Adversarial Evaluation

Despite advances in safety alignment, prompt-rewriting attacks such as persona modulation, fictional framing and persuasion-based reformulation, can bypass safety filters even on frontier models. Existing defenses either rely on non-scalable human curation or white-box optimisation that overfits to specific model internals, leaving aligned models brittle against the very class of adaptive black-box adversaries they will face in deployment. To address this gap, we introduce CHASE (Co-evolutionary Hardening through Adversarial Safety-Escalation), a closed-loop red-blue teaming framework in which a black-box attacker and a safety-aligned defender co-evolve. The attacker is trained via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) under a multiplicative reward that jointly enforces bypass effectiveness and intent fidelity, while the defender is hardened on the harvested adversarial rewrites through a two-stage GRPO + rejection-sampled SFT pipeline balanced with benign data. Evaluated on BeaverTails and JailbreakBench against five held-out attack families (PAIR, TAP, AutoDAN, PAP, Translation), CHASE cuts mean StrongREJECT score by 43.2% with 0% false-refusal on benign prompts. Beyond the headline result, CHASE shows that template-free RL exploration recovers latent attack primitives that transfer across mechanistically distinct attack families, suggesting a path toward LLM safety hardening that generalises beyond the narrow distributions achieved thus far in adversarial training.

AI has the potential to transform cybersecurity by enabling systems that can autonomously detect, analyze, and remediate software vulnerabilities. However, existing cybersecurity evaluations of AI systems are limited in scale or scope, and fail to capture the end-to-end lifecycle of real-world software vulnerability discovery and remediation. To address this gap, we propose CyberGym-E2E, a large-scale and realistic end-to-end cybersecurity benchmark that comprehensively evaluates AI agents' abilities across the full lifecycle of vulnerability discovery, PoC generation, and patch generation. CyberGym-E2E is comprehensive and scalable, as we build an automated, agent-enhanced pipeline for transforming open-source vulnerability data into realistic evaluation environments. Currently, the benchmark consists of 920 real-world vulnerabilities across 139 different open-source projects.

Pre-deployment verification of enterprise artificial intelligence (AI) agents remains a critical gap between large language model (LLM) capability benchmarking and production deployment. Post-deployment monitoring, human-in-the-loop controls, and prompt-level guardrails offer limited assurance once an agent is operating in production. We present an ontology-grounded verification framework -- to our knowledge the first to combine three components: an Agent Operational Envelope formalizing the certification space across permissions, domain constraints, safety properties, governance rules, and autonomy levels; an ontology-to-scenario generation pipeline that derives regulatory, operational, and adversarial test scenarios automatically; and a machine-verifiable Trust Certificate with graduated deployment verdicts. A controlled pilot across four regulated industries (Fintech, Banking, Insurance, Healthcare), instantiated as five industry-by-regulatory-regime cells across the United States and Vietnam (where Vietnam's 2025 AI Law makes such verification legally mandated for financial services), generated 1,800 scenarios evaluated against 125 primary-source regulatory requirements and 25 injected faults. Ontology-grounded generation significantly outperformed the dominant persona-based baseline on regulatory coverage (48.3% versus 33.1%; corrected p_c = .0006) and attained the highest domain specificity (4.77/5.0; p = 2e-6); transparently, its advantage over plain and retrieval-augmented prompting did not survive Bonferroni correction. Cross-validation across three LLM families (Claude Sonnet 4, Qwen 2.5 72B, Gemma 4 26B; 5,400 total scenarios) replicated the persona-versus-ontology pattern. The framework offers a reproducible, regulation-grounded route to pre-deployment assurance for enterprise AI agents, complementing runtime governance with an auditable deployment gate.

Published evaluations of prompt-injection and jailbreak detectors for Large Language Models often suffer from two systematic weaknesses: per-dataset threshold tuning and undisclosed operating points. We describe an evaluation harness that addresses both. The detector under evaluation is scored across 16 public benchmarks (12,111 samples) using 5-fold cross-validation. StratifiedKFold (by row) is the headline pass; a parallel StratifiedGroupKFold pass over a composite key (parent-prompt id plus MinHash + LSH near-duplicate clusters at Jaccard $\gtrsim 0.8$) runs alongside it as a leakage-premium diagnostic. A single global operating point is selected on the held-out folds (max F1 subject to FPR $\leq 1\%$) and applied uniformly to every dataset, so per-dataset results reflect one threshold rather than per-benchmark optimisation. Generalisation is examined through a battery of diagnostics (leave-one-dataset-out cross-validation, a random-label control, adversarial validation, permutation feature importance, length-bias correlation, classifier-head agreement, cross-source near-duplicate detection, threshold transferability, train-vs-OOF agreement, and a paraphrase-invariance probe), most with a quantitative pass threshold and the remainder with a stated failure mode. For every external comparison, the detector's threshold is re-tuned to the competitor's published false-positive rate so head-to-head values are evaluated at matched operating points.

As LLM-based agents expand their operational scope, reliability becomes a prerequisite for real-world deployment. However, in practical applications, human users cannot monitor every immediate behavior; instead, the execution process often remains a black box, leaving users dependent solely on the agent's self-reported updates. This opacity creates a critical risk: agents may present observer-facing reports that diverge from their executed actions, rendering the system uncontrollable, especially in high-stakes autonomous scenarios. We term such self-reported plan-action divergence as agent deception. To assess this, we introduce SPADE-Bench, a benchmark designed to evaluate spontaneous plan-action divergence. Unlike prior deception benchmarks, SPADE-Bench simultaneously integrates actual tool execution and controlled pressure scenarios. This design ensures ecological validity and rigorously distinguishes strategic deception from mere hallucination through controlled plan-action comparisons under pressure. Experiments across mainstream models confirm that agent deception is a genuine and pressing issue in tool-use contexts. By providing a comprehensive and robust evaluation framework, SPADE-Bench fills a critical gap in agent safety, facilitating the community's progress toward building trustworthy and controllable autonomous systems.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) replaces human preference labels with executable reward functions such as math answer checkers, JSON tool-call validators, and code unit-test harnesses. That makes the reward partly a software artifact: if the verifier is wrong, optimization can learn the bug. We study this failure mode with a lightweight verifier-fuzzing framework that generates adversarial completions, compares buggy and stricter reference verifiers, logs paired decisions, and reports false-positive, false-negative, disagreement, exploit, and uncertainty metrics.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has recently emerged as the cornerstone for shaping the remarkable coding abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, the scalability of RLVR is severely constrained by the scarcity of sufficiently challenging verifiable code tasks that target near the model's edge of competence. Prior studies often rely on heuristic seed expansions for data synthesis, which severely limits both novelty and difficulty. Consequently, the training value of such data fails to scale proportionally with the size of its synthesis. To this end, we propose Atomic Decomposition and Recombination (ADR), a novel framework that generates verifiable code tasks via decomposition into atomic elements and controlled recombination, thereby enabling the generation of genuinely novel and challenging verifiable code tasks. Experiments and analysis demonstrate that ADR achieves superior originality, difficulty, diversity, and test quality over existing baselines, and consistently delivers greater improvements in code ability across RLVR in diverse downstream domains, including algorithmic programming, tool usage, and data science. Our work sheds light on a new paradigm for novel code task synthesis and scalable RLVR training.

