Active Inference

Learning from trajectory demonstrations offers a route to active-inference control of complex systems whose dynamics are difficult to model explicitly. We introduce generative active-inference control (GenAIF), in which one generative trajectory model learns from demonstrations and measured action interventions to supply a goal-conditioned policy distribution and a state-to-observation likelihood mapping. From this control design, we derive three model requirements: (i) useful action proposals, (ii) accurate prediction under imposed actions, and (iii) probabilistic observation evidence for belief updating and expected information gain. We benchmark diffusion, autoregressive Transformers, conditional variational autoencoders (CVAEs), and flow matching in a MuJoCo manipulation task with multiple physical conditions. Diffusion delivers the strongest control across the tested dynamics, while CVAE combines comparable short-horizon prediction with much faster inference. Correct conditioning is decisive, and trajectory reuse offers further computational savings. In replay after an unannounced tilt change, pretrained diffusion updates belief fastest among the original models; fine-tuning on recovery demonstrations further accelerates identification and sustains accurate tracking. These findings support the use of shared generative trajectory models to connect action proposal, controlled prediction, and observation evidence within GenAIF.

Intrinsic motivation plays a central role in adaptive and goal-directed behavior by conferring agents reward-independent objectives and biases useful to act in noisy and uncertain environments. Active Inference addresses the problem of acting in a partially observable environment through a principled framework for belief updating and action selection. A key component of Active Inference is the specification of prior preferences, which shapes behavior by encoding desirable future outcomes. An intrinsic motivation approach called the Maximum Occupancy Principle (MOP) proposes that agents act so as to maximize occupancy over future paths of states and actions, with no preferences or epistemic targets. Despite its simple formulation, MOP gives rise to rich and adaptive behaviors that combine exploratory variability with goal-directed dynamics. In this work, we extend MOP to partially observable environments and introduce a Bellman reformulation of the Expected Free Energy for Active Inference, both incorporating belief-based inference over hidden states as part of the agent state. The Bellman formulation enables tractable offline computation via value iteration over the full belief-state space. We compare the resulting behaviors in a set of minimal experimental settings with uncertain food sources. We find that MOP agents switch between goal-directed (food seeking) behavior and exploration between different food sources, depending on their energy available and their belief state. In contrast, Active Inference agents mostly inhabit regions around a single food source, a strategy having both high pragmatic and epistemic value. We finally compare with Empowerment, which is shown to be qualitatively similar to Active Inference.

Teleoperation systems are tuned for channel fidelity, while whether the operator experiences the device as part of the body, the Sense of Embodiment (SoE), is measured only afterwards, by questionnaire. Predictive-processing accounts suggest controlling devices to reduce the mismatch between the operator's predictions and the returned feedback, but those predictions are unobservable, and an objective that only penalizes mismatch is minimized by removing feedback. We formulate an embodiment-aware controller, the Universal Embodiment Engine (UEE), that infers the operator's embodiment and visuo-proprioceptive cue weighting from implicit gaze and pupil signals and task outcome, and chooses bounded device settings under explicit preferences, cast as a discrete Active Inference agent. In simulations with 300 heterogeneous synthetic operators, the UEE found the suitable setting within half a minute for most operators, before identifying their exact type, and came close to an oracle in the second half of the session (embodiment 1.68 against 0.73 for the best fixed setting, on a 0-2 scale). Adapting without reading the operator did no better than fixed control, and model-free bandits did worse, whereas an expected-utility controller with the same inference did exactly as well: the benefit comes from Bayesian inference over the operator with explicit preferences, not from the information-seeking term of Active Inference. A naive prediction-error minimizer withheld feedback, as its objective implies, and lost task success (0.74 vs 0.90). The benefit shrank but persisted for operators outside the controller's model family, grew with the variety of the population, and vanished when the controller trusted an uninformative signal or when cue weighting changed mid-session without being modeled. These failures show what studies with people must establish first: calibrated signals and a model of change.

