Prices

We propose the Integrable Context-Dependent Demand Network (ICDN), a demand-first neural model for multiproduct retail demand. The model learns log-demand as a smooth, context-conditioned function of log-prices, allowing elasticities to be derived exactly from the learned demand surface. On the Dominick's beer dataset, ICDN improves out-of-sample generalization over a directed log-log benchmark and yields more stable, economically plausible elasticity estimates, especially for weakly identified cross-price effects.

Modelling claim frequency and severity for non-life insurance pricing predominantly relies on generalised linear models, with gradient-boosted machines as the leading machine learning alternative. Tabular foundation models (TFMs) present a fundamentally different inference paradigm. By pre-training on large collections of synthetic datasets, TFMs enable inference on new data through in-context learning, without any dataset-specific fitting or hyperparameter tuning. This paper presents a first empirical evaluation of TabPFN for motor insurance pricing, benchmarking it against GLM and XGBoost on two publicly available MTPL datasets. Our results show that TabPFN does not consistently outperform established baselines, exhibits substantially longer inference times, and is sensitive to the size of the in-context training set. While tabular foundation models represent a promising direction, particularly in data-scarce settings, their current performance does not offer a viable replacement for established actuarial methods.

Shilling is the use of artificial bids to make competition appear stronger and push prices upward. We study repeated first-price auctions in which shilling affects feedback but not allocation: the learner wins or loses against the real competing bid, but after a loss observes the maximum of the real bid and an independent shill bid. Thus the manipulation changes what the learner observes and hence how it learns to bid, without changing the outcome of the current auction. We analyze regret with respect to the best bid benchmark, assuming that the shill-bid distribution is known. Even then, shilling can mask the real bid, while useful side information appears only through intermittent low-shill events. Our algorithm combines a robust interval-elimination branch, which ignores the shilled report and achieves the dynamic-pricing rate $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$, with an optimistic branch that debiases losing-side reports and exploits the resulting suffix information when it is reliable and achieves the first-price auctions rate $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$. A validation and racing procedure lets the algorithm use these optimistic updates without knowing the right scale or feedback geometry in advance. We complement the upper bounds with a matching lower bound, up to logarithmic factors, in the single-active-region case. Overall, the results show that even feedback-only shilling can sharply alter the statistical difficulty of repeated bidding.

Multi-Robot Task Allocation (MRTA) is a central challenge in decentralized multi-agent systems, where teams of robots must cooperatively assign and execute tasks under limited communication while optimizing global performance objectives. Auction-consensus algorithms, such as the Consensus-Based Bundle Algorithm (CBBA), provide scalable decentralized coordination with provable convergence, but rely on hand-crafted greedy scoring functions that often lead to suboptimal task allocations. This paper proposes a learning-enhanced auction-consensus framework in which CBBA's deterministic bidding mechanism is replaced by a neural bidding policy trained using reinforcement learning. Under a centralized training and decentralized execution paradigm, agents learn to compute task bids from partial local observations while retaining the standard auction and consensus phases for decentralized coordination. The learned bidding policy is trained using Proximal Policy Optimization with rewards shaped by proximity to globally optimal solutions obtained via mixed-integer linear programming. Multiple neural architectures are evaluated, including a Neural Additive Model, the Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) model, and the Set Transformer Model. Experimental results across varying swarm sizes demonstrate that learned bidding policies can improve solution quality over classical CBBA while preserving decentralized execution. The proposed approach highlights the effectiveness of integrating reinforcement learning with classical distributed coordination algorithms, offering a scalable pathway toward higher-quality decentralized multi-robot task allocation.

Logged advertising auctions make offline reserve-price evaluation attractive but risky. Replay tables can identify policies with large apparent yield gains, yet they can also hide weak threshold support, multiple-comparison effects, subgroup harm, and bidder-response uncertainty. Existing replay and off-policy evaluation methods estimate or rank policy values, but they do not directly answer the operational question of whether the available evidence is strong enough to justify validation. This paper develops a support-aware offline decision framework for reserve-policy selection. Rather than outputting a single point-estimate winner, the framework converts logged evidence into a conservative decision object consisting of certified policies, statistically dominated alternatives, and unresolved candidates requiring further validation. The main theoretical result gives a unified finite-catalog guarantee showing that, under simultaneous uncertainty control and conservative support gates, the framework preserves the best gate-passing policy while eliminating only policies with certified regret. Supporting results characterize support-localized replay generalization, establish information-theoretic threshold-resolution limits, and quantify when heterogeneous bidder response can overturn localized replay rankings. Experiments on iPinYou real-time-bidding logs show that the leading reserve rule achieves a 47.66% replay lift in season two, a 40.71% simultaneous lower-bound lift, and a 43.87% frozen out-of-time replay lift in season three. The framework reduces a 19-policy catalog to a two-policy validation shortlist while certifying non-harm across 44 advertiser, exchange, and region segments. The results support the central claim that offline reserve-policy evaluation should produce certified validation decisions rather than point-estimate rankings alone.

We describe an adaptive market-making architecture that preserves the analytical structure of the Avellaneda--Stoikov framework while introducing a successor measure-style adaptation mechanism. In our paper we keep Avellaneda--Stoikov fast Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman structure and make it adaptive to changing market regimes and trading objectives. The central idea is to separate market dynamics from the trading objective. The market state determines a low-dimensional set of Avellaneda--Stoikov parameters, while recent realized rewards determine a low-dimensional objective vector. The HJB forward map then converts this objective into optimal bid and ask quotes through a scalarization of future reward features.

Firms increasingly rely on dynamic pricing to respond to evolving customer demand, yet in many applications they observe only the revenue generated by a single posted price in each period. At the same time, market conditions may shift gradually or abruptly due to changes in customer preferences, competition, or external shocks. These features create two intertwined challenges: learning the revenue--demand relationship from limited feedback and adapting pricing decisions to a changing environment. We study how a seller can learn and earn effectively under these constraints, without assuming a specific parametric form for demand. We develop a learning framework that updates prices using revenue-based gradient approximations constructed from one observation per period. To address environmental changes, we incorporate a restarting mechanism that periodically refreshes the learning process so that outdated information is discounted. When the degree of nonstationarity is unknown, we further introduce a meta-learning layer to adaptively hedge across multiple restarting schedules. We provide performance guarantees for our approach, showing how cumulative revenue loss relative to a fully informed benchmark depends on both the time horizon and the magnitude of market variation. Simulation experiments using synthetic and real-world data illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed procedures.

This paper proposes a computationally efficient mechanism for multi-dimensional matching markets where agents report preferences over object features rather than complete utility assessments. We use Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to identify the principal direction of variation in feature space and match agents to objects along this dimension, reducing a complex multi-dimensional problem to an effectively one-dimensional problem solvable in $O(N \log N)$ time. We show that when data exhibit low effective dimensionality, our mechanism approximately maximizes Nash Social Welfare, satisfies distributional truthfulness, and achieves symmetry. We establish a novel connection between Nash Social Welfare and Geometric Distributionally Robust Optimization, providing robustness guaranties. Numerical experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves 99% optimal welfare while running three orders of magnitude faster than direct optimization. The framework applies naturally to school choice, labor markets, and course allocation, where feature-based elicitation reduces the cognitive burden on agents.

In this paper, we investigate whether deep reinforcement-learning agents interacting in a shared optimal-execution environment can sustain supra-competitive outcomes, in the sense of achieving lower implementation shortfalls than the relevant game-theoretical competitive benchmark. We study a two-agent Almgren-Chriss liquidation game and examine how learned behavior depends on intra-episode environment feedback, the ability to interpret the mid-price and the agent's knoledge of the past. We first use ex-ante schedule-learning agents to remove intra-episode feedback and isolate what can arise when agents commit to complete liquidation trajectories before execution begins. We then allow agents to condition on the evolving state using a variety of DDQN architectures. We find that, when agents are given access to intra-episode history, especially recent prices and own past actions, supra-competitive outcomes become substantially more frequent and more persistent. These findings indicate that supra-competitive behavior in this execution game is driven not by multi-agent learning or by current price observation alone, but by feedback, memory, and state-contingent interaction along the realized execution path.

