Intrusion Detection

Feature selection is critical for network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) operating under high-dimensional, highly imbalanced traffic, as found in operational and defense networks. Traditional filter methods rank features using global statistics computed symmetrically across classes and thus fail to capture the asymmetry of intrusion detection, where attacks are best characterized as deviations from dominant benign traffic. We propose benign-anchored Classwise Mean Deviation (nCMD), a lightweight and interpretable method that scores feature relevance based on the deviation of attack-class distributions from the benign-class mean, rather than a globally biased reference. This approach aligns feature selection with the operational semantics of NIDS at no additional computational cost. Across four benchmark datasets (CICIDS2017, CICDDoS2019, NSL-KDD, and UNSW-NB15), multiple feature budgets, and three downstream classifiers, nCMD matches or exceeds classical filter baselines in macro-averaged F1-score. It achieves the best result on three of the four datasets and under every classifier, with the strongest improvements observed under tight feature budgets and severe class imbalance. These results support benign-anchored ranking as a scalable and interpretable preprocessing component for resource-constrained NIDS.

Adversarial attacks pose a serious and growing threat to Machine Learning (ML)-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), where imperceptible perturbations to network flow features can systematically mislead classifiers into accepting malicious traffic as benign. The IDS-Anta framework partially addresses this through Z-score normalization, Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), and Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) classifier selection with Thompson Sampling, yet its classifier pool lacks sufficient structural diversity for robust adversarial resistance. This work introduces IDS-Anta++, which incorporates XGBoost and LightGBM gradient boosting models into the ensemble and wraps the extended pool in a three-layer black-box defense: Isolation Forest anomaly screening, median feature smoothing, and six-way majority voting. Experiments conducted on CIC-IDS-2017, CEC-CIC-IDS-2018, and CIC-DDoS-2019 under both Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and Zeroth Order Optimization (ZOO) attacks confirm detection accuracy above 99% on clean data, with measurable robustness gains under adversarial conditions relative to the baseline IDS-Anta configuration.

Rule-based Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) offer precise attack detection as well as mitigation, however their manually crafted, signature-driven rules limit adaptability to emerging and zero-day threats. Additionally, existing public datasets (e.g., CICIDS2017, UNSW-NB15) focus on traffic classification and provide little structured information to support automatic rule synthesis or prevention logic. To address this gap, we propose Generative Thread Intelligence (GenTI) \footnote{GenTI refers to the proposed framework, and GTI refers to the dataset.} an LLM-driven benchmark for automatic generation of IDPS rules targeting unseen attacks. The dataset (GTI) aggregates over 150k detection and prevention rules from Snort, Suricata, Emerging Threats, as well as 50k YARA, each annotated with protocol behavior, payload signatures, contextual relationships, mappings to Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI), along with actionable response types (alert, drop, reject). Moreover, on top of this corpus we design an LLM-based pipeline that transforms analyst prompts and representative payloads into deployable rules via structured prompt engineering, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, as well as a Chain-of-Verification (CoVe) loop for syntactic, semantic, and security validation. The generated rules are executed in real time on (Snort/Suricata) and evaluated by syntax accuracy, semantic similarity, CTI coverage, security effectiveness as well as unseen attacks detection. Furthermore, our GenTI instantiation achieves a composite rule-quality score of 89.4%, with 94.8% CTI coverage, improving unseen attacks detection from 45% to 87.4% and reducing the false-positive rate from 8.5% to 2.3%. Overall, GenTI establishes the first large-scale benchmark that tightly couples rule-level CTI with LLM-based automation, enabling adaptive, self-evolving IDPS.

With the rapid proliferation of IoT devices, security concerns have dramatically escalated and intrusion detection systems have become critical for protecting networked environments. This paper presents an improved CNN-LSTM based intrusion detection model that combines multi-class classification, dataset integration, and temporal feature learning to enhance detection performance in IoT networks. Using network traffic data, the proposed approach is evaluated on intrusion detection tasks and achieves an accuracy of approximately 97%. Experimental results demonstrate that the model effectively detects multiple attack categories while maintaining stable training and validation performance. The integration of convolutional and recurrent neural network components enables the framework to capture both spatial and temporal characteristics of network traffic, improving overall intrusion detection capability in IoT environments.

Digital infrastructure is growing at a rapid pace in the United States, and as a result, exposure to advanced cyber threats to critical sectors including healthcare, finance, transportation, energy and government systems is growing. The traditional cybersecurity approaches, including signature-based intrusion detection systems, have become less effective against today's cyber attacks, as they are unable to detect unknown and changing attacks in real time. To overcome these constraints, this research suggests a smart cyber-defense system, which utilizes Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) algorithms in the detection and prevention of cyber attacks in the U.S. digital infrastructure. This study uses the CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset, which is a realistic network traffic dataset, along with various cyber attack scenarios, including Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), brute force attacks, botnets, infiltration attacks, and web-based attacks. A number of machine learning and deep learning models such as Random Forest, XGBoost, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks are implemented and evaluated to be used in identifying malicious network behavior and boosting the accuracy of intrusion detection. The framework proposed combines data preprocessing, feature engineering, real-time traffic monitoring, intelligent threat classification with automated prevention mechanisms to build cybersecurity resilience. E

The increasing penetrations of the critical infrastructure sector in the United States with intelligent digital technologies have greatly increased exposure to advanced cyber adversaries and operational vulnerabilities. AI-powered governance and automated decision-making systems are becoming a key part of the operation of critical infrastructure systems, including energy, healthcare, transportation, financial services, and communication infrastructure, in order to improve efficiency and strategic management. The growing cyber threat environment, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDos) attacks, botnets, ransomware, and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) pose significant challenges to infrastructure resilience, cyber security reliability, and governance trustworthiness. In a changing attack landscape and dynamic network environment, traditional cybersecurity mechanisms can often fall short of meeting the evolving needs and protecting critical systems. This study will develop a resilient cyber risk analytics and model reliability assessment framework to support intelligent governance and decision support for cyber risk exposure in the U.S. critical infrastructure environment. This study is based on the CICIDS2017 dataset for the development and testing of intrusion detection system models and cyber risk prediction models based on machine learning. Various classifiers like XGBoost, Random Forest, and Decision Tree are used to detect malicious activities on the network and determine the level of cyber risk. Furthermore, the Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) techniques are integrated to enhance transparency, interpretability, and trust in cybersecurity decision-making processes. The proposed framework presents the reliability and resilience of the model by having various performance measures such as accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score, ROC-AUC, and false positive rate.

Vulnerability disclosure volumes now far exceed organizational assessment capacity, yet three adjacent research communities (proof-of-concept generation, vulnerability prioritization, and detection rule engineering) operate largely in isolation. Existing automated exploit generation systems report binary pass/fail outcomes, discarding partial progress and producing no signal for the other two communities. This paper presents FORGE, a multi-agent system that bridges these three silos through graduated exploitation depth. Five specialized agents (Intel, Generator, Planner, Exploit, and Detector) execute in a fixed pipeline that (1) generates targeted vulnerable applications from CVE metadata, (2) conducts coached, multi-turn exploitation assessed by an LLM-primary oracle on a four-level taxonomy (L0: no evidence through L3: full compromise), and (3) produces Sigma and Snort detection rules grounded in OpenTelemetry exploitation traces. Graduated depth is the bridging mechanism: deeper exploitation yields richer behavioral traces for detection engineering, while depth data across scoring bands provides ground truth for prioritization validation. A tiered knowledge architecture accumulates intelligence across assessments, transferring build and exploitation experience to subsequent CVEs. Evaluation on 603 CVEs from the CVE-GENIE dataset achieves 67.8% end-to-end L1+ exploitation at USD 1.50 per CVE across eight languages and 187 CWE types. Exploitation rates remain near 68% regardless of EPSS or CVSS band, indicating that pattern-level reachability is orthogonal to metadata-based prioritization. Detection rules from L2+ exploitation achieve significantly higher span-normalized grounding than L1-derived rules (p=0.035), and 93.4% of generated Snort rules produce zero false positives against a synthetic benign corpus.

Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) deployed in energy infrastructure are vulnerable to model theft attacks, which allow adversaries to create evasive traffic offline. Current defences against model extraction rely either on identity-bound query monitoring, which is ineffective against distributed attackers (Sybil), or on prediction poisoning through soft-label perturbation, which is inapplicable to hard-label IDS deployments. Therefore, we propose FlowGuard, an identity-independent defence based on flow matching that classifies incoming queries as out-of-distribution (OOD) prior to IDS processing. This approach exploits the fact that queries generated synthetically for data-free model stealing attacks occupy a lower-dimensional manifold than real network traffic. This results in measurably lower log-likelihoods when using a Continuous Normalizing Flow that has been trained on legitimate data. We evaluate our method against PRADA and FDINet using MAZE and DisGUIDE attacks in single-client and distributed (100-client Sybil) settings. While PRADA's detection rate dropped to 0% when the distribution changed, our defence maintained a stable detection rate across both settings without relying on identity information. We discuss the scope and limitations of the approach, and outline potential applications to data-dependent attacks.

Distributed event-based systems have become a common substrate for Internet-scale publish/subscribe services, IoT telemetry, cloud-native microservices, and security operations pipelines. Their loose coupling and asynchronous delivery improve scalability, but they also expand the attack surface: publishers, brokers, subscribers, topics, schemas, and temporal ordering can each be abused without a single component observing the whole behavior. This paper proposes SECUREVENT, a hybrid AI/ML security-monitoring architecture for distributed event-based systems. The architecture combines traditional protections such as authenticated transport, topic-level authorization, and signed events with online anomaly detection, graph-aware behavioral features, complex-event policy rules, federated learning, and adversarial-ML governance. A deterministic prototype study over synthetic event-stream attacks illustrates how a hybrid AI/CEP monitor can improve recall over static rules while retaining a low false-positive rate. The central claim is not that machine learning replaces cryptographic and access-control mechanisms, but that model-based security monitoring is necessary when event flows, identities, schemas, and timing relationships are too dynamic for static controls alone.

Spiking neural networks (SNNs) are increasingly studied for network intrusion detection, but comparative evidence on how neuron models and spike encodings affect performance remains limited. Evaluation choices can influence results when preprocessing, capture structure, or scenario information crosses the train--test boundary. We evaluate nine snnTorch neuron families with three spike encodings, yielding 27 SNN configurations across four intrusion-detection benchmarks. We screen the design space and then repeat the evaluation using train-only transforms, seed-independent partitions, and capture- or scenario-aware separation. In our study, LeakyParallel/latency ranked first in both 27-configuration evaluations. The leading configurations identified during screening also remained largely consistent under confirmation, indicating that screening preserved the ordering useful for design selection even when the measured performance changed under the stricter protocol. We then examine what latency coding contributes by holding the active spike set fixed and changing only its temporal organization. At the main T=25 operating point, mapping feature magnitude to spike time improved macro-F1 on all five confirmation protocols, while spreading the same spikes through time without that mapping could either improve or reduce performance. This shows that the effect of latency coding comes from both the information carried by spike time and how those spikes interact with the temporal dynamics of the network. Finally, sparse input encoding does not directly translate into sparse internal activity, although latency coding requires fewer fanout-weighted operations than rate coding in the evaluated models. Overall, the results show that SNN design choice, evaluation protocol, spike-timing representation, and computational activity should be examined separately when applying SNNs to static network-flow data.

Multimodal LLMs use dedicated encoders to bridge non-language modalities (vision encoders for images, depth models for audio codec tokens) because raw token embeddings alone cannot capture modality-specific structure. We argue that Semantic IDs (SIDs), the hierarchical codes used in generative recommendation, constitute another such modality: a SID level token's meaning depends on its prefix context, yet current systems simply add SID tokens to the vocabulary and rely on training to learn these context-dependent meanings from scratch. We propose PrefixMem, a lightweight SID encoder based on prefix n-gram memory tables that provides the LLM with structured, prefix-conditioned representations at SID token positions. Like vision encoders in multimodal LLMs, PrefixMem can be pre-trained independently and then attached to any LLM for joint training. We evaluate on large-scale data from Pinterest across multiple LLM families and show that PrefixMem improves deepest-level SID accuracy by up to 46% relative and full-SID retrieval recall by up to 22% relative at matched training compute. The encoder's benefit concentrates on hard examples where greedy decoding fails, with up to 77% relative accuracy gains, confirming that SID tokens benefit from a dedicated encoder just as other non-language modalities do.

The detection of intrusions in IoT-based networks poses challenges that cannot be overcome using traditional machine learning methods. Perhaps the biggest of them is related to the presence of a class imbalance in the side-channel dataset, where the number of samples in the normal class compared to the attacks can reach a ratio of 75,964 to 1. Such an aspect is addressed by Dominguez et al. through the proof of concept of power-based intrusion detection. Unfortunately, neither the authors attempt to cope with the problem of imbalance nor do they assess the classifier performance using a balanced training set. In the current paper, both aspects will be handled at once. First, a Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) was performed on all nine possible datasets extracted from the initial one, providing an exact imbalance ratio of 1.1 for each. Then, eight algorithms i.e. Random Forest, HistGradientBoosting, LightGBM, Extra Trees, XGBoost, k-Nearest Neighbors, Multi-Layer Perceptron, and Decision Tree were trained under identical conditions for the SMOTE balanced 6-hour dataset. Random Forest reached a micro-averaged F1 score of 0.9989 and macro F1 of 0.9794, thus outperforming the previously best micro-F1 result obtained by Time Series Forest algorithm from the base paper of 0.9983. Extra Trees provided the same performance as well, but at 10 times faster. The introduction of a macro-F1 metric explicitly in contrast to the base paper assessment reveals important class-level information missed with aggregate performance metrics. Recall rates per-class calculated with confusion matrices, F1 heatmaps, and ROC curves show that minority attack classes, especially those with combined M+L infections, are detected reliably only when using SMOTE balance. Feature importance analysis indicates the latest time steps as the most important predictor signals out of 60 steps in a power window.

Modern network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are caught in a structural contradiction: the protocols carrying the highest threat intelligence are precisely those encrypted under TLS 1.3 and QUIC, where payload inspection yields nothing. We ask a simpler question -- what if the attack signature is not in the bytes, but in the rhythm? -- and answer it by treating network flows as a language whose grammar is written entirely in L3/L4 packet metadata: length, inter-arrival time, TTL, TCP flags, and hashed port numbers. We present PLM-NIDS, which proves three claims in sequence. (1) The grammar exists and is learnable: a RWKV-4 state-space model trained on 344,232 unlabelled Monday flows achieves a causal LM validation loss of 0.204, demonstrating that benign traffic has predictable, statistically consistent structure. (2) Attacks violate this grammar: the per-flow perplexity score cleanly separates benign from attack flows with PR-AUC = 0.93 using zero attack labels at training time. (3) This separation is architecturally nontrivial: an LSTM trained on identical token sequences degenerates to a majority-class predictor (ROC-AUC approximately 0.50, F1 = 0.91 by always predicting "attack"), proving that RWKV's causal pre-training provides an inductive bias unavailable to direct classifiers. Supervised fine-tuning further raises PR-AUC to 0.94 and ROC-AUC to 0.75, with a precision of 97.7% at the calibrated operating threshold. The RWKV backbone's O(T) recurrent inference enables per-packet streaming without flow buffering, making PLM-NIDS operationally viable at line rate. Because it reads only IP/TCP/UDP headers, it is inherently encryption-agnostic: TLS 1.3, QUIC, and future encrypted protocols are handled transparently.

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in Internet of Things (IoT) environments face significant challenges due to data heterogeneity, lack of labeled data, and limited model interpretability. Federated Learning (FL) offers a privacy-preserving solution; however, existing approaches such as SOH-FL suffer from two key limitations: reliance on a manually tuned aggregation parameter γ and lack of explainability in model predictions. In this paper, we propose XAI-SOH-FL, an enhanced framework that integrates adaptive aggregation and explainable artificial intelligence into the SOH-FL paradigm. First, we introduce a dynamic γ selection mechanism based on similarity thresholding, enabling the aggregation process to adapt to evolving data distributions. Second, Bayesian Optimization is employed to automatically determine optimal γ values, eliminating the need for manual tuning. Third, SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations) is incorporated to provide feature-level interpretability for intrusion detection decisions. Experimental evaluation on the CICIDS2017 dataset demonstrates that the proposed approach achieves an accuracy of 94.12% and an F1-score of 0.92, outperforming the baseline SOH-FL model while converging in fewer communication rounds. Furthermore, SHAP-based analysis reveals that flow-level features such as Flow Duration and Packet Length significantly influence model predictions. These results indicate that XAI-SOH-FL provides an effective balance between accuracy, adaptability, and interpretability in heterogeneous IoT environments.

