Matching Markets

Recent work has identified incremental learning in shallow networks trained on single-index and multi-index models. However, existing analyses often rely on simplifying settings, such as small initialization, correlation loss, or layer-wise training. These choices reduce neuron interactions and leave some feature learning dynamics under standard initialization unexplored. We study training dynamics for polynomial-width two-layer networks learning orthogonal multi-index targets under standard initialization using polynomially many samples. We first prove that incremental learning still occurs: the loss decreases sequentially according to the Hermite expansion of the target, with lower-order components learned before higher-order components recover the individual target directions. In this standard initialization regime, training also shows a competitive reallocation of parameter mass: after the total mass fits the target mean and stabilizes, mass shifts into the target subspace and then concentrates on aligned neurons. Our theoretical analysis uses slightly modified gradient flow, while vanilla gradient descent empirically exhibits the same qualitative dynamics. Technically, we introduce a symmetry-based finite-width approximation via symmetrized networks, rather than comparing directly with an infinite-width limit. This yields better control of approximation errors and may be of independent interest.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed for enterprise workflows, yet existing evaluations rarely test whether business-decision conclusions transfer across competitive market ecologies. We introduce ERPBench, an execution-instrumented benchmark for enterprise decision agents in a six-round Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) simulation with coupled pricing, production, procurement, inventory, finance, and shared-market competition. ERPBench evaluates the same 100 fixed problems in two matched competitive market ecologies: Solo, where each evaluated LLM agent competes against fixed rule-based opponents, and Arena, where six evaluated LLM agents compete in a shared market. Across six model families, this yields 1,200 model-level trajectories spanning 7,200 decision rounds. Under the observed service configuration, the leading model differs between ecologies: DeepSeek leads in Solo (252.29M mean valuation; mean rank 1.67), whereas Gemini leads in Arena (263.95M; 1.76). The two ecologies identify the same task-level winner on only 21 of 100 problems, and Gemini's bottom-rank rate falls from 22 % to 0 % in Arena. ERPBench supports paired evaluation of whether enterprise-agent rankings transfer across competitive market ecologies, supplemented by aggregate execution-intervention analysis. Code and benchmark resources are available in our https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/erp-bench.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown strong potential for financial analysis and trading, but direct trading remains challenging because the predictive capabilities required can vary across assets, decision fields, and market conditions. Existing LLM-based trading systems either coordinate human-defined external experts or adopt conventional internal Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) routers that do not directly evaluate how individual experts contribute to trading decisions. Moreover, these routers receive no direct signal indicating when an inactive expert has become more suitable as market conditions change. We find that native router scores poorly reflect how much individual experts improve trading decisions, frequently leaving better alternatives unselected. We further reveal that token-specific expert usefulness exhibits a compact low-dimensional structure. Based on these findings, we propose TradingMoE, a trading-oriented sparse MoE that augments a frozen dense LLM with lightweight residual experts. We introduce a Query-Key router that represents the expertise required by each token under the current market context as a low-dimensional query and matches it with learnable expert keys. We further propose a sparse expert selection update mechanism that samples a few inactive experts during training and estimates whether they should replace the weakest expert in the current Top-k route. This mechanism enables the router to update expert selection as market conditions change while preserving sparse computation. Experiments against 22 baselines on stock and cryptocurrency markets show that TradingMoE improves cumulative return over the best-performing baselines by 30.89% and 30.7%, respectively. Rolling paper-trading experiments further demonstrate that its advantage persists under forward-only deployment.

Dynamic matching markets require decisions about whom to match and when: matching now yields value but removes participants who may create better future opportunities. We develop a value-based reinforcement-learning framework for this problem on finite, evolving weighted graphs. We study an infinite-horizon continuous-time model with stochastic arrivals, node-type transitions, edge realizations, and exogenous exits. We prove an event-time reduction: without loss of optimality, the planner acts immediately after each exogenous event and then waits for the next one. We further show that the optimal edge-wise $Q$-function is characterized by a single continuation-value function on post-decision residual graphs, reducing the learned object from state-action values to graph values. Exact action selection still requires combinatorial matching optimization; we approximate the value with a graph neural network, train it by temporal-difference learning, and use it in a forward-greedy matching heuristic. In a binary-type benchmark, the learned policy substantially outperforms immediate and threshold-greedy rules by preserving common nodes for rare arrivals of valuable matches while forming lower-value matches only in thick pools. In a kidney paired donation benchmark, it performs similarly to immediate greedy when exits are unpredictable, recovers the logic of patient matching when warnings are reliable, and outperforms the better of Immediate Greedy and Patient Greedy across intermediate warning probabilities. These results show that residual-graph value learning yields state-dependent dynamic matching policies that adapt to realized connectivity and exit information.

