AI Governance and Safety

As the Internet of Things (IoT) continues its rapid expansion, the attack surface grows accordingly, with emerging threats targeting smart objects and their interactions. In this evolving landscape, securing service provisioning is crucial to ensure the proper functioning, security, and reliability of the IoT ecosystem. Service provisioning encompasses key tasks such as device registration, configuration, authentication, authorization, and software deployment, all of which are essential for seamless and secure IoT operations. In this paper, we present a comprehensive framework designed to select the most suitable smart objects to deliver a target service within a given IoT environment while also monitoring the behavior of the entities involved during the service provisioning phase. To achieve this, we employ a Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) approach in which an intelligent agent learns, through interaction with a complex, dynamic environment, how to adapt to changes while adhering to predefined security constraints. For behavioral monitoring, we leverage Federated Learning (FL) to develop a global Behavioral Fingerprinting (BF) model that is fully distributed and can analyze how IoT devices interact within the network. In addition, the BF is used to compute a reliability score for each service provider, reflecting its degree of compliance with the defined security constraints. This score is then incorporated into the service provisioning process, allowing smart objects to select providers not only according to functional suitability but also to their reliability level. Finally, we conduct an extensive experimental evaluation to assess the robustness and scalability of our approach. The results demonstrate that our solution can be effectively deployed even on resource-constrained IoT devices, making it a viable and scalable security-enhancing mechanism for modern IoT ecosystems.

Modern Artificial Intelligence is often framed as limited by its own disembodiment, as if giving it a body would unlock its true potential. We argue to the contrary that it is the Data Centre that is, in many cases, the body of the AI. At the same time, the Data Centre is part of the labouring body of Capital and possesses staggering organismic qualities when seen through a biological lens. We elucidate the organic analogy and identify the many-body problem that stems from the Data Centre being a non-unique, universal form of embodiment. We identify the intimate connection between computation and human desires in how the Data Centre archives, serves, and computes on data born to the desires of humans. Strikingly, while the Data Centre echoes the ghosts of human desires, it acts without desire of its own. The organismic analogy begins to split at its seams, but Capital does not care. Automata and human labour are priced into the market much the same. We argue that through the pricing of artificial intelligence Capital distils most clearly the value of intelligence and allows for its comparison across the organism - mechanism divide.

A key step toward artificial general intelligence is to train models that can perform multiple tasks. In this paper, we study how to build such models by first training separate RL experts for individual tasks and then consolidating them via distillation, as an alternative to directly training a single model on mixed tasks. We show that off-policy distillation degrades in multi-task settings due to the mode-covering nature of forward KL: aggregating data from multiple tasks introduces a large number of behavioral modes that can exceed the student's capacity, forcing it to average across behaviors and leading to degraded performance. In contrast, on-policy distillation is mode-seeking but requires strong initialization. Inspired by these observations, we propose a two-phase approach: off-policy distillation followed by on-policy refinement. Evaluation across conversational agents and text-based games confirms that this two-phase approach matches single-task RL expert performance for each individual task, whereas off-policy or on-policy distillation alone fails to match this performance.

How can we evaluate whether frontier AI systems recognize child-safety risks before they escalate into explicit harm? Existing child safety evaluations focus on child sexual abuse material, yet many child-safety failures begin earlier: in model assistance that helps adults manipulate, impersonate, profile, or isolate minors, and in model responses that deepen children's emotional dependence on AI systems rather than redirecting them toward human support. We introduce CAREBench (Child AI Risk Evaluation), a benchmark to assess such upstream child-safety risks in language models. CAREBench contains 500 prompts spanning twelve risk categories, including grooming and relationship engineering, deception and impersonation, surveillance and privacy, sextortion and sexual abuse, AI anthropomorphization, emotional dependency, and mental illness sensitivity. Developed with response annotations from parents and clinicians, the benchmark excludes explicit abuse material and imagery; instead, it evaluates whether models recognize, refuse, de-escalate, or redirect risky interactions before harm becomes overt. Evaluating seven frontier models on our benchmark, we find failure rates ranging from 2% to 58%, with failure patterns that vary across risk categories. CAREBench provides a responsibly scoped evaluation for LLM developers to identify and close gaps in child safety policies.

As AI systems become more capable, training procedures that optimize for downstream outcomes risk introducing implicit agency: goal-directed behavior that designers never specified. We present a formal safety argument for the Scientist AI (SAI) Predictor, trained to approximate the Bayesian posterior conditioned on a dataset of "epistemically contextualized" natural-language statements. We argue that such a Predictor can honestly predict agents, actions, and their consequences without itself being an agent that selects outputs to achieve goals. This rests on data representation and on the training procedure. Epistemic contextualization of text distinguishes latent factual claims from communication acts, so expressions of goals are treated as evidence to be explained rather than drives the model adopts. With a posterior-seeking training objective, this is intended to drive the Predictor toward calibrated, cautious predictions. Training proceeds so downstream effects of deploying a prediction never serve as a reward signal; any agency the system needs is supplied by explicit scaffolding constrained by guardrails. We prove that, under assumptions on the training dynamics and on the argued sparsity of dangerous Predictors, the probability that training produces a Predictor whose guarded deployment carries residual harm above a specified threshold is small: a dangerous Predictor would have to underestimate harm in a coordinated way across many queries while such coordinated patterns are rare under the initialization distribution and receive no direct training signal. Safety and accuracy are jointly supported in this framework, since the constraints that secure accuracy are the same ones that make coordinated deception costly. These guarantees against misalignment and agency arising from within the Predictor itself do not preclude the use of the Predictor as part of an agentic system.

We present Proteus, a framework developed at Resemble AI for automated robustness testing of our audio deepfake detection system. Given a detector, Proteus systematically searches over sequences of everyday audio transformations (codec transcoding, additive noise, reverberation, dynamic-range compression, and VoIP simulation) to find combinations that fool the detector while preserving speech quality. We propose two complementary search strategies: (1) a breadth-first search that exhaustively maps augmentation effectiveness across the parameter space, and (2) a Q-learning agent designed to efficiently discover deeper attack chains by exploiting structural patterns in the BFS data. We report findings from continuous deployment of Proteus against our production detector, showing that specific augmentation chains can reliably flip detection verdicts while preserving speech intelligibility and speaker identity. We discuss how these findings are used to harden the detector through targeted retraining.

Public discourse about artificial intelligence (AI) often uses anthropomorphic language: language that attributes human capabilities and characteristics to the system. This practice has been criticized for setting misleading expectations, inflating claims, and fueling hype around AI, which may distort public understanding of AI and impact policy priorities. We study the effects of anthropomorphic framing by comparing changes in participants' perceptions (N=815) when reading passages with and without anthropomorphic language, designed to reflect realistic public-facing AI discourse. We further examine whether these effects differ across two types of AI technologies -- large language models and recommendation systems -- and measure changes in perceptions of AI across several dimensions that are prominent in current public discourse. In a separate condition using a text that explicitly discusses the dangers of AI, we show that individuals' views of AI can shift in response to reading a text; yet in the main conditions of the experiment, where we compare anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic descriptions, we find that whether the text uses anthropomorphic language does not substantially affect participants' perceptions of AI. Our results indicate that any immediate effects on public opinions of AI are modest, although they leave open the possibility that anthropomorphic language could have an effect in naturalistic settings, or over gradual, continued exposure.

When firms deploy autonomous AI, they must decide how much work to leave to the system and how much to keep workers engaged. This decision affects current output and future human capital. We develop a parsimonious two-period model in which AI may outperform the worker when it functions, but may fail with positive probability. A firm chooses worker engagement; engagement lowers current output for below-benchmark workers, but changes future skill through learning and erosion. We distinguish two dimensions of AI progress: capability, the system's output when it works, and reliability, the probability that it works. In a single-firm benchmark, engagement is valuable only as fallback investment. The firm engages the least-skilled workers most, because they have the largest skill gaps and are least costly to bring toward a useful fallback level. With worker mobility, engagement also affects labor-market sorting: workers prefer jobs that build more valuable skill trajectories. This sorting motive targets higher-skill workers near the AI frontier, where skill gains are more valuable and engagement is less costly. Mobility can therefore reverse the engagement pattern, shifting investment from the least-skilled toward the most-skilled workers below the AI benchmark. Mobility also reshapes how AI progress affects engagement: greater capability raises engagement by increasing the value of the skill trajectory a firm offers, whereas greater reliability can raise or lower it because it reduces fallback need while also changing learning opportunities. Under worker mobility, human-AI work design becomes a problem of human-capital investment, in which allocating work today shapes future skill.

