Prices

Distributed constraint optimization problems (DCOPs) provide a popular framework for distributed decision making under limited communication, but many real-world instances are too large to solve monolithically. We address this challenge from two complementary directions. We revisit the connection between DCOPs and potential games, and adapt modern online learning algorithms for equilibrium finding to DCOPs. We show that these algorithms are competitive with representative incomplete DCOP algorithms. We then turn to decomposition frameworks for large-scale DCOPs, motivated by large-scale decentralized satellite scheduling. We propose a new framework that separates a DCOP into two interacting subproblems: a high-level meta-DCOP for task allocation, and independent local optimization problems for scheduling. To couple the two levels, we develop a novel iterative pricing method that updates the meta-level utilities using feedback from the local optimizers. Combining our online learning methods with our iterative pricing framework, we obtain near-optimal performance on real-world decentralized satellite scheduling problem instances, fulfilling over 99% of observation requests compared with 87% for state-of-the-art baselines.

Transaction propensity prediction in B2B e commerce presents unique challenges distinct from B2C contexts, primarily due to the heterogeneous procurement behaviors of organizational entities, which violate SMOTE's implicit assumption of within class feature homogeneity. Specifically, B2B buyers exhibit multi modal procurement cycles that render linear interpolation between minority class samples structurally invalid, producing synthetic data that does not represent real purchasing behavior. This paper introduces a production deployed propensity modeling framework designed to address these complexities through two primary contributions. First, we replace conventional SMOTE based augmentation with a synthetic data generation approach leveraging Diverse Counterfactual Explanations (DiCE). This method produces minority class samples with superior distributional fidelity compared to SMOTE, as validated through quantitative proximity analysis and UMAP cluster visualization. Second, we adapt the PyPARC piecewise affine classification framework to generate calibrated propensity probabilities, facilitating the interpretable segmentation of customers into actionable risk tiers. Evaluated on two years of longitudinal data from a large scale B2B e commerce platform with a 1 to 9 class imbalance ratio, the proposed architecture achieves 93.1% precision at a decision threshold of 0.8, a 9.2 percentage point improvement over SMOTE based baselines at the same threshold (83.9%), and a 26.1 point improvement over SMOTE at threshold 0.7 (66.04%), demonstrating consistent superiority across operating points. These results demonstrate the framework's efficacy in enabling high precision marketing campaigns with significant improvements in customer activation and return on investment.

Auto-bidding systems optimize bids to maximize value under efficiency constraints such as Cost-Per-Action (CPA). Existing methods treat each day as an independent episode. However, many advertisers produce value so sparsely that per-day efficiency ratios become statistically unreliable, undermining advertiser retention. Platforms therefore evaluate window-level efficiency over sliding windows of $W{=}7$ days, ensuring fair evaluation and long-term advertising effectiveness. This creates cross-episode coupling: each day's bidding decisions affect up to $W$ overlapping windows, so setting daily targets requires anticipating future market conditions. We propose SWAG-Bid (Sliding-Window Aware Generative Auto-Bidding), a hierarchical framework decomposing this challenge into episode-level planning and step-level execution. The planner uses a Masked Trajectory Model to forecast markets and generate candidate plans, scored across all overlapping windows by Multi-Window Model Predictive Control Sampling (MWMS) with exponential confidence decay. The controller adjusts reliance on this guidance through a state-adaptive gate, Per-Step Gated Adaptive Layer Normalization (PSG-AdaLN), complemented by Return-to-Go and Cost-to-Go channels carrying budget and constraint information. Experiments on AuctionNet-Sparse and online A/B tests on AliExpress show that SWAG-Bid achieves competitive constraint satisfaction and value acquisition under sliding-window evaluation.

Automated code generation is becoming an important tool in quantitative finance, where large language models can generate option pricing implementations directly from mathematical model specifications. Validating such implementations, however, requires considerably more than conventional software testing: numerical pricing methods must remain mathematically consistent, numerically stable, and reliable across a wide range of model parameters. We introduce RIDGE, an autonomous validation framework in which generated pricing implementations are subjected to structured no-arbitrage tests, stress tests, benchmark comparisons, and consistency checks. Validation evidence is interpreted diagnostically, while the resulting knowledge is accumulated in a repository and reused across models and successive validation iterations. This enables systematic refinement of both the pricing implementation and the validation methodology. The framework is applied to five stochastic volatility models. Across these studies, all detected implementation defects are removed and, in two cases, the validation process reveals methodological limitations and motivates the development of alternative numerical methods. The supplementary material is available in the GitHub repository: https://github.com/ShQiangLiu/ridge.