Robot teams that learn a common environment model exchange belief summaries and plan by the expected information gain of their actions. Under conjugate exponential-family beliefs the shared belief is counted once per robot at two points: at fusion, the product of local posteriors counts the common prior $n$ times, and at planning, every robot scores its plan under the same belief and the team converges on the same unknown. Both errors are removed by adding evidence increments to the shared natural parameter, realized increments at fusion and expected increments at planning. The expected increment of a committed teammate gives the next robot its conditional gain; corrected gains sum to the joint gain, the redundancy removed equals the total correlation of the planned observation streams, and sequential commitment keeps the $1/2$ greedy guarantee. The expected increment is exact for Gaussian beliefs with fixed sampling paths and for Dirichlet beliefs under the novelty approximation of discrete active inference, whose team objective has a closed concave form within an explicit bound of the exact mutual information, and fails for finite hypothesis classes, where a short exact enumeration replaces it. Experiments on cooperative RockSample, foraging, and field monitoring show that fusion correction leaves exploration redundancy unchanged, anticipated evidence removes it, and sequential commitment recovers most of the value of centralized joint planning at cost linear in the team size.

Autonomous agents operating on multisensory data cannot assume that all sensory modalities remain consistently informative. In real environments, sensory streams are frequently corrupted by noise, missing data, or inter-modal incongruence, requiring adaptive arbitration between competing sensory hypotheses. While active inference provides a principled framework for uncertainty-guided inference, the role of dynamically inferred sensory precision in generative multimodal arbitration under sensory conflict remains comparatively underexplored. We propose a multimodal perceptual inference model in which latent beliefs and modality-specific sensory precisions are jointly updated through iterative free-energy minimization. In our proposed model, sensory precision dynamics not only reflect sensory uncertainty but actively shape the evolution of latent beliefs during multimodal conflict. In addition, we introduce a learned prior over sensory precisions that induces structured, class-dependent precision patterns and influences cross-modal inference dynamics. We evaluate the model using a synthetic multimodal MNIST dataset combining visual, auditory, and tactile representations of digit classes under controlled sensory noise and inter-modal incongruence. Results show that dynamic precision inference improves reconstruction robustness under corrupted sensory evidence, supports coherent latent inference from reduced sensory evidence, and enables stable arbitration between conflicting modalities. Furthermore, learned precision priors generate interpretable precision structures that shape inference dynamics and cross-modal latent structure. These findings support sensory precision inference as a mechanistic control process for adaptive multimodal belief formation under uncertainty, highlighting precision dynamics as a computational mechanism for robust and interpretable multisensory integration.

Active inference offers a unified framework for perception, learning, and action, but scaling discrete active-inference models to rich spatial and temporal domains remains difficult. Renormalising generative models (RGMs) address this challenge by composing discrete generative models across spatial and temporal scales, coarse-graining lower-level states and paths into higher-level causes for objects, events, and action. However, fully reproducing and adapting the framework remains difficult: the mathematical exposition is compact, and the reference implementations are deeply integrated within specialized software environments, leaving many algorithmic details implicit. This paper addresses these challenges by providing a self-contained, derivation-oriented account of RGMs together with an open, verified implementation. We explain how the hierarchy is built, how beliefs and actions are updated within it, and how information is passed between levels. Where the published equations and implementation differ in emphasis, we make those choices explicit and explain their modelling consequences. By clarifying the theory and separating it from its original implementation context, this work lowers practical barriers to entry and makes RGMs more transparent, auditable, and reproducible, providing a foundation for future quantitative evaluation and development on machine-learning benchmarks.

Biological systems must regulate competing needs under limited perceptual bandwidth, where sharpening one estimate costs the capacity to sharpen the others. Any fixed-budget system therefore has to decide where to allocate its perceptual precision. We study this in a foraging agent that must keep several bodily needs satisfied to survive, modelled with active inference. At each step it reads its own body-state beliefs, identifies the most-needed channel, and reallocates a fixed budget of interoceptive precision toward it, so that the same precision-shaped likelihood feeds both belief update and planning. In AffectWorld, a four-channel foraging gridworld, this selective allocation more than doubles learning-phase survival at matched budget against a uniform-precision agent ($0.414$ vs $0.199$ across 11 layouts, $n{=}32$ seeds each, paired cluster-bootstrap $p \leq 10^{-4}$). Two further results sharpen the mechanism. The benefit runs through planning as well as perception, since denying the shaped likelihood to the planner alone removes about half of it. It is also need-aligned, since aiming precision at the least-needed channel does worse than spreading it evenly. The attended channel additionally learns its own dynamics about twice as fast, and stays ahead even at matched observation count, a behavioural trace of the same precision routing, visible in learning speed, not survival.