Personal and organizational planning systems maintain two records that drift apart: what was planned (a task's effort budget) and what was done (a logged action's duration and description). Existing systems bridge them with an exclusive, all-or-nothing link that strands genuinely related but unlinked effort and reports false stalls on active goals. We formulate the bridge as a quasi-linear Fisher market: planned tasks are budget-constrained buyers, performed actions are divisible goods, and a fused text/structural/temporal signal sets each buyer's valuation. Two market instruments - a seller reserve price and a buyer cash option - yield conservation, a hard budget cap, and a provable junk filter as theorems. We extend the market with a concave completion utility discounting progress as a task nears its plan; standard convergence theory for the market's algorithm does not transfer here, resolved by a satiation-threshold fixed point with existence (Brouwer) and local uniqueness under an explicit diagonal-dominance condition, validated empirically on random and adversarial instances. A de-circularized, multi-seed benchmark - observed affinity corrupted independently of the scored ground truth - surfaces a genuine weak spot: the market's sharp, zero-entropy equilibrium is more sensitive to affinity noise than entropy-regularized optimal transport's permanently smoothed one. We resolve this with a one-parameter entropy-regularized generalization unifying the two, plus a noise-adaptive rule for its regularization strength. We report full reproducibility parameters, discuss limitations candidly, and relate the result to multi-touch attribution, optimal transport, and online Fisher-market algorithms.

Shippers are beginning to delegate carrier selection to large language model (LLM) agents. We ask what such delegation does to a freight matching market, and which platform design choices contain it. We carried out agent-based simulations in which fifty shipper agents, built on commercial LLMs from OpenAI (GPT), Anthropic (Claude), and Google (Gemini), procure truckload capacity for thirty days. The market implements the rules of digital freight matching: each load is offered down the shipper's ranked list of carriers (waterfall tendering), carriers have daily capacity limits, spot prices respond to congestion, and carrier ratings accumulate with transactions. We found three risks and one remedy that works. Agents converged at once: for a fixed sampled carrier population, the same carrier was the modal first choice of every model on day one, attracting up to 76% of requests. Because each agent picks from its own randomly drawn list of displayed candidates, the platform controls how many options each shipper sees; concentration rose steeply once lists exceeded about ten carriers, with the onset differing across models. Which carriers ended up dominant varied widely from one sampled market to another, and displaying true quality instead of estimated ratings changed neither the level nor this variability (by design, quality affects only what agents see, never delivery outcomes). Against these risks, disclosing each carrier's remaining daily capacity cut concentration by a third and doubled shipper surplus, while vendor diversification, list-order randomization, and popularity display showed no clearly detectable effect. Platform information design, ahead of model choice or model regulation, is the lever that works.

In future cities every driver may own a vehicle which could be either independently driven (HDV), or autonomously routed and piloted (CAV). The autonomous operations could be handled by a few competing companies. What is the market structure which would make this market aligned with city goals? In this paper we discuss a variant of the emerging market of collectively routed fleets of CAVs, where revenue for fleet operators is proportional to market share. We provide benchmark scenarios to compare the routing algorithms. We present several routing algorithms and demonstrate that, when the attitudes of human drivers towards CAVs exhibit significant diversity, randomised CAV routing, resulting in unpredictable travel times for HDVs, is more efficient than routing proportional to system optimum/user equilibrium. Based on this, we propose to improve the design of the market by augmenting the market-share objective with mean systemwide travel time in order to limit antisocial randomised strategies of fleet operators and drive the competition towards social welfare oriented cooperation.

The escalating demand for Machine Learning (ML) training resources in recent years has resulted in a substantial gap between the high demand and the available supply. Efficient allocation of these scarce and expensive resources is crucial for organizations to maximize their return on investment. Existing resource allocation mechanisms, like Karma [OSDI'23], are designed to guarantee Pareto efficiency and max-min fairness in settings with dynamic (time-varying) user demands, but fail to preserve these key properties in the presence of demands with heterogeneous values. Given the ubiquity and inevitability of heterogeneity in organizational values of different workloads, effective resource allocation policies must accommodate these variations. In this paper, we describe the design, implementation, deployment, and theoretical analysis of Quota Marketplace, a market-based mechanism to efficiently allocate ML training chips (like GPUs), explicitly addressing scenarios with demands of heterogeneous value. We detail the implementation of this mechanism within Google and present metrics that demonstrate its impact. We also discuss many business-critical requirements that the Quota Marketplace handles quite effectively, and document the gains and opportunities it has unlocked. We establish theoretically how this market-based approach achieves the essential properties of Pareto efficiency and max-min fairness by allowing the users to express the value of their workloads and enabling dynamic resource pricing based on supply and demand fluctuations. Ultimately, the market facilitates resource allocation that aligns with organizational priorities.

Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations. A prevalent yet complex scenario involves a single seller negotiating concurrently with multiple buyers, each possessing heterogeneous, private budgets. In such settings, constrained by a limited number of communication turns, the seller must balance exploring the broader market to discover the highest valuation with concentrating sufficient turns on a single target buyer to secure the best possible outcome. Our analysis reveals a significant gap in standard Large Language Models (LLMs): while these models are linguistically proficient, they fail to act as effective economic decision-makers. Specifically, they exhibit a failure to explore the buyer pool, often fixating on the current highest bid rather than strategically investigating the market to discover latent high valuations. In this paper, we propose a specialized training recipe using Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). By anchoring the reward function to objective economic outcomes, the strategic balance between market discovery and surplus extraction emerges natively through the learning process. Our results demonstrate that the trained seller undergoes a multi-stage strategic evolution, learning to leverage price anchoring and strategic probing to identify more profitable counterparties. The agent extracts a substantially higher surplus than frontier models by both improving its persuasive bargaining skills and consistently closing deals with high-value buyers. Finally, we show that our seller strategies generalize robustly to unseen buyer negotiation styles and budget distributions.

