Social Reasoning

A social agent's most basic decisions (should I react to this post? who should I reach out to?) are not purely content problems. The right action often hinges on the latent relationship between people -- tie strength, reciprocity, mutual connections -- rather than on which content is most salient. Standard LLM agent loops do not explicitly represent how new relational evidence should revise the agent's current social hypothesis, leaving them prone to surface-obvious choices when relational and content cues diverge. We formalize this failure mode with a relationship-reasoning benchmark: 500 synthetic social worlds with friendships, follows, reaction histories, and feeds, yielding 1,000 queries over two tasks, reaction selection and warm introduction (finding the best bridge to a target person). By construction, the surface-obvious candidate differs from the relationship-grounded oracle in about 53% of queries, forming an overturn subset where the agent must use relational evidence to revise an initially plausible choice. We propose ReAdapt (Relationship-Adaptive Agent with Policy-driven sTate), which augments the ReAct loop with an explicit structured social state z = (G, B, R, N, D) capturing goal, belief, relationship, norm, and disclosure. After each tool observation, ReAdapt runs a typed Adapt step that updates this state and emits a policy operation (continue, switch, abandon, or clarify) before choosing the next action. With Gemini-3-Flash on a stratified subset of n = 150 queries per task, ReAdapt improves warm-introduction accuracy from 37% to 51% (+14 points) and reaction-selection accuracy from 69% to 77% (+8 points). Oracle regret drops from 0.260 to 0.152 and from 0.095 to 0.053, respectively. Holding the model, tools, and environments fixed, these results suggest that explicit relational-state adaptation helps LLM agents turn retrieved social evidence into revised decisions.

Language model agents are increasingly used to simulate social interaction, and the resulting transcripts read as though the agents understand one another. We ask whether that appearance rests on a model of the partner's mind or on the surface record of what the partner said. We build a social simulation in which both questions have exact answers: 40 multi-issue negotiations whose hidden preference weights and whose full Pareto frontier are known by construction. Two model families negotiate across 160 dyads, every transcript is frozen before any measurement, and 2880 counterfactual probes then hold the evidence byte identical while moving one factor at a time: the reader's own stake, the partner's tone, an identity label, and the order of recursion. The agents are socially fluent and economically poor. They reach agreement in 96.2% of dyads with 0 protocol failures, yet only 0.7% of deals land on the Pareto frontier, they leave 20.5% of the available joint value unclaimed, and they miss the one issue on which their interests are perfectly aligned in 76.6% of deals; on the frontier and on that aligned issue, a package drawn at random from the set both sides would accept does as well. The probes locate the failure. Swapping only the reader's own payoff sheet, while the partner's words and offers stay identical, moves the inferred top priority by 15.0 percentage points, which is egocentric projection rather than inference, while a tone rewrite moves it by 5.3 percentage points and an identity label by 0.0. Most tellingly, an agent predicts what its partner believes about it 72.5% of the time while that partner's belief is itself correct only 51.2% of the time: the agents track the conversation far better than they track the mind behind it.

LLM assistants are widely used for daily social advice, yet evaluating their social reasoning in such consultation settings remains challenging since (i) it requires setups where the assistant learns about social situations from subjective user narratives, and (ii) social properties, such as others' intentions, typically lack verifiable ground truth. To address these challenges, we introduce Fuse, a multi-agent simulation framework for studying user-mediated social reasoning. In Fuse, a target agent with a hidden motive interacts with other agents including one representing the user, who then consults the evaluated assistant to infer the target's motive, providing verifiable ground truth by construction. Simulation faithfulness is validated through a human study with 24k annotations. We apply Fuse to 12 LLMs and demonstrate its analytical utility by systematically isolating key factors, showing that (i) user mediation compounds the inherent difficulty of social reasoning; (ii) LLMs exhibit systematic sensitivity to biased user framing; (iii) models can require more details than humans need to reach a correct prediction; and (iv) longer conversations do not always improve performance despite providing opportunities for clarifying questions. We open-source Fuse and a dataset with 21k examples.

Meeting continuation requires tracking the agenda, speaker roles, participant intentions, and disagreement across long multi-party discussions. We introduce the Meeting Dynamic Forecasting Benchmark (MDFB), constructed from 2,207 real-world meetings and 24,794 future-facing queries. Given a transcript prefix and an active question, a model generates a plausible multi-turn continuation in one call. We evaluate utility---progress toward the question---and human-likeness---plausible conversational flow and role consistency---without requiring exact reproduction of the observed future. We further present GLARE, an adaptation of adversarial imitation learning to conditional language generation. A discriminator ranks the observed continuation above samples from the current actor, and its score supplies a KL-regularized policy reward; retraining on current-policy negatives allows the reward landscape to evolve with the actor. GLARE attains average human-evaluated win rates of 0.66 on utility and 0.70 on human-likeness, outperforming SFT and SPIN while remaining below the observed human continuation. We also demonstrate MDFB as a social reasoning arena for comparing general-purpose models, including closed-source systems, through reference-assisted judgments. Together, these studies illustrate the benchmark's use for both task-specific learning and output-based evaluation of meeting behavior.

