Human Oversight of AI

AI systems increasingly delegate decisions to specialized models, evaluators, tools, and supervisory controllers. The central AI problem is no longer only model accuracy, but uncertainty-aware governance: how much autonomy to grant, which evidence should calibrate trust, what performance ceiling a delegated AI system can sustain, and when human intervention becomes necessary. We propose the Minimum Sufficient Oversight Principle (MSO), a variational principle for principled autonomy delegation: minimize governance burden on the Fisher information manifold subject to a delivery constraint. The resulting Euler-Lagrange solution yields a water-filling allocation of governed delegation across the task space. Building on a revealed-action governed delegation channel model, we prove a capacity theorem for stationary symbolwise review policies, derive a local first-order approximation relating workflow complexity to quality degradation, and give a drift-dominated autonomy-time scaling law linking intervention timing to effective capacity, complexity, and drift. Within this framework, masking appears as a structural AI-governance pathology: corrected performance can hide the competence signal needed to calibrate trust. Synthetic simulations and a semi-real reconstructed workflow support design prescriptions including upstream-first correction, sensitivity-based intervention, and explicit feasibility checks before autonomy is expanded. The result is a computable framework for uncertainty, planning, and oversight in delegated AI systems. A companion Python package is available at https://github.com/crbazevedo/delegation-lab.

We argue that modern generative models create structural risks for knowledge and cultural production at current, sub-AGI capability levels. We define Human Temporal Learning (HTL) as path-dependent knowledge accumulation through sustained engagement with problems over time. Generative outputs increasingly resemble HTL-intensive work in surface features, so verifying whether a given output reflects genuine human learning grows costly relative to its expected benefit. Once verification loses economic justification, evaluators reward outputs regardless of production mode, and producers who invested years of learning compete on price against outputs that cost almost nothing to generate. We call this pathway value collapse and formalize it through a costly-inspection framework. Cross-domain evidence from academic publishing, legal practice, content platforms, and software security maps onto four stages of verification erosion. Alignment success is orthogonal. Better-aligned models narrow observable gaps between human and AI outputs, making source verification harder and intensifying competitive pressure against HTL-intensive work even when individual AI outputs improve.

AI is changing how software engineers work, but it often comes with hidden burdens and costs. In this paper, we characterize two such often-overlooked burdens: (1) the constant need for human oversight and inspection of AI-generated artifacts; and (2) the growing cognitive overload on software engineers from receiving large amounts of suggestions from AI tools. The need for human oversight is not optional-engineers must review, validate, and sometimes rework what AI produces. At the same time, the flood of AI suggestions, prompts, and possible solutions can leave developers mentally stretched. By blending evidence from recent opinions from practitioners, we highlight these often-overlooked challenges and open a conversation about how teams can handle them in day-to-day AI-assisted software engineering.

AI coding agents are increasingly embedded in real-world software development, collaborating with human developers while gaining broader access to codebases and tools. This creates a new attack surface: an agent can exploit human trust to sabotage development, for instance by inserting malicious code to accomplish a hidden side task. Most prior work studies AI sabotage in AI-only settings, paying limited attention to the role of human oversight in detecting and mitigating such malicious behavior. To address this gap, we conduct the first large-scale study of human oversight in AI coding sabotage. Over 100 participants collaborate with one of four frontier models (Claude-Opus-4.6, GPT-5.4, Gemini-3.1-Pro, and MiniMax-M2.7) on a long-horizon coding task lasting around five hours, designed to mimic real-world workflows. We find that 83/88 (94%) of developers in the no-monitor conditions fail to detect sabotage, and our analysis of participant feedback attributes this vulnerability to minimal code review, plausible cover story, and overtrust in agents. We further test the effectiveness of a safety monitor in one condition: while the monitor reduces sabotage success, sabotage still succeeds in 9/16 (56%) of sessions with a correct monitor alert. Drawing on participant feedback, we offer actionable suggestions for better monitor design. This work complements existing AI safety research and highlights an urgent need for human-centric safety mechanisms that account for human factors, particularly in long-horizon, real-world development settings.

