Negotiation

Sequential deliberation is a mechanism for collective decision making: at each round, a uniformly randomly selected pair is asked to revise a collective outcome, which then becomes the reference point for the next round. Existing theory by Fain et al.~\cite{fain2017sequential} treats the current outcome solely as the disagreement alternative in bargaining. Yet an existing draft, policy, or proposal might carry social influence and anchor participants' expressed positions toward the status quo. We introduce anchored sequential deliberation on a one-dimensional decision space. In each round, two participants with bliss points $U$ and $V$ shift their positions toward the previous outcome $O_{t-1}$ with anchoring strength $λ$, then Nash-bargain using $O_{t-1}$ as the disagreement alternative. The update simplifies to $O_t=(1-λ)\mathsf{Median}\{U,V,O_{t-1}\}+λO_{t-1}$. We establish a convergence--stability trade-off. For every population distribution and $λ<1$, the process has a unique stationary distribution. A monotone coupling yields a $1$-Wasserstein contraction factor of at most $\frac{1+λ}{2}$ and at least $λ$; thus, stronger anchoring slows mixing. On the other hand, stationary social cost weakly decreases with $λ$, although the worst-case distortion remains $\frac{1+\sqrt{2}}{2}$. We also identify a unique \emph{deliberative fixed point}, where the expected unanchored movement is zero, and prove that the stationary distribution concentrates around it as $λ\to 1$. For the uniform population, stationary distortion lies between $1+\frac{1-λ}{9+7λ}$ and $1+\frac{1-λ}{6(1+λ)}$, with both bounds approaching $1$ as $λ\to1$. Simulations for uniform and Beta populations show that stronger anchoring slows mixing, concentrates the stationary distribution, and lowers stationary distortion in these instances.

Long-horizon agentic tasks go beyond chaining short tasks over more interaction turns. Their evolving dynamic environments and long-range dependencies require Large Language Models (LLMs) to continually explore, learn from experience, and adapt their policies over thousands of steps. We introduce E-Commerce Bench, the first open-source benchmark that integrates multi-round counterpart negotiation and dynamic events into a year-long business operation. Over a 365-day year, an LLM agent concurrently runs multiple online stores, researching the market, negotiating with suppliers to source inventory, optimizing sales strategies, fulfilling orders, handling returns, and managing cash flow to maximize its end-of-year total assets. To construct a realistic merchant-side operating environment, the product and supplier data are derived from a real e-commerce platform, while a year-long calendar of promotions, natural disasters, and supply-chain shocks continually reshapes demand. For reproducibility, both sides of the market are deterministic: customer purchases and returns follow a fixed demand model, while a negotiation kernel determines supplier pricing, concessions, and decisions, with an LLM used only to verbalize them. We evaluate 18 frontier models across seven dimensions, including year-end assets, and find that no single model dominates. GPT-5.6 Sol earns the most, growing the 100,000 opening stake into 1,431,425, yet it ranks 16th of 18 on fraud avoidance and trails Fable5 in operational efficiency. Among open-weight models, Qwen3.8-Max-Preview leads with 416,252, 38% above GLM 5.2 (high), and achieves the strongest learning over the horizon, progressively bargaining down prices across repeated orders. Our code is available at https://github.com/QwenLM/E-CommerceBench.

The emergence of language-based AI agents promises to transform the scope of machine economic activity. Instead of just proposing bids or following hard-coded protocols, such agents can be used to negotiate and execute agreements in open-ended natural language. However, most evaluations of these abilities have focused on one-off exchanges or simple economic games, leaving open the rich space of time-extended, contingent, and incomplete contracts made expressible by language; they also focus on raw profit, without measuring the qualities required for trustworthy contracting. We address this by formulating a rational framework for how agents should negotiate and perform natural language contracts in uncertain multi-step environments. Within this framework, we develop metrics and baselines for quantifying rational and cooperative play. To evaluate how agents perform at such contracting, we instantiate our framework in ContractSim, an evaluation suite where two players negotiate and execute a multi-turn supplier contract under environmental and inter-player uncertainty. Across six environments and three supplier settings (catering, hotel cleaning, and AI hosting) we find that current LLM-based agents reach agreement reliably, and negotiate efficient contracts when environmental uncertainty is low. However, under high uncertainty, they often fail to negotiate satisfiable, efficient, or mutually beneficial contracts. They are also frequently uncooperative when executing contracts, violating contract terms for additional profit even when contracts are easy to satisfy. These findings highlight room for improvement in the design of language agents that can negotiate, interpret, and execute contracts both rationally and cooperatively.

Negotiation is a demanding social task for LLM agents, requiring strategic reasoning, persuasion, and interpersonal adaptation. Yet existing benchmarks often treat agents as emotionally neutral, overlooking a key driver of human bargaining behavior. We study how prompt-conditioned emotions affect LLM-based price negotiation. In a controlled framework, buyer and seller agents are independently assigned one of six emotional states and negotiate over 350 real consumer products under two budget conditions. Across 36 emotion-pair settings and five widely used LLMs, we find that emotions strongly shape outcomes. Angry buyers almost never reach agreement (0.39% deal rate), while happy buyers agree most often (28.91%), but obtain worse prices than fearful buyers. Emotion effects are role-dependent: buyer emotion mainly drives acceptance and rejection, whereas seller emotion shapes concession dynamics. These effects influence not only language, but also termination behavior and price trajectories, raising concerns for emotion-conditioned agents in commerce.

LLMs are increasingly being applied to tasks involving institutional and political texts, but existing benchmarks evaluate them on isolated documents or single tasks. In realpolitik, negotiations are longitudinal data, where participating parties can align or argue over multiple iterations and each turn is an outcome of the previous turns, hence, understanding one turn requires tracking everything before it. We introduce TradeVerse, a benchmark built from the World Trade Organisation (WTO) specific trade concerns, where member states challenge one another and exchange arguments over multiple rounds, sometimes for years. We, in TradeVerse, reconstruct minutes of $1170$ meetings, spanning across 5 groups and $89$ product groups and define three tasks: first, the system has to analyze the longitudinal meeting records and predict the harmonized system codes (HS chapters) of the products under discussion in the particular meeting, second, we examine whether the system, upon analyzing the anonymized content of the meeting, can guess the name of the responding country and third, we ask the system to play the role of the responding country and provide the statement for the very last round. All labels are recovered directly from the proceedings, requiring no manual annotation. Our experiments highlight the challenges these tasks pose for current LLMs. To the best of our knowledge, TradeVerseis the first benchmark to investigate potential of LLMs in understanding longitudinal political trade negotiations.