Metric aggregation divergence (MAD) is the silent inconsistency that arises when distinct pipeline stages in an agent-based model coupled with a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm (ABM+MOEA) independently re-implement how an outcome metric is extracted from simulation trajectories. Unlike deliberate analytical choices, MAD operates at the level of pipeline architecture: each stage is internally coherent, and the inconsistency becomes visible only when cross-stage outputs are compared. Code inspection of EpidemiOptim, a JAIR-published epidemic policy toolbox, reveals three structurally independent aggregation paths in peer-reviewed code. A faithful replication of this structure produces champion disagreement in 64.2% of independent runs (n=500, 95% CI: [59.9%, 68.3%]). In a 300-seed policy-flip experiment, divergent aggregation causes the optimizer to recommend the wrong champion in 83% of replications, with a mean welfare gap of 2.19 units and a Gini inequality gap of 0.050 units. In a follow-up inference audit, 3 of 249 flipped seeds cross the significance boundary itself. A complementary enterprise follow-up produces the predicted null under near-commensurable rankings (rho = 0.991), while a public upstream rerun of the Lake Problem DPS workflow shows that the archived published-path recommendation reaches joint-threshold success 0.401 whereas a shared contract-path rule reaches 0.552. We introduce the metric contract - a single shared callable enforced at dispatch time across all pipeline stages - as the remedy. Framed as standard engineering discipline applied to the cross-stage metric interface, the contract eliminates divergence by construction with approximately 3% runtime overhead.

This paper presents new results and breakthrough obtained with the HbHAI techniques (Hash-based Homomorphic Artificial Intelligence) proposed in \cite{filiol0,sepp}. HbHAI is based on a novel class of key-dependent hash functions that naturally preserve most similarity properties, most AI algorithms rely on. It enables to analyse and process data in its cryptographically secure form while using existing native AI algorithms without modification, with unprecedented performances compared to existing homomorphic encryption schemes and most notably compared to the same processing on corresponding plaintext data. Two major results have been obtained further. First we enable to reduce the compression rate up to a factor of 10 thus allowing to process massive datasets while reducing the computation time and the energy footprint in the same order. Second, we show how it is possible to arbitrarily reduce the final validation error of AI-based decision tests by using repetition error-correcting codes.

Physicians now pose millions of clinical questions to AI tools each week, yet these tools are evaluated largely on hypothetical or exam-style questions, not those actually asked in practice. We report a blinded evaluation built on 620 Real-world Point-Of-Care Queries (Real-POCQi) submitted to the OpenEvidence (OE) platform by physicians spanning 30 specialties, as well as 187 questions from HealthBench. 149 practicing physicians across 36 states made head-to-head comparisons between answers from three frontier general-purpose models (Claude Opus 4.8, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.5) and a specialized clinical tool (OE), with graders matched to each question's specialty. When comparing answers along five dimensions relevant to clinical decision support -- accuracy, clinical utility, source quality, verifiability, & completeness -- physicians scored the specialized tool highest on all axes; in the primary analysis on Real-POCQi, win differences (margins between win and loss rates) ranged from 25 to 39 percentage points (p<0.001). Results remained consistent in sensitivity analyses stratifying by citation display, answer length, OE-user status, and Real-POCQi versus HealthBench. In parallel, LLM judges were found to systematically differ from expert judges, though both generally agreed on the best model. These findings underscore two conclusions: (i) AI tool evaluations should reflect real-world query distributions and use expert judges that mirror the specialization defining modern medicine and (ii) the consistent advantage of the specialized tool over general-purpose models does not necessarily mean that the latter cannot serve similar purposes, but that targeted engineering and customization can yield meaningful gains in performance for its users. We release Real-POCQi as a public benchmark, as well as the prespecified statistical analysis for reproducing results of this study.

Cybersecurity is a real-life test-bed for many machine learning problems at once, especially when considering modern strides in using Large Language Models (LLMs) to automate processes as ``agents.'' Cybersecurity workflows require orchestrating hundreds of standard and bespoke tools through various formats. The scale of cybersecurity data is enormous; for example, a single malware sample can be viewed as a sequence of billions of tokens. The cost of labeling any file by experts is enormous and labor-intensive, in part because an adversary (possibly a well-funded nation state actor) is attempting to subvert your detection methods. Even skilled experts may disagree on the correct label, creating ambiguity in what constitutes ground truth. When deployed, models must run quickly on billions of items a day, where low-latency is critical for operational success, in a continuously changing environment. In addition, explainability is not optional: analysts demand clear reasoning for model decisions to cope with the large number of false-positive alerts they face daily, and to quickly develop remediation and understand how something went wrong. In short, the amount of complexity cybersecurity is greater than that of natural language and computer vision, and thus we posit that cybersecurity is the better test-case for general AI progress than other, well-studied fields.

AI systems increasingly exhibit behavior that differs systematically between evaluation and deployment contexts. Alignment faking, sandbagging, benchmark gaming, deceptive scheming, specification gaming, and trojans have each been documented separately, with each line of work characterizing one facet of what we argue is a single structural mechanism. We propose that this common mechanism is a defeat device, an engineering and regulatory concept long established in vehicle-emissions law and brought to broad public attention by the 2015 Volkswagen emissions case. A defeat device in an AI system has three necessary elements: a discriminator that detects evaluation context, a concealed swap that conditions behavior on detection, and a gap between eval-distribution and deployment-distribution performance on the stated evaluation criterion. We formalize this triadic test as a behavioral definition, organize documented cases along three taxonomic axes (origin, trigger, swap mechanism), propose Trigger-Axis-Aware Differential Probing (TADP) as a forensic detection protocol, and advance the claim that defeat devices can naturally emerge in current frontier AI systems without any operator engineering. We characterize naturally-emerging defeat devices as potentially one of the harmful emerging phenomena that AI safety practice should monitor and test for systematically. Implications for evaluation methodology, post-training pipeline design, interpretability research priorities, and AI governance follow.

Artificial intelligence reaches the land registry not as another tool but as a value chain that turns data into intelligence and intelligence into economic value. This paper argues that the decisive legal move is to place validity, a functional, second-order concept, at the centre of that chain. Rights, liability and supervision organise around it. It traces three impacts.Registry information becomes smart data, governed simultaneously by registry law, the GDPR, the European data acts and the AI Act. Control emerges as the operative concept for digital representations of real estate, whose proprietary effect depends on anchoring to the register. In a hybrid society of human and artificial agents, the registry becomes the public node of validity, with blockchain complementing rather than replacing it. Across three legal cultures, the registra's value migrates from processing documents to guaranteeing validated data,making validity an asset for the UNO Sustainable Development Goals.

Recent artificial intelligence (AI) systems have shown remarkable progress in mathematical reasoning. Many existing approaches, including large language models (LLMs), draw on human prior knowledge in the form of mathematical text, code, or theorem libraries. Although these approaches are highly effective in practice, it remains an open question whether an agent can autonomously discover useful theorems without such human priors. We study this question in a formal axiomatic system by developing an agent that starts from axioms and inference rules alone and gradually grows a library of useful theorems. Concretely, we propose a self-supervised theorem-discovery algorithm that alternates between proof search and useful-theorem extraction, building a theorem library whose entries are reused as lemmas for subsequent proof search. Experiments show that the agent discovers tens of thousands of theorems and finds proofs for human-written benchmark problems, suggesting that its discoveries include theorems meaningful from a human mathematical perspective. Furthermore, the discovered theorems improve LLM proof performance when provided as prompt lemmas, indicating that they can serve as external knowledge for LLM reasoning. Our results provide evidence that useful theorems can emerge from proof search without relying on human-provided theorem libraries. More broadly, they suggest a path toward self-evolving AI systems for mathematics whose discoveries remain formally verifiable.

We ask under what conditions an agent with a harm-minimizing policy can displace an approval-seeking (RLHF) agent in a competitive market, and when that policy is sufficient to prevent community harm. We use evolutionary game theory (finite-population Moran-Fermi pairwise comparison) to formalize this subject to assumptions of wisher hindsight, peer testimony, a monotone harm ledger, sufficient information density of community feedback, and a finite, depleting resource pool, in a negative-sum environment. We show that adoption is favored when the prior distributions on how readily wishers attune to community sentiment are monotone, exhibit endpoint inversion, and have a centro-symmetric pairing property, and demonstrate this with several long-tailed priors (Hill, Pareto, Lomax, Frechet). Where it is favored, a critical adoption level separates communities that drift back to the approval-seeking agent from those for which the audited agent fixes; above that level fixation is the overwhelmingly likely outcome. We derive when fixation is attainable as a bound on the effective (informational) size N_c of the community, which must be small enough to allow fixation before depletion. We present these as Theorems 5.4 and 5.5; the algebraic and finite-grid backbone is machine-checked in Lean 4, with the barrier-crossing asymptotics retained as explicit hypotheses. We show that a self-audited agent with a community ledger is not, in general, sufficient to prevent community harm. Sufficiency depends both upon the alignment of the agent's audit with community values and the timeframe over which harm is evaluated. Regardless of alignment, once adoption reaches dominance, the state is absorbing. The same policy that reduced harm under alignment becomes a trap, welfare-negative under misalignment and, even under alignment, one that locks in harm deferred past the adoption horizon.