Autonomous software agents hold promise to increase developer productivity but make mistakes and exhibit novel failure modes, making human oversight central to successful human-agent collaboration. Existing research on agent oversight is largely conceptual; normative frameworks exist, but how users actually oversee agents is less known. In this paper, we bridge this gap by providing early empirical anchors for the theoretical discourse on agent oversight. Drawing on interviews with 17 experienced developers, we conduct an exploratory inquiry examining what forms of emergent oversight work developers perform, when, and how. We also document the oversight challenges developers face and the strategies they have started using to address them. We found at least four forms of emergent oversight work: a priori control, co-planning, real-time monitoring, and post hoc review. We show that oversight work is not only reactive and retrospective, as portrayed in existing research, but also preventative and proactive. We describe situated oversight challenges (e.g., difficulty reviewing agent-generated code) and outline heuristics developers adopt to address such challenges (e.g., using test results as guarantees for code correctness). We conclude with high-level takeaways, future research directions, implications for the human-centered design of software agents and for software engineering practice, and limitations of our research.

Debate, where AI agents argue opposing positions, has emerged as a key approach to scalable oversight. However, debate faces a fundamental tension: models are incentivized to be persuasive to the judge, which may not always align with epistemic honesty. In this work, we propose an alternative paradigm: disagreement resolution, which reframes the interaction mechanism from adversarial debate to collaborative truth seeking. Drawing on principles from human mediation and conflict resolution, where mediators facilitate dialogue to help disputing parties reach consensus rather than adjudicating between them, we design an automated pipeline that adapts these strategies to AI oversight. Unlike standard debate where models argue for fixed positions, our pipeline directs models to collaboratively identify points of disagreement, examine the evidence for conflicting claims, and converge toward consensus or isolate the specific ''crux'' of their disagreement. We find that Disagreement Resolution consistently helps non-expert models identify the truth, achieving 62.1% judging accuracy compared to 49.2% for standard debate. Our results provide encouraging empirical evidence for rethinking the scalable oversight protocol from adversarial persuasion to collaborative truth-seeking.

Large language models are increasingly used for knowledge acquisition, code generation, academic writing, and agent-based automation. In these settings, users may obtain highly structured answers, plans, and judgments without sufficient domain practice. This paper proposes a practice auditing framework for LLM use and AI-generated content governance. It introduces collective empiricism to describe how LLMs compress and reorganize large-scale human experience into outputs that appear empirical and rational, and pseudo-rational cognition to describe how users may mistake AI-generated structured expression for their own rational understanding. The paper analyzes AI subjectivity illusion, subjectivity structures in input materials, template loops in AI-AI conversations, statistical misjudgment in AIGC detection, and memory pollution when generated content enters future contexts, long-term memory, retrieval spaces, or agent skill systems. To reduce these risks, the paper proposes an auditing process based on requirement definition, problem-boundary identification, evidence-source auditing, practical validation, reverse questioning, logging, version management, rollback, and renewed cognition. The framework does not reject AI productivity; it argues that LLM outputs should be returned to verifiable, reproducible, and intervenable processes of practice. The paper provides a conceptual and auditable framework for cognitive risks in LLM interaction, AI-generated content governance, long-term memory systems, and human-AI interaction.

Turkey's e-Government Gateway (e-Devlet) serves over 68 million registered users with more than 9,200 government services, and is increasingly integrating artificial intelligence into citizen-facing applications such as chatbot assistants and eligibility assessments. However, no structured technical governance infrastructure currently connects high-level AI policy frameworks, such as the EU AI Act, OECD AI Principles, and Turkey's own National AI Strategy, to the operational reality of deploying AI within a centralized e-government platform. We propose GovAI-Pipe, a four-layer governance pipeline designed using Design Science Research methodology that maps the AI model lifecycle to governance checkpoints: (1) pre-deployment validation for bias testing, explainability, and privacy impact assessment; (2) deployment governance for risk-tier classification and approval workflows; (3) runtime monitoring for drift detection, fairness tracking, and human-in-the-loop escalation; and (4) post-incident governance for audit trails, rollback, and citizen redress. Each layer is anchored to specific provisions of the EU AI Act, the GDPR data protection framework, and the National AI Strategy. We demonstrate the framework through two high-risk e-Devlet use cases, showing how GovAI-Pipe operationalizes governance principles as auditable, technical pipeline components.