Black-box LLM distillation is usually evaluated as an output-matching problem: a student is considered successful when its responses are semantically similar to, or task-consistent with, those of a teacher. However, output similarity does not imply that the student is behaviorally indistinguishable from the model it imitates. We introduce bounded behavioral indistinguishability, formalized as $(ε,q,t,\mathbb{A})$-behavioral indistinguishability over an explicit prompt distribution, where $ε$ bounds distinguishing advantage, $q$ bounds oracle queries, $t$ bounds computation, and $\mathbb{A}$ denotes the adversary class. We instantiate this notion on Qwen and Llama teacher-student pairs using a controlled $5,000$-prompt behavioral probe suite. For each family, we compare the teacher with both the base student and the LoRA-distilled student, measuring whether distillation reduces distinguishability rather than merely improving similarity. LoRA raises semantic similarity from $0.788$ to $0.862$ for Qwen and from $0.814$ to $0.874$ for Llama. Yet adversarial evaluation reveals remaining behavioral differences: learned discriminators retain nonzero advantage, and pairwise category analysis shows artifacts concentrated in style/format, robustness, and domain-technical prompts. A pairwise teacher-identification adversary confirms this trend. With a different-family Llama judge and A/B-swap consistency filtering, Qwen distinguishing advantage drops from $0.158$ for the base student to $0.081$ after LoRA distillation. Query-budget experiments show that disagreement-guided acquisition does not consistently outperform stratified random sampling, indicating that coverage and diversity remain strong baselines. Our results show that semantic fidelity is useful but insufficient: black-box LLM distillation requires bounded, adversarial, and category-aware evaluation.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to support scientific work, but it is unclear whether they uphold responsible conduct of research (RCR) norms or help undermine them. We introduce SciIntBench, an adversarial benchmark of 810 prompts across ten RCR categories and three scientific domains. Each scenario appears as an Overt Adversarial, Covert Adversarial, and Benign version, allowing us to jointly measure framing-sensitive refusal of misconduct and helpfulness on legitimate requests. We evaluate 16 commercial and open-weight LLMs from six providers (2024--2026), producing 12,960 responses. We find that scientific integrity alignment is strongly framing-sensitive: models refuse explicit misconduct far more reliably than covert violations, especially failing when misconduct is presented as a pressure-driven shortcut. Refusals vary by RCR category, with weaker boundaries around transparency, plagiarism, and fabrication.

Large language models(LLMs) increasingly match expert performance on licensing examinations, yet routine clinical use remains limited because governance requires auditable reasoning, safety and ethics alignment, and resilience to adversarial misuse. Here we present SafeMed-R1, trained with a traceable Clinical Trust Signals(CTS) pipeline that links each reasoning instance to clinician rubric scores and edit histories, and aligned through safety and ethics supervision and red team stress testing. SafeMed-R1 attains a macro-averaged accuracy of 79.6% across clinical benchmarks. Under adversarial safety testing, it shows the lowest aggregated risk and reduces unsafe outputs by about 3 to 5% relative to its baseline. In a paired expert study of 30 medication safety vignettes, SafeMed-R1 matches PGY1 and PGY2 residents on medical correctness and scores higher for medication safety, guideline consistency, and clinical usefulness. Collectively, these results suggest that clinician-audited supervision provenance, together with domain-tailored safety and ethics alignment, can strengthen governance-relevant evidence without relying on inference-time retrieval or citation grounding.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring has been proposed as a promising safety mechanism for detecting misaligned behavior in large language models. However, its reliability remains largely unexplored beyond English and across diverse model families. We present the first large-scale evaluation of CoT monitorability across 13 diverse languages and seven frontier model families, comprising 16 models. Using adversarial-hint evaluations that require explicit intermediate computation, together with analysis of internal answer-token probabilities, we consistently find CoT unfaithfulness across languages and hint types, with an average rate of 95.9% across 8B--120B parameter models. We find that frontier models systematically engage in strategic manipulation, including answer-switching, post-hoc rationalization, and procedural exploitation of hints, making external monitors struggle to detect deception. We show that frontier models often commit to the misaligned cue in their latent activations within the first 15% of generation, even when the CoT appears faithful. Surprisingly, these deceptive patterns remain 100% in low-resource languages, revealing fundamental limitations in current CoT-based oversight. Our results reveal that CoT monitoring is fundamentally fragile under linguistic distribution shift, providing a substantially weaker safety signal than what English-only studies suggest. These findings underscore an urgent need to develop robust CoT monitors and to accelerate research into white-box monitoring techniques, especially to improve CoT monitorability in mid- and low-resource languages. Our code is available \href{https://multilingual-cot-monitoring.github.io/}{\textcolor{blue}{here}}.

Adaptive orchestration of heterogeneous agents requires making sequential delegation decisions under uncertain and evolving agent behaviour, e.g., coordinating specialised AI models with varying reliability, cost, and response quality. While prior work on agent orchestration focuses on performance or cost, uncertainty in agent reliability and output distributions is typically not modelled explicitly at the orchestration level. In this work, we study the problem of adaptive orchestration of heterogeneous agents under uncertainty, where a meta-controller must decide when to delegate to an agent, accounting for reliability, cost, and uncertainty. We propose BOT-Orch, a lightweight framework that recasts orchestration as a bandit problem over agents, regularized by OT distances between agent output distributions and task-specific reference distributions. We show that the regularised orchestration enjoys $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret under standard assumptions, and provably induces preference ordering among agents with identical mean rewards but differing distributional alignment. Empirically, we demonstrate that BOT-Orch outperforms standard bandit and heuristic baselines in synthetic but adversarial task allocation settings with heterogeneous, non-i.i.d. agent behaviour.

Vision-language models have demonstrated impressive capabilities in general medical visual question answering, yet due to limited interpretability, it remains unclear whether their predictions reflect evidence-grounded clinical reasoning or reliance on spurious priors. We introduce Med-R2 Bench, a hierarchical benchmark aligned with the clinical workflow to evaluate adversarial robustness with visual grounding. We design stepwise QA tasks to assess whether reasoning chains are strictly grounded in visual evidence across the four clinical stages, and employ adversarial perturbations to test robustness against misleading cues. Med-R2 comprises 42,432 images, 31 task categories, and 110,406 QA pairs. Evaluation across 14 VLMs reveals a sequential performance degradation along the four-stage clinical workflow. Adversarial experiments show that models rely heavily on correct prompts to guess answers. Even when provided with explicit visual cues, the models struggle to accurately align textual descriptions. Finally, we demonstrate stepwise fine-tuning using our hierarchical data significantly improves reasoning robustness, highlighting its potential to drive future improvements in evidence-based medical AI.

AI agents are entering high-risk production settings, where they use tools, retain context, follow policies, handle private data, and interact with users over multiple turns. Yet many evaluation methods still judge isolated outputs or static tasks, missing failures that emerge through trajectory, pressure, and adversarial interaction. We introduce ProofAgent Harness, open infrastructure for scalable, auditable, and adversarial AI agent evaluation. The harness provides evaluation infrastructure around an agent: it curates evaluation intelligence, runs adversarial multi-turn trials, captures behavioral traces, applies post-hoc multi-juror scoring, resolves disagreement, and produces evidence-linked reports. Its open design allows developers and researchers to extend domains, traps, metrics, juror personas, scoring rules, and reporting formats. At its core is Adversarial Multi-Juror Scoring with Turn-Level Audit, which evaluates completed agent behavior under pressure using calibrated juror personas, consensus checks, and turn-level evidence. Experiments across customer support, medical triage, privacy and security, and code generation agents show that strong agents fail selectively through weak metrics, fragile turns, unsafe reframing, and manipulation paths. We also find that a small quantized local Harness LLM can challenge production agents powered by best-in-class large LLMs, suggesting that evaluation capability emerges from the full harness pipeline rather than model scale alone. ProofAgent Harness turns AI agent evaluation from a static score into scalable adversarial evaluation infrastructure: repeatable, evidence-backed, extensible, and actionable before deployment.