Modern intrusion detection systems generate thousands of alerts daily, but alert fatigue severely limits security operations effectiveness due to too many false positives or low-impact events. We address this by proposing a principled framework for alert prioritization based on subnormal Gaussian fuzzy numbers, explicitly modeling three sources of uncertainty: threat severity, detection confidence, and organizational risk attitude. Each alert is represented as a fuzzy number with the core indicating severity, spread indicating uncertainty, and height reflecting detection reliability. We apply ranking indices to prioritize alerts, allowing organizations to tune security posture through a risk-attitude parameter. Experimental validation on CIC-IDS2017 and NSL-KDD demonstrates greater robustness than baselines under detector degradation (0.9963 vs 0.8215 NDCGrel@100), with distinct differentiation in mid-confidence alerts and near-parity with baselines under robust detectors. The framework is theoretically grounded, computationally efficient, provides interpretable reasoning, and remains robust across detector families and miscalibration scenarios.

The rapid proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has created an urgent demand for adaptive, resource-efficient Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) capable of handling dynamic and evolving cyber threats. This paper investigates AOC-IDS, a state-of-the-art autonomous online IDS published at IEEE INFOCOM 2024, which employs an Autoencoder (AE) with Cluster Repelling Contrastive (CRC) loss and an autonomous Gaussian-based decision module. We first successfully replicate AOC-IDS on the UNSW-NB15 benchmark, achieving 89.39% accuracy in close agreement with the published 89.19%. We then identify four key limitations: class imbalance, unreliable pseudo-label generation, limited generalization, and computational overhead for IoT deployment, and propose targeted improvements for each. Our XGBoost-BalSamp method achieves 95.45% accuracy on UNSW-NB15, a gain of 6.26% over the baseline. Our combined deep learning approach (PseudoFilter, MixupAug, and LiteAE) achieves a best-run accuracy of 90.88% (F1: 91.45%), surpassing the base paper while reducing model parameters by 55%.These results demonstrate that targeted improvements to AOC-IDS yield consistent accuracy gains while improving practical deployability on IoT edge devices.

Streaming intrusion-detection studies assemble evaluation streams from network captures by interleaving capture days, pooling captures, or replaying records round robin. We show on two benchmarks that this assembly is an uncontrolled experimental treatment changing what the evaluation measures. On CICIDS2017, reordering an identical record multiset under a fixed positional 70/15/15 split yields held-out samples sharing only 32.5% of their records, at prevalences of 68.235% and 25.2396% (42.9954 points apart), and reverses the measured ordering of the two deterministic scorers. Restricting both arms to the 78000 records both held out removes the reversal, so it is attributable to which records the assembly hands to the test set, not to the order in which the detector saw its history. That attribution assumes that history contributes no more on the records the arms do not share than on those they do. On LITNET-2020, pooling three temporally disjoint captures reports one 6.4982% operating point, the equal-weight mean of per-capture held-out prevalences from 0.176% to 15.7747%, an identity presented as an audit check. The evaluated detector's reset posterior P(r_t=0) equals the hazard rate exactly below the run-length cap, though evaluations spend nearly all their length at or beyond it, and its evaluated score is a function of P(r<=5), not of P(r=0). Its deployed max composition ranks worse than its tail term alone (0.103477 AP, 0.302658 AUC-ROC) because the auxiliary branch is inverted (AUC-ROC 0.281890) and the maximum lets it set the score wherever the tail is small. With evaluated records and fitted model fixed, changing only the accompanying batch moves the ECOD reference implementation's AUC-PR by 0.003063, so published ECOD numbers are not comparable across studies scoring different batches. Every measured value traces to an archived, hash-verified run manifest.

The detection of previously unseen network attacks remains a major challenge for intrusion detection systems. Although supervised learning methods often perform well on known attack classes, they are limited when new attack types are not represented in the training data. Unsupervised methods are more suitable for detecting zero-day attacks, as they do not require labelled attack samples, but they often suffer from high false positive rates, which limits their real-world usefulness. This paper presents UNAD+, an enhanced framework for unknown network attack detection derived from the previously proposed Unknown Network Attack Detector (UNAD). UNAD+ combines a benign-only unsupervised ensemble with Weighted Majority Voting (WMV), a supervised refinement stage trained on pseudo-labelled detections, and a post hoc explainability layer that provides both local and global explanations. The framework was evaluated on the CICIDS2017 and NSL-KDD benchmark datasets. The results show that UNAD+ improves on the original UNAD framework, achieving F1-scores above 98% across the benchmark datasets while significantly reducing false positives and enhancing transparency and deployment suitability through integrated explainability.

Unsupervised anomaly detection is widely used in transaction fraud detection where labels are scarce. Isolation Forest (IF) is among the most popular classical methods due to its scalability and ease of deployment. We propose SilIF, an augmentation of Isolation Forest that adds a silhouette-based scoring layer computed in a representation space induced by the trees of the forest. For each point, we extract a vector of per-tree path lengths, cluster these "fingerprints" into structural groups, and compute a silhouette score that measures how well the point fits its assigned group versus the nearest alternative. The silhouette signal is combined with the base IF score via a single hyperparameter alpha. On the IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection benchmark (~590K transactions, 3.5% fraud), SilIF with alpha=1.0 improves over plain Isolation Forest by +0.0080 AUC-PR on average across five seeds, with SilIF winning on all five seeds (paired t-test p=0.046). We also report results on a synthetic credit-card dataset (Sparkov) where the silhouette augmentation does not improve over plain IF, and we characterize the conditions that distinguish the two outcomes. The paper presents SilIF as a tunable, easy-to-deploy enhancement to Isolation Forest with honest reporting of when it helps and when it does not. Code at https://github.com/venkat15vk/silif-anomaly-detection.

This paper investigates a unexplored yet impactful vulnerability in AI explainability used in intrusion detection (IDS): multicollinearity-induced instability. Despite extensive reliance on post-hoc explainability tools such as SHAP or LIME, the impact of correlated features on explanation robustness is not evaluated. We introduce a formal theorem stating that multicollinearity inflates attribution variance. This demonstrates that explanations and feature importances are non-identifiable under multicollinearity. A suite of comprehensive experiments validates the theorem on a representative benchmark dataset, UNSW-NB15. Four widely used families of models are evaluated, including linear, tree-based, kernel, and neural, across full and pruned feature sets based on VIF and correlation thresholding. We propose the novel metric of Explanability Fragility Score and two novel methods to mitigate it with variable integration complexity. CAA-Filtering focuses on stabilising explanations by grouping attributions of trained models. SHARP is a novel training-time regularisation framework that penalises attribution instability, enabling controllable and monotonic improvement of explainability stability. The findings support stable predictive performance, using Kendall's τ to quantify instability across bootstrapped explanations. This work has direct implications for the trustworthiness and reproducibility of XAI in security-critical contexts, and motivates incorporating multicollinearity mitigations into the IDS pipelines, providing a set of guidelines for practitioners.

Modern recommender systems rely heavily on ID-based collaborative filtering: each item is represented by a unique ID embedding that accumulates collaborative signals from user interactions. Livestreaming recommendation, however, faces a unique challenge in this paradigm: a live room typically broadcasts for only tens of minutes, so its item ID remains poorly learned in a persistent cold-start state and ID-centric ranking models fail to generalize. We present FLUID, the first framework to fully retire the candidate-side item ID from a production-scale livestreaming ranker. FLUID introduces a cross-domain multimodal encoder, jointly trained on short videos and livestreams, to produce discrete hierarchical semantic codes, called LUCID, for content-based item characterization. To adapt the ranker to LUCID, FLUID further employs a staged warmup scheme: it first incorporates cold, slice-level LUCID as an independent token alongside the ID embedding, and then replaces the ID embedding with warm, room-level LUCID before online incremental training. Deployed on our industrial livestreaming recommenders with a cross-platform combined user base of over one billion globally, FLUID delivers significant online gains of +0.55% Quality Watch Duration, +2.05% Cold-Start Room Views, and +0.05% Active Hours.

Recent benchmark efforts have advanced the evaluation of large language models (LLMs) in cybersecurity, including tasks such as penetration testing and vulnerability identification. However, a critical cybersecurity task, namely intrusion detection from system logs, remains unexplored. In this work, we present a new benchmark to assess LLMs' capabilities in supporting host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS). This task requires fine-grained reasoning over large-scale, noisy, and highly imbalanced system logs, where complex interactions between benign and malicious activities make reliable detection challenging. Our benchmark unifies three public system log datasets, DARPA-E3, DARPA-E5, and NodLink, and introduces a data construction pipeline that transforms raw host telemetry into LLM-compatible inputs, enabling systematic evaluation under realistic intrusion detection settings. Our evaluation of frontier LLMs reveals substantial performance gaps across datasets. While many models achieve high precision (often above 0.8) on simpler datasets, their performance degrades significantly as system logs become noisier and more complex, with MCC frequently dropping below 0.5 and false positive rates increasing sharply. We further analyze model behavior and identify distinct regimes, including conservative detectors with low false positive rates and over-sensitive models that generate excessive alerts. Overall, our results highlight that while LLMs show strong potential for HIDS, their effectiveness is highly sensitive to data complexity, and robust system design is essential for reliable deployment.