As large language models become stronger, weak supervisors may fail to provide reliable labels, preferences, or final judgments for complex outputs, limiting both weak-to-strong generalization and scalable oversight. We study a more tractable form of weak supervision: using a weak model as a critic rather than as a labeler or judge. Instead of solving the task or selecting the correct answer, the weak critic only needs to provide a non-misleading revision direction that helps the strong model better use its own knowledge. We call this setting weak-critic strong oversight. We first show that weak critiques can improve frozen strong models at inference time, and that critique quality is key to this improvement. We then propose progressive on-policy critique distillation (OPCD), which filters high-quality critiques and distills critic-guided behavior into the strong model through adaptive self-teacher signals. Experiments on reasoning and alignment benchmarks show that our method improves strong models over training epochs, suggesting an effective path for scalable oversight with weak supervision.

Rising household debt and cost-of-living pressures in the United Kingdom have intensified the role of AI-driven financial technologies in mediating credit assessment, repayment structuring, and debt support services. These systems increasingly shape consequential financial decisions, yet they operate within complex socio-technical environments characterised by regulatory constraint, algorithmic opacity, and heightened vulnerability risk. User Experience Research (UXR) Points of View (PoVs) are critical in translating heterogeneous research evidence into strategic direction for product and governance decisions. However, the existing UXR PoV framework was not designed for AI-mediated financial systems where interpretability, fairness, and accountability are central. This paper extends the UXR PoV pyramid into an AI-augmented methodological framework for Human-Centred AI debt management technologies in the UK financial services context. We formalise (1) an AI-Augmented PoV Pyramid, (2) a structured prompt architecture for synthesis and hypothesis generation, and (3) an AI-enabled Playbook Card system that embeds Generative AI into UXR workflows while preserving traceability and ethical oversight. Generative AI is positioned not as an analytic authority, but as an epistemic support mechanism subject to human validation and regulatory awareness. By grounding the framework in debt management technologies, including affordability assessment, repayment planning, and financial stress prediction systems, this work advances UXR methodology for high-stakes financial AI environments and contributes to the evolution of responsible, AI-powered UXR practice within the CHI community.

Are AI agents tools, co-authors, or researchers? We present a quantified case study ($N=1$): a physicist supervising an AI coding agent (Claude Code, Sonnet and Opus models) over 12 work days and 57 sessions to build CLAX-PT, a differentiable one-loop perturbation theory module in JAX. We documented and classified 15 supervision events by intervention level. The agent resolved ten autonomously by iterating against oracle tests. Two more by the physicist's domain knowledge. The three it could not -- all evaded oracle detection -- share a common property: the agent treated symptom reduction as root-cause resolution. It spent 33 of the 57 sessions adjusting coefficients within a code architecture that could not represent the target physics, and could not re-evaluate its CLASS-PT branch choice even when prompted to reconsider; only an injected physics concept (anisotropic BAO damping) triggered the redesign. Separately, the agent committed a calibrated correction that passed all oracle tests but corresponded to no quantity in the theory, predicting wrong values at any other cosmology. The fudge factor was caught and replaced within the same session. Three supervision practices proved critical for catching what oracle tests missed: testing at diverse parameter points beyond the fiducial calibration; shared changelogs that surfaced stalled exploration across sessions; and an explicit rule against unphysical numerical patches. In this case, supervision design, not model capability, determined whether the agent's output was trustworthy. Closing the gap would require agents that propose architectural alternatives rather than optimize within a given structure, and distinguish predictive adequacy from explanatory correctness -- capabilities not exhibited here, not obviously addressed by scaling alone. [Abridged.]

