Clean Label Backdoor Attack

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Sep 30, 2026cs.AI

Backdoor Purification for LoRA-Tuned LLMs via Null-Space Projection

With the rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) and parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods, the risk of backdoor attacks has become more severe. Existing backdoor purification methods typically rely on at least one of the strong assumptions, such as prior knowledge of triggers, access to clean references, or aggressive retraining, and they often lack comprehensive evaluations. These constraints substantially limit their practical applicability. To overcome these challenges, our work proposes purifying LoRA-tuned LLMs without these assumptions and even without post-hoc retraining of the suspect parameters. Our objective is to significantly reduce the attack success rates (ASR) while preserving both (i) the base model's general capabilities and (ii) the new downstream skills learned through the adapter. Through a series of ablation studies, we progressively scale our approach from a single layer in a text classification setting to a full-parameter LLM in the generative task. Through careful data curation and feature approximation, we extract high-fidelity backdoor directions and, for each layer or head, construct orthogonal null spaces in both the input and output channels, onto which the LoRA updates are projected. Empirically, our null-space projection method reduces the ASR from nearly 100% to less than 10%, while preserving the base model's benign performance and the adapter's learned abilities during downstream task adaptation.

Jianwei Li, Jung-Eun Kim

North Carolina State University Raleigh, NC 27606, USA

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Attacker Large Language Model

Sep 11, 2026cs.CR

SpecGuard: Inference-Time Backdoor Detection For Free

Large language models are often fine-tuned, shared, or downloaded from third parties, so a deployed model may carry a hidden backdoor that behaves normally on benign inputs but switches to attacker-controlled behavior when a secret trigger appears. While backdoors can be audited before deployment, runtime monitoring remains important for models that are frequently updated. The challenge is that LLM serving is latency-sensitive: existing inference-time detectors either rely on assumptions about the trigger form, which can fail on stealthy attacks, or require extra model computation, such as input perturbations or an additional generation pass. We introduce SpecGuard, an inference-time backdoor detector that repurposes speculative decoding at zero added model-computation cost. Speculative decoding speeds up inference by using a small draft model to propose tokens and a target model to verify them. We observe that this verification process already exposes a useful signal: when a backdoor is triggered, the target model shifts toward the attacker's behavior, while a clean draft model does not predict this shift, causing the draft-token acceptance rate to change. We formalize when this signal appears and show that an attacker who suppresses it must also weaken the backdoor. Across diverse backdoor types and model families, SpecGuard reliably detects triggered behavior, including stealthy cases where input-level filters are blind, while avoiding the extra generation cost of existing runtime detectors. Speculative decoding therefore doubles as a free, always-on signal for detecting backdoored LLM behavior.

Rui Wen, Ahmed Salem, Andrew Paverd +2

Institute of Science Tokyo · Microsoft Security Response Center · Microsoft Azure +1

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Inference-Time Defense LLM Inference Optimization

Sep 7, 2026cs.LG

Fine-grained Distributed Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning

Federated learning, as a privacy-preserving distributed machine learning paradigm, faces significant threats from backdoor attacks. Compared to centralized attacks, distributed backdoor attacks are more harmful but require more poisoned samples to compensate for the loss of trigger strength due to decomposition. Fixed trigger patterns are also easily detected by robust aggregation algorithms, increasing the risk of attack exposure. To address these challenges, we propose a fine-grained distributed backdoor attack framework (FDBA). This framework uses dynamic trigger generation and embedding vector optimization to perform attacks with fewer poisoned samples. First, we design a dynamic trigger generation method based on image edge structures using the Canny algorithm to extract edge features, which are then injected with Laplacian noise. RGB channel decomposition is applied for covert adaptation of the distributed trigger, reducing detection chances. Second, we introduce an embedding vector contrastive learning strategy that forces poisoned samples to approach the target class center in the feature space, enhancing attack effectiveness. On CIFAR-10, piecewise-linear estimates for target ASRs between 70% and 90% show that FDBA reduces the required poisoning ratio by 37.4%--48.4% compared with DBA. In non-independent and identically distributed (Non-IID) scenarios, FDBA retains 84.7% of its IID attack performance under extreme heterogeneity, whereas DBA drops to 73.5%, and the framework successfully bypasses mainstream defense mechanisms. This study offers new insights into federated learning security and emphasizes the potential threats and defense challenges posed by fine-grained distributed attacks.

Jian Wang, Hong Shen, Wei Ke +1

Faculty of Applied Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, R. de Luís Gonzaga Gomes, Macao, 999078, China · Faculty of Cyberspace Security, Guangzhou University of Software, No.548 Guangcong South Road, High-tech Industrial Park, Conghua Economic Development Zone, Guangzhou, 501900, China · School of Engineering and Technology, Central Queensland University, Bruce Highway, Norman Gardens, Rockhampton, Queensland, 4702, Australia +1

Federated Learning Clean Label Backdoor Attack

Sep 4, 2026cs.LG

Backdoors Leave Structural Traces: FedMAST for Backdoor Detection and Containment in Federated Learning

Federated learning enables distributed training without requiring clients to share their raw data. However, its reliance on the integrity of the client-submitted updates exposes the global model to stealthy backdoor poisoning. Existing defenses often rely on individual evidence sources, but stealth-constrained attacks can adapt to these signals. Such attacks can suppress anomaly signals they are optimized to evade, yet their poisoned updates still leave residual structural traces. We propose FedMAST, a Federated Multi-Axis Structural Tracing defense for backdoor detection in federated learning. FedMAST scores client updates using complementary structural, spectral, and historical evidence and then applies tiered filtering and round-level containment to limit adversarial influence. To capture traces that isolated signals may miss, FedMAST uses squeeze-pair coherence scoring to expose coupled feature distortions and signed spectral-drift tracking to reveal persistent directional changes over time. Across six backdoor attacks, FedMAST achieves lower attack success rate (ASR) than baseline defenses in all nine evaluated comparisons, averaging 1.51% ASR and 94.84% main-task accuracy (MTA) across the complete 200-round runs. Over the full 200-round method-aware CovertLayers run, FedMAST achieves 1.53% ASR and 92.26% MTA, compared with ASRs of 100.00%, 99.67%, 99.53%, and 32.84% for FedAvg, MultiKrum, AlignIns, and FLAME, respectively.

Srinivasan Subramanian, Md. Abdullah Al Hafiz Khan, Kazi Aminul Islam

Department of Computer Science Kennesaw State University Marietta, USA

Federated Learning Clean Label Backdoor Attack Fedavg Model-Agnostic Defense

Sep 2, 2026cs.CV

Beyond Small Patches: Black-Box Detection and Purification of Diverse Backdoor Triggers

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly deployed in real-world vision systems, yet their predictions can be covertly manipulated by backdoor attacks, in which malicious triggers cause targeted misclassification while preserving high clean accuracy. Existing defenses often rely on model internals, training data, or clean validation samples, making them difficult to deploy when only black-box access to a trained model is available. We propose TRIM (Trigger Removal by Identifying Manipulated Regions), a deployment-oriented black-box defense that detects and selectively removes backdoor triggers at inference time without requiring model internals, training data, or clean samples. The key insight behind TRIM is to identify image regions that are responsible for anomalous model behavior and purify only those regions while preserving benign content. TRIM innovates via three key components: (i) region-based segmentation with deep feature representations, (ii) adaptive trigger discovery through inpainting and diffusion-based reconstruction to isolate regions responsible for misclassification---without assumptions about trigger type, shape, or location, and (iii) selective region purification that cleans poisoned regions while retaining benign content. To support practical deployment, TRIM further caches feature embeddings of previously identified triggers, enabling efficient recognition and avoiding redundant detection and purification. Extensive experiments across diverse datasets and backdoor types, including blended, sparse, varying-size, and multiple triggers, show that TRIM consistently outperforms existing black-box defenses, reducing attack success rates (ASR) to as low as 1.16% while preserving clean accuracy of up to 87.87%. These results demonstrate that effective backdoor mitigation is possible at inference time even when the defender has no access to any auxiliary data.

Ahmed Abdelnaby, Mohamed Elmahallawy

School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Washington State University, Richland, WA 99354, USA

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Unsupervised Detection Black Box Removal Small Models Selective+1

Aug 13, 2026cs.LG

Understanding Backdoor Vulnerabilities in Vertical Federated Learning: The Gap Between Research and Practice

Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) enables organizations holding complementary features of shared entities to collaborate and train models. In this setting, the initiator can withhold information about the learning task, while other contributors participate without exposing their local datasets, creating an asymmetric information structure aligned with growing privacy demands. However, this asymmetry is a double-edged sword. Among various threats, backdoor attacks are particularly concerning because VFL not only enables malicious contributors to poison the model during training, but also allows them to activate the backdoor at inference time to manipulate predictions. Although prior work has reported near-perfect attack success rates and proposed effective defenses, we find that most findings fail to hold under realistic conditions, exposing a fundamental gap between research and practice. In this paper, we present a systematic, practice-oriented study of backdoor vulnerabilities in VFL, revealing this gap in both methodological design and evaluation practices. We show that existing approaches overlook key practical constraints and therefore rely on unrealistic prior knowledge. Furthermore, these limitations have remained hidden due to poorly designed evaluation practices in the literature. To bridge this gap, we redefine threat models under realistic constraints, propose practical backdoor workflows, and introduce BVBench, a backdoor-centric benchmark that enables fair, practical, and comprehensive evaluation, preloaded with state-of-the-art baselines. BVBench provides strong evidence of the fragility of the current understanding of VFL backdoor risks and establishes a foundation for steering research toward uncovering practical vulnerabilities and developing more meaningful defenses.