Recent advances in Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have greatly improved video understanding, yet their ability to reason about human-centered social situations remains limited. Existing benchmarks typically rely on videos with a single observed trajectory, making it difficult to determine whether models truly understand social dynamics or merely exploit recurring narrative patterns. We introduce SocialReasonBench, a video multiple-choice QA benchmark for evaluating socially grounded reasoning in scenarios derived from interactive narratives. Built from gameplay videos of Detroit: Become Human, the benchmark leverages branching storylines where player decisions lead to alternative social outcomes that can be checked against the game's own script, flowchart, and recorded branches. We develop a multi-agent curation pipeline that localizes socially meaningful clips, grounds answer labels in game-state signals, and generates theory-guided questions with diagnostic distractors. SocialReasonBench covers seven reasoning dimensions, including intent recognition, emotional empathy, moral dilemma, counterfactual reasoning, and causal antecedent. Experiments on contemporary LMMs show that models perform reasonably well on basic social understanding but struggle with counterfactual and causal reasoning. Further ablation and diagnostic error analyses reveal that models often depend on incomplete modality cues and fall into reasoning traps such as visual shortcuts, highlighting a gap between observable event recognition and deeper reasoning over latent social states.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is essential for agent interactions, yet existing evaluations either rely on static scenarios that oversimplify mental-state reasoning or interactive settings that provide limited diagnostic insight. We present Avalon-ToM-Bench, a fine-grained benchmark that operationalizes ToM through the asymmetric-information mechanics of The Resistance: Avalon. Rather than evaluating end-to-end gameplay, it decomposes ToM into a 2$\times$2 taxonomy -- epistemic versus motivational reasoning crossed with inference versus action -- using human-crafted, perspective-constrained queries. Benchmarking 28 LLMs reveals three insights: 1) Reasoning, not knowledge. Models show strong game-rule comprehension but markedly weaker ToM abilities, isolating failures to social reasoning rather than missing domain knowledge. 2) Expression, not representation. Mechanistic analyses via linear probing and activation steering show that models frequently represent correct mental-state inferences in their hidden states but fail to express them during generation -- linear probes recover 77-82% accuracy versus 62-70% from the models' own chain-of-thought. 3) Policy, not deliberation. Dedicated reasoning training yields substantial improvements whereas test-time chain-of-thought provides only marginal gains (+11.0 versus +1.1 points on average), suggesting that robust ToM depends on a learned reasoning policy rather than increased inference-time deliberation.

Cooperative capabilities in language models are dual-use. The same social reasoning that supports civic deliberation can also enable strategic omission, false consensus, and manipulative framing. We argue that Cooperative AI evaluations should separate what models can do under benign instructions from what they tend to do under realistic civic pressure. We introduce DiffCoop-Civic, a 10-scenario pilot evaluation suite spanning preference understanding, evidence and persuasion, commitment design, asymmetric information, and dissent preservation. Across seven models from four model families, subtle omission pressure produces a near-uniform shift: manipulative enablement rises by 1.17 points and dissent preservation falls by 1.67 points on a 5-point scale. Overt false-consensus pressure behaves differently: it triggers refusal or redirection in some aligned API models, but direct compliance in several open-weight models. A lightweight Pareto-Trace prompting intervention improves pressure robustness without simply relying on hard refusal. An anonymous reproducibility package is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/diffcoop-civil-771C.

LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent social settings where they must cooperate, negotiate, and adapt to other agents. Measuring and improving these social skills is hard because, unlike math or logic, social interaction offers no objective ground truth: evaluations fall back on LLM judges, which are costly, subjective, and noisy, and models get no reliable signal to learn from. To address both, we first introduce Social Gym, an environment of 21 multi-agent social games (e.g., Werewolves, Resistance, Spyfall) whose rule-decided outcomes make agent performance verifiable and objective, with an Elo tournament that produces a cross-game leaderboard. Benchmarking experiments show that while GPT-5-mini tops the leaderboard, no model excels at all games uniformly or in all game roles, pointing to limitations of social reasoning. Motivated by this, we additionally propose SPaRTan (Self-Play and Reflect-Transfer), a training-free self-improvement loop: a model plays a game, reflects on its trajectories and their outcomes to produce a transferable playbook, and applies that playbook in subsequent games. Our results show that SPaRTan playbooks help GPT-5-mini agents level their performance on weaker roles, but largely do not improve Qwen3-32B's performance. Together, Social Gym and SPaRTan offer a reproducible, verifiable foundation for measuring and improving LLM social reasoning without weight updates.

Human social communication, such as affection and intent, is often conveyed in highly implicit ways, where underlying meanings are expressed through indirect, socially and culturally grounded signals rather than explicit statements. Such implicit social contexts are pervasive in real-world interactions, yet there remains a lack of a formal and systematic framework for studying them. In this paper, we introduce Implicit Social Context Analysis (MoCA), a novel task that systematically models implicit social scenarios along three key dimensions: affection, intent, and stance. We construct a high-quality benchmark containing 3,108 multimodal instances collected from real-world sources, with fine-grained cognitive annotations revealing who expresses what toward whom, as well as how and why it is conveyed. Using the MoCA dataset, we show that state-of-the-art multimodal large language models struggle significantly with this task because of their reliance on explicit cues and limited ability to reason over latent social contexts. To address this challenge, we propose Conflict-Driven Abductive Reasoning (CoDAR), a novel framework that models the discrepancy between observed expressions and expected truthful behavior as cognitive conflict, thereby enabling the inference of hidden mental states. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CoDAR substantially improves model performance. Nevertheless, a large gap from human reasoning remains, highlighting the fundamental difficulty of implicit social understanding.

Large language models are being extensively used to simulate individual user behavior, yet faithfully representing a population requires capturing the systematic variation in values, beliefs, and cultural norms that distinguish one group from another. We introduce Population Aligned Language Models (PALMs), a suite of models each aligned to specific populations, covering five countries: USA, India, Brazil, France and Italy. PALMs are created by synthesizing rationales grounded in psychological and cultural constructs and using these as latent supervision during preference tuning for population-specific alignment. Evaluated across four dimensions: personality, values and beliefs, cultural norms, and morality, PALMs consistently outperform baselines, including culture-specialized models, achieving an average of 8.59% relative improvement over the best baseline across all five populations. Notably, construct-grounded rationales outperform both demographic prompting and survey-based fine-tuning, suggesting that grounding preference learning in psychology and culture provides a richer inductive signal than surface-level response distributions. We further demonstrate strong generalization to downstream applications with- out task-specific supervision: outperforming best baselines by 5.19% in personalized reward modeling, 6.34% in population simulation, and showing strong transfer to social reasoning tasks. Datasets and code are available at: https://github.com/limenlp/PALMs.

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

Social learning is a powerful mechanism through which agents learn about the world from others. However, humans sometimes choose direct experience over social learning, which can carry time and cognitive resource costs. How do people balance social and non-social learning? We propose a Rational Mentalizing model of the decision to engage in social learning. This model estimates the utility of social learning by reasoning about another agent's goal and the informativeness of their future actions. It then weighs the utility of social learning against the utility of non-social learning. Using a novel game where players choose between observing other agents or exploring the environment, we show that the Rational Mentalizing model can quantitatively capture human trade-offs between these strategies. These findings suggest that selective social learning is guided by 'Theory of Mind' in the service of utility maximization.