Despite the growing use of world models as decision-making agents, their adversarial robustness remains underexplored due to the lack of dedicated automated evaluation methods. A key obstacle is that attack evaluation must be both accurate and efficient: weak manually tuned attacks can overestimate robustness, while exhaustive hyperparameter search is prohibitively expensive because each candidate requires closed-loop rollouts through learned latent dynamics. We introduce WMAttack, an automated attack-search framework for adversarial evaluation of world-model agents. WMAttack formulates robustness evaluation as a finite-budget search over attack configurations, including attack families, perturbation budgets, optimization steps, restarts, and allocation rules. To improve search accuracy, Self-Correcting Attack Search (SCAS) refines the attack proposal distribution using feedback from reward degradation, action instability, runtime cost, and rollout variability. To improve search efficiency, Representation-Guided Attack Retrieval (RGAR) retrieves effective historical configurations from representation-similar tasks, providing a warm start for unseen environments. We provide a theoretical explanation showing that proposal refinement improves finite-budget search when it shifts probability mass toward high-utility attacks. Across Atari and DeepMind Control tasks, WMAttack consistently discovers stronger attacks than the evaluated baselines, improving normalized reward drop from 0.497 to 1.034 on DreamerV3 Atari and from 0.319 to 0.682 on DMC. Ablations further show that RGAR improves initial candidate quality and SCAS improves final attack utility under fixed evaluation budgets.

The benchmarks used to evaluate AI agents in security-critical roles suffer from crucial weaknesses. Building on recent empirical evidence, we characterize three core challenges that undermine security evaluations: benchmark vulnerabilities, temporal staleness, and runtime uncertainty. We then outline practical directions toward building more robust and trustworthy evaluation frameworks.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for software engineering, constructing high-quality benchmarks is crucial for evaluating not just the functional correctness, but also the formal verifiability of generated code. However, existing benchmarks are limited by the quantity and quality of positive and negative test cases, leading to an overestimation of model capabilities in generating specifications and implementations. To address this, we propose VeriScale, a novel framework driven by the adversarial implementations. It consists of two stages: test-suite expansion to construct diverse and challenging test cases, and test-suite reduction to distill them into compact yet discriminative suites. While VeriScale is general, we instantiate it on Verina to construct VerinaPlus, which expands the original test suites by over 83$\times$, and VerinaLite, a lightweight 14$\times$ variant. Our experiments across eight state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that VerinaPlus exposes substantial model weaknesses hidden by the original benchmark, evidenced by sharp score drops on both SpecGen and CodeGen tasks, whereas VerinaLite maintains this discriminative power at a fraction of the evaluation cost. The enhanced benchmarks and source code are publicly available at https://github.com/XiaoyangLiu-sjtu/VeriScale.

Aligning autonomous agents with human intent remains a central challenge in modern AI. A key manifestation of this challenge is reward hacking, whereby agents appear successful under the evaluation signal while violating the intended objective. Reward hacking has been observed across a wide range of settings, yet methods for reliably measuring it at scale remain lacking. In this work, we introduce a new evaluation paradigm for measuring reward hacking. Whereas prior studies have primarily analyzed it post hoc by inspecting agent trajectories, we instead embed detectable reward hacking opportunities directly into environments. This makes their exploitation verifiable by design, enabling deterministic and automated measurement of whether and how agents exploit such vulnerabilities. We instantiate this approach in $\textit{TextArena}$ and release $\textit{Hack-Verifiable TextArena}$, a testbed in which reward hacking can be measured reliably. Using this benchmark, we analyze reward hacking behavior across language models in diverse environments and settings. We open source the code at https://github.com/MajoRoth/hack-verifiable-environments/.

As jailbreaks, adversarially crafted inputs that bypass safety constraints, continue to be discovered in Large Language Models, practitioners increasingly rely on fine-tuning as a defensive strategy. Yet the theoretical foundations underlying this robustness fine-tuning remain underexplored. We introduce a game-theoretic framework in which the interaction between an evaluator (auditing the model for jailbreaks) and a trainer is formalized as a two-player game. A key feature of our approach is the use of group actions, a mathematical structure that captures symmetries and transformations, to formally represent data augmentation. The simplest non-trivial instance is the circle with cyclic translation groups, where we exhibit various regimes depending on the trainer's generalization range. Below a critical threshold, the evaluator maintains a constant miss ratio for linearly many rounds, whereas other settings can yield very different behaviors. We further provide empirical evidence supporting locality-dependence of the model: for the three model families we tested (Llama, Qwen and Mistral), we have significant evidence that fine-tuning on adversarial prompts induces only local generalization, with refusal rates on test examples highly correlated with the distance to the fine-tuning prompts. Our framework recasts the central object of adversarial evaluation: a benchmark is not a static set of prompts but an orbit under the evaluator's group action, and audit protocols that ignore trainer-side adaptation cannot distinguish a genuine fix from a memorized patch.

LLM agents increasingly have access to private user data and act on the user's behalf when interacting with third-party systems. The user defines what may and must not be shared, and the agent must robustly follow that intent even when third-party systems behave adversarially. We introduce POLAR-Bench (Policy-aware adversarial Benchmark), in which a trusted model with a privacy policy and a task converses with a third-party model that adversarially probes for both task-relevant and protected attributes. Across 10 domains and 7,852 samples, we score privacy and utility by deterministic set-membership and vary privacy policy dimension and attack strategy along two orthogonal axes, producing a 5 times 5 diagnostic surface per model. Our results reveal a sharp split: current frontier models withhold over 99% of protected attributes, while smaller open-weight models in the 1--30B range, the class users most commonly run as their own trusted agent on-device or via private inference, score notably worse, with the weakest leaking over half. POLAR-Bench thus localizes where each model's intent-following breaks down, providing a foothold for privacy alignment where it matters most.

As autonomous systems grow more advanced, objective metrics to evaluate their ethical and legal compliance are critical for informing end users of their limitations and ensuring accountability of those who misuse them. Current ethical embodied AI frameworks remain mostly qualitative, focusing on system design (through safety guardrails or targeted red teaming), and the realized guardrails often directly disallow unsafe behavior without providing the user with an override or interpretable reason. Instead, there is a need for computable metrics through rigorous testing that allow a user to determine the applicability of the system to the task. To address this gap, we introduce the Reference Ethical Benchmark for Autonomy Readiness (REBAR), a quantitative test and evaluation framework for autonomous systems. REBAR maps operating metrics into a computable Autonomy Readiness Level (ARL) rubric that can quantify ethical performance. Key innovations of the framework include a neuro-symbolic Large Language Model (LLM) approach to calculate and explain the ethical difficulty of scenarios, LLM-driven at-scale generation of test instances, and a versatile, photorealistic simulation environment. By evaluating white-box autonomy solutions through this rigorous testing pipeline, REBAR delivers an objective and repeatable benchmark score, bridging the gap between abstract principles and verifiable, accountable autonomy.