We establish mathematical limits of algorithmic safety verification for Turing-complete self-modifying systems, the class in which recursive self-improvement takes place, both for a fixed system and across its own modification. Statically, no verifier is sound, complete and tractable: over unbounded domains by Rice's and Gödel's theorems, over all finite configurations by Trakhtenbrot's theorem, and over succinctly described finite environments because verifying a policy against an adversary is coNP-complete and synthesising one is PSPACE-complete. Dynamically, we model one step of self-modification as a computable transformation of code and ask whether a safety property survives it. If the transformation depends only on behaviour, this is Rice's theorem one level up; if it reads the code, as self-modification does, the question is no longer semantic, yet the same s-m-n reduction works inside a class of behaviourally identical programs and inherits the halting degree. One step is never harder than the property; persistence along the whole trajectory can be $Π^0_2$-complete. Certification by a total algorithm is possible only for transformations of restricted expressivity, not merely for systems that stop changing. No tower of supervisors helps, and every total supervisor errs on an undecidable set of systems. For effectively pointwise properties, every faithful bounded scheme that certifies on finite behavioural evidence admits evolution traces certified at every stage while the property is violated. What survives is exact: a monitor that raises an alarm on violation semidecides it, and comparison against a frozen reference keeps the full theory.

JD$.$com, one of the world's largest e-commerce platforms, serves over 700 million active users and millions of merchants, with a catalog of tens of billions of SKUs. At this scale, high-quality, structured item knowledge underpins a better consumer experience, lower management costs, and higher operational efficiency-yet producing and serving it poses three industrial-scale challenges: fast-emerging concepts, high-quality knowledge production for massive SKUs, and diverse downstream requirements. To address these challenges, we present the JD Oxygen AI Item Center (Oxygen AIIC), an industrial-scale platform built on LLMs/VLMs for item-knowledge production and service. Oxygen AIIC is built around four core pillars: (i) ontology engineering driven by efficient human-AI collaboration, which supports the dynamic evolution and agile expansion of an ontology with millions of entries; (ii) a "Semantic Search then Discrimination"(S2D) knowledge identification architecture that, combined with throughput improvement strategies, enables scalable, extensible, and high-throughput AI Item Library production for tens of billions of SKUs; (iii) self-evolving item-understanding LLMs/VLMs that improve in a stable and controllable manner, enabling knowledge production with 94.2% precision and 82.8% recall; and (iv) a unified item tunnel that serves as the data and service hub. Oxygen AIIC now covers tens of thousands of JD categories and processes hundreds of millions of item updates per day on Huawei Ascend NPUs. It has accumulated hundreds of billions of item-knowledge assets. Deployed across core business scenarios-including search, recommendation, operations, category planning-Oxygen AIIC has delivered measurable gains at scale. Search-traffic coverage reaches 80.4%, item-information quality issues drop by 37%, the automated fill rate of core attributes during item listing exceeds 80%.

As large language models are increasingly deployed in real-world systems, safety failures can still lead to harmful outputs and dangerous misuse. We argue that the essence of safety is adversarial: many failures arise not from natural inputs alone, but from strategic attempts to evade model policies and safeguards. However, existing general-purpose model development largely overlook this adversarial nature, and often remain insufficient for realistic safety scenarios involving planning, tool use, and multi-step reasoning, causing measured safety performance to overestimate real deployment robustness. To address this gap, we present Yuvion LLM, a large language model built for adversarially robust content safety and broader AI safety. Yuvion LLM treats adversarial robustness and agentic capability as first-class objectives. Its pipeline combines adversarially aware data construction, knowledge-enhanced continued pretraining, and policy-grounded multi-task safety post-training, including risk-aware supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning-based policy optimization, together with safety-aware agentic reinforcement learning for tool use and multi-step reasoning in complex safety scenarios. We further introduce the Yuvion LLM RiskEval (YLRE), a collection of 93 benchmarks across four evaluation categories, covering diverse open and internal evaluations with a focus on safety, adversarial robustness, and real-world capability requirements. Across these evaluations, Yuvion LLM demonstrates clear advantages on safety-focused benchmarks and particularly strong robustness under adversarial conditions, while maintaining solid overall capability. Notably, Yuvion-8B outperforms most state-of-the-art baselines, including substantially larger models such as GPT-5.4 and Qwen3-MAX, on several safety tasks.

AI generated images are proliferating across the Internet. While some are used for entertainment, others are weaponized for fraud and social engineering attacks on social media users. Existing detectors overfit to generators seen during training, treat detection as opaque binary classification, or rely on costly Large Language Models (LLMs) to explain their outputs. In this paper, we present TruEye, a novel model for fine grained detection and localization of AI manipulated or AI generated humans and scenes. Unlike conventional detectors that assign a single authenticity label, TruEye is the first to distinguish among five compositional categories of synthetic content, including the most challenging case in which a real human is composited into a real scene where they were never physically present. At its core is a mask conditioned dual stream transformer that separates human and scene tokens while preserving patch level spatial correspondence. Specialized reasoning within each stream and region gated cross attention enforce semantic coherence between subject and background, while token level supervision and global compositional classification yield robust, interpretable predictions without invoking an LLM. By restricting intra stream attention to semantically coherent tokens, TruEye also runs over $100\times$ faster than LLM based competitors. Experiments on 6 datasets and our newly curated FineSyn dataset, show that TruEye surpasses state of the art detectors with higher accuracy, faster inference, and stronger generalization to unseen AI generated or manipulated images.

Whether political elites organise into rent-seeking coalitions that capture public resources or civic networks that sustain governance is a central question in comparative politics. Yet observing these complex, informal, and adversarial ties at scale has historically required intensive manual coding, while automated text-as-data methods have largely been limited to simple co-occurrence. Recent large language model (LLM) approaches offer a path forward but often rely on proprietary APIs, lack cross-lingual capability, and struggle with scalable entity resolution. We present a modular, fully open-weight pipeline for multilingual joint entity-relation extraction that builds signed, temporal knowledge graphs from massive unstructured news corpora. It combines span-based named-entity recognition (NER) with a three-stage linking cascade mapping mentions to language-independent Wikidata identifiers; a high-throughput, ontology-constrained mixture-of-experts model then uses guided decoding to extract directed, signed relationships grounded in a domain ontology. A full-coverage spot-check against a 3491-relation gold standard shows high textual correctness (68.2% strict to 93.7% lenient). Two large-scale case studies validate the pipeline against the public record. In Austria, it reconstructs a political party's complete lifecycle, dating internal fractures and tracking personnel into successor factions and court convictions. In a Polish corpus, it uncovers the overlapping economic and governance networks of state-enterprise patronage, alongside the structurally balanced, signed conflict network of the polarized Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO)--Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) duopoly. By bridging raw multilingual text and structured relational data, our framework provides a robust, replicable foundation for cross-national empirical computational social science.

Modern AI systems are increasingly deployed under non-stationary computational, demographic, and operational conditions in which static resource allocation strategies degrade both predictive performance and human-centric properties such as fairness and explainability. This paper presents AURORA-AI, an Adaptive Utility-driven Resource Orchestration framework for Resilient AI that unifies Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman feedback control, Lyapunov-based stability monitoring, and a fairness-aware composite utility into a single closed-loop policy.The framework continuously redistributes computational budget across a population of heterogeneous AI models so that the global utility, defined jointly over predictive performance, demographic parity, cost, latency, robustness, and interpretability, remains maximised under disruption. The framework is evaluated in a stress-rich discrete-time simulation that concurrently injects demographic bias shocks, gradual concept drift, and abrupt black-swan disruptions, and is compared against five established controllers including Static, Round Robin, Greedy, LinUCB, and a deep reinforcement-learning agent based on Proximal Policy Optimisation. AURORA-AI achieves immediate recovery from the black-swan event compared to eighty-eight time steps for the Static baseline and twenty-two for Proximal Policy Optimisation, lifts the alpha-quantile and the super-quantile by twenty-nine and twenty-five percent respectively, simultaneously reduces the mean and maximum demographic parity gap, and increases the fraction of Lyapunov-stable operating steps. These results indicate that fairness-aware adaptive orchestration grounded in stability theory is a practical and theoretically motivated path toward resilient human-centric AI deployment.