Network Intrusion Detection System is a critical means of ensuring cybersecurity. However, existing Genetic Algorithm-based feature selection methods face several limitations when dealing with high-dimensional redundant traffic features. For example, population diversity is difficult to maintain, and evolutionary operators lack guidance. To solve these problems, this study proposes the Multi-Population Diversity-Guided Genetic Algorithm (MPDGGA). First, we build a chained multi-population evolutionary structure. Second, we introduce a diversity-guided operator based on information gain ratio. Experiments on NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, and 9 UCI datasets show that the proposed model significantly outperforms four other advanced multi-population feature selection models. Across the 11 datasets, it attains the highest accuracy on 10 datasets and at least 2.26% of the features were selected.

Gradient-based adversarial attacks subtly manipulate inputs of Machine Learning (ML) models to induce incorrect predictions. This paper investigates whether careful architectural choices alone can yield an inherently robust Deep Neural Network (DNN)-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), without any additional explicit defenses. Through thousands of experiments, around 2200, varying network depth, feature dimensionality, activation functions, and dropout across FGSM, PGD, and BIM attacks, we show that shallower networks, reduced feature sets, and ReLU activation consistently and jointly reduce adversarial vulnerability. Moreover, a simple model following this recipe outperforms deeper, fully-featured adversarially trained models, while maintaining near-perfect clean-traffic detection and lower training times. Nevertheless, while less is more, the selection of the right less is what truly matters.

Generative recommendation reformulates recommendation as next-token prediction over discrete semantic identifiers (IDs). A fundamental yet unexplored design choice is that existing methods employ fixed-length tokenization for all items, implicitly assuming uniform encoding capacity regardless of item characteristics. Through systematic experiments across four datasets, we discover the Popularity-Length Paradox: popular items achieve optimal performance with short IDs, while tail items require substantially longer codes to capture discriminative semantics. This reveals a critical mismatch where popular items benefit from abundant collaborative signals and require minimal semantic detail, whereas tail items must rely on fine-grained content features due to sparse interaction data. To address this, we propose VarLenRec, a framework for learning variable-length tokenization. We develop Popularity-Weighted Information Budget Allocation (PIBA), an information-theoretic framework proving that optimal ID length should scale as a negative power of popularity. Directly implementing variable-length allocation faces two technical challenges: standard Euclidean residual quantization lacks geometric capacity to support diverse code lengths without distortion, and discrete length decisions are non-differentiable. We address these through Hyperbolic Residual Quantization, which leverages the exponential volume growth of the Poincaré ball to naturally stratify encoding capacity, and a Soft Length Controller, which enables differentiable length prediction via continuous layer retention probabilities regularized by PIBA-derived priors. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VarLenRec achieves significant improvements over state-of-the-art methods in recommendation accuracy and training/inference efficiency, revealing the importance of adaptive encoding capacity in generative recommendation.

Insider threats often reveal early anomalies through disruptions in behavioral statistics-such as altered recurrence patterns or short-versus long-term frequency shifts-rather than changes in event semantics. Yet, as the field has shifted from statistical modeling to log tokenization and deep sequential encoders, these statistical cues are weakened or lost, leaving current models insensitive to gradual and low-visibility insider behaviors.We propose MV-Gate, a multi-view behavior modeling framework that explicitly integrates statistical regularities with sequence semantics. MV-Gate constructs three aligned behavioral sequences: activity tokens, multi-scale status signals capturing recurrence patterns, and frequency-deviation signals describing short- vs long-term intensity differences. An anomaly-aware gating mechanism injects these statistical views into the attention computation, guiding the encoder to emphasize statistically irregular events. Experiments on CERT r4.2, CERT r5.2, and ADFA-LD show that MV-Gate achieves notable gains over classical, deep-learning, and domain-specific baselines, particularly for progressive, weak-signal threats. These results highlight the necessity of jointly modeling statistical and sequential evidence for robust insider-threat detection.

Network intrusion detection systems play a vital role in protecting networks by detecting malicious network traffic which can then be investigated by a cybersecurity operations centre. State-of-the-art approaches utilise supervised machine learning methods to train a classification model to recognise known cyberattacks; however, these models require a large labelled dataset to train and show poor performance when trained on smaller datasets. In an attempt to address this shortcoming, anomaly detection models learn the distribution of benign traffic and flag non-conforming traffic as malicious. While these methods do not require malicious examples to train, they suffer from high false-positive rates rendering them impractical. As a result, networks may be particularly vulnerable when there are insufficient labelled instances of a specific attack class to train an effective classifier. This often occurs in newly established networks or when previously unseen types of attacks emerge. To address this challenge, this work proposes the use of a triplet network, utilising online triplet mining and a KNN classifier, which is able to perform few-shot classification, enabling effective intrusion detection after being trained on a limited number of malicious examples. Various online triplet mining algorithms were explored and model design choices, such as the inference algorithm and optimised distance metrics, were compared and evaluated through a series of ablation studies. The final model was compared against other state-of-the-art approaches in few-shot binary and multiclass classification, where the proposed approach was found to be competitive with existing methods when trained on as little as 10 malicious samples of each class.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is widely adopted today for its ability to detect patterns, automate tasks, and reduce time and cost across various applications. Its integration into Cybersecurity has garnered significant attention, particularly in areas such as intrusion detection, malware analysis, and phishing or spam detection. As AI and cybersecurity evolve, new methods and approaches emerge regularly. Current trends include the use of Generative AI, Natural Language Processing, Federated Learning for privacy-preserving collaborative training, and eXplainable AI to ensure interpretability and trust, which are vital in cybersecurity. This paper presents an interesting review of current AI-based cybersecurity trends, focusing on intrusion detection approaches and aiming to uncover meaningful insights through comparative analysis based on the employed AI techniques and reported performance.

The rapid evolution of digital health technologies is redefining healthcare services worldwide. The integration of wireless communication and Internet-enabled medical devices within Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) networks enables continuous, real-time patient monitoring. However, this increased connectivity raises cybersecurity and patient safety risks due to increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks. This paper proposes a novel on-device, interpretable Tsetlin Machine (TM)-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to identify various phases of cyberattacks in IoMT environments. The TM is a rule-driven and transparent machine learning (ML) approach that represents attack patterns using propositional logic. Extensive evaluations on the MedSec-25 dataset, encompassing various phases of realistic cyberattacks, show that the proposed model outperforms ML models, attaining an F1-score (macro) of 97.83%. Moreover, the proposed model offers explicit explanations of its decisions to enhance transparency using feature-level contributions, class-wise vote scores, and clause activation heatmaps. Edge deployment (Raspberry Pi) further supports real-time on-device inference and intrusion detection. The combination of interpretability and high performance makes the proposed model well-suited for IoMT healthcare, where trust, reliability, safety, and timely decision-making are critical.

LLM agents routinely serve as first (and sometimes only) readers of academic papers, skimming for sub-claims, extracting reproducibility steps, and generalizing scope. Standard prose papers produce recurring failures in this role: sub-claims that cannot be cited at sub-paper granularity, scope overextension beyond what the paper tests, and figure commands buried in codebases rather than the paper itself. We propose paper.json, a companion JSON file that travels with the PDF and addresses each failure with a lightweight convention: stable claim IDs (C1), an explicit does-not-claim list (C2), exact per-figure shell commands (C3), and stable definition IDs (C5). A fifth convention (C4) holds that minimum viable compliance, hand-written JSON alongside the PDF, is achievable in under an hour for a finished paper without touching the human-readable output. C1, C2, C3, and C5 are open invitations: an agent that reads a compliant paper and acts on it produces evidence for or against them. This paper is itself compliant: uv run validator.py paper.json --against paper.typ passes. Repo: https://github.com/arquicanedo/paper-json

Security in cloud computing has become a major concern due to several factors such as layered cloud architectures, dynamic environments, and exposure to unseen or zero-day attacks. Moreover, intrusion detection systems (IDS) typically operate at specific layers and rely heavily on machine learning models, which often perform well in experimental settings but fail to sustain performance in real cloud deployments. In this work, we implement a confidence-aware multilevel intrusion detection system using reinforcement learning tailored for cloud environments. The system secures three distinct layers: network, host, and hypervisor. Machine learning models at each layer detect known attack patterns, while prediction confidence distinguishes reliable decisions from uncertain outcomes. Within the multi-gate flow, low-confidence events pass through a learned-threshold confidence gate (Gate-1), followed by a Chroma memory-matching gate (Gate-2), with unresolved events escalated to a large language model (LLM) for semantic analysis and explanation. Final attack promotion at Gate-3 uses calibrated LLM confidence or weighted-fusion fallback, while uncertain events are retained in a review bucket to avoid forced classification. Generated explanations and confirmed knowledge are stored in ChromaDB to support future analysis and retraining. The approach is first evaluated using static thresholds, establishing a baseline for comparison. Results show that the proposed system learns adaptive thresholds and reduces LLM escalation by 58.78%, lowering cost while maintaining strong performance (88.68% accuracy, 85.29% precision, 84.72% recall, 85.00% F1). The network and hypervisor layers achieve 98.02% and 97.08% accuracy, demonstrating a balanced and efficient detection system.