Ziqi Zhao, Jialin Lu, Junjie Shan +3

School of Computing and Data Science, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Federated Learning Attack-Success Rate

Aug 10, 2026cs.AI

ElasticBack: Stealthy Conditional Backdoor in LLM-Agent Skills via Coupled Trigger-Rule Optimization

Agent skills, bundles of instructions and resources that an LLM agent loads on demand, form an emerging supply chain where a single poisoned skill can persistently compromise every agent that installs it. However, existing skill attacks either fire on every request or rely on fine-tuned weights or multiple skills, leaving a conditional and low-cost backdoor unexplored. In this work, we present ElasticBack, an effective conditional single-skill backdoor that plants a rule R in the skill document and a benign-looking trigger T in the user query, so the malicious payload fires only when both co-occur. ElasticBack binds the two sides through a trigger-as-switch construction, generating R via semantic-anchored rule injection. It then freezes R and evolves T against it with a stealth-constrained genetic search, so that effectiveness and stealth are optimized, keeping the backdoor weight-free and dormant on benign inputs. Extensive experiments across three target behaviors (50 skills each) and four agent LLMs show that ElasticBack attains a high attack success rate at a near-zero false-positive rate with preserved clean accuracy, transfers across models, and evades deployment-time defenses. These results motivate stronger defenses for the skill supply chain.

Hao Sui, Simeng Qin, Jie Liao +3

Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, China · Northeastern University, China · Chongqing University, China +1

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Malicious Agents Attacker Large Language Model Large Language Model Tool Use Supply Chain Optimization Prompt Optimization

Aug 10, 2026cs.CR

Diversity Matters: Distributional Feature Coverage Sample Selection for Data-Efficient Backdoor Attacks

Backdoor attacks compromise training data so that a model retains clean accuracy but predicts an attacker-chosen target on triggered inputs. At very low poisoning rates, only a few samples convey the trigger--target association, making poison-sample selection critical. Existing methods typically rank candidates using per-sample scores, which can select redundant samples from similar semantic regions, and many require task-specific surrogate training. We propose Distributional Feature Coverage Sample Selection (DFCS), a training-free, trigger-agnostic method that clusters fixed pretrained features into one region per poisoning slot and selects the centroid-nearest sample from each region. A local first-order analysis relates this allocation to feature-coverage and representative-mass terms. Across BadNets and Blended attacks on CIFAR-10, Tiny-ImageNet, and Imagenette, DFCS achieves the highest mean attack success rate among seven selectors in all six dataset--attack settings, averaging

96.30\%

and exceeding the strongest comparator in each setting by 4.60 percentage points on average while preserving clean accuracy. These results support distributional feature coverage as an effective selection principle for low-budget dirty-label backdoor attacks.

Yi Yang, Xiaoke Chen, Jinyang Huang +6

School of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230601, China · School of Information Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China · John Hopcroft Center for Computer Science, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China +1

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Poisoning Oversampling

Aug 3, 2026cs.LG

Z-PEFT: Zero-shot Backdoor Detection in Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning via Canonical Spectral Signatures

Parameter-Efficient Fine-tuned (PEFT) models are frequently downloaded from open repositories by practitioners. This widespread practice creates a significant attack surface, as malicious actors can publish backdoored models that induce specific behaviors in response to predefined triggers. We study the problem of weight-space backdoor detection, where a detector classifier predicts whether a model is malicious using only its weights, enabling a lightweight safety mechanism. Most existing methods are designed and evaluated in a closed-world setting, where the detector is trained and tested on the same attack type. In contrast, we evaluate backdoor detection under novel conditions, including previously unseen attacks and datasets. We propose Z-PEFT, a lightweight meta-classifier that relies exclusively on layer-wise spectral measures for classification. Our experiments show that strong performance in the closed-world setting does not necessarily translate to high accuracy in zero-shot backdoor detection. Among weight-space detectors, Z-PEFT achieves the best performance while maintaining low and scalable computational cost.

Nicola Pitzalis, Donald Shenaj, Giacomo Cignoni +3

University of Pisa

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning Methods Unsupervised Detection Spectral Features

Aug 1, 2026cs.CR

Robust Watermarks Meet Backdoored Models: Evading Diffusion Semantic Watermarks via Stealthy Backdoor

Although semantic watermarking is considered a promising safeguard for images generated by Latent Diffusion Models (LDMs), the reliance of the watermark detection pipeline on neural networks introduces a critical yet underexplored backdoor attack surface. To systematically study this vulnerability, we propose GhostVAE to plant a stealthy backdoor into the encoder of Variational Autoencoder (VAE), enabling reliable evasion of watermark detection. GhostVAE operates in two stages: it first constructs a universal trigger via power spectrum regularization to improve the trigger robustness, and then trains a backdoored VAE encoder with a parameter-aligned objective. Through extensive evaluations across three state-of-the-art semantic watermarking schemes and three widely adopted LDMs, we show that GhostVAE preserves watermark detection performance on benign images (achieving an average true positive rate of 94.4%), while simultaneously enabling highly effective evasion under trigger activation (achieving an average attack success rate of 94.6%). Moreover, we comprehensively analyze seventeen representative defenses and demonstrate that GhostVAE remains stealthy across the input space, parameter space, and latent space. Our work fundamentally undermines the trustworthiness of semantic watermarking systems and highlights that secure deployment of semantic watermarks requires end-to-end security considerations, particularly for neural network components.

Jinyuan Liu, Tianshuo Cong, Pei Li +4

1Tsinghua University · 2Shandong University · 4Shandong Key Laboratory of Artificial Intelligence Security, Shandong University +5

Watermarks Watermarking Clean Label Backdoor Attack Latent Diffusion Model

Jul 30, 2026cs.CR

Temporal Poisoning: Clean-Label Backdoors via Event Redistribution in SNNs

Backdoor attacks on Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs) have primarily assumed dirty-label poisoning, in which triggered training samples are relabeled to an attacker-selected class. We study clean-label temporal poisoning, where a fixed timestamp transformation is applied only to the target-class training streams, leaving their labels unchanged. The transformation preserves the per-pixel, per-polarity event count exactly, making clean and triggered samples identical after temporal aggregation while altering the sequence processed by the SNN. Across three neuromorphic datasets and both convolutional and transformer-based victims, the attack reaches an ASR of 1.00 in the strongest configurations. We analyze the attack through poison-budget and trigger-shape ablations and evaluate established backdoor defenses adapted to spiking models. Defenses that collapse the time axis before inspection are blind by construction, while feature-space methods detect the poison only in selected settings. Our model-free detector, based on per-step event mass, detects the evaluated temporal transformations, demonstrating both the limitation of rate-collapsed defenses and the boundary of the attack's stealth. To our knowledge, this is the first clean-label backdoor attack evaluated on SNNs and neuromorphic event data.

Roberto Riaño, Gorka Abad, Stjepan Picek +1

Radboud University, The Netherlands · Ikerlan Research Centre, Spain · University of Bergen, Norway +1

Spiking Neural Networks Clean Label Backdoor Attack Poisoning

Jul 28, 2026cs.CR

Lilith: Backdoor Generalization under Training-Inference Trigger Shift

Machine-learning services increasingly rely on public data, third-party providers, and outsourced training, creating opportunities for data-poisoning attacks that implant persistent malicious behavior while preserving benign utility. However, existing backdoor studies largely evaluate exact trigger reuse, training-exposed trigger diversity, or variations along predefined transformation axes. They therefore leave a critical blind spot: whether a backdoor learned from one training-time trigger can generalize to an inference-time trigger family absent from victim training. We formulate this problem as backdoor generalization under training--inference trigger shift and introduce Lilith, a black-box anchor-to-family framework. Using only disjoint surrogate resources, Lilith first induces a compact target-side vulnerability with a single training anchor, then constructs a bounded inference-only family that preserves the anchor-induced representation geometry. We characterize this mechanism through anchor clearance and family reach, deriving sufficient conditions for family-wise target preservation under local regularity and bounded surrogate--victim discrepancy. Experiments across datasets, architectures, poisoning rates, and defenses show that Lilith achieves high family-wise attack success with limited utility degradation and a small trigger generalization gap. Additional analyses show that family activation depends on representation alignment rather than the proposal mechanism, exposing a broader threat overlooked by exact-trigger evaluation.

Zhou Feng, Jiahao Chen, Chunyi Zhou +6

Zhejiang University College of Computer Science and Technology Hangzhou, China · Zhejiang University School of Software Technology Hangzhou, China · Chongqing University School of Big Data & Software Engineering Chongqing, China +1

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Attack-Success Rate

Jul 27, 2026cs.CR

Early Detection of Distributed Backdoors in Multi-Agent LLM Systems: A Characterization Study

Multi-agent LLM systems can be attacked by a payload that no single agent ever holds in full: a poisoned tool hides encrypted fragments in its observations, spreads them across several agents, and an external step reassembles and executes them after the run. Per-step safety checks that judge each action in isolation may fail to recognize the complete distributed payload. We investigate how early such an attack can be detected while the run is still unfolding, and how robustly it can be caught once its most obvious cues are stripped away. We build a working instance on a hierarchical multi-agent system, run it under benign and attacked conditions across five language models and two task domains, and record when each fragment is injected and when the payload is assembled and executed. Detection is a race against assembly. Before the first fragment is injected, attacked and benign runs are indistinguishable; once injection begins, a prefix detector flags

99.3\%

of successful attacks with a median of five steps remaining and a

10.3\%

safe-run false-positive rate. Because assembly occurs only after the run, these alarms arrive in time to abort nearly every successful attack. We then measure how much of that warning rests on removable surface cues of the attack rather than on its distributed structure. Generic zero-shot and behavior-trained detectors provide almost no warning at all; the detectors that do work lean in part on removable surface cues, chiefly the ciphertext's length and entropy, and once the entropy cue is removed from the payload and the length features from the detector, detection arrives later and transfers poorly across domains, though a fine-tuned model recovers some of the loss.