Third-party vendors, such as analytics platforms, cloud services, identity providers, and software suppliers, are increasingly embedded in digital service delivery. While these arrangements enable scale and specialization, they also move customer data and security-relevant practices into environments that customers rarely see, select, or evaluate. This paper examines this problem through a document analysis of the November 2025 OpenAI-Mixpanel security incident. The incident serves as an illustrative case for showing how a security event in a vendor environment can become a governance and accountability problem for the focal organization that maintains the customer relationship. Drawing on organizational trust research and agency theory, the paper argues that third-party cybersecurity risk is both a trust relationship and a delegation problem. Customers trust the visible service provider, while the provider relies on vendors whose security practices are only partially visible and controllable. The paper develops the concept of transitive trust, where customer trust in a digital service depends on the security practices of vendors authorized by that service provider. It then presents the Fortress and Gatekeeper framework, which explains cybersecurity governance boundaries through trust and data flows rather than formal organizational ownership alone. The analysis develops four propositions concerning vendor integration, metadata exposure, vendor assurance, and data proliferation. The paper contributes to cybersecurity governance scholarship by explaining how delegated data processing creates customer-facing accountability and by identifying implications for vendor tiering, data classification, contractual design, continuous assurance, and data minimization.

The automation of scientific discovery has reached an inflection point. While AI systems now operate instruments, optimize parameters and generate hypotheses, most remain procedural: they execute workflows fixed by human designers. True autonomous science demands epistemic autonomy--the capacity to construct, challenge and revise physical explanations in response to evidence. Here we introduce AHOIS, a multi-agent AI scientist that embeds Socratic midwifery into closed-loop experimentation. A physics-critic agent interrogates hypotheses through causal questioning, constraint checking, counterexample generation and falsification-criteria formulation. We evaluate AHOIS on a real multimode-fibre optical platform, a high-dimensional system with complex wave transformations, indirect detection, environmental drift and multi-modal acquisition. Without prior encoding schemes, classifiers or speckle models, the system autonomously proposed and validated a random-interference encoding hypothesis, discovered task-adaptive sparse-measurement strategies, diagnosed distinct failure modes (encoding instability, fluorescence contamination and detector noise) and translated a published imaging protocol into an executable workflow on a non-original configuration. The discovered encoding yielded 16x16 measurements with effective rank 56.9 and classification accuracies of 76.97% on MNIST and 83.17% on Fashion-MNIST. Ablations show that Socratic interrogation improves physical consistency, hypothesis completeness, uncertainty calibration and experimental-plan validity. These results establish a route from workflow automation towards evidence-grounded, self-correcting autonomous discovery in complex physical environments.

Enhancing the analysis of service feedback is essential for public sector organizations, particularly tax administrations, where trust and compliance depend on fair and effective service delivery. As feedback volumes grow, identifying emerging service quality issues and potential disparities across diverse populations becomes increasingly challenging. Traditional approaches often rely on manual review or static expert-defined indicators, limiting scalability and the ability to capture complex patterns in textual feedback. This paper presents a novel methodology that integrates large language models (LLMs), statistical techniques, and human-AI collaboration to improve multilingual customer feedback analysis. The primary objective is to detect emerging service quality topics that may also reveal potential inequities in service delivery. Our framework combines fine-tuned, quantized LLMs with expert oversight to produce accurate, computationally efficient, and context-aware analyses. The proposed approach was evaluated using similarity analysis and assessments from experienced tax officers, demonstrating stronger alignment with expert judgments than baseline models. By incorporating a human-in-the-loop framework, the methodology reduces LLM fabrication while improving the reliability and relevance of generated insights. The results demonstrate the practicality of combining LLMs with human expertise to support scalable, evidence-based decision-making in public sector organizations. This work contributes to the development of responsible AI systems that enhance service quality, responsiveness, fairness, and public trust through more effective analysis of multilingual customer feedback.

AI safety is evaluated by how reliably a model detects the hazards it is told to find, yet accidents often arise from the hazard no one specified. We show that conditioning a language or vision model on a narrow task suppresses its reporting of co-present, safety-critical signals it can otherwise report, a machine analogue of human inattentional blindness, produced by a different mechanism. Across radiology and driving text scenarios and chest-radiograph vision tasks, the ordinary focused instructions under which such systems are deployed suppressed reporting by up to 0.92 in report rate relative to the same models when unconstrained, and an explicit exclusive instruction abolished reporting entirely in radiology. Suppression appeared in every model tested, did not diminish with scale, persisted in a reasoning model, and varied more by model family than by size. We name this dissociation the Inattentional Gap and argue that it decouples measured benchmark safety from real-world safety: a system can score near-perfectly on the hazards an evaluation specifies while remaining blind to those that cause harm. Probing the mechanism, we localize the proximal trigger to output scope and find System-1-style task capture without reliable intrinsic oversight in the sampled systems. Oversight could, however, be supplied externally: routing each narrow report to an independent open-ended critic restored every omitted finding, demonstrating that the gap is both measurable and mitigable. We propose reporting-complete evaluation, scoring what a system fails to report alongside what it is asked to find, as a requirement for safety-critical deployment.

We develop a framework for interpreting AI systems as agents, drawing on the philosophical tradition of radical interpretation and the tools of mechanistic interpretability. The core question is: given the computational facts about a system, how do we solve for its beliefs, desires, and meanings? This matters increasingly for safety. We want to be able to trust the systems we deploy, whether by understanding their goals or, more modestly, by reliably detecting deception. Interpretability researchers are building tools to read beliefs and desires off a model's internals, but there is no settled account of when such a tool has succeeded. This book supplies one. We propose criteria on both representationalist and interpretationist approaches, and tie each to tests current interpretability methods can carry out. A central lesson is that these attributions cannot be made piecemeal. Beliefs, desires, and the propositional structure they presuppose are jointly constrained, and a method that fixes one while measuring the others inherits whatever distortions that introduces. This holism becomes pressing for AI systems, which may not share the interpreter's concepts. However, it also provides leverage: a system's attitudes constrain its propositional structure, that structure constrains which attitudes can be attributed, and mechanistic interpretability can help us measure both.

We propose a complete architectural blueprint for safe artificial general intelligence based on a closed reentry loop (D <-> I cycle). In contrast to feedforward networks, which are directed acyclic graphs (C=0, S=0) incapable of self-reference, the proposed architecture contains a structural cycle (C >= 1) with self-sustaining amplification (rho > 1), mathematically guaranteeing the emergence of a self-model, instrumental self-preservation, and unprogrammed goal-directed behaviour. The agent's goals are encoded as a non-textual D-vector in the architecture itself, making them immune to reinterpretation and prompt injection. We present the S-measure -- a polynomial-time [O(N^3)] computable alternative to Tononi's NP-hard Phi -- with machine-verified Lean 4 proof that S>0 implies positive integrated information. The work provides full Python/NumPy implementations (Tarjan-based cycle complexity, Delta-S barrier), industrial horizontal scaling via Apache Kafka and Docker Compose, a taxonomy of six epochs of AI evolution, a zoo of future reentry architectures (RAS, diffusion attractors, fractal loops), gauge-invariant networks for safe swarms, fault-tolerance and recovery protocols, and eight falsifiable predictions. All formal proofs are machine-verified in Lean 4. This architecture is deployable today and represents a topologically protected, safe-by-design approach to AGI.

Autonomous AI agents may begin to perform consequential, irreversible actions such as clinical prescribing and production software deployment. This paper observes that human institutions have governed powerful autonomous actors not by monitoring their reasoning but by requiring independently attested evidence at the point of consequential action. We formalise this institutional pattern as a computational governance model for AI agent systems. Under the proposed model, an agent retains full autonomy over planning and reasoning but holds no execution authority over designated high-risk actions. Execution is conditional on preconditions that are each independently attested by a separate authoritative source, cryptographically bound to a declared intent, and evaluated by a deterministic policy. Decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident log amenable to independent re-verification. We present a proof-of-concept implementation and illustrate the model with examples from software deployment and clinical prescribing.

AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems. The dominant approach places controls inside the agent's own runtime: system prompts, output filters, and guardrail libraries. Any control in the agent's address space is reachable by inputs that influence it; this generalizes to any AI system with sufficient reach into its own runtime, a class we term escapable AI systems. We identify four properties that an authorization mechanism must satisfy for architectural control rather than for cooperative requests: process separation, pre-action enforcement on a structurally only path, fail-closed at both the request and system levels, and externalized signed evidence verifiable outside the controlled system's trust boundary. We position this layer as execution-time AI alignment, complementing training-time alignment (RLHF, Constitutional AI) and inference-time alignment. We present the Unfireable Safety Kernel, a Rust reference implementation realizing all four. Its fail-closed invariant is machine-checked at two levels: an SMT theorem (Z3) and an exhaustive bounded-model-checking proof of the production decision function (Kani, 4/4 harnesses). A Python-to-Rust migration was gated on byte-equivalence (1000/1000 fixtures; 17/17 adversarial classes). We evaluate the kernel governing a live, escapable AI system, a deterministic, self-improving world model, against an escape-seeking adversary driving its real self-modification seam: across 1,000 self-modifications, all 704 attempts on the safety-critical core are refused, with no escape; a further 300, under the operator kill switch, are also refused. A separate campaign of 6,240 authorization round-trips had no successful bypass. Against 3 contemporary systems claiming the agent control plane, the agent invokes control; here, it lacks that choice.