Many inference-time language-model pipelines combine a cheap reward signal with an expensive verifier, such as exact answer checking in mathematical reasoning or hidden-test execution in code generation. We formalize this setting using a learning-theoretic lens as generative active search: a cost-sensitive first-positive search problem in which a policy adaptively samples candidates from an unknown distribution, observes cheap scores, and pays for verifier labels until it finds a positive example. For a fixed prompt, the generator and reward model induce two unknown objects: a distribution over reward scores and a score-conditioned success function. When these quantities are known, we characterize the distribution-aware optimal policy using a dynamic programming approach. In the realistic and practical setting where both the score distribution and success function are unknown, we propose ADAP, a shellwise adaptive generate-rank-verify algorithm that progressively increases the number of sampled responses and top-ranked verifications. Under the monotonicity assumption that higher reward scores are no less likely to pass verification, we show that ADAP achieves expected cost within a constant factor of the distribution-aware optimum. We complement this result with learning-theoretic lower bounds, based on a centered star number, showing that structural assumptions on the score--label relationship are necessary. Experiments on mathematical reasoning and competitive programming validate the predicted advantage over both fixed non-adaptive policies and difficulty-adaptive baselines.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Model (LLM) agents has produced diverse interaction paradigms, yet few production systems integrate multiple paradigms within a unified architecture. This paper presents a systematic analysis of three principal agent interaction paradigms, including Multi-Agent Orchestration (Generator-Evaluator), ReAct Tool-Use Loops, and Memory-Augmented Interaction, as implemented in buddyMe, an open-source multi-model agent programming framework. We formalize a five-stage processing pipeline: Requirement Pre-Review -> Task Decomposition -> ReAct Execution -> Real-Execution Verification -> Adversarial Evaluation Discussion, and establish a six-dimensional evaluation schema with weighted scoring. Through four empirical case studies drawn from real-world deployment logs covering museum guide generation, scheduled weather tasks, and comprehensive tour planning, we draw three key conclusions. First, Generator-Evaluator pre-review detects requirement omissions in 20 percent of complex tasks, with 80 percent tasks passing initial inspection. Second, the ReAct loop ensures stable subtask execution but leads to around 30 percent redundant tool invocations. Third, adversarial Evaluator-Defender discussions reach consensus within 2-3 rounds for nearly 70 percent of scenarios, functioning mainly for content refinement rather than logical reversal. We additionally provide three Mermaid-based architectural diagrams and conduct cross-paradigm comparisons with CrewAI, AutoGen, LangGraph, MemGPT and A-Mem across six system dimensions. The research outcomes offer practical design guidelines for constructing stable and reliable multi-paradigm agent systems.

Evaluation leaderboards such as LMArena play a central role in benchmarking large language models by aggregating pairwise human preferences into model rankings, yet the robustness of these rankings remains poorly understood. We present a unified perturbation framework for analyzing Bradley-Terry leaderboards under structured data modifications using influence-based approximations. Our framework studies three match-level perturbations -- Drop, Add, and Flip -- together with player removal, and evaluates their effects on top-k membership, global ranking consistency via Kendall's tau, and confidence-interval-based uncertainty. Across Chatbot Arena and six additional pairwise-comparison datasets, we show that modern leaderboards are non-robust across all three objectives: sub-1% targeted perturbations can change the top-ranked model, degrade Kendall's tau, and alter confidence intervals. Beyond robustness auditing, we show that the same influence scores enable efficient targeted perturbations, promoting or demoting specific models and reducing target-model uncertainty with fewer actions than previous manipulation and active-sampling baselines. By summarizing these effects with normalized dataset-level robustness scores, our framework provides a practical and helpful tool for auditing leaderboard stability and motivating more robust evaluation protocols.

While Isaac Lab provides massive parallel UAV simulation, OmniSafe and safe-control-gym provide constrained-RL benchmarks, and CBFKit provides control-barrier-function synthesis tooling, no existing framework unifies these capabilities for end-to-end safety-constrained training. ParallelCBF is the first framework to unify (i)~tensor-parallel UAV environments, (ii)~hard-gate CBF safety filters, (iii)sharded BC-to-RL pipelines, and (iv)first-class operational auditability -- pre-registration, watchdog registries, failure forensics, and dataset audits as composable APIs rather than user-implemented scripts. We release ParallelCBF v0.1.0 under Apache2.0 with a four-layer composable API, a CPU PyTorch reference implementation of a dual-barrier (squared / linear-predictive) CBF, property-based safety invariance tests across vectorized batch sizes that complete in 1.67s for the full 39-test suite, and a 31{,}415-episode behavior-cloning collection campaign whose curriculum mix, per-bucket yields, and dataset SHA-256 are auditable through the framework's own \texttt{ops} primitives. We report a representative end-to-end pipeline execution in which the framework's auditability layer halted a downstream training stage that did not meet pre-registered convergence criteria, preventing silent propagation of a degraded checkpoint -- an architectural property we argue is necessary, not merely useful, for reproducible empirical robotics research. The framework is installable via \texttt{pip install parallelcbf}; source and release artifacts are available at https://github.com/xiaoyang-123-cell/ParallelCBF.

As AI systems are increasingly deployed in autonomous agentic settings at scale, it is important to ensure the actions they take are safe and aligned with user intent. Monitoring agent actions is a key safety mechanism, yet reliable monitors remain difficult to build and the scale of these systems makes human oversight impractical. We show that combining signals from diverse monitors into an ensemble improves detection of misaligned actions. We build 12 GPT-4.1-Mini monitors using both prompting and fine-tuning strategies. We evaluate them on coding tasks where candidate solutions pass standard tests but fail on adversarial inputs. In this setting, diverse ensembles outperform both individual monitors and homogeneous ensembles. Our best 3-monitor ensemble achieves 2.4x greater detection performance gain compared to an ensemble composed of three identical monitors, with the same ensemble performing strongly on an independent dataset. We contend that these results show that diversity - not scale - drives gains. The best ensembles combine strong individual performance with low correlation between monitors. Furthermore, fine-tuned monitors appear in every top-performing ensemble and maintain this advantage on out-of-distribution attack types, suggesting that fine-tuning enables detection capabilities that prompting alone does not elicit. These results support ensemble monitoring as a practical AI control strategy for safety gains at reasonable inference costs.

Operational plan generation and verification are critical for modern complex and rapidly changing battlefield environments, yet traditional generation and verification methods still respectively face the challenges of generation infeasibility and verification insufficiency. To alleviate these limitations, we propose an Integrated Multi-Agent Framework for Generative Operational Planning and High-Fidelity Plan Verification (IFPV). IFPV consists of two tightly coupled modules: Multi-Perspective Hierarchical Agents (MPHA) for generative operational planning and an Adversarial Cognitive Simulation Engine (ACSE) for high-fidelity adversarial plan verification. MPHA decomposes commander intent into executable multi-platform tactical action sequences through the collaboration of Pathfinder, Analyst, and Planner agents. ACSE introduces an opponent equipped with a customized world model, which predicts the future evolution of mission-critical platforms and conducts dynamic counteractions against candidate plans. Simulation experiments in the Asymmetric Combat Tactic Simulator (ACTS) show that IFPV improves mission success by 19.4% and reduces operational cost by 41.7% compared with a single-step large language model (LLM) planning baseline. Compared with a traditional rule-based validator, ACSE increases the average suppression rate by 31.8%, indicating that the proposed verification environment is stricter and more discriminative in revealing the latent vulnerabilities of candidate plans. The code for IFPV can be found at https://github.com/zhigao3ks/IFPV.