We study an online market-making problem in which a learner sequentially posts bid and ask prices for a single asset while interacting with traders holding private valuations. Unlike existing online learning formulations that assume fully censored feedback, we introduce an action-dependent feedback model inspired by real limit order books: when a trade occurs, the trader's valuation remains hidden, whereas when no trade occurs, informative feedback about supply and demand is revealed. We show that this additional information fundamentally changes the learnability of the problem. In the stochastic setting with i.i.d. market prices, we propose an elimination-based algorithm that achieves $O(\sqrt T)$ regret with high probability, without requiring any smoothness assumptions on the distribution of trader valuations. We then extend this result to a broad class of mean-reverting price processes by considering both local, autoregressive dynamics and a weaker global drift condition based on cumulative deviations from the mean. Under either assumption, we establish high-probability $O(\sqrt T)$ regret bounds, relying on a new concentration inequality of independent interest. Finally, in the adversarial setting with oblivious prices, we design an explore-then-perturb algorithm that guarantees $O(T^{2/3})$ regret in expectation. Our results quantify the value of observing the order book in online market making and demonstrate that even limited, action-dependent feedback can substantially improve regret guarantees compared to standard bandit feedback models.

Automated bidding is central to modern digital advertising. Early rule-based methods lacked adaptability, while subsequent Reinforcement Learning approaches modeled bidding as a Markov Decision Process but struggled with long-term dependencies. Recent generative models show promise, yet they lack explicit mechanisms to balance exploration and safety, relying solely on action perturbations or trajectory guidance without a safety fallback. This results in inefficient exploration and elevated financial risk for advertising platforms. To address this gap, we propose GUIDE (Generative Auto-Bidding with Unified Modeling and Exploration), a framework that synergistically integrates directed exploration with a safe fallback mechanism. GUIDE employs a Decision Transformer (DT) to jointly model historical bidding actions and environmental state transitions. A Q-value module guides the DT's exploration via regularization constraints, while an Inverse Dynamics Module (IDM) leverages DT-predicted future states to infer robust, behaviorally consistent actions as a safe policy fallback. The Q-value module then adaptively selects the final action between these two options, balancing exploration and safety. Together, these components form an integrated "explore-safeguard-select" pipeline that unifies efficiency and safety. We conduct extensive experiments on public datasets, in simulated auction environments, and through large-scale online deployment on Taobao, a leading Chinese advertising platform. Results show GUIDE consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines across all scenarios. In real-world deployment, GUIDE achieves notable gains: +4.10% ad GMV, +1.40% ad clicks, +1.66% ad cost, and +3.52% ad ROI, demonstrating its effectiveness and strong industrial applicability.

Personalized pricing negotiations are a challenging testbed for LLM agents because successful interaction does not guarantee profitable decision making. A seller may produce valid actions and close many deals while still pricing poorly when buyer willingness to pay and bargaining traits remain hidden. This paper presents PrefBench, a simulator-based benchmark for hidden-preference personalized pricing negotiations. Each episode pairs a simulated buyer with a fixed vehicle-customization bundle; the seller observes public persona descriptors, bundle information, and negotiation history, while latent buyer variables govern valuation, patience, counter-offer behavior, and walkaway decisions. PrefBench evaluates this setting through an LLM-facing state-summary protocol that constrains agents to return strict JSON actions under a fixed hidden-information boundary. We evaluate zero-shot LLM sellers against heuristic references over 7,500 episodes. The tested LLMs follow the protocol reliably and achieve deal rates above 0.99, but their seller-profit outcomes remain weak: the best LLM average profit is only slightly above the random baseline and far below a simple concession heuristic under the same episode stream. These results show that structured action compliance and agreement-seeking behavior can coexist with weak profit-sensitive bargaining. PrefBench provides a controlled benchmark for evaluating pricing-agent behavior under hidden buyer preferences.

This paper compares gradient boosting and long short-term memory (LSTM) architectures for intraday directional prediction in Micro E-Mini Nasdaq 100 futures (MNQ). Motivated by recent foundation-model research on financial candlestick data, including the Kronos architecture, we test whether five-minute OHLCV bar sequences contain exploitable sequential predictive structure at the scale of a single instrument dataset. Using 944 trading days from 2021-2025, four model configurations are evaluated under strict expanding-window walk-forward validation across three out-of-sample periods. The target variable is whether the session close exceeds the 10:30 AM open by more than ten points. No configuration produces statistically significant out-of-sample accuracy above the 51.8% base rate. Combined OOS accuracies range from 50.00% to 50.89% across gradient boosting variants, while the LSTM achieves 50.59%. Permutation tests yield p-values of 0.135 for the best gradient boosting model and 0.515 for the LSTM, indicating no statistically significant predictive edge. Feature importance instability across walk-forward folds suggests noise fitting rather than stable structural signal capture. The results indicate that four years of single-instrument five-minute OHLCV data are insufficient for reliable sequential ML-based intraday forecasting. The primary contribution is a documented evaluation of a Kronos-inspired architecture on a constrained real-world dataset, providing an empirical lower bound on data scale requirements for sequential financial ML.

Regime shifts in financial markets reorganise the joint dynamics of asset prices and macro variables, breaking any single-regime calibration. They are nonetheless difficult to detect reliably because the data signal is noisy and heavily multicollinear, while the contemporaneous text that announces them is unstructured. Standard regime shift detection methods rely solely on structured time-series data and ignore policy communications, even though these texts often signal shifts before they materialise in observed prices. We propose a text-enhanced regime shift detection pipeline that combines large language model (LLM) reasoning over central-bank communications with statistical validation on multivariate financial time series. The framework is detector-agnostic: text-proposed candidates are validated using a bootstrap likelihood-ratio test on a vector autoregression (VAR), while data-driven candidates from arbitrary regime detectors are ratified through a lenient LLM text check. We evaluate the framework on 2010-2024 FOMC minutes paired with a 14-variable U.S. Treasury and macroeconomic panel, using four interchangeable data-driven detectors. The proposed pipeline achieves F1 = 0.82 against a verified anchor list of monetary-policy regime shifts, with same-day modal detection latency and consistently stronger performance than pure data-driven baselines. The results demonstrate that combining unstructured policy text with statistical structural-break detection improves the robustness and interpretability of regime shift identification in financial markets.

This study develops and evaluates a deep reinforcement learning framework for dynamic portfolio allocation across global equity markets. The Soft Actor-Critic algorithm is used to learn continuous portfolio weights within a Markov Decision Process, incorporating transaction costs, turnover penalties, and diversification constraints into the reward function. Five model configurations are compared, varying in reward formulation, policy structure (flat versus hierarchical Dirichlet), portfolio constraints, and temporal encoder (LSTM versus Transformer), and evaluated via walk-forward optimization across sixteen out-of-sample folds spanning 2003-2026 on the Nasdaq-100, Nikkei 225, and Euro Stoxx 50. Results show that RL strategies achieve competitive risk-adjusted performance primarily in the Euro Stoxx 50, where statistically significant abnormal returns are observed, but the central hypothesis is only partially confirmed: no strategy achieves statistically significant excess returns relative to Buy and Hold under HAC-robust inference across all markets. Regime analysis reveals that RL adds the most value during periods of elevated uncertainty, while ensemble aggregation across markets improves risk-adjusted performance and confirms the benefits of geographic diversification.

Accurate forecasting of the Volatility-Covariance Matrix (VCV) is central to regulatory capital adequacy processes such as the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) and the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). Traditional econometric models, including GARCH-family and Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) approaches, suffer from parametric rigidity, distributional assumptions, and numerical instability under stress, leading to systematic underestimation of tail risk. This paper proposes and validates a novel Hybrid Gaussian Process Regression-Historical Simulation (GPR-HS) framework for estimating Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) across a diversified portfolio of seven major global equity indices. The framework decouples the VCV estimation problem: individual asset volatilities are modelled dynamically using Univariate GPR with a Matern 5/2 kernel, while inter-asset correlations are estimated via stable historical covariance. A key methodological contribution is the Aggressive Noise Initialization (ANI) strategy, which sets the initial White Noise kernel variance equal to the empirical variance of the training returns, ensuring Gram matrix positive-definiteness, regularization, and conservative, regulatory-compliant forecasts. Evaluated using an expanding window forward-chaining cross-validation scheme over June 2020 -June 2025, the GPR-HS framework achieves regulatory compliance in the majority of test splits; including a 100% ES pass rate at the portfolio level, while outperforming the static Historical VaR benchmark in 71.4% of univariate cases by Quadratic Loss and 100% of cases by violation count.