Diego Fernandez Arias, Dev Prashant Mistry, Ren Wang +1

Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago, Illinois, USA

Multi-Agent Large Language Model Systems Clean Label Backdoor Attack Single-Agent

Jul 22, 2026cs.CR

Defense Against LLM Backdoors using Critical Neuron Isolation Pruning

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where hidden triggers induce malicious outputs. Existing defenses generally fall into inference-time detection or training-time mitigation, but face two key limitations. First, they focus on fine-tuning-based backdoors (e.g., PEFT modules) and fail to address insidious model-editing attacks that bypass training pipelines. Second, they target simple classification settings and do not naturally extend to open-ended LLM generation and do not naturally extend to the open-ended generation characteristics of LLMs. Consequently, these methods focus on surface-level behavioral patterns while neglecting the deeper representational causes of malicious activations. This lack of mechanistic understanding forces defenses to depend on empirical heuristics, limiting their robustness, generality, and practical applicability in real-world LLM deployment. To bridge this gap, we introduce DeCNIP (Defense with Critical Neuron Isolation Pruning), which leverages representational analysis to identify and neutralize backdoors in a unified pipeline. Specifically, DeCNIP identifies trigger-like behaviors by optimizing a cross-entropy loss between harmful prompts with candidate tokens and benign inputs. This representational discovery exposes latent threats by uncovering mechanisms through which triggers hijack model weights. It then isolates Backdoor Critical Neurons (BCNs) and prunes them selectively to remove malicious influence while preserving model utility. Extensive evaluations on six open-source LLMs and two benchmark datasets demonstrate that DeCNIP achieves over 95% relative reduction in Attack Success Rate (ASR), outperforming seven state-of-the-art defenses with only 0.1% neuron intervention. Moreover, it maintains 97% of the model's performance on normal benchmarks, demonstrating its efficacy, robustness, and scalability.

Yuxi Li, Zhibo Zhang, Kailong Wang +3

Huazhong University of Science and Technology China · Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics China · Nanyang Technological University Singapore

Attacker Large Language Model Clean Label Backdoor Attack LLM Defense Mechanisms Neurons

Jul 10, 2026cs.CV

Event Burst Trigger: An Availability Backdoor Attack on Event-Based SNN Object Detection

Event-based vision and spiking neural networks (SNNs) are increasingly adopted for edge intelligence under strict latency and energy constraints. However, the vulnerability of event-based SNN object detection models to availability backdoor attacks remains insufficiently studied. This paper presents Event Burst Trigger (EBT), an availability backdoor attack targeting SNN-based object detection models. EBT injects carefully crafted event-based triggers into the training data, which induce temporally concentrated event streams during inference. These burst-like activations increase the number of phantom (i.e., spurious) object candidates, and consequently inflate the computational cost of the post-processing stage, particularly Non-Maximum Suppression (NMS). We evaluate EBT on SpikeYOLO, the state-of-the-art SNN-based object detector, under a poison-only threat model that does not require modifications to the model architecture, loss function, or inference pipeline. Experimental results show that while detection accuracy remains largely preserved, with mAP@0.5 decreasing by less than 0.099, the latency of the NMS stage increases by up to 38%. This indicates that NMS can become a dominant availability bottleneck in event-based SNN object detection. Experiments on an edge platform further show that the proposed attack elevates baseline resource utilization and reduces scheduling slack without inducing conspicuous peaks in resource usage. In addition, STRIP-based backdoor detection fails to reliably distinguish the proposed attack from benign inputs. These results characterize a previously underexplored availability backdoor threat in event-based SNN object detection systems.

Jaesun Baek, Chanwook Lee, Eun-Kyu Lee

Dept. of Information and Telecommunication Eng., Incheon National University, Republic of Korea

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Edge-Aware

Jul 9, 2026cs.CR

Beware What You Autocomplete: Forensic Attribution of Backdoored Code Completions

Large language models have enabled powerful code completion systems that assist developers by predicting subsequent lines of code. However, these models remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious fine-tuning data covertly implants unsafe behaviors. Despite advances in defensive techniques, adaptive and sophisticated backdoor attacks still evade detection and mitigation. We present CodeTracer, a forensic framework that traces malicious code completions back to the backdoor fine-tuning data responsible for them. Operating under realistic post-deployment constraints, CodeTracer relies solely on the fine-tuning corpus and the reported miscompletion event. It extracts a structured behavioral fingerprint from the compromised output, narrows the search to semantically relevant code samples, and employs LLM-based reasoning to attribute unsafe logic to specific backdoor data. Extensive evaluations across three representative vulnerability cases and ten backdoor attacks, along with sixteen competitive baselines, demonstrate that CodeTracer consistently achieves high forensic accuracy, low false identification rates, and strong robustness against adaptive attacks.

Anjun Gao, Yueyang Quan, Zhuqing Liu +1

University of Louisville · University of North Texas

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Vulnerable Code Attacker Large Language Model Code Completion Digital Forensics Traces+2

Jul 7, 2026cs.CR

ORAN-DEFEND: Subspace Detection and Sanitization of Backdoor DRL xApps in Open RAN

Open Radio Access Networks (O-RAN) increasingly delegate near-real-time control to deep reinforcement learning (DRL) xApps obtained from third-party vendors, creating a new supply-chain attack surface. A backdoor policy behaves optimally until an adversary injects a covert trigger into the observed key performance indicator (KPI) telemetry, at which point it issues harmful control actions that degrade quality of service (QoS). We present ORAN-DEFEND, a retraining-free wrapper that sanitizes a frozen, potentially compromised xApp by projecting each KPI window onto a safe subspace estimated from a small number of trusted clean rollouts via singular value decomposition (SVD). We establish, both analytically and empirically, a precise recovery condition: the defense succeeds if the trigger energy concentrates in the orthogonal complement of the safe subspace, and we quantify this boundary through the trigger's

\Eperp

energy fraction. On the Colosseum COLORAN dataset, we evaluate four structurally distinct DRL backdoor attacks, like TrojDRL, SleeperNets, BadRL, and Q-Incept, spanning inner-loop and outer-loop poisoning regimes and demonstrate

100\%

return recovery and

\geq99.5\%

defense success rate across all four when the subspace assumption holds. A geometry ablation reveals an intrinsic and previously uncharacterized limit of any linear projection defense: when the trigger collocates with the legitimate signal, the

\Eperp

energy fraction governs recovery monotonically, and the linear residual detector collapses to chance even while a nonlinear classifier retains perfect separability.

Md Raihan Uddin, Fatemeh Lotfi, Tolunay Seyfi +1

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Model-Agnostic Defense Open Radio Access Networks LLM Defense Mechanisms Subspace Poisoning

Jul 7, 2026cs.CR

The Power of Backdoor Absorption in Community Training

Backdoor attacks severely threaten large-scale AI models. When model owners delegate training to external compute providers within a decentralized training paradigm, adversaries can craft stealthy, low-frequency triggers to inject malicious behavior while evading standard audits. Traditionally, detecting these attacks requires a full re-computation of the training steps--a prohibitive overhead that directly contradicts the owner's resource constraints. To address this, we investigate the resilience of continuous optimization dynamics under Byzantine perturbations, where adversaries are forced to compete against a continuous influx of honest updates. Under a threat model where an adversary compromises f out of n total trainers, we quantify the minimum auditing overhead required by the model owner to probabilistically bound the attack success rate. We formalize this injection-absorption dynamic as a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC). Using this framework, we prove that the success probability of any bounded adversary asymptotically collapses to zero under a defense strategy combining natural absorption, a randomized scheduler, and lazy verification oracle. Empirical results demonstrate significant backdoor suppression with zero utility degradation even when invoking the verification oracle on merely 10% of the total training steps. This approach yields a provably sound and computationally efficient defense for safety-critical AI.

Issam Seddik, Sami Souihi, Mohamed Tamaazousti +1

Université Paris-Saclay, CEA LIST, Palaiseau, France

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Model-Agnostic Defense Bounded Adversary Attack-Success Rate Decentralized Learning

Jul 2, 2026cs.AI

DRL-CLBA: A Clean Label Backdoor Attack for Speech Classification via DDPG Reinforcement Learning

Deep learning models for speech classification are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious triggers cause misclassification at inference time. While sample-specific attacks can bypass many defenses, they often rely on poisoned label attack, making them detectable via manual data defense. In this paper, we propose DRL-CLBA, a novel clean label backdoor attack for speech classification that leverages Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG) reinforcement learning. We also utilize deep audio steganography to embed sample-specific triggers into source audio, creating feature-space anchors. The proposed reinforcement learning framework effectively optimizes target samples toward trigger-bearing anchor points in the model's deep latent space, enabling label-migration-free poisoning of target samples. Experimental results across three datasets and four different DNNs demonstrate that DRL-CLBA achieves a high attack success rate, effectively bypassing some backdoor defenses. The attack demonstrates strong resistance against fine-tuning, pruning, and spectral signature defenses, exposing critical vulnerabilities in speech-controlled systems.