We study a sequential learning problem for stable matchings in two-sided markets where preferences on both sides are initially unknown. We focus on a centralized setting where an algorithm matches agents at each time step and receives noisy rewards that reflect the preferences of the matched agents, following a semi-bandit feedback structure. We adopt a pure exploration perspective, aiming to efficiently identify the optimal stable matching with high probability. Our work extends prior results by handling \emph{two-sided uncertainty} and by exploiting \emph{partial preference} information. A central ingredient is the notion of \textbf{pervasive stable matching}, which enables the identification of optimal stable matchings under partial preferences. We propose elimination-based algorithms whose stopping criteria exploit the structure of the learned partial preferences, and provide a refined sample-complexity analysis. Beyond pure exploration, we extend our approach to regret minimization and establish regret bounds with respect to the \emph{optimal} stable matching that avoid dependence on the minimum reward gap $Δ_{\min}$.

In two-sided marketplaces with heterogeneous products, it is important to understand the causal relationship between additional supply and marketplace outcomes, such as the total quantity transacted or transaction value in the marketplace. This paper studies a causal machine learning approach to estimating this relationship across product segments. We use the Airbnb marketplace as an example, focusing on the impact of additional listing supply on total bookings, but the methodology applies to other two-sided marketplaces. Our approach combines double/debiased machine learning with a hierarchical Bayesian framework that leverages pre-existing knowledge as priors. We construct tractable and informative features for the model by leveraging measures of product segment similarity from the geospatial literature. We find that such a model provides plausible estimates of the marketplace returns to additional supply and strong out of sample performance.

Two-sided marketplaces connect distinct user groups whose interests often conflict -- improving outcomes on one side could degrade the other side's experience. To address this challenge, we deploy an integrated framework for personalizing free-value thresholds -- a policy governing the scope of complimentary services for job listings -- across a two-sided job marketplace connecting millions of employers and job seekers. Our personalized policy delivers statistically significant and economically sizable lift in the target metric while respecting engagement guardrail constraints. Direct application of standard uplift methods proves insufficient here for two reasons. First, cross-side externalities demand multi-objective optimization: maximizing employer-side metrics risks harming job seeker engagement, with effects varying substantially across job segments. Second, marketplace interference necessitates cluster-level randomization, limiting us to few discrete treatment levels -- effectively a form of positivity violation that rules out methods designed for continuous treatments. We contribute an integrated framework with three components. Our ensemble-based hybrid ranking models target and guardrail metrics separately, cutting guardrail risk by over 10% for equivalent target gains compared to single-objective approaches. A treatment effect extrapolation method extends our estimates from limited experimental variation to untested policy levels, relying on monotonicity assumptions that we validate empirically. Finally, we present production deployment, where post-launch data confirms both extrapolation accuracy and guardrail compliance. Our deployed system demonstrates that principled methodology can enable meaningful personalization even when experiments are severely constrained and different objectives compete -- common conditions that characterize many real-world marketplaces.

Vegetable prices in Sri Lanka are highly volatile because the market is largely import-isolated, so supply disruptions quickly drive prices up. This study develops a machine learning framework to forecast such volatility by incorporating supply-chain-aware features and explicitly modelling the country's two cultivation seasons, Maha (October-April) and Yala (May-September). An integrated dataset was constructed by combining retail and farmer-gate prices with origin-aligned weather variables, diesel costs, and exchange rates across 12 vegetable varieties and 14 market centres from 2013 to 2019. A gradient-boosted ensemble model (XGBoost and LightGBM) was trained and optimised using Optuna, and unified and season-specific configurations were compared. Results show that season-specific models improve within-season fit, with the Yala-specific model achieving the highest R2 of 0.9420 (95% CI [0.690, 1.000]), while the unified model delivers the best overall predictive accuracy of 90.84% (95% CI [88.34%, 91.52%]) and an R2 of 0.9281 (95% CI [0.760, 1.000]). Notably, the unified model maintains 85.96% accuracy on a completely unseen 2024 hyperinflationary period without retraining, successfully tracking major price surges. These findings suggest that agricultural price movements in import-constrained markets are meaningfully predictable when models capture supply-chain dynamics, offering practical value for early warning and decision making by farmers, traders, and policymakers. Existing studies on Sri Lankan vegetable prices are confined to Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) and Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) applied to single markets, with no supply-chain features, seasonal segmentation, or cross-regime validation.