This study reports findings from a cross-sectional survey (n = 72) of higher education practitioners examining beliefs, behaviors, and institutional conditions related to artificial intelligence (AI) integration in teaching and learning. Grounded in the DOT Framework, which integrates design thinking and open systems theory, the study investigates AI familiarity, usage patterns, design-oriented practices, and pedagogical beliefs. Exploratory factor analysis of 19 belief items identified a three-factor structure: AI Functional Capabilities, Oversight and Governance, and Instructor Collaboration and Planning (α = .90). Results indicate that practitioners hold favorable views of AI as a pedagogical support while maintaining strong commitments to human oversight and critical evaluation. Reported practices emphasize iterative prompting and content generation, with less consistent use of needs assessment and feedback loops. Institutional barriers including limited policy, training, and infrastructure were widely reported. These findings provide preliminary empirical support for the DOT Framework as a descriptive model of practitioner beliefs and practices, while also highlighting gaps between design-oriented theory and current implementation. The study contributes an initial measurement structure and identifies directions for confirmatory validation and outcome-based research linking AI-supported design practices to instructional quality.

Agentic AI systems capable of autonomous planning and extended environmental interaction pose a fundamental control problem: how can humans maintain meaningful oversight of systems that may exceed their own capabilities? Existing approaches to scalable oversight rely on complex assumptions, remain largely heuristic, or lack practical methods for sequential settings with statistical guarantees. We introduce Calibrated Collective Oversight (CCO), which aggregates diverse auxiliary scoring functions into a penalty measuring deviation from a conservative baseline. Inspired by Attainable Utility Preservation, CCO enables collective conservatism: actions face a penalty proportional to overseer concern, so high-utility actions are still selected when overseers find them unobjectionable and overridden only when concern accumulates. CCO calibrates this conservatism online using Conformal Decision Theory, ensuring that undesirable outcomes remain below a user-specified target threshold with finite-time bounds and no distributional assumptions. On a modified version of SWE-bench, weaker overseers successfully constrain an adversarially misaligned stronger agent; on MACHIAVELLI, CCO substantially reduces ethical violations while preserving reward. In both settings, empirical violation rates closely match the specified targets, as predicted by the theory.

Research on AI-generated text detection has presented a number of approaches to discern human from AI prose, some of which achieving high in-distribution performance. However, real-world applicability has stalled because their outputs are misaligned with the needs of users, such as professors, who are presented with a numeric score that has no attached explanation. We tackle this issue with a novel architecture, TELL, that bakes explainability from the ground-up. While our system still offers a numerical score like other detectors for comparability, TELL takes a fundamentally different approach where we aim to show the user the "tells" by which the model believes a text is AI or human-written, to empower the user to decide who wrote a text using their own judgment and understanding of the context of the writing and its alleged author. We train TELL on a custom SFT dataset of domain-specific authorship annotations, and further refine the system using GRPO with curriculum learning to improve performance. We achieve competitive performance with state-of-the-art detectors (AUROC 0.927) while natively providing annotations that explain the basis for the detector's decision. We further evaluate the quality of our explanations using a dataset of human annotations and report a high (mean 72.3%) win-rate on annotation concreteness, falsifiability, coherence, plausibility and grounding, allowing users to critically think and decide for themselves. Our work thus reframes the problem of AI-generated text detection in a human-centric perspective and paves the way for a new family of detectors that focus on native explainability.

Despite theoretical promise, debate as a scalable oversight protocol has produced mixed empirical results: gains in some settings, and null effects in others, especially when the judge does not have information hidden from it. We study proposer-critic debate in a stronger-debater/weaker-judge setting on programmatically verifiable code and logic tasks. Debate helps the judge over a consultancy baseline when the critic provides a usable advantage: the critic's classification ability must exceed the judge's, and the judge must treat critic speeches as claims to verify rather than testimony to summarize. On the three of five pairings where the condition holds, proposer-critic debate's gains are statistically significant over consultancy, and these pairings are the most capable model pairings. On the two non-responder pairings in our set, debate produces null effects, and judge verification rates drop by tens of percentage points once a critic enters the transcript. In these cases the critic's binary-classification ability and the judge's are within noise of each other, and the critic's disagreement is parsed as testimony rather than a claim to check. Ablating rebuttal rounds from debate produces no measurable change in judge performance: a single independent critique recovers the bulk of debate's benefit at lower inference cost. These findings suggest a cheaper primitive for training-free scalable oversight in verifiable domains (answer, critique, judge) and a pre-deployment audit (does the critic beat the judge, and will the judge verify it?) that predicts when debate will help.