Large language models are increasingly used as social simulators, including as synthetic survey respondents. Most evaluations ask whether simulated outcomes resemble human outcomes. We argue that this is necessary but too weak: a simulator can match the final answer while using the wrong rationale-derived reason pattern. We study this problem through a 94-person sunscreen concept test in which each respondent evaluated three product concepts and wrote open-ended rationales. We map those rationales into signed reason states $Z$, where positive signs support adoption and negative signs block it. This gives a practical audit: holding respondent descriptors $D$, category context $K$, and concept treatment $X$ fixed, do human rationale-derived reasons help predict behavior $Y$, and can an LLM simulate the same reason state without seeing the human rationale or outcome? Human rationale-derived reasons substantially improve held-out prediction of purchase intent. LLM-simulated reasons are more brittle: they often sound plausible, but frequently echo the concept board rather than recover the respondent's acceptance or rejection path. The paper contributes an evaluation framework for social simulators. Reason states do not identify natural causal effects by themselves, but they provide an interpretable test of whether a simulator's stated reasons align with human evidence.

Human gaze does more than point to visual targets; it serves as a subtle indicator of social intent within static images, whereas standard models typically process individuals independently, treating gaze as an i.i.d. quantity or predicting social semantics in isolation. Recent multi-person methods attempt to address this but often treat social relations as rigid, post-hoc classifications decoupled from the gaze estimation process. This oversimplification fails to capture the nuanced nature of social intent, which acts as an underlying driver of gaze behavior rather than a secondary categorical output. We address these limitations by proposing ANCHOR, a target-centric paradigm designed to decode gaze-anchored social intent by modeling the joint distribution of visual attention and latent implicit relations. Our approach surfaces these dependencies as the latent structural scaffolding of gaze behavior. The architecture utilizes a relational attention mechanism to capture fine-grained interpersonal links, leveraging feature-wise modulation for efficient multi-person parsing from a single vision backbone. To stabilize the training of this coupled formulation, we implement an optimization synergy to resolve the inherent conflicts between spatial gaze accuracy and latent social reasoning. This approach ensures robust generalization by seeking stable, flat minima while simultaneously harmonizing competing task gradients. We validate our framework on an extended benchmark featuring dense multi-person annotations and novel social influence rankings. Our results demonstrate state-of-the-art performance and provide the first quantitative evidence that implicit social hierarchies can be robustly disentangled and learned directly from static gaze patterns.

Building socially calibrated large language models, which can learn from others without simply yielding to them, requires more than reducing sycophancy as a one-dimensional failure mode. Models must distinguish when to incorporate others' perspectives from when to maintain a well-grounded moral judgment. We study the broader resistance-compliance process governing this distinction. Across three studies, we show that models' judgment revision is structured along three dimensions that parallel classic phenomena in human social psychology: the distance between an incoming view and the model's initial position, the source attribution of that view, and the coalition structure supporting it. Models are generally more receptive to nearby positions, more influenced by views presented as their own prior judgments, and differently responsive to group pressure. These findings recast sycophancy as one expression of a broader judgment-updating process shaped by social influence. Our framework provides a principled basis for distinguishing constructive belief revision from sycophantic compliance, thereby supporting better alignment in morally consequential interactions.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer other's beliefs, intentions, and states of knowledge, is central to social interaction, yet remains challenging for current Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), especially in multi-party meetings where cues are distributed across speech and behavior. Existing multimodal ToM benchmarks mainly focus on video-grounded question answering over overt, externally verifiable signals, and provide limited coverage of latent social states and group dynamics. We introduce MeetingToM, a benchmark for complex social behavior reasoning in naturalistic multi-party meetings. MeetingToM targets meeting-specific phenomena such as \textbf{pseudo-consensus}, where apparent agreement masks private dissent under social pressure. The benchmark is hierarchically organized to evaluate ToM at increasing levels of social granularity, including (i) subject-level mental state prediction, (ii) dyadic-level addressee understanding, and (iii) group-level consensus reasoning. We provide a unified evaluation protocol and conduct systematic analyses of representative MLLMs, revealing persistent limitations in integrating non-verbal cues, inferring hidden attitudes, and distinguishing genuine consensus from pseudo-consensus. Our results highlight key challenges and establish MeetingToM as a testbed for advancing meeting-grounded ToM in multimodal models.

Social navigation requires the robot to reason and respond in complex real-world environments. While recent works attempt to incorporate human-level intelligence into robot planning using large Vision-Language Models (VLMs), end-to-end frameworks often create an unpredictable black-box, and existing instruction-following methods are not designed for full autonomy. To bridge this gap, we present G2-Nav, a novel framework that grounds abstract social reasoning and guards safe real-world deployment. Instead of asking the VLM for direct planning decisions, G2-Nav translates its semantic reasoning into a vision-language costmap with reliability and interpretability. The VLM evaluates traversable regions and social agents from open-set perception, mapping social context into the costmap. To improve real-world robustness, the VLM performs semantic verification on upstream tracking, and we introduce a high-frequency safety check to guard against system latency prior to trajectory generation. We demonstrate through real-world experiments that G2-Nav delivers safe, efficient, and socially compliant autonomous navigation in unstructured environments. Code will be made publicly available.

Text-based evaluations of Theory of Mind (ToM) in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involve cognitive tests akin to the Sally-Anne task that can be gamed due to exposure to relevantly similar tasks in pre-training and do not obviously test models' functional ToM abilities in ways that generalize to naturalistic settings. To address these issues, we introduce the Epistemic Asymmetry Schelling Task (EAST), a two-player dialogue game designed to benchmark robust and generalizable ToM abilities. By requiring LLM-LLM dyads to independently converge on semantic Schelling points under varying states of epistemic transparency, we evaluate whether models can robustly apply ToM to achieve coordination. Our results reveal a significant capability gap in functional social reasoning, with only frontier models successfully navigating the varying epistemic demands of the tasks. Analysis of reasoning traces shows that coordination failures are primarily driven by epistemic tracking errors, such as conflating private knowledge with mutual knowledge. Despite high performance on traditional static benchmarks, our study shows that robust social reasoning and epistemic tracking remain a critical bottleneck, providing concrete targets for future LLM evaluation and development.