Portfolio optimization in real-world financial markets is notoriously difficult due to non-stationarity, noisy data, and high transaction costs. Standard predict-then-optimize methods first forecast returns and then solve for weights, compounding prediction errors and often failing under regime shifts. We propose an end-to-end framework that directly optimizes differentiable surrogates of key financial metrics (Sharpe ratio, Omega ratio, Conditional Value-at-Risk, and risk parity), allowing neural networks to learn portfolio weights via backpropagation. Our expanding-window walk-forward procedure, applied to 50 S&P 500 stocks from 2007 to 2023, incorporates realistic bid-ask spread costs and rebalances quarterly. On the challenging out-of-sample test period (2022-2023), the best model, an AttentionLSTM with the Omega-CVaR-RiskParity loss, achieves an annualized Sharpe of 0.29 and a total compounded return of +7.86%, while the S&P 500 delivers -4.52% total compounded return and an annualized Sharpe of -0.02. This outperforms the S&P 500 by 12.38 percentage points, while keeping tail risk (CVaR) nearly unchanged. The framework outperforms the equal-weight portfolio, S&P 500, and traditional methods (MVP, HRP, NCO, ERC), demonstrating that embedding financial objectives directly into model training yields robust, economically meaningful outperformance even in adverse market conditions.

Capped-usage SaaS products -- LLM subscriptions such as Claude Code and ChatGPT, cloud platforms such as Vercel and Cloudflare Workers, corporate benefit platforms, identity-verification services with liability transfer -- share a structural signature with insurance products: a fixed premium decoupled from realized consumption, stochastic per-user demand with heavy-tailed severity, a non-fungible cap that resets on a fixed schedule, and a portfolio-level exposure that requires reserve adequacy under tail risk. We argue that this is not an analogy. It is the same operational problem actuarial science has been tooled for decades to address, restated with new dependent variables (tokens, bandwidth bytes, function-invocations, gym check-ins) in place of medical claims. This paper proposes a modeling framework for capped-usage SaaS pricing built from frequency-severity decomposition, premium calculation principles, and Monte Carlo reserve adequacy. We map the framework to publicly observable subscription tiers in two domains (LLM services and cloud platforms), ground it in canonical health-insurance economics (Arrow 1963; Pauly 1968; Manning et al. 1987; Brot-Goldberg et al. 2017), and demonstrate divergence from traditional unit economics through a worked example. The contribution is operational rather than theoretical: not a new theorem, but vocabulary and tools currently absent from cs.LG/stat.ML practice.

Differential privacy changes the effective sample size governing CVaR learning. For tail mass $τ$, the privacy-relevant sample size is not $n$, but $nτ$; equivalently, the effective private tail sample size is $εnτ$. Private CVaR excess risk decomposes into ordinary tail-risk statistical error and a privacy price. This decomposition is complete for scalar estimation and finite classes: scalar estimation has rate $Θ(B \min\{1,(nτ)^{-1/2}+(εnτ)^{-1}\})$, and finite classes of size $M$ have rate $Θ(B \min\{1,\sqrt{\log(2M)/(nτ)}+\log(2M)/(εnτ)\})$. These complete rates hold under pure DP, and their lower bounds extend to approximate DP in the stated small-$δ$ regimes. For convex Lipschitz learning, modular upper and lower reductions show that the CVaR-specific privacy term necessarily scales as $1/(εnτ)$, with dimension dependence inherited from private stochastic convex optimization. Together, these results identify ordinary private learning on $Θ(nτ)$ informative tail records as the canonical hard subproblem inside private CVaR learning.

The integration of advertising auction mechanisms into large language model (LLM)-based chatbots presents a significant opportunity for commercialization, yet poses unique challenges in balancing relevance, efficiency, and user experience. Recently, Feizi et al.\citep{feizi2023online} and Hajiaghayi et al.\citep{hajiaghayi2024ad} outlined a retrieve-then-generate paradigm that decouples retrieval and generation, offering lightweight ad insertion and payment determination. However, current retrieval relies solely on text embedding similarity, which may lead to commercial misinterpretation and issues such as repetitive insertions. In this paper, we propose LERA, a two-stage retrieve-then-generate auction framework tailored for LLM chatbots. In the first stage, embedding-based coarse filtering pre-selects a small set of candidate advertisers. In the second stage, the LLM itself is queried with a carefully designed prompt to produce logits over candidates, which serve as refined organic relevance scores. These scores are combined with bids, and a critical-value payment rule accounts for both the coarse-filtering and fine-ranking thresholds, ensuring truthfulness for utility-maximizing advertisers. The framework naturally extends to multiple ad insertions within dynamic dialogue flows and long responses. Experiments on a synthetic advertiser-query benchmark show that LERA substantially improves ad selection accuracy and insertion diversity while incurring only controllable latency overhead.

We study whether simple algorithmic pricing systems can systematically produce collusive-like prices in multi-firm markets. We consider firms that price using a myopic estimate-then-optimize rule: each repeatedly fits a demand model to its own price and sales history and sets the price that maximizes estimated profit. This demand model is misspecified, omitting competitors' prices. We analyze the dynamics of this rule when it is initialized by an exploration phase of independent random prices. We characterize when this pipeline converges to supra-competitive prices above the Nash equilibrium, via a fluid-limit ordinary differential equation analysis. We show that supra-competitive prices arise when firms initially explore within similar price ranges on the same side of the Nash price. Moreover, prices can be substantially above the Nash price; we show that prices can reach monopoly levels under symmetric exploration. Simulations calibrated to a real multifamily rental market confirm that supra-competitive outcomes arise robustly beyond our theoretical assumptions, including under finite horizons, heterogeneous products, and nonlinear logit demand.

We study contextual dynamic pricing in a semiparametric scalar-index valuation model where the latent value is $v_t=μ_\ast(\mathsf c_t)+ξ_t$, with an unknown utility map $μ_\ast$ and an unknown additive noise distribution. The key decision object is the one-dimensional oracle price map $u\mapsto p^\ast(u)$ induced by the scalar index $u=μ_\ast(\mathsf c)$ and the noise tail. Under the $β$-Hölder smoothness of the tail function for $β\geq 2$ and a revenue-geometry condition that gives a unique, stable, interior maximizer, this oracle map is itself $(β-1)$-smooth. We exploit such structure through $\mathsf{ORBIT}$, a modular coarse-to-fine policy that takes a scalar pilot index as input, localizes a benchmark price in each active bin, and learns a local polynomial approximation of the oracle map inside a trust region via bandit convex optimization. For the baseline linear utility model $μ_\ast(\mathsf c)=\mathsf c^\topθ_\ast$, an adaptive elliptical exploration scheme constructs the required scalar pilot online without distributional assumptions on the contexts. The resulting policy achieves regret $\widetilde{O}\big(T^{\frac{2β-1}{4β-3}}+\sqrt{dT}\big)$. For fixed $d$, we establish a matching lower bound in the horizon dependence, unveiling that the nonparametric oracle-map learning term is minimax sharp. The same scalar-pilot interface also yields extensions to sparse high-dimensional linear utility and nonparametric Hölder utility.

We introduce \textsc{Cattle Trade, a multi-agent benchmark for evaluating large language models (LLMs) as agents in strategic reasoning under imperfect information, adversarial interaction, and resource constraints. The benchmark combines auctions, hidden-offer trade challenges (TCs), bargaining, bluffing, opponent modeling, and resource allocation within a single long-horizon game lasting 50--60 turns. Unlike prior agent benchmarks that test these abilities in isolation, \textsc{Cattle Trade} evaluates whether agents integrate them across a competitive, multi-agent economic game with conflicting incentives. The benchmark logs every bid, TC offer, counteroffer, and card selection, enabling behavioural analysis beyond final scores or win rates. We evaluate seven cost-efficient language models and three deterministic code agents across 242 games. Strategic coherence, in particular spending efficiency, resource discipline, and phase-adaptive bidding, is associated with rank more strongly than spending volume or any single subskill. Two heuristic code agents outperform most tested LLMs, and behavioural traces surface recurring LLM failure modes including overbidding, self-bidding, bankrupt TC initiation, and weak opponent-state adaptation. Evaluating agentic competence requires benchmarks that test the joint deployment of multiple capabilities in multi-agent environments with conflicting incentives, uncertainty, and economic dynamics.