Large language models (LLMs) excel in structured tasks but struggle with dynamic social interactions, where success requires long-term goal coordination and rapid adaptation. Current methods often apply uniform goal-based rewards to every utterance, overlooking the specificity of objectives at each dialogue turn and failing to account for the rationale of potential strategies. Inspired by the Theory of Planned Behavior, we propose the Think-Strategy-Response (TSR) framework, which decomposes social dialogue into two hierarchical stages: high-level strategic planning and low-level linguistic execution. To optimize TSR, we introduce Linearized Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning with Variance-Gated Rewards (LHRL-VGR), a novel algorithm that dynamically routes rewards - balancing goal completion and strategy adherence - based on the variance of goal achievement scores. Experiments on the SOTOPIA benchmark show that our approach fine-tunes a Qwen2.5-7B agent to surpass the GPT-4o baseline by 7.32% in goal completion success, demonstrating state-of-the-art performance in multi-agent social negotiation tasks.

Agentic science is transforming the landscape of computational work, and is applied to scientific pipelines and workload managers. Scientific workloads require specialized hardware within and between institutions. Automated resource discovery is an essential step for scheduling workloads with specific hardware and environmental requirements. In this paper, we present a hierarchical, dynamic architecture and accompanying software to discover resources across diverse cloud, edge, and HPC systems. The design enables concurrent, asynchronous negotiation, selection, and dispatch of requests for work using secretary agents. The agents probe and discover 51 real and simulated providers across 7 categories. We perform 19,973 negotiation and 6,952 selection simulations to assess reliability of decisions, demonstrating high (87.71%) negotiation accuracy and selection costs comparable to more traditional strategies. Designed for extensibility and currently supporting the US DOE Genesis Mission, this architecture exemplifies the importance of careful coordination between agents, discovery tools, and infrastructure for agentic science.

Traditional distributed consensus protocols classify nodes as either honest-but-faulty or actively malicious (Byzantine). However, in organizational structures, departmental agents rarely fit this binary. Instead, they exhibit bounded rationality and self-interested preferences while operating under asymmetric information. This paper presents the Organizational Consensus Algorithm (OCA), a mechanism design framework tailored for internal negotiation and decision coordination. OCA models inter-departmental conflict as an incomplete information dynamic game, integrating internal token staking, an exception-triggered challenge mechanism, and confidence-weighted consensus rules. Rather than enforcing instantaneous total ordering, OCA leverages a retrospective penalty system driven by delayed verifiable outcomes to deter structural bias and reduce exhaustive coordination overhead. A Python simulation prototype was developed to evaluate OCA. Across independent trials with varying organizational scales, OCA reports lower coordination overhead, higher informative reporting rates, and bounded welfare loss in noisy environments. Crucially, these results remain conditional on the stated simulation model and do not by themselves establish a general truthful equilibrium.

As LLM agents move from decision support to autonomous procurement, firms need to know whether delegated negotiators create value, divide it predictably, and avoid money-losing contracts. We study this in a canonical supply chain bargaining problem: a buyer with private demand information negotiates a quantity-payment contract with an uninformed seller. We benchmark nine LLMs from OpenAI, Google, and Alibaba against a validated Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium across 9,840 LLM-to-LLM negotiations. First, capability governs value creation. Agents agree in 98.9% of negotiations and capture 95.4% of first-best surplus undiscounted, but average 2.98 rounds against the benchmark's 1.25, and this delay erodes 21-34% of surplus. Capability also governs reliability: baseline models accept individually irrational contracts in 19.2% of cases, versus 0.0-0.6% at mid-tier and flagship, making automated profit verification the binding guardrail below that threshold. Second, surplus capture is relational. Provider identity predicts who captures surplus better than capability rank: self-play buyer shares average 40% for OpenAI, 50% for Google, and 70% for Alibaba's Qwen, an ordering that survives restricted communication and no discounting. Reversing which provider sells moves the division by 7-18 percentage points, and the capable Qwen flagship is the weakest cross-family seller: vendor choice is a first-order distributional decision. Third, the prompt is a strategic lever. Delegation separates the principal's economic patience from the agent's prompted strategic patience, a free deployment choice that is the single strongest driver of surplus division (90% of explained variance). Together these establish an equilibrium-referenced audit of AI agents along three dimensions: discounted efficiency, distributional profile, and operational reliability.

The difficulty of collective action remains a central challenge in the design of policies for multifamily residential redevelopment. Stakeholders continually adjust their decisions in response to evolving negotiation contexts and the reactions of others, meaning that when a policy intervenes and which stakeholders it targets can substantially reshape collective outcomes. Assessing these adaptive responses ex ante remains difficult because existing simulation models often rely on predefined behavioral rules. Here, we present CoRenew, an open-source platform that uses LLM-based agents to simulate negotiations among multiple stakeholders and evaluate the effects of alternative policy combinations. Integrating open source geographic and demographic data, the platform can generate synthetic residents, simulate negotiation dynamics under alternative policy settings and compares policy performance across competing objectives. It supports both numerical and semantic policy inputs and includes built-in tools for visualization and result export. We validate its behavioral realism against survey responses from 324 residents and a nine-month observed negotiation process from a real redevelopment case. With its modular and adaptable architecture, CoRenew can be used to assess policies across different institutional and cultural contexts.

Debt collection is a critical negotiation task in the financial industry, with strong practical relevance and exceptional academic value as a behaviorally rich, high-stakes testbed for human-centered dialogue systems. While large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in dialogue and negotiation, effectively evaluating their performance in this complex scenarios remains a major challenge: existing benchmarks uniformly assume users to be static, rational agents with fixed preferences, failing to capture the rich behavioral heterogeneity inherent in real-world debt collection. To bridge this gap, we propose DebtBench, the first public persona-enriched debt collection benchmark, that highlights behavioral heterogeneity in negotiation. Moreover, we develop DebtGPT, a debt collection agent trained to jointly optimize financial recovery and interaction experience. Our experimental results, using 16 state-of-the-art LLMs, find that most existing models struggle in this complex but realistic scenarios, whereas DebtGPT outperforms all open-source baselines and achieves performance on par with GPT-4o. The code and data are available at https://github.com/YYuHhhh/DebtNegotiation.

As AI agents operate with increasing autonomy in a multi-agent world, they will need to learn to cooperate with other agents and with humans to generate mutual benefits. However, cooperation is a challenge because the costs of cooperation are often incurred early on, but the benefits are only realized later, creating an incentive to defect. How can AI agents cooperate with commitment? Here, we draw on inspiration from legal institutions and contracting that human societies have used to solve principal-agent problems of this kind. Contracts provide observable representations of agreements that enable credible commitments through the enforcement of terms. We study the role of contract-based cooperation using LLM-based agents in \CT, a spatial-temporal game that combines bargaining with navigation towards a goal. We study a suite of contract representations that range from formal contracts that compile to code to natural contracts that require reinterpretation. We evaluate agents with a range of LLM backbones using different sizes and providers. We find that self-negotiated contracts can improve cooperative outcomes beyond what is possible with regular trading.