Classical alpha mining achieves strong risk-adjusted returns by combining many low-correlated predictive signals, yet deep learning stock-ranking methods typically produce a single alpha per stock, rely on increasingly complex architectures with diminishing gains, and obtain diversity only through separate models or implicit routing, without explicitly controlling inter-alpha correlation. We introduce MAPLE (Multi-Alpha Position-aware Listwise Ensembling), a backbone-agnostic framework that recovers this diversity principle within a single training pass. MAPLE combines a unified, capacity-scaled prediction head with an extreme-rank weighted listwise ranking loss and a diversity regularizer that explicitly penalizes pairwise correlation across alphas. Across four equity markets spanning the US, China, and Japan, MAPLE achieves the best average Sharpe and Calmar ratios among nine baselines, using up to 55x fewer parameters and 2.5x less training time, and generalizes across five backbone architectures with Sharpe and Calmar Ratio gains of 10-23% and 17-43%, respectively. Behavioral analysis further shows why each component works: the unified head already reduces inter-alpha correlation before any diversity loss is applied, and the extreme-rank loss lets diversity regularization improve rather than erode per-alpha ranking quality as capacity scaling sustains this balance at scale. These results show that principled loss design and capacity allocation, rather than architectural complexity, drive diverse and effective multi-alpha generation.

We study the contextual dynamic pricing problem under non-stationarity, where a firm sells products to $T$ sequentially arriving consumers that behave according to an unknown demand model that can change over time. The demand model is assumed to be a generalized linear model (GLM), allowing for a feature vector in $\mathbb{R}^d$ that encodes products and consumer information. To achieve optimal revenue (i.e., least regret), the firm needs to learn and exploit the unknown GLMs while monitoring for potential changes. We propose a multiscale change-point detection based algorithm that achieves a regret of order $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{s_TdT}\wedge\{V_T^{1/3}d^{1/3}T^{2/3}+\sqrt{dT}\})$, where $s_T$ is the number of piecewise stationary segments and $V_T$ is a newly defined notion of design-adjusted variation budget of model parameters. Our algorithm is adaptive and does not require knowing $s_T$ or $V_T$. Moreover, to our knowledge, this is the first dynamic pricing algorithm that is adaptive to the nature of changes and achieves the best-of-both-worlds rate, thus closing a long-standing gap in the literature. We remark that, due to the varying contexts, existing works in the adaptive non-stationary bandit literature cannot be applied to achieve optimality for contextual dynamic pricing. The regret is further accompanied with a newly constructed minimax lower bound, confirming the optimality of our algorithm (up to logarithmic factors). Extensive numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate the efficiency and robustness of the proposed algorithm in non-stationary dynamic pricing.

This paper presents an empirical comparison of lexicon-based and Large Language Model (LLM)-based sentiment analysis for extracting market-relevant signals from social media discourse in highly volatile equity markets. Using Reddit data from r/WallStreetBets and focusing on meme stocks (GME, AMC, NOK), we construct time-aligned sentiment indicators and evaluate their relationship with market returns, with particular attention to extreme positive return events in the upper tail of the return distribution. The LLM-based approach generates multidimensional sentiment representations capturing emotional polarity, bullishness, sarcasm likelihood, and topical relevance, whereas the baseline relies on the VADER lexicon-based model. We evaluate both approaches using lead/lag correlation analysis, OLS regression, ROC-AUC-based directional classification, and a quantile-based early-warning framework. The results indicate that LLM-derived indicators provide a richer multidimensional representation and exhibit stronger asset-specific statistical structure than the lexicon-based baseline. However, their relationship with market movements remains heterogeneous across assets, suggesting that increased linguistic expressiveness does not necessarily translate into stable forecasting performance in retail-driven volatility regimes.

Some properties of so-called complex or collective systems can be observed to emerge from the interactions of elementary agents. This phenomenon, known as emergent behaviour, has long since been studied in the most diverse disciplines, with recent growing awareness from the formal methods community about the opportunity of opening up to seemingly distant disciplines with appropriate technology for computer-aided reasoning. Different peculiar elements of complexity make automated reasoning on these systems particularly challenging. We consider electronic financial markets to drive our discussion. We identify and structure the sources of complexity to tackle in order to provide computational support for the analysis of emergent phenomena. We refrain from evaluating the suitability of specific technical solutions or frameworks of preference, which would as usual require simplifying assumptions and divert from the actual phenomenon of interest. Rather, we elaborate on possible alternatives to handle some of the main technical aspects involved in automated analysis, while retaining a solid and concrete interpretation of the domain, and in doing so outline a more systematic research program for the formal specification and analysis of market mechanisms.