In algorithmic markets, predictive models become part of the data-generating process they aim to forecast. Once their outputs are converted into trades, allocations, execution schedules, or risk controls, they change the future data on which they are evaluated. I introduce algometrics, a framework for time series whose evolution depends on the predictive algorithms forecasting them. The framework distinguishes historical risk, measured under passive forecasting, from deployment risk, measured when forecasts drive actions. I prove three results. First, deployment risk is not identifiable from passive historical data alone: even in a one-step linear feedback model, infinitely many algorithm-mediated environments induce the same historical law while implying different deployment risks for the same forecaster. Second, historical model rankings can invert under crowding, so a predictor with lower passive error can have higher deployment error once similar algorithms are adopted. Third, randomized or instrumented actions identify short-horizon linear feedback, and I derive a finite-sample bound for deployment-risk estimation. These results suggest that time-series benchmarks in algorithmic markets should report feedback sensitivity alongside predictive accuracy.

Predicting cross-sectional stock returns is challenging due to low signal-to-noise ratios and evolving market regimes. Classical factor models offer interpretability but limited flexibility, while deep learning models achieve strong performance yet often underutilize financial priors. We address this gap with PRISM-VQ (PRior-Informed Stock Model with Vector Quantization), a dynamic factor framework that integrates expert prior factors, vector-quantized discrete latent factors learned from cross-sectional structure, and a structure-conditioned Mixture-of-Experts to generate time-varying factor loadings. Vector quantization acts as an information bottleneck that suppresses noise while capturing robust market structure, with discrete codes serving both as latent factors and as routing signals for temporal expert specialization. Experiments on CSI 300 and S&P 500 show consistent improvements in cross-sectional return prediction and portfolio performance over strong baselines while preserving interpretability. Our code is available at https://github.com/finxlab/PRISM-VQ.

Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation. It is also a canonical testbed for agentic language models, requiring multi-turn interaction under hidden preferences, strategic communication, and binding constraints. These properties make negotiation hard to evaluate: unlike math or code, it has no intrinsic verifier. Existing LLM negotiation evaluations rely on LLM-vs.-LLM interaction or aggregate outcomes such as deal rate, leaving failures opaque. We introduce Terms-Bench, short for Testbed for Economic Reasoning in Multi-turn Strategy, a Bayesian-game framework that makes the environment itself the verifier by specifying the counterpart's latent type, policy, and payoff structure. We instantiate it in bilateral price negotiation, where the counterpart's private state and simulator policy are hidden from the agent but observable to the evaluator. This turns the counterpart from a black-box opponent into a diagnostic instrument, enabling agent-attributable failure analysis and oracle-reference optimality gaps. Evaluating 13 LLM agents spanning frontier systems from major providers, Terms-Bench turns negotiation evaluation from aggregate ranking into actionable diagnosis: where agents fail, why they fail, and what to strengthen. Empirically, frontier models saturate deal rate yet diverge in surplus extraction, cue use, belief calibration, and compliance, revealing agent-specific bargaining bottlenecks masked by prior benchmarks.

Marketplace platforms routinely evaluate pricing and allocation policies using logged observational data, yet strong offline performance does not imply that a policy is safe to deploy. In real-time bidding (RTB) marketplaces, reserve-price and floor-policy changes affect not only revenue but also fill, advertiser value, budget pacing, and competition across auctions, creating feedback and interference. The central problem is therefore not to estimate whether a policy improves an offline metric, but to determine whether the available evidence justifies direct launch or only further validation. In this regard, we propose a support-aware decision-support system (DSS) that distinguishes promising from actionable evidence. The framework integrates replay, support-aware off-policy evaluation (OPE), conservative lower-bound ranking, multi-sided guardrails, out-of-time validation, sensitivity analysis, and interference-aware validation design into a claim-preserving pipeline that outputs a launch-readiness classification rather than a single performance estimate. Applying the framework to iPinYou-style RTB logs, we identify a margin-gated floor policy as the leading candidate, with a 47.7% replay yield lift, a 45.8% conservative lower-tail lift, and stable out-of-time performance. However, the framework does not recommend direct launch. A decision-rule ablation shows that simplified pipelines select the same policy but incorrectly recommend deployment, leaving key causal assumptions unresolved. In contrast, the proposed DSS selects the same policy but changes the action to online validation, reflecting missing evidence on propensities, bidder response, and interference. Overall, the contribution is a reproducible DSS protocol that prevents decision overclaim under partial identification and converts offline evaluation into an auditable, action-oriented recommendation.

Reinforcement learning agents for portfolio management are typically trained and deployed as static policies, with no mechanism for using price forecasts at inference time. We propose $\text{FPILOT}$ (Financial Plugin Inference-time Learning for Optimal Trading), a plugin inference-time optimization framework inspired by Model Predictive Control (MPC). Our key structural insight is that future prices mostly do not depend on one agent's portfolio allocation, so a suitable predictive model can produce a multi-step price trajectory without iterative action-conditioned rollouts as in typical reinforcement learning. At each decision step, we use the forecaster's predicted price trajectory to construct an allocation-based imagined return objective, and optimize the policy at inference-time before executing one step of the trade. Our framework is compatible with any pre-trained agent and adapts the policy to the forecaster's predictions without any retraining. Evaluated across five policy learning algorithms on the TradeMaster DJ30 benchmark, $\text{FPILOT}$ produces consistent improvements in total return and return-based risk-adjusted metrics (Sharpe, Sortino, Calmar), with stochastic policies benefiting more than deterministic ones. Further, using synthetic forecasts at calibrated quality levels, we show that gains consistently improve with forecaster quality, suggesting that our performance will improve based on advances in financial forecasting.

The growing share of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) in modern power systems increases both grid imbalances and frequency deviations, reinforcing the need for ancillary services such as Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR) and passive balancing. Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) are well-suited for these services, but prior research typically relies on uniform FCR bids that remain constant throughout the control period. Such static bids fail to fully exploit BESS flexibility, as they do not balance the trade-off between reserving energy for FCR delivery and using it for imbalance arbitrage, limiting the achievable value in value-stacking settings. To address this limitation, we propose a two-stage control framework for the European context that introduces non-uniform FCR bids. In the first stage, we derive a time-varying bid sequence using data-driven Monte Carlo (MC) optimization. In the second stage, a Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) agent leverages the residual flexibility for real-time imbalance trading while proactively managing the State of Energy (SoE) to ensure compliance with FCR requirements. The framework is presented as a proof of concept, highlighting the potential benefits of time-varying bidding strategies. By incorporating daily cycle budgets and time-varying reserve commitments, our approach achieves a 7.56% profit increase compared to uniform baselines. These results show that non-uniform bidding can unlock additional value by more effectively aligning reserve obligations with rapidly changing imbalance opportunities.

We study proportional representation in the temporal voting model, where collective decisions are made repeatedly over time over a fixed horizon. Prior work has extensively investigated how proportional representation axioms from multiwinner voting (e.g., justified representation (JR) and its variants) can be adapted, satisfied, and verified in this setting. However, much less is understood about their interaction with social welfare. In this work, we quantify the efficiency cost of enforcing proportionality. We formalize the welfare-proportionality tension via the worst-case ratio between the maximum achievable utilitarian welfare and the maximum welfare attainable subject to a proportionality axiom. We show that imposing proportional representation in the temporal setting can incur a growing, yet sublinear, welfare loss as the number of voters or rounds increases. We further identify a clean separation among axioms: for JR, the welfare loss diminishes as the time horizon grows and vanishes asymptotically, whereas for stronger axioms this conflict persists even with many rounds. Moreover, we prove that welfare maximization under each axiom is NP-complete and APX-hard, even under static preferences and bounded-degree approvals, and provide fixed-parameter algorithms under several natural structural parameters.