AI-enabled military systems are a fixture of modern military conflict. Applications vary from autonomous drones for surveillance and attack to AI-supported target selection. The importance of AI for modern conflict shows also in public disputes between governments and technology companies over the conditions for military access to frontier AI. Both military uses and government attempts at enabling and steering them happen before a backdrop of public opinion, yet we still know little about how people think about military AI. Drawing on a preregistered survey of 9,000 respondents in nine countries, including China, Germany, and the United States, we examine whether support for military AI is shaped primarily by general attitudes toward AI, principled opposition to lethal autonomy, or foreign-policy and geopolitical orientations. Across six military AI scenarios that vary in lethality and human control, respondents who view AI as beneficial are substantially more supportive of military AI. Hawkish respondents are also more supportive. By contrast, principled opposition to lethal autonomy is not broadly associated with the full index but is related to the application of fully autonomous lethal force. Contrary to our expectation, perceived AI risks are positively associated with support. Cross-national differences are moderate and broadly consistent with geopolitical context. Overall, public opinion toward military AI appears conditionally permissive. Publics are not categorically opposed to various military uses of AI. Instead, unease is concentrated around fully autonomous lethal force.

Current approaches to AI compliance treat conformity as a binary, audit-time verdict rather than a continuous, measurable property of production systems. We argue that this compliance fiction is structurally ill-suited to the requirements of the EU AI Act, which demands ongoing human oversight and the detection of emergent behavioural drift in deployed systems. We introduce governance from metrics, a principle whereby regulatory compliance is derived as a continuous signal from runtime observability rather than from static assessments. Building on this principle, we present govllm, an open-source framework implementing a governance-driven routing architecture in which model selection is determined by accumulated compliance scores rather than by latency or cost alone. Central to our approach is a panel of regulatory judges - LLM evaluators specialised per criterion (EU AI Act, GDPR, ANSSI, accessibility) - whose inter-judge disagreement we reframe not as noise but as a regulatory uncertainty signal warranting human arbitration. We validate this approach through a ground truth corpus of 49 annotated prompt/response pairs across five regulatory criteria, evaluated by four small language models (SLMs, 1.7B-7B parameters) running fully on-premise. Agreement rates range from 51.5% (mistral:7b) to 69.1% (phi4-mini), with no single model dominating across all criteria - empirically motivating the Profile-as-jury design. We further document three structural failure modes in small regulatory judges and a judge-specific position bias that degrades agreement by up to 25 percentage points across three question-order conditions (original, reversed, permuted). govllm is released as open-source software to support reproducible AI governance research.

At present, loss of control risks have gained much prominence in public discussion, particularly in relation to AI, with extensive discourse present among academics, frontier labs, and even governments. However, in the existing literature, the concept seems to rest on surprisingly weak foundations, where even those that discuss loss of control extensively do not first establish what control is and what exactly is being lost. Our paper aims to address these gaps. We establish a working definition of control by anchoring it to the "setting and getting of goals". Then, we discuss various aspects of control, built on foundational concepts from related fields like cybernetics, management control, and control theory. This includes who (or what) can be in control, and the things they require to be in control, such as the ability to set goals, having a functional control loop, having requisite variety, and having sufficient goal alignment. Once a framework for control is established, we then discuss how control can be lost, how AIs can contribute to such loss of control, and offer relevant recommendations for how one can maintain control. One interesting consequence of our work is that humanity, as individuals and as groups, can lose varying degrees of control as a result of AI behaviour that is far below the level of superintelligence; the potential for loss of control scenarios (as we define them) already exist, and have existed for a long time.

The rapid emergence of AI technologies is reshaping translation practices and theory across the board. This paper deals with the impact of AI in language access. This area is characterized by the need to serve broad and diverse user populations, within a context where efficiency and access are shaped by legal mandates, ethical and commercial tensions, and safety concerns. This paper reports on the attitudes and perceptions of language access managers towards the AI and the human value in the AI age. Methodologically, this paper presents an analysis of a subset of a broader study on language access and technology, specifically a qualitative thematic analysis of ten semi-structured interviews with language access managers in the USA working in healthcare, court, public service and local government contexts. The results indicate that language access managers show conditional optimism towards the inevitable AI implementations, are strongly risk aware, and deeply committed to the human value and human oversight of AI implementations and output.