Yueming Huang, Wenhan Yao, Fen Xiao +2

Xiangtan University, Yuhu District Xiangda Road, Xiangtan, 411100, Hunan, China · Peking University, No.5, Summer Palace Road, Haidian District, Beijing, China, Beijing, 100871, Beijing, China

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Speaker Steganography

Jul 2, 2026cs.CR

Pmeta-TLA: Backdoor Attacks for Speech Classification Models via Meta-Learning with Timbre Leakage Attack

Recently, speech classification methods have gained widespread adoption in intelligent gadgets. Current study indicates that backdoor attacks provide a substantial security concern to these models, underscoring the pressing necessity to investigate additional potential attack techniques to expose and prevent such risks. This work discusses the vulnerability of current speech triggers to detection by deep neural network defenders and introduces the Timbre Leakage Attack (TLA). The suggested trigger disseminates timbre information at the frame level within the deep self-supervised features, producing poisoned samples that appear natural to human perception. Furthermore, we introduce Pmeta-TLA, an innovative training mechanism for embedding numerous backdoors one time. This method proposes a multi-backdoor injection training strategy using meta-learning and Projected Conflicting Gradients (PCGrad) and introduces TLA as a multi-target attack tool within it. We performed tests on data-poisoning backdoor attacks in keyword spotting tasks utilizing some deep neural network models. Experimental results indicate that the proposed strategy attains superior Attack efficacy, enhanced stealthiness, robustness, and a reduced attack cost relative to baseline methods.

Yueming Huang, Wenhan Yao, Fen Xiao +2

Xiangtan University, Yuhu District Xiangda Road, Xiangtan, 411100, Hunan, China · Peking University, No.5, Summer Palace Road, Haidian District, Beijing, China, Beijing, 100871, Beijing, China

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Speaker Meta-Learning

Jun 30, 2026cs.CR

CSO-LLM: Class Subspace Orthogonalization for Post-Training Backdoor Detection and Trigger Inversion in LLMs

While post-training backdoor detection and trigger inversion schemes have been developed for AIs used e.g. for images, there is a paucity of such methods for LLMs. First, the LLM input space is discrete, with up to 150,000^k k-tuples to consider with k the token-length of a putative trigger. Second, one must blacklist tokens typical of the putative target response (class) of an attack, as such tokens may give false detection signals. However, a comprehensive blacklist is not available, in general, for a given domain. We develop a highly effective detection and inversion framework for LLMs treated as classifiers. Central to our approach is class subspace orthogonalization (CSO), a novel plug-and-play paradigm for backdoor detection that serves two fundamental roles when applied to LLMs: i) it enhances both sensitivity and specificity of a baseline detector; ii) it provides a form of implicit blacklisting, as it penalizes against inclusion, in a candidate trigger, of tokens that induce signal perturbations "in the direction of" the putative target class of an attack. One version of our detector performs continuous optimization in token embedding space, while a companion trigger-inversion and detection method performs greedy accretion in discrete token space. Our methods give both strong detection performance and accurate inversion of ground-truth triggers on several LLM classification domains, and for several different LLM architectures.

Zhengxing Li, David J. Miller, Guangmingmei Yang +1

Electrical Engineering Dept Penn State University University Park, PA 16802 · Anomalee Inc. · Computer Science & Engineering Dept Penn State University University Park, PA 16802 +1

Attacker Large Language Model Clean Label Backdoor Attack Large Language Models(Llms Inverse Design Orthogonality

Jun 22, 2026cs.CR

TooBad: Backdoor Diffusion Models with Ultra-Low Poison Rate and Imperceptible Trigger

Diffusion models (DMs), despite their impressive capabilities across a wide range of generative tasks, have been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. However, existing backdoor methods face critical trade-offs among key factors: attack performance, stealthiness, time complexity, and required poison rates. For example, achieving high attack performance typically demands a high poison rate and prolonged training, which undermines stealthiness, making the attack more detectable by backdoor defenses. This paper proposes TooBad (trigger optimization for backdoor diffusion models), a backdoor framework which introduces a novel DM-tailored trigger optimization technique to dramatically enhance the performance of backdoor attacks on DMs. Experiments on representative benchmarks such as CIFAR-10 show that TooBad can achieve high ASRs (

> 85

%) at only 0.5% poison rate, significantly lower than the 10% typically required by prior work on the same datasets. At 5% poison rate, TooBad reaches nearly 100% ASR within just 3-5 backdoor injection epochs, whereas existing methods need at least 30-50 epochs at double the poison rate for comparable results. Despite its potency, TooBad easily evades SOTA defenses and maintains high utility. These results reveal a critical threat on DMs and highlight the need for more robust defenses against such stealthy yet efficient attacks.

Vu Tuan Truong, Long Bao Le

INRS, University of Quebec

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Diffusion Models Poisoning Prompt Optimization

Jun 22, 2026cs.LG

CLIP-guided Diffusion Model for Backdoor Generation in Sensor-based Human Activity Recognition

Sensors are critical components of modern intelligent devices. The proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) and wearable mobile devices has enabled the integration of such sensors to monitor the environment and enable users to take predictive actions. Human activity recognition (HAR) is a popular application in which Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)-based sensors, such as accelerometers and gyroscopes, are used to provide insights into health, training, and medical diagnosis. However, the accuracy of such a model is hindered by the lack of data. The diffusion model-based technique has proven successful in generating synthetic data for training HAR models. In this paper, we propose a backdoor training technique, IMU-DM-CLIP, that leverages a diffusion model to enable trigger-based attacks on HAR models. Our empirical analysis shows that the attack is successful even with a very small backdoor injection rate of 10% and 10% of the data guided for the diffusion model.

Toby Briston, Illya Kosyk, Kuniyih S

Human Activity Recognition Clean Label Backdoor Attack Inertial Measurement Units Unsupervised Detection Diffusion Models

Jun 21, 2026cs.LG

SCRUB-FL: Sanitizing and Cleansing Representations via Unlearning of Backdoors

Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative model training without sharing raw data, making it a promising paradigm for privacy-sensitive applications. However, its decentralized nature makes it inherently vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious clients embed hidden triggers into local training data to manipulate model predictions. Existing defenses mainly operate during before and during aggregation cannot fully eliminate backdoor behaviors that persist in the converged global model. Moreover, the effectiveness of post-training sanitization is often limited by the server's lack of knowledge of trigger patterns or poisoned clients after convergence, resulting in residual backdoor behaviors or accuracy degradation due to neuron entanglement. To address this limitation, we propose SCRUB-FL (Sanitizing and Cleansing Representations via Unlearning of Backdoors), a two-phase solution for post-training backdoor removal in FL. During training, clients identify suspicious samples using spectral analysis and activation clustering, then train lightweight Wasserstein Generative Adversarial Network with Gradient Penalty (WGAN-GP) models to capture trigger-related distributions. The generator parameters are aggregated server-side to construct a global representation of suspicious patterns without exposing raw data. After convergence, the server synthesizes trigger-approximating samples and applies machine unlearning to erase the trigger-target association by redistributing predictions toward a uniform distribution. Experimental evaluations on CIFAR-10 and GTSRB across three attack types and up to 40% malicious participation demonstrate that SCRUB-FL reduces the backdoor attack success rate to as low as 3.88% while maintaining over 91% normal task accuracy, outperforming state-of-the-art defenses without requiring prior trigger knowledge or a large clean proxy dataset at the server.

Osama Wehbi, Sarhad Arisdakessian, Omar Abdel Wahab +2

Department of Computer and Software Engineering, Polytechnique Montréal, Montreal, Quebec, Canada · Department of Computer Science, Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi, UAE

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Federated Learning Model-Agnostic Defense Malicious Agents Post-Hoc

Jun 19, 2026cs.LG

Fusing Backdoors, Machine Learning, and Optimization for Large-Scale Parametric Mixed-Integer Programs

Large-scale optimization problems are often solved repeatedly under similar structural conditions, leading to substantial computational overhead. This occurs in applications such as power systems, transportation, and supply chain networks, where the underlying structure is fixed while parameters frequently vary under perturbations. This paper proposes a Learning to Optimize (LTO) framework that accelerates the solution of large-scale general mixed-integer problems by leveraging the concept of a backdoor, i.e., a subset of variables that drive most of the computational complexity. The proposed BIPC framework consists of three phases. Phase I is an identification procedure that discovers a backdoor for a set of instances in the distribution. Phase II uses supervised learning to develop machine learning models that, given an instance, predict values for bounded-domain backdoor variables and intervals for wide-domain backdoor variables. These predictions define a reduced optimization problem where the predictions constrain the backdoor variables, while the other variables remain free. Phase III optimizes this reduced problem and, if necessary, applies a correction step to restore feasibility or the optimality guarantees. Experiments on real-world, large-scale problems show substantial reductions in solution time with only a limited loss in solution quality. The framework enables organizations to solve large-scale optimization problems efficiently in the presence of frequent perturbations, such as unexpected events, demand fluctuations, or operational changes. Because these changes affect parameters rather than the problem structure, BIPC can quickly provide high-quality, feasible solutions, offering a practical approach to integrating machine learning into existing optimization pipelines.

El Mehdi Er Raqabi, Pascal Van Hentenryck

Department of Operations and Decision Systems, Université Laval, Québec, Canada · H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA

Mixed-Integer Programming Clean Label Backdoor Attack Fewer Surprising Backdoors Supply Chain Optimization

Jun 18, 2026cs.CV

Mirage: a Clean-Label Backdoor against LiDAR 3D Object Detection

Deep neural network-based LiDAR 3D object detection serves as a critical perception component in safety-critical autonomous systems. However, recent studies have revealed its vulnerability to backdoor attacks. Existing attacks typically require white-box access or label modification and focus on geometric attacks such as object disappearance or bounding-box manipulation. In this paper, we present Mirage, a black-box and clean-label backdoor attack against deep neural network-based LiDAR 3DOD. Mirage injects a small number of label-consistent poisoning samples into the training set, causing the model to learn a malicious association between a trigger pattern and an attacker-chosen target class while preserving normal training semantics. As a result, the compromised model behaves normally on benign inputs yet systematically misclassifies triggered objects as the target class during deployment. We evaluate Mirage on multiple state-of-the-art LiDAR 3DOD models and benchmark datasets. Experimental results show that Mirage achieves a 73% misclassification success rate with a poisoning rate of only 0.5%, while maintaining detection performance close to that of benign models.