This paper develops a joint spectral radius (JSR) framework for analyzing rank-one deflated Q-value iteration (Q-VI) in discounted Markov decision process control. Focusing on an all-ones residual correction, we interpret the resulting algorithm through the geometry of switching systems and, to the best of our knowledge, give the first JSR-based convergence analysis of deflated Q-VI for policy optimization problems. Our analysis reveals that the standard Q-VI switching system model has JSR exactly the discount factor $γ\in (0,1)$, since all admissible subsystems share the all-ones vector as an invariant direction. By passing to the quotient space that removes this direction, we obtain a projected switching system model whose JSR governs the relevant error dynamics and may be strictly smaller than $γ$. Therefore, the deflated Q-VI admits a potentially sharper convergence-rate characterization than the ambient-space $γ$-bound. Finally, we prove that the correction is equivalent to a scalar recentering of standard Q-VI. Hence, the projected trajectory, and therefore the greedy-policy sequence, is unchanged relative to standard Q-VI initialized from the same point. The benefit of deflation is not a change in the induced decision-making problem, but a more precise JSR-based description of the convergence geometry after the redundant all-ones component is removed.

We study sparse recovery when observations come from mixed-quality sources: a small collection of high-quality measurements with small noise variance and a larger collection of lower-quality measurements with higher variance. For this heterogeneous-noise setting, we establish sample-size conditions for information-theoretic and algorithmic recovery. On the information-theoretic side, we show that it is sufficient for $(n_1, n_2)$ to satisfy a linear trade-off defining the Price of Quality: the number of low-quality samples needed to replace one high-quality sample. In the agnostic setting, where the decoder is completely agnostic to the quality of the data, it is uniformly bounded, and in particular one high-quality sample is never worth more than two low-quality samples for this sufficient condition to hold. In the informed setting, where the decoder is informed of per-sample variances, the price of quality can grow arbitrarily large. On the algorithmic side, we analyze the LASSO in the agnostic setting and show that the recovery threshold matches the homogeneous-noise case and only depends on the average noise level, revealing a striking robustness of computational recovery to data heterogeneity. Together, these results give the first conditions for sparse recovery with mixed-quality data and expose a fundamental difference between how the information-theoretic and algorithmic thresholds adapt to changes in data quality.

We address the problem of maximizing Gain from Trade (GFT) in repeated buyer-seller exchanges subject to global budget balance constraints. While this problem is well-understood in purely adversarial and stochastic settings, these environments exhibit a sharp dichotomy: adversarial environments allow for no-regret learning against the best fixed-price mechanism, whereas stochastic environments allow for no-regret learning against the best distribution over prices that is budget balanced in expectation. This gap is significant, as policies balanced in expectation can increase the GFT by a multiplicative factor of two. In this work, we bridge these extremes by studying perturbed markets, where an underlying stochastic distribution is subject to an adversarial corruption $C$. We design an algorithm that adaptively scales with the level of corruption, achieving an $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4}) + \mathcal{O}(C\log(T))$ regret bound against the best budget-balanced distribution over prices. Simultaneously, our algorithm maintains the worst-case $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4})$ regret bound relative to a per-round budget-balanced baseline, ensuring optimality even in fully adversarial environments.

In industrial procurement, an LLM answer is useful only if it survives a standards check: recommended material must match operating condition, every parameter must respect a regulated threshold, and no procedure may contradict a safety clause. Partial correctness can mask safety-critical contradictions that aggregate LLM benchmarks rarely capture. We introduce IndustryBench, a 2,049-item benchmark for industrial procurement QA in Chinese, grounded in Chinese national standards (GB/T) and structured industrial product records, organized by seven capability dimensions, ten industry categories, and panel-derived difficulty tiers, with item-aligned English, Russian, and Vietnamese renderings. Our construction pipeline rejects 70.3% of LLM-generated candidates at a search-based external-verification stage, calibrating how unreliable industrial QA remains after LLM-only filtering. Our evaluation decouples raw correctness, scored by a Qwen3-Max judge validated at $κ_w = 0.798$ against a domain expert, from a separate safety-violation (SV) check against source texts. Across 17 models in Chinese and an 8-model intersection over four languages, we find: (i) the best system reaches only 2.083 on the 0--3 rubric, leaving substantial headroom; (ii) Standards & Terminology is the most persistent capability weakness and survives item-aligned translation; (iii) extended reasoning lowers safety-adjusted scores for 12 of 13 models, primarily by introducing unsupported safety-critical details into longer final answers; and (iv) safety-violation rates reshuffle the leaderboard -- GPT-5.4 climbs from rank 6 to rank 3 after SV adjustment, while Kimi-k2.5-1T-A32B drops seven positions. Industrial LLM evaluation therefore requires source-grounded, safety-aware diagnosis rather than aggregate accuracy. We release IndustryBench with all prompts, scoring scripts, and dataset documentation.

Accurate stock price forecasting has consistently remained a pivotal yet challenging FinTech task that underpins quantitative trading and investment decision making. Recent efforts have been dedicated to modeling various complex relationships among stocks in the stock market toward more reliable stock price forecasting.These methods depend heavily on strong static prior assumptions by modeling either temporal dependencies within individual stocks or spatial dependencies across different stocks based on predefined structures, while the complex market dynamics that drive stock price movements remain unexplored. To alleviate this issue, we propose a novel game-theoretic modeling method that captures heterogeneous investor interactions for stock price forecasting. The core idea is to embed game-theoretic mechanisms into the heterogeneous graph structure to finely model the dynamic strategic interactions among heterogeneous investors with respect to target stocks. Additionally, temporal positional encoding is adopted to reflect the differentiated influences of each game event at different time steps within the time window on future stock price movements. Leveraging heterogeneous graph networks, we proxy the intricate dynamics of the stock market through investor games and enable real-time information propagation and node updates among all nodes. Extensive experiments conducted on two real-world benchmark dataset demonstrate that our method effectively outperforms state-of-the-art stock price forecasting methods.

The transition to First-Price Auctions (FPA) in digital advertising has spurred significant research, yet existing work typically assumes access to a valuation oracle, ignoring the reality that values must be inferred from censored data. While Linear Treatment Effect (LTE) models address this by learning value uplift, they have not been adapted to realistic settings with hard Budget constraints or Return-on-Spend (RoS) targets requiring regret and violation control. In this work, we propose a unified primal-dual framework for constrained FPAs that jointly learns the latent LTE valuation parameters and the competitor's bid distribution. This simultaneous learning introduces a critical technical challenge: the estimation error is dynamically scaled by the Lagrangian multiplier, potentially leading to unbounded regret. We resolve this by leveraging a strong Slater condition and a novel adaptive burn-in procedure to stabilize the dual variables. Our approach achieves near-optimal regret guarantees, providing the first theoretically grounded solution for constrained bidding with latent valuations.

Public procurement is vulnerable to error, fraud, and corruption, particularly as high transaction volumes overwhelm oversight. While research often focuses on tender-stage anomalies, post-award payment monitoring remains underexplored. Since labelled datasets are rare and methods like Benford's Law face restrictive assumptions, there is a need for interpretable, unsupervised frameworks for high-volume procurement oversight and decision support. This paper introduces the Structural Heterogeneity Index (SHI), a composite statistic for one-dimensional samples, and its payment-specific instantiation, the Payment Heterogeneity Index (PHI), characterising payment structure and latent regimes. It incorporates Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) parameters alongside non-parametric statistics, integrating four interpretable components: modality, asymmetry, tail behaviour, and structural dispersion. Uniquely, the tail-behaviour component captures both distributional heaviness and extreme-value concentration, while structural-dispersion combines the variability, prevalence, and separation of latent payment regimes. Applied to UK municipal procurement data, PHI identifies a financially significant cohort (0.6% of suppliers; 10.1% of high-volume vendors) with structurally distinct payment patterns. Statistical testing further supports these differences, and targeted human verification confirms the plausibility of prioritised cases. Comparative analysis shows PHI reveals regime separation obscured by the Coefficient of Variation ($ρ= 0.310$). PHI provides a transparent, decomposable, and computationally lightweight framework for procurement integrity oversight and targeted audit prioritisation.

