We design the first regret guarantees for robust dynamic pricing that decouple the dependence on the corruption
C and the time horizon
T. In dynamic pricing, a seller with unlimited supply of a good interacts with a stream of buyers over
T rounds, with the goal of maximizing revenue. At each round
t, the seller posts a price
pt, and the buyer purchases the good only if their unknown valuation
v⋆ exceeds this price. The seller observes only the binary feedback
I{pt≤v⋆}, indicating whether a sale occurred. In the \emph{robust} pricing setting, a malicious adversary is allowed to corrupt this feedback in at most
C rounds. Even if the learner knows the corruption
C, the best known regret bound is
O(CloglogT) by Gupta et al. [2025]. This leaves as an open problem to ``decouple'' the dependence on
C and
T. In this work, we resolve this open problem. In particular, we develop a robust variant of binary search that achieves regret
O(C+logT) when the corruption
C is known and
O(C+log2T) when the corruption is unknown.