Modern agentic AI systems combine multiple large language model agents with heterogeneous skills, yet most architectures either fix communication in advance or allow full broadcast. Both can be inefficient because token cost, latency, redundancy, and error propagation increase with the number of active agents and communication links. We model agent selection and communication as a cooperative game with task-conditioned net utility $U(C\mid x)=V(C\mid x)-\sum_{i\in C}c_i$, separating coalition-level costs from agent activation costs. We propose a marginal-value activation rule and greedy router, extend the model to optimize communication edges with per-edge costs, and use estimated Shapley values to predict which agents are worth contacting before and during execution. We connect the problem to submodular maximization and prove two limited guarantees: a curvature-refined bound for a monotone, cardinality-constrained special case, and a tight $1/2$-approximation, with a correction for signed objectives, for an unconstrained non-monotone case via double greedy. Neither guarantee applies directly to the main router, which remains a heuristic. We also prove a Shapley-submodularity sandwich bound linking the error of marginal-value routing to a per-agent diminishing-returns quantity. In synthetic experiments, greedy routing achieves $99.5$ of brute-force-optimal utility while activating $1.96$ of $8$ agents on average, compared with $38.8$ for full broadcast. Performance is robust to activation cost and redundancy weight but falls to $66$ under strong violations of submodularity or noisy value estimates. We distinguish the framework from Shapley pricing, hedonic coalition formation, and communication-graph pruning, and propose evaluation on real multi-agent LLM benchmarks.

Estimating contemporaneous bidirectional interactions from observational data is difficult because each outcome is endogenous to the other, while flexible regressions may capture only reduced-form dependence. This paper proposes SEM-DNN, a heteroscedastic neural simultaneous-equation estimator that learns reciprocal structural interactions without external instruments. Identification exploits conditional covariance diagonalization: when structural shocks have zero conditional means, are conditionally uncorrelated given predetermined covariates, and exhibit nonproportional conditional variances, only the true interaction coefficients diagonalize the conditional residual covariance across the feature space. The method jointly approximates nonlinear structural mean functions and feature-dependent variances using a diagonal Gaussian quasi-likelihood that incorporates the simultaneous-system Jacobian. We establish unique identification and positive-definite local curvature of the profiled population criterion and show that, under neural-profile compatibility conditions, the implemented neural criterion inherits this curvature despite nonunique network parameterizations. The coefficients admit a causal interpretation when the structural equations represent autonomous mechanisms that remain invariant under the relevant interventions. Monte Carlo experiments with nonlinear, high-dimensional nuisance functions and non-Gaussian shocks show that SEM-DNN recovers structural effects more reliably than parametric, kernel-based, and separate-equation neural alternatives as information increases, although at greater computational cost. An application to ready-to-eat cereal scanner data illustrates how the method can study contemporaneous price-sales feedback and assess identification strength, residual diagonalization, variance calibration, and optimization sensitivity.

Personal and organizational planning systems maintain two records that drift apart: what was planned (a task's effort budget) and what was done (a logged action's duration and description). Existing systems bridge them with an exclusive, all-or-nothing link that strands genuinely related but unlinked effort and reports false stalls on active goals. We formulate the bridge as a quasi-linear Fisher market: planned tasks are budget-constrained buyers, performed actions are divisible goods, and a fused text/structural/temporal signal sets each buyer's valuation. Two market instruments - a seller reserve price and a buyer cash option - yield conservation, a hard budget cap, and a provable junk filter as theorems. We extend the market with a concave completion utility discounting progress as a task nears its plan; standard convergence theory for the market's algorithm does not transfer here, resolved by a satiation-threshold fixed point with existence (Brouwer) and local uniqueness under an explicit diagonal-dominance condition, validated empirically on random and adversarial instances. A de-circularized, multi-seed benchmark - observed affinity corrupted independently of the scored ground truth - surfaces a genuine weak spot: the market's sharp, zero-entropy equilibrium is more sensitive to affinity noise than entropy-regularized optimal transport's permanently smoothed one. We resolve this with a one-parameter entropy-regularized generalization unifying the two, plus a noise-adaptive rule for its regularization strength. We report full reproducibility parameters, discuss limitations candidly, and relate the result to multi-touch attribution, optimal transport, and online Fisher-market algorithms.