Accurate and efficient imbalance electricity price forecasting is critical for industrial energy trading systems, especially as battery assets and automated bidding pipelines increasingly participate in balancing markets. However, real-time forecasting is complicated by nonlinear market-rule-based price formation, heterogeneous input signals, and incomplete data availability caused by communication delays, publication lags, and measurement outages. This paper proposes a market-rule-informed neural forecasting framework that embeds imbalance price formation rules into the latent space of an expressive neural network. The proposed framework preserves raw signal information while exploiting transparent market-rule priors. We further analyze operational robustness by removing price-component information and characterize how forecasting performance scales with input length and forecasting horizon. Experimental results show that the proposed model achieves competitive forecasting performance with substantially fewer trainable parameters and shorter training time than generic deep learning baselines. Experimental results show that the proposed model achieves competitive forecasting performance with substantially fewer trainable parameters and shorter training time than generic deep learning baselines, demonstrating that market-rule priors and expressive neural networks should be jointly used for accurate and computationally sustainable forecasting in industrial energy trading applications. The implementation is publicly available at https://runyao-yu.github.io/MRINN/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to forecasting. To evaluate this capability while mitigating pre-training data contamination, several living benchmarks have been proposed. However, existing benchmarks either lack the multidimensional events essential for accurate forecasting due to data scarcity, or focus on relatively closed environments. To assess the predictive capabilities of LLMs in complex, real-world scenarios, we propose LEAF, the first living benchmark for event-augmented forecasting tasks, including future event probabilities, trend and time series forecasting. LEAF utilizes a recursive retrieval agent system paired with dual-agent cross-validation to provide comprehensive and relevant auxiliary text for forecasting. Evaluating state-of-the-art proprietary and open-weight LLMs, we find that these models can leverage signals extracted from complex events to enhance predictive performance. In the stock domain, we find that LLMs achieve better performance on equities they confidently identify as more predictable. Furthermore, the events demonstrate a strong correlation with the target equities. To this end, LEAF provides a necessary, dynamically updating testbed to continuously track and drive progress in event-driven forecasting tasks.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) transition into conversational agents, generative advertising emerges as a crucial monetization strategy. However, embedding advertisements within unstructured LLM outputs introduces a critical trilemma: balancing advertiser payoffs, platform revenue, and user experience. Existing methods, such as prompt injection or rigid position slots, disrupt semantic coherence and lack a parametric framework for independent control, rendering rigorous mechanism design intractable. To bridge this gap, we introduce Neuron Auctions, a novel paradigm that shifts the auction object from the surface text space to the LLM's internal representations. Leveraging mechanistic interpretability, we identify brand-specific feed-forward network (FFN) neurons and demonstrate that competing brands activate within approximately orthogonal subspaces. This near-perfect independence allows us to define continuous, disentangled intervention budgets (specifically, neuron counts and amplification factors) as auctionable commodities. Building on this computational carrier, we design a continuous menu-based auction mechanism that naturally guarantees strategy-proofness and optimizes revenue for the platform. By explicitly incorporating a user utility penalty into the platform's optimization objective, our framework dynamically prices out overly aggressive interventions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Neuron Auctions effectively preserve natural discourse quality while achieving an optimal alignment between commercial incentives and user satisfaction.

We design the first regret guarantees for robust dynamic pricing that decouple the dependence on the corruption $C$ and the time horizon $T$. In dynamic pricing, a seller with unlimited supply of a good interacts with a stream of buyers over $T$ rounds, with the goal of maximizing revenue. At each round $t$, the seller posts a price $p_t$, and the buyer purchases the good only if their unknown valuation $v^\star$ exceeds this price. The seller observes only the binary feedback $\mathbb{I} \left\{ p_t \leq v^\star \right\}$, indicating whether a sale occurred. In the \emph{robust} pricing setting, a malicious adversary is allowed to corrupt this feedback in at most $C$ rounds. Even if the learner knows the corruption $C$, the best known regret bound is $\mathcal{O}(C\log\log T)$ by Gupta et al. [2025]. This leaves as an open problem to ``decouple'' the dependence on $C$ and $T$. In this work, we resolve this open problem. In particular, we develop a robust variant of binary search that achieves regret $\mathcal{O}(C+\log T)$ when the corruption $C$ is known and $\mathcal{O}(C+\log^2 T)$ when the corruption is unknown.

Marketing decisions reflect the interaction of latent consumer heterogeneity, time-varying internal states, and explicit interventions, a structure that current prediction- and language-oriented models do not capture in a unified manner. We propose a Three-in-One world-model architecture in which a Deep Boltzmann Machine (DBM) learns a frozen belief representation from demographics, time, and lagged actions and outcomes, with lightweight task-specific adapters attached on top. The same belief supports three tasks within a single framework: (i) energy-based consistency evaluation through the DBM's free energy, (ii) outcome prediction through adapters, and (iii) counterfactual inference by holding the belief fixed and varying only the action input given to the adapter. Using a controlled simulation in which the latent price sensitivity, promotion responsiveness, and base preference of each consumer are known, we show that the adapters match a strong MLP baseline on visit- and purchase-AUC while recovering heterogeneous treatment effects substantially better than S-, T-, X-, and DR-learner meta-learners and a Causal Forest baseline built on the same raw features, with the largest gap on a confounded price-promotion intervention. Complementing this, free-energy clamps systematically penalize counterfactual purchase trajectories that lack prior promotional exposure, and the penalty itself depends on the latent base preference in the expected direction. These results indicate that DBM beliefs disentangle latent traits in a form that survives counterfactual queries, providing an integrated world-model substrate for marketing intervention.

We introduce a causal aware foundation-model framework for real time optimal decision making in discrete choice environments. We propose a constrained triple-head price optimization (C3PO) network to solve a bilevel decision problem in which a service provider selects an optimal assortment while heterogeneous users make personalized acceptance or rejection choices optimizing their own personalized preferences. C3PO integrates imitation learning of prices, multi-task learning of revenue responses, and in context learning of price elasticity to generate pricing recommendations while adhering to business constraints. During inference, frontier model prompting retrieves an enhanced elasticity prior for new products from behavioral economics literature, improving pricing effectiveness. We demonstrate strong in context learning performance using simulated, synthetic, and real-world datasets. C3PO is trained on simulated data generated from multiple classical discrete choice models in economics. The model is trained on data comprising simulated customer segments and counterfactual action and outcome pairs and evaluated on randomly generated choice environments with no access to the underlying preference structure. The trained model consistently improves the pricing KPIs, with gains increasing as customer price sensitivity increases. We also deploy the tuned foundation model for optimal pricing in real-world applications such as healthcare, tender pricing, airline ancillary pricing, and other domains, achieving substantial gains across multiple products, markets, and divisions.

Outcome metrics can certify the wrong behavior. We study this failure in a two-hotel revenue-management simulator where Hotel A trains an agent against a fixed rule-based revenue-management competitor, Hotel B. A standard learning agent can obtain near-reference revenue per available room (RevPAR) while failing to learn market-like yield management: it sells too aggressively, undercuts, or collapses to modal price buckets. We diagnose this as a Goodhart-style failure under partial observability. Hotel A cannot observe the competitor's remaining inventory, booking curve, or pricing rule, so the same Hotel A-visible state maps to multiple plausible Hotel B prices. Deterministic value-based RL and deterministic copying collapse this unresolved uncertainty into shortcut behavior. We introduce a trace-level diagnostic protocol using RevPAR, occupancy, ADR, full price-bucket distributions, L1/JS distances, and seed-level confidence intervals. The verified repair is Trace-Prior RL: learn a distributional market prior from lagged market traces, then train a stochastic pricing policy with a RevPAR reward and a KL penalty to the learned prior. The final policy matches Hotel B's RevPAR, occupancy, ADR, and price distribution within seed-level uncertainty, while still optimizing Hotel A's own reward. We argue that the contribution is not a new optimizer and not a hotel-pricing leaderboard, but a reproducible failure-and-repair recipe for agentic systems where scalar rewards are easy to game and the intended behavior is only visible in traces. A key finding is that higher exact action accuracy can worsen aggregate trace alignment when the target is distributional.

Algorithmic decision-making in high-stakes settings can have profound impacts on individuals and populations. While much prior work studies fairness in static settings, recent results show that enforcing static fairness constraints may exacerbate long-run disparities. Motivated by this tension, we study a stylized sequential selection problem in which a decision-maker repeatedly selects individuals, affecting both immediate utility and the population distribution over time. We introduce notions of group fairness for both the short and long term and theoretically analyze the trade-off between fairness and utility via the Price of Fairness (PoF). We characterize optimal and fair policies in the short term and show that the PoF can be large even when group distributions are nearly identical. In contrast, we show that long-term disparities can vanish under simple investment policies that achieve a low PoF. We also empirically validate these theoretical observations using both synthetic and real datasets.