Predictive coding offers a powerful theory of cortical computation, but corresponding scalable algorithmic implementations for artificial intelligence have remained elusive. This paper introduces the Bayesian reflex, a computational framework that directly instantiates predictive coding through three pillars: belief maintenance via hierarchical generative models, sequential Bayesian updating via prediction-error minimization, and uncertainty-driven action via active inference. We show that recent breakthroughs---ellipsoidal decomposition for exact $i.i.d.$ sampling, recursive Gaussian processes for deep hierarchical inference, and derivative-aware Bayesian optimization---provide the missing algorithmic ingredients. The resulting framework enables mathematically principled, scalable, and brain-inspired continual learning, perception, and decision-making. We illustrate its versatility through applications ranging from climate model evaluation to prime number discovery, offering a blueprint for truly adaptive artificial intelligence.

A recent line of work measures causal emergence in reinforcement learning agents through Integrated Information Decomposition, reporting that $Φ_r$ grows with training and tracks reward improvement. For active inference, this raises the question of how reward-free predictive organization relates to such information-theoretic signatures. I test this within an active inference agent whose architecture separates a fast perception latent $z$ from a slow global latent $g$, where $g$ is driven by prediction error and structurally decoupled from policy gradients. In a reward-free environmental regime-switching protocol, $Φ_r$ concentrates in $g$; its aggregate magnitude is largely architectural and decreases with training. The substantive effect of learning becomes legible only at the atom-compositional level: decoupling flips sign from negative to positive and becomes regime-invariant under environmental change, while downward causation carries the regime-dependent adjustment. These results identify $g$ as the architectural locus of $Φ_r$-relevant temporal organization in an active inference agent, and argue against reading scalar $Φ_r$ as a direct index of learned integration.

Active Inference (AIF) frames adaptive behavior as the minimization of expected free energy (EFE), combining epistemic and pragmatic objectives within a single variational principle. We frame AIF as policy optimization and show that, for closed-loop control policies, EFE minimization can be formulated as a convex Markov decision process (MDP). This perspective reveals that policy-dependent reward prediction errors transmit natural gradients of the expected free energy backwards in time rather than up a hierarchy. Finally, we show that coupling world-model learning with policy optimization gives active inference the structure of performative reinforcement learning. Together this places EFE minimization within modern reinforcement learning and optimization theory and opens a route toward principled algorithms for active inference.

Sophisticated Inference is a variant of active inference often associated with recursive belief modeling and tree search. We argue that its central computational role is simpler: within a planning horizon, it makes active inference closed-loop by allowing future actions to depend on future states and observations. This closed-loop structure can be represented in the epistemic-prior variational free energy framework. Epistemic priors supply the active-inference objective, while a joint posterior over future states and actions supplies the state-contingent control structure. We evaluate this decomposition in the Reactivity Maze, a stochastic benchmark designed to separate epistemic incentive from inner-horizon closed-loop control. The comparison includes three variational objectives with the same state-action posterior family, an action-state factorized active inference objective, Sophisticated Inference, and standard Expected Free Energy planning. The results show that neither ingredient is sufficient on its own. Methods without an epistemic component do not seek information, while methods that prevent future actions from depending on future states cannot turn information into reliable goal-reaching. By contrast, both Sophisticated Inference and full-joint epistemic-prior active inference solve the environment by combining epistemic drive with closed-loop inference. These results show that the advantage associated with Sophisticated Inference need not be specific to tree search itself. It arises from the closed-loop form of active inference, and this form can be represented in epistemic-prior variational inference when the posterior keeps future actions dependent on future states.

An agent acting under partial observability must decide when to gather information and which observations are worth their cost. Standard POMDPs value information only through its eventual effect on reward. The $ρ$-POMDP framework instead rewards uncertainty reduction directly, through a belief-dependent utility $ρ$, but in practice both the choice of $ρ$ and the weight placed on it are tuned by hand for every task. We show that active inference removes this tuning entirely. Minimizing Expected Free Energy (EFE) is exactly equivalent to solving a $ρ$-POMDP whose utility is expected information gain, and the exploration weight is fixed at $w=1$ because the variational bound expresses pragmatic and epistemic value in the same units (nats). We prove this equivalence for observe-then-commit POMDPs and extend it to factored observation POMDPs, a broader class that covers interleaved observe-act problems such as non-destructive testing and mobile sensing, where gathering information leaves the hidden state unchanged. Experiments support the theory. Across environments ranging from the classic Tiger problem to RockSample and a new Structural Inspection benchmark with over 65,000 states, the untuned weight matches or outperforms reward-only planning at the same horizon, avoids the over-exploration of bonuses tuned per task, and sits near the reward-maximizing knee of the success-reward Pareto frontier. The practical payoff is an exploration objective that works out of the box. In applications such as fault detection and medical screening, where every test has a price and every missed fault has a cost, EFE supplies a belief-dependent utility that is derived rather than tuned.