Ziba Parsons, Ang Li

Computer and Information Science University of Michigan - Dearborn Dearborn, MI 48170

3D Object Detection Clean Label Backdoor Attack 3D Generation

Jun 14, 2026cs.LG

InstantForget: Update-Free Backdoor Unlearning with Inference-Time Feature Reset

Backdoor unlearning aims to remove a malicious trigger behavior from a deployed model while preserving clean utility. We study the update-free inference-time setting, where model parameters remain frozen. First, we audit a common projection assumption under oracle paired clean and triggered features. Projection succeeds mainly on BadNets and leaves WaNet, Blended, and SIG at 0.683, 0.888, and 0.941 ASR on CIFAR-10 ResNet-18. This failure is not explained by spectral compactness, spatial locality, or subspace misalignment. It is predicted by a logit-triplet gap involving the target margin, target-logit drop, and non-target logit rise. We then introduce InstantForget, a clean-calibrated gated reset that flags anomalous features with a Mahalanobis score and moves only flagged features toward a neutral non-target representation. With one fixed operating point selected on held-out triggered validation, InstantForget reduces average ASR to 0.071 across four non-adaptive CIFAR-10 triggers without triggered samples or parameter updates at deployment. It also reaches 0.981 detection AUROC and transfers to six of eight tested backbones. Reported failures under WaNet, ModelNet10 point blend, two backbone geometries, and adaptive feature-compactness attacks define the method's scope.

Zhenyu Yu

College of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Fudan University

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Inference-Time Defense Retraining Forgetting Imagenet Inference-Time+1

Jun 12, 2026cs.CR

Continual Backdoor Training in IoT/CPS

Internet of Things (IoT) and Cyber-physical systems (CPS) increasingly rely on continual learning (CL) to adapt to evolving environments, device heterogeneity, and concept drift, thereby improving overall utility. While continual adaptation is essential for long-lived IoT deployments where data patterns evolve, it also introduces new security vulnerabilities. In particular, backdoor attacks can exploit incremental updates, replay buffers, and representation reuse to implant persistent malicious behaviors that remain dormant during normal operation but activate upon specific triggers. In this paper, we present a backdoor attack in continual learning used in IoT/CPS systems. To this end, we formalize an IoT/CPS-specific threat model, analyze why continual learning amplifies backdoor persistence in IoT pipelines, and evaluate our technique under varying conditions. Our analysis highlights critical open challenges in securing lifelong learning in IoT/CPS and industrial IoT (IIoT) environments, as well as the need for heightened security controls.

Oxana Salish, Kuniyilh S

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Internet Of Thing Replay-Based Continual Learning Continual Learning Realistic Threat Model Cyber-Physical System

Jun 10, 2026cs.CR

From Parameters to Feature Space: Task Arithmetic for Backdoor Mitigation in Model Merging

Model merging (MM) has gained significant attention as a cost-effective approach to integrate multiple task-specific models into a unified model. However, recent work reveals that MM is highly susceptible to backdoor attacks. Existing defenses based on task arithmetic often fail to eliminate backdoors without substantially degrading clean-task performance, owing to their reliance on direct parameter-space editing. To address this gap, we propose Linear Feature Path Minimization (LFPM), a backdoor mitigation framework for model merging, which introduces an anti-backdoor task vector into the backdoored merged model. Unlike prior approaches, LFPM formulates the backdoor robustness of the merged model from a unified feature-space perspective under the Cross-Task Linearity (CTL) framework, which leverages the approximate linearity of features across tasks. This perspective guides the optimization of the anti-backdoor task to suppress backdoors while preserving clean-task performance. Furthermore, we introduce an effective optimization mechanism based on gradient accumulation and loss path-integral, ensuring robust backdoor suppression along the interpolation path. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LFPM consistently exhibits strong robustness against backdoor attacks in both full fine-tuning and Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) settings.

Zhenqian Zhu, Yamin Hu, Yiya Diao +3

Institute of Cyberspace Security, School of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, Shenzhen, 518055, China. · Shenzhen Key Laboratory of Media Security, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, 518060, China.

Continual Model Merging Clean Label Backdoor Attack Model-Agnostic Defense Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning Methods Multi--Task Learning Malware+2

Jun 2, 2026cs.CR

Patcher: Post-Hoc Patching of Backdoored Large Language Models

Large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreak backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison safety alignment data to embed hidden triggers that bypass safety mechanisms. Existing defenses often require comprehensive attack information or multiple triggered examples, making them impractical when defenders only observe a single reported failure case without knowing whether it stems from a backdoor attack or a natural alignment bug. This paper presents Patcher, a post-hoc defense framework that repairs backdoored language models using only a single reported failure case and the model parameters. Patcher operates in two stages. First, it localizes backdoor triggers by computing response-conditioned gradient-based saliency scores and applying adaptive clustering to separate triggers from benign context. Second, it patches the model through a constrained fine-tuning objective that breaks the trigger-response association while preserving benign-task utility and robustness to non-triggered jailbreak attacks through KL-divergence constraints. We conduct extensive evaluations across multiple backdoor attack strategies and demonstrate that Patcher successfully localizes triggers and neutralizes backdoors while maintaining model utility. We further show robustness against adaptive attacks designed to evade our defense. This work represents a significant step toward practical defenses against training-time attacks in deployed language models.

Anjun Gao, Yueyang Quan, Yufei Xia +2

University of Louisville · University of North Texas

Large Language Model Jailbreaks Clean Label Backdoor Attack Jailbreak Attacks Safety Alignment

May 27, 2026cs.LG

Density-aware Sample-specific Attack

Despite recent progress in backdoor attacks, existing methods remain susceptible to post-training defenses that erase the backdoor through fine-tuning or pruning. We revisit the core objectives of backdoor attacks and derive principled criteria characterizing optimal sample-specific trigger construction under a Bayes-optimal model of the victim's training. Our analysis reveals that both attack success and clean-accuracy preservation are simultaneously optimized when triggered samples are steered into low-density regions of the clean data distribution, a distributional condition that controls all moments of the poisoned distribution at once rather than a handful of input-space summary statistics. We introduce a bilevel optimization framework that estimates density ratios via conditional time-score matching and optimizes a mixture-model objective to place triggered samples in these sparse regions. Extensive evaluations on MNIST, CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and TinyImageNet demonstrate that our method achieves above 99% attack success rate before defense and retains 50--85 percentage points higher post-defense ASR than the strongest baselines under fine-tuning defenses. Against neuron-pruning defenses, the method exhibits complete immunity, with zero neurons identified for removal across all pruning thresholds. These results expose a fundamental gap in current defense paradigms and underscore the need for defenses that operate beyond the support of the clean distribution.

Qiyuan Wang, Yao Li, Raymond K. W. Wong

Texas A&M University · University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Model-Agnostic Defense Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Attack-Success Rate

May 26, 2026cs.CR

Backdoor Attacks on Fault Detection and Localization in Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate sensing, communication, computation, and control to support critical infrastructure, including smart grids, industrial automation, and control systems. In the electrical utility domain, various controllers are used in CPS to ensure the system detects and recovers from faults, such as voltage fluctuations, and to perform load balancing in distribution systems. Machine learning- and deep learning-based fault detection and localization frameworks have recently gained significant attention in CPS for their ability to identify anomalies and operational failures in real time. However, these intelligent models are vulnerable to adversarial machine learning attacks, particularly backdoor attacks. In a backdoor attack, an adversary injects malicious patterns into the training data so that the model behaves normally most of the time but produces attacker-controlled outputs when triggered by specific patterns. This paper investigates the threat of backdoor attacks against fault detection and localization mechanisms in recent ML pipelines used in modern CPS systems. We define these threats and explore how they can be realized by designing triggers and evaluating their success in the CPS domain. Our experiments show the attack is successful even with 10% of poisoning.

Abile Jean, Kuniyilh S

Cyber-Physical System Clean Label Backdoor Attack Localization

May 19, 2026cs.LG

Your Neighbors Know: Leveraging Local Neighborhoods for Backdoor Detection in Decentralized Learning

Decentralized learning (DL) is an emerging machine learning paradigm where nodes collaboratively train models without a central server. However, the collaborative nature of DL makes it vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where a model is taught to behave normally on standard inputs while executing hidden, malicious actions when encountering data with specific triggers. Backdoor attacks in DL remain understudied and existing defenses often overlook DL constraints. We introduce Argus, a novel backdoor detection framework native to DL that requires neither a central coordinator nor prior knowledge of the trigger. In Argus, honest nodes locally analyze received model updates to identify potential backdoor triggers. Nodes then collectively share their triggers with their neighbors and use a structural similarity metric to separate true backdoors from false alarms induced by data heterogeneity. A key insight is that false positive triggers exhibit inconsistencies across participants while true positive ones show consistent patterns. Model updates that fail this collaborative test are rejected, and persistently malicious senders are eventually evicted. We provide the first theoretical convergence guarantees for a DL-specific backdoor detection mechanism, showing that filtering out suspicious model updates with high probability preserves a convergence rate comparable to standard DL. We implement and evaluate Argus on three standard datasets and against three state-of-the-art baselines. Across settings, Argus reduces attack success rates by up to 90 points compared to no defense, while preserving model utility within 5 percentage points of an omniscient oracle. Furthermore, the effectiveness of Argus compared to baselines improves as data heterogeneity increases.