Auto-bidding is a crucial task in real-time advertising markets, where policies must optimize long-horizon value under delivery constraints (e.g., budget and CPA). Existing methods for auto-bidding rely on compact numerical state representations: while they can implicitly capture delivery dynamics, they offer limited support for explicitly representing and controlling high-level intent, evolving feedback, and operator-style strategic guidance in real campaigns. Meanwhile, Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a powerful method for encoding semantic information, it remains unclear when LLMs help and how to integrate them without sacrificing numerical precision. Through systematic preliminary studies, we find that (1) LLM embeddings contain bidding-relevant cues yet cannot replace numerical features, and (2) gains emerge only with careful semantic--numeric integration rather than naive concatenation. Motivated by these findings, we propose \textit{SemBid}, a novel auto-bidding framework that injects LLM-encoded semantics into offline bidding trajectories at the token level. SemBid introduces three semantic inputs: \textit{Task}, \textit{History}, and \textit{Strategy}. It injects these semantics as tokens alongside numerical trajectory tokens and uses self-attention to integrate them, improving controllability and generalization across objectives. Across diverse scenarios and budget regimes, SemBid outperforms competitive baselines from offline RL and generative sequence modeling, with more consistent gains in overall performance, constraint satisfaction, and robustness. Our code is available at: \href{https://github.com/AlanYu04/SemBid-KDD2026}{\textcolor{blue}{here}}.

We study contextual dynamic pricing with linear valuations and bounded-support agnostic noise, whose induced demand curve may be non-Lipschitz with arbitrary jumps and atoms. Such discontinuities break the cross-context interpolation arguments used by smooth-demand pricing algorithms, while the best previous method achieved only $\tilde O(T^{3/4})$ regret. We propose Conservative-Markdown Redirect-UCB Pricing, a polynomial-time algorithm that combines randomized parameter estimation, conservative residual-grid probing, and confidence-based one-step redirection. Our algorithm achieves $\tilde O(T^{2/3})$ optimal regret, matching the known lower bounds of Kleinberg and Leighton (2003) up to logarithmic factors and improving over the previous upper bound of Xu and Wang (2022). Under stochastic well-conditioned contexts, this closes the long-existing open regret gap in linear-valuation contextual pricing under agnostic non-Lipschitz noise distribution.

Causal discovery methods such as LiNGAM identify causal structure from observational data by assuming mutually independent disturbances. This assumption is fragile: shared volatility, common scale effects, or other forms of dependence can cause the methods to recover the wrong causal order, even with infinite data. We introduce the Linear Mean-Independent Acyclic Model (LiMIAM), which replaces full independence with weaker one-sided mean-independence restrictions on the disturbances. Under finite-order consequences of these restrictions, source nodes are generically identifiable, and hence a compatible causal order can be recovered recursively. Our proof is constructive and leads to DirectLiMIAM, a sequential residual-based algorithm for causal discovery under dependent noise. In simulations with mean-independent but dependent disturbances, DirectLiMIAM outperforms LiNGAM methods. A large-scale empirical application to the oil market highlights the implausibility of the independence assumption and the ability of DirectLiMIAM to recover a realistic causal ordering, from policy to production and from prices to inflation.

Financial market forecasting is inherently uncertain, yet most deep learning approaches rely on point predictions that provide only single-value estimates without quantifying uncertainty. Such predictions are insufficient for risk-aware decision-making, as they fail to capture the range of possible outcomes and the associated confidence of forecasts.The problem can be solved using prediction intervals, which allow obtaining an upper and lower bound for the prediction, thus enabling uncertainty representation in the model. Yet, the current methods tend to disregard relationships between assets or cannot simultaneously ensure good calibration and sharpness of the resulting intervals in dynamically changing market regimes. In our work, we propose a spatio-temporal graph-based approach with a bi-level chaotic fusion technique to solve this problem. Our model uses separate nonlinear transformation functions to estimate the interval center and width. Additionally, a volatility-aware gating mechanism is used to make predictions dependent on the regime in which the market operates. Temporal dependencies are considered by embedding graph structures and sequentially modeling them. Training is conducted according to a Lower-Upper Bound Estimation (LUBE) objective. Our experimental results show significant improvements compared to existing baselines (LSTM, GRU, GCN, HGNN) when applied to data from 2016 to 2026 with 43 leading companies in eight sectors of the NSE. It provides the lowest Winkler score (0.0778), tightest prediction intervals (PIAW = 0.1407), and highest coverage (PICP = 96.6%), with all differences statistically significant (p < 0.001) according to the Diebold-Mariano test.

Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice and labor market clearing. In practice, however, these markets are invariably governed by complex distributional constraints, ranging from diversity quotas and regional balance to global capacity slacks, under which stable matchings often fail to exist. This raises a fundamental question: how to distribute unavoidable instability across agents while preserving strategy-proofness? To address this, we propose \texttt{MenuNet}, a strategy-proof mechanism design framework based on a neural representation of menus. Rather than directly constructing assignments, \texttt{MenuNet} learns to generate personalized probabilistic menus, from which assignments are realized via a structured sequential choice rule that guarantees strategy-proofness by construction. By decomposing stability into fairness (no envy) and non-wastefulness, our approach models these properties as vector-valued quantities and optimizes their distribution through differentiable objectives, providing a principled trade-off between competing axioms. Empirically, \texttt{MenuNet} navigates this trade-off effectively: it consistently outperforms Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) in terms of envy and Deferred Acceptance (DA) in terms of waste, while maintaining scalability and computational efficiency. These results suggest that learning-based menu mechanisms provide a flexible and scalable paradigm for mechanism design in highly constrained, real-world environments.

We argue that AI-saturated markets are likely to create Veblen-good premiums, which we term human-provenance premiums, for verified human presence, and hence AI governance should treat human-provenance verification as labor infrastructure. Generative and agentic AI systems lower the cost of many standardized cognitive, creative, and coordination tasks, weakening the scarcity premiums that have supported much middle-tier knowledge work. We argue that this pressure may produce an asymmetric barbell-shaped structure of value capture in advanced economies: high-volume synthetic production controlled by owners of AI infrastructure at one pole, and scarce, high-status human labor valued for verified human presence at the other. We advance three claims. First, AI compresses the value of standardized middle-tier labor by making good-enough synthetic substitutes scalable at low marginal cost, hollowing out the middle of the skill distribution currently categorized by knowledge work. Second, this compression reallocates demand for human labor toward work valued for its visible human character. We term this performative humanity and distinguish three forms of labor: relational presence, aesthetic provenance, and accountability. Third, as these premiums depend on credible verification, AI governance should treat human-provenance systems as labor infrastructure rather than as luxury authenticity labels. To evaluate hybrid human-AI work, we propose constitutive human presence as the relevant standard: human labor retains premium value when human judgment, attention, accountability, authorship, or relational participation is not incidental to the output but constitutive of what is being purchased.

The increasing penetration of renewable energy has introduced substantial volatility into wholesale electricity markets, complicating the optimal bidding strategies for power producers. Traditional Reinforcement Learning (RL) approaches often struggle to balance profit maximization with risk management, frequently overfitting to specific market conditions or failing to account for the stochastic spread between Day-Ahead (DA) and Real-Time (RT) settlements. To address these challenges, this paper makes two primary contributions. First, we introduce and open-source a high-fidelity gymnasium environment for two-settlement electricity market bidding. Grounded in extensive empirical data from the PJM Interconnection, the environment explicitly models the interplay between DA commitments and RT deviations, providing a standardized testbed for general and risk-sensitive agents. Second, we propose MARS-DA (Multi-Agent Regime-Switching for Day-Ahead markets), a novel hierarchical framework that orchestrates distinct sub-policies for risk management and profit seeking. MARS-DA utilizes a top-level Meta-Controller to dynamically blend the actions of two specialized base agents: a "Safe Agent" that optimizes for reliable DA allocation and a "Speculator Agent" that targets volatile RT arbitrage opportunities. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MARS-DA achieves superior risk-adjusted returns compared to state-of-the-art baselines while maintaining robust regime alignment during periods of extreme market volatility.