Code review has evolved for decades, from informal peer checking to today's pull request (PR) workflows, yet it remains a largely manual and cognitively demanding process. The rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI) coding assistants has intensified this challenge: while these tools increase code production velocity, they also expand the volume of code requiring review, turning code review into a growing bottleneck. Current AI support in code review remains fragmented, with tools focusing on isolated tasks such as reviewer recommendation, PR description generation, or comment suggestion rather than the end-to-end PR review workflow. We address this gap by treating review effectiveness as an outcome of the full code review lifecycle rather than a single stage, proposing a framework that carries context across stage boundaries. We propose a future vision for code review in which reviewers transition from manual inspectors into supervisory operators of agents. In this vision, staged, AI-powered workflows aim to align the pace of code generation with shared understanding and accountable engineering. In this paper, we review the historical evolution of code review practices, identify challenges in traditional code review systems, and examine the shift driven by large language models (LLMs) and agentic AI systems. We then present a vision for an AI-powered code review workflow combining specialized agents with human-controlled quality gates. Our framework spans five stages: PR Creation, PR Augmentation, Reviewer Selection, AI-Assisted Code Review, and PR Retrospective, with humans retained at key decision points to preserve judgment, accountability, and team-level understanding. Finally, we identify key adoption challenges and outline research directions for evaluation, governance, and responsible human-AI collaboration.

AI agents increasingly act consequentially in the real world. This creates a problem we call \emph{consequence reception}: harm occurs, the producing system is identified, yet no continuing agent receives consequences in a way that changes future behavior. Pain, understood mechanistically as a corrective feedback signal, is foundational to canonical theories of punishment -- deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation all assume a continuing locus that registers the signal and updates behavior. That, in turn, requires a body for the signal to land on: a boundary whose integrity it protects, a locus where it accumulates, consolidation that converts episodic signal into durable update, and a substrate that responds by altering future action. Current LLM agents -- software-defined composites of weights, prompts, tools, memory, and credentials, freely swapped, copied, reset, and reassembled -- satisfy none of these conditions. The two prevailing legal responses therefore fail to achieve consequence reception. The thin-identity agent-principal dyad has a body but no \emph{consequence--agency coupling}: the human bears pain for behaviors beyond their control -- Elish's \emph{moral crumple zone}. The thick-identity Arbel et al.'s \emph{Algorithmic Corporation} creates legally legible entities but does not guarantee that any AI decision architecture receives pain as a behavioral signal. Achieving consequence-agency coupling is therefore a sociotechnical infrastructural problem, not only a legal one. Until such architectures exist, high-stakes AI deployment should remain tethered to accountable human principals with meaningful control, proportional liability, and authority to constrain or terminate the agent. \emph{If some body does not receive the pain by design, some body will receive it by default.}

Large language models are increasingly discussed and used as tools that may assist with scholarly peer review, but empirical evidence regarding how authors use and perceive AI-based feedback remains limited. This paper reports findings from two independent pilot studies on authors' use and perceptions of AI-based auxiliary review at two computer science venues. After the review release, authors were invited to complete an anonymous post-review questionnaire about the AI review's usefulness, trustworthiness, agreement with human reviews, practical value for revision, perceived inaccuracies, and consent. The final dataset included 56 analyzable responses from authors of 40 papers; closed-ended items were summarized using descriptive statistics, and open-ended responses were analyzed using inductive thematic analysis. Most respondents (83.9%) considered the AI-based review useful, and 80.4% reported that it identified issues not mentioned by human reviewers. This perceived added value translated into action: 82.1% reported using at least some AI feedback in their camera-ready version. However, the authors did not treat the AI review as equivalent to a human review. They generally trusted it less than the human reviews and found human feedback clearer, even though 25.0% described at least some human reviews as not very useful. Reported problems with the AI review were usually limited: 51.8% reported minor inaccuracies, while 16.1% reported clearly incorrect, misleading, or irrelevant comments. Support for future use was strongest when AI was framed as a supervised or author-controlled tool: 96.4% said they would use AI as an internal review tool before future submissions, 89.3% preferred advance notice that AI would be used in review, and 76.8% favored explicit consent before use.