We introduce Frontier Financial Judgement, a challenging new benchmark developed in collaboration with professional equity analysts to assess agents' ability to replicate expert human judgements. Rapidly identifying new information, evaluating its implications and determining its valuation impact is one of the most time-consuming and challenging aspects of real-world equity coverage. This is becoming ever more difficult and important as AI rapidly increases the quantity of new information to process. The strongest agent we evaluate on Frontier Financial Judgement matches all expert labels in only 52.4% of cases. We also find significant divergence in estimated false-positive rates among frontier agents, ranging from ~1% for GPT-5.6 Sol to ~32% for Claude Sonnet 4.6. To construct the benchmark and make it representative of real-world settings, we combine human-designed and labelled synthetic articles with live news articles and historical documents, creating 656 items for assessment. The resulting task requires agents to distinguish genuinely new, valuation-relevant financial information from stale, immaterial or misleading news under realistic conditions. We find substantial trade-offs among agent accuracy, cost, false positives and reliability that continue to hinder the reliable deployment of news-flow filtering in practice.

Generative AI can produce book-length works of fiction at near-zero cost. These books are often dismissed as low-quality ``slop'' that buyers will ignore, and are assumed to carry little commercial weight. We test that assumption with full-text AI detection across 14,419 self-published genre-fiction books sold on Amazon from 2023 to 2026, matched to daily sales records through June 2026. None of these books disclose whether or not they contain AI-produced content. We find that books for which we detected substantial AI text ($>$ 25%) make up a large share of the catalog but a smaller share of sales. Even so, they reach commercial scale, winning a growing share of sales over time and taking more of the scarce top-rank positions once held by books with no detected AI text. Over this period, the number of books with observed sales in a quarter grew 19.2-fold, while quarterly revenue grew only 8.9-fold. The market therefore added selling books faster than it added revenue, and revenue per selling book fell across most genres. Books with no AI text lose the most ground in genres with high AI diffusion, and most of all where Kindle Unlimited availability is high. Among top-selling books, those with substantial AI text draw on more distinctive language from existing books than do books with no AI text; for these books overlap rises with revenue, a gradient we do not detect for books with no AI text. Generative AI can thus reshape a creative market through scale rather than quality. Our results bear directly on the market-effect question at the center of the fair use defense to copyright infringement.

Shippers are beginning to delegate carrier selection to large language model (LLM) agents. We ask what such delegation does to a freight matching market, and which platform design choices contain it. We carried out agent-based simulations in which fifty shipper agents, built on commercial LLMs from OpenAI (GPT), Anthropic (Claude), and Google (Gemini), procure truckload capacity for thirty days. The market implements the rules of digital freight matching: each load is offered down the shipper's ranked list of carriers (waterfall tendering), carriers have daily capacity limits, spot prices respond to congestion, and carrier ratings accumulate with transactions. We found three risks and one remedy that works. Agents converged at once: for a fixed sampled carrier population, the same carrier was the modal first choice of every model on day one, attracting up to 76% of requests. Because each agent picks from its own randomly drawn list of displayed candidates, the platform controls how many options each shipper sees; concentration rose steeply once lists exceeded about ten carriers, with the onset differing across models. Which carriers ended up dominant varied widely from one sampled market to another, and displaying true quality instead of estimated ratings changed neither the level nor this variability (by design, quality affects only what agents see, never delivery outcomes). Against these risks, disclosing each carrier's remaining daily capacity cut concentration by a third and doubled shipper surplus, while vendor diversification, list-order randomization, and popularity display showed no clearly detectable effect. Platform information design, ahead of model choice or model regulation, is the lever that works.

Procuring supervised fine-tuning (SFT) data forces a buyer to decide, before any downstream training, whether a candidate corpus is worth acquiring. We present \sys{}, a statistics-first gating architecture that treats procurement as a cost-aware routing problem over three intrinsic quality axes -- diversity, utility, and redundancy. Cheap blind measurements are summarised into per-axis estimates with confidence intervals; a gate accepts a decision only when intervals are tight, sample sizes are adequate, and the axes agree, otherwise it escalates the case to an adjudicative debate between a buy-advocate and a reject-advocate judge, resolved by a presiding verdict. On a controlled benchmark of 12 datasets ($2{\times}3{\times}2$ grid over the three axes) with 5 seeds, the gate reaches 0.90 accuracy and 0.83 $F_1$ at $0.017 per unit, sitting between an always-verify baseline (0.75) and an oracle upper bound (0.98) while spending less than always-escalate ($0.020). We further report honest negative diagnostics of the debate path: a con-side win rate of 0.80 ($p\approx3{\times}10^{-6}$) and a 52% position-flip rate under advocate swapping expose negativity and positional biases that a naive LLM-judge would hide. We frame the injected-knob evaluation explicitly as a controlled synthetic benchmark for measurement fidelity and routing calibration, and delimit external validity as future work.