Generative retrieval offers a promising alternative by unifying the fragmented multi-stage retrieval process into a single end-to-end model. However, its practical adoption in industrial e-commerce search remains challenging, given the massive and dynamic product catalogs, strict latency requirements, and the need to align retrieval with downstream ranking goals. In this work, we propose a retrieval framework tailored for real-world recall scenarios, positioning generative retrieval as a recall-stage supplement rather than an end-to-end replacement. Our method, CQ-SID (Category-and-Query constrained Semantic ID), employs category-aware and query-item contrastive learning along with Residual Quantized VAEs to encode items into hierarchical semantic cluster identifiers, significantly reducing beam search complexity. Additionally, we develop EG-GRPO (Expert-Guided Group Relative Policy Optimization), a reinforcement learning approach that aligns generative recall with downstream ranking under sparse rewards by injecting ground-truth samples to stabilize training. Offline experiments on TmallAPP search logs show that CQ-SID achieves up to 26.76% and 11.11% relative gains in semantic and personalized click hitrate over RQ-VAE baselines, while halving beam search size. EG-GRPO further improves multi-objective performance. Online A/B tests confirm gains in GMV (+1.15%) and UCTCVR (+0.40%). The generative recall channel now contributes substantially in production, accounting for over 50.25% of exposures, 58.96% of clicks, and 72.63% of purchases, demonstrating a viable path for deploying generative retrieval in real-world e-commerce systems.

During thDuring the last few years, the term Mechanistic Interpretability, a specific area, under the umbrella of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), has been introduced, to explain the decisions made by complex machine learning (ML) models in critical systems like UAV intrusion detection systems (UAVIDS). In this paper, we apply best-practices for data pre-processing and examine a wide range of tree-ensembles, deep neural networks, hybrid stacking models and the latest ensemble neural networks to detect intrusions in UAV, with stratified 10-fold cross validation. With our top-performing model, XGBoost, we proceed to Shapley Additive explanations (SHAP), to analyze the global and local feature importances and understand which features, each attack targets, to mimic normal traffic and where the misclassifications occur. Furthermore a distribution analysis follows, by visually comparing violin plots and the curves of kernel density estimations. With the Westfall-Young permutation test for multiple comparisons, the Bandwidth optimization of the KDEs and the selection of Jensen-Shannon Distance for the test, we discover the true causes of false predictions, observed in Wormhole and Blackhole attacks in UAVIDS-2025. The findings provide robust, reliable and explainable models for UAV intrusion detection, along with statistical insights, which capture and clarify the masked nature of the attacks, regarding the challenge of Density Support Intersection, between these attacks, in this dataset.

Modeling ultra-long user sequences involves a difficult trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness. While current paradigms rely on either item-specific search or item-agnostic compression, we propose UxSID, a framework exploring a third path: semantic-group shared interest memory. By utilizing Semantic IDs (SIDs) and a dual-level attention strategy, UxSID captures target-aware preferences without the heavy cost of item-specific models. This end-to-end architecture balances computational parsimony with semantic awareness, achieving state-of-the-art performance and a 0.337% revenue lift in large-scale advertising A/B test.

The new wave of adversarial attacks that utilize gradient-related vulnerabilities in neural network-based classifiers makes Network Intrusion Detection Systems more open to such threats. Although state-of-the-art adversarial training methods have shown promising results in producing more robust classifiers, their interpretability and defense ability are limited due to their lack of understanding of how adversarial attacks propagate in different layers of network classifiers. In this paper, we present an insightful approach, called LARAR (Layer-wise Adversarial Robustness using Adaptive Regularization), that incorporates additional layer-wise vulnerability analysis and adaptive weighting in conventional adversarial training methods. Additionally, we utilize 'Auxiliary Classifiers' in our approach. LARAR provides interpretable layer-wise vulnerability scores, achieves a clean accuracy of 95.01%, and provides better robustness against adversarial attacks (FGSM, PGD, and transfer attacks) on the UNSW-NB15 dataset. Through the identification of vulnerable layers, the proposed framework reduces computational complexity and enables the early detection of adversarial samples, thus enhancing the effectiveness and interpretability of adversarial defense mechanisms in NIDS.

Chinese character categories are extremely large, and unseen characters frequently arise in open-world scenarios, making zero-shot Chinese character recognition an important yet challenging problem. Existing IDS-based retrieval methods usually encode a character image and its ideographic description sequence into a single global vector for matching. Although efficient, such holistic alignment often under-models local component differences. Moreover, directly introducing patch-token level fine-grained interaction suffers from both the noise of structural operators in IDS and the high cost of full-candidate retrieval.To address these issues, we propose a Global-Local Hierarchical Perception Network (GL-HPN), which jointly learns global and local representations of character images and IDS sequences within a unified cross-modal alignment framework. The global branch supports efficient coarse recall, while the local branch improves component-level discrimination through patch-token interaction. We further introduce a structure filtering mask to suppress structurally meaningful but visually non-entity IDS operators in local similarity aggregation. On top of this, we design a coarse-to-fine hierarchical inference strategy that performs global retrieval over the full candidate set and local reranking only on Top-$K$ candidates, followed by parameter-free multiplicative fusion of normalized posterior scores. Experimental results show that GL-HPN achieves competitive performance across multiple zero-shot splits, performs especially well under low-resource settings, and substantially reduces the inference cost of large-scale candidate retrieval.

Advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks remain difficult to detect due to their stealth, adaptability, and use of legitimate system components. Provenance-based intrusion detection systems (PIDS) offer a promising defense by capturing detailed relationships between system components and actions. However, current PIDS rely on predefined or subset-determined thresholds, which limit detection stability and the ability to detect any anomalous behavior in general. Furthermore, related work often neglects the role of process executables, which describe system activity by interacting through a process with files, network components, and other processes. We introduce GRASP, a PIDS based on masked self-supervised classification. GRASP masks the executable information of processes and learns to infer it from their two-hop provenance graph neighborhood, marking misclassified processes as anomalies. It captures behavior patterns for the learned executables without thresholding, making it robust against interference and unknown activities. Evaluations on the DARPA TC and OpTC datasets demonstrate that GRASP consistently detects anomalous behavior, including known attack-related activities, outperforming existing systems. Our PIDS identifies all documented attacks on datasets where the behavior of executables is learnable. In addition, compared to existing systems, GRASP uncovers potentially malicious anomalous behavior not labeled as an attack in the documentation.

Detecting stealthy malicious communications from flow logs under benign-only training remains a critical challenge in network security. Malicious communications often camouflage as normal traffic like standard HTTPS flows. Conventional intrusion detectors rely strictly on known labeled attacks. Alternatively, they score flows completely independently. These approaches fail against sparse and context-dependent suspicious activity. To capture this essential context, graph anomaly detectors have been introduced to add valuable relational information to the analysis. However, existing methods fail to test the structural consistency of specific communication edges. To overcome these fundamental limitations, we present GESR, a novel graph-based framework for detecting suspicious communications and anomalous hosts under a benign-only training setting. GESR models complex network activity as attributed communication graphs. It cleverly reconstructs edge semantics entirely from local structural context rather than isolated features. This non-intuitive design forces the framework to predict expected communication patterns from neighborhood topologies. Attackers cannot easily manipulate this deep structural dependency. The model then converts the resulting structural inconsistencies into host-level anomaly scores. It utilizes robust Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) calibration for this final step. We evaluate GESR extensively on CTU-13 and CICIDS2017 datasets. These evaluations strictly impose tight false-positive operating constraints. On CICIDS2017, GESR achieves an outstanding ROC-AUC of 0.9753. It also yields a high TPR of 0.8569 at a strict 5% FPR threshold. GESR consistently outperforms existing methods across both evaluated benchmarks. The results prove that structure-conditioned edge reconstruction is a credible direction for practical intrusion detection.