Joint-Embedding Predictive Architectures (JEPAs) are the dominant design for latent world models, yet they are usually justified by empirical performance rather than a normative principle. We show that the choice of anti-collapse regulariser determines whether a JEPA's training objective, a prediction loss plus a weighted embedding regulariser, is a valid Active Inference (AIF) variational free energy. We organise four non-contrastive regularisers (VICReg, LogDet, PairDist, and SIGReg) into an entropy-estimator hierarchy indexed by a prior-miscalibration gap, and show that the gap's sign, whether the estimator bounds the latent entropy from above or below, decides whether the AIF surprise bound survives: VICReg and LogDet are unsafe upper bounds, PairDist a safe lower bound, and SIGReg eliminates the gap. We then prove a correspondence theorem: under the standard constant-noise encoder model and successful SIGReg enforcement (isotropic-Gaussian embeddings), the gap vanishes, the objective becomes an exact information bottleneck, the surprise bound is preserved, and the latent goal cost becomes an exact proxy for AIF pragmatic value, whereas VICReg leaves an irreducible second-order anisotropy term. We extend the correspondence to multi-step expected free energy, ensemble epistemic value, and a learned-policy regime, and we identify the one AIF term no current JEPA world model computes: the state-epistemic value, a future-state coverage signal. The predictions differ in kind, not degree, and are stated here as theoretical consequences left for empirical test in separate work; full proofs are in Appendix A, and the algebraic core of every result is machine-verified in Lean 4 (Appendix D).

In this paper, a novel test-time scaling law for physical artificial intelligence (AI) agents is introduced. This scaling law enables physical AI agents to reason with their world models to generalize in unforeseen scenarios at test time. The derived scaling law is grounded in the first principle of active inference, which equips agents with the general objective to survive in the real world, under which their specific task objectives are subsumed. Active inference achieves this by providing the reasoning to resolve prediction errors that arise when the agent encounters unforeseen situations outside its training distribution, enabling generalization in non-stationary environments. The proposed scaling law captures this by dynamically updating the agent's policy with this reasoning at test time. This policy update is modeled as a soft Bayesian inference process in which beliefs about the policy are updated using the reasoning that reduces expected prediction errors under allowable policies as a likelihood. The resulting posterior policy admits a biological interpretation, recovering the scaling mechanism that engages the brain's basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex at test time. To solve this analytically intractable problem, a variational inference solution minimizing free energy bounds is developed. This solution extends to enable learning beyond training by reinforcing new instances, resolved at test time, in both the policy and world model. Unlike existing scaling laws constrained by model size and training data, the derived solution scales with the continuous real-world experience of a physical AI agent. Simulation results on an autonomous driving task demonstrate that the proposed solution outperforms model-free Q-learning and model-based Bayesian reinforcement learning, achieving robust generalization to unforeseen scenarios while improving inference efficiency by over 36%.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) improves large language models' performance in math and symbolic reasoning. But on planning, contested ethics, and tasks where the model cannot check itself, more reasoning makes things worse. Both effects are documented; what has been missing is a principled account of which property decides the outcome. We argue it is meta-uncertainty: how unsure the model is about the reliability of its own evidence. When that uncertainty is high, extra reasoning stops adding signal and starts manufacturing false confidence. We prove that the policy minimizing expected free energy under uncertain precision stops integrating cues after a finite number of high-validity ones when the precision prior is heavy-tailed (Theorem 2.6.1), and under a Descending Dominance condition, is sample-wise identical to take-the-best (Theorem 2.7.4). Fast-and-frugal heuristics and active inference are, then, two descriptions of the same computation. The prediction is that on high-meta-uncertainty items, longer CoT should degrade accuracy. We score the regime per item (simulate-and-recover rho > 0.96), build FEH-79, a benchmark of Knightian frames with matched controls, and run a pre-registered study across seven models (five open-weight 3B-32B, two frontier), five CoT lengths, and 7,875 responses. The gate, fixed before any data, required a negative interaction with posterior probability above 0.95 and an accuracy drop of more than 6 points. It held. The high-regime drop is 17.3 points (95% CI [7.7, 25.5]); matched items with definite answers show no cost. The effect is regime-dependent: decisive in capable mid-to-large models, directional in the two frontier systems, absent-to-reversed in the weakest. The framework answers when CoT helps and unifies the Bayesian and fast-and-frugal traditions: less-is-more effects are evidence about the meta-uncertainty regime, not against Bayesian cognition.