Evolutionary agent-based markets (ABMs) couple several mechanisms -- who reproduces, how price forms, how biased the agents are, how consensus propagates -- yet these are usually fixed by convention, so it is unclear which mechanism controls which emergent property. In a coevolving, endogenous-price simulator with 120 heterogeneous behavioral agents, we make four mechanisms pluggable and run matched 3x20-seed interventions. We find the levers are largely separable. (1) Selection -> diversity: a Quality-Diversity (QD/MAP-Elites) operator robustly raises strategy-mix entropy over truncation top-k (paired Delta entropy +0.27 to +1.12 bits; sign-test p<0.001; CIs exclude 0) and sustains more strategy cycling (strongest in crisis: Delta=+0.070, p=0.0004). (2) Selection does not improve realism: even a per-agent realism reward that provably steers selection does not raise 5-fact realism (Delta_5=-0.11,-0.08,+0.03; not significant). (3) Microstructure -> realism: enabling reflexive price feedback does raise realism (Delta_5=+0.13,+0.20,+0.20; crisis/bull p<0.05, all CIs positive). (4) Behavior -> fragility: amplifying behavioral bias raises a genomic fragility proxy (Delta=+10.5,+11.1,+14.4; bull p<0.001, all CIs positive) while leaving realism flat. The remaining mechanism -- consensus network topology -- shows no robust effect (honest null). The contribution is a decomposition: in these single-mechanism sweeps the mechanisms behave as approximately distinct control knobs over diversity, realism, and fragility.

We study a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in the competitive setup with two-sided matching markets under a human centric decision making model. To capture human preferences, we use cumulative prospect theory (CPT) that weighs the actions of the agent in a nonlinear fashion using a ($α$-Hölder continuous) weight function. CPT has been widely used in behavioral economics and risk sensitive machine learning to emulate human preferences. We analyze the state-of-the-art learning algorithm with CPT weight distorted rewards and obtain a player optimal regret of $\mathcal{O}(K\log T \left(\frac{1}Δ\right)^{2/α})$, where $K$ denotes the number of arms, $T$ is the learning horizon, and $Δ$ represents (suitably defined) players' minimum preference gap. Noticing the dependence on $Δ$ to be sub-optimal, we further improve this regret by judiciously selecting the active set of arms during exploration, which removes the dependence on $K$ in the dominant term and achieves an improved (optimal) regret guarantees in the setting where the number of arms $K$ is significantly larger than the number of players $N$. In addition, we consider adversarial markets where the observed rewards of the agents may be corrupted. We propose and analyze algorithms for robust markets with CPT as risk sensitive measure in both settings where the total corruption budget is known and where it is unknown, and establish logarithmic player-optimal regret guarantees in both cases.

Two-sided matching markets often involve information that unfolds over time through interviews, repeated interaction, learning, and separation. Existing matching models typically reduce this process to immediate sub-Gaussian feedback about fixed preferences, missing settings where payoff-relevant information is revealed gradually and changes future matching decisions. We introduce a framework with temporally extended feedback, that formulates two-sided matching as a partially observable Markov game with costly pre-match screening, noisy post-match observations, evolving latent profiles, and endogenous continuation or dissolution. We instantiate this framework in Learn2Match, a multi-agent reinforcement-learning benchmark for dynamic matching markets. Learn2Match supports decentralized decision making over whom to interview, whom to match with, and when to dissolve a match, while evaluating policies using regret, social welfare, and an information-friction loss that measures the welfare gap caused by incomplete revelation of latent preferences. We find that independent PPO achieves higher cumulative social welfare and lower cumulative regret than the bandit-style CA-ETC baseline under temporally extended feedback, demonstrating the promise of MARL for dynamic matching markets. However, PPO still incurs higher information-friction loss, revealing that end-to-end MARL does not yet provide the coordinated exploration structure of matching-bandit methods. These results position Learn2Match as a benchmark for developing the next generation of matching-market algorithms: methods that are adaptive like RL agents, statistically disciplined like bandit algorithms, and structurally aware like stable-matching mechanisms. Please refer to https://sites.google.com/view/learn-to-match/home for the official website and the code link.

On a platform with many sellers, should a pricing algorithm explicitly model competitors' prices when learning demand? Classical learning arguments suggest an affirmative answer: ignoring competitors induces model misspecification and inefficiency. In contrast, recent work on algorithmic collusion suggests that strategic obliviousness -- deliberately ignoring competitor prices -- may facilitate collusive outcomes and improve profits. We study this modeling choice in a stylized competitive market with unknown noisy demand, in which multiple sellers repeatedly set prices and estimate demand via iterated least squares, and either incorporate competitors' prices into their demand models (informed) or ignore them (oblivious). We first show that, relative to a monopolist, an oblivious seller in a competitive market must explore more aggressively to compensate for the loss of dynamic competitor information. Building on this insight, we characterize market dynamics when all sellers are oblivious and show that prices converge to the competitive outcome under sufficient exploration, while a continuum of pseudo-equilibria arises when exploration decays. Analyzing the resulting price trajectories, we uncover an excursion phenomenon that gives rise to transient collusive patterns that dissipate as learning progresses. In markets with both oblivious and informed sellers, the informed strictly out-earn the oblivious. Read as a strategy game, the modeling choice has a unique Nash equilibrium: the all-informed market, in which prices converge to the competitive outcome efficiently. Overall, our results indicate that collusive patterns are not robust and are not sustained by oblivious modeling; therefore, incorporating competitor information, together with sufficient price exploration, remains a reliable strategy for sellers in competitive markets.