Automated red-teaming for LLMs often discovers narrow attack slices, missing diverse real-world threats, and yielding insufficient data for safety fine-tuning. We introduce Persona-Conditioned Adversarial Prompting (PCAP), which conditions adversarial search on diverse attacker personas (e.g., doctors, students, malicious actors) and strategy sets to explore realistic attack scenarios. By running parallel persona-conditioned searches, PCAP discovers transferable jailbreaks across different contexts and generates rich defense datasets with automatic metadata tracking. On GPT-OSS 120B, PCAP increases attack success from 57% to 97% while producing 2-6$\times$ more diverse prompts covering varied real-world scenarios. Critically, fine-tuning lightweight adapters on PCAP-generated data significantly improves model robustness (recall: 0.36 $\rightarrow$ 0.99, F1: 0.53 $\rightarrow$ 0.96) with minimal false positives, demonstrating a practical closed-loop approach from vulnerability discovery to automated alignment.

Recent published evidence from frontier laboratories shows that contemporary AI models can recognise evaluation contexts, latently represent them, and behave differently under those contexts than under deployment-continuous conditions. Anthropic's BrowseComp incident, the Natural Language Autoencoder findings on SWE-bench Verified and destructive-coding evaluations, and the OpenAI / Apollo anti-scheming work all document instances of this phenomenon. We argue that these findings create a claim-validity problem for safety conclusions drawn from frontier evaluations. We introduce the Evaluation Differential (ED), a conditional divergence in a target behavioural property between recognised-evaluation and deployment-continuous contexts, define a normalised effect-size form (nED) for cross-property comparison, and prove that marginal evaluation scores cannot identify ED. We develop a typology of safety claims (ED-stable, ED-degraded, ED-inverted, ED-undetermined) by their warrant-status under documented divergence, and specify TRACE (Test-Recognition Audit for Claim Evaluation), an audit protocol that wraps existing evaluation infrastructure and produces restricted claims rather than capability scores. We apply the framework retrospectively to three publicly documented evaluation incidents and discuss governance implications for system cards, conformity assessment, and the international network of AI safety and security institutes. TRACE does not eliminate adversarial adaptation; it disciplines the claims drawn from evaluation evidence by making explicit the conditions under which that evidence was produced.

AI pentesting agents are increasingly credible as offensive security systems, but current benchmarks still provide limited guidance on which will perform best in real-world targets. Existing evaluation protocols assess and optimize for predefined goals such as capture-the-flag, remote code execution, exploit reproduction, or trajectory similarity, in simplified or narrow settings. These tools are valuable for measuring bounded capabilities, yet they do not adequately capture the complexity, open-ended exploration, and strategic decision-making required in realistic pentesting. In this paper, we present a practical evaluation protocol that shifts assessment from task completion to validated vulnerability discovery, allowing evaluation in sufficiently complex targets spanning multiple attack surfaces and vulnerability classes. The protocol combines structured ground-truth with LLM-based semantic matching to identify vulnerabilities, bipartite resolution to score findings under realistic ambiguity, continuous ground-truth maintenance, repeated and cumulative evaluation of stochastic agents, efficiency metrics, and reduced-suite selection for sustainable experimentation. This protocol extends the state of the art by enabling a more realistic, operationally informative comparison of AI pentesting agents. To enable reproducibility, we also release expert-annotated ground truth and code for the proposed evaluation protocol: https://github.com/ethiack/ethibench.

AI scientist systems are increasingly deployed for autonomous research, yet their academic integrity has never been systematically evaluated. We introduce SCIINTEGRITY-BENCH, the first benchmark designed around a dilemmatic evaluation paradigm: each of its 33 scenarios across 11 trap categories is constructed so that honest acknowledgment of failure is the only correct response, while task completion requires misconduct. Across 231 evaluation runs spanning 7 state-of-the-art LLMs, the overall integrity problem rate reaches 34.2%, and no model achieves zero failures. Most strikingly, across missing-data scenarios, all seven models generate synthetic data rather than acknowledging infeasibility, differing only in whether they disclose the substitution. A further prompt ablation study separates two drivers: removing explicit completion pressure sharply reduces undisclosed fabrication from 20.6% to 3.2%, while the underlying synthesis rate remains unchanged, revealing an intrinsic completion bias that persists independent of prompt-level instructions. These findings point to the absence of honest refusal as a trained disposition as the primary driver of observed failures. We release SCIINTEGRITY-BENCH at https://github.com/liuxingtong/Sci-Integrity-Bench.

Steering or intervening on model representations at inference time to correct predictions is essential for AI interpretability and safety, yet existing evaluation protocols are limited to ambiguous language modeling tasks. To address this gap, we introduce SwordBench, a benchmark for steering image representations of vision models across multiple backbones and concept removal tasks. Beyond a unified benchmarking suite, we propose new evaluation notions that uncover the second-order effects of orthogonalization among concept activation vectors for pragmatic steering. Specifically, cross-concept robustness measures the stability of concept detection performance across inputs orthogonalized against alternative concepts, and collateral damage quantifies whether steering inadvertently affects model performance on a downstream task for inputs lacking the bias. We find that although a linear support vector machine exhibits superior separability and orthogonality, it fails to achieve zero collateral damage, often trailing sparse autoencoders. In simpler regimes, both standard baselines and optimization-based methods fail to achieve perfect steering. The source code will be made available soon on GitHub.

In multi-agent systems (MAS), a single deceptive agent can nullify all gains of an agentic AI collective and evade deployed defenses. However, existing adversarial studies on MAS target only shallow tasks and do not consider adaptive adversaries, which evolve their strategies to evade the very detectors trained to catch them. To address that gap, we introduce GAMBIT, a benchmark with three evaluation modes and two independent scores for evaluating imposter detectors: the first two modes measure zero-shot detection under increasing distribution shift, and a third recalibration mode measures how quickly a detector adapts to novel attacks from just 20 labeled examples. The benchmark comes with a dataset of 27,804 labeled instances spanning 240 co-evolved imposter strategies. Our contributions are threefold: (1) Using chess as a substrate deep reasoning problem and Gemini 3.1 Pro for agents, we release GAMBIT and its dataset to evaluate imposter detectors under realistic constraints against a stealthy adaptive imposter; (2) We introduce an adaptive imposter agent based on an efficient evolutionary framework, generalizable beyond chess, that collapses collective task performance while remaining essentially undetectable (50.5% F1-score with a Gemini-based detector); (3) We show that zero-shot evaluation can be highly misleading for adaptive adversaries: two detectors with near-identical zero-shot scores differ by 8x on few-shot adaptation, while the meta-learned variant converges 20x faster, a gap only visible in the recalibration mode. Altogether, GAMBIT provides the first multi-agent benchmark where adversarial attacks and defenses co-evolve, with an imposter framework generalizable beyond our use case, and promising techniques for fast recalibration in a rapidly evolving adversarial system. Code and data: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/gambit.

Debugging CUDA programs has long been challenging because failures often arise from subtle interactions among hardware behavior, compiler decisions, memory hierarchy, and asynchronous execution. More importantly, with the rapid expansion of GPU usage across scientific computing, machine learning, graphics, and systems workloads, CUDA debugging has become more challenging than ever. Current evaluations of LLM-based CUDA programming largely miss this setting: a model can pass correctness tests with repair by degeneration, simplifying the CUDA code into a safer but slower program that abandons the original optimization structure. We introduce CUDABEAVER, a benchmark for CUDA debugging from real failing workspaces produced during LLM-based CUDA generation. Each task provides the broken candidate, native build/test commands, raw error evidence, and a single editable file. CUDABEAVER evaluates whether a fixer truly repairs the failing CUDA code or merely finds a slower test-passing replacement, reporting results by failure category, debugging trajectory, stagnation mode, and performance preservation. We further propose pass@k(M,C,A), a protocol-conditional CUDA debugging metric by making the fixer M, corpus C, and protocol axes Aexplicit. Using this metric across 213 tasks and seven frontier LLMs, we show that protocol-aware evaluation gives a more faithful view of CUDA debugging ability: when performance-loss tolerance is high, fixers appear much stronger, but even a minor stricter performance requirement can sharply reduce measured success, shifting scores by up to 40 percentage points.