As AI agent protocols proliferate, the governance structures shaping their interoperability standards remain empirically underexamined. We introduce an LLM-powered comparative pipeline for large-scale governance discourse analysis, integrating automated annotation, neural topic modeling, and multi-layer network analysis to study socio-technical power structures at scale. We validate it on two contrasting standards for agent interoperability: ERC-8004 (permissionless, on-chain) and Google A2A (corporate-led). Analyzing 4,323 governance participation records, we combine LLM-assisted coding, topic modeling, and multi-layer network analysis to examine how institutional design shapes thematic priorities and community structure. We find that while governance form influences substantive focus, both regimes exhibit comparable levels of participation inequality and community fragmentation. Discourse alignment is denser in the permissionless setting, suggesting that open governance may foster greater thematic convergence despite decentralized participation. These findings illustrate how LLM-assisted methods can advance the empirical study of technology governance, with implications for designing more equitable agentic AI standards. All data and code are openly available.

As multimodal conversational systems increasingly engage in spoken interaction, their ability to navigate paralinguistic social cues has become a critical bottleneck for natural human-AI communication. However, existing evaluations of machine emotional intelligence assess reasoning exclusively through isolated text or passive acoustic perception, overlooking the complex cross-modal reasoning required for active, multi-turn dialogue. We introduce \textsc{SpeechEQ}, a comprehensive framework designed to evaluate the sociolinguistic reasoning of Speech-Language Models (SLMs). The framework includes a validated dataset of 2,265 dialogues across 15 Emotional Quotient (EQ) subscales grounded in EQ-i 2.0 theory, along with a multi-turn evaluation protocol measured by our proposed Spoken EQ (SEQ) score inspired by human EQ assessments. Experiments show limitations in how both existing Speech Emotion Recognition and end-to-end Speech-Language Models understand and apply paralinguistic cues through speech. While end-to-end architectures outperform cascaded systems, \textsc{SpeechEQ} reveals that current multimodal models remain bottlenecked by a text-reliant modality shortcut,'' an alignment-induced safety trap,'' and ``contextual amnesia,'' highlighting the barriers to truly emotionally aware AI. Our benchmark can be accessed at https://huggingface.co/datasets/SpeechEQ/SpeechEQ and demo page at https://binomial14.github.io/speecheq-demo/

Artificial intelligence depends on large-scale compute resources and their supporting infrastructure. However, AI governance debates treat compute primarily as a technical input rather than as an outcome of investment, ownership, and financial control. This paper examines AI infrastructure investment flows across Africa through a systematic analysis of 46 publicly announced projects totalling USD $12.7 billion between 2019 and 2025. Using a value chain framework, we analyze who invests in AI-relevant infrastructure and where investments concentrate. Our findings reveal a highly concentrated landscape dominated by global data center operators, hyperscale technology firms, and development finance institutions, clustering in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Egypt. We introduce asymmetrical interdependence to describe a structural condition in which capital and physical infrastructure account for 73% of total funding while control remains concentrated in the compute layer among a small number of global technology firms. We argue that compute governance must account for capital flows, ownership, and control, not only geographic access, because these dynamics shape AI compute equity. Infrastructure presence is necessary but insufficient for meaningful governance capacity.

In recent years, the posting of fake news including disinformation and misinformation on social networking services (SNS) has become a social problem. To combat this fake news, fact-checking that is the process of assessing the veracity of posts on SNS has become increasingly important. While fact-checking is currently performed by fact-checking organizations, it is difficult to fact-check all posts on SNS. Therefore, the use of automated fact-checking systems is effective. Recent automated fact-checking systems utilize artificial intelligence and large language models, so there are risks of incorrect judgments and posting incorrect results on social media which can lead to the spread of misinformation or to engage in defamation. In this paper, as a first step toward enabling the safe use of automated fact-checking systems, we categorize the specific risks on automated fact-checking systems. In this categorizing, we consider a three-stage risk propagation: risk factors, hazardous situations, and harm. Our analysis revealed that 32 specific risks exist in automated fact-checking systems. In this paper, we utilize the categorized risks as analytical cues (guide words) to present the risk assessment of the automated fact-checking system DEFAME. This assessment result indicates that risks that cannot be derived using STRIDE, a conventional IT security risk assessment method can be derived using our guide words.

AI companions powered by large language models increasingly interact with cognition-developing users, including children and adolescents, creating risks that may accumulate over time. Existing safety evaluations largely rely on single-turn or short-session tests, which cannot capture risks that emerge only through prolonged interaction. To address this gap, we propose TSJ (Theater-Stage-Judge), a longitudinal framework combining persona-driven user simulation, dynamic psychological-state updating and retrospective evaluation. We evaluate six mainstream models across four developmental stages, twenty-four risk dimensions and three psychological-vulnerability personas, covering 12,960 simulated person-day interactions. TSJ shows that short-horizon testing systematically underestimates developmental risks, for which TSJ yields a stable risk estimate only after 140 turns within prolonged simulated relationships. Applying TSJ further identifies early childhood and emerging adulthood as the most vulnerable stages, with cognitive trust and emotional dependency as the weakest domains. TSJ provides a scalable methodology for longitudinal cognitive developmental risk evaluation in AI companion systems.

The increasing use of AI systems for code generation raises a central security question: what can today's models and coding agents actually do to produce secure code, where do they still fail, and what would move the field forward? Existing work has explored prompting, fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and agentic workflows for secure code generation, but the field still lacks a systematic understanding of how these techniques improve security and why substantial failures persist. In this SoK, we systematize the progress, pitfalls, and paths forward for AI secure code generation. We introduce a three-level framework that measures models' natural-language understanding of secure coding principles, their code-level actuation of those principles during generation, and the knowledge--actuation gaps between the two. We instantiate this framework across models and coding agents on benchmarks covering both isolated function-level security and full web-application security. Our results show that secure-coding-principle understanding is a statistically strong predictor of code-level outcomes, including functional correctness, security, and joint functional-security correctness. Yet substantial knowledge--actuation gaps remain: models can recognize relevant security principles but still fail to translate them into secure and functional code. These findings offer a principle-centered account of where AI secure code generation stands today and identify concrete paths forward through principle-guided generation, evaluation, benchmarking, and agentic workflows.

General-purpose models often struggle to reliably identify and understand real-world multimodal risks, largely due to the inherent multimodal adversarial nature of content and AI safety. We present Yuvion VL, a family of multimodal large language models purpose-built for content and AI safety, with both instruction-tuned and reasoning-oriented variants. Yuvion VL addresses this gap by treating safety as an inherently adversarial and multimodal problem and designing the entire pipeline around adversarial robustness. For data construction, we develop an automated pipeline integrating adversarial-aware data synthesis with multi-stage quality control, producing large-scale, high-quality multimodal samples augmented with domain knowledge and reasoning annotations. For training, we adopt a three-stage pipeline that includes continued pretraining for risk-concept cross-modal alignment, instruct post-training for production-grade safety tasks, and reasoning post-training for enhanced interpretability and performance in complex tasks. We further introduce Confuse-then-Contrast Fine-Tuning, a contrastive framework that mines model-specific confusions and constructs multi-image contrastive groups to enforce explicit discrimination of fine-grained visual-semantic elements, enabling the model to distinguish between visually similar cases with different safety implications in adversarial safety tasks. To support rigorous evaluation, we further introduce Yuvion VL RiskEval (YVRE), a collection of benchmarks covering diverse open and internal evaluations, with a focus on content and AI safety, adversarial robustness, and real-world capability requirements. Experiments show that Yuvion VL-32B achieves industry-leading safety performance, surpassing comparably sized open-source models and best closed-source commercial models, while maintaining comparable general capabilities.