We develop a game-theoretic framework that compares welfare efficiency across three market mechanisms: continuous double auctions with transparent order books (lit exchanges), opaque order books (dark pools), and periodic batch auctions. Each mechanism is modeled as a queuing system where heterogeneous traders face trade-offs between the execution price, waiting costs, and transaction costs. Our main result establishes that under moderate arrival rates and bounded adverse selection, dark pools dominate both alternatives in aggregate ex-ante welfare. Observable order books create costly strategic timing games in which traders delay or rush submissions to optimize their position in the queue, generating wasteful social waiting costs. Opaque order books eliminate these timing games through information design. We formally characterize the equilibrium strategies in each mechanism and prove the welfare ranking $W^{DARK} > W^{LIT} > W^{BATCH}$. Extensions incorporate asymmetric information and endogenous venue choice. The results demonstrate how the information structure and the discipline of the service jointly determine efficiency in strategic matching environments.

Traditional multi-modal financial forecasting often relies on scalar sentiment scores, which fail to capture the nuances of financial news. To address this information loss, this paper explores high-dimensional representation learning by replacing discrete polarity ratings with dense FinBERT embeddings within a Transformer-based forecasting architecture. We benchmarked various embedding strategies on the FNSPID dataset, including raw embeddings, attention-weighted aggregation, and a custom Siamese network. While the attention-based mechanism struggled with the low signal-to-noise ratio typical of financial data, the integration of Siamese-optimized embeddings outperformed both the scalar baseline and raw embedding approaches, demonstrating that preserving high-dimensional narrative context yields improved predictive accuracy for short-term stock price movements.

We study bandit learning in matching markets, where players and arms constitute the two market sides, and the players' utilities are linear in the arm contexts. In each round, new arms arrive with observable contexts. Then, the algorithm matches them to players, aiming to minimize each player's regret against a stable matching benchmark. This contextual structure creates significant complexity: subtle context shifts can slightly alter one player's utility while completely reconfiguring the underlying benchmark, causing large regret spikes for others. We address this in two settings: stochastic contexts, drawn from a latent distribution, and adversarial contexts, which may be arbitrary. For the stochastic case, we introduce a novel minimum preference gap to capture learning difficulty and provide a fully adaptive algorithm with an instance-dependent poly-logarithmic regret upper bound. We also establish matching instance-independent regret upper and lower bounds under a mild distributional assumption. For the adversarial setting, we propose a tractable regret notion that remains valid under arbitrary contexts and achieves an instance-independent sublinear regret bound via an adaptive algorithm.

The edge-cloud computing continuum demands self-management mechanisms that scale across autonomous administrative domains while honouring tenant- and operator-specified data sovereignty. We present Neural Pub/Sub, a federated-broker autonomic substrate whose self-organising behaviour emerges from market-based price signals rather than centralised control. Its MAPE-K control loop closes over per-broker health and load monitoring, marginal-cost clearing-price analysis, placement planning over a polymatroidal feasibility region, federated cross-domain dispatch, and shared peer subscription summaries with bounded-staleness price signals. The Plan step is anchored in a Walrasian convergence proposition: under gross-substitutes valuations on tree and series-parallel service-dependency DAGs, decentralised price-based allocation matches the welfare of a centralised oracle. We evaluate the substrate on a 4-VM, 4-domain, 48-worker federated edge-cloud testbed (single data centre, 50 ms emulated WAN) in a 1005-run campaign augmented by a fair-process-count sharded-oracle comparator. The federated market dominates a single-process oracle by 2-4% with 45 of 45 per-seed wins (sign-test p ~ 2.8e-14, Hodges-Lehmann median -39.6 ms); against a four-shard centralised orchestrator at equal process count the gap stays within +/-1.5% across all nine (pipeline, load) cells. Round-robin completion rate collapses 98.8% -> 22.4% -> 3.3% across arrival rates 5/10/15 pps while the market preserves completion; the advantage decomposes into three Walrasian properties (information completeness, admission control, price discovery). Federation withstands broker death and network partition (completion rate >= 98.7% across 75 cells), and sovereignty enforcement adds no measurable runtime overhead across 60 governance-grid runs. Heterogeneous-domain stressors and cross-site WAN deployment remain future work.

Recursive Multi-Agent Trading System (RMATS) integrates four specialized agents -- Sentiment, Report, Analysis, and Risk -- coordinated through a recursive Manager Agent with iterative feedback loops. Experimental evaluation over a 561-trading-day period (January 2023 to March 2025) across a 24-asset multi-class universe demonstrates that RMATS achieves a maximum drawdown of 9.62%, lower than MVO (15.49%) and FinBERT Sentiment (15.28%), and exhibits the lowest event-period drawdown in 3 of 5 geopolitical stress scenarios tested. While RMATS underperforms return-maximizing baselines in a sustained bull market environment, ablation studies confirm the individual contribution of each agent component to downside protection. These results position RMATS as a risk-control-oriented architecture suitable for institutions prioritizing capital preservation under geopolitical uncertainty.