Classical generative adversarial networks (GANs) have been applied to generate adversarial network traffic capable of attacking intrusion detection systems, but they suffer from shortcomings such as the need for large amounts of high-dimensional datasets, mode collapse, and high computational overhead. In this work, we propose a hybrid quantum-classical GAN (QC-GAN) framework where a variational quantum generator is used to generate synthetic network traffic flows mimicking malicious traffic using latent representations. Instead of sampling classical noise vectors, we encode the latent vector (the hidden features) as a quantum state, which is the basis for claiming more expressive latent representations and reducing computational overhead. A classical discriminator will be trained on real-world datasets (UNSW-NB15) and the proposed QC-GAN-generated fake network flows. In this configuration, the generator aims to minimize the discriminator's ability to distinguish real from fake traffic, while the discriminator aims to maximize its classification accuracy, in an iterative manner. In our attack model, we assume that the attacker is a state actor with access to limited quantum computing power, whereas the discriminator is chosen to be classical, as will likely be the case for most end users and organizations. We test the generated flows using classical intrusion detection system (IDS) models, such as a random forest classifier and a convolutional neural network-based classifier, for their ability to bypass the detection process. This work aims to highlight the possibilities of quantum machine learning as a means of generating advanced attack flows and stress testing classical IDS. Lastly, we further evaluate how hardware-based noise affects these attacks to offer a new perspective on IDS, highlighting the need for a quantum resilient defense system.

The rapid expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial IoT (IIoT) has created a massive, heterogeneous attack surface that challenges traditional network security mechanisms. While Federated Learning (FL) offers a privacy-preserving alternative to centralized Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), standard approaches struggle to generalize across diverse device behaviors and typically fail to utilize the vast amounts of unlabeled data present in realistic edge environments. To bridge these gaps, we propose CLAD, a holistic framework that seamlessly incorporates Clustered Federated Learning (CFL) with a novel Dual-Mode Micro-Architecture ($\text{DM}^2\text{A}$). This unified approach simultaneously tackles the two primary bottlenecks of IoT security: device heterogeneity and label scarcity. The $\text{DM}^2\text{A}$ component features a shared encoder followed by two branches, enabling joint unsupervised anomaly detection and supervised attack classification; this allows the framework to harvest intelligence from both labeled and unlabeled clients. Concurrently, the clustering component dynamically groups devices with congruent traffic patterns, preventing global model divergence. By carefully combining these elements, CLAD ensures that no data is discarded and distinct operational patterns are preserved. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that this integrated approach significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving a 30% relative improvement in detection performance in scenarios with 80% unlabeled clients, with only half the communication cost.

Railway track intrusions pose a critical safety challenge for Indian Railways, encompassing wildlife incursions and deliberate malicious obstructions. The December 2025 collision in Assam, in which seven elephants were killed by the Rajdhani Express, underscores the urgency of effective real-time detection. Existing solutions such as the optical fiber-based Gajraj system suffer from prohibitive costs ($1000/km) and high false alarm rates, limiting deployment to only 20 of India's 101 elephant corridors. This paper proposes NETRA, a cost-effective, internet-independent intrusion detection system deployed on Raspberry Pi Zero W and Raspberry Pi 4 edge platforms. NETRA employs probabilistic sensor fusion integrating a PIR motion sensor and an HC-SR04 ultrasonic distance sensor with a tunable threshold (tau_c = 0.65), enabling event-driven camera activation that reduces unnecessary visual processing by 52%. Upon confirmed intrusion, edge-AI classification using MobileNet-SSD (Pi Zero) or YOLOv5 ONNX (Pi 4) identifies threats including humans, large animals, and track obstructions. Confirmed threats are transmitted via LoRa (868 MHz) to alert the locomotive driver within 2.4 seconds end-to-end. Experimental evaluation across 113 motion events demonstrated 95% detection accuracy with zero false alarms through probabilistic fusion, compared to 85% for binary methods. Raspberry Pi 4 with YOLOv5 achieved 83.5% elephant F1-score, a 5.6x improvement over Pi Zero's heuristic approach (14.8%). LoRa communication achieved 100% packet delivery across 1-2 km in field trials. NETRA reduces deployment cost by 75% ($247/km vs $1000/km for Gajraj) while providing unified detection of both wildlife and obstruction threats.

The digital age has completely transformed the way that information is processed and stored, which makes cybersecurity a crucial field of research. Cybersecurity contains many different domains, but this work focuses on Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). Within the literature, Hierarchical Self-Organizing Maps (HSOMs) have been used to create trustworthy, explainable, and AI-based IDSs. However, HSOMs are trained sequentially, which means that training HSOMs on large datasets is slow. This work presents a novel parallel HSOM architecture, called parHSOM. The purpose of this research is to investigate the effect that parallel computation has on the HSOM training time. parHSOM is tested on two different testbeds, four different output grid sizes, and five different cybersecurity datasets. Performance metrics collected from these experiments show that parHSOM consistently trains faster than the Sequential HSOM algorithm without any significant loss in performance. Additionally, this work provides a platform for further investigation into parallel HSOM implementations.

Classic Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) often rely on manual feature engineering to extract meaningful patterns from network traffic data. However, this approach requires domain expertise and runs counter to the widely adopted principle of modern machine learning and neural networks: that models themselves should learn meaningful representations directly from data. We investigate whether tabular representation learning techniques can improve intrusion detection performance by automatically learning robust feature representations for NetFlow data. This paper presents a systematic evaluation of state-of-the-art representation learning methods on benchmark NetFlow datasets, comparing against traditional autoencoders and end-to-end transformer baselines. We evaluate learned representations using both supervised classifiers and unsupervised anomaly detectors, with comprehensive hyperparameter exploration for each combination. Our results reveal strong dataset-model dependency, with no single approach consistently dominating across all scenarios. For supervised classification, TabICL achieves the best performance on CIDDS, while autoencoders follow closely and tie with end-to-end transformer models for the best average rank across datasets. Supervised approaches substantially outperform unsupervised anomaly detection methods, where no single combination consistently dominates as optimal choices depend on the dataset. Cross-dataset transfer experiments demonstrate that learned representations can generalize across network environments with appropriate method and classifier selection. However, transfer performance varies substantially depending on the source-target dataset combination, indicating sensitivity to distributional differences between network environments.

Capturing user interests across extensive watch histories is critical for short-form video recommendation, yet scaling sequence length is limited by two bottlenecks: the semantic sparsity of atomic Video IDs and the quadratic computational complexity of Transformers. Traditional orthogonal Video IDs fail to capture content relationships and demand large embedding tables, while the quadratic complexity of self-attention restricts the maximum sequence length under strict industrial latency and resource constraints. In this work, we present a production-deployed framework for modeling ultra-long user behavior sequences at a billion-user scale. We first address the representation bottleneck by adopting content-native Semantic IDs. By utilizing depth-truncated, coarse-grained Semantic IDs, we shrink the embedding table size from corpus cardinality. This compact representation naturally generalizes to cold-start content through shared semantic prefixes. Second, to overcome the sequence scaling barrier, we introduce a Global-Aware Compression Transformer that leverages non-parametric temporal folding and unified global query integration to effectively condense the sequence, alleviating both the memory and computational bottlenecks of standard self-attention. Offline profiling on our computing infrastructure demonstrates an order-of-magnitude reduction in peak memory footprint and a drastic decrease in computational overhead. This efficiency gain enables supporting longer sequence lengths at an affordable cost in production, yielding substantial online gains in satisfied user engagement and satisfied content consumption in large-scale online A/B tests.

Machine learning-based intrusion detection requires complex models to capture patterns in high-dimensional, noisy, and class-imbalanced raw network traffic, yet deploying such models remains impractical on resource-constrained devices with limited processing power and memory. In this paper, we present a correlation-aware divide-and-conquer learning technique that decomposes a complex learning problem into smaller, more manageable subproblems. This enables lightweight models as simple as decision trees to be trained on focused subtasks, yielding up to 43.3% higher local accuracy and up to 257 times reduction in model size on real-world network intrusion detection datasets, while also improving adversarial robustness and explainability.