Planning under uncertainty requires agents to balance goal achievement with information gathering. Active inference addresses this through the Expected Free Energy (EFE), a cost function that unifies instrumental and epistemic objectives. However, existing EFE-based methods typically employ specialized optimization procedures that are difficult to extend or analyze. In this paper, we show that EFE-based planning can be formulated as Variational Free Energy minimization on a generative model augmented with epistemic priors. Our main result demonstrates that minimizing a Variational Free Energy functional with appropriately chosen priors yields a decomposition into expected plan costs (the EFE) plus a complexity term. This formulation reinforces theoretical consistency with the Free Energy Principle by casting planning as the same inferential process that governs perception and learning. We validate our approach on three environments of increasing complexity: a deterministic T-maze, a stochastic Reactivity Maze, and a partially observable MiniGrid DoorKey-8x8 environment. The experiments demonstrate that the epistemic priors induce information-seeking behavior, that the variational formulation yields policy-based inference outperforming plan-based methods under stochastic transitions, and that temporal factorization enables scalability to environments where existing tabular active inference methods cannot operate.

Cancer treatment is at the core a sequential decision-making problem with partial observability, latent patient heterogeneity, and explicit constraints on the budget for medical measurements. Unlike standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) approaches that control state trajectories, cancer treatments permanently modify patients' transition dynamics, changing how states evolve over time. We model cancer treatment as a belief-space planning problem using active inference, deriving an expected free-energy objective that unifies goal-directed control and information acquisition under measurement budgets without. We implement this framework using real clinical cancer data from the AACR Project GENIE Biopharma Collaborative dataset. Results on clinical data demonstrate a simultaneous patient categorization and high treatment efficacy, under real measurement and treatment constraints.

Active inference casts decision-making as inference, with the Expected Free Energy (EFE) unifying goal-directed and information-seeking behavior. Recent work showed that EFE minimization can be written as Variational Free Energy (VFE) minimization on a generative model augmented with epistemic priors. We prove that the VFE of the augmented model can be rewritten as the VFE of the predictive model plus explicit entropy-correction terms, making the EFE contribution transparent. We then show that proper EFE-based planning requires combining these epistemic corrections with a planning correction that turns marginal inference into policy optimization, yielding a full variational characterization of EFE-based planning. This clarifies which corrections are needed for cross-entropy planning and for full EFE-based planning. The same entropy-corrected formulation leads to a detailed message-passing scheme for EFE-based planning together with simpler ablations. Experiments on three grid-world environments show that full EFE-based planning outperforms ablations that omit either the planning correction or the epistemic corrections.

Urban traffic signal control at IoT-instrumented intersections must remain effective under sensor occlusion, weather attenuation, and nonstationary demand. Conventional controllers degrade under these conditions, and learned policies remain difficult to audit. To address these challenges, we propose an active inference controller for a four-arm signalized intersection that dynamically selects phases by minimizing expected free energy (EFE) over Gaussian beliefs about per-direction congestion levels, yielding a fully traceable decision pipeline. We benchmark the controller in a SUMO traffic simulator against a rule-based heuristic and a deep Q-network (DQN) across four scenarios that progressively increase noise and nonstationarity, spanning sensor occlusion, adverse weather, and stochastic accidents. Across 100 independent random evaluations per scenario, active inference attains the lowest idle times and CO2 emissions in the noisiest scenarios (56,977 s and 29.12 kg vs. 71,741 s and 30.56 kg for DQN). These gains come at a modest cost in bus priority service rate and phase switch frequency.

$U$-statistics play a central role in statistical inference. In many modern applications, however, acquiring the labels required for $U$-statistics is costly. Motivated by recent advances in active inference, we develop an active inference framework for $U$-statistics that selectively queries informative labels to improve estimation efficiency under a fixed labeling budget, while preserving valid statistical inference. Our approach is built on the augmented inverse probability weighting $U$-statistic, which is designed to incorporate the sampling rule and machine learning predictions. We characterize the optimal sampling rule that minimizes its variance and design practical sampling strategies. We further extend the framework to $U$-statistic-based empirical risk minimization. Experiments on real datasets demonstrate substantial gains in estimation efficiency over baseline methods, while maintaining target coverage.