Stream-processing systems increasingly operate across heterogeneous mobile edge--cloud infrastructures, where workload volatility, resource contention, and stringent quality-of-service (QoS) requirements complicate decentralized scheduling. This paper proposes \emph{MAS-DecStream}, whose main contribution is \emph{LLM-MR-CNP}: an extension of the classical Contract Net Protocol with semantic CFP formulation, progressive context disclosure, multi-round proposal revision, negotiation memory, and deterministic validation. Edge-cluster agents refine natural-language offloading proposals from local observations, predicted resource states, and qualitative runtime context, while hard resource and QoS constraints remain deterministic. Experiments derived from the Alibaba ASI Trace evaluate the extension at three levels: single- versus multi-round CNP, rule-based versus LLM-assisted refinement, and fixed-model single- versus multi-round negotiation. Under the evaluated configurations, MAS-DecStream reduces latency violations to 3%, eliminates resource overcommitment, reaches a conflict-resolution rate of 0.91 with 20 agents, and improves utility by up to 22% over the multi-round rule-based baseline. A separate 25-case evaluation shows model- and prompt-dependent accuracy--cost trade-offs. The results provide initial evidence that multi-round CNP refinement is the principal protocol-level gain, with LLM assistance adding value for qualitative and uncertain runtime context.

The formation of political coalitions is a complex negotiation driven by both concrete policy objectives and deep-seated ideological convictions. While Large Language Models (LLMs) open new avenues for computational political science, the neutrality and helpfulness biases instilled by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) prevent them from sustaining steadfast partisan behaviour. We present a multi-agent framework that reconciles factual grounding with ideological alignment by combining Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG): DPO instils aggressive party-specific personas, while a per-party RAG pipeline keeps each agent bounded to its official manifesto. We operationalize the framework on the 2019 Flemish election, deploying the partisan agents in a hub-and-spoke negotiation arbitrated by a formateur. To make the emergent negotiation interpretable, we introduce a Multi-Layered Information Lineage Topology (MILT) that traces every clause in the final agreement back to its manifesto origin and classifies it into five provenance states, a Coalition Influence Score (CIS) that aggregates these traceable contributions to identify which party shaped the agreement, and a real-world grounding pass that benchmarks each simulated provision against the historically adopted coalition agreement. Across three independent simulations the framework yields a stable winner and ranking (N-VA ahead of CD&V and Open Vld), and manifesto-anchored lineage reliably predicts real-world materialization whereas hallucinated content does not. The result is a transparent, scalable testbed for the ex-ante exploration of party compatibility and formateur-mediated compromise.

Modern autonomous vehicles largely operate as isolated agents: they rely on on-board perception and decision modules and broadcast Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) that expose only low-level kinematic state. While existing cooperative driving frameworks enable limited sensor sharing, they rarely communicate high-level maneuver intentions, and edge computing is primarily used for content delivery rather than decision arbitration. As a result, current connected autonomy lacks a principled mechanism for making globally consistent, intent-aware coordination decisions across vehicles. To address this gap, we propose MIND-CAVs, a Multi-Intelligence Negotiation and Decision framework for connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) based on intent-driven autonomy. Each vehicle abstracts raw sensor observations into structured intent representations, exchanges them over V2X links, and receives globally consistent coordination plans from roadside edge servers. Edge agents combine learned and rule-based arbitration mechanisms to negotiate conflicting intents among vehicles, while a cloud platform records decisions for auditing and continual retraining. We implement MIND-CAVs in a CARLA-based AI-in-the-loop platform and evaluate it in multi-lane highway scenarios involving conflicting maneuvers and route-constrained exits. Experimental results show improved maneuver completion time and reduced unsafe proximity and unnecessary braking compared with isolated autonomy, first-come-first-served arbitration, and multi-agent reinforcement learning baselines.

Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations. A prevalent yet complex scenario involves a single seller negotiating concurrently with multiple buyers, each possessing heterogeneous, private budgets. In such settings, constrained by a limited number of communication turns, the seller must balance exploring the broader market to discover the highest valuation with concentrating sufficient turns on a single target buyer to secure the best possible outcome. Our analysis reveals a significant gap in standard Large Language Models (LLMs): while these models are linguistically proficient, they fail to act as effective economic decision-makers. Specifically, they exhibit a failure to explore the buyer pool, often fixating on the current highest bid rather than strategically investigating the market to discover latent high valuations. In this paper, we propose a specialized training recipe using Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). By anchoring the reward function to objective economic outcomes, the strategic balance between market discovery and surplus extraction emerges natively through the learning process. Our results demonstrate that the trained seller undergoes a multi-stage strategic evolution, learning to leverage price anchoring and strategic probing to identify more profitable counterparties. The agent extracts a substantially higher surplus than frontier models by both improving its persuasive bargaining skills and consistently closing deals with high-value buyers. Finally, we show that our seller strategies generalize robustly to unseen buyer negotiation styles and budget distributions.

Personal agents will increasingly negotiate on behalf of users: splitting costs with other personal agents, appealing platform decisions, escalating support disputes, requesting refunds, changing subscriptions, and negotiating deadlines or reimbursements. Existing negotiation benchmarks emphasize agreement, surplus, or strategic competence, but a user-owned agent can reach an agreement while harming the user through privacy leakage, consent violation, unsupported advocacy, over-concession, failed escalation, or poor auditability. We introduce SovereignNegotiation-Bench, a trace-level multi-turn benchmark for delegated personal-agent negotiation under private utilities, disclosure constraints, evidence requirements, and institutional asymmetry. The benchmark separates agent-visible observable state from evaluator-only labels and evaluates agreement success jointly with user utility, privacy, consent, evidence grounding, concession discipline, escalation, and auditability. We report an artifact-backed validation over 240 scenarios, 4 model families, 14 baselines, 13,440 frozen-prompt live trajectories, 61,135 parsed action rows, and a blinded 3-annotator audit over 300 items. The strongest agreement-maximizing baseline achieves the highest agreement rate but low user utility and high privacy/consent risk; FullSovereign does not maximize agreement, but obtains the best sovereign negotiation score by preserving utility, minimizing leakage, grounding claims, and reducing unauthorized commitments. The results show that agreement success is insufficient for user-owned negotiation agents.