AI-powered edge computing security is moving Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) from passive, rule-based protections to proactive, smart, zero-touch, self-sufficient safeguards that neutralize threats in milliseconds. As transportation becomes more connected with edge computing, massive IoT, and advanced 5G for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) connectivity, AI at the edge computing nodes plays a crucial role in protecting against sophisticated threats, enabling URLLC (ultra-low-latency communications) for smart transport, and enhancing infrastructure capabilities and safety. This research applies edge computing to improve latency, bandwidth efficiency, and service responsiveness by moving processing closer to devices, gateways, and users. However, this shift also expands the cyberattack surface because edge nodes are distributed, heterogeneous, and often resource-constrained. The paper proposes a trust-aware federated hybrid intrusion detection framework in which a random forest, a decision tree, and a linear SVM network learn complementary traffic representations at each edge site, while a server performs trust-aware aggregation of local model updates.

Deploying an intrusion detector trained in one industrial plant to another remains difficult because Industrial Control System (ICS) traffic is highly site-dependent, labels are scarce, and unseen attacks often appear after deployment. To address this challenge, this paper introduces a medoid prototype alignment framework for cross-plant unknown attack detection. Instead of aligning all source and target samples directly, the method first compresses heterogeneous traffic into a comparable representation space and then extracts robust medoid prototypes that summarize local operational structure in each domain. A prototype-calibrated transfer objective is further designed to align target prototypes with source prototypes while preserving source-domain discrimination and encouraging confident target predictions. This strategy reduces noisy cross-domain matching and improves transfer stability under heterogeneous industrial conditions. Experiments conducted on natural gas and water storage control systems show that the proposed method achieves the best average performance among all compared models, reaching an average accuracy of 0.843 and an average F1-score of 0.838 across four unknown-attack transfer tasks. The analysis also shows clear transfer asymmetry between source-target directions and confirms that prototype guidance is especially helpful on challenging reverse-transfer settings. These findings suggest that medoid prototype alignment is a practical solution for robust industrial intrusion detection under domain shift.

The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a safety-critical in-vehicle communication protocol that lacks built-in security mechanisms, making intrusion detection essential. Existing approaches predominantly formulate CAN intrusion detection as a classification task, mapping complex traffic patterns to attack labels. However, this formulation abstracts away the temporal and relational structure of CAN traffic and misaligns with real-world forensic workflows, which require systematic reasoning about traffic behavior. To address this gap, we introduce CAN-QA, the first benchmark that reformulates CAN traffic analysis as a question-answering (QA) task. CAN-QA converts raw CAN logs into temporally segmented windows and applies deterministic rule-based templates to generate natural-language questions paired with automatically derived ground-truth answers. The resulting dataset comprises 33,128 QA pairs across 10 categories, each targeting distinct semantic and temporal properties of CAN traffic. Using CAN-QA, we evaluate large language models across both True/False and multiple-choice formats. Our results indicate that, although these models capture superficial statistical regularities, they struggle with temporal reasoning, multi-condition inference, and higher-level behavioral interpretation. Our code is available at https://github.com/Kriiiiss/CAN-QA.

In enterprise fraud detection, model accuracy alone is insufficient when insiders can tamper with audit logs or bypass approval workflows. Real-world incidents show that fraud often persists not because detection algorithms fail, but because the audit trail itself is controllable by privileged operators. This exposes a fundamental trust gap: who audits the auditor? We present a tamper-evident fraud detection system that anchors both ML predictions and workflow execution to an immutable blockchain ledger. Rather than using blockchain as passive storage, we enforce the entire approval process through smart contracts, ensuring that every transaction, prediction, and explanation is atomically recorded and cannot be retroactively modified. Our detection module achieves competitive accuracy (F1 = 0.895, PR-AUC = 0.974) while providing cryptographically verifiable decision trails that support regulatory auditability requirements (e.g., GDPR Article 22). System evaluation shows sub-25 ms inference latency and economically viable deployment on Layer-2 networks at under $0.01 per transaction (validated against PolygonScan data), supporting enterprise-scale workloads of 10,000+ monthly payments.

The proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has significantly expanded attack surfaces, making IoT ecosystems particularly susceptible to sophisticated cyber threats. To address this challenge, this work introduces A-THENA, a lightweight early intrusion detection system (EIDS) that significantly extends preliminary findings on time-aware encodings. A-THENA employs an advanced Transformer-based architecture augmented with a generalized Time-Aware Hybrid Encoding (THE), integrating packet timestamps to effectively capture temporal dynamics essential for accurate and early threat detection. The proposed system further employs a Network-Specific Augmentation (NA) pipeline, which enhances model robustness and generalization. We evaluate A-THENA on three benchmark IoT intrusion detection datasets-CICIoT23-WEB, MQTT-IoT-IDS2020, and IoTID20-where it consistently achieves strong performance. Averaged across all three datasets, it improves accuracy by 6.88 percentage points over the best-performing traditional positional encoding, 3.69 points over the strongest feature-based model, 6.17 points over the leading time-aware alternatives, and 5.11 points over related models, while achieving near-zero false alarms and false negatives. To assess real-world feasibility, we deploy A-THENA on the Raspberry Pi Zero 2 W, demonstrating its ability to perform real-time intrusion detection with minimal latency and memory usage. These results establish A-THENA as an agile, practical, and highly effective solution for securing IoT networks.

Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is another technology that has been developing in the last few years as a relevant technique to improve network programmability and administration. Nonetheless, its centralized design presents a major security issue, which requires effective intrusion detection systems. The SDN-specific machine learning-based intrusion detection system described in this paper is innovative because it is trained and tested on the InSDN dataset which models attack scenarios and realistic traffic patterns in SDN. Our approach incorporates a comprehensive preprocessing pipeline, feature selection via Mutual Information, and a novel ensemble learning model, SDNGuardStack, which combines multiple base learners to enhance detection accuracy and efficiency. In addition, we include explainable AI methods, including SHAP to add transparency to model predictions, which helps security analysts respond to incidents. The experiments prove that SDNGuard-Stack has an accuracy rate of 99.98% and a Cohen Kappa of 0.9998, surpassing other models, and at the same time being interpretable and practically executable. It is interesting to see such features like Flow ID, Bwd Header Len, and Src Port as the most important factors in the model predictions. The work is a step towards closing the gap between performance intrusion detection and realistic deployment in SDN, which will lead to the creation of secure and resilient network infrastructures.

Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) ensure protection against malicious attacks on networked systems. While deep learning-based IDSs achieve effective performance, their limited trustworthiness due to black-box architectures remains a critical constraint. Despite existing explainable techniques offering insight into the alarms raised by IDSs, they lack process-based explanations grounded in packet-level sequencing analysis. In this paper, we propose a method that employs process mining techniques to enhance anomaly-based IDSs by providing process-based alarm severity ratings and explanations for alerts. Our method prioritizes critical alerts and maintains visibility into network behavior, while minimizing disruption by allowing misclassified benign traffic to pass. We apply the method to the publicly available USB-IDS-TC dataset, which includes anomalous traffic affected by different variants of the Slowloris DoS attack. Results show that our method is able to discriminate between low- to very-high-severity alarms while preserving up to 99.94% recall and 99.99% precision, effectively discarding false positives while providing different degrees of severity for the true positives.

Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for 5G networks must handle complex, high-volume traffic. Although opaque "black-box" models can achieve high accuracy, their lack of transparency hinders trust and effective operational response. We propose ExAI5G, a framework that prioritizes interpretability by integrating a Transformer-based deep learning IDS with logic-based explainable AI (XAI) techniques. The framework uses Integrated Gradients to attribute feature importance and extracts a surrogate decision tree to derive logical rules. We introduce a novel evaluation methodology for LLM-generated explanations, using a powerful evaluator LLM to assess actionability and measuring their semantic similarity and faithfulness. On a 5G IoT intrusion dataset, our system achieves 99.9% accuracy and a 0.854 macro F1-score, demonstrating strong performance. More importantly, we extract 16 logical rules with 99.7% fidelity, making the model's reasoning transparent. The evaluation demonstrates that modern LLMs can generate explanations that are both faithful and actionable, indicating that it is possible to build a trustworthy and effective IDS without compromising performance for the sake of marginal gains from an opaque model.