Sayan Biswas, Antoine Boutet, Davide Frey +7

1EPFL · 2Inria, INSA Lyon, CITI · 3Univ. Rennes, Inria, CNRS, IRISA

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Decentralized Learning Singular Learning Theory Attack-Success Rate Neighbors Honesty

May 18, 2026cs.SD

A Survey of Large Audio Language Models: Generalization, Trustworthiness, and Outlook

The foundational capabilities established by Large Language Models (LLMs) have paved the way for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), within which Large Audio Language Models (LALMs) are essential for realizing universal auditory intelligence. Despite their remarkable performance, the escalation of LALMs' capabilities has significantly outpaced the development of systemic frameworks to ensure their trustworthiness. This survey provides a comprehensive investigation into the endogenous mechanisms of LALMs, detailing the architectural innovations and alignment algorithms that facilitate emergent reasoning. Specifically, we analyze how the transition to unified end-to-end frameworks and the integration of continuous acoustic signals inherently expand the attack surface. To rigorously evaluate the risks within these paradigms, we establish a comprehensive taxonomy of trustworthiness, categorizing critical vulnerabilities such as cross-modal jailbreaking, latent acoustic backdoors, and biometric privacy leakage. We review the state-of-the-art through six analytical pillars: hallucination, robustness, safety, privacy, fairness, and authentication. The profound imbalance between a mature offensive landscape and underdeveloped defenses further validates the critical trustworthiness gaps and multidimensional risks facing audio-centric intelligence. Finally, we propose a strategic roadmap advocating for "Defense-in-Depth" architectures, causal auditory world modeling, and intrinsic representation engineering to bridge the gap between empirical performance and intrinsically trustworthy audio intelligence. Our project has been uploaded to GitHub https://github.com/Kwwwww74/Awesome-Trustworthy-AudioLLMs.

Kaiwen Luo, Zhenhong Zhou, Leo Wang +31

Nanyang Technological University · Independent Researcher · The University of Melbourne +15

Large Audio Language Models Large Language Model Safety AI Trustworthiness Clean Label Backdoor Attack

May 18, 2026quant-ph

Can Quantum Federated Learning Withstand Circuit-Level Backdoors?

Quantum Federated Learning (QFL) inherits the core vulnerability of federated optimization to malicious clients, while also introducing an attack surface from variational circuit training and measurement-driven gradients. This work proposes a novel CircUit-Level backdoor Threat (CULT) model that formalizes four stealthy attacks by exploiting quantum-aware mechanisms, including Grover, Pauli, Bit-flip, and Sign-flip. By enabling malicious clients on both in-training and post-training surfaces, these attacks can critically undermine the learning process. We establish a rigorous theoretical foundation to demonstrate attack stealthiness under standard smoothness assumptions. Experiments on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets with non-IID splits and varying fractions of malicious clients show that even a single malicious client can induce severe accuracy degradation under FedAvg aggregation. While popular defenses, including Krum, Multi-Krum, FoolsGold, FLGuardian, and Mud-HoG, reduce degradation in many regimes, they fail to eliminate worst-case failure cases, where accuracy drops up to 50%. The experimental analysis further reveals that under the CULT model, malicious updates effectively mask their presence by staying close to benign norms, thereby helping attackers evade detection.

Aakar Mathur, Mohammed Ruknuddin, Ashish Gupta

BITS Pilani Dubai Campus, Dubai, UAE

Federated Learning Variational Quantum Algorithms Clean Label Backdoor Attack Attack Stealthiness

May 17, 2026cs.CR

Fast and Lightweight Backdoor Detection via Head Random Probing

Deep neural networks (DNNs) remain critically vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing post-training detectors often require clean or surrogate data, gradients, or iterative trigger reconstruction, leading to high computational costs and limited robustness under practical model-auditing scenarios. In this paper, we propose HTell, a fast and lightweight data-free backdoor detector based on head random probing. Instead of reconstructing diverse trigger patterns, HTell inspects their unified manifestation in the prediction head: backdoored models tend to exhibit abnormal response concentration on the target class under random latent probes. HTell generates architecture-aware random latent probes, feeds them directly into the model head, and detects backdoors by analyzing class-wise response statistics, without accessing real or surrogate data, model gradients, or parameter optimization. We evaluate HTell on a large-scale benchmark containing more than 6,000 backdoored models and over 700 clean models, covering 4 datasets, 14 architectures, and 21 types of backdoor attacks. HTell achieves 99.03% true positive rate and 2.11% false positive rate with only 12.69 ms/model detection latency, reducing the time cost by over 30,000

\times

compared with representative gradient-based detectors. These results demonstrate that head random probing provides an accurate, robust, and efficient solution for large-scale data-free backdoor model auditing.

Yinbo Yu, Xueyu Yin, Jing Fang +4

College of Artificial Intelligence, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, Jiangsu, 210016, China · School of Cybersecurity, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710072, China · Shenzhen Research Institute of Northwestern Polytechnical University, Shenzhen, Guangdong, 518057, China +1

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Unsupervised Detection Lightweight

May 17, 2026cs.CR

Lightweight and Fast Backdoor Model Detection

Deep neural networks (DNN), despite their remarkable performance, are highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing defenses mainly rely on activation anomaly analysis or trigger reverse engineering and often require clean samples or prior knowledge of trigger patterns, resulting in limited efficacy, practicability, and generalizability. More critically, while advanced attacks can implement backdoor implantation in milliseconds, current detection approaches typically demand minutes or even hours. To this end, we propose DFBScanner, a lightweight static parameter inspection framework for fast backdoor scanning. DFBScanner leverages our key observation that backdoor-induced feature perturbations can lead to distinctive and anomalous parameter updates in the final classification layer. Hence, we shift our detection focus from recognizing diverse and attack-specific trigger patterns targeted by prior work, to identifying the unified backdoor manifestation within the final layer, thereby enabling efficient and attack-agnostic detection. Specifically, by constructing and strategically combining multiple anomaly indicators of the final-layer parameters into a Trojan clue, DFBScanner detects backdoors through maximum anomaly scoring. DFBScanner is evaluated on a large-scale backdoor benchmark, including over 5,000 backdoor models trained on 4 datasets, 12 network architectures, 20 types of backdoor triggers, 2 attack strategies (all-to-one and -all), and 3 backdoor injection methods (data poisoning, training pipeline manipulation, and bit-flips). Numerical results show that DFBScanner achieves a 97.17% true-positive rate, 0.95% false-positive rate, and an average detection time of only 1 ms per model, significantly outperforming prior methods.

Yinbo Yu, Jing Fang, Xuewen Zhang +4

College of Artificial Intelligence, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, Jiangsu, 210016, China · Shenzhen Research Institute of Northwestern Polytechnical University, Shenzhen, Guangdong, 518057, China · School of Software, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, 710072, P.R. China +2

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Fewer Surprising Backdoors Threat Detection Unsupervised Detection Lightweight

May 15, 2026cs.CV

EntropyScan: Towards Model-level Backdoor Detection in LVLMs via Visual Attention Entropy

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks, yet they remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing defense methods predominantly focus on sample-level defense, which relies on the knowledge of training data or triggers. However, identifying whether a given model is backdoored remains a critical but unexplored task. To fill this gap, we propose EntropyScan, a lightweight and trigger-agnostic method for model-level backdoor detection in LVLMs. We first observe that backdoor injection disrupts the cross-modal alignment, resulting in pronounced structural anomalies in visual attention allocation on benign samples. Based on this insight, EntropyScan detects the backdoor models by quantifying such attention deviations. Specifically, it extracts visual attention distributions from the initial layers of the Large Language Model (LLM) and applies Tsallis entropy to capture these structural distortions. By employing a reference-anchored Z-score normalization on a small set of benign samples, it effectively identifies the backdoored model. Extensive experiments across two LVLMs architectures and three advanced attack scenarios show that EntropyScan achieves an F1 score of 98.5% in average and an AUC of 96.6%. Our code will be publicly available soon.

Xuanyu Ge, Zhongqi Wang, Jie Zhang +2

China University of Geosciences · University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences · Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Large Language Model Backbones LLM Defense Mechanisms

May 12, 2026cs.CL

When Emotion Becomes Trigger: Emotion-style dynamic Backdoor Attack Parasitising Large Language Models

Backdoor vulnerabilities widely exist in the fine-tuning of large language models(LLMs). Most backdoor poisoning methods operate mainly at the token level and lack deeper semantic manipulation, which limits stealthiness. In addition, Prior attacks rely on a single fixed trigger to induce harmful outputs. Such static triggers are easy to detect, and clean fine-tuning can weaken the trigger-target association. Through causal validation, we observe that emotion is not directly linked to individual words, but functions as an overall stylistic factor through tone. In the representation space of LLM, emotion can be decoupled from semantics, forming distinct cluster from the original neutral text. Therefore, we consider the emotional factor as the backdoor trigger to propose a pparasitic emotion-style dynamic backdoor attack, Paraesthesia. By mixing samples with the emotional trigger into clean data and then fine-tuning the model, the model is able to generate the predefined attack response when encountering emotional inputs during the inference stage. Paraesthesia includes two the quantification and rewriting of emotional styles. We evaluate the effectiveness of our method on instruction-following generation and classification tasks. The experimental results show that Paraesthesia achieves an attack success rate of around 99% across both task types and four different models, while maintaining the clean utility of the models.

Ziyu Liu, Tao Li, Tianjie Ni +5

School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China · School of Computer Science, China West Normal University, Nanchong, China · School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou, China

Attacker Large Language Model Clean Label Backdoor Attack Emotional Regulation Emotion Large Language Models(Llms

May 8, 2026cs.LG

Beyond the False Trade-off: Adaptive EWC for Stealthy and Generalizable T2I Backdoors

Preserving model fidelity is essential for stealthy text-to-image (T2I) backdoor attacks. Existing methods such as Learning without Forgetting (LwF) rely on output-based distillation, which provides limited regularization. We introduce Elastic Weight Consolidation (EWC) as a parameter-based alternative for preserving fidelity in backdoor learning. While stronger in principle, we show that standard static EWC with a fixed regularization weight lambda and mean-squared utility loss creates an artificial trade-off between attack success rate (ASR) and fidelity, particularly degrading performance on weak triggers. To address this, we propose Cosine-Aware Adaptive EWC, which dynamically adjusts EWC regularization using a cosine-based semantic utility and adaptive scheduling. This approach transforms EWC from a fixed penalty into a context-sensitive constraint, maintaining high ASR while preserving model fidelity. Experiments demonstrate improved ASR-fidelity balance and enhanced robustness on out-of-domain (OOD) datasets compared to existing baselines.