We present two new classes of causal models of decision-making agents. Our approach is motivated by the needs of modeling the economics of computing systems. These systems are composed of subsystems and can exhibit endogenous limits on cognitive resources and value discounting. Structural Causal Decision Models (SCDMs) expand on Structural Causal Influence Models. Like SCIMs, they explicitly represent the causal relationships between model variables and the payoffs of agent decisions. Additionally, agent decisions can be constrained by their causal antecedents, and SCDMs can have open root variables for which no probability distribution or structural equation is given. We show that SCDMs have a well-defined and computationally useful property of composability. Building on SCDMs, we then define a Structural Causal Decision Process (SCDP) as a recurring SCDM with a discount variable. SCDPs benefit from the useful composition properties of SCDMs. Moreover, SCDPs are strictly more expressive than POMDPs because they do not assume rational belief formation. Indeed, an SCDP can endogenously model the memory-formation process, and is thus useful for modeling resource rational agents in dynamic settings. SCDPs are also capable of modeling variable discounting, a tool used widely in social scientific modeling. We pose that SCDPs are a useful framework for policy simulation for the digital economy, mechanism design for information systems, and digital twin modeling of cyberinfrastructure.

Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is the marginal gain from paid exposure: even without winning a sponsored slot, an advertiser may still earn revenue via an organic search result (e.g., on Google or Amazon). Motivated by recent work, we model ad value as a treatment effect--the outcome difference between winning and losing the auction--and study online learning for bidding in second-price (Vickrey) auctions under this causal perspective. We develop algorithms that attain rate-optimal regret under several feedback models. A key ingredient exploits the information revealed by the second-price payment rule, which strictly improves regret relative to analogous learning problems in first-price auctions.

Language data are increasingly acquired and governed as assets, yet platforms often price candidate resources before knowing their true privacy or access costs. We study online pricing for governed language data assets under cost uncertainty. At each round, a platform observes an NLP task, a candidate asset, and a coarse cost estimate, may pay for a refined cost signal, posts a price, and receives safe net revenue. We introduce \textsc{NH-CROP}, a clipped robust pricing framework with a no-harm information-acquisition gate. The method compares direct pricing, risk-aware pricing, and verify-then-price, and acquires information only when its estimated decision value exceeds the best no-verification alternative. Across synthetic, real-proxy, and downstream-utility-grounded benchmarks, clipped \textsc{NH-CROP} variants improve or remain competitive with price-only and risk-aware baselines. Causal ablations show that paid verification is not the main source of gains in real-proxy and utility-grounded settings: the strongest learned policies often choose not to verify. Oracle and high-decision-value diagnostics show that refined cost information can still have substantial local value. Overall, governed language-data platforms should calibrate pricing under uncertain access costs first and verify only when information is cheap and decision-actionable.

This position paper argues that agentic AI systems should be designed and evaluated as \emph{marginal token allocation economies} rather than as text generators priced by the unit. We follow a single request -- a developer asking a coding agent to fix a failing test -- through four economic layers that today are designed in isolation: a router that decides which model answers, an agent that decides whether to plan, act, verify, or defer, a serving stack that decides how to produce each token, and a training pipeline that decides whether the trace is worth learning from. We show that all four layers are solving the \emph{same} first-order condition -- marginal benefit equals marginal cost plus latency cost plus risk cost -- with different index sets and different prices. The framing is deliberately minimal: we do not propose a complete theory of AI economics. But adopting marginal token allocation as the shared accounting object explains why systems that locally minimize tokens globally misallocate them, predicts a small set of recurring failure modes (over-routing, over-delegation, under-verification, serving congestion, stale rollouts, cache misuse), and points to a concrete research agenda in token-aware evaluation, autonomy pricing, congestion-priced serving, and risk-adjusted RL budgeting.

Norway's electricity market is heavily dominated by hydropower, but the 2021-2022 energy crisis and stronger integration with Continental Europe have fundamentally altered price formation, reducing the reliability of forecasting models calibrated on historical data. Despite the critical need for updated models, a unified benchmark evaluating feature contributions across all structurally diverse Norwegian bidding zones remains lacking. Here we present a comprehensive evaluation of one-step-ahead forecasting of the Nord Pool market across all five Norwegian bidding zones. We constructed a multimodal hourly dataset spanning 2019-2025 and evaluated eight forecasting model families, including Light Gradient Boosting Machine (LightGBM), autoregressive models with exogenous variables, and advanced deep learning architectures, using a strictly causal test set. We implemented robust rolling-origin backtesting, leave-one-group-out feature ablation, and conditional regime analysis to dissect model performance and feature utility. Our results show that LightGBM achieves the best performance in every zone, with mean absolute error ranging from 1.60 to 5.58 euros per megawatt-hour, while a ridge-regularized autoregressive model with exogenous variables remains a highly competitive linear benchmark in northern zones. Feature ablation reveals that models relying solely on lagged prices and calendar variables achieve high accuracy and often match or closely approach the performance of the full multimodal model. However, conditional regime analysis demonstrates that external features like reservoir levels and gas prices remain crucial to stratify forecast errors, which consistently increase under stressed market regimes. This highlights the practical value of model interpretability and regime awareness for decision makers facing structural changes in market dynamics.

We study online regression with the square loss in a reproducing kernel Hilbert space under a dynamic regret criterion. The learner is compared with a time-varying comparator sequence, and the bounds depend on its path length in the RKHS norm. The proposed method transfers the finite-dimensional discounted Vovk--Azoury--Warmuth approach of Jacobsen & Cutkosky (2024) to the RKHS setting by means of finite-dimensional subspace approximations. For a fixed subspace, we run a VAW-based ensemble of discounted VAW forecasters over a geometric grid of discount factors. The additional approximation error is controlled by the uniform projection error of kernel sections. We then introduce a general orthogonal truncation method: starting from a feature expansion of the kernel, we construct the associated RKHS by introducing an inner product that makes the feature functions orthonormal, and then use the spans of the first basis functions as finite-dimensional approximation spaces. The resulting subspace reduction is applied to several approximation schemes. Explicit feature expansions yield fast-regime bounds for Gaussian and analytic dot-product kernels. Mercer truncations provide a spectral approximation method and lead to dynamic regret bounds in fast and slow regimes, depending on the eigenvalue decay. Finally, we study subspaces spanned by kernel sections and apply this construction to Matérn kernels.

Technological advancements in cryptocurrency markets have increased accessibility for investors, but concurrently exposed them to the risks of market manipulations. Existing fraud detection mechanisms typically rely on machine learning methods that treat each financial asset (i.e., token) and its related transactions independently. However, market manipulation strategies are rarely isolated events, but are rather characterized by coordination, repetition, and frequent transfers among related assets. This suggests that relational structure constitutes an integral component of the signal and can be effectively represented through graphical means. In this paper, we propose three graph construction methods that rely on aggregated hourly market data. The proposed graphs are processed by a unified spatio-temporal Graph Neural Network (GNN) architecture that combines attention-based spatial aggregation with temporal Transformer encoding. We evaluate our methodology on a real-world dataset comprised of pump-and-dump schemes in cryptocurrency markets, spanning a period of over three years. Our comparative results showcase that our graph-based models achieve significant improvements over standard machine learning baselines in detecting anomalous events. Our work highlights that learned market connectivity provides substantial gains for detecting coordinated market manipulation schemes.

Efficient and fair spectrum allocation is a central challenge in 6G networks, where massive connectivity and heterogeneous services continuously compete for limited radio resources. We investigate the use of Large Language Models (LLMs) as bidding agents in repeated 6G spectrum auctions with budget constraints in vehicular networks. Each user equipment (UE) acts as a rational player optimizing its long-term utility through repeated interactions. Using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism as a benchmark for incentive-compatible, dominant-strategy truthfulness, we compare LLM-guided bidding against truthful and heuristic strategies. Unlike heuristics, LLMs leverage historical outcomes and prompt-based reasoning to adapt their bidding behavior dynamically. Results show that when the theoretical assumptions guaranteeing truthfulness hold, LLM bidders recover near-equilibrium outcomes consistent with VCG predictions. However, when these assumptions break -- such as under static budget constraints -- LLMs sustain longer participation and achieve higher utilities, revealing their ability to approximate adaptive equilibria beyond static mechanism design. This work provides the first systematic evaluation of LLM bidders in repeated spectrum auctions, offering new insights into how AI-driven agents can interact strategically and reshape market dynamics in future 6G networks.