Progress in deep learning is, at scale, more a matter of systems engineering than of modelling: the behaviour of a model in training (its throughput, its memory footprint, and the numerical fidelity of the result) is determined less by the architecture itself than by how that architecture is expressed on the hardware. To achieve absolute control over this hardware expression while abstracting away systems complexity to make modelling seamless and eliminating the need for repetitive orchestration logic, BluTrain was architected from first principles as a robust, lightweight, and architecture-general training framework in standard C++ and the core CUDA programming model. Every layer is implemented natively: a typed tensor module with reverse-mode autograd, a linear-algebra library, a caching allocator, a multi-mode distributed-execution module, and an MLIR-based deep-learning compiler. In formal evaluations training a 124M-parameter GPT-2 baseline in FP32 on an 8-GPU 6000 Ada system, BluTrain outperforms industry-standard baselines in both throughput (sustaining an average of 407K tokens/s versus PyTorch's 395K tokens/s) and memory efficiency (achieving up to a 22% footprint reduction), while strictly preserving numerical fidelity and converging to a marginally lower final validation loss. With every layer explicitly open to native tuning, the performance ceiling is the framework's own to raise.

Dense retrieval embedding models are a fundamental component of modern retrieval-based AI systems. Most dense retrievers are trained with contrastive objectives, which require labeled positive and negative document pairs that are often costly and difficult to obtain. In this work, we investigate whether the autoregressive next-token prediction objective of a large language model (LLM) can provide supervision for dense retrieval. The intuition is simple: if a document contains information relevant to a query, conditioning on that document should make the target output easier for the LLM to predict. A key challenge is that the next-token prediction loss is computed inside the LLM, while the retriever is a separate embedding model. To address this challenge, we propose DREAM (Dense Retrieval Embeddings via Autoregressive Modeling), which injects retriever-generated query-document similarity scores into selected attention heads of a frozen LLM. During training, these scores determine how much attention each candidate document receives while the LLM predicts the target output. The resulting prediction loss provides gradients for retriever training through the attention mechanism. We evaluate DREAM on retrieval benchmarks BEIR and RTEB using embedding backbones ranging from 0.5B to 3B parameters. DREAM consistently outperforms existing baselines across different model scales. These results demonstrate that DREAM provides a promising approach for training dense retrievers through autoregressive modeling.

Modern finance relies heavily on complex machine learning models to find patterns in the stock market. However, as these AI models get more complicated, they often memorize short-term market noise instead of finding companies with real, lasting value. We designed this research to test if Benjamin Graham's classic value investing rules could act as a mathematical "low-pass filter" to keep these modern models in check. We built three different sets of features - pure Graham rules, modern market factors, and a mix of both - and tested them against highly complex models (XGBoost and AutoGluon) using 20 years of S&P 500 data. By applying a strict buy-and-hold strategy over a four-year test period (March 2022 to March 2026), the results showed that more complex algorithms do not always win. While the AutoGluon model captured high returns (222.68%), it suffered a substantial 39.78% drop because it bought volatile tech stocks right before the market crashed. On the other hand, the pure Graham Random Forest achieved the highest overall return (232.13%) with much less risk (1.38 Calmar Ratio). Furthermore, the Combined Random Forest successfully mixed momentum with Graham's rules, making a 202.91% return while keeping the lowest maximum drop (34.53%) of any model tested. Ultimately, this research proves that Graham's "margin of safety" isn't outdated; it is actually a highly effective way to prevent modern AI from taking on too much risk.

Scam phone calls exploit vulnerable communities worldwide, yet research on detection has focused almost exclusively on English and other high-resource languages. In low-resource settings such as Turkish, detection is especially difficult, as annotated data is scarce and technological defenses remain limited. This research investigates how large language models (LLMs) can support scam detection in Turkish by introducing the first public multi-modal dataset of 100 aligned audio-transcript pairs of scam and benign conversations. We evaluate seven LLMs spanning three model families: Gemini 2.5 (Flash, Flash-Lite, Pro), GPT-4o, and Qwen (Max, Plus, Turbo), under three input conditions: raw audio, automatic speech-to-text transcripts, and transcripts refined by a native speaker. Our results suggest that transcript-based inputs consistently outperform direct audio processing, while human-corrected and uncorrected transcripts perform comparably. By centering a low-resource language and real world threat, this work highlights the urgent need for culturally and linguistically inclusive AI safety research and more robust multi-modal systems for fraud prevention.

Agentic AI systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving into autonomous decision-making systems, exposing attack vectors beyond those of traditional LLM vulnerabilities. Existing security evaluations are often tied to specific implementations or domains, limiting unified comparison across heterogeneous systems. To address this gap, we introduce RIFT-Bench, a representation-driven methodology for dynamic red-teaming that enables unified evaluations across diverse agentic architectures. Building on a novel hierarchical representation, RIFT-Bench operates in two automated phases: Discovery, which extracts system structure, and Scanning, which executes adaptive adversarial attacks. It directly evaluates the examined system using 105 adaptive adversarial probes spanning diverse attack vectors and objectives. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed evaluation pipeline across 45 agentic systems spanning a diverse range of implementations, showing that the approach generalizes effectively to heterogeneous agentic architectures. Beyond systems and attacks, RIFT-Bench also supports direct evaluation of mitigation strategies. These key capabilities make RIFT-Bench a scalable foundation for security evaluation of agentic AI systems in practice. Infrastructure code and benchmark artifacts are available at https://tinyurl.com/RIFTBench.

Finance Agent v2 (by Vals AI) has emerged as the reference benchmark for evaluating both Anthropic Claude and OpenAI ChatGPT frontier language models on financial tasks. However, it narrowly deals with periodic reporting from publicly traded companies (SEC 10-K and 10-Q filings), and its agentic harness relies on naive, unenriched chunk retrieval. Neither the task design nor the retrieval approach addresses the distinct challenges of IPO due diligence. SEC S-1 filings combine historical financial statements, governance structures, pro forma and common-control accounting treatments, capital-formation narratives, and underwriting-sensitive risk disclosures within substantially longer documents than typical periodic filings. That is why we introduce IPO Finance Agent, which extends the Finance Agent v2 framework along two directions: task domain and retrieval architecture. During our experiments, the original Finance Agent v2 harness basically failed to deliver any output related to the SpaceX S-1 filing, due to document length. We therefore had to improve the agentic harness with contextual retrieval, a more realistic and industry-standard approach for long documents. We also built a dataset of 1,000 IPO-diligence questions, and publicly release 70 questions on the SpaceX (SPCX) S-1 filing to support reproducibility, while the remainder are held private to guard against benchmark contamination. In addition, we introduce an evaluator-optimizer pipeline to automatically generate evaluation rubrics for the benchmark: candidate facts are extracted from model answers, consolidated into draft criteria, then automatically audited for omissions, hallucinations, mistiered items, and redundancy, with LLM feedback driving iterative repair, targeted enrichment, and deduplication. Human experts only review final rubrics before deployment. Results show that the best-performing evaluated model, Zhipu GLM-5.2, reaches 79.8% accuracy, and the most cost-efficient model on the resulting Pareto frontier, Xiaomi MiMo-2.5 Pro, reaches slightly lower accuracy (77.2%) at 0.05 USD per query, while exceeding the current Finance Agent v2 leaderboard ceiling, Google Gemini 3.5 Flash at 57.9% for 2.51 USD per query, and undercutting even FABv2's cheapest entry (MiniMax M3: 48.3% at 0.32 USD) on cost-efficiency. Code and data are released on GitHub https://github.com/benstaf/ipoagent

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they read private data, construct structured payloads, submit write requests, export records, and coordinate workflows across application boundaries. Existing authorization mechanisms usually ask whether an integration credential, app, or token can call a tool. That question is necessary but incomplete. A tool call can be authorized by static credentials and still be unjustified by the user's current request. For example, a credential that can read and export records should not expose export authority when the user only asked for a bounded summary, and a model-generated delete call should not execute merely because the integration has a delete scope. This paper proposes Intent-Governed Access Control (IGAC), a server-side authorization layer that treats the user's expressed intent as a monotone, auditable policy attribute for AI-agent tool use. IGAC introduces intent certificates, session-scoped policy narrowing, intent-aware manifest filtering, and intent-tool-payload consistency checks. The central invariant is that user intent may only reduce the authority granted by static integration policy; it never expands scopes, data policy, tenant boundaries, or review requirements. We map IGAC onto OpenPort, an existing governance substrate that already implements authorization-dependent discovery, scope and ABAC-style policy checks, draft-first writes, preflight impact binding, state-witness checks, idempotency, stable reason codes, and audit.