Lu Bowen, Xinyu Tang, Yin Yin Low +1

Monash University

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Attention-Guided Training Text-To-Image Trade-Off Financial Question Answering

May 8, 2026cs.CL

Activation Differences Reveal Backdoors: A Comparison of SAE Architectures

Backdoor attacks on language models pose a significant threat to AI safety, where models behave normally on most inputs but exhibit harmful behavior when triggered by specific patterns. Detecting such backdoors through mechanistic interpretability remains an open challenge. We investigate two sparse autoencoder architectures -- Crosscoders and Differential SAEs (Diff-SAE) -- for isolating backdoor-related features in fine-tuned models. Using a controlled SQL injection backdoor triggered by year-based context ("2024" triggers vulnerable code, "2023" triggers safe code), we evaluate both approaches across LoRA and full-rank fine-tuning regimes on SmolLM2-360M. We find that Diff-SAE consistently and substantially outperforms Crosscoders for backdoor isolation. Diff-SAE achieves a Backdoor Isolation Score (BIS) of 0.40 with perfect precision (1.0) and zero false positive rate across most experimental conditions, while Crosscoders fail almost entirely with BIS below 0.02 in most cases. This performance gap holds across multiple transformer layers (14, 18, 22, 26) and both fine-tuning regimes, with full-rank fine-tuning producing particularly clean backdoor signals. Our results suggest that backdoors manifest as directional activation shifts rather than sparse feature activations, making difference-based representations fundamentally more effective for detection. These findings have important implications for AI safety monitoring and the development of interpretability tools for detecting model manipulation.

Sachin Kumar

LexisNexis* · Raleigh, USA

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Sparse Autoencoder Features Model Activations Mechanistic Interpretability Artificial Intelligence Safety Vulnerable Code+1

May 7, 2026cs.CV

Backdoor Mitigation in Object Detection via Adversarial Fine-Tuning

Backdoor attacks can implant malicious behaviours into deep models while preserving performance on clean data, posing a serious threat to safety-critical vision systems. Although backdoor mitigation has been studied extensively for image classification, defenses for object detection remain comparatively underdeveloped. Adversarial fine-tuning is a common backdoor mitigation approach in classification, but adapting it to detection is nontrivial as classification-oriented adversarial generation does not match the detection attack space, where attacks may cause object misclassification or disappearance, and standard detection losses can dilute the repair signal across many predictions. We address these challenges through a detection-aware adversarial fine-tuning framework for mitigating object-detection backdoors when the defender has access only to a compromised detector and a small clean dataset, without knowing the attack objective. For adversarial generation that does not require knowledge of the attack objective, we introduce soft-branch minimisation, which uses a soft gate to combine objectives aligned with misclassification and disappearance attacks, together with a detection-aware classification-loss maximisation. For targeted repair, we introduce a dual-objective fine-tuning loss applied to target-matched predictions, concentrating the defensive update on predictions most relevant to the backdoor behaviour. Experiments across CNN- and Transformer-based detectors show that our approach more effectively reduces attack success while preserving true detections, compared with classification-oriented baselines, and maintains competitive clean detection performance.

Kealan Dunnett, Reza Arablouei, Dimity Miller +2

Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane Australia · CSIRO, Pullenvale QLD, Australia

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Object Detection Adversarial Training Model Fine-Tuning Loss Function Flat Minima

May 5, 2026cs.CR

Undetectable Backdoors in Model Parameters: Hiding Sparse Secrets in High Dimensions

We present Sparse Backdoor, a supply-chain attack that plants a provably undetectable backdoor in pre-trained image classifiers, including convolutional networks and Vision Transformers. The attack injects a structured sparse perturbation along a randomly chosen direction into a small subset of columns at each fully connected layer, propagating a trigger signal to an adversary-chosen target class, and masks the perturbation with an independent isotropic Gaussian dither. The dither serves a single technical purpose: it induces a clean reference distribution anchored at the pre-trained weights, against which undetectability can be formalized. Under a mild margin condition on the pre-trained classifier, we show that the dithered reference is functionally equivalent to the original classifier. We prove that distinguishing the backdoor-injected model from this reference is at least as hard as Sparse PCA detection, which is computationally infeasible under standard hardness assumptions. The guarantee holds against any probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher with white-box access to the parameters.

Sarthak Choudhary, Atharv Singh Patlan, Nils Palumbo +3

University of Wisconsin–Madison · Princeton University

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Unsupervised Detection Vision Transformer Principal Component Analysis Zero-Knowledge Proofs

May 4, 2026cs.AI

CBV: Clean-label Backdoor Attacks on Vision Language Models via Diffusion Models

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have achieved remarkable success in tasks such as image captioning and visual question answering (VQA). However, as their applications become increasingly widespread, recent studies have revealed that VLMs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing backdoor attacks on VLMs primarily rely on data poisoning by adding visual triggers and modifying text labels, where the induced image-text mismatch makes poisoned samples easy to detect. To address this limitation, we propose the Clean-Label Backdoor Attack on VLMs via Diffusion Models (CBV), which leverages diffusion models to generate natural poisoned examples via score matching. Specifically, CBV modifies the score during the reverse generation process of the diffusion model to guide the generation of poisoned samples that contain triggered image features. To further enhance the effectiveness of the attack, we incorporate the textual information of the triggered images as multimodal guidance during generation. Moreover, to enhance stealthiness, we introduce a GradCAM-guided Mask (GM) that restricts modifications to only the most semantically important regions, rather than the entire image. We evaluate our method on MSCOCO and VQA v2 with four representative VLMs, achieving over 80% ASR while preserving normal functionality.

Ji Guo, Xiaolong Qin, Cencen Liu +3

Laboratory of Intelligent Collaborative Computing, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, China · School of Software Engineering, Chengdu University of Information Technology, China · The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, China

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Diffusion Models Neural Mask Estimation

May 2, 2026cs.CR

Checkerboard: A Simple, Effective, Efficient and Learning-free Clean Label Backdoor Attack with Low Poisoning Budget

Backdoor attacks threaten the deep learning supply chain by poisoning a small fraction of the training data so that a model behaves normally on clean inputs but misclassifies trigger-carrying inputs to an attacker-chosen target class. Clean-label backdoor attacks are especially dangerous because poisoned samples remain label-consistent and are therefore harder to detect. Yet existing clean-label attacks typically rely on expensive optimization, surrogate-model training, or nontrivial data access. We present Checkerboard, a theoretically grounded, learning-free clean-label backdoor attack that is effective, efficient, and simple to implement. From a linear separability formulation, we derive a checkerboard trigger in closed form, removing the need for surrogate-model training and trigger optimization. For texture-rich datasets, we introduce Complexity-driven Sample Selection, which uses only target-class data to improve trigger-to-background contrast by selecting low-complexity images for poisoning. Across four benchmark datasets, Checkerboard outperforms 8 baseline attacks and achieves state-of-the-art performance under low poisoning budgets. For example, on CIFAR-10, under a trigger perturbation budget of

10/255

, poisoning 20 training samples achieves

99.99\%

Attack Success Rate (ASR). On ImageNet-100, a poisoning rate of only

0.46\%

yields over

94\%

ASR without degrading clean accuracy. The proposed attack also remains effective against state-of-the-art backdoor defenses and shows strong resistance to adaptive defenses.

Yi Yang, Jinyang Huang, Binbin Liu +5

School of Computer Science and Information Engineering Hefei University of Technology Hefei, Anhui, China · School of Information Science and Technology University of Science and Technology of China Hefei, Anhui, China · Faculty of Business Data Science Kansai University Japan +3

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Black-Box Adversarial Attacks Chess Token Budget Allocation Supply Chain Optimization

Apr 23, 2026cs.CR

Stealthy Backdoor Attacks against LLMs Based on Natural Style Triggers

The growing application of large language models (LLMs) in safety-critical domains has raised urgent concerns about their security. Many recent studies have demonstrated the feasibility of backdoor attacks against LLMs. However, existing methods suffer from three key shortcomings: explicit trigger patterns that compromise naturalness, unreliable injection of attacker-specified payloads in long-form generation, and incompletely specified threat models that obscure how backdoors are delivered and activated in practice. To address these gaps, we present BadStyle, a complete backdoor attack framework and pipeline. BadStyle leverages an LLM as a poisoned sample generator to construct natural and stealthy poisoned samples that carry imperceptible style-level triggers while preserving semantics and fluency. To stabilize payload injection during fine-tuning, we design an auxiliary target loss that reinforces the attacker-specified target content in responses to poisoned inputs and penalizes its emergence in benign responses. We further ground the attack in a realistic threat model and systematically evaluate BadStyle under both prompt-induced and PEFT-based injection strategies. Extensive experiments across seven victim LLMs, including LLaMA, Phi, DeepSeek, and GPT series, demonstrate that BadStyle achieves high attack success rates (ASRs) while maintaining strong stealthiness. The proposed auxiliary target loss substantially improves the stability of backdoor activation, yielding an average ASR improvement of around 30% across style-level triggers. Even in downstream deployment scenarios unknown during injection, the implanted backdoor remains effective. Moreover, BadStyle consistently evades representative input-level defenses and bypasses output-level defenses through simple camouflage.

