric transformation that, applied to existing functions, allows to create propensity metrics. We further introduce SimpleTrace, a lightweight tracing pipeline built on infini-gram that deterministically attributes model generations to large-scale training corpora and computes verbatim, near-verbatim, and propensity-transformed memorization metrics. Evaluating two fully-open models: Comma and DFM Decoder on two datasets: Common Pile and Dynaword in two languages, we find a consistent gap between capability and propensity: prefix attacks elicit substantially stronger memorization signals than generic or dataset-specific prompts, while propensity scores remain low overall. Thus, the models can reveal training data when directly elicited, but rarely do so in more common non-adversarial settings. We also find that DFM Decoder, which is continually pre-trained from Comma, exhibits reduced memorization and memorization propensity for Common Pile, confirming that memorization capability can decrease when later training emphasizes partially different data. Our results suggest, and we encourage, that memorization audits should report both worst-case extractability and ordinary leakage propensity in order to have a more comprehensive view of this phenomenon.