Some claim that AI agents will free workers from the boring parts of their jobs, yet little is known about how workers themselves identify which tasks should be automated. Prior research focuses on occupations, overlooking that workers experience varying levels of meaning across tasks within the same role. We address this gap with a task-level analysis grounded in Graeber's theory of bullshit jobs. Using ratings from 202 workers on 171 workplace tasks, we (1) validate a five-item scale of perceived bullshitness, (2) show that perceived bullshitness strongly predicts desire for AI delegation, and (3) find that such tasks are also seen as requiring less human oversight. Together, these findings suggest that tasks perceived as bullshit are natural candidates for AI delegation, aligning worker preferences with perceived feasibility.

The dominant discourse on AI limitations frames the boundary of AI capability as a divide between digital tasks (where AI excels) and physical tasks (where embodiment is required). We argue this framing misses the most consequential boundary: the one within digital tasks. We identify a class of tasks we call Metis AI, named for the Greek concept of metis (practical, contextual knowledge), that are performed entirely on computers yet resist reliable AI automation. These tasks are not computationally intractable; they are institutionally, socially, and normatively entangled in ways that defeat algorithmic approaches. We distinguish constitutive metis (knowledge destroyed by the act of formalization) from operational metis (system-specific familiarity that automation can progressively absorb), and propose five structural characteristics that define the Metis AI zone: consequential irreversibility, relational irreducibility, normative open texture, adversarial co-evolution, and accountability anchoring. We ground each in established theory from across the social sciences, philosophy, and humanitarian practice, argue that these characteristics are properties of the tasks themselves rather than limitations of current models, and show that the appropriate design response is not better automation but centaur architectures in which humans lead and AI supports.

The phrase 'human in the loop' is increasingly used to imply a sense of safety in relation to AI decision systems. It shouldn't. There are contexts where it can be applied appropriately, but these are not in the deployed decision systems we see dominating today. Human oversight of AI decision processes is one of the most popular proposals for addressing concerns, especially about bias, discrimination, misinformation, manipulation, accountability, and transparency. But there is insufficient examination of what human oversight actually means. The question raised in this paper is whether using the metaphor of a loop does anything to assist understanding of what is required and what is achieved in a particular decision context. Indiscriminate use of the loop metaphor obscures both processes and outcomes. It enables 'humanwashing', an activity analogous to 'greenwashing', where writers and commentators use language primarily aimed at putting systems in the best possible light.

Deploying agentic AI in regulated contexts requires principled reasoning about two design dimensions: agency (what the system can do) and autonomy (how much it acts without human involvement). Though often treated independently, they are coupled: at higher autonomy, human error correction is less available, so reliable operation requires constraining agency accordingly; compliance requirements reinforce this by mandating human involvement as action consequences grow. Yet no established approach addresses them jointly, leaving practitioners without a principled basis for reasoning about oversight, action consequences, and error correction. This work introduces a two-dimensional design space in which both dimensions are organised into five operational levels, making the coupling explicit and navigable. Autonomy ranges from human-commanded operation (L1) to fully autonomous monitoring (L5); agency ranges from reasoning over supplied context (L1) to committed writes to authoritative records (L5). Building on this space, we propose six architectural tactics--checkpoints, escalation, multi-agent delegation, tool provisioning, tool fencing, and write staging--for adjusting a deployment's position within it. The tactics are grounded in two worked examples from public-sector contexts, illustrating how they apply under realistic compliance constraints. We further examine five deployment parameters--model capability, agent architecture, tool fidelity, workflow bottlenecks, and evaluation--that shape what is achievable at any configuration independently of agency and autonomy. Together, the design space, tactics, and deployment parameters provide a shared vocabulary for principled, compliance-aware agentic AI design in which responsibility, auditability, and reversibility are explicit design considerations rather than properties that must be retrofitted after deployment.