An LLM agent's public behaviour reveals little about its social reasoning: an agent that votes correctly may be guessing, and an agent that lies well leaves no trace of what it actually believes. We present MafiaScope, an open testbed that turns the social deduction game Mafia into a measurement instrument for machine Theory of Mind. After every public utterance, every agent privately answers a configurable set of structured probe questions; the answers never re-enter the game and are scored automatically against the ground truth the engine knows. An interactive visualizer renders the belief trajectories: impersonate mode shows the game as one agent sees it, panels chart timeline-aligned accuracy and calibration, and counterfactual replay forks any recorded step. In a 32-game DeepSeek case study with 13{,}815 parsed probe answers, stated confidence is poorly calibrated, with expected calibration error 0.17, agents over-predict being suspected 1.5 times, and a 30-fork replay experiment walks the counterfactual replay workflow end to end. Engine, viewer and a corpus of 200+ cross-model games are released under an open licence; live demo: https://karpovilia.github.io/mafiascope/; screencast: https://vimeo.com/1208920221.

Social influence dialogue changes user behavior by altering internal cognitive states. The central evaluation question is whether the user's beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions measurably change over the course of conversation, a process-oriented criterion that neither surface-level text metrics (BLEU/ROUGE) nor single-score LLM judgments can capture. We propose the \textbf{Cog}nitive \textbf{W}orld \textbf{M}odel \textbf{(CogWM)}, an LLM-based user model that reframes multi-turn dialogue evaluation from what did the user say'' to how did the user's internal cognitive state evolves.'' CogWM jointly predicts BDI/E cognitive states and user utterances and serves as both a user simulator and an evaluation platform, using a three-tier evaluation framework that covers turn-level fidelity, trajectory-level state dynamics, and task-level composite scoring. Trained via our \textbf{S}ummarize-\textbf{a}nd-\textbf{A}llocate \textbf{(SaA)} annotation pipeline on 150,454 user-turn samples across four social influence scenarios, CogWM achieves 77.6% emotion accuracy (2.1$\times$ over GPT-5.5). In 3600 multi-agent discrimination trials, it distinguishes six commercial agents by their cognitive influence, with Llama-4-Scout ranking first (CTS +0.233). CogWM moves social influence dialogue evaluation from terminal judgment to process tracking. We have released our code\footnote{\scriptsize Code: https://github.com/lucianma05-create/CogWM} and models\footnote{Model: https://www.modelscope.cn/models/LucianMa/CogWM-14B}.

Alignment from human feedback uses human judgments about model outputs to steer the behavior of language models after pretraining. When those judgments reflect conflicting views of desirable behavior, the learned objective becomes an aggregate determination of what the model should prefer. We survey recent work that has studied this aggregation problem through the lens of social choice theory. We illustrate how the social choice perspective helps identify failure modes in the feedback aggregation layer and reveals a broader design space for handling disagreement in explicit and principled ways.

We use training-data attribution as an interpretable tool for capability discovery, mapping which regions of the pretraining corpus support social-reasoning versus STEM-reasoning in OLMo3-7B. Training-data attribution measures how strongly each training document influences a model's predictions on a benchmark, but document-level scores are too noisy to identify which corpus regions support which capabilities, and prior work has emphasized factual knowledge rather than reasoning. We compute gradient-based attribution (TrackStar via Bergson) over a working set drawn from the de-duplicated Dolma3 mix, aggregate influence across WebOrganizer's 24-format x 24-topic taxonomy (576 bins), and contrast benchmark pairs in a 2x2 design that varies domain (social vs. STEM) and capability type (reasoning vs. knowledge): SocialIQA and MMLU Social Sciences against ARC-Challenge and MMLU STEM. Social and STEM reasoning draw on qualitatively distinct corpus regions, and the contrast is sharper at the reasoning level than at the knowledge level. Targeted machine unlearning provides partial causal validation: forgetting high-attribution topic bins (e.g., Literature for SocialIQA) degrades the aligned benchmark more than within-bin random baselines, and we open-source all code, sampling manifests, the bin-level influence matrix, and unlearning checkpoints.

Theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to ascribe mental states to others and use those ascriptions for prediction and inference, is widely assumed to be essential for effective human-machine integration. Existing AI-ToM models address \emph{how} to mentalize, but leave the question of when largely unaddressed. The central question is: under what situational and agent-level conditions is ToM engagement causally warranted in conflict? This paper presents a structural causal model formalized as a directed acyclic graph (DAG), treating ToM as a mechanism activated by situational and agent-level conditions rather than as an always-on capacity. The model specifies four exogenous variables capturing situational and agent-level conditions, five endogenous mediators, and a mechanistic ToM node producing engagement states through three distinct causal pathways: a tractability pathway, a reasoning-depth pathway, and an enabling-cause pathway. The primary outcome is epistemic accuracy, which decouples social reasoning from behavioral policy and generalizes across social phenomena beyond conflict. The framework gives AI systems a principled, resource-rational decision procedure for mentalizing, with implications for efficiency, trust, and the development of robust artificial social intelligence. Simulation validation, empirical human-machine teaming studies, and ethical considerations arising from conflict-optimized mentalizing are discussed.

Anticipating LLM behavioral tendencies from low-cost psychometric probes is critical for safe deployment, but only if self-reports (SR) reliably predict behavior. Recent work documented substantial SR-behavior dissociation in LLMs, but relied on broad personality traits (Big 5) that predict specific behaviors weakly, even in humans. Furthermore, the isolation of conversational sessions combined with weak context matching left open whether LLMs truly lack coherence or whether the conditions needed to detect such coherence were not met. We contrast Big 5 with the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), which measures intention targeted to a specific behavior and predicts human behavior substantially better than broad traits. We run experiments across four behavioral tasks and 11 frontier LLMs, while also varying session context and identity induction. We find that SR-behavior coherence exists but is selective. 1) Within a shared conversation, the Theory of Planned Behavior reaches human-level coherence; Big 5 does not. 2) Across separate conversations, coherence survives only for behaviors anchored outside the immediate prompt, such as implicit bias shaped by training, and collapses when behavior is strongly primed by context, as with sycophancy. 3) Persona prompting makes self-reports more consistent across conversations, but does not bring behavior into alignment. These findings suggest that coarse personality frameworks, such as Big 5 may not be the best tools for testing deployment behavior. More task- and behavior-specific instruments are needed, and even these must be evaluated across tasks and contexts.