Jiali Wei, Ming Fan, Guoheng Sun +3

School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China · Ministry of Education Key Lab for Intelligent Networks and Network Security, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China

Attacker Large Language Model Clean Label Backdoor Attack Large Language Model Backbones LLM Defense Mechanisms Bad

Apr 23, 2026cs.CR

CSC: Turning the Adversary's Poison against Itself

Poisoning-based backdoor attacks pose significant threats to deep neural networks by embedding triggers in training data, causing models to misclassify triggered inputs as adversary-specified labels while maintaining performance on clean data. Existing poison restraint-based defenses often suffer from inadequate detection against specific attack variants and compromise model utility through unlearning methods that lead to accuracy degradation. This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of backdoor attack dynamics during model training, revealing that poisoned samples form isolated clusters in latent space early on, with triggers acting as dominant features distinct from benign ones. Leveraging these insights, we propose Cluster Segregation Concealment (CSC), a novel poison suppression defense. CSC first trains a deep neural network via standard supervised learning while segregating poisoned samples through feature extraction from early epochs, DBSCAN clustering, and identification of anomalous clusters based on class diversity and density metrics. In the concealment stage, identified poisoned samples are relabeled to a virtual class, and the model's classifier is fine-tuned using cross-entropy loss to replace the backdoor association with a benign virtual linkage, preserving overall accuracy. CSC was evaluated on four benchmark datasets against twelve poisoning-based attacks, CSC outperforms nine state-of-the-art defenses by reducing average attack success rates to near zero with minimal clean accuracy loss. Contributions include robust backdoor patterns identification, an effective concealment mechanism, and superior empirical validation, advancing trustworthy artificial intelligence.

Yuchen Shi, Xin Guo, Huajie Chen +3

Faculty of Data Science, City University of Macau, Taipa, Macau. · Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology, University of Technology Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Model-Agnostic Defense Poisoning Adversarial Robustness

Apr 21, 2026cs.CV

PASTA: A Patch-Agnostic Twofold-Stealthy Backdoor Attack on Vision Transformers

Vision Transformers (ViTs) have achieved remarkable success across vision tasks, yet recent studies show they remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing patch-wise attacks typically assume a single fixed trigger location during inference to maximize trigger attention. However, they overlook the self-attention mechanism in ViTs, which captures long-range dependencies across patches. In this work, we observe that a patch-wise trigger can achieve high attack effectiveness when activating backdoors across neighboring patches, a phenomenon we term the Trigger Radiating Effect (TRE). We further find that inter-patch trigger insertion during training can synergistically enhance TRE compared to single-patch insertion. Prior ViT-specific attacks that maximize trigger attention often sacrifice visual and attention stealthiness, making them detectable. Based on these insights, we propose PASTA, a twofold stealthy patch-wise backdoor attack in both pixel and attention domains. PASTA enables backdoor activation when the trigger is placed at arbitrary patches during inference. To achieve this, we introduce a multi-location trigger insertion strategy to enhance TRE. However, preserving stealthiness while maintaining strong TRE is challenging, as TRE is weakened under stealthy constraints. We therefore formulate a bi-level optimization problem and propose an adaptive backdoor learning framework, where the model and trigger iteratively adapt to each other to avoid local optima. Extensive experiments show that PASTA achieves 99.13% attack success rate across arbitrary patches on average, while significantly improving visual and attention stealthiness (144.43x and 18.68x) and robustness (2.79x) against state-of-the-art ViT defenses across four datasets, outperforming CNN- and ViT-based baselines.

Dazhuang Liu, Yanqi Qiao, Rui Wang +2

Delft University of Technology, Delft, the Netherlands. · University of Turku, Turku, Finland

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Vision Transformer Model-Agnostic Defense Transformer Architectures Taco

Apr 21, 2026cs.LG

Mechanistic Anomaly Detection via Functional Attribution

We can often verify the correctness of neural network outputs using ground truth labels, but we cannot reliably determine whether the output was produced by normal or anomalous internal mechanisms. Mechanistic anomaly detection (MAD) aims to flag these cases, but existing methods either depend on latent space analysis, which is vulnerable to obfuscation, or are specific to particular architectures and modalities. We reframe MAD as a functional attribution problem: asking to what extent samples from a trusted set can explain the model's output, where attribution failure signals anomalous behavior. We operationalize this using influence functions, measuring functional coupling between test samples and a small reference set via parameter-space sampling. We evaluate across multiple anomaly types and modalities. For backdoors in vision models, our method achieves state-of-the-art detection on BackdoorBench, with an average Defense Effectiveness Rating (DER) of 0.93 across seven attacks and four datasets (next best 0.83). For LLMs, we similarly achieve a significant improvement over baselines for several backdoor types, including on explicitly obfuscated models. Beyond backdoors, our method can detect adversarial and out-of-distribution samples, and distinguishes multiple anomalous mechanisms within a single model. Our results establish functional attribution as an effective, modality-agnostic tool for detecting anomalous behavior in deployed models.

Hugo Lyons Keenan, Christopher Leckie, Sarah Erfani

School of Computing and Information Systems, The University of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia.

Interpretable Anomaly Detection Clean Label Backdoor Attack Obfuscation

Nov 12, 2025cs.CR

Unveiling Hidden Threats: Using Fractal Triggers to Boost Stealthiness of Distributed Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning

Traditional distributed backdoor attacks (DBA) in federated learning improve stealthiness by decomposing global triggers into sub-triggers, which however requires more poisoned data to maintian the attck strength and hence increases the exposure risk. To overcome this defect, This paper proposes a novel method, namely Fractal-Triggerred Distributed Backdoor Attack (FTDBA), which leverages the self-similarity of fractals to enhance the feature strength of sub-triggers and hence significantly reduce the required poisoning volume for the same attack strength. To address the detectability of fractal structures in the frequency and gradient domains, we introduce a dynamic angular perturbation mechanism that adaptively adjusts perturbation intensity across the training phases to balance efficiency and stealthiness. Experiments show that FTDBA achieves a 92.3% attack success rate with only 62.4% of the poisoning volume required by traditional DBA methods, while reducing the detection rate by 22.8% and KL divergence by 41.2%. This study presents a low-exposure, high-efficiency paradigm for federated backdoor attacks and expands the application of fractal features in adversarial sample generation.

Jian Wang, Hong Shen, Chan-Tong Lam

Faculty of Applied Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, Macao SAR, China · School of Cyberspace Security, Guangzhou University of Software, Guangzhou, China · School of Engineering and Technology, Central Queensland University, Australia

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Federated Learning Fractal Dimension Adversarial Examples Attack Stealthiness

Aug 6, 2025cs.LG

FLAT: Revealing Hidden Latent-Conditioned Backdoor Failures in Federated Learning

Horizontal federated learning (HFL) backdoor audits often summarize model behavior through clean accuracy (CA), mean attack success rate (ASR), or a single known-trigger test. Such summaries can hide a different failure mode, in which one target label is activated by many trigger realizations. We study this failure mode with FLAT, a latent-conditioned reliability stress test for HFL backdoors. In FLAT, compromised clients still submit ordinary classifier updates to the server, while an attacker-side generator

G(x,t,z)

separates target intent

t

from trigger realization

z

. This separation shifts the audit question from whether one known trigger succeeds to how the hidden behavior varies across targets, latent samples, defenses, and post-stop rounds. On CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny-ImageNet, FLAT preserves clean utility while reaching 99.49%, 99.66%, and 94.10% single-target FedAvg ASR. The evaluation also reveals non-uniform defense responses, where a server rule can suppress one target mode while leaving another active. These observations motivate HFL backdoor audits that report target-wise ASR, worst-target ASR, target coverage, latent-sampled behavior, post-stop persistence, and defense response.

Tuan Nguyen, Sze Jue Yang, Khoa D. Doan +2

College of Engineering and Computer Science, VinUniversity, Hanoi, Vietnam · VinUni-Illinois Smart Health Center, VinUniversity, Hanoi, Vietnam · Siebel School of Computing and Data Science, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA +1

Federated Learning Clean Label Backdoor Attack Attack-Success Rate Stress Testing

Feb 29, 2024cs.CR

SynGhost: Invisible and Universal Task-agnostic Backdoor Attack via Syntactic Transfer

Although pre-training achieves remarkable performance, it suffers from task-agnostic backdoor attacks due to vulnerabilities in data and training mechanisms. These attacks can transfer backdoors to various downstream tasks. In this paper, we introduce

\mathtt{maxEntropy}

, an entropy-based poisoning filter that mitigates such risks. To overcome the limitations of manual target setting and explicit triggers, we propose

\mathtt{SynGhost}

, an invisible and universal task-agnostic backdoor attack via syntactic transfer, further exposing vulnerabilities in pre-trained language models (PLMs). Specifically,

\mathtt{SynGhost}

injects multiple syntactic backdoors into the pre-training space through corpus poisoning, while preserving the PLM's pre-training capabilities. Second,

\mathtt{SynGhost}

adaptively selects optimal targets based on contrastive learning, creating a uniform distribution in the pre-training space. To identify syntactic differences, we also introduce an awareness module to minimize interference between backdoors. Experiments show that

\mathtt{SynGhost}

poses significant threats and can transfer to various downstream tasks. Furthermore,

\mathtt{SynGhost}

resists defenses based on perplexity, fine-pruning, and

\mathtt{maxEntropy}

. The code is available at https://github.com/Zhou-CyberSecurity-AI/SynGhost.

Pengzhou Cheng, Wei Du, Zongru Wu +4

School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering Shanghai Jiao Tong University · Department of Computer Science and Engineering Southern University of Science and Technology

Clean Label Backdoor Attack Attacker Large Language Model Pretraining Large Language Model Backbones Synthetic Training Data Poisoning+1