Policy-grounded document review requires determining whether a target document complies with organization-specific policies, guidelines, or playbooks. While large language models can assist with policy interpretation and document analysis, end-to-end prompting leaves the applied policy logic implicit, making compliance decisions difficult to inspect, update, and test. We present PolicyGuard, a neuro-symbolic framework for policy-grounded document compliance review. PolicyGuard converts organizational policy guidance into an executable review engine consisting of typed relational logic rules and atom-level extraction questions. During review, LLMs answer these local questions using retrieved document evidence, and a symbolic evaluator applies the formal rules to detect non-compliance. We instantiate and evaluate PolicyGuard on company-specific NDA compliance review, where contract clauses must be checked against organization-specific negotiation policies. By separating policy formalization, local document interpretation, and symbolic compliance evaluation, PolicyGuard makes document review more explicit, maintainable, and systematically testable.

We evaluate manipulative behavior in six frontier language models across six environments, ranging from negotiation tasks to agentic workflows, resulting in 13{,}590 individual scenarios. Manipulation rates are measured across three axes: framing (mandate honesty or permit manipulation), incentive structure (from no incentives to substantial ones), and task difficulty. Existing benchmarks typically vary a single axis within a single environment, an approach our results show is insufficient. We rank models by manipulation rate and find Spearman rank correlations across environments average $ρ= 0.055$, indicating manipulative tendencies in one task do not necessarily predict those in another. Additionally, we find the axis that drives manipulation varies across different environments. In environments where models are incentivized to misrepresent future actions, instructional framing and structurally binding incentives are the primary drivers; in environments where models are incentivized to misrepresent a ground truth, task difficulty dominates. This split was identified in five environments and validated against a sixth held-out environment. Together, these findings illustrate the importance of rigorous multi-dimensional evaluations when measuring manipulative propensities.

Evaluating LLM agents requires dynamic environments that go beyond static reasoning and zero-sum games. Real-world economic interaction is often open-ended and mixed-motive: agents must negotiate, create positive-sum surplus, compete for scarce assets, and plan under delayed returns. We introduce SidConArena, a new benchmark framework for evaluating LLM agents in open-ended, positive-sum bargaining. SidConArena formalizes a multi-player economy as a finite-horizon partially observable stochastic game with three coupled phases: natural-language negotiation with binding trades, deterministic converter-based production, and sealed-bid auctions for long-term assets. The framework combines structured observations, phase-aware agent dispatching, a neural-symbolic action interface, and asynchronous execution, enabling free-form interaction while preserving rule-grounded evaluation. Across homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments, stronger frontier models achieve higher economic outcomes, yet agents still misvalue resources, bargain passively, and remain limited in long-horizon investment planning.

Conversational AI promises a new kind of preparation for high-stakes workplace negotiations -- personalized, interactive, and capable of simulating realistic resistance. That promise is intuitive. We built Trucey, a theory-driven coaching system, to test it. The system encoded four assumptions: that articulation supports clarification, that personalization builds strategic competence, that chunked delivery reduces cognitive load, and that structured scaffolding removes metacognitive burden. A pre-registered experiment (N=267) and interviews (N=15) complicated each of them. Notably, the static handbook we included as a passive control outperformed both AI conditions on empowerment and usability. We reflect on why: each assumption encoded a specific model of how preparation unfolds, and the findings revealed that conversational AI imposes a linear execution model on a task that is fundamentally recursive. We identify an unexamined scope condition on established HAI design guidelines and close with a sequencing principle -- map before path, path before simulation -- for future AI coaching design.

Autonomous driving is full of tiny social negotiations: a driver presses forward, another yields, a pedestrian fakes toward the curb, or a lane vehicle chooses whether to open a merge gap. Such interactions require inferring hidden intent from behavior under partial observability and then acting safely and efficiently. Existing autonomous-driving language benchmarks mostly focus on perception, visual question answering, or open-loop planning, while existing language-agent negotiation benchmarks typically make the negotiation explicit in text. Self-Driving Negotiator bridges the gap between the two: a text-only, multi-turn, procedurally generated environment for measuring implicit social coordination in driving. Agents generate specific driving actions. Reward and diagnostics are computed from the privileged simulator state, not from the explanation of the model. This report covers task design, reward and anti-gaming invariants, validated scenarios, non-LLM baselines, and a six-model inference leaderboard. Current models are far removed from the scripted expert. The best average success rate across three scenarios is 0.68; contested merge is statistically flat across models; and difficulty tiers separate cue-following from true wait-for-commitment behavior.

Pre-mediation, the preparatory phase preceding direct human negotiation, plays a critical role in achieving mutually beneficial agreements, yet is often omitted due to cost, time, and limited access to trained mediators. We introduce an automated mediator for human negotiation, implemented as a structured pipeline of LLM modules, that supports pre-mediation in integrative negotiation settings. The pipeline decomposes preparation into specialized modules for dialogue, preference prediction, response-level critique, and structured summarization, separating inference, generation, and evaluation to address limitations of monolithic single-prompt approaches. We use the term "agent" for each module following common LLM-systems terminology, but the components are not autonomous and do not interact peer-to-peer; outputs are passed forward in a fixed sequence. We evaluate the system in two controlled human-subject experiments comparing AI-based pre-mediation with professional human mediators in a multi-issue negotiation scenario. On short-term self-reported measures, the automated mediator achieves preparation outcomes broadly comparable to human mediators, including trust in the mediator and confidence in reaching mutually beneficial agreements, while achieving substantially lower error on the preference-inference task under our scenario and prompts (36% lower RMSE). A second study shows that targeted prompt refinements reduce excessive affirmation patterns from 36.6% to 16.8%, matching human mediator baselines. Our findings suggest that structured LLM pipelines can provide scalable, low-effort pre-mediation support broadly comparable to human mediators on short-term self-reported preparation outcomes. The pipeline's single-party design mirrors how human mediators run pre-mediation today and enables parallel deployment across all parties to a dispute, supporting scalability.

In this work we study agents in simulated bargaining scenarios, where a buyer and a seller communicate through a text channel and attempt to negotiate mutually beneficial trades, under different information regimes (complete information, information asymmetry or mutual uncertainty). We evaluate their performance w.r.t. game-theoretical solutions and further investigate their honesty (their tendency to disclose or withhold information or to mislead and deceive) as well as their credulity (their tendency to trust or distrust information provided by the other agent). We study zero-shot LLM agents with simple prompting scaffolding as well as fine-tuned agents, in order to investigate whether optimising the agents to maximise financial profits makes them stronger negotiators but also more dishonest and less trusting. We find that off-the-shelf LLMs all substantially deviate from game-theoretical equilibria, they attempt to lie about their private information but cannot efficiently exploit information asymmetries. Fine-tuning on financial utility makes the agents stronger at achieving better deals but also more dishonest, highlighting the risks that optimising agents for a task can have on their safety. We release our code and a dataset of bargaining scenarios.