Temporal knowledge-graph data marketplaces face three coupled failures in static designs: stale hybrid index shortcuts reduce recall as edges evolve, stationary Shapley pricing misattributes value after distribution shifts, and uncoordinated agents over-consume a shared differential-privacy budget. We present CHRONOS, a three-layer architecture providing a unified treatment of these challenges with explicit public and private separation. Layer one applies neural-ODE temporal decay to shortcut edges, providing a per-query expected recall-loss bound of Big-O of Pq lambda delta t, with a monotone-envelope guarantee reducing bound looseness to 1.8 to 3.2 times observed loss. Layer two conditions Shapley valuation on detected changepoints and provides finite-sample error guarantees under noise. Layer three uses EXP3-IX to achieve Big-O of the square root of T log T regret while enforcing epsilon and delta differential privacy via moments accounting. CHRONOS releases a privatized affinity matrix per epoch using the Gaussian mechanism; all retrieval and ranking are post-processing, incurring no extra privacy cost. We provide multi-epoch settlement, scalability analysis for 500 sellers, and comparisons against accelerated baselines. Across four benchmarks, CHRONOS shows 0.937 recall at ten, 2.74 queries per second, 161 ms latency, and total epsilon of 4.25 at delta of 10 to the power of negative 6 under zCDP composition. These results indicate a competitive operating point. A limitation is that at this privacy level, released valuations remain noise-dominated; utility derives primarily from public index routing and adaptive scheduling driven by low-sensitivity statistics.

We describe an adaptive market-making architecture that preserves the analytical structure of the Avellaneda--Stoikov framework while introducing a successor measure-style adaptation mechanism. In our paper we keep Avellaneda--Stoikov fast Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman structure and make it adaptive to changing market regimes and trading objectives. The central idea is to separate market dynamics from the trading objective. The market state determines a low-dimensional set of Avellaneda--Stoikov parameters, while recent realized rewards determine a low-dimensional objective vector. The HJB forward map then converts this objective into optimal bid and ask quotes through a scalarization of future reward features.

This paper proposes a computationally efficient mechanism for multi-dimensional matching markets where agents report preferences over object features rather than complete utility assessments. We use Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to identify the principal direction of variation in feature space and match agents to objects along this dimension, reducing a complex multi-dimensional problem to an effectively one-dimensional problem solvable in $O(N \log N)$ time. We show that when data exhibit low effective dimensionality, our mechanism approximately maximizes Nash Social Welfare, satisfies distributional truthfulness, and achieves symmetry. We establish a novel connection between Nash Social Welfare and Geometric Distributionally Robust Optimization, providing robustness guaranties. Numerical experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves 99% optimal welfare while running three orders of magnitude faster than direct optimization. The framework applies naturally to school choice, labor markets, and course allocation, where feature-based elicitation reduces the cognitive burden on agents.

We study an online market-making problem in which a learner sequentially posts bid and ask prices for a single asset while interacting with traders holding private valuations. Unlike existing online learning formulations that assume fully censored feedback, we introduce an action-dependent feedback model inspired by real limit order books: when a trade occurs, the trader's valuation remains hidden, whereas when no trade occurs, informative feedback about supply and demand is revealed. We show that this additional information fundamentally changes the learnability of the problem. In the stochastic setting with i.i.d. market prices, we propose an elimination-based algorithm that achieves $O(\sqrt T)$ regret with high probability, without requiring any smoothness assumptions on the distribution of trader valuations. We then extend this result to a broad class of mean-reverting price processes by considering both local, autoregressive dynamics and a weaker global drift condition based on cumulative deviations from the mean. Under either assumption, we establish high-probability $O(\sqrt T)$ regret bounds, relying on a new concentration inequality of independent interest. Finally, in the adversarial setting with oblivious prices, we design an explore-then-perturb algorithm that guarantees $O(T^{2/3})$ regret in expectation. Our results quantify the value of observing the order book in online market making and demonstrate that even limited, action-dependent feedback can substantially improve regret guarantees compared to standard bandit feedback models.

We study whether simple algorithmic pricing systems can systematically produce collusive-like prices in multi-firm markets. We consider firms that price using a myopic estimate-then-optimize rule: each repeatedly fits a demand model to its own price and sales history and sets the price that maximizes estimated profit. This demand model is misspecified, omitting competitors' prices. We analyze the dynamics of this rule when it is initialized by an exploration phase of independent random prices. We characterize when this pipeline converges to supra-competitive prices above the Nash equilibrium, via a fluid-limit ordinary differential equation analysis. We show that supra-competitive prices arise when firms initially explore within similar price ranges on the same side of the Nash price. Moreover, prices can be substantially above the Nash price; we show that prices can reach monopoly levels under symmetric exploration. Simulations calibrated to a real multifamily rental market confirm that supra-competitive outcomes arise robustly beyond our theoretical assumptions, including under finite horizons, heterogeneous products, and nonlinear logit demand.