Inter-brain synchrony (IBS) observed in real-time dyadic interactions, including parent-infant exchanges, suggests that two agents can align their internal representations through interaction. Yet computational accounts of how such alignment can arise between agents that have only local sensory access and asymmetric internal knowledge remain underdeveloped. We propose a constructive model of parent-infant homeostatic co-regulation that integrates a POMDP formulation of active interoceptive inference with the Metropolis-Hastings Naming Game (MHNG) derived from the Collective Predictive Coding (CPC) hypothesis. In our model, the parent and infant agents agree on homeostatic regulatory actions for the infant's visceral state through a shared communicative variable generated by a locally computable Metropolis-Hastings probability. The parent observes the infant through body-generated exteroceptive cues, whereas the infant directly senses its own visceral state through interoception. This difference in access modality is implemented as asymmetric generative-model knowledge: the parent knows how actions transform visceral states but must learn what the infant's bodily cues indicate, whereas the infant perceives its visceral state directly but must learn how actions affect it. We quantify the degree of representational alignment using the Jensen-Shannon divergence between the two agents' latent representations. Notably, this synchrony emerged far earlier than the generative-model convergence and was maintained despite heterogeneous generative-model knowledge, indicating that it does not require fully shared world models. These findings support CPC as a candidate computational framework for explaining how dynamic representational synchrony relevant to IBS can emerge through local interactions.

This paper presents an expert-guided active-inference-inspired framework for adaptive UAV swarm trajectory planning. The proposed method converts multi-UAV trajectory design from a repeated combinatorial optimization problem into a hierarchical probabilistic inference problem. In the offline phase, a genetic-algorithm planner with repulsive-force collision avoidance (GA--RF) generates expert demonstrations, which are abstracted into Mission, Route, and Motion dictionaries. These dictionaries are used to learn a probabilistic world model that captures how expert mission allocations induce route orders and how route orders induce motion-level behaviors. During online operation, the UAV swarm evaluates candidate actions by forming posterior beliefs over symbolic states and minimizing KL-divergence-based abnormality indicators with respect to expert-derived reference distributions. This enables mission allocation, route insertion, motion adaptation, and collision-aware replanning without rerunning the offline optimizer. Bayesian state estimators, including EKF and PF modules, are integrated at the motion level to improve trajectory correction under uncertainty. Simulation results show that the proposed framework preserves expert-like planning structure while producing smoother and more stable behavior than modified Q-learning. Additional validation using real-flight UAV trajectory data demonstrates that the learned world model can correct symbolic predictions under noisy and non-smooth observations, supporting its applicability to adaptive UAV swarm autonomy.

The proliferation of agentic artificial intelligence has outpaced the conceptual tools needed to characterize agency in computational systems. Prevailing definitions mainly rely on autonomy and goal-directedness. Here, we argue for a minimal notion open to principled inspection given three criteria: intentionality as action grounded in beliefs and desires, rationality as normatively coherent action entailed by a world model, and explainability as action causally traceable to internal states; we subsequently instantiate these as a partially observable Markov decision process under a variational framework wherein posterior beliefs, prior preferences, and the minimization of expected free energy jointly constitute an agentic action chain. Using a canonical T-maze paradigm, we evidence how empowerment, formulated as the channel capacity between actions and anticipated observations, serves as an operational metric that distinguishes zero-, intermediate-, and high-agency phenotypes through structural manipulations of the generative model. We conclude by arguing that as agents engage in epistemic foraging to resolve ambiguity, the governance controls that remain effective must shift systematically from external constraints to the internal modulation of prior preferences, offering a principled, variational bridge from computational phenotyping to AI governance strategy

Understanding how road users resolve space-sharing conflicts is important both for traffic safety and the safe deployment of autonomous vehicles. While existing models have captured specific aspects of such interactions (e.g., explicit communication), a theoretically-grounded computational framework has been lacking. In this paper, we extend a previously developed active inference-based driver behavior model to simulate interactive behavior of two agents. Our model captures three complementary mechanisms for uncertainty reduction in interaction: (i) implicit communication via direct behavioral coupling, (ii) reliance on normative expectations (stop signs, priority rules, etc.), and (iii) explicit communication. In a simplified intersection scenario, we show that normative and explicit communication cues can increase the likelihood of a successful conflict resolution. However, this relies on agents acting as expected. In situations where another agent (intentionally or unintentionally) violates normative expectations or communicates misleading information, reliance on these cues may induce collisions. These findings illustrate how active inference can provide a novel framework for modeling road user interactions which is also applicable in other fields.