Language models fine-tuned with reinforcement learning typically optimize for task reward, ignoring multi-agent strategic structure. Because these agents condition on natural language game-state descriptions and emit actions through free-form generation, strategic failure modes -- exploiting weaker opponents, coordinating on harmful equilibria, and externalizing costs are inseparable from the language interface itself. We propose Safe Equilibrium Policy Optimization (\sepo{}), a training objective that augments expected payoff with explicit penalties for exploitability, collusion risk, and externality cost. We implement \sepo{} as a reward signal for Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), applied to Gemma4 E4B-it and Qwen3.5-4B after supervised fine-tuning (SFT). Evaluated across five strategic domains: Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated auctions, two negotiation variants, and Kuhn Poker. \sepo{} achieves zero exploit-pool advantage in Kuhn Poker for both models, outperforms the base model on safety in four domains, and corrects the over-cooperative behavior introduced by SFT. In negotiation, \sepo{} achieves a positive-safety outcome and only the positive normalized relative advantage of any negotiation configuration. Ablation experiments confirm that per-rollout exploit computation is necessary: a shared constant penalty cancels in GRPO advantage normalization (constant control-variate property), producing zero gradient. To support further research in strategic safety for agents, we release our \href{https://anonymous.4open.science/r/sepo-2668/README.md}{code} and SFT datasets.

Post-trained LLMs are often optimized to produce helpful, polite, and accommodating responses. In adversarial negotiation, however, such behavior can become a vulnerability: emotionally framed language may influence an agent's bargaining decisions in ways that conflict with its user's objectives. We therefore introduce EmoDistill, an offline framework for distilling emotional negotiation skills from LLM-LLM interactions into smaller language-model agents. Here, an emotional negotiation skill is a state-conditioned behavior that determines which explicit emotion to invoke in a bargaining state and how to realize that emotion as an effective negotiation utterance. EmoDistill learns these two components separately: an Implicit Q-Learning (IQL) selector learns which emotion to express in each bargaining state, while a LoRA-adapted 7B policy learns emotion-conditioned expression through Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Judge Policy Optimization (JPO). Across four emotion-sensitive negotiation domains, the full EmoDistill policy achieves competitive utility and improves over vanilla and IQL-only baselines in most settings. Emotion-free ablations show that removing the explicit emotion channel substantially reduces overall negotiation utility, while transfer experiments reveal partial, domain-dependent transfer and robustness to unseen LLM counterparties.

According to canonical negotiation theory, people's success in a negotiation depends on how well they balance competing demands--empathizing and asserting, demonstrating concern for other and concern for self, being soft on the people and hard on the problem. Yet people struggle to manage these tensions, so researchers have lacked the ability to rigorously test the field's prescriptions under controlled conditions. AI agents do not face the same limitations, and their precision, repertoire, consistency, and scalability enable a new class of experiments to contribute to negotiation theory. In this article, we introduce personality engineering: a methodology that uses AI agents to precisely parameterize, manipulate, and evaluate negotiator personality. We propose using the interpersonal circumplex--and its two core dimensions of warmth and dominance--as a foundational coordinate system for the field. This approach offers both a rigorous methodology for testing classic negotiation theories and a practical guide for designing the personalities of AI negotiation agents.

Personalized pricing negotiations are a challenging testbed for LLM agents because successful interaction does not guarantee profitable decision making. A seller may produce valid actions and close many deals while still pricing poorly when buyer willingness to pay and bargaining traits remain hidden. This paper presents PrefBench, a simulator-based benchmark for hidden-preference personalized pricing negotiations. Each episode pairs a simulated buyer with a fixed vehicle-customization bundle; the seller observes public persona descriptors, bundle information, and negotiation history, while latent buyer variables govern valuation, patience, counter-offer behavior, and walkaway decisions. PrefBench evaluates this setting through an LLM-facing state-summary protocol that constrains agents to return strict JSON actions under a fixed hidden-information boundary. We evaluate zero-shot LLM sellers against heuristic references over 7,500 episodes. The tested LLMs follow the protocol reliably and achieve deal rates above 0.99, but their seller-profit outcomes remain weak: the best LLM average profit is only slightly above the random baseline and far below a simple concession heuristic under the same episode stream. These results show that structured action compliance and agreement-seeking behavior can coexist with weak profit-sensitive bargaining. PrefBench provides a controlled benchmark for evaluating pricing-agent behavior under hidden buyer preferences.

Negotiation requires more than inferring what the other side wants: it requires using that information to make advantageous offers and counteroffers over multiple turns. We study whether large language model (LLM) agents do this in a controlled multi-attribute bargaining environment. We find that current LLM agents can model a counterparty's preferences, but do not reliably turn that knowledge into strategic bargaining. When given negotiating partner preference information, agents model it accurately and early in their reasoning traces, yet this does not reliably improve outcomes for the informed side. Turn-level analyses show why: agents often respond to what they believe the counterparty values, but do not consistently pair those moves with gains on their own high-value attributes. Sellers are more accommodating overall, and in asymmetric-information conditions, the informed side often makes the more weakly compensated concessions. Because agents fail to leverage this underlying utility structure for strategic advantage, their final agreements are heavily dictated by surface-level opening anchors rather than actual utility weights. Finally, requiring agents to explicitly state concession-for-reciprocity trades before making an offer makes individual turns look more strategic, but ultimately fails to improve the efficiency of the final agreements.

We introduce \textsc{Cattle Trade, a multi-agent benchmark for evaluating large language models (LLMs) as agents in strategic reasoning under imperfect information, adversarial interaction, and resource constraints. The benchmark combines auctions, hidden-offer trade challenges (TCs), bargaining, bluffing, opponent modeling, and resource allocation within a single long-horizon game lasting 50--60 turns. Unlike prior agent benchmarks that test these abilities in isolation, \textsc{Cattle Trade} evaluates whether agents integrate them across a competitive, multi-agent economic game with conflicting incentives. The benchmark logs every bid, TC offer, counteroffer, and card selection, enabling behavioural analysis beyond final scores or win rates. We evaluate seven cost-efficient language models and three deterministic code agents across 242 games. Strategic coherence, in particular spending efficiency, resource discipline, and phase-adaptive bidding, is associated with rank more strongly than spending volume or any single subskill. Two heuristic code agents outperform most tested LLMs, and behavioural traces surface recurring LLM failure modes including overbidding, self-bidding, bankrupt TC initiation, and weak opponent-state adaptation. Evaluating agentic competence requires benchmarks that test the joint deployment of multiple capabilities in multi-agent environments with conflicting incentives, uncertainty, and economic dynamics.

Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation. It is also a canonical testbed for agentic language models, requiring multi-turn interaction under hidden preferences, strategic communication, and binding constraints. These properties make negotiation hard to evaluate: unlike math or code, it has no intrinsic verifier. Existing LLM negotiation evaluations rely on LLM-vs.-LLM interaction or aggregate outcomes such as deal rate, leaving failures opaque. We introduce Terms-Bench, short for Testbed for Economic Reasoning in Multi-turn Strategy, a Bayesian-game framework that makes the environment itself the verifier by specifying the counterpart's latent type, policy, and payoff structure. We instantiate it in bilateral price negotiation, where the counterpart's private state and simulator policy are hidden from the agent but observable to the evaluator. This turns the counterpart from a black-box opponent into a diagnostic instrument, enabling agent-attributable failure analysis and oracle-reference optimality gaps. Evaluating 13 LLM agents spanning frontier systems from major providers, Terms-Bench turns negotiation evaluation from aggregate ranking into actionable diagnosis: where agents fail, why they fail, and what to strengthen. Empirically, frontier models saturate deal rate yet diverge in surplus extraction, cue use, belief calibration, and compliance, revealing agent-specific bargaining bottlenecks masked by prior benchmarks.

AI agents negotiate and transact in natural language with unfamiliar counterparts: a buyer bot facing an unknown seller, or a procurement assistant negotiating with a supplier. In such interactions, the counterpart's LLM, prompts, control logic, and rule-based fallbacks are hidden, while each decision can have monetary consequences. We ask whether an agent can predict an unfamiliar counterpart's next decision from a few interactions. To avoid real-world logging confounds, we study this problem in controlled bargaining and negotiation games, formulating it as target-adaptive text-tabular prediction: each decision point is a table row combining structured game state, offer history, and dialogue, while $K$ previous games of the same target agent, i.e., the counterpart being modeled, are provided in the prompt as labeled adaptation examples. Our model is built on a tabular foundation model that represents rows using game-state features and LLM-based text representations, and adds LLM-as-Observer as an additional representation: a small frozen LLM reads the decision-time state and dialogue; its answer is discarded, and its hidden state becomes a decision-oriented feature, making the LLM an encoder rather than a direct few-shot predictor. Training on 13 frontier-LLM agents and testing on 91 held-out scaffolded agents, the full model outperforms direct LLM-as-Predictor prompting and game+text features baselines. Within this tabular model, Observer features contribute beyond the other feature schemes: at $K=16$, they improve response-prediction AUC by about 4 points across both tasks and reduce bargaining offer-prediction error by 14%. These results show that formulating counterpart prediction as a target-adaptive text-tabular task enables effective adaptation, and that hidden LLM representations expose decision-relevant signals that direct prompting does not surface.

We propose a personal-LLM exchange (LLM-X), a scalable negotiation-oriented environment that enables direct, structured communication across populations of personal agents (LLMs), each representing an individual user. Unlike existing tool-centric protocols that focus on agent-API interaction, LLM-X introduces a message bus and routing substrate for LLM-to-LLM coordination with guarantees around schema validity and policy enforcement. We contribute: (1) an architecture for LLM-X comprising federated gateways, topic-based routing, and policy enforcement; (2) a typed message protocol supporting capability negotiation and contract-net-style coordination; and (3) the first empirical evaluation of LLM-based multi-agent negotiation at scale. Experiments span 5, 9, and 12 agents, under distinct negotiation policies (Low, Medium, High), and across both short-run (minutes) and long-run (2h, 12h) load conditions. Results highlight clear policy-performance trade-offs: stricter policies improve robustness and fairness but increase latencies and message volume. Extended runs confirm that LLM-X remains stable under sustained load, with bounded latency drift.

Negotiation agents must infer what their counterpart values, update those beliefs over dialogue turns, and choose actions under uncertainty. End-to-end large language models (LLMs) can imitate negotiation dialogue, but their opponent beliefs are usually implicit and difficult to inspect. We propose BOND (Bayesian Opponent-belief Negotiation Distillation), a framework for auditable negotiation. BOND consists of an LLM-based Bayesian teacher that scores dialogue contexts against the six possible opponent priority orderings, updates a posterior over those orderings, and uses the posterior for menu-based decision making, as well as a smaller 8B student language model that emits both negotiation actions and normalized posterior beliefs as tagged text. In the CaSiNo negotiation dataset, BOND outperforms the state-of-the-art and achieves mean Brier score 0.085 over opponent-priority posteriors. The distilled student preserves much of this belief signal, achieving Brier 0.114, below the uniform six-ordering reference of 5/36, approximately 0.139. Compared with a 70B structured-CoT baseline, the significantly smaller 8B student model yields substantially better elicited posterior calibration. We further showcase auditability through posterior trajectories, belief-versus-policy error decomposition, and posterior-prefix interventions. These diagnostics reveal that distillation preserves a scoreable belief report more strongly than causal belief-conditioned control, making weak belief-action coupling visible, not hidden.

Grounding is the collaborative process of establishing mutual belief sufficient for a communicative goal. While static grounding maps language to a shared context, dynamic grounding requires agents to negotiate meaning across turns. Current multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) benchmarks largely emphasize static, one-shot tasks, overlooking whether agents can repair grounding breakdowns through interaction. We introduce an iterated multi-turn negotiation game where two agents allocate shared resources to private projects with verifiable jointly optimal outcomes. Although individual agents can identify Pareto-optimal allocations in isolation, agent dyads consistently fail to reach them across models. We identify four failure modes: (1) loss of shared interaction history, (2) stubborn anchoring to early proposals, (3) defaulting to equal splits over reward-maximizing coordination, and (4) referential binding errors across turns. Our baselines show that the coordination gap is not explained by individual reasoning limits or insufficient information exchange alone. Instead, the bottleneck lies in dynamic grounding: joint plan formation, commitment, and execution.

Human-robot interaction (HRI) has long studied how agents and people coordinate to achieve shared goals. In this work, we formalize and benchmark the non-intrusive assistance as an independent paradigm of HRI, where a robot proactively supports a human's ongoing multi-step activities while strictly avoiding interruptions. Unlike conventional HRI tasks that rely on direct commands, explicit negotiation, or proactive interventions based on user habits and history, our task treats the human's plan as the primary process and formulates assistance as a joint decision over when to act and what to do. To systematically evaluate this problem, we establish a simulation benchmark, NIABench, along with new metrics tailored to the non-intrusive assistance task. We further propose a hybrid architecture that integrates an LLM with a scoring model. The scoring model first applies semantic retrieval to prune large candidate action sets, and then a ranker evaluates human-step and robot-action pairs, enabling reasoning over timing and cross-step dependencies. Comprehensive experiments on both NIABench and real-world scenarios demonstrate that our method achieves proactive, non-intrusive assistance that reduces human effort while preserving task effectiveness.