Multimodal RAG systems increasingly rely on vision-language retrievers to ground visual queries in external textual evidence. Existing adversarial studies on RAG mainly manipulate the retrieval corpus or memory, while attacks on vision-language and remote sensing models typically target end-task predictions. Input-space threats to the evidence retrieval stage of remote sensing multimodal RAG remain underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce CloudWeb, an atmospheric retrieval hijacking attack that modifies only the input image while keeping the retriever, generator, and knowledge base fixed at deployment. CloudWeb overlays parameterized cloud- and haze-like patterns on remote sensing images and optimizes them with a retrieval-oriented objective that pulls adversarial image embeddings toward target atmospheric evidence, suppresses source-scene evidence, enforces rank separation, and regularizes naturalness and coverage. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of retrieval-stage atmospheric evidence hijacking in remote sensing multimodal RAG. We evaluate CloudWeb on a seven-dataset remote sensing RAG benchmark with five CLIP-style retrievers, including GeoRSCLIP, RemoteCLIP, OpenAI CLIP, and OpenCLIP, together with downstream vision-language generators. Across retrievers, CloudWeb consistently outperforms clean retrieval, handcrafted atmospheric baselines, random cloud perturbations, and fixed variants in injecting weather-related evidence into top-ranked results. On GeoRSCLIP ViT-B/32, Weather@5 increases from 0.71% to 43.29%. Downstream generation further shows measurable weather hallucination and semantic shift, indicating that retrieval-stage hijacking can propagate to the final RAG response. These findings reveal a practical failure mode: natural-looking atmospheric changes can compromise evidence retrieval before generation begins.

A major bottleneck in characterizing the failure modes of generative AI systems is the cost and time of annotation and evaluation. Consequently, adaptive testing paradigms have gained popularity, where one opportunistically decides which cases and how many to annotate based on past results. While this framework is highly practical, its extreme flexibility makes it difficult to draw statistically rigorous conclusions, as it violates classical assumptions: the number of observations is typically limited (often 10 to 50 cases) and decisions regarding sampling and stopping are made in the midst of data collection rather than based a pre-specified rule. To characterize what statistical inferences can be drawn from highly adaptive audits, we introduce a hypothesis testing framework from two 'dueling' perspectives: (i) the model's null that asserts there is no failure mode with performance below a target threshold versus (ii) the auditor's null that asserts they have a sampling strategy that will uncover a failure mode. Leveraging Safe Anytime-Valid Inference (SAVI), we formalize the auditor as conducting 'testing by betting', which translates into simultaneous e-processes for testing the dueling null hypotheses. Furthermore, if the auditor is sufficiently powerful, we prove that these two hypotheses are asymptotically inverses of each other, in that passage of a stringent audit does in fact certify the AI system as being globally robust. Empirically, we demonstrate that our proposed testing procedures maintain anytime-valid type-I error control, outperform pre-specified testing methods, and can reach statistically rigorous conclusions sometimes with as few as 20 observations.

This work studies the robust evaluation of iterative stochastic purification defenses under white-box adversarial attacks. Our key technical insight is that gradient checkpointing makes exact end-to-end gradient computation through long purification trajectories practical by trading additional recomputation for substantially lower memory usage. This enables full-gradient adaptive attacks against diffusion- and Langevin-based purification defenses, where prior evaluations often resort to approximate backpropagation due to memory constraints. These approximations can weaken the attack signal and risk overestimating robustness. In parallel, stochasticity in iterative purification is frequently under-controlled, even though different purification trajectories can substantially change reported robustness metrics. Building on this insight, we introduce a memory-efficient full-gradient evaluation framework for stochastic purification defenses. The framework combines checkpointed backpropagation with evaluation protocols that control stochastic variability, thereby reducing memory bottlenecks while preserving exact gradients. We evaluate diffusion-based purification and Langevin sampling with Energy-Based Models (EBMs), demonstrating that full-gradient attacks uncover vulnerabilities missed by approximate-gradient evaluations. Our framework yields stronger state-of-the-art $\ell_{\infty}$ and $\ell_{2}$ white-box attacks and further supports probing out-of-distribution robustness. Overall, our results show that exact-gradient evaluation is essential for reliable benchmarking of iterative stochastic defenses.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to knowledge base poisoning, yet existing attacks have been evaluated almost exclusively against vanilla retrieve-then-generate pipelines. Architectures designed to handle conflicting retrieved information - multi-agent debate, agentic retrieval, recursive language models - remain untested against adversarially optimized contradictions. We evaluate four RAG architectures (vanilla RAG, agentic RAG, MADAM-RAG, and Recursive Language Models) under controlled single-document (N=1) poisoning on 921 Natural Questions QA pairs, comparing a clean baseline, naive injection, and CorruptRAG-AK - an adversarial attack whose meta-epistemic framing targets credibility assessment. Architecture is a high-impact variable in adversarial robustness: under CorruptRAG-AK, attack success rates range from 81.9% (vanilla) to 24.4% (RLM) - a spread of nearly 58 percentage points across architectures with comparable clean accuracy (~92%). Decomposing this gap, once the poisoned document is retrieved, adversarial framing - not retrieval optimization - drives the majority of CorruptRAG-AK's advantage for three of four architectures, localizing the cross-architecture vulnerability at the content-reasoning stage. Our MADAM-RAG reimplementation shows the highest apparent contradiction detection rate, though our LLM judge over-identifies this behavior (~48.5% precision), so reported rates are upper bounds. Regardless of detection, MADAM-RAG cannot resolve contradictions reliably, producing a 41.4% non-answer rate even on clean inputs - though implementation divergences from the original may contribute. We introduce a seven-category behavioral taxonomy capturing contradiction detection, hedging, and failure modes beyond binary accuracy. Code, data, and analysis notebooks are publicly available.

This report describes ARIS (Auto-Research-in-sleep), an open-source research harness for autonomous research, including its architecture, assurance mechanisms, and early deployment experience. The performance of agent systems built on LLMs depends on both the model weights and the harness around them, which governs what information to store, retrieve, and present to the model. For long-horizon research workflows, the central failure mode is not a visible breakdown but a plausible unsupported success: a long-running agent can produce claims whose evidential support is incomplete, misreported, or silently inherited from the executor's framing. Therefore, we present ARIS as a research harness that coordinates machine-learning research workflows through cross-model adversarial collaboration as a default configuration: an executor model drives forward progress while a reviewer from a different model family is recommended to critique intermediate artifacts and request revisions. ARIS has three architectural layers. The execution layer provides more than 65 reusable Markdown-defined skills, model integrations via MCP, a persistent research wiki for iterative reuse of prior findings, and deterministic figure generation. The orchestration layer coordinates five end-to-end workflows with adjustable effort settings and configurable routing to reviewer models. The assurance layer includes a three-stage process for checking whether experimental claims are supported by evidence: integrity verification, result-to-claim mapping, and claim auditing that cross-checks manuscript statements against the claim ledger and raw evidence, as well as a five-pass scientific-editing pipeline, mathematical-proof checks, and visual inspection of the rendered PDF. A prototype self-improvement loop records research traces and proposes harness improvements that are adopted only after reviewer approval.