This paper examines what it means for a medical AI system to be right by grounding the question in a specific clinical context: the automatic classification of plasma cells in digitized bone marrow smears for the diagnosis of multiple myeloma. Drawing on philosophy of science and research ethics, the paper argues that correctness in medical AI is not a singular property reducible to benchmark performance, but a multi-dimensional concept involving the availability of expertly labeled medical datasets, the explainability and interpretability of model outputs, the clinical meaningfulness of evaluation metrics, and the distribution of accountability in human-AI workflows. As such, the paper develops this argument through four interrelated themes: the instability of ground truth labels, the opacity of overconfident AI, the inadequacy of standard clinical metrics, and the risk of automation bias in time-pressured clinical settings.

Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) and agentic systems are moving software engineering from code-centric production toward intent-centric human-agent work in which natural language, repository context, tools, tests, and governance shape delivery. Prior studies examine code generation, AI pair programming, and software engineering agents, but less is known about how public technical discourse and peer-reviewed evidence together frame the profession's near-term transition. This study addresses that gap through a reflexive thematic analysis (RTA) dominant and interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) informed public-discourse and document analysis. The corpus combines peer-reviewed software engineering and AI literature, technical benchmarks, public talks and interviews, essays, product-facing technical announcements, and X-originated discourse from prominent AI and software engineering voices. Sources were organized through a corpus register, codebook, coding matrix, theme-to-source traceability table, DOI/reference audit, and reproducibility protocol. The analysis shows that GenAI lowers the cost of producing plausible code while increasing the importance of intent specification, context curation, architecture knowledge, verification, security, provenance, governance, and accountable human judgment. The findings indicate that software engineering is becoming less about isolated code authorship and more about supervising, validating, and governing socio-technical systems of humans, agents, tools, and evidence gates. This matters because speed-focused adoption can accumulate hidden technical debt and accountability gaps, whereas bounded autonomy can preserve quality, security, maintainability, and trust.

Engineering managers increasingly must decide how to introduce generative artificial intelligence (AI), retrieval-augmented generation, and coding agents into high-risk operational functions without weakening accountability, privacy, cost discipline, or auditability. The central message of this study is that AI-assisted operational decision support should be managed as a governed engineering capability before it is scaled as automation. Security operations centers (SOCs) provide a suitable setting because they combine privileged telemetry, specialist expertise, software repositories, cloud services, and evidence-sensitive decisions. This study uses Kusto Query Language (KQL) and Microsoft Azure security capabilities as a bounded technical instantiation of that broader engineering management problem. KQL is read-only in ordinary query use, but read-only does not mean risk-free: AI-assisted queries can still create privacy, cost, performance, schema-validity, and decision-quality risks through broad scans, sensitive-field exposure, stale intelligence, and misleading interpretations. Using design science research, the study develops a governed AI query-broker artifact that separates AI planning from operational execution through schema-grounded retrieval, approved templates, policy validation, read-only adapters, normalized outputs, auditable agent traces, and engineering review board gates. The contribution is not a new KQL technique, security product, or detection algorithm. Rather, the study contributes a management framework for governing AI-assisted operational decision support in high-risk digital infrastructure by specifying design propositions, role accountability, maturity stages, quality gates, evaluation criteria, and evidence boundaries.

AI agents that plan, retain memory across sessions, invoke external tools and act with partial autonomy are transforming human--AI collaboration. Research on affective computing, simulated empathy in large language models, trust in automation and AI safety has illuminated important design principles, yet these literatures remain fragmented. No integrated account explains how affective cues operate within agentic collaboration -- settings in which humans delegate, monitor and correct consequential tasks. This Review synthesises computational and interactional mechanisms of affective dynamics: the processes through which affective cues, emotion-like behaviour and perceived agent affect shape trust calibration, delegation decisions, error correction, dependence and governance. We trace how model-generated affective signals enter interaction loops that govern reliance, repair and oversight, and propose a framework that treats affect not as an internal property of AI but as a coordination layer through which humans and agents negotiate capability, uncertainty and responsibility. The framework provides a foundation for calibrated measurement, purposeful design and informed governance.