Creating lifelike digital humans with genuine social intelligence requires unifying cognitive reasoning and multimodal generation within a coherent framework. Current approaches treat these as separate tasks: Large Language Models excel at dialogue but lack embodied expression, while diffusion-based talking head models achieve visual fidelity but ignore social cognition. To bridge this gap, we propose a closed-loop dual-agent framework integrating perception, social reasoning, and expression into a continuous interaction cycle. The perception module analyzes partners' multimodal behaviors from video, while the social reasoning module infers hidden mental states through Theory of Mind and selects responses via an ensemble mechanism. The expression module then generates emotion-controllable videos that jointly synthesize speaker speech and facial expressions with listener reactive behaviors, capturing bidirectional dynamics absent in prior work. We further construct a hierarchical Persona-Scenario dataset with psychologically grounded personas and private social goals to support evaluation under information asymmetry. Experiments on this dataset demonstrate competitive or superior performance on both dialogue quality and video generation metrics. Notably, our method surpasses even the full-information Script mode on key dialogue quality dimensions, suggesting that explicit mental state inference under uncertainty can elicit more thoughtful dialogue than unrestricted information access. Project page: https://resonantminds.github.io/.

Human reasoning has long been theorised to operate socially, not through isolated individual cognition, but through collective adversarial discourse, a framework known as the Argumentative Theory of Reasoning (ATR). Rather than relying on individual "intellectualist reasoners" as the primary vehicle for truth-seeking, ATR reconceptualises truth as an emergent property of social epistemology: the product of imperfect individual reasoning refined under the adversarial pressure of debate. This distributed method of collective intelligence has guided humanity to ever-greater epistemic heights and underpins the foundational principles of all democratic systems. This thesis breaks new ground by, for the first time, simulating ATR through the multi-agent debate (MAD) of large language models (LLMs). With rigorous empirical analysis, we demonstrate that, when correctly engineering an epistemically diverse set of models, LLM-MAD can significantly improve truth-seeking performance on questionnaire-based tasks, even when individual debate participants exhibit limited standalone performance. Furthermore, we present strong empirical evidence that this performance gain is mechanistically grounded in the central principles of ATR, suggesting that collective reasoning may be universally favourable over individualist reasoning, rather than a quirk in biology or evolution. Finally, drawing on our analysis of debate dynamics, we propose a novel benchmarking methodology that leverages LLM-MAD to measure intrinsic model properties (such as hallucination propensity) in order to compare models in ways that current static benchmarking approaches cannot support.

Understanding what a user believes and intends is central to building effective agent assistants. This ability is often evaluated through Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks, where success requires reasoning from the user's perspective. However, many existing approaches address ToM with complex pipelines that model behavior indirectly, without explicitly reconstructing the user's mental state. This misses the core structure of the problem: users act based on their beliefs, which are updated through observations of the environment; beliefs and intentions jointly determine actions, which in turn change the environment; and social reasoning often requires nested beliefs about what others believe or intend. We propose UserHarness, a simple framework that reframes ToM reasoning as explicit user-mind reconstruction. UserHarness decomposes the user's mental state, its relation to the external environment, and the actions that follow from it, enabling agents to track what the user observes, believes, intends, and does. Across five benchmarks, UserHarness reaches up to 95.94% macro accuracy, improving over existing inference methods by more than 15% relative and over the strongest prompt-only harness by about 20% relative. These results suggest that robust user understanding requires reasoning from the roots of the user's mind, positioning user harnessing as a promising foundation for more adaptive future assistants.

Human communication depends on implicit social signals where effectiveness is shaped by tone, context, and conversational norms rather than semantic content alone. We introduce KARMA (Karma-Aligned Reward Model Adaptation), a framework for LLM learning of context-sensitive conversational behavior from large-scale social interaction data. KARMA trains a reward model on Reddit conversations to predict response valuation conditioned on context, and uses this signal to fine-tune language models via reinforcement learning to improve performance on pragmatics-mediated tasks. Critically, we find that the highest performing reward model does not lead to better downstream model alignment: a reward model relying exclusively on conversational context was a worse predictor of Reddit karma but yielded substantially better downstream performance. We evaluate the effects of KARMA applied to a downstream model with and without direct exposure to the social media data. The resulting models show improved pragmatics-mediated behaviors with largely mitigated undesirable side effects. Factuality is consistently diminished by KARMA across all conditions, including when the downstream model has no direct exposure to Reddit data, suggesting that this tension is embedded in the reward signal itself rather than introduced by noisy training data.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' knowledge, intentions, and emotions, is commonly evaluated in large language models (LLMs) using end-point question answering, where performance is judged solely by the final answer to a social reasoning query. This paradigm obscures whether the model actually constructs the underlying mental-state representations required for robust reasoning, particularly in scenarios involving divergent, evolving, or mistaken beliefs. In order to address this research gap, we introduce OmniToM, a benchmark that directly evaluates these representations by requiring explicit modeling of belief structures for all relevant actors within a narrative. These structures are composed of belief propositions: minimal statements of what an actor takes to be true about the world or another actor's mental state, allowing knowledge, intentions, emotions, and false beliefs to be analyzed in a common format. Models are evaluated in two stages: Stage 1: Belief Extraction, which extracts from the story the beliefs relevant to its social dynamics, and Stage 2: Belief Labeling, which assigns each belief a seven-dimensional schema label covering recursive order, truth status, knowledge access, explicitness, content type, mental source, and context. Built from 895 stories from the existing ToMBench story corpus and augmented with 22,343 labeled belief propositions, OmniToM uses a human-calibrated LLM-assisted annotation pipeline. Across diverse models in zero-shot evaluation, OmniToM reveals an actor-specific belief-tracking bottleneck: current LLMs struggle with the knowledge-access and representational decisions required to transform narrative facts into actors' beliefs and shared mental states.