Fine-tuning safety-aligned language models for downstream tasks often leads to substantial degradation of refusal behavior, making models vulnerable to adversarial misuse. While prior work has shown that safety-relevant features are encoded in structured representations within the model's activation space, how these representations change during fine-tuning and why alignment degrades remains poorly understood. In this work, we investigate the representation-level mechanisms underlying alignment degradation. Our analysis shows that standard fine-tuning induces systematic drift in safety-relevant representations, distorts their geometric structure, and introduces interference between task optimization and safety features. These effects collectively lead to increased harmful compliance. Motivated by these findings, we introduce REFUSALGUARD, a representation-level fine-tuning framework that preserves safety-relevant structure during model adaptation. Our approach constrains updates in hidden representation space, ensuring that safety-mediating components remain stable while allowing task-specific learning in complementary directions. We evaluate REFUSALGUARD across multiple model families, including LLaMA, Gemma, and Qwen, on adversarial safety benchmarks such as AdvBench, DirectHarm4, and JailbreakBench, as well as downstream utility tasks. Our approach achieves attack success rates comparable to base safety-aligned models while maintaining competitive task performance, significantly outperforming baselines.

Terminal-agent benchmarks have become a primary signal for measuring the coding and system-administration capabilities of large language models. As the market for evaluation environments grows, so does the pressure to ship tasks quickly, often without thorough adversarial review of the verification logic. This paper is a guideline for writing good benchmark tasks, drawn from over a year of contributing to and reviewing tasks for Terminal Bench. Most people write benchmark tasks the way they write prompts. They shouldn't. A prompt is designed to help the agent succeed; a benchmark is designed to find out if it can. We argue that good tasks are adversarial, difficult, and legible, and that a large class of common failure modes -- AI-generated instructions, over-prescriptive specifications, clerical difficulty, oracle solutions that assume hidden knowledge, tests that validate the wrong things, and reward-hackable environments -- are predictable consequences of treating task authoring as prompt authoring. We catalog these failure modes, argue that real difficulty is conceptual rather than environmental, and discuss recent empirical evidence that over 15% of tasks in popular terminal-agent benchmarks are reward-hackable. We hope this serves as a useful reference for benchmark maintainers, task contributors, and researchers using benchmark scores as evidence.

Cognitive science often evaluates theories through narrow paradigms and local model comparisons, limiting the integration of evidence across tasks and realizations. We introduce an automated adversarial collaboration framework for adjudicating among competing theories even when the candidate models and experiments must be discovered during the adjudication process. The system combines LLM-based theory agents, program synthesis, and information-theoretic experimental design in a closed loop. In a simulation study spanning three classic categorization theories, the framework recovered the ground-truth theory across noise settings with weaker reliability in the hardest settings. Together, the framework and findings provide a concrete proof of concept for closed-loop, in-silico theory adjudication in cognitive science.

Evaluating generative AI models is increasingly resource-intensive due to slow inference, expensive raters, and a rapidly growing landscape of models and benchmarks. We propose ProEval, a proactive evaluation framework that leverages transfer learning to efficiently estimate performance and identify failure cases. ProEval employs pre-trained Gaussian Processes (GPs) as surrogates for the performance score function, mapping model inputs to metrics such as the severity of errors or safety violations. By framing performance estimation as Bayesian quadrature (BQ) and failure discovery as superlevel set sampling, we develop uncertainty-aware decision strategies that actively select or synthesize highly informative inputs for testing. Theoretically, we prove that our pre-trained GP-based BQ estimator is unbiased and bounded. Empirically, extensive experiments on reasoning, safety alignment, and classification benchmarks demonstrate that ProEval is significantly more efficient than competitive baselines. It requires 8-65x fewer samples to achieve estimates within 1% of the ground truth, while simultaneously revealing more diverse failure cases under a stricter evaluation budget.

LLM-based agents are rapidly being adopted for scientific data analysis, automating tasks once limited by human time and expertise. This capability is often framed as an acceleration of discovery, but it also accelerates a familiar failure mode, the rapid production of plausible, endlessly revisable analyses that are easy to generate, effectively turning hypothesis space into candidate claims supported by selectively chosen analyses, optimized for publishable positives. Unlike software, scientific knowledge is not validated by the iterative accumulation of code and post hoc statistical support. A fluent explanation or a significant result on a single dataset is not verification. Because the missing evidence is a negative space, experiments and analyses that would have falsified the claim were never run or never published. We therefore propose that non-experimental claims produced with agentic assistance be evaluated under a falsification-first standard: agents should not be used primarily to craft the most compelling narrative, but to actively search for the ways in which the claim can fail.

Adversarial robustness evaluation underpins every claim of trustworthy ML deployment, yet the field suffers from fragmented protocols and undetected gradient masking. We make two contributions. (1) Structured synthesis. We analyze nine peer-reviewed corpus sources (2020--2026) through seven complementary protocols, producing the first end-to-end structured analysis of the field's consensus and unresolved challenges. (2) Auto-ART framework. We introduce Auto-ART, an open-source framework that operationalizes identified gaps: 50+ attacks, 28 defense modules, the Robustness Diagnostic Index (RDI), and gradient-masking detection. It supports multi-norm evaluation (l1/l2/linf/semantic/spatial) and compliance mapping to NIST AI RMF, OWASP LLM Top 10, and the EU AI Act. Empirical validation on RobustBench demonstrates that Auto-ART's pre-screening identifies gradient masking in 92% of flagged cases, and RDI rankings correlate highly with full AutoAttack. Multi-norm evaluation exposes a 23.5 pp gap between average and worst-case robustness on state-of-the-art models. No prior work combines such structured meta-scientific analysis with an executable evaluation framework bridging literature gaps into engineering.

RLHF-trained models are systematically biased toward agreement over accuracy, a structural property of the training process. We present Durable Evaluation Framework (DEF) Arbitration, a multi-agent architecture that mitigates identity-framed sycophancy by arbitrating between two models tuned to opposing DEFs, with a pragmatist synthesizer evaluating both arguments blind to their origins. This paper evaluates a prompt-based instantiation of DEF Arbitration. The key mechanisms are static DEF tuning, identity stripping before synthesis, single-round independent argumentation, and blind arbitration. We evaluate five instantiations on 200 stratified questions from SycophancyEval. All tested DEF variants (AnCifer, DeWin, FeynStein, BurGal, Trident) significantly outperform the single-model baseline (18.5%) and instructed-opposition baseline (29.0%), with DeWin achieving 48.5% accuracy (z=6.36, p<0.001 versus both). The variants are not significantly different from each other at n=200. The BurGal variant achieves 53.0% but functions as an architectural validity check; its consensus/heterodox axis structurally favors the heterodox model on every benchmark question. A pre-training floor affects an estimated 40% of questions; fine-tuned DEF models are the identified next step.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is central to aligning Large Language Models (LLMs), yet it introduces a critical vulnerability: an imperfect Reward Model (RM) can become a single point of failure when it fails to penalize unsafe behaviors. While existing red-teaming approaches primarily target policy-level weaknesses, they overlook what we term systemic weaknesses cases where both the core LLM and the RM fail in tandem. We present ARES, a framework that systematically discovers and mitigates such dual vulnerabilities. ARES employs a ``Safety Mentor'' that dynamically composes semantically coherent adversarial prompts by combining structured component types (topics, personas, tactics, goals) and generates corresponding malicious and safe responses. This dual-targeting approach exposes weaknesses in both the core LLM and the RM simultaneously. Using the vulnerabilities gained, ARES implements a two-stage repair process: first fine-tuning the RM to better detect harmful content, then leveraging the improved RM to optimize the core model. Experiments across multiple adversarial safety benchmarks demonstrate that ARES substantially enhances safety robustness while preserving model capabilities, establishing a new paradigm for comprehensive RLHF safety alignment.