Auto-bidding plays an essential role in online advertising, automatically adjusting bids for advertisers to optimize their commercial goals. The emerging AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB) paradigm widely adopts generative modeling to optimize bidding strategies, yet suffers from the limited mode coverage of offline datasets and inadequate task-state understanding, hindering effective exploration of optimal strategies. Large Language Models (LLMs), with prior world knowledge and reasoning capabilities, offer a promising approach to overcome these limitations. However, directly applying LLMs to auto-bidding tasks faces inherent challenges in limited numerical precision, hallucinations, and inference latency. To address these limitations, we propose AIGB-R1, a hierarchical self-evolving auto-bidding framework aiming to enhance AI-Generated Bidding via LLMs' Reasoning capabilities, comprising a high-level Planner module for macro-level strategy planning and a low-level Executor module for fine-grained decision-making. Building upon this, we design an experience-driven self-evolving loop, enabling autonomous strategy exploration and optimization from accumulated experience. We adopt a two-stage pipeline of offline pre-training and post-training alignment, and build an interactive bidding simulation environment for strategy rollout. Furthermore, we propose Decoupled Group Relative Policy Optimization (D-GRPO) to achieve end-to-end optimization via advantage decoupling. Experimental results on a large-scale public dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of AIGB-R1.

A truckload carrier must accept or reject each load tender within seconds. The decision depends on fleet state, hours-of-service (HOS) clocks, and appointment windows. We model this as a weakly coupled dynamic program in which the resources relocate and carry clocks: serving a request moves the truck to a new market and depletes its clocks, and whether a truck can serve a request depends on its state. Occupancy-based reusable-resource models do not cover this setting. We build a real-time dual-price policy from the same Lagrangian relaxation that gives the problem's upper bound. Policy and bound come from one object, so every run reports a certified optimality gap. We prove three things. First, the certificate is valid for any duals, any discretization, and any surrogate quality. Second, the policy's same-time spatial-gradient rule is exactly fluid complementary slackness, and the policy is asymptotically optimal in the subcritical fluid regime; the fitted prices are also portable across sample paths, by linear-programming basis stability. Third, certificates have limits: per-resource Lagrangian slack can stay bounded away from zero at every fleet size. We exhibit a three-truck kernel with an exact rational certificate and a replication lemma. On a public closed-loop benchmark with thirty paired seeds, the policy -- which needs no rollout labels, only one offline dual solve -- beats a rollout-trained surrogate on two of three scenarios (tight: +2.0 pp, 95% CI [+0.5, +3.6], Wilcoxon p = 0.023; mild: +3.5 pp, CI [+2.4, +4.5]) and ties the third. It decides in 0.04-0.09 ms, three orders of magnitude faster than the Monte Carlo rollout teacher. Its certificates are stable across ten bounded instances per scenario, at 57-64% of optimal, within 3-6 points of what the 1000x-slower teacher certifies.

In future cities every driver may own a vehicle which could be either independently driven (HDV), or autonomously routed and piloted (CAV). The autonomous operations could be handled by a few competing companies. What is the market structure which would make this market aligned with city goals? In this paper we discuss a variant of the emerging market of collectively routed fleets of CAVs, where revenue for fleet operators is proportional to market share. We provide benchmark scenarios to compare the routing algorithms. We present several routing algorithms and demonstrate that, when the attitudes of human drivers towards CAVs exhibit significant diversity, randomised CAV routing, resulting in unpredictable travel times for HDVs, is more efficient than routing proportional to system optimum/user equilibrium. Based on this, we propose to improve the design of the market by augmenting the market-share objective with mean systemwide travel time in order to limit antisocial randomised strategies of fleet operators and drive the competition towards social welfare oriented cooperation.