Identity-document fraud detection is not a stationary binary classification problem. Adaptive attackers modify templates and fabrication pipelines, making historical fraud labels stale, and successful forgeries recur at scale as coherent campaigns. We therefore study layout-aware representation learning for open-set fraud discovery rather than only closed-set classification. We adapt DINOv3 to the document domain via context-aware SimMIM fine-tuning and supervised metric learning with composite loss that encourages inter-class separability and intra-class compactness. The model is trained with U.S. IDs only. With a lightweight MLP and softmax classifier, the embedding achieves 99.83% layout classification accuracy on Canadian layouts. Moreover, on a dataset of 20,448 Canadian IDs, embedding-space analysis surfaces 276 adaptive physical-fraud cases, including 222 not surfaced by incumbent detectors. The embedding supports similarity-based expansion from a single confirmed seed to additional related cases not linked by conventional metadata graphs. The layout-aware document embeddings provide a production-aligned basis for discovering novel and campaign-scale fraud under distribution shift.

Network security is a critical concern in the digital landscape of today, with users demanding secure browsing experiences and protection of their personal data. This study explores the dynamic integration of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms with Software-Defined Networking (SDN) controllers to enhance network security through adaptive decision mechanisms. The proposed approach enables the system to dynamically choose the most suitable ML algorithm based on the characteristics of the observed network traffic. This work examines the role of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) as a fundamental component of secure communication networks and discusses the limitations of SDN-based attack detection mechanisms. The proposed framework uses adaptive model selection to maintain reliable intrusion detection under varying network conditions. The study highlights the importance of analyzing traffic-type-based metrics to define effective classification rules and enhance the performance of ML models. Additionally, it addresses the risks of overfitting and underfitting, underscoring the critical role of hyperparameter tuning in optimizing model accuracy and generalization. The central contribution of this work is an automated mechanism that adaptively selects the most suitable ML algorithm according to real-time network conditions, prioritizing detection robustness and operational feasibility within SDN environments.

Recent studies increasingly explore Large Language Models (LLMs) as a new paradigm for recommendation systems due to their scalability and world knowledge. However, existing work has three key limitations: (1) most efforts focus on retrieval and ranking, while the reranking phase, critical for refining final recommendations, is largely overlooked; (2) LLMs are typically used in zero-shot or supervised fine-tuning settings, leaving their reasoning abilities, especially those enhanced through reinforcement learning (RL) and high-quality reasoning data, underexploited; (3) items are commonly represented by non-semantic IDs, creating major scalability challenges in industrial systems with billions of identifiers. To address these gaps, we propose the Generative Reasoning Reranker (GR2), an end-to-end framework with a three-stage training pipeline tailored for reranking. First, a pretrained LLM is mid-trained on semantic IDs encoded from non-semantic IDs via a tokenizer achieving $\ge$99% uniqueness. Next, a stronger larger-scale LLM generates high-quality reasoning traces through carefully designed prompting and rejection sampling, which are used for supervised fine-tuning to impart foundational reasoning skills. Finally, we apply Decoupled Clip and Dynamic sAmpling Policy Optimization (DAPO), enabling scalable RL supervision with verifiable rewards designed specifically for reranking. Experiments on two real-world datasets demonstrate GR2's effectiveness: it surpasses the state-of-the-art OneRec-Think by 2.4% in Recall@5 and 1.3% in NDCG@5. Ablations confirm that advanced reasoning traces yield substantial gains across metrics. We further find that RL reward design is crucial in reranking: LLMs tend to exploit reward hacking by preserving item order, motivating conditional verifiable rewards to mitigate this behavior and optimize reranking performance.

This paper presents a hybrid insider threat detection framework for enterprise environments, integrating multi-agent simulation, layered SIEM correlation, trust-adaptive thresholds, behavioral and communication forensics, and Theory-of-Mind reasoning. Email is treated not as a control channel but as a coordination and social-engineering evidence stream correlated with authentication, file-access, and privilege events. Four variants are evaluated: Layered SIEM-Core (LSC), Cognitive-Enriched SIEM (CE-SIEM), Evidence-Gated SIEM (EG-SIEM), and EG-SIEM-Enron with Enron-calibrated email forensics. Across ten matched runs with eight malicious insiders, actor-level F1 improves from 0.567 for LSC to 0.774 for CE-SIEM, 0.898 for EG-SIEM, and 0.944 for EG-SIEM-Enron; paired Wilcoxon tests confirm the first three differences after Holm-Bonferroni correction. Evidence gating reduces confirmed false positives from 33.7 per run under LSC and 49.3 under CE-SIEM to 0.2 and 0.0 respectively, a precision gain traded against longer confirmation time. Domain-shift evaluation shows that an Enron-trained email classifier does not transfer to a different operational email domain, although target-domain fine-tuning reaches F1 = 0.974 under grouped template-family evaluation. On CERT r4.2, the evidence-gated logic improves actor-level detection while reducing false positives, outperforming tabular anomaly detectors and a sentence-embedding baseline. Scalability tests to 1000 agents indicate stable detection quality.

The growth of IoT devices in shared environments has outpaced our ability to identify them, posing urgent risks to privacy, safety, and accountability. This challenge is especially pronounced in open-world environments, where network traffic metadata is often sparse, noisy, or adversarial. To address this problem, we introduce a semantic inference pipeline that reframes device identification as a language modeling task over real-world network metadata. As this approach depends on reliable supervision, we first construct high-fidelity vendor labels for the IoT Inspector dataset, the largest real-world corpus of its kind, using an ensemble of large language models guided by mutual-information and entropy-based stability scores. We then instruction-tune a quantized LLaMA 3.1 8B model on this dataset using curriculum learning to support generalization under sparsity and long-tail vendor distributions. Our model achieves 98.69% top-1 and 90.73% macro accuracy across 2,015 vendors, while remaining robust to missing fields, protocol drift, and adversarial manipulation. We also evaluate the model on an independent IoT testbed dataset, assess explanation quality, and conduct adversarial tests to probe robustness under spoofed and obfuscated input. These results position instruction-tuned LLMs as a scalable, interpretable foundation for trustworthy device identification at scale.

[Corrected v2: an audit found that the score, threshold, and latency descriptions below are not what the shared codebase implements, and that the evaluation streams are assembled constructions. See the correction note on the title page and the corrected companion work, arXiv:2605.24696 (corrected v3), artifact doi:10.5281/zenodo.22673735.] We present a risk-calibrated approach to streaming intrusion detection that couples Bayesian Online Changepoint Detection (BOCPD) with decision thresholds aligned to Site Reliability Engineering (SRE) error budgets. BOCPD provides run-length posteriors that adapt to distribution shift and concept drift; we map these posteriors to alert decisions by optimizing expected operational cost under false-positive and false-negative budgets. We detail the hazard model, conjugate updates, and an O(1)-per-event implementation. A concrete SRE example shows how a 99.9% availability SLO (43.2 minutes per month error budget) yields a probability threshold near 0.91 when missed incidents are 10x more costly than false alarms. We evaluate on the full UNSW-NB15 and CIC-IDS2017 benchmarks with chronological splits, comparing against strong unsupervised baselines (ECOD, COPOD, and LOF). Metrics include PR-AUC, ROC-AUC, Brier score, calibration reliability diagrams, and detection latency measured in events. Results indicate improved precision-recall at mid to high recall and better probability calibration relative to baselines. We release implementation details, hyperparameters, and ablations for hazard sensitivity and computational footprint. Code and reproducibility materials will be made available upon publication; datasets and implementation are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

Signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) detect malicious activity by matching network or host events against predefined rules. Security analysts manually develop these rules from Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI). As threats evolve, this manual pipeline faces two bottlenecks. Before authoring a new rule, an analyst must reconcile the incoming CTI with the existing rule base and determine whether to create, update, or retire one. This process is challenging due to the representational differences between the CTI and Rule formats. This gap limits the effectiveness of keyword- and embedding-based search, making rule reconciliation cognitively demanding and, in turn, contributing to "rule bloat". Second, automated verification of a new rule is inherently difficult as zero-day threats lack ground truth from simulated testing. Hence, standard metrics cannot prove that a rule semantically adheres to the CTI, and the use of LLMs leads to non-deterministic behavior. To address these challenges, we introduce FALCON, an agentic framework for CTI-grounded rule retrieval, generation, and validation. At its core, a novel CTI-Rule semantic scorer, quantifies the functional alignment between a CTI and a rule; the same signal drives a retriever that surfaces relevant deployed rules and a ground-truth-free validator that scores generated ones. Around it, a generation pipeline produces deployable rules from CTI in real time and refines them through self-reflective syntactic, semantic, and performance validators. Across network (Snort) and host-based (YARA) platforms on a purpose-built CTI-Rule dataset, FALCON attains a mean relevance of 0.72 (approx), with 84% inter-rater agreement among cybersecurity analysts, underscoring the promise of real-time security automation.