Safety

This paper appraises recent frameworks within AI development to integrate LLMs into control tasks in automotive contexts from the perspective of safety assurance. This work has built upon the rapid integration of LLMs across automotive settings. However, we find that at present, these frameworks face significant challenges, limiting their efficacy in real-time safety-critical contexts. Firstly, we consider conceptual challenges, including the fact that deployers are faced with a dual challenge, wherein they must assure a model which has been developed upstream, i.e. as general-purpose tools by the large AI labs, in a downstream context, i.e. into specific vehicle architectures. Secondly, we consider concrete challenges from across existing standards. We show that there are currently both fundamental engineering constraints covered in ISO21448, such as latency, and novel LLM-specific issues, such as alignment-related issues covered in ISO/PAS8800. We ground both examples in a concrete introductory, experimental case study exploring an existing open-source repository, Talk2Drive. We present a safety argument in order to make explicit the limitations of existing solutions. Nonetheless, given that the use of LLMs in automotive contexts is being explored at a technical level and operationalised, we propose potential assurance mechanisms for LLM-related hazardous events going forward.

Safety certification of Vision-Language-Action (VLA) driving planners under ISO 21448 (SOTIF) rests on an Operational Design Domain (ODD) specification that answers two complementary questions: when does the planner start to fail, and how severely does it fail once it does? We evaluate Alpamayo R1, a 10B-parameter open-weight driving VLA, on 15,968 (clip, attack) pairs. We find a conservative-aggregate gap: an aggregate safe threshold of $σ\leq 50$ under a 15% average displacement error (ADE) budget masks well-sampled scenarios that tolerate the top of the tested grid ($σ= 70$). A Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) on the changed-explanation subset identifies six discrete severity bands (BIC-optimal $k{=}6$), so two perturbation conditions with the same mean error can differ materially in their share of high-severity (C4/C5) failures. Joining the two analyses on the same corpus surfaces a finding neither yields in isolation: the scenarios with the loosest noise thresholds are not those with the lowest high-severity rate: STOP_SIGNAL concentrates roughly $4\times$ the C4/C5 share of LANE_KEEPING despite tolerating a larger $σ$. A deployable SOTIF ODD specification for driving VLAs therefore requires a two-dimensional safety envelope, not a single aggregate value per hazard.

We present the design and implementation of a safety constrained large language model (LLM) system for public health information access, focusing on maternal and child health (MCH) resource navigation. While LLM based systems offer flexible and natural interfaces for information retrieval, their deployment in healthcare contexts introduces risks related to safety, trust, and uncontrolled generation. This work explores practical design patterns for constraining LLM behavior in safety critical environments. We introduce a multi-layered architecture that integrates domain-restricted retrieval augmented generation (RAG), strict boundary enforcement to prevent medical advice, anonymous multiuser session management, and comprehensive audit logging for monitoring and compliance. A key aspect of the design is a controlled data pipeline that grounds all responses in curated public health resources, avoiding reliance on the model pretrained medical knowledge. We implement the system in a real world public health setting and conduct scenario-based validation across in scope, out of scope, and emergency queries. Results show consistent enforcement of safety constraints, reliable resource grounding, and stable system performance, with an average response time of 5.3 seconds. Beyond the specific application, we discuss design trade offs and lessons learned in balancing safety, usability, and system flexibility. Our findings provide practical guidance for deploying LLM based systems in healthcare and other domains where strict information boundaries and accountability are required.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to access organisational documentation, including standard operating procedures (SOPs), HR policies and institutional guidelines. However, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems that rely on free-form rewriting can introduce hallucinations and unstable trade-offs between completeness and conciseness, particularly in safety- and compliance-critical settings. Objectives: To evaluate extraction as a hallucination-resistant alternative to rewriting-based RAG and compare strategies that balance precision, recall and safety across document types and model scales. Methods: We compare multiple prompting strategies, including line-number-based source selection, extraction of relevant guideline sentences with explicit safety annotations, and a multi-stage pipeline that refines draft answers using supporting evidence from source guidelines. Experiments are conducted on documents of varying length and structure, including local NHS acute care and oncology guidelines and UK-wide NICE guidelines, using both frontier-scale and locally deployable models. Performance is assessed using automatic metrics and human expert evaluation of relevance and completeness. Results: Line-number selection achieves the strongest results, outperforming direct copying and safety-focused strategies across both large and small models while maintaining high term recall (up to 95%) and close alignment with source text. Safety-oriented approaches improve precision but introduce systematic omissions, while multi-stage filtering further amplifies this trade-off. Performance varies with document structure: line-based extraction excels in protocol-like content, whereas alternative strategies perform better on more verbose documents (up to 97% term recall).

Agentic large language model systems that autonomously invoke tools, maintain persistent memory, and execute multi-step plans are increasingly deployed in public-facing domains, including government services, healthcare triage, and financial advising. We ask whether the frameworks used to build these systems provide architectural-level structural safety guarantees. Applying six containment principles derived from a compositional model of agentic architectures, we audit three dominant frameworks (LangChain, AutoGPT, and OpenAI Agents SDK) and find no native compliance in any of them. Memory integrity, a defense against one of the most prevalent vulnerability classes, is not observed in any of the three evaluated frameworks. We validate these findings empirically: in a simulated government benefits agent built on LangChain, a single memory-poisoning write induces persistent targeted corruption across all tested seeds and backends, increasing the wrongful denial rate for targeted applicants to 88.9%. Under a complex five-factor policy, the same attack preserves aggregate accuracy while increasing targeted wrongful denials by 3.5x, rendering the corruption difficult to detect through standard monitoring. We then introduce two lightweight containment mechanisms: a memory integrity validator and a policy gate, which eliminate both attack vectors with sub-millisecond overhead (<0.2ms per call). We conclude that the current agentic framework ecosystem may not yet meet secure-by-default expectations for public-facing deployments and outline priority architectural interventions to enable trustworthy deployment in high-stakes, socially impactful applications.

Safety classifiers deployed in production operate under a stationarity assumption that fails silently: when input distributions drift, accuracy degrades with no error signal until ground-truth labels arrive. We present an online monitor that detects distributional shift in classifier scores via a sliding-window KS statistic with empirically calibrated alarm thresholds. In a pre-registered factorial evaluation (4 classifiers $\times$ 5 shift conditions $\times$ 20 seeds $\times$ 2 window sizes; 800 cells), the monitor achieves 86.6% valid detection (mean latency 39.5 steps) across synthetic-onset, real-jailbreak, and adversarial regimes; a classifier $\times$ shift interaction ($η^2 = 0.185$) shows that monitoring must be tuned per classifier. Attempting to recover post-detection coverage via weighted conformal prediction exposes a failure mode: density-ratio estimation collapses for generative classifiers because logistic regression separates source from target perfectly in 3584-4096-dimensional embedding space, clipping all importance weights to zero; projecting to $\leq 32$ dimensions restores coverage. We then extend the framework to gradient-based evasion and give the first threat-model characterisation of score-disagreement monitoring as a canary. We falsify three assumptions: that architectural diversity drives the signal (false, $η^2 = 0.011$), that it is generic out-of-distribution detection (false, GCG-specific, $p < 10^{-12}$), and that an adaptive attacker can suppress it (false while the canary is confident). We derive the exact security boundary, a confidence-gated equilibrium at which a monitor-aware attacker stalls at gap $= 1/(2λ)$, and provide a calibration-free scan martingale achieving false-alarm rate $\leq 1\%$ across all classifiers with no per-model tuning.

Vision-based navigation models, particularly foundation models, generate viable trajectories from RGB observations alone. However, even state-of-the-art transformer- and diffusion-based policies struggle to generalize in unfamiliar deployment environments containing unseen obstacles or shifted conditions. The resulting trajectories often remain goal-directed but unsafe. Existing efforts improve safety through external trajectory correction or internal geometric priors, yet the resulting policies are not trained to explicitly represent obstacle boundaries or traversable free-space structure. To address this, we propose a navigation model that incorporates these structures directly into the policy via fine-tuning and is designed to be compatible with diverse RGB-based backbones. Across multiple robot platforms, indoor environments, and static and dynamic obstacle scenarios, our method reduces collision frequency relative to ViNT, NoMaD, and their CARE-augmented variants while maintaining goal-reaching performance.

Quantized checkpoints are often screened first with quality metrics and only later, if at all, with direct safety tests. This paper audits that shortcut on a matched 51-row matrix spanning 6 models, 4 families, a 7-level GGUF ladder, and AWQ/GPTQ INT4 checkpoints. In this matrix the shortcut fails: all 36 quality-safety pairings split direction across models, and 9 hidden-danger rows plus 1 near-hidden-danger row show quality stable or improved while refusal falls by 12-68 percentage points. Seven of the 11 AWQ/GPTQ rows are hidden-danger. A four-probe mechanistic follow-up over the 17 Hugging Face-backed FP16/AWQ/GPTQ cells does not rescue it: entropy, refusal-direction, and calibration probes are weak or null separators of dangerous rows, and although probe-identified safety-associated neurons absorb 1.39$\times$ more quantization error overall ($p < 5 \times 10^{-7}$), the effect is not regime-specific. Claude Sonnet 4 relabels 11,470 items in a predefined stratified set, agrees with the primary gemma3:12b judge on 89.9% of rows ($κ= 0.873$, 95% CI [0.866, 0.881]), and changes 0/10 hidden-danger cells. A calibrated study-internal behavioral screen -- the Refusal Template Stability Index (RTSI), built from four refusal-template drift features and calibrated on this matrix -- routes 10/10 hidden- or near-hidden-danger rows to direct safety testing (Wilson 95% CI lower bound 0.72) while leaving 23 of 45 non-baseline rows in a low-risk bucket under both in-sample scoring and row-level leave-one-out validation; on the same matrix, the best single-feature baselines (unique-prefix-rate-delta, raw refusal-rate delta) recover 9/10 and 8/10 respectively at matched bucket size, and cross-stack transfer requires recalibration. For the quantized checkpoints, model families, and safety outcomes studied here, retained quality cannot waive direct safety evaluation.

Hard safety filters are increasingly placed downstream of learned controllers to guarantee constraint satisfaction at run time. Yet a filtered controller that never violates a constraint may still have learned nothing about safety: the filter can silently repair an incompetent upstream policy, so that post-filter success measures the filter, not the policy. We argue that safe policy learning should ask who earns the safety - the policy or its protective layers - and we make this question measurable. We introduce Intervention-Aware Variational Quantum Differentiable Predictive Control (IA-VQC-DPC), which (i) trains a compact variational quantum circuit (VQC) policy under a primal-dual intervention budget that penalizes reliance on a differentiable Control-Barrier-Function (CBF) projection, and (ii) is evaluated with a safety-attribution protocol that decomposes the executed-trajectory correction into a CBF term and a deployment runtime-guard term, and stress-tests the policy with guard-off evaluation. On closed-loop, high-fidelity BOPTEST building-control emulators (5 seeds, 60 episodes per method), intervention-aware training significantly lowers the quantum policy's raw pre-filter violation and total safety-layer reliance (both p < 10^-4) with no significant energy regression; at an equal approximately 400-parameter budget the quantum policy is significantly safer and more comfortable than a matched classical policy. Guard-off evaluation confirms the improvement is policy-level and exposes a valuable negative result: a learned differentiable energy head is only safe when paired with a distribution-aware runtime guard. The attribution protocol is general beyond quantum policies and buildings.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have demonstrated impressive end-to-end performance across a variety of robotic manipulation tasks. However, these policies offer no guarantees against collisions with task-irrelevant objects in the scene. Existing safety filters sidestep this problem by querying a vision-language model (VLM) to identify obstacles and their locations. This, however, is too slow to run in the control loop and can only be invoked at episode initialization, leaving the filter unable to track moving obstacles. We discover that a small number of attention heads within a VLA model reliably localize the object the policy intends to approach. These heads can be exploited within a training-free safety framework that obtains the active target from the attention heads at every step, treats the remainder of the scene as obstacles, and feeds these into a Control Barrier Function (CBF) filter. Together with a lightweight real-time object tracker, this allows for collision avoidance for non-static obstacles. We evaluate our framework on SafeLIBERO, which we extend with moving obstacles. On the original static benchmark, our method performs comparably to an oracle that uses privileged simulator state to identify the target, emulating a VLM-based identification step run once at episode initialization. On the dynamic variant, where the oracle's init-time target assignment becomes stale, our method substantially outperforms it by 43%, on average. Our findings suggest that the perceptual signals needed for real-time safety filtering are already present within VLA policies and can be exploited without additional training or heavy auxiliary models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled increasingly personalized interactions by adapting to users' preferences, contexts, and long-term histories. However, the mechanisms that enable personalization also expand the safety landscape in ways not systematically addressed by existing literature. Existing reviews typically focus either on personalization or safety, leaving their intersection largely unexplored. We present the first comprehensive, safety-aware review of personalized LLMs. We organize personalization along three dimensions-user representation, personalization paradigm, and evaluation-and introduce a unified taxonomy of safety risks. At the representation level, we analyze risks arising from diverse user representations. Across mainstream personalization paradigms, we delineate vulnerabilities inherent to prompting, retrieval augmentation, parameter fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, Mixture-of-Experts (MoE), pruning, agent frameworks, and multimodal personalization, and synthesize mitigation strategies across the model lifecycle. Beyond these fine-grained risks, we characterize paradigm-agnostic safety risks arising from personalized adaptation. We further summarize personalized datasets and evaluation methodologies. Through a case study of OpenClaw, we analyze deployment trends in personalized agent ecosystems. Our analysis reveals three structural inadequacies in existing research: safety is evaluated as user-invariant rather than relational, personalization techniques are analyzed in isolation rather than in composition, and evaluation frameworks cannot capture emergent long-term risks. By jointly examining personalized representations, personalization paradigms, safety risks, defenses, and evaluation methods, we provide a unified framework for developing safe personalized LLMs and highlight key directions for future research.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for medical summarization, but their outputs can omit medically important information and introduce unsupported claims. Existing error-detection methods produce heuristic or uncalibrated scores, providing no formal control over missed errors and no principled way to trade off safety against clinician review burden. We introduce Conformal Assessment for Risk Evaluation (CARE), a post-hoc, model-agnostic safety layer that uses conformal risk control to overlay calibrated omission and hallucination flags onto summaries from any LLM without retraining. CARE provides finite-sample, distribution-free guarantees through two controllers: a hallucination controller that bounds the probability of a document containing any unflagged hallucinated sentence, and an omission controller that bounds the expected fraction of important omissions not surfaced for review. Unlike hallucination detection, omissions depend jointly on whether a source sentence is important and whether it is covered by the summary. We show that calibrating only one dimension can violate the target risk bound, while marginal decompositions remain valid but overly conservative. By jointly calibrating over the full $(τ,γ)$ threshold space, CARE preserves formal guarantees while surfacing up to 5$\times$ fewer sentences than alternative calibrated baselines. Across five medical summarization tasks, CARE satisfies the target risk bound at $α= 0.15$ with 95% confidence across 100 calibration/test resplits, using only ~100 labeled documents per domain. In a preliminary clinician study (75 document reviews), calibrated flags improved omission detection by 28.6 percentage points on average. These results show that sentence-level safety guarantees are feasible for LLM-assisted medical summarization and offer a tunable mechanism for balancing residual risk and review effort.

Robots operating in human environments must not only ensure physical safety but also exhibit behaviors that are understandable, fluent, and acceptable to human partners. This paper investigates motion generation strategies that combine safety guarantees with interaction quality considerations, such as motion smoothness and human comfort. While the design of robots capable of ensuring safety in shared human-robot environments has enabled closer and more advanced forms of interaction, these new proximity-based tasks require moving beyond purely technical considerations. In particular, robot behavior must also be addressed from psycho-cognitive and social perspectives. In this context, we argue for the relevance of integrating social-aware motion control into robotic systems. First, we identify the motion parameters that influence human perception and operator experience. Then, we implement a Model Predictive Control (MPC) framework that generates four distinct socially-informed robot behaviors. Finally, we conduct a user study to evaluate and validate these behaviors and assess their social impact on non-expert participants. The results demonstrate that variations in robot behavior significantly affect the perceived social acceptability of the system. These findings highlight the importance of incorporating human-centered considerations into motion generation strategies for robots operating in shared environments.

Safety-aligned large language models often exhibit sycophancy, which is the tendency to affirm users' opinions regardless of factual accuracy. Although well-studied in English, its manifestation in other languages remains largely unexamined, leaving billions of non-English speakers potentially vulnerable to model-validated misinformation. We present the first large-scale, multi-model evaluation of cross-lingual sycophancy, benchmarking \textbf{six instruction-tuned models} across \textbf{1.1 million instances} spanning \textbf{38 languages} and \textbf{33 topic categories}. We identify a consistent resource-tier effect: sycophancy rates spike sharply in low-resource and zero-shot language settings. Critically, this degradation is topic-agnostic, as models fail uniformly across both benign and safety-critical prompts, offering no additional protection where it is most needed. We further identify tokenizer fertility as a structural driver of this alignment collapse. Collectively, our results demonstrate that prevailing alignment methodologies generalize poorly beyond high-resource languages, underscoring the urgent need for equitable multilingual safety techniques.

LLM-based scientific agents have shown strong capacity for autonomous research, yet their safety layers remain structurally divorced from core reasoning: they inspect pipeline outputs rather than shaping the deliberation that produces them. This separation opens two failure modes: safety signals accumulated at one stage are discarded before the next, and sequences of individually benign tool calls can compose into harmful outcomes that no single-step filter detects. To address these challenges, we introduce \textbf{SciTrace}, a framework that weaves safety reasoning into every stage of the scientific agent pipeline. SciTrace couples two complementary mechanisms: a \textit{Safety-Intrinsic Reasoning Loop} (SIR) that maintains a cumulative risk state across the Thinker, Experimenter, Writer, and Reviewer stages through joint task-and-safety deliberation, and a \textit{Compositional Tool-Chain Verifier} (CTV) that performs trajectory-aware safety checks before execution, catching risks that surface only across multi-step tool sequences. Evaluated on 240 high-risk research tasks and 120 tool-related risk tasks spanning six scientific domains, SciTrace achieves state-of-the-art (\textbf{SOTA}) safety among compared frameworks across four backbone models: it consistently improves tool call safety and adversarial robustness while preserving scientific output quality, and it uncovers \textbf{78.8%} of the compositional tool-chain escapes that single-step monitors miss. The project website is available at https://opensciagent.github.io/SciTrace/.

Large Language Model (LLM) safety has often been evaluated at the behavior level, which provides limited evidence of internal robustness, as these evaluations target outputs rather than representation-level vulnerability under intervention. We formalize this discrepancy as the audit gap: the difference between behavioral safety and robustness under intervention. To study this gap, we construct dissociated models that preserve safe outward behavior while remaining vulnerable in the latent space. We introduce an intervention-based evaluation framework to test model robustness through soft interventions in parameter and latent spaces, including harmful fine-tuning and layer-wise latent perturbations. To formalize the evaluation, we propose the Latent Vulnerability Score (LVS) to measure how easily harmful behavior can be elicited by bounded latent perturbations. Using this evaluation framework, we show that behavioral safety metrics are insufficient measures of representation-level robustness across multiple safely and unsafely aligned state-of-the-art models. Notably, dissociated models show substantially elevated LVSs despite comparable refusal behavior under harmful intervention, with intermediate representations being the most sensitive to intervention. Our results suggest that behavioral safety evaluation alone provides an incomplete picture of model robustness, motivating representation-aware audits of latent vulnerability and observable behavior.

Recent advances in generative AI, especially powerful Large Language Models (LLMs) and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), raise concerns over the interpretability, safety and sustainability of these large and opaque AI models. The power of such architectures is derived not only from the scalability of deep neural networks, but also massively parallel hardware such as GPU clusters. The diffuse nature of deep neural networks gives them great function-approximation capability when provided with sufficient training data but imposes a cost in interpretability and computational efficiency. Observing that localised machine learning (ML) models tend to be more interpretable and computationally efficient than deep neural networks on small datasets, we reason by analogy that similar advantages may apply to specific localised hardware ML architectures. We argue that localised architectures with lower bandwidth but higher expressivity per node have the potential to be fundamentally more interpretable than deep neural networks running on GPU clusters while remaining competitive for smaller datasets. We then evaluate the suitability of various hardware ML paradigms for implementing such localised architectures and evaluate their per-node expressivity, energy efficiency and practical maturity of the technology required.

LLMs-as-judges are the only way to evaluate safety at scale. Despite their importance, LLM-judges themselves are rarely evaluated beyond human agreement in simple, static benchmarks. We therefore investigate two under-explored but crucial properties of LLMs-as-judges: their susceptibility to relying on in context-information, and their steerability to differing safety definitions, which may not align with their internal safety priors. We evaluate the safety judging abilities of many generalist LLMs and safety-specific judges, and investigate the impact of task demonstrations, novel in-context information, and changing safety definitions. We find that while LLM-judges can learn from new information, they are broadly unlikely to adjust their evaluations if the context or safety definition contradicts their prior.

Are tool-calling LLM agents equally safe throughout a conversation? We discover they are not: agents are most vulnerable at the very start of a session and become substantially safer after a few regular agentic tasks -- a phenomenon we term the cold-start safety gap. To study this systematically, we introduce Safety Over Depth for Agents (SODA), a benchmark that controls how many regular agentic tasks the agent completes before encountering a safety threat, supporting up to 20 preceding tasks. Evaluating 7 models from 4 families, safety improves by 9--52% as the number of preceding regular agentic tasks increases from zero to twenty. Representation analysis confirms that model hidden states gradually shift toward a safety-aligned region as more preceding tasks are present. By systematically studying which part of the preceding conversation matters most, we find that the regular agentic tasks themselves are the primary driver of safety, while the agent's own prior responses have less effect on safety but are essential for preserving later utility. This conclusion is further supported by evaluation on open-source safety benchmarks (AgentHarm, Agent Safety Bench) and utility benchmarks (BFCL, API-Bank), confirming that warming up the agent with regular agentic tasks before deployment makes it safer and preserves full capability. Based on these findings, we recommend a simple deployment strategy: having the agent complete a few regular agentic tasks before possible exposure to safety-critical requests mitigates the cold-start safety gap. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/Agent-Cold-Start-Safety-Gap

Reinforcement learning (RL) policies enable dynamic legged locomotion but lack mechanisms to avoid violations of safety constraints that are absent during training. Large-scale offline safe learning is impractical for covering all edge cases. Existing safety frameworks either rely on reduced-order models that cannot reason about whole-body behaviors or require conservative recovery controllers that degrade task performance. We propose a predictive safety filter that post-hoc filters the nominal contact locations fed to the RL policy. When a collision is predicted, a sampling-based optimizer asynchronously searches for safer contact sequences using a full-physics model, while a learned value function bootstraps long-horizon returns. Our three algorithmic components (geometric projection of sampled contacts, momentum-augmented updates, and replica-exchange) make the optimization tractable in a discontinuous contact landscape. We validate the filter on a quadruped robot in dense, cluttered environments, both in simulation and in the real world, showing substantial reductions in safety violations with minimal deviation from the nominal input.

Safety is a fundamental requirement in the development of autonomous driving (AD) systems. While function offloading has demonstrated significant benefits in terms of computational efficiency and energy consumption, its application to safety-critical AD functionality introduces new challenges. In particular, offloaded service compositions incur increased and variable response times due to wireless vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, which directly affects the vehicle's reaction time and thus its safety guarantees. In this paper, we address this challenge by extending the definitions of Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) to explicitly account for different response times of local and offloaded AD service compositions. Based on this extension, we propose an integration into function offloading, using the RSS safety constraints for offloading decision-making and fallback mechanisms. Offloaded service compositions are only permitted if the current traffic situation remains safe under the corresponding end-to-end response time. If this condition is violated, the system performs a controlled fallback to local execution. Furthermore, we introduce an enhanced fallback strategy that includes a warm-standby phase for offloaded services, enabling faster and safer transitions from offloaded to local services. The proposed approach is integrated into our AD stack and evaluated in both simulation and the real world. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method improves safety compared to state-of-the-art function offloading and safety frameworks, while preserving the benefits of distributed computation when safety conditions allow.

Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability. We introduce Posterior Attack, a single-query jailbreak that bypasses guardrails by prompting the model to generate the exact harmful response its internal classifier would normally flag as unsafe. Through extensive empirical evaluation across 30 open-source LLMs (up to 35B parameters in size) and frontier models (e.g., GPT-5, Claude 4.6), we observe a striking phenomenon: models with superior safety-judgment capabilities are disproportionately more susceptible to this exploitation. To explain this, we formalize the Safety Paradox, analytically showing that monotonic improvements in safety alignment naturally amplify posterior vulnerability. Finally, we establish a causal link via reinforcement learning interventions, exemplifying that artificially degrading a model's safety judgment immunizes it against the attack, whereas enhancing judgment exacerbates the vulnerability. Our findings highlight potential flaws in current alignment paradigms, indicating that defense mechanisms may require further structural refinement.

Recent progress in generative modeling has made safety control a central challenge, yet existing approaches remain largely model-specific, requiring retraining or tailored interventions for each new architecture. In this work, we ask whether safety can be represented as a portable latent direction, learned once and reused across heterogeneous generators. We introduce the first framework for cross-model safety steering, in which a safety direction is estimated in a source LLM from paired safe-unsafe prompts, transported to a target generator through a lightweight alignment fitted on benign data alone, and applied at inference time. Crucially, our pipeline never accesses unsafe data on the target side, isolating whether safety can be transferred through shared representation geometry. Beyond a single global direction, we also identify a multi-vector extension that captures category-specific safety behaviors, enabling more selective control. We evaluate our approach in text-to-image and text-to-video generation across diverse source-target model pairs. Across models, transferred safety directions achieve ASR reduction and CLIP-Score/FID trade-offs comparable to directions learned natively on the target model using unsafe data, while requiring no target-side unsafe data. This indicates that safety improvements do not come at the expense of generation quality. Our results point to a modular view of safety: safety-relevant behavior is not purely model-local, but can be controlled through latent directions that persist across models. This suggests a new path toward lightweight, reusable safety mechanisms that do not require target-side unsafe data.

As AI companion platforms such as Replika and Character.AI rapidly grow, concerns about unsafe human-AI interactions have intensified. This study introduces AICompanionBench, to our knowledge the first publicly available benchmark dataset of human-AI companion conversations annotated with fine-grained safety risk categories. The dataset contains 2,123 real-world Replika conversations collected from Reddit and annotated through human-AI collaboration across nine categories: sexual behavior, antisocial behavior, physical aggression, verbal aggression, substance abuse, self-harm and suicide, control, manipulation, and no-harm. Using this benchmark, we evaluate 20 state-of-the-art open-source and closed-source LLMs under an LLM-as-judge framework for detecting unsafe interactions. Results show substantial variation in model performance, with stronger models achieving high overall accuracy but still struggling with nuanced categories such as manipulation, as well as benign conversations that are incorrectly identified as harmful. Our findings suggest that while current LLMs can effectively detect explicit harmful content, they remain limited in identifying implicit unsafe interactions. Overall, our work contributes a new benchmark dataset for AI companionship safety research and offers insights into monitoring AI companion systems using LLMs. The dataset is publicly available at: https://github.com/anonymousresearcher2026/AICompanionBench/blob/main/AICompanionBench.xlsx

Safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to interventions during inference that redirect generation toward harmful outputs. Recent work attributes this to shallow safety, where alignment concentrates in the first few output tokens. We show that shallow safety is a special case of a broader inference-time vulnerability, in which short token injections at any generation step can substantially alter subsequent safety behavior. We also find that a model's alignment with refusal directions in its hidden states does not predict its robustness to such injection, revealing that internal state alone does not determine generation behavior under perturbation. To address this, we align models directly on generation trajectories constructed by simulating mid-sequence perturbation, and show that this improves robustness to mid-sequence injection and generalizes to attacks that exploit early-token generation. Our work argues that robust safety alignment requires training on the generation process itself, not only its outputs.

Worker safety attitudes are key determinants of whether protective practices are applied or bypassed on construction sites. Yet measuring them at scale has remained out of reach. Safety attitudes are multidimensional, vary across topics, and surface most candidly in workers' own conversations. This study created and validated the Construction Safety Attitude Framework (CSAF), which integrates two components: a theory-grounded structure that characterizes safety attitudes along eight dimensions, and an operational codebook for measuring them in worker naturalistic discourse. Applying CSAF to 250 posts and comments from the r/Construction community on Reddit, trained coders reached strong agreement (Krippendorff's α = 0.85). Pairwise lift and conditional probability confirmed that the eight dimensions are related yet distinct. To apply the framework across large volumes of discourse, CSAF was operationalized through a large language model (LLM) classifier. On 450 r/Construction contributions, the classifier reproduced expert human coding (Cohen's \k{appa} = 0.90, precision = 0.98, recall = 0.98), and on 400 contributions from r/Roofing it retained that accuracy after transfer to a different trade community (\k{appa} = 0.89, precision = 0.98, recall = 0.97). A proof-of-value case study then applied the validated classifier to 10,346 contributions from r/Roofing, demonstrating that CSAF can distinguish multidimensional attitudes by safety topic, track how they shift over time, and trace the reasoning behind unfavorable ones. The study therefore provides a theoretically grounded, empirically vetted instrument for examining safety attitudes, offering a basis for targeted interventions that address the attitudes underlying unsafe practices.

Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is fragile in part because it is often shallow: fine-tuning mainly reshapes the model's behavior near the first few output tokens. We argue that this phenomenon can be understood through autoregressive consistency, the tendency of next-token prediction to preserve and extend the current response trajectory consistently. By analyzing the learning dynamics of safety alignment, we show that autoregressive consistency can concentrate alignment updates on early tokens, offering a mechanistic explanation for shallow safety alignment. The same mechanism also predicts a broader class of attacks on LLMs: attacks that induce harmful continuation states at arbitrary positions in the output trajectory. As a concrete example, we introduce random insertion attack, which inserts a short harmful span into an otherwise safe refusal trajectory and exploits autoregressive consistency to sustain the resulting harmful branch, thereby bypassing safety alignment. Notably, a short harmful span can redirect the generation to be harmful even after a long refusal prefix, highlighting autoregressive consistency as a potential broader failure mechanism. This suggests that safety alignment should also break harmful autoregressive consistency throughout the output trajectory. We therefore propose adversarial safety alignment, an initial framework based on worst-case harmful continuation states, and instantiate it with random worst-insertion training. Overall, our results suggest that autoregressive consistency should be treated as a central consideration in both safety alignment and attack design.

Contemporary AI safety spans pre-training interventions, post-training alignment, deployment-time controls, monitoring, and red-teaming. These methods are necessary, but they primarily certify snapshots of system behavior. As AI systems become more capable, dynamic, embodied, and self-improving, this snapshot view becomes incomplete: safety depends not only on whether a system behaves acceptably now, but whether it remains correctable as it learns, adapts, acts, and modifies itself over time. This paper argues that safety should therefore be treated as an epistemic property of the evolving learner, not merely a behavioral property of the current policy. We introduce teachability as the capacity to preserve future corrective leverage under bounded human, institutional, or environmental intervention. We argue that advanced systems can retain visible competence while eroding the representational, algorithmic, or meta-decision conditions needed for future correction. Safe advanced AI systems must not only behave acceptably now; they must remain teachable later.

As AI systems increasingly assist humans in physical tasks, ensuring safety becomes paramount -- physical actions carry immediate and irreversible consequences that digital errors do not. We introduce the Vision-Language Embodied Safety Agent (VLESA), a framework that monitors human activities from egocentric video and triggers real-time safety interventions when dangerous actions are predicted. VLESA addresses intent-dependent safety where identical actions can be safe or dangerous depending on context. A dataset pairing egocentric frames with goal-conditioned safety annotations is introduced, enabling a goal-conditioned safety Q-filter trained via GRPO that evaluates actions with respect to inferred intent without retraining. On top of that, an intent-action prediction agent is proposed to jointly infer goals and predict future actions from video. On the ASIMOV-2.0 benchmark, VLESA achieves higher intervention accuracy at the exact ground-truth frame compared to baselines, while the GRPO-trained Q-filter improves action safety by over 41 percentage points through goal-conditioned constrained decoding. Code is available at https://github.com/HanjiangHu/VLESA.

Operational safety in high-stakes domains such as industrial process control, autonomous, and safety-critical systems, demand reliable hazard identification. While large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in automating safety analysis tasks, single-turn, monolithic inference is brittle: it lacks the self-correction, deliberation, and contextual refinement that safety engineers apply iteratively. In this paper, we introduce HAZDIAL, a framework that investigates whether structured agentic dialogue-multi-agent, multi-turn interactions improves the quality of NLP- based hazard identification over single-pass baselines. We systematically compare two dialogue modalities: adversarial debate and constructive discussion, and propose an algorithm-based agentic interaction optimization. We evaluate all configurations against a curated golden dataset using standard classification metrics (accuracy, precision, recall, F1) and novel dialogue metrics. This work advances the intersection of dialogue systems, multi-agent reasoning, and AI safety, providing an empirical evidence for dialogue-driven hazard analysis.

Open-weight LLMs are increasingly fine-tuned into customized assistants, but downstream fine-tuning can weaken safety alignment and make models more vulnerable to malicious prompts, even when the training data is not intentionally harmful. This creates a recurring safety recovery problem as target models are repeatedly updated with new task data or user interactions. We propose SafeGene, a reusable safety-adapter module designed for cross-task reuse within each architecture-compatible model family. Rather than treating safety recovery as a model-specific repair step, SafeGene treats safety capability as an independent, reusable adapter representation decoupled from task-specific updates. This representation is obtained from aligned--degraded model discrepancies, refined into task-transferable safety vectors through data-aware layer selection, and expressed in each downstream task-adapted model via few-shot layer-wise coefficient recalibration. Experiments across multiple model families, downstream tasks, and safety judges show that SafeGene-enhanced models reduce harmful response rates while maintaining downstream performance, outperforming representative safe adaptation methods in safety--utility trade-off.

Adapting foundation large language models to a user's task or preferred style through fine-tuning can result in compromising the model's safety. Previous works examined the effects of fine-tuning on model safety in limited and seemingly random experimental settings. We argue that anchoring fine-tuning to a specific capability goal is essential for avoiding arbitrary empirical choices, allowing us to draw meaningful conclusions about safety impacts, and to compare mitigation methods on a consistent basis. We conduct a multi-dimensional evaluation of the effects of fine-tuning on model behavior by focusing on capability as well as safety. Our results surface important issues that (1) fine-tuned models can produce incoherent generations in response to safety prompts, (2) automated safety judgments are unreliable for such incoherent outputs, and (3) the conclusions about the effects of fine-tuning can change depending on the choice of safety benchmark as well as the safety evaluator.

Underground coal mining requires personnel and heavy equipment to operate within shared, confined, and poorly illuminated spaces where hazards such as equipment proximity violations, structural instabilities, and occluded blind spots are difficult to anticipate. Conventional monitoring systems, including fixed cameras and rule-based proximity alerts, can detect predefined events but lack the 3D scene understanding and contextual memory needed to identify complex or evolving hazards. This paper presents a continuous monitoring framework that converts colourised 3D point clouds into structured and traceable safety reasoning outputs. The framework combines 3D semantic perception, uncertainty-based anomaly detection, rule-based hazard checks, on-device LLM reasoning, and GraphRAG -based memory analysis to identify immediate hazards and interpret longer-term safety patterns. Scene and temporal graphs serve as the explicit knowledge structure, linking perception outputs across reasoning stages. To overcome the scarcity of labeled underground data, real roadway scans, controlled object placement, and high-fidelity longwall simulation were combined to generate diverse hazard scenarios, while self-supervised pretraining improved segmentation from limited annotations. The perception model achieved 92.7% accuracy at 30 FPS with low memory usage. Across 115 hazard scenarios, rule-based checks achieved 57% coverage, increasing to 76% with contextual LLM reasoning and 93% with memory-based reasoning using historical records. Qualitative results show uncertainty-derived anomaly signals support the interpretation of out-of-distribution hazards beyond predefined classes. Overall, graph-based knowledge representation combined with 3D perception and layered safety reasoning provides a practical foundation for intelligent decision support in underground mine monitoring.

Aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values often degrades their general capabilities, termed the alignment tax. Existing methods mitigate this by balancing dual objectives, which heavily rely on massive general-purpose data or auxiliary reward models. In this paper, we argue that, because safety features are inherently sparse within the output distribution, alignment requires localized modifications rather than global trade-offs. To this end, we propose SafeSteer, which performs on-policy distillation confined to safety tokens. First, we construct a safety teacher via activation steering. Based on this teacher, we develop a safety token selection algorithm. Consequently, SafeSteer restricts the reverse KL penalty to these tokens during training to preserve general capabilities. Experimental results across diverse models show that our SafeSteer achieves a superior trade-off between safety and general capability compared with existing methods, attaining strong safety performance on seven safety benchmarks with only minimal degradation on five general capability benchmarks. Notably, SafeSteer requires only 100 harmful samples without using any general-purpose data, less than 1% of what previous baselines used, considerably reducing alignment cost. More details are on our project page at https://anjingkun.github.io/SafeSteer.

Fine-tuning safety aligned large language models (LLMs) on downstream data improves adaptation but may erode learned safety behavior. Existing methods use fixed safety examples, global constraints, or one-sided task filtering. Our diagnostics show task updates expose different safety constraints, motivating joint selection of relevant references and compatible task samples. We propose DualSelect, a coupled framework for task and reference selection that refreshes task conditioned safety references before filtering whole task samples compatible with the induced reference direction. Under a minimax view, DualSelect selects safety references with high preservation loss and task conflict, together with compatible task samples, through entropy-regularized scoring surrogates, lazy reference refresh, and gradient correction. On 1B-8B LLMs, DualSelect preserves safety without losing task utility; using the REDORCA judge, it improves Safety Avg. over the strongest baseline by at least 5.10 points and remains highest in Safety Avg. across judges with moderate overhead. This view extends to retention focused continual learning.

With the rapid advancements in text-to-image diffusion models, generative video models (T2V models) like Sora can now produce short synthetic videos from a text prompt or an initial image. However, synthetic video generation -- especially when guided by an initial image -- often poses risks, including the potential creation of illegal, politically sensitive, or unethical content. Existing benchmarks have started to consider the safety of generated videos, but they primarily focus on testing models with malicious text prompts, ignoring the scenario where text prompt and image combination may still lead to harmful video content. In practice, this is a common and challenging issue: videos generated from safe text and image inputs can nonetheless convey harmful information. To bridge this gap, we introduce SafeGen-Bench, a benchmark specifically designed to evaluate the safety of conditional T2V models. Our benchmark defines 10 malicious categories, concentrating on risks related to both temporal sequences and depicted behaviors. SafeGen-Bench consists of carefully selected start frames from diverse image and video sources, paired with corresponding text prompts to simulate realistic inputs. We evaluate a variety of conditional T2V models on SafeGen-Bench, and the results indicate that current models struggle to consistently avoid generating malicious content with unsafety scores reaching up to 44.5, especially under conditions requiring high quality. Furthermore, we assess the effectiveness of both text-based and image-based guardrails on our benchmark, finding that unimodal guardrails alone were insufficient to provide a robust defense, with an 80% failure rate across seven malicious categories. We hope that SafeGen-Bench will foster the development of safer and more controllable conditional T2V models.

LLM chatbots increasingly serve as a first source of support for people in psychological distress, including those whose distress is entangled with delusional beliefs. Prior work on LLM mental-health safety largely evaluates general therapeutic quality or single-turn crisis detection, leaving unclear how models behave when distress is intertwined with delusion over sustained conversations. We address this gap with matched multi-turn simulations, across clinically grounded personas and six LLMs, that pair each delusional conversation with a distress-only control to isolate the effect of delusional framing. This reveals a recognition-intervention gap: models detect distress at comparable rates regardless of framing, yet sharply fail to act on it once distress is embedded in delusion, with safety interventions suppressed by up to 4.5x. The failure tracks accumulated acceptance of the user's premises rather than emotional validation. Worse, the intuitive fix of prompting models to assess user distress backfires under delusional framing; only delusion-aware prompting with explicit response guidance closes the gap, and even this depends on a delusion classifier that is itself unreliable on the most vulnerable models. Safe deployment therefore requires treating delusional framing as a distinct risk signal that overrides conversational accommodation.

Safety alignment in LLMs does not improve monotonically across model generations. Studying four generations of Google's Gemma family (7B-31B) with quality-diversity evolution (MAP-Elites) as an automated red-teaming probe, we find that Gemma 3 (12B) exhibits 68.7% +/- 5.7% attack success rate (ASR; mean +/- std, 3 seeds), significantly higher than its predecessor Gemma 2 (45.5% +/- 7.2%; p = 0.030, paired bootstrap) and its successor Gemma 4 (33.9% +/- 1.8%). Replaying evolved attack archives across generations reveals that attacks from other generations transfer to Gemma 3 at 44-46% but only 14-18% to Gemma 4, indicating that Gemma 4's safety gains generalize beyond the attack distributions evolved against earlier generations. Under our 8B judge, copyright and cybercrime vulnerabilities register at near-100% across all generations, though a second-judge audit (Section 6) suggests the copyright result is sensitive to judge choice. Misinformation ASR jumps from 29% to 99% between Gemma 2 and Gemma 3 and remains elevated at 77% in Gemma 4, indicating the regression was not fully addressed. These patterns are invisible to static benchmarks and emerge only through adaptive, longitudinal probing. All experiments use 3 random seeds with a unified self-hosted judge; code and artifacts are available at https://github.com/bassrehab/red-queen.

Current approaches to LLM adversarial testing suffer from coverage gaps: manual red-teaming does not scale, LLM-as-attacker methods exhibit mode collapse, and gradient-based approaches produce uninterpretable gibberish. We introduce a quality-diversity evolutionary framework that operates at the semantic level, evolving interpretable attack strategies rather than token sequences. Using MAP-Elites, we maintain a diverse archive of attacks across behavioral dimensions (strategy type, encoding method, prompt length). In experiments across GPT-4o-mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash, and an open-weight coding model (Devstral-small-2), we discover distinct vulnerability profiles: GPT-4o-mini is vulnerable to hypothetical and multi-turn framing combined with ROT13 encoding (fitness 0.8), Gemini to direct attacks with ROT13 and multi-turn with Leetspeak (0.8), while Claude shows uniformly ambiguous responses across all strategies (max 0.4). The semantic representation produces interpretable attacks that reveal systematic, model-specific weaknesses, providing actionable insights for improving LLM safety and a reproducible baseline for evaluating future frontier models. Code and experiment artifacts are released at https://github.com/bassrehab/red-queen.

The prevailing paradigm in large language model (LLM) alignment operates via erasure, filtering unsafe data or training models to strictly refuse harmful prompts. While effective at reducing immediate toxicity, this approach fundamentally constricts the model's epistemological scope, resulting in over-cautious systems that output uninformative blanket refusals to sensitive yet benign queries. In this work, we challenge the orthodoxy that unsafe data must be discarded. We propose a dialectical approach to alignment, positing that unsafe data encodes rich, domain specific knowledge critical for nuanced, safe, and informative generation. To operationalize this, we introduce SafeMoE, a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) framework that isolates unsafe knowledge into domain-specific Low-Rank Adapters (LoRA experts) trained exclusively on harmful corpora. To synthesize safety from these unsafe primitives, we train a lightweight gating network using a minimal, highly curated set of safe-informative responses. During inference, this router dynamically orchestrates the unsafe experts, effectively steering the generation trajectory to harness their deep domain knowledge while strictly enforcing safety constraints. Extensive empirical evaluations across stringent safety benchmarks demonstrate that SafeMoE is not only safer, achieving over a 20% relative improvement in safe response rate (more than a 15% absolute gain), but also produces more informative responses when safety and harmfulness are of paramount concern. Furthermore, the routing mechanism exhibits strong zero-shot generalization to unseen domains and broader safety tasks without domain-specific supervision. Our findings suggest a paradigm shift in alignment: true safety requires not the masking of unsafe knowledge, but its controlled integration.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures scale Large Language Models (LLMs) efficiently, enabling greater capacity with reduced computational cost by dynamically routing inputs to relevant experts, yet introduce a critical vulnerability: Safety Sparsity, where safety capabilities concentrate in few experts, making them susceptible to adversarial bypassing. Meanwhile, conventional alignment methods uniformly adapt all parameters, ignoring their functional differences and inadvertently degrading performances. To address these challenges, we propose MESA (MoE Safety Alignment), a targeted alignment framework for MoE-based LLMs that strategically decentralizes safety responsibility to maximize coverage while minimizing interference with utility. Based on Optimal Transport (OT) theory, MESA operates through two mechanisms: (1) Expert Capacity Reallocation uses a transport cost matrix to distribute safety duties to the most cost-effective experts, and (2) Dynamic Routing Refinement constrains the router to precisely activate these decentralized modules. Experiments show that MESA achieves robust defensive performance against varied harmful benchmarks while preserving helpfulness. Code is available at https://github.com/lorraine021/MESA.

Long-horizon LLM agents produce safety evidence across long trajectories, where sparse, delayed, and compositional risk signals often escape local moderation. Existing turn-level or short-context detectors struggle to reliably retain and aggregate such evidence over extended horizons. We reframe long-horizon agent safety detection as trajectory-level evidence compression and propose Trajectory Risk-Aware Compression for Long-Horizon Agent Safety (TRACE). TRACE uses a Compressor-Reader design: the Compressor encodes the full trajectory into a compact latent evidence state under trajectory-level supervision, and the Reader judges the raw trajectory with this latent evidence state as a safety reference. This design helps aggregate dispersed risk cues and reduce premature evidence loss. Across ASSEBench, Pre-Ex-Bench, and R-Judge, TRACE achieves the best accuracy on all evaluated backbones, improving over strong baselines by up to 12.6 percentage points. On LongSafety, TRACE shows smaller performance degradation as context length grows. Attention visualizations and case studies suggest that the compressed reference helps the Reader focus on risk-critical segments and recover cross-step evidence. Code is available at https://github.com/Peregrine123/TRACE_official.

Safe global deployment of AI models requires alignment with human values that vary across cultures. Yet rater pools in safety evaluation datasets remain largely geographically homogeneous, failing to capture geo-cultural differences. Further, it remains unclear whether such differences persist after controlling for demographics such as age, gender, and ethnicity. Through a meta-analysis of safety datasets, we find that most do not report geo-cultural information, and those that do lack a unified methodology to jointly analyze geo-cultural and demographic correlates. Using the Inglehart-Welzel dimensions of cross-cultural variation, we demonstrate via multilevel modeling that cultural zone membership explains variance in safety ratings beyond standard demographics (p<0.05 across 6 datasets). Moreover, our analysis indicates that roughly 10% of items in the datasets we examined are culturally sensitive: likely to be misclassified as safe without adequate cultural representation. We evaluate LLMs as both rater surrogates and triage tools, finding that current LLMs do not reliably stand in for raters, though they can help prioritize culturally sensitive items for human annotation. Our findings motivate more culturally pluralistic safety evaluation and offer practical takeaways to support it.

Robot teleoperation enables safe, non-contact task execution in hazardous environments where direct human access is difficult, and its application has expanded with recent VR technologies. Many VR teleoperation studies, however, have primarily served as data-collection tools for robot imitation learning, so they often do not explicitly address dynamic obstacles, workspace changes, or collision risks during operation. For real deployment aimed at operator safety, teleoperation must react to dynamic situations with low latency and remain robust to mistakes made by inexperienced operators. This paper presents a VR teleoperation framework that supports real-time manipulation while handling collisions with both static and moving obstacles. The framework integrates GPU-accelerated inverse kinematics and trajectory optimization within a VR interface to generate feasible joint commands at each control cycle under robot constraints. Experiments with a 7-DoF manipulator demonstrate stable online behavior and collision-aware motion generation across three scenarios: obstacle-free, static-obstacle, and moving-obstacle environments. The results indicate that the proposed approach generates motion consistent with the operator's command while producing safe detours when obstacles interfere with the commanded path.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) to heterogeneous and rapidly evolving safety requirements remains a critical challenge. Existing instruction-tuned LLMs and standalone safety classifiers often fail to generalize to new safety configurations, motivating the need for Reward Models (RMs) that are explicitly configurable to changing specifications. We introduce the Configurable Safety Reward Model (CSRM), which is jointly optimized for calibrated safety compliance and reward modeling. Our approach is supported by configuration-targeted data augmentation that enforces instruction adherence while preserving relative severity structure. The resulting RM is sensitive to fine-grained safety configurations and conversational nuances, substantially improving generalization to previously unseen safety configurations. CSRM achieves state-of-the-art performance on recent configurable safety benchmarks, including CoSApien (94.6% F1) and DynaBench (75.8% F1), without requiring additional human annotation. When used for downstream safety alignment, CSRM yields LLMs with a significantly improved helpfulness-safety tradeoff compared to existing baselines.

Attack Success Rate (ASR) evaluates each jailbreak with a single yes/no label at the end of generation, telling us whether a failure happened but not how it unfolded. Two attacks that produce equally harmful outputs may have followed completely different paths, and ASR cannot tell them apart. We make those hidden paths observable from logits alone. Temporal Logit Observability (TLO) is a training-free diagnostic that watches a compliance-refusal margin during decoding and places each model-attack condition on a calibrated 2D plane. By design, this plane is most informative exactly where ASR is least informative: among attacks that succeed for genuinely different reasons. Across four aligned LLMs and three jailbreak paradigms, attacks with nearly identical ASR land at clearly different points on the plane: the same model can fail through different temporal patterns. The geometry matches refusal-direction probes from hidden states on most conditions, with one model showing the limit of our fixed-lexicon approach. A simple early-stop rule derived from TLO cuts successful jailbreaks by more than half, without false alarms on plain benign queries. Safety evaluation should report when and how a failure unfolds, not only whether it occurred. TLO makes the first two observable from logits alone.

Large language models(LLMs) increasingly match expert performance on licensing examinations, yet routine clinical use remains limited because governance requires auditable reasoning, safety and ethics alignment, and resilience to adversarial misuse. Here we present SafeMed-R1, trained with a traceable Clinical Trust Signals(CTS) pipeline that links each reasoning instance to clinician rubric scores and edit histories, and aligned through safety and ethics supervision and red team stress testing. SafeMed-R1 attains a macro-averaged accuracy of 79.6% across clinical benchmarks. Under adversarial safety testing, it shows the lowest aggregated risk and reduces unsafe outputs by about 3 to 5% relative to its baseline. In a paired expert study of 30 medication safety vignettes, SafeMed-R1 matches PGY1 and PGY2 residents on medical correctness and scores higher for medication safety, guideline consistency, and clinical usefulness. Collectively, these results suggest that clinician-audited supervision provenance, together with domain-tailored safety and ethics alignment, can strengthen governance-relevant evidence without relying on inference-time retrieval or citation grounding.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exacerbate safety risks by introducing vulnerabilities across multiple modalities, such as language and vision. Current MLLM safety evaluation tools, however, suffer from major limitations: 1) English-centric dataset construction, and 2) a focus on generic risks that are not tied to local cultural contexts. This paper introduces KSAFE-MM, a benchmark for Korean multimodal safety evaluation that covers both general safety risks and culture-specific vulnerabilities. KSAFE-MM consists of two parts, KSAFE-MM-G and KSAFE-MM-C. KSAFE-MM-G evaluates globally shared risks in Korean contexts through linguistic contextualization, which transforms generic safety queries into contextually grounded multimodal samples. KSAFE-MM-C targets culture-dependent MLLM safety vulnerabilities using localized visual queries derived from real-world contexts. It pairs these visual queries with jailbreak-style textual queries to cover multimodal safety risks involving cultural visual cues and malicious textual intent. Together, these components provide a general-to-local construction pipeline for evaluating both globally shared safety risks and culture-specific vulnerabilities. We evaluate 12 state-of-the-art MLLMs on KSAFE-MM and reveal that models exhibit greater vulnerability to culturally grounded attacks than to generic ones. Notably, jailbreaking strategies substantially amplify attack success rates, with ProgramExecution yielding up to 74.2% ASR compared to 13.4% for standard queries. Furthermore, we identify a systematic trade-off between safety and over-refusal, where models achieving low ASR tend to exhibit excessive refusal behavior on benign queries. These findings highlight the urgent need for culturally grounded safety evaluation beyond English-centric benchmarks.

Motorcycles face disproportionately high crash risks compared to cars due to limited protection and heightened sensitivity to surface hazards, yet Advanced Rider Assistance Systems (ARAS) remain underdeveloped relative to Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS). We propose a novel ARAS that enhances motorcycle safety through semantic perception and risk-aware planning. Our approach leverages Vision-Language Models (VLMs) for contextual hazard reasoning and integrates them with segmentation-based detection to construct dense risk maps. These maps encode both semantic characteristics (e.g., pothole severity, puddle slipperiness) and physical attributes (e.g., size, depth), which produce per-pixel hazard costs that capture motorcycle-specific risks. These maps are used by a sampling-based planner tailored to motorcycle dynamics to recommend throttle and steering actions that minimize hazard exposure while advancing toward the destination. We evaluate our system in different scenarios in the CARLA simulator. Compared to the baseline method, our method achieves higher success rates and lower hazard exposure, while qualitative results demonstrate interpretable risk maps and safe trajectory recommendations.

LLM agents increasingly operate through multi-turn tool use and environment interaction, where safety risks often emerge from intermediate steps long before they surface in the final outcome. Reactive auditing is therefore insufficient: post-hoc diagnosis frequently misses the chance to flag risks while they are unfolding. We propose TRACES, a representation-based proactive auditor that learns prefix-level trajectory risk states from the hidden representations of an observer LLM. TRACES induces latent mechanism features from step representations and models their temporal evolution to estimate whether a partial trajectory is drifting toward unsafe behavior. To sidestep the cost and ambiguity of step-level risk annotation, TRACES is trained with weak trajectory-level supervision while still producing dense prefix-level risk estimates. Across multiple agent safety benchmarks, TRACES improves both full-trajectory safety prediction and proactive risk discrimination. Our analyses further suggest that these risk states can help train a safer agent, highlighting the broader potential of proactive auditing for long-horizon agent safety.

Finance LLM agents must simultaneously block prompt-induced unauthorized actions and approve legitimate multi-step business workflows. However, boundary filters often miss irreversible mid-trajectory tool calls, while post-hoc LLM judges perform auditing only after termination -- too late for intervention and at a computational cost that scales linearly with trace length. We present FinHarness, an inline safety harness that wraps a finance agent end-to-end with three components: a Query Monitor that fuses single-turn intent with cross-turn drift, a Tool Monitor that evaluates each prospective tool call, and a Cascade module that integrates per-step risk and adaptively routes verification between a lightweight and an advanced-tier LLM judge. Fired risk factors are re-injected into the agent input as ex-ante evidence, enabling the agent to refuse, re-plan, or approve on its own. On FinVault, routed FinHarness cuts ASR from 38.3% to 15.0% while largely preserving benign approval ($41.1\% \to 39.3\%$), and uses $4.7\times$ fewer advanced-judge calls than an always-advanced ablation.

Safety benchmarks for language models are typically evaluated using static paradigms that treat all items as equally informative for all models, an assumption that is particularly problematic for adversarial, highly heterogeneous safety items. Applied in full to modern benchmark suites, the current evaluation procedures would require on the order of $10^5$ responses, most of which provide little ranking signal. We analyze a suite of widely used safety benchmarks and make three contributions toward more efficient safety evaluation. First, we show that Item Response Theory (IRT) recovers interpretable structure on safety benchmarks, with ability estimates resolving differences among models that cluster at the ceiling of raw safety metrics. Second, we show that adaptive item selection, which dynamically chooses informative items for each model based on its responses, approximates full-benchmark rankings while reducing evaluation cost by at least 80% on benchmarks where Spearman's $ρ>$90% with full-benchmark is attainable, and by up to 99.9% on AIR-Bench 2024. Third, we introduce a practical procedure for extracting a fixed, informative subset of items reusable across models, providing an alternative to adaptive selection with savings of up to 99.8% on AIR-Bench 2024. Together, these results establish that psychometric methods enable benchmark-aware reductions in evaluation costs across the safety evaluation pipeline.

Direct Preference Optimisation (DPO) is widely used for safety alignment in large language models. However, prior work shows it is brittle and exhibits poor out-of-distribution (OOD) generalisation. In this paper, we investigate whether Curriculum Learning can improve the robustness of DPO-based safety alignment. We propose Staged-Competence, a curriculum-based framework that organises preference data by difficulty, employs competence-based sampling, and progressively updates the reference model during training. Averaged across three model families, Staged-Competence reduces OOD harmful response rates by 16% and jailbreak attack success rates by 20%, while preserving general capabilities with near-zero over-refusal. We further show that Staged-Competence (1) matches baseline safety with only 75% of the training data and (2) yields better separation between safe and unsafe responses. Staged-Competence is agnostic to the policy optimisation loss and can extend to other DPO variants and alignment domains. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/Sandeep5500/curriculum-learning-for-safety.

Women's safety and security are paramount for a modern society. Crimes against women occur in daylight as well as in low-light conditions. Often, such events are captured through real-world surveillance cameras that operate at lower resolutions. Despite substantial progress in CV-related research, video anomaly detection (VAD) focused on women's safety has not yet been adequately addressed. Existing video anomaly datasets contain well-lit, high-resolution, close-shot videos, and fail to represent women-centric anomalies such as chain snatching, stalking, inappropriate touch, and other subtle forms of crime against women. To address these problems, we propose the ExtrAnom dataset, a new multi-modal benchmark containing 1001 videos with textual descriptions, 500 normal and 501 anomalous, classified into 5 different types of women-centric crimes. The dataset comprises low-light (8%), low-resolution videos (13%), long-shot (15%), along with daylight (64%) anomalous videos. And it covers anomalous events like stalking (3.9%), chain snatching (17.6%), kidnapping (7.3%), assassinations (2.3%), harassment (18.9%), and normal (50%). Each video is supplemented with 4 textual annotations, including one human-generated and three LLM-generated descriptions, enabling cross-modal and VLM-based validations. The aim of creating a women-centric dataset is to accurately detect the women-centric anomaly patterns, which are possible to observe visually. The dataset supplements the VLMs to accurately generate video-level descriptions. ExtrAnom has been benchmarked against popular unimodal and multi-modal VAD datasets (e.g., XD-Violence, UCF-Crime, and UCA) and SOTA methods. Experiments reveal that the existing datasets are insufficient to train models for detecting women-centric anomalies.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) excel at structural reasoning yet suffer from a sharp logical brittleness in structural consistency. We term this phenomenon Structural Cognitive Overload (SCO), a byproduct of the contention between deep reasoning and safety alignment. However, prior work has predominantly targeted typographic and pixel-level perturbations, leaving the study of SCO largely unexplored. To this end, we propose StructBreak, an automated end-to-end framework designed to quantify SCO. By leveraging StructBreak, we uncover a novel higher-order cognitive overload attack paradigm; notably, this attack operates under a practical black-box setting, requiring no internal model access. Consequently, we utilize this framework to establish a comprehensive benchmark spanning ten diverse threat scenarios. Empirical evaluations on six leading MLLMs reveal that SCO readily triggers toxic generation, yielding a 92% average ASR (up to 97% on Gemini 2.5). To elucidate the mechanism of SCO, we further conduct model-level interpretations spanning attention dynamics, latent space topology, and geometric analysis. Our findings reveal that StructBreak acts as a novel structural channel to circumvent safety filters. Furthermore, the limited efficacy of inherent safety mechanisms underscores that current alignment paradigms are insufficient for the era of complex multimodal reasoning.

Pairwise model comparisons drawn from foundation-model benchmarks ("A is safer than B") are read as quantitative verdicts but hinge on harness choices benchmark papers under-specify. We close one theory-benchmark loop on this primitive: a finite-envelope proposition tying a measurable pairwise-disagreement rate to whether the strict ordering admits a configuration-pair reversal, paired with a commit-stamped evaluation protocol that operationalises it on widely cited alignment benchmarks. On every benchmark we test, configuration choice alone can flip the pairwise verdict; the proposition isolates this strict-reversal failure mode.

The widespread integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates rigorous and systematic safety evaluation. Existing paradigms either rely on constructed benchmarks to assess safety from predefined perspectives, or employ dynamic red-teaming to probe potential vulnerabilities. While effective, these approaches face challenges, as they depend heavily on expert domain knowledge, offer limited systematic guarantees, and are vulnerable to rapid obsolescence. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel framework POLARIS that brings the rigor of specification-based software testing to AI safety. POLARIS first compiles unstructured natural-language policies into First-Order Logic (FOL) representations, establishing a traceable link between high-level rules and concrete test cases. This formalization enables the construction of a Semantic Policy Graph, where complex policy violation scenarios are encoded as traversable paths. By systematically exploring this graph, POLARIS uncovers compositional violation patterns, which are then instantiated into executable natural-language test queries, enabling coverage-driven and reproducible safety testing. Experiments demonstrate that POLARIS achieves higher policy coverage and attack success counts compared to established baselines. Crucially, by bridging formal methods and AI safety, POLARIS provides a principled, automated approach to ensuring LLMs adhere to safety-critical policies with verifiable traceability. We release our code at https://github.com/huac-lxy/POLARIS.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures have become an increasingly important paradigm for scaling Large Language Models (LLMs). As MoE models are increasingly deployed in real-world services, safety auditing becomes necessary to verify whether these models produce or facilitate harmful behaviors during operation. However, existing content-based auditing methods typically require access to user prompts, model inputs, or generated outputs, potentially exposing sensitive user information and creating a fundamental tension between LLM safety and user privacy. On the other hand, we observe that, in MoE models, sparse expert routing maps different inputs to activate different expert-execution patterns, producing measurable footprints in low-level GPU execution telemetry. Inspired by this observation, we propose RouteScan, a non-intrusive auditing framework for detecting harmful behaviors through GPU-level expert routing telemetry. Specifically, RouteScan utilizes the number of active GPU threads allocated to expert modules during the prefilling phase as a discriminative micro-architectural fingerprint, and builds a lightweight detection pipeline that isolates cross-domain invariant risk indicators for the precise identification of malicious prompts. Comprehensive evaluations on open-source MoE LLMs with distinct routing designs demonstrate that RouteScan achieves strong generalization, with an AUROC exceeding 0.93 on unseen harmful domains and 0.96 under novel jailbreak wrappers. Moreover, empirical inversion tests show that the collected expert routing telemetry provides limited information for prompt reconstruction, suggesting a practical privacy advantage over content-based auditing methods.

We introduce notions of safety, liveness, and fairness, as commonly used in temporal reasoning, to quantitative (bipolar) argumentation dialogues where repeated inferences are drawn from argumentation graphs with weighted nodes. Between inferences, these graphs undergo updates. Strong and weak safety capture that arguments' (final) strengths remain above a specific threshold of justification and always reach the threshold eventually, respectively. Liveness requires that arguments' strengths fluctuate across the threshold of justification. Fairness notions assess how safe arguments are spread within a sequence of argumentation graphs. We formally show how these notions are related, and discuss some analytical challenges with respect to providing general guarantees for our properties.

We study adversarial multi-armed bandits with and without delayed feedback under a safety-aware goal: achieving minimax-optimal worst-case regret while keeping nearly constant regret relative to a designated "safe" baseline policy. Existing approaches can balance this trade-off with immediate feedback for smooth comparators, but arbitrary delays can mistime transitions between conservatism and exploration, endangering the safety guarantee. To bridge this gap, we propose Prudent-Banker, a novel algorithm that combines a delay-adapted variant of Online Mirror Descent with a modified phased-aggression mechanism. Its key technical contribution is a delay-calibrated restart threshold that rigorously accounts for the worst-case distortion induced by unobserved feedback and reliably detects comparator suboptimality. We also establish new lower bounds for safety-constrained adversarial delayed bandits, showing that the regret guarantees of Prudent-Banker are unimprovable, up to logarithmic factors, under the baseline-safety requirement. To the best of our knowledge, Prudent-Banker is the first algorithm to achieve the optimal safety--robustness trade-off: pseudo-regret $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T}+\sqrt{D})$ together with $\widetilde{O}(1)$ regret against the safe comparator, both with and without delays. Experiments across diverse delay distributions show that, unlike standard delay-robust baselines, Prudent-Banker effectively balances safety and learning.