Active inference, a neurally-inspired model for inferring actions based on the free energy principle (FEP), has been proposed as a unifying framework for understanding perception, action, and learning in the brain. Active inference has previously been used to model ecologically important tasks such as navigation and planning, but scaling it to solve complex large-scale problems in real-world environments has remained a challenge. Inspired by the existence of multi-scale hierarchical representations in the brain, we propose a model for planning of actions based on hierarchical active inference. Our approach combines a hierarchical model of the environment with successor representations for efficient planning. We present results demonstrating (1) how lower-level successor representations can be used to learn higher-level abstract states, (2) how planning based on active inference at the lower-level can be used to bootstrap and learn higher-level abstract actions, and (3) how these learned higher-level abstract states and actions can facilitate efficient planning. We illustrate the performance of the approach on several planning and reinforcement learning (RL) problems including a variant of the well-known four rooms task, a key-based navigation task, a partially observable planning problem, the Mountain Car problem, and PointMaze, a family of navigation tasks with continuous state and action spaces. Our results represent, to our knowledge, the first application of learned hierarchical state and action abstractions to active inference in FEP-based theories of brain function.

Failures are the norm in highly complex and heterogeneous devices spanning the distributed computing continuum (DCC), from resource-constrained IoT and edge nodes to high-performance computing systems. Ensuring reliability and global consistency across these layers remains a major challenge, especially for AI-driven workloads requiring real-time, adaptive coordination. This work-in-progress paper introduces a Probabilistic Active Inference Resilience Agent (PAIR-Agent) to achieve resilience in DCC systems. PAIR-Agent performs three core operations: (i) constructing a causal fault graph from device logs, (ii) identifying faults while managing certainties and uncertainties using Markov blankets and the free energy principle, and (iii) autonomously healing issues through active inference. Through continuous monitoring and adaptive reconfiguration, the agent maintains service continuity and stability under diverse failure conditions. Theoretical validations confirm the reliability and effectiveness of the proposed framework.

Autonomous robotic navigation in real-world environments requires exploration to acquire environmental information as well as goal-directed navigation in order to reach specified targets. Active inference (AIF) based on the free-energy principle provides a unified framework for these behaviors by minimizing the expected free energy (EFE), thereby combining epistemic and extrinsic values. To realize this practically, we propose a deep AIF framework that integrates a diffusion policy as the policy model and a multiple timescale recurrent state-space model (MTRSSM) as the world model. The diffusion policy generates diverse candidate actions while the MTRSSM predicts their long-horizon consequences through latent imagination, enabling action selection that minimizes EFE. Real-world navigation experiments, including baseline comparisons, component ablations, and robustness evaluations, demonstrated that our framework achieved higher success rates and fewer collisions, particularly in exploration-demanding scenarios. These results highlight how AIF based on EFE minimization can unify exploration and goal-directed navigation in real-world robotic settings.

Recent and rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) make it increasingly important to understand the foundations of adaptive behaviour in autonomous agents, especially for building safe and efficient systems. While artificial neural networks have dominated the development of AI, recent work has begun to explore living biological neuronal networks as an alternative substrate for computation. These systems promise remarkable data and sample efficiency and rich dynamics, and may also inspire explainable and biologically plausible models. Here, we develop an experiment-informed active inference framework to model decision-making in closed-loop agents that mirror experimental setups using biological neurons. Using a generative model whose dimensions are matched to an experiment protocol, we systematically compare three decision-making schemes within this common generative model. Under matched episode counts (i.e. total data available for learning) to the in-vitro experiment, our simulations show that agents with short memory horizons reach a level of performance close to that of mouse and human cortical cultures (DishBrain platform), whereas longer memory horizons depart from it substantially. Increasing the planning horizon, by contrast, confers no comparable benefit. Because all model parameters are explicit, we can also track the quantities in our generative model that accompany this improvement, such as the risk term and the entropy of the transition and state-action mappings. Together, these results illustrate how active inference offers a formal language for comparing decision-making schemes in similar closed-loop control environments.