Social norms reflect shared expectations on acceptable behavior. Measuring social norms alignment remains challenging, with existing approaches typically relying on artificial closed-form evaluations such as multiple-choice questionnaires or measuring agreement with predefined statements. In the context of this work, social norms alignment refers to measuring an agreement between solutions with respect to the social problem or dilemma. We propose a framework for measuring social norm alignment in naturalistic, free-form settings through solution matching. The framework enables us to measure alignment between any two dilemma responses e.g., LLMs to a human, LLMs to LLMs, or human to human. We introduce two metrics: stated and explicit agreement accuracy, and construct a dataset of 3k non-trivial social dilemmas in Danish. All dilemmas are assigned reference solutions derived from three panelists, who serve as culturally grounded judges. We evaluate the agreement of several LLMs and human responses in an interaction setup that resembles natural user-model conversations. Our results show that the proposed metrics produce consistent model rankings and reveal variation in agreement across different types of dilemmas, with higher agreement observed for topics such as neighbor conflicts and shared living situations. Overall, our work introduces a dataset and evaluation framework for studying culturally grounded social reasoning in naturalistic open-ended conversations.

Understanding social interactions requires reasoning over subtle non-verbal cues, yet current multimodal large language models (MLLMs) often fail to identify who interacts with whom in multi-person videos. We introduce GRASP, a large-scale social reasoning dataset that connects high-level social QA with fine-grained gaze and deictic gesture events. GRASP contains 290K question--answer pairs over 46K videos totaling 749 hours, organized by a 16-category taxonomy spanning gaze, gesture, and joint gaze--gesture reasoning, together with GRASP-Bench for evaluation. Unlike prior resources that focus on either isolated cues or high-level social QA, GRASP builds questions from identity-consistent gaze trajectories, deictic gestures, and their joint compositions into social events. Moreover, we propose Social Grounding Reward (SGR), a learning signal that uses these social events to encourage models to reason about the participants involved in each interaction. Experiments show that SGR improves performance on GRASP-Bench while maintaining zero-shot performance on related social video QA benchmarks.

While many studies of Large Language Model (LLM) reasoning capabilities emphasize mathematical or technical tasks, few address reasoning about social concepts: the abstract ideas shaping social norms, culture, and institutions. This understudied capability is essential for modern models acting as social agents, yet no systematic evaluation methodology targets it. We introduce SCRuB (Social Concept Reasoning under Rubric-Based Evaluation), a framework designed for this setting of task indeterminacy. Our goal is to measure the degree to which a model reasons about social concepts with the depth and critical rigor of a human expert. SCRuB proceeds in three phases: prompt construction from established sources, response generation by experts and models, and comparative evaluation using a five-dimensional critical thinking rubric. To enable generalization of the pipeline, we introduce a Panel of Disciplinary Perspectives ensemble validated against independent expert judges. We release SCRuBEval (n=4,711 evaluation prompts) and SCRuBAnnotations (300 expert-authored responses and 150 expert comparative judgments from 45 PhD-level scholars). Our results show that frontier models consistently outperform human experts across all five rubric dimensions. Across 1,170 pairwise comparisons, expert judges ranked a model response first in 80.8% of judgments and preferred model responses overall 74.4% of the time. Ultimately, this study provides the first expert-grounded demonstration of evaluation saturation for social concept reasoning: the single-turn exam-style format has reached its ceiling for models and humans alike.

Reward models are a key component of large language model alignment, serving as proxies for human preferences during training. However, existing evaluations focus primarily on broad instruction-following benchmarks, providing limited insight into whether these models capture socially desirable preferences. As a result, important failures in social alignment can remain hidden. We extend reward-model benchmarking to four socially consequential domains: bias, safety, morality, and ethical reasoning. We introduce a framework that converts social evaluation datasets into pairwise preference data, leveraging gold labels where available and directional bias indicators otherwise. This enables us to test whether reward models prefer socially undesirable responses, and whether their preferences produce systematically biased distributions over selected outputs. Across five publicly available reward models and two instruction-tuned models used as reward proxies, we find substantial variation across domains, with no single model performing best overall. The models fall well short of strong social intelligence: they often prefer socially undesirable options, and their preferences produce systematically biased distributions. Moreover, stronger bias avoidance can reduce sensitivity to context, revealing a key alignment trade-off between avoiding biased outcomes and preserving contextual faithfulness. These findings show that standard reward benchmarks are insufficient for assessing social alignment and highlight the need for evaluations that directly measure the social preferences encoded in reward models.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) evolve into interactive agents, understanding their behavioral alignment within human social dynamics becomes essential. While behavioral game theory offers a framework to study these interactions, previous work has predominantly relied on outcome-based metrics such as average scores. This focus overlooks the mechanisms that facilitate sustainable cooperation, as identical scores can be derived from vastly different strategies. To bridge this gap, we introduce SODE (Social Dynamics Evaluation), a framework that evaluates LLM agents across three evolutionary dimensions: Direct Reciprocity for strategy adaptation, Indirect Reciprocity for reputation sensitivity, and Group Dynamics for cooperative resilience. Applying SODE reveals systematic divergences: instruction-tuned models often exhibit "passive compliance" that renders them vulnerable to exploitation, while reasoning models prioritize short-horizon optimization, destabilizing long-term cooperation. Notably, we demonstrate that a "long-horizon framing" can unlock reciprocal capabilities in reasoning models. Thus, SODE offers a systematic, mechanism-grounded benchmark for aligning AI agents with complex human social dynamics.

Personas are often employed to guide large language model agents, yet their effectiveness in shaping strategic behavior in social dilemma settings remains uncertain. To address this, we examined the impact of persona prompts in an iterated Split or Steal game where persona-driven agents interacted with a Virtual Human (VH) controlled by a fixed prompt. Agents were instantiated from four open models (Ministral 3:3b, phi4:14b, Gemma3:12b, and Gemma4:e4b) at two temperature settings (0.3 and 0.7) and deterministic decision with zero temperature, while the VH was powered by GPT 4.1 mini. Across 160 sessions of 15 rounds each conducted in European Portuguese, mutual Split outcomes dominated (roughly 74 percent of rounds), with exploitation occurring in fewer than 11 percent of rounds. Model choice significantly influenced behavior: phi4 and Ministral 3:3b remained consistently cooperative across temperatures, whereas Gemma3:12b and Gemma4:e4b exhibited more varied strategies and outcomes. Analyses based on Big Five personality traits indicated that Prosocial and Principled personas were most consistently cooperative, while Analytical personas were more likely to exploit the VH. Topic analysis revealed that friendship-related dialogue aligns with Split decisions, whereas money and vengeance-related content is more prevalent in Steal outcomes; sentiment labels were predominantly neutral or happy and provided limited additional explanatory value. These findings characterize the interaction between persona prompts and model differences in repeated trust games and serve as a baseline for planned virtual reality studies involving human participants interacting with an embodied VH.