Predicting cross-sectional stock returns is challenging due to low signal-to-noise ratios and evolving market regimes. Classical factor models offer interpretability but limited flexibility, while deep learning models achieve strong performance yet often underutilize financial priors. We address this gap with PRISM-VQ (PRior-Informed Stock Model with Vector Quantization), a dynamic factor framework that integrates expert prior factors, vector-quantized discrete latent factors learned from cross-sectional structure, and a structure-conditioned Mixture-of-Experts to generate time-varying factor loadings. Vector quantization acts as an information bottleneck that suppresses noise while capturing robust market structure, with discrete codes serving both as latent factors and as routing signals for temporal expert specialization. Experiments on CSI 300 and S&P 500 show consistent improvements in cross-sectional return prediction and portfolio performance over strong baselines while preserving interpretability. Our code is available at https://github.com/finxlab/PRISM-VQ.

We address the problem of maximizing Gain from Trade (GFT) in repeated buyer-seller exchanges subject to global budget balance constraints. While this problem is well-understood in purely adversarial and stochastic settings, these environments exhibit a sharp dichotomy: adversarial environments allow for no-regret learning against the best fixed-price mechanism, whereas stochastic environments allow for no-regret learning against the best distribution over prices that is budget balanced in expectation. This gap is significant, as policies balanced in expectation can increase the GFT by a multiplicative factor of two. In this work, we bridge these extremes by studying perturbed markets, where an underlying stochastic distribution is subject to an adversarial corruption $C$. We design an algorithm that adaptively scales with the level of corruption, achieving an $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4}) + \mathcal{O}(C\log(T))$ regret bound against the best budget-balanced distribution over prices. Simultaneously, our algorithm maintains the worst-case $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4})$ regret bound relative to a per-round budget-balanced baseline, ensuring optimality even in fully adversarial environments.

Accurate stock price forecasting has consistently remained a pivotal yet challenging FinTech task that underpins quantitative trading and investment decision making. Recent efforts have been dedicated to modeling various complex relationships among stocks in the stock market toward more reliable stock price forecasting.These methods depend heavily on strong static prior assumptions by modeling either temporal dependencies within individual stocks or spatial dependencies across different stocks based on predefined structures, while the complex market dynamics that drive stock price movements remain unexplored. To alleviate this issue, we propose a novel game-theoretic modeling method that captures heterogeneous investor interactions for stock price forecasting. The core idea is to embed game-theoretic mechanisms into the heterogeneous graph structure to finely model the dynamic strategic interactions among heterogeneous investors with respect to target stocks. Additionally, temporal positional encoding is adopted to reflect the differentiated influences of each game event at different time steps within the time window on future stock price movements. Leveraging heterogeneous graph networks, we proxy the intricate dynamics of the stock market through investor games and enable real-time information propagation and node updates among all nodes. Extensive experiments conducted on two real-world benchmark dataset demonstrate that our method effectively outperforms state-of-the-art stock price forecasting methods.

Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice and labor market clearing. In practice, however, these markets are invariably governed by complex distributional constraints, ranging from diversity quotas and regional balance to global capacity slacks, under which stable matchings often fail to exist. This raises a fundamental question: how to distribute unavoidable instability across agents while preserving strategy-proofness? To address this, we propose \texttt{MenuNet}, a strategy-proof mechanism design framework based on a neural representation of menus. Rather than directly constructing assignments, \texttt{MenuNet} learns to generate personalized probabilistic menus, from which assignments are realized via a structured sequential choice rule that guarantees strategy-proofness by construction. By decomposing stability into fairness (no envy) and non-wastefulness, our approach models these properties as vector-valued quantities and optimizes their distribution through differentiable objectives, providing a principled trade-off between competing axioms. Empirically, \texttt{MenuNet} navigates this trade-off effectively: it consistently outperforms Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) in terms of envy and Deferred Acceptance (DA) in terms of waste, while maintaining scalability and computational efficiency. These results suggest that learning-based menu mechanisms provide a flexible and scalable paradigm for mechanism design in highly constrained, real-world environments.

We argue that AI-saturated markets are likely to create Veblen-good premiums, which we term human-provenance premiums, for verified human presence, and hence AI governance should treat human-provenance verification as labor infrastructure. Generative and agentic AI systems lower the cost of many standardized cognitive, creative, and coordination tasks, weakening the scarcity premiums that have supported much middle-tier knowledge work. We argue that this pressure may produce an asymmetric barbell-shaped structure of value capture in advanced economies: high-volume synthetic production controlled by owners of AI infrastructure at one pole, and scarce, high-status human labor valued for verified human presence at the other. We advance three claims. First, AI compresses the value of standardized middle-tier labor by making good-enough synthetic substitutes scalable at low marginal cost, hollowing out the middle of the skill distribution currently categorized by knowledge work. Second, this compression reallocates demand for human labor toward work valued for its visible human character. We term this performative humanity and distinguish three forms of labor: relational presence, aesthetic provenance, and accountability. Third, as these premiums depend on credible verification, AI governance should treat human-provenance systems as labor infrastructure rather than as luxury authenticity labels. To evaluate hybrid human-AI work, we propose constitutive human presence as the relevant standard: human labor retains premium value when human judgment, attention, accountability, authorship, or relational participation is not incidental to the output but constitutive of what is being purchased.