This study concentrates on predicting stock prices in the Egyptian market, focusing on the EGX30, an influential financial hub in the Middle East. While most research focuses on global stocks, there's a growing need to understand stock trends in developing countries like Egypt. The study compares different machine learning models for forecasting EGX30 trends, covering short and long-term predictions. Using historical EGX30 data, including metrics like root mean squared error, Mean Absolute Percentage Error, and coefficient of determination, models like K-Nearest Neighbours, random forest, extreme gradient boosting, long short-term memory networks, and gated recurrent unit networks were evaluated. The goal is to determine the most effective models for EGX30 prediction, considering Egypt's unique market dynamics. Insights from this study aid investors in making informed decisions. Results show that the Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) outperformed the other models in the one-week, one-month, and two-months while the eXtreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost) model outperformed others in the one-day predictions, highlighting their usefulness in predictive analysis for financial markets. The study also showed the importance of using the ensemble techniques, especially in the long-term predictions which proved better results reaching 5 times the GRU in the two-month predictions. Additionally, the study notes the surprisingly good performance of K-Nearest Neighbours (KNN) on long-term predictions, suggesting its enduring relevance and potential for future applications in the fintech domains.

Advertisers delegate bidding to autobidders; users delegate tasks to language-model agents. A person describes what they want to an automated proxy that acts in a mechanism on their behalf. This is the revelation principle in production, and it forces a question classical theory assumes away: when is it optimal to describe yourself honestly to your own proxy? We show the answer turns on one quantity, the proxy's within-range regret. The most a principal can gain by misreporting equals the regret of the proxy's honest-report action against those the principal could have steered it to take. Honest self-description is optimal exactly when the proxy already plays the best action it can reach, that is, when it is loyal (Theorem 1). The identity unifies auction-specific autobidding results and pins down when the faithful-communication assumption behind language-model elicitation proxies (Huang et al.) holds. The identity constrains guardrails placed on proxies, from bid caps to a model's alignment layer. No guardrail can be at once binding (it displaces the truthful action from the proxy's best reachable outcome), truthful (honest reporting stays optimal), and capability-preserving (that outcome stays reachable through some report); any two preclude the third (Theorem 2). A safety constraint that alters what a model does while leaving its best output reachable makes honest description of intent suboptimal, so a sharper report can gain. This is the incentive behind prompt-engineering and jailbreaking. Because within-range regret is #P-hard to compute exactly, we estimate it from samples and maintain it as a model is updated, at a cost set by how far the model drifts, not how often it changes. Running it on production language models from five providers under an alignment-style cap, we find honest reporting leaves surplus unclaimed on every model, recovered by inflating the report.

In bandit problems, standard regret-minimizing algorithms treat exploration as an amortized cost, which can expose early participants to unfair ex-ante losses in settings such as clinical trials. Recent work addresses this by evaluating the sequence of per-round expected rewards through the generalized $p$-mean, interpolating between utilitarian welfare ($p=1$), Nash welfare ($p\to0$), and Rawlsian fairness ($p\to-\infty$). Although tight guarantees are known for $p\ge0$, the strictly fair regime $q=-p>0$ remains unresolved because negative-power means are dominated by the smallest per-round rewards. For $σ$-sub-Gaussian rewards with nonnegative means, the best prior algorithm relied on uniform early exploration and achieved regret $O(k^{(q+1)/2}/\sqrt{T})$, while the only general lower bound was the classical $Ω(σ\sqrt{k/T})$. Thus it was unclear whether the extra dependence on $k$ was intrinsic to strict fairness or an artifact of uniform exploration. We close this gap by identifying the exact polynomial price of strict fairness. Using a needle-in-haystack construction, we prove an algorithm-independent lower bound $Ω(σ\sqrt{k^{\max(1,q)}/T})$; for $q>1$, this shows that the penalty $k^{q/2}$ is information-theoretically unavoidable. We then introduce \textsf{UCB-HARE} (Harmonic Anchored Rank Exploration), which replaces uniform exploration with an inverse-weighted harmonic rank schedule protected by a certified positive-mean anchor. Its regret is $\widetilde{O}(σ\sqrt{k^{\max(1,q)}/T})$, matching the lower bound up to logarithmic factors. Experiments on synthetic instances confirm that \textsf{UCB-HARE} improves over uniform-exploration baselines, with gains increasing as $q$ grows.