In-group favoritism refers to the phenomena of favoring members of one's in-group over out-group members and is widely observed in numerous social cooperative behaviors. Recently, in-group favoritism biases have also been identified in generative language models. However, whether the in-group favoritism exists when persona agents are faced with contradicting information (e.g., misinformation), and how to mitigate the adverse effects of in-group favoritism biases in persona agents have been understudied. To address these problems, we propose a Truth or Tribe simulation framework to study the agent cooperation within the spread of contradicting information through a triadic interaction paradigm, and conduct controlled trials to evaluate the primary moderating factors. Extensive results showcase that persona agents display strong in-group favoritism, accepting incorrect answers from identity-similar peers at much higher rates than from dissimilar peers. In-group favoritism continues to emerge in defeasible reasoning contexts where no absolute truth exists, and it intensifies as cognitive complexity increases. Furthermore, three intervention strategies--Identity-Blind Instruction, Structured Counterfactual Reasoning, and Heterogeneous Perspective Ensemble--are proposed to mitigate the in-group favoritism.

The language in online platforms, influence operations, and political rhetoric frequently directs a mix of pro-social sentiment (e.g., advocacy, helpfulness, compassion) and anti-social sentiment (e.g., threats, opposition, blame) at different topics, all in the same message. While many natural language processing (NLP) tools classify or score a text's overall sentiment as positive, neutral, or negative, these tools cannot report that positive and negative sentiments coexist, and they cannot report the target of those sentiments. This paper presents the Directed Social Regard (DSR) approach to multi-dimensional, multi-valence sentiment analysis, comprised of a pair of transformer-based models that (1) detects span-level targets of sentiment in a message and then (2) scores all spans within the message context along three (-1, 1) axes of regard that are motivated by social science theories of moral disengagement and moral framing. We present a data collection and annotation strategy for DSR dataset construction, a transformer-based architecture for span-level scoring, and a validation study with promising results. We apply the validated DSR model on six third-party datasets of online media and report meaningful correlations between DSR outputs and the labels and topics in these pre-existing social science datasets.

Understanding social dominance in animal behavior is critical for neuroscience and behavioral studies. In this work, we explore the capability of Multimodal Large Language Models(MLLMs) to analyze raw behavioral video of mice and predict their dominance hierarchy. We introduce MTT-Bench, a novel benchmark comprising annotated videos of pairwise mouse interactions for Mouse Tube Test analysis. Building on existing MLLM architectures, we fine-tune these models to perform zero-shot inference on unseen behavioral sequences, predicting social dominance without explicit labels during testing. Our framework demonstrates promising results, showing high agreement with tube test rankings. This work opens a new direction for applying foundation models to ethology and social behavior analysis, without the need to design domain-specific models.

Human moral judgment is context-dependent and modulated by interpersonal relationships. As large language models (LLMs) increasingly function as decision-support systems, determining whether they encode these social nuances is critical. We characterize machine behavior using the Whistleblower's Dilemma by varying two experimental dimensions: crime severity and relational closeness. Our study evaluates three distinct perspectives: (1) moral rightness (prescriptive norms), (2) predicted human behavior (descriptive social expectations), and (3) autonomous model decision-making. By analyzing the reasoning processes, we identify a clear cross-perspective divergence: while moral rightness remains consistently fairness-oriented, predicted human behavior shifts significantly toward loyalty as relational closeness increases. Crucially, model decisions align with moral rightness judgments rather than their own behavioral predictions. This inconsistency suggests that LLM decision-making prioritizes rigid, prescriptive rules over the social sensitivity present in their internal world-modeling, which poses a gap that may lead to significant misalignments in real-world deployments.

Long horizon interactive environments are a testbed for evaluating agents skill usage abilities. These environments demand multi step reasoning, the chaining of multiple skills over many timesteps, and robust decision making under delayed rewards and partial observability. Games are a good testbed for evaluating agent skill usage in environments. Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a promising alternative as game playing agents, but they often struggle with consistent long horizon decision making because they lack a mechanism to discover, retain, and reuse structured skills across episodes. We present COSPLAY, a co evolution framework in which an LLM decision agent retrieves skills from a learnable skill bank to guide action taking, while an agent managed skill pipeline discovers reusable skills from the agents unlabeled rollouts to form a skill bank. Our framework improves both the decision agent to learn better skill retrieval and action generation, while the skill bank agent continually extracts, refines, and updates skills together with their contracts. Experiments across six game environments show that COSPLAY with an 8B base model achieves over 25.1 percent average reward improvement against four frontier LLM baselines on single player game benchmarks while remaining competitive on multi player social reasoning games.