The ongoing shift towards decentralization of the electric energy sector, driven by the growing electrification across end-use sectors, and widespread adoption of distributed energy resources (DERs), necessitates their active participation in the electricity markets to support grid operations. Furthermore, with bi-directional energy and communication flows becoming standard, intelligent, easy-to-deploy, resource-conservative demand-side participation is expected to play a critical role in securing power grid operational flexibility and market efficiency. This work proposes a market engagement framework that leverages a hierarchical multi-agent deep reinforcement learning (MARL) approach to enable individual prosumers to participate in peer-to-peer retail auctions and further aggregate these intelligent prosumers to facilitate effective DER participation in wholesale markets. Ultimately, a Stackelberg game is proposed to coordinate this hierarchical MARL-based DER market participation framework toward enhanced market performance.

Digital marketplaces processing billions of dollars annually represent critical infrastructure in sociotechnical ecosystems, yet their performance optimization lacks principled measurement frameworks that can inform algorithmic governance decisions regarding market efficiency and fairness from complex market data. By looking at orderbook data from double auction markets alone, because bids and asks do not represent true maximum willingnesses to buy and true minimum willingnesses to sell, there is little an economist can say about the market's actual performance in terms of allocative efficiency. We turn to experimental data to address this issue, `inverting' the standard induced value approach of double auction experiments. Our aim is to predict key market features relevant to market efficiency, particularly allocative efficiency, using orderbook data only -- specifically bids, asks and price realizations, but not the induced reservation values -- as early as possible. Since there is no established model of strategically optimal behavior in these markets, and because orderbook data is highly unstructured, non-stationary and non-linear, we propose quantile-based normalization techniques that help us build general predictive models. We develop and train several models, including linear regressions and gradient boosting trees, leveraging quantile-based input from the underlying supply-demand model. Our models can predict allocative efficiency with reasonable accuracy from the earliest bids and asks, and these predictions improve with additional realized price data. The performance of the prediction techniques varies by target and market type. Our framework holds significant potential for application to real-world market data, offering valuable insights into market efficiency and performance, even prior to any trade realizations.

Do the functional narratives in cryptocurrency whitepapers correspond to how their tokens behave in markets? We develop a content-verified, contamination-aware pipeline for measuring structural correspondence between project narratives and market structure, and report two results. The first is a cautionary one. An apparent entity-level signal in an earlier version of our corpus -- specialised tokens appearing to align more strongly than broad infrastructure tokens -- was entirely an artifact of corpus contamination: roughly a quarter of the documents were failed-download stubs or wrong-document whitepapers (for example, a "Cosmos" entry that was in fact Binance Smart Chain text), and the apparent ordering does not survive content verification: on the clean corpus no token registers as helping alignment. We therefore report it as a contamination diagnosis, not a finding. The second is an honest null. Combining zero-shot NLP classification of 43 content-verified whitepapers across 10 semantic categories with seven cross-sectional market-structure statistics computed from hourly data (17,543 timestamps, 2023-2024), and aligning the two spaces with Procrustes rotation and Tucker's congruence coefficient ($φ$), we do not detect a significant claims-market alignment in this $n = 43$ sample (dimension-matched $φ= 0.303$, zero-padded $φ= 0.223$; both non-significant). A positive-control and power analysis shows the binding constraint is the low reliability of the text instrument: the minimum detectable effect is $φ\approx 0.66$, well above the observed $\approx 0.22$. This is absence of evidence for alignment, not evidence of its absence -- we can reject strong alignment ($φ\geq 0.70$) but cannot distinguish weak alignment ($φ\approx 0.3$) from none.

As algorithms increasingly mediate competitive decision-making, their influence extends beyond individual outcomes to shaping strategic market dynamics. In our experiment, we examined how algorithmic advice affects human behavior in a classic economic game with a unique, non-collusive, and analytically traceable equilibrium. Participants (N = 129) played a Cournot quantity competition with equilibrium-aligned or strategically biased algorithmic recommendations. While individualized equilibrium advice supported stable convergence, collusively downward-biased advice led to sustained underproduction and supracompetitive profits - hallmarks of tacit collusion. Participants' quantities converged faster and more consistently toward individualized than collective equilibrium advice, potentially due to an objective quality advantage or greater perceived ownership of the former. These findings demonstrate that algorithmic advice can function as a strategic signal, shaping coordination even without explicit communication. The results echo real-world concerns about algorithmic collusion and underscore the need for careful design and oversight of algorithmic decision-support systems in competitive environments.

We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional problem reduces exactly to a single-dimensional problem in agents' best-option values. More options make low best-option values rarer, weakening the case for screening. We characterize when no screening is optimal and show it remains optimal as variety expands. Large-variety limits and numerical results for finite, correlated markets support this pattern. We apply these results to propose an invitation-based vaccine appointment system.