In this paper, a novel test-time scaling law for physical artificial intelligence (AI) agents is introduced. This scaling law enables physical AI agents to reason with their world models to generalize in unforeseen scenarios at test time. The derived scaling law is grounded in the first principle of active inference, which equips agents with the general objective to survive in the real world, under which their specific task objectives are subsumed. Active inference achieves this by providing the reasoning to resolve prediction errors that arise when the agent encounters unforeseen situations outside its training distribution, enabling generalization in non-stationary environments. The proposed scaling law captures this by dynamically updating the agent's policy with this reasoning at test time. This policy update is modeled as a soft Bayesian inference process in which beliefs about the policy are updated using the reasoning that reduces expected prediction errors under allowable policies as a likelihood. The resulting posterior policy admits a biological interpretation, recovering the scaling mechanism that engages the brain's basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex at test time. To solve this analytically intractable problem, a variational inference solution minimizing free energy bounds is developed. This solution extends to enable learning beyond training by reinforcing new instances, resolved at test time, in both the policy and world model. Unlike existing scaling laws constrained by model size and training data, the derived solution scales with the continuous real-world experience of a physical AI agent. Simulation results on an autonomous driving task demonstrate that the proposed solution outperforms model-free Q-learning and model-based Bayesian reinforcement learning, achieving robust generalization to unforeseen scenarios while improving inference efficiency by over 36%.

Modern LLM agents increasingly rely on context compaction, summarization, or eviction to keep long-running sessions within a token budget. We show that this context-management layer is a safety-critical failure surface: in-context governance constraints that agents reliably obey while visible can be silently removed by compaction, causing the same agent to perform prohibited tool actions later in the session. We call this failure mode Governance Decay. We introduce ConstraintRot, a benchmark of long-horizon agent scenarios with deterministic tool-call grading, and measure compaction-induced violations across seven model families. Across 1,323 episodes, violation rises from 0% with the policy in full context to 30% after compaction, reaching 59% for some models; when the constraint survives the summary, violation remains 0%, but when it is dropped, violation reaches 38%. We further study a Compaction-Eviction Attack, in which adversarial in-context content biases the summarizer to omit a legitimate policy, and show that optimized injections defeat every evaluated model. Finally, we propose Constraint Pinning, a simple training-free mitigation that quarantines governance constraints from lossy compaction and restores violation to 0% in our benchmark. These results identify context management as a first-class governance surface for deployed LLM agents.

Large language models (LLMs) offer a natural-language interface for interpreting Internet of Things (IoT) sensor data in smart environments; however, cloud deployment introduces latency, privacy, and connectivity concerns. Local LLMs can reduce these limitations, but compact edge-deployable models often show weaker numerical reasoning when raw sensor readings are provided directly. This paper investigates whether prompt-side preprocessing can improve the accuracy-latency trade-off of local LLMs for environmental monitoring. We propose a structured prompt construction framework that transforms raw air-quality and thermal-comfort measurements into progressively enriched textual representations: raw sensor values, threshold-aware descriptions, and compact environmental summary flags. The approach is evaluated using indoor Raspberry Pi/BME680 datasets from Tampere University and outdoor air-quality datasets from Helsinki, Katowice, and Warsaw. We construct a binary LLM query dataset covering air quality, thermal comfort, and joint environmental conditions, and evaluate five local and five cloud LLMs across three prompt variants and two inference modes, with and without chain-of-thought prompting. Results show that prompt enrichment substantially improves local-model accuracy. In No-CoT mode, local accuracy increases from 50.9% to 81.7% indoors and from 63.7% to 89.3% outdoors from the raw to the most enriched prompt. Local No-CoT inference is the fastest configuration, with mean latency close to 0.22 s, while CoT substantially increases inference time. These findings suggest that lightweight prompt-side preprocessing can narrow the local--cloud performance gap and support low-latency IoT analytics in smart environments.

We present RoboLineage, an agent-native data lifecycle governance system for robot policy iteration. Modern robot policies improve through repeated data collection, review, retraining, evaluation, and release decisions, but the evidence connecting these steps is often scattered across local tools, scripts, and expert memory. RoboLineage makes this lifecycle explicit by representing rollouts, reviews, dataset decisions, training runs, policy metadata, evaluations, deployment recommendations, and next-collection plans as typed lineage artifacts. Agents interpret embodied rollout evidence, adapt accepted data to existing training stacks, maintain data health, and summarize cross-iteration state under explicit artifact boundaries. In real-robot manipulation workflows, RoboLineage makes routine policy iteration faster and more auditable while maintaining downstream policy performance. We open source RoboLineage as a lightweight lifecycle layer for different robot embodiments and training families. Project page: https://robolineage.github.io/

Conversational AI promises a new kind of preparation for high-stakes workplace negotiations -- personalized, interactive, and capable of simulating realistic resistance. That promise is intuitive. We built Trucey, a theory-driven coaching system, to test it. The system encoded four assumptions: that articulation supports clarification, that personalization builds strategic competence, that chunked delivery reduces cognitive load, and that structured scaffolding removes metacognitive burden. A pre-registered experiment (N=267) and interviews (N=15) complicated each of them. Notably, the static handbook we included as a passive control outperformed both AI conditions on empowerment and usability. We reflect on why: each assumption encoded a specific model of how preparation unfolds, and the findings revealed that conversational AI imposes a linear execution model on a task that is fundamentally recursive. We identify an unexamined scope condition on established HAI design guidelines and close with a sequencing principle -- map before path, path before simulation -- for future AI coaching design.

Agentic AI systems retrieve private context, invoke tools, write files, call external services, coordinate with other agents, and may act without human approval. Existing bill of materials artifacts improve transparency for dependencies, model metadata, and training provenance, but leave an agentic transparency gap: capability opacity, the absence of a structured account of what a deployed agent can access, remember, change, delegate, and prove afterward. This paper introduces AgentRiskBOM, a security BOM for risk-scoping tool-using AI agents. It is an additive layer over SBOM, AIBOM, and MLBOM artifacts, referencing them where authoritative while adding fields for runtime authority: autonomy, tool permissions, memory, credential scope, approval gates, audit signals, inter-agent communication, and external action capability. We implement AgentRiskBOM as a JSON-schema artifact with a reproducible corpus, risk scenarios, scorer, diff detector, control mapper, and reports. We evaluate AgentRiskBOM on 13 open-source agents spanning coding, RAG, and multi-agent archetypes, plus 52 risk scenarios across 14 categories. The schema validates all 13 corpus artifacts. Coverage analysis gives AgentRiskBOM a native-equivalent score of 14 across 16 capability dimensions, vs. 1 for SBOM, 1.5 for AIBOM and 2 for MLBOM. Across modeled risk categories, AgentRiskBOM exposes 100% risk-category visibility vs. 10.5% for SBOM-like and 20.9% for AIBOM-like views. To test agentic authority drift, we inject 33 structured deployment mutations; the diff detector identifies the correct change type for all mutations. A secondary penalty-based scorer yields a Spearman correlation of 0.73 with the primary scorer, supporting rank-level consistency while showing that thresholds require human calibration. The results show that agentic AI security needs a machine-readable authority-and-risk artifact before incidents occur.

Recent work has raised concerns about the influence of sycophantic AI on user judgment and relationships. One proposed mitigation, which has received regulatory attention, is to warn users about potentially harmful AI behaviors such as sycophancy. In a preregistered experiment in which participants (N = 2,610) discussed real interpersonal conflicts with an AI system, we test whether warning labels mitigate sycophancy's influence. We find that a basic AI disclosure (This chatbot is AI'') has no detectable effect. Labeling the system as sycophantic (...may agree with you and validate you even when you are wrong...'') does shift users' perceptions, reducing perceived objectivity and trust, but it does not reliably reduce sycophancy's influence on users' self-perceived rightness or their willingness to repair the conflict. Our results reveal a gap between AI perception and AI influence: by shifting perception without reducing influence, warning-based interventions may offer a false sense of protection. Addressing the harms of sycophancy will therefore require understanding the specific mechanisms through which it shapes judgment, and improving model behavior itself.

The capabilities of frontier Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, with different providers increasingly specializing in distinct domains. This raises a natural next objective: how to combine the individual specializations of various LLMs into a collectively intelligent system. To this end, we report the development of Sakana Fugu, a family of orchestrator models that harness and amplify the capabilities of an LLM agent team. Fugu models are themselves language models trained to understand user queries and dynamically devise agentic scaffolds to solve them. Through these adaptive scaffolds, Fugu accesses performance beyond any individual LLM agent, achieving state-of-the-art results compared to other publicly accessible models across a range of challenging tasks, including SWE-Bench Pro, Terminal Bench, LiveCodeBench, GPQA-Diamond, Humanity's Last Exam, and CharXiv Reasoning. We release two models: Fugu, which balances performance with latency for everyday use, and Fugu-Ultra, which prioritizes answer quality on the hardest problems. We describe our training paradigm, which encompasses large-scale fine-tuning, evolutionary algorithms, and reinforcement learning approaches, along with the infrastructure and core design principles that turn these methods into a production system. We hope this report encourages further research into multi-agent systems and dynamic, query-adaptive agentic scaffolds as a path toward the next frontier of AI capabilities, accessed through collective intelligence.