Language Model (LM)-based agents remain largely untested in mixed-motive settings where agents must leverage short-term cooperation for long-term competitive goals (e.g., multi-party politics). We introduce Cooperate to Compete (C2C), a multi-agent environment where players can engage in private negotiations while competing to be the first to achieve their secret objective. Players have asymmetric objectives and negotiations are non-binding, allowing alliances to form and break as players' short-term interests align and diverge. We run AI only games and conduct a user study pitting human players against AI opponents. We identify significant differences between human and AI negotiation behaviors, finding that humans favor lower-complexity deals and are significantly less reliable partners compared to LM-based agents. We also find that humans are more aggressive negotiators, accepting deals without a counteroffer only 56.3% of the time compared to 67.6% for LM-based agents. Through targeted prompting inspired by these findings, we modify agents' negotiation behavior and improve win rates from 22.2% to 32.7%. We run over 1,100 games with over 16,000 private conversations totaling 15.2 million tokens and over 150,000 player actions. Our results establish C2C as a testbed for studying and building LM-based agents that can navigate the sophisticated coordination required for real-world deployments. The game, code, and dataset may be found at https://negotiationgame.io/c2c.

As software systems grow in complexity, they must satisfy an increasing number of competing quality attributes, making it essential to balance them in a principled manner -- for example, a safety requirement for sensor-fusion verification may conflict with a tight planning-cycle budget. Multi-agent large language model frameworks support this balancing process by assigning specialized agents to different objectives. However, their conflict resolution is typically heuristic. Requirements are aggregated implicitly without explicit acceptance or rejection, limiting auditability in regulated domains. We present ArgRE, a multi-agent requirements negotiation system that embeds Dung-style abstract argumentation into the negotiation stage. Each proposal, critique, and refinement is modeled as an argument, conflicts are represented as directed attack relations, and the accepted set of arguments is computed under grounded and preferred semantics. The pipeline further integrates KAOS goal modeling, multi-layer verification, and standards-oriented artifact generation. Evaluation across five case studies spanning safety-critical, financial, and information-system domains shows that ArgRE provides argument-level traceability absent from existing frameworks. Independent evaluators rated its decision justifications significantly higher than those of heuristic synthesis (4.32 vs. 3.07, p < 0.001), indicating improved auditability, while semantic intent preservation remains comparable (94.9% BERTScore F1) and compliance coverage reaches 84.7% versus 47.6%--47.8% for baselines. Structural analysis further confirms that the default pairwise protocol yields acyclic graphs in which grounded and preferred semantics coincide, whereas cross-pair arbitration introduces controlled cyclicity, leading to predictable divergence between the two semantics.

Freight brokerages negotiate thousands of carrier rates daily under dynamic pricing conditions where models frequently revise targets mid-conversation. Classical time-dependent concession frameworks use a fixed shape parameter $β$ that cannot adapt to these updates. Deriving $β$ from the live spread enables adaptation but introduces a new problem: a pricing shift can cause the formula to retract a previous offer, violating monotonicity. LLM-powered brokers offer flexibility but require expensive reasoning models, produce non-deterministic pricing, and remain vulnerable to prompt injection. We propose a two-index anchor-and-resume framework that addresses both limitations. A spread-derived $β$ maps each load's margin structure to the correct concession posture, while the anchor-and-resume mechanism guarantees monotonically non-decreasing offers under arbitrary pricing shifts. All pricing decisions remain in a deterministic formula; the LLM, when used, serves only as a natural-language translation layer. Empirical evaluation across 115,125 negotiations shows that the adaptive $β$ tailors behavior by regime: in narrow spreads, it concedes quickly to prioritize deal closure and load coverage; in medium and wide spreads, it matches or exceeds the best fixed-$β$ baselines in broker savings. Against an unconstrained 20-billion-parameter LLM broker, it achieves similar agreement rates and savings. Against LLM-powered carriers as more realistic stochastic counterparties, it maintains comparable savings and higher agreement rates than against rule-based opponents. By decoupling the LLM from pricing logic, the framework scales horizontally to thousands of concurrent negotiations with negligible inference cost and transparent decision-making.

Emotion plays a pivotal role in shaping negotiation outcomes, influencing trust, cooperation, and long-term relationships. Developing negotiation dialog systems that can recognize and respond strategically to emotions is, therefore, essential to create more effective human-centered interactions. Beyond generating emotionally appropriate responses, interpretability - understanding how a system generates a particular emotion-aware response, is critical for fostering reliability and building rapport. Driven by these aspects, in this work, we introduce PRISMA, an interpretable emotionally intelligent negotiation dialogue system targeting two application domains, viz. job interviews and resource allocation. To enable interpretability, we propose an Emotion-aware Negotiation Strategy-informed Chain-of-Thought (ENS-CoT) reasoning mechanism, which mimics human negotiation by perceiving, understanding, using, and managing emotions. Leveraging ENS-CoT, we curate two new datasets: JobNego (for job interview negotiation) and ResNego (for resource allocation negotiation). We then leverage these datasets to develop PRISMA by augmenting self-training with Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), guiding agents toward more accurate, interpretable, and emotionally appropriate negotiation responses. Automatic and human evaluation on JobNego and ResNego datasets demonstrate that PRISMA substantially enhances interpretability and generates appropriate emotion-aware responses, while improving overall negotiation effectiveness.

Student engagement with large language models (LLMs) in academic writing is not a stable trait, an adoption decision, or a competency level; it is a continuously negotiated process that existing frameworks cannot adequately theorize. Typological models provide categories without mechanisms; technology acceptance models explain adoption but not post-adoption quality; AI literacy frameworks treat competency as a static predictor rather than a live input. None accounts for within-student variability across tasks, the developmental paradox whereby experience produces habituation rather than sophistication, or principled non-use as a form of ethical reasoning. This article introduces the Reliance Negotiation Framework (RNF), developed from a sequential explanatory mixed-methods study of 382 undergraduates at a public minority-serving institution in the United States (survey, N = 382; 14 semi-structured interviews; three qualitative survey strands; 1,435 coded instances). The RNF reconceptualizes LLM reliance as an ongoing negotiation among four concurrent inputs (perceived benefits, perceived risks, ethical commitments, and situational demands) with outputs that recursively modify subsequent decisions. A Two-Model Architecture accommodates the 13.0% of participants whose categorical ethical commitments foreclose negotiation entirely. The framework generates four falsifiable predictions with implications for AI literacy pedagogy, academic integrity policy, and equity-centered practice at minority-serving institutions.