Large pretrained time-series models such as TimesFM are attractive for financial forecasting, but raw directional accuracy is a misleading scoreboard in equity markets. An early LoRA adapter in this project appeared to reach roughly 80% directional accuracy; we show this is not evidence of skill. Over a long horizon in a rising market, a trivial "always-up" rule attains comparably high accuracy without using the input at all. To separate genuine skill from this base-rate artifact, we build a reproducible, frozen-data benchmark with expanding walk-forward folds, a stratified held-out-ticker split, honest baselines (zero-shot TimesFM, always-up, random-walk, persistence, AR(1)), and paired significance tests (McNemar, Diebold-Mariano) under Benjamini-Hochberg FDR control. We apply the identical method to two universes -- a tech-heavy NASDAQ-100 and a broad S&P 500 -- reporting excess accuracy over the always-up base rate. Three findings replicate. First, when the historical ~80% condition is recreated, the high number is a base rate of ~0.70 that the fine-tuned model scores below. Second, pooled LoRA shows no directional skill over the base rate at any horizon on either universe (negative at the six-month horizon). Third, per-sector specialization is significantly worse than a single pooled adapter (Diebold-Mariano p<0.001 on held-out stocks at h=128). Fine-tuning's only measurable benefit is a statistically significant reduction in point-forecast error relative to zero-shot TimesFM, which nonetheless does not beat naive baselines and confers no tradeable directional edge. The contribution is methodological: a defensible, fully seeded protocol that prevents the base-rate trap, together with the replicated negative result it produces.

For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds. First, interior Nash equilibria lack $C^1$ vector field information, meaning agents cannot distinguish aligned from strictly opposing incentives. Inheriting this geometry, the worst-case pure Nash equilibria dictating robust PoA bounds manifest as topologically unstable strict saddles, and in canonical congestion games, as global repellers supported on almost everywhere strictly dominated strategies. Anchoring efficiency guarantees to these unstable states causes algebraic sensitivity; we prove that accommodating all strictly positive affine costs renders the PoA unbounded. Furthermore, projecting learning trajectories onto the discrete simplex of correlated play systematically accommodates non-rationalizable behavior. Evaluating dynamics via Coarse Correlated Equilibria or proximal refinements fails to preclude strictly dominated strategies. Moreover, optimal $O(1/T)$ swap-regret minimization does not preclude macroscopic turbulence, manifesting as chaotic limit sets even in minimal games. Finally, we examine the non-atomic limit of congestion games. Though considered highly stable with tight sub-linear $Θ(p/\ln p)$ PoA bounds (where $p$ is the polynomial degree), we prove that under discrete-time learning, the unique equilibrium destabilizes into Li-Yorke chaos and global attractors whose time-averaged inefficiency degrades exponentially as $2^p$. These results necessitate re-evaluating worst-case equilibrium frameworks for dynamically grounded metrics.

Trader-facing dynamic fees are increasingly proposed for automated market makers (AMMs), but historical data do not identify how order flow would respond: trader-facing fees do not vary, trader types are latent, and a replayed tape is not a sequential decision environment. We therefore construct a minimal closed-loop simulator in which the missing signal exists by construction: two constant-product pools repriced by an equilibrium-inspired dynamic-fee rule, fee-sensitive noise flow, and closed-form CEX--AMM arbitrage. Equilibrium is used as a closure principle, not as an object the trader learns. Against a tuned benchmark ladder of schedule, planning, lookahead, and tabular policies, a small DQN is the only evaluated valid policy whose paired improvement over tuned one-step routing excludes zero. On a reserved final block of 1{,}000 seeds with completion forced to 1.0 for every policy, it reduces implementation shortfall under every tested intra-step ordering, by $13.3\bps$ of order notional under the pre-specified agent-last ordering, and the edge is concentrated in, and learned from, dynamic-fee environments: under constant fees the paired difference is indistinguishable from zero. The result is model-conditioned counterfactual evidence about execution control in AMMs, not evidence about historical traders, equilibrium play, or deployable profit.

Pricing food products to balance profitability with consumer welfare is a central challenge for retailers. Dynamic pricing is widely used to maximize revenue, yet most pricing models optimize business objectives while overlooking consumer fairness. This paper studies the risk of consumer exploitation under dynamic food pricing in Canada and proposes a methodology that embeds fairness constraints directly into retail sales forecasting. We model total retail trade sales with a log--log Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) specification, in which the coefficient on a product price is a sales elasticity, and pose the pricing problem as maximizing forecast sales subject to price bounds anchored to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). We solve this problem with both Linear Programming (LP) and Simulated Annealing (SA), under single-product and multi-product configurations. A key finding is that the fitted nominal elasticities are positive. As a result, an unconstrained sales-maximizer would push every price to its upper bound, and the CPI ceiling is the safeguard that prevents this. Simulated Annealing instead settles on conservative, interior prices that lower consumer cost while still meeting the sales target. We benchmark forecast accuracy against naive, seasonal-naive, ARIMA, and SARIMA baselines, and a CPI-deflated re-specification shows that the positive nominal elasticities are largely an inflation-driven artifact. The result is a transparent, fairness-aware pricing framework.

Enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language model (LLM) agents requires effective orchestration of diverse expert models and tools. However, existing frameworks typically call APIs, based on coarse-grained matching between tasks and the functions of expert models or tools, while overlooking critical factors such as performance variability and cost efficiency among functionally similar alternatives. To address this, we propose Agora, a framework that uses a confidence-calibrated auction to dynamically allocate tasks to expert models and tools. By treating reasoning steps as tradeable items, Agora bases allocation on calibrated competence rather than raw confidence. Across five main benchmarks, Agora improves or remains competitive with single-model, routing, and cascade baselines under matched candidate pools.

Decision-making is posing an increasingly formidable challenge to investors because of the growing number of alternatives available in financial markets. A hot area of research over the past few decades has been portfolio optimization that seeks to determine how much an investor should invest in which asset. Introducing real-world conditions to the optimization model turns the problem into an NP-hard one for whose solution exact methods become inefficient; hence, researchers have turned to evolutionary algorithms to approximate solutions. In this paper, strengthening strategies are presented for multi-objective evolutionary algorithms that can provide a faster convergence rate and extensive search ability in the portfolio optimization problem under the cardinality constraint. To implement those features, a unique solution representation, a novel operator, and new repair mechanisms are introduced for solving the aforementioned problem in which lower and upper limits are set on the number of assets in the portfolio. For this purpose, new mating strategies along with the aforesaid package are implemented in well-known multi-objective evolutionary algorithms to solve the problem. The customized algorithms are subsequently tested against traditional ones using well-known market indices as benchmarks. Results indicate that the proposed strategy not only provides better approximations but also converges faster as well at no loss of performance with an increasing number of assets in the market.

The escalating demand for Machine Learning (ML) training resources in recent years has resulted in a substantial gap between the high demand and the available supply. Efficient allocation of these scarce and expensive resources is crucial for organizations to maximize their return on investment. Existing resource allocation mechanisms, like Karma [OSDI'23], are designed to guarantee Pareto efficiency and max-min fairness in settings with dynamic (time-varying) user demands, but fail to preserve these key properties in the presence of demands with heterogeneous values. Given the ubiquity and inevitability of heterogeneity in organizational values of different workloads, effective resource allocation policies must accommodate these variations. In this paper, we describe the design, implementation, deployment, and theoretical analysis of Quota Marketplace, a market-based mechanism to efficiently allocate ML training chips (like GPUs), explicitly addressing scenarios with demands of heterogeneous value. We detail the implementation of this mechanism within Google and present metrics that demonstrate its impact. We also discuss many business-critical requirements that the Quota Marketplace handles quite effectively, and document the gains and opportunities it has unlocked. We establish theoretically how this market-based approach achieves the essential properties of Pareto efficiency and max-min fairness by allowing the users to express the value of their workloads and enabling dynamic resource pricing based on supply and demand fluctuations. Ultimately, the market facilitates resource allocation that aligns with organizational priorities.

Online truckload bid acceptance is a closed-loop stochastic decision problem in which a carrier or broker must, in real time, accept or reject a tendered load subject to operational feasibility, fleet repositioning costs, and opportunity cost against future demand. Public, reproducible benchmarks for this problem are scarce: existing routing benchmarks are static, while dynamic-fleet studies typically rely on private operator data. We introduce FreightBidBench, a public-calibrated, dependency-free, closed-loop benchmark in which feasibility (pickup reach, appointment windows, simplified hours-of-service, stochastic yard delays) and economics (service-failure penalty, terminal fleet value, daily price-premium window) are explicit, versioned, and reproducible from public Freight Analysis Framework and U.S. Department of Agriculture truck rate data. We develop two full-horizon hindsight ceilings: a simple LP style relaxation and a tighter Lagrangian-per-truck information relaxation that retains per-truck hours-of-service and sequencing structure and is 20.7% tighter than the LP relaxation on a tight-capacity scenario and 39.3% tighter on a scarce-capacity scenario. We introduce a parametric surrogate-