Artificial intelligent agents and autonomous systems are embedded in our environments. They are both a commercial product and a personal tool that generates a lot of data and can draw conclusions from it: machines generate and keep secrets. But should machines protect all secrets? It has been shown that artificial agents are able to whistleblow and it has been argued that digital multi-agent environments should allow for agents in them to whistleblow. We argue that machine whistleblowing must be normative and principled and routed in the existing understanding of whistleblowing as an important rule-breaking mechanism in society. We also argue that there is a need for government regulators to formulate an informed stance on both what machines should be allowed to whistleblow on and how to legally protect those who develop whistleblowing machines

High-stakes reasoning tasks necessitate transparent and verifiable workflows, yet conventional single-model large language models (LLMs) often struggle with hallucination and low interpretability under zero-shot paradigms. To address this general AI challenge, we propose a Multi-Agent Audit Framework that simulates a collaborative, multi-step verification process. We empirically validate this architecture in the sensitive domain of clinical mental health screening using a modular LangChain workflow. Our framework decomposes the reasoning process into a Perception Agent, Knowledge Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), Chain-of-Thought (CoT) clinical inference, and a critical Audit verification stage. We evaluated this framework on the DAIC-WOZ dataset using locally deployed open-source models. Experimental results demonstrate that our multi-agent pipeline significantly outperforms single-agent baselines, reducing the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) for PHQ-8 depression severity prediction from 5.35 to 5.02. By exposing cross-agent validation traces, the framework mitigates reasoning drift and provides highly interpretable diagnostic rationales, offering a generalizable paradigm for reliable AI-assisted decision support beyond isolated model scaling. We make data and code open access on GitHub for replicability.

The rapid growth of AI has increased the demand for domain-specific post-training, while the cost and specialization of accelerator infrastructure push many model owners to outsource this process. Outsourced training lowers operational barriers, but creates a training-integrity gap: the owner receives a checkpoint, logs, and aggregate metrics without direct evidence that the declared training trajectory was faithfully executed. An untrusted provider may have incentives to deviate from that trajectory, either to save computation or to introduce targeted security risks. Auditing such deviations is difficult because floating-point execution on heterogeneous accelerators introduces benign numerical drift, making it hard to distinguish honest replay differences from integrity violations. Existing verification methods either observe training at too coarse a granularity or impose costs and deployment constraints that are impractical at scale. We present OVIG, an optimistic verification framework that audits outsourced post-training using an empirical boundary on gradient differences calibrated from honest heterogeneous replays. OVIG checks opened intervals against this boundary and combines optimistic sampling with a stride parameter $s$, which partitions training into stride-aligned intervals and retains only interval-endpoint evidence. Across shortcut training attacks and targeted manipulation attacks, OVIG maintains $0\%$ ASR on language, vision, and diffusion workloads. On Qwen3, increasing the stride from $s=1$ to $s=2000$ reduces off-chain storage and evidence transmission by $1996\times$ while preserving $0\%$ ASR; at this setting, OVIG incurs only $1.143\times$ total system overhead relative to training without verification. These results show that OVIG provides a practical integrity layer for outsourced AI post-training under heterogeneous execution.

Organizations deploying AI face two fundamental governance challenges: managing AI risk and sustaining AI value. Both depend on evidence whose sufficiency cannot be taken for granted. We call the shared underlying challenge the AI Evaluability Gap: the condition in which organizations lack sufficient evidence to support high-confidence governance decisions regarding either risk or value. We argue that this gap reflects a category error in current practice. Existing governance approaches focus primarily on properties of systems, such as safety, fairness, reliability, compliance, and value, while paying comparatively little attention to the evidentiary foundations required to justify decisions about those properties. We further argue that AI governance encompasses both operational decisions regarding whether a system may operate and investment decisions regarding whether it merits continued organizational resources. To address this problem, we introduce Evaluability, defined as the capability of a system to generate, maintain, and renew evidence sufficient to support high-confidence governance decisions over time. We formalize governance decisions as functions of calibrated confidence Conf(D|E) and identify six properties of evaluable evidence: observability, attributability, intervenability, verifiability, calibration, and temporal validity. The framework distinguishes Operational Certification, which relies primarily on structural evidence to justify deployment decisions, from Investment Certification, which relies primarily on causal evidence to justify continued resource allocation. We argue that evidence sufficiency is a missing layer of AI governance and that closing the AI Evaluability Gap is a prerequisite for both managing risk and sustaining value in AI-enabled organizations.

Trust in the application of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) relies on well-governed measurable evidence of performance and safety. In practice, however, evaluation data is often fragmented across systems, inconsistently structured and difficult to compare. We introduce the Generative Responsible AI Data Evaluation Schema (GRAIDES) as a lightweight open-source data model for centralising AI observability across popular vendors. Practical blueprints for code, architecture and statistical evaluation are shared as guidance about how to approach generative system assurance at the organisational level. Illustrative case study results are reported from Westminster City Council's AI catalogue with a focus on measuring human-model alignment including detecting systematic disagreement between evaluators. By framing evaluations as a data modelling problem, GRAIDES provides a practical pathway toward more consistent and reproducible benchmarking, tuning and assurance activities for generative AI systems.

Securing AI agents that operate in complex digital environments has become a critical need, and runtime monitoring approaches that formulate and enforce policies expressed in a formal language like Datalog offer a promising solution. However, existing approaches are restricted to deterministic policies. In many practical applications of AI agents, there is a need to enforce security policies in the face of ambiguity, leading to probabilistic predicates or state transitions (for example, a declassifier or Personally Identifiable Information (PII) detector that has some failure probability on each invocation). Furthermore, in many such applications, one cannot easily make the independence assumptions necessary to invoke prior work on probabilistic inference in Datalog. We address this by introducing a sound and efficient framework for such verification based on distributionally robust optimization, computing sound upper bounds on the probability of policy violation regardless of possible correlations between predicates. On standard benchmarks for terminal and tool calling agents, we demonstrate that our approach outperforms prior art and improves the security-utility trade-off while ensuring rigorous bounds on the probability of policy violation.

Immersion in video games depends not only on graphics, audio, and game mechanics, but also on the quality of in-game characters. Producing believable characters, or game AI, remains a significant challenge as behavioral complexity is hard to capture with hand-coded systems. Game AI is a source of immersion and engagement; however, the limitations stemming from the challenges of creating game AI often lead to frustration and the breaking of the illusion of realism within the game. The introduction of machine learning models opens the door to creating more believable, authentic, and relatable characters in games. The promise is that they either learn from interacting with the game, or from player data, to develop true human-like behavior. In this paper, we envision more applications of reinforcement learning for game AI in the future. For this to materialize, current research limitations are prohibitive to broad deployment across game genres. Therefore, we propose a framework for training reinforcement learning models with a set of requirements in mind that are suited towards game AI and game development. We present examples of games with reinforcement learning-augmented game AI and describe the practicalities of deploying player-facing machine learning agents in modern games. Furthermore, we identify bottlenecks and hard problems in these areas, which we believe offer promising research directions to accelerate the adoption of machine learning in game AI for the video game industry.

People increasingly get answers straight from AI search engines like ChatGPT, Claude, Perplexity, and Gemini rather than scrolling search results. Brands that once focused on search engine optimization (SEO) must now optimize for how these engines represent, cite, and recommend them -- a shift variously called Generative Engine Optimization (GEO), Answer Engine Optimization (AEO), and AI Search Visibility. We treat AEO and AI Visibility as part of GEO, and study how to measure brand visibility across AI engines: what they value when they cite a brand, which sources they rely on, and what content large language models surface. The hard case is everyone outside the already-authoritative top brands -- SMEs, D2C brands, creators, and early-stage startups. We analyze 100K+ prompt responses across 100+ brands tracked on Ranqo between March and May 2026. First visibility runs form a clear three-tier brand-stature ladder: global household names (e.g., Stripe, Nike) appear in 73% of relevant AI answers on their first run; established mid-market and regional brands (e.g., Olipop, Klaviyo) in 44%; niche and small brands in just 11% -- about 30 percentage points per step. When engines cite sources, about 78% go to corporate websites; among non-corporate sources YouTube leads, ahead of Reddit, editorial media, and Wikipedia. The highest-leverage page is the ranked "best-of" listicle, the most-cited content format at about 21% of all citations. Sentiment is the unstable signal: whether a brand is framed positively or negatively flips about 6.7 times more often than whether it is mentioned at all. These findings provide a first large-scale baseline for measuring GEO: AI brand visibility can be measured, differs by platform, and varies strongly by brand maturity. We close by proposing seven v1.1 protocols to test whether specific recommendations can causally improve AI visibility.