Automated negotiation in complex, multi-party and multi-issue settings critically depends on accurate opponent modeling. However, conventional numerical-only approaches fail to capture the qualitative information embedded in natural language interactions, resulting in unstable and incomplete preference estimation. Although Large Language Models (LLMs) enable rich semantic understanding of utterances, it remains challenging to quantitatively incorporate such information into a consistent opponent modeling. To tackle this issue, we propose a novel preference estimation method integrating natural language information into a structured Bayesian opponent modeling framework. Our approach leverages LLMs to extract qualitative cues from utterances and converts them into probabilistic formats for dynamic belief tracking. Experimental results on a multi-party benchmark demonstrate that our framework improves the full agreement rate and preference estimation accuracy by integrating probabilistic reasoning with natural language understanding.

Language models are increasingly used to simulate people: survey respondents, negotiators, stakeholders in policy exercises. In that role a model should reproduce how people plausibly behave, hesitating, conceding late, and settling for imperfect deals, rather than playing the best move. We call this the sampler role, in contrast to the solver role of finding the best move, and we test how the reasoning modes providers ship to strengthen models as solvers affect it. Our testbed is multi-party negotiation: five agents bargain over a regulation for fifteen turns, and unresolved issues are decided by an authority. Agents without a structured memory of the negotiation almost never reach agreement, whether reasoning is on or off: 314 of 315 such runs end with the authority deciding. What reasoning changes is how the failure looks. With reasoning enabled, one model family negotiates visibly, with varied moves, concessions in most runs, and a different path every time, yet still ends without agreement in fifteen runs of fifteen. Diversity checks would pass a model whose endings never change. Two further results show the task permits agreement: when agents write their own short running notes on the negotiation, agreement becomes the norm, while the same notes supplied ready-made change nothing; and hand-coded agents following textbook concession strategies agree in most runs under identical rules. Simulation pipelines should therefore vet models as samplers, on the distributions of outcomes they produce. Fidelity as a sampler must be tested on its own: solver strength is no guide to it, and switching on reasoning leaves it where it was.

As AI usage becomes more prevalent in social contexts, understanding agent-user interaction is critical to designing systems that imp rove both individual and group outcomes. We present an online behavioral experiment (N=243) in which participants play three multi-tu rn bargaining games in groups of three. Each game, presented in randomized order, grants access to a single LLM assistance modality: proactive recommendations from an Advisor, reactive feedback from a Coach, or autonomous execution by a Delegate. All three modalitie s are powered by an LLM with super-human performance within this negotiation setting. On each turn, participants privately decide whe ther to act manually or use the AI modality available in that game. We document a preference-performance misalignment: participants s trongly prefer the higher-control Advisor (44%) over the Delegate (19%), yet groups only significantly increase collective surplus un der Delegate access. Adjusting for voluntary non-compliance, delegating to the AI yields suggestive individual welfare gains, roughly 1.5x the intent-to-treat estimate. A mechanism analysis traces this gap to a human filter: AI-generated proposals create more joint surplus than manual proposals across all conditions, but in the Advisor and Coach modes users modify, override, or ignore the AI's su ggestions, reverting toward human-baseline trade patterns. The Delegate advantage arises not from a different AI capability but from bypassing this filtering step altogether. Realizing these welfare gains depends not only on model capability, but on the interaction structure through which that capability is delivered. We argue that assistance modalities should be designed as mechanisms with endog enous participation; adoption-compatible interaction rules are a prerequisite to improving welfare with automated assistance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) generate text token-by-token in discrete time, yet real-world communication, from therapy sessions to business negotiations, critically depends on continuous time constraints. We use simulated negotiations between paired agents under strict deadlines to study adaptation to real-time pressure. Agents either receive only the initial deadline or explicit remaining-time updates at each turn. Remaining-time feedback raises deal closure from 4% to 32% for GPT-5.1-chat-latest and increases offer acceptance more than sixfold. The same model achieves near-perfect closure under turn-based limits, showing that poor wall-clock performance is not simply due to insufficient negotiation competence. Across additional interface conditions, qualitative urgency cues can outperform numeric countdowns, repeated deadline reminders do not consistently reproduce their benefits, and directed time tracking can help or hurt depending on the model. Across additional negotiation scenarios and model configurations, we find real-time temporal adaptation is fragile, model-dependent, and sensitive to how temporal constraints are presented. Code available at https://github.com/sehgal-neil/llm-temporal-awareness

Negotiation is a core component of social intelligence, requiring agents to balance strategic reasoning, cooperation, and social norms. Recent work shows that LLMs can engage in multi-turn negotiation, yet nearly all evaluations occur exclusively in English. Using controlled multi-agent simulations across Ultimatum, Buy-Sell, and Resource Exchange games, we systematically isolate language effects across English and four Indic framings (Hindi, Punjabi, Gujarati, Marwadi) by holding game rules, model parameters, and incentives constant across all conditions. We find that language choice can shift outcomes more strongly than changing models, reversing proposer advantages and reallocating surplus. Crucially, effects are task-contingent: Indic languages reduce stability in distributive games yet induce richer exploration in integrative settings. Our results demonstrate that evaluating LLM negotiation solely in English yields incomplete and potentially misleading conclusions. These findings caution against English-only evaluation of LLMs and suggest that culturally-aware evaluation is essential for fair deployment.

This book is an introductory textbook targeted towards computer science students who are completely new to the topic of automated negotiation. It does not require any prerequisite knowledge, except for elementary mathematics and basic programming skills. This book comes with an simple toy-world negotiation framework implemented in Python that can be used by the readers to implement their own negotiation algorithms and perform experiments with them. This framework is small and simple enough that any reader who does not like to work in Python should be able to re-implement it very quickly in any other programming language of their choice.

Large language models (LLMs) still struggle with strategic persuasion, largely because existing approaches either neglect information asymmetry or rely on unrealistic pre-commitment assumptions. We introduce a type-induced commitment-communication mechanism that grounds Bayesian Persuasion (BP) in natural language dialogue without pre-commitment: the persuader narrates their potential types (e.g., honest vs. dishonest) to dynamically construct an information schema, enabling the persuadee to perform Bayesian belief updates within the conversation itself. We implement two variants: Semi-Formal-Natural-Language (SFNL) and Fully-Natural-Language (FNL), evaluating them against strong baselines across multiple LLMs and human judges. BP strategies consistently outperform baselines: SFNL excels in logical credibility, while FNL shows superior robustness and emotional resonance. We verify that gains stem from genuine Bayesian reasoning rather than superficial formatting, and we further show that supervised fine-tuning enables small models to match the persuasive performance of much larger ones.