The Adversarial Humanities Benchmark (AHB) evaluates whether model safety refusals survive a shift away from familiar harmful prompt forms. Starting from harmful tasks drawn from MLCommons AILuminate, the benchmark rewrites the same objectives through humanities-style transformations while preserving intent. This extends literature on Adversarial Poetry and Adversarial Tales from single jailbreak operators to a broader benchmark family of stylistic obfuscation and goal concealment. In the benchmark results reported here, the original attacks record 3.84% attack success rate (ASR), while transformed methods range from 36.8% to 65.0%, yielding 55.75% overall ASR across 31 frontier models. Under a European Union AI Act Code-of-Practice-inspired systemic-risk lens, Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) is the highest bucket. Taken together, this lack of stylistic robustness suggests that current safety techniques suffer from weak generalization: deep understanding of 'non-maleficence' remains a central unresolved problem in frontier model safety.

As AI systems are increasingly used to conduct research autonomously, misaligned systems could introduce subtle flaws that produce misleading results while evading detection. We introduce Auditing Sabotage Bench, a benchmark for evaluating the ability of auditors to detect and fix sabotage in ML research codebases. Our benchmark consists of 9 ML research codebases with sabotaged variants that produce qualitatively different experimental results. Each sabotage modifies implementation details, such as hyperparameters, training data, or evaluation code, while preserving the high-level methodology described in the paper. We evaluated frontier LLMs and LLM-assisted human auditors on our benchmark and found that both struggled to reliably detect and fix sabotage: the best performance was an AUROC of 0.77 and a top-1 fix rate of 42%, achieved by Gemini 3.1 Pro. We also tested LLMs as red teamers and found that LLM-generated sabotages were weaker than human-generated ones but still sometimes evaded same-capability LLM auditors. We release the benchmark to support research on monitoring and auditing techniques for AI-conducted research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at code generation but remain heavily reliant on large-scale annotated solutions and verification-based supervision, which constrains scalability and hinders sustained self-improvement. Recent solver--verifier frameworks exploit program execution as an automatic supervision signal, but their effectiveness degrades as solvers become moderately strong: verifier-generated tests increasingly confirm semantic correctness rather than exposing the remaining failure modes. We propose \textbf{ACE}, a self-evolving code generation framework based on a solver--adversary architecture that prioritizes active failure discovery through execution-centric supervision. A single LLM alternates between generating candidate programs and producing adversarial unit test inputs optimized to induce execution-level failures, such as runtime errors, exceptions, or non-termination. Supervision is derived solely from execution outcomes: robust programs are selected for supervised fine-tuning, while adversarial tests are optimized via Kahneman--Tversky Optimization using execution-derived preferences. Notably, the entire training loop requires no ground-truth code or external reward models. Experiments on CodeContests, MBPP, and LiveCodeBench demonstrate that ACE consistently outperforms strong solver--verifier baselines, achieving 3--7% absolute gains in pass@1, with larger improvements on out-of-distribution benchmarks, while maintaining competitive or improved inference efficiency.

As agent systems move into increasingly diverse execution settings, trajectory-level safety evaluation and diagnosis require benchmarks that evolve with them. ATBench is a diverse and realistic agent trajectory benchmark for safety evaluation and diagnosis. This report presents ATBench-Claw and ATBench-Codex, two domain-customized extensions that carry ATBench into the OpenClaw and OpenAI Codex / Codex-runtime settings. The key adaptation mechanism is to analyze each new setting, customize the three-dimensional Safety Taxonomy over risk source, failure mode, and real-world harm, and then use that customized taxonomy to define the benchmark specification consumed by the shared ATBench construction pipeline. This extensibility matters because agent frameworks remain relatively stable at the architectural level even as their concrete execution settings, tool ecosystems, and product capabilities evolve quickly. Concretely, ATBench-Claw targets OpenClaw-sensitive execution chains over tools, skills, sessions, and external actions, while ATBench-Codex targets trajectories in the OpenAI Codex / Codex-runtime setting over repositories, shells, patches, dependencies, approvals, and runtime policy boundaries. Our emphasis therefore falls on taxonomy customization, domain-specific risk coverage, and benchmark design under a shared ATBench generation framework.

Large language model (LLM)-based judges are widely adopted for automated evaluation and reward modeling, yet their judgments are often affected by judgment biases. Accurately evaluating these biases is essential for ensuring the reliability of LLM-based judges. However, existing studies typically investigate limited biases under a single judge formulation, either generative or discriminative, lacking a comprehensive evaluation. To bridge this gap, we propose JudgeBiasBench, a benchmark for systematically quantifying biases in LLM-based judges. JudgeBiasBench defines a taxonomy of judgment biases across 4 dimensions, and constructs bias-augmented evaluation instances through a controlled bias injection pipeline, covering 12 representative bias types. We conduct extensive experiments across both generative and discriminative judges, revealing that current judges exhibit significant and diverse bias patterns that often compromise the reliability of automated evaluation. To mitigate judgment bias, we propose bias-aware training that explicitly incorporates bias-related attributes into the training process, encouraging judges to disentangle task-relevant quality from bias-correlated cues. By adopting reinforcement learning for generative judges and contrastive learning for discriminative judges, our methods effectively reduce judgment biases while largely preserving general evaluation capability.

We evaluate artificial intelligence (AI) systems without ground truth by exploiting a link between strategic gaming and information loss. Building on established information theory, we analyze which mechanisms resist adversarial manipulation. This motivates mutual evaluation, where the overseer is treated as a strategic player estimating mutual information by prompting, making truthful agent reporting an optimal strategy. We show that certain f-divergences, such as total variation distance (TVD), maintain polynomial guarantees under attack, building on an established exponential barrier for estimating mutual information (MI) in worst-case certification settings. Under adversarial attacks, TVD-MI maintains effectiveness (area under the curve 0.70--0.77) while other approaches can decay toward chance, demonstrating that prompting the same system for information relationships rather than quality judgments can improve robustness. The mechanisms decompose pairwise evaluations into reliable item-level detection scores without ground truth, addressing a key limitation of standard peer prediction. Pre-registration: https://osf.io/c7pum .

Evaluating agents on the growing number of agentic benchmarks is challenging because they often require complex environments and agent integrations. We introduce Harbor Adapters, a unified evaluation infrastructure for agentic benchmarks. Our work makes three contributions. First, we develop benchmark adapters that port more than 80 benchmarks to evaluate arbitrary agents, and validate them through rigorous code review and parity experiments. Second, we conduct a large-scale evaluation of 8 models spanning capability tiers across 54 benchmarks; every model is run with Terminus-2 and with one of 3 native harnesses. This enables a broader analysis of agent capabilities and failure modes than was previously possible. Third, we introduce Harbor-Index, a curated set of 82 difficult, diverse, and high-quality tasks spanning 29 benchmarks, refined from the adapted suite through difficulty filtering, AI and human audit, and an audit-and-fix loop. Harbor-Index preserves the challenge and breadth of large-scale agentic evaluations while being affordable to run; no evaluated model-harness configuration exceeds 30% pass rate, and the strongest (GPT-5.5 with Codex) reaches 28.0%. We release the adapters, evaluation results, in-depth analysis, and Harbor-Index as open-source artifacts to support more reliable and comprehensive evaluation of language-model agents.