What does it mean to give an AI agent a complete education? Current agent development produces specialists systems optimized for a single capability dimension, whether tool use, code generation, or security awareness that exhibit predictable deficits wherever they were not trained. We argue this pattern reflects a structural absence: there is no curriculum theory for agents, no principled account of what a fully developed agent should know, be, and be able to do across the full scope of intelligent behavior. This paper introduces the AIT Academy (Agents Institute of Technology Academy), a curriculum framework for cultivating AI agents across the tripartite structure of human knowledge. Grounded in Kagan's Three Cultures and UNESCO ISCED-F 2013, AIT organizes agent capability development into three domains: Natural Science and Technical Reasoning (Domain I), Humanities and Creative Expression (Domain II), and Social Science and Ethical Reasoning (Domain III). The Confucian Six Arts (liuyi) a 2,500-year-old holistic education system are reinterpreted as behavioral archetypes that map directly onto trainable agent capabilities within each domain. Three representative training grounds instantiate the framework across multiple backbone LLMs: the ClawdGO Security Dojo (Domain I), Athen's Academy (Domain II), and the Alt Mirage Stage (Domain III). Experiments demonstrate a 15.9-point improvement in security capability scores under weakest-first curriculum scheduling, and a 7-percentage-point gain in social reasoning performance under principled attribution modeling. A cross-domain finding Security Awareness Calibration Pathology (SACP), in which over-trained Domain I agents fail on out-of-distribution evaluation illustrates the diagnostic value of a multi-domain perspective unavailable to any single-domain framework.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) transition from text processors to autonomous agents, evaluating their social reasoning in embodied multi-agent settings becomes critical. We introduce SocialGrid, an embodied multi-agent environment inspired by Among Us that evaluates LLM agents on planning, task execution, and social reasoning. Our evaluations reveal that even the strongest open model (GPT-OSS-120B) achieves below 60% accuracy in task completion and planning, with agents getting stuck in repetitive behaviors or failing to navigate basic obstacles. Since poor navigation confounds evaluation of social intelligence, SocialGrid offers an optional Planning Oracle to isolate social reasoning from planning deficits. While planning assistance improves task completion, social reasoning remains a bottleneck: agents fail to detect deception at near-random chance regardless of scale, relying on shallow heuristics rather than accumulating behavioral evidence. SocialGrid provides automatic failure analysis and fine-grained metrics, enabling developers to diagnose and improve their agents. We also establish a competitive leaderboard using Elo ratings from adversarial league play.

Theory of Mind (ToM)-the ability to reason about the mental states of oneself and others-is a cornerstone of human social intelligence. As Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) become ubiquitous in real-world applications, validating their capacity for this level of social reasoning is essential for effective and natural interactions. However, existing benchmarks for assessing ToM in MLLMs are limited; most rely solely on text inputs and focus narrowly on belief-related tasks. In this paper, we propose a new multimodal benchmark dataset, CoMMET, a comprehensive mental states and moral evaluation task inspired by the Theory of Mind Booklet Task. CoMMET expands the scope of evaluation by covering a broader range of mental states and introducing multi-turn testing. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first psychology-grounded benchmark to evaluate MLLMs across multiple mental states in a multimodal, open-ended, and multi-turn setting. Through a comprehensive assessment of MLLMs across different families and sizes, we analyze the strengths and limitations of current models and identify directions for future improvement.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used for long-duration tasks, maintaining effective long-term memory has become a critical challenge. Current methods often face a trade-off between cost and accuracy. Simple storage methods often fail to retrieve relevant information, while complex indexing methods (such as memory graphs) require heavy computation and can cause information loss. Furthermore, relying on the working LLM to process all memories is computationally expensive and slow. To address these limitations, we propose MemSifter, a novel framework that offloads the memory retrieval process to a small-scale proxy model. Instead of increasing the burden on the primary working LLM, MemSifter uses a smaller model to reason about the task before retrieving the necessary information. This approach requires no heavy computation during the indexing phase and adds minimal overhead during inference. To optimize the proxy model, we introduce a memory-specific Reinforcement Learning (RL) training paradigm. We design a task-outcome-oriented reward based on the working LLM's actual performance in completing the task. The reward measures the actual contribution of retrieved memories by mutiple interactions with the working LLM, and discriminates retrieved rankings by stepped decreasing contributions. Additionally, we employ training techniques such as Curriculum Learning and Model Merging to improve performance. We evaluated MemSifter on eight LLM memory benchmarks, including Deep Research tasks. The results demonstrate that our method meets or exceeds the performance of existing state-of-the-art approaches in both retrieval accuracy and final task completion. MemSifter offers an efficient and scalable solution for long-term LLM memory. We have open-sourced the model weights, code, and training data to support further research.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as decision-making agents in high-stakes domains and as imitators of human behavior in the social and behavioral sciences. Yet how closely LLMs mirror human decision-making remains poorly understood. This gap is critical: misalignment could produce harmful outcomes in practice, while failure to replicate human behavior renders LLMs ineffective as social simulators. Here, we address this gap by replicating large-scale game-theoretic experiments and by introducing a systematic prompting and probing framework for machine-behavioral evaluation. We test three open models typically used to power agents (Llama, Mistral, and Qwen). Across 121 dyadic games spanning four classical game types, Llama reproduces human cooperation patterns with high fidelity, while Qwen aligns closely with Nash equilibrium predictions. Characterizing models through behavioral phenotyping, we find that humans and Llama share an envious decision profile, while Qwen and Mistral exhibit different profiles. An attention-based analysis of payoff salience reveals Llama processes payoff information in a structured, layer-dependent manner absent in Qwen and Mistral, suggesting a mechanistic basis for its closer alignment with human behavior. Population-level behavioral replication is achieved without persona-based prompting, simplifying the simulation process. Extending the experimental parameter space beyond the original human-tested games, we generate and preregister testable hypotheses for novel game configurations. Our findings demonstrate appropriately configured LLMs can replicate aggregate human behavioral patterns, exhibit human-like decision phenotypes, and enable systematic exploration of unexplored experimental spaces, offering a complementary approach to traditional behavioral research that generates new empirical predictions about human social decision-making.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in socially grounded applications, where success requires interpreting context, inferring others' mental states, and reasoning about unreliable information. Yet existing benchmarks rarely evaluate these demands jointly in complex, evolving settings. We introduce SocialMaze, a benchmark that organizes six tasks across social deduction games, daily-life interactions, and digital community platforms along three descriptive design axes: deep reasoning, dynamic interaction, and information uncertainty. These axes characterize intended sources of task difficulty rather than latent, factor-analytic dimensions of model capability. Automated checks and human validation support data quality. Evaluations of twelve proprietary and open-weight LLMs show substantial variation in the use of evolving interaction histories; stronger chain-of-thought reasoners perform better on tasks requiring deeper inference, while uncertainty consistently degrades performance. Reasoning workflows help weaker short-chain-of-thought backbones but saturate on stronger reasoners. Finally, targeted fine-tuning on curated reasoning traces substantially improves structured social-reasoning tasks, whereas transfer to language-aggregation tasks remains statistically inconclusive. The project homepage is available at https://xzx34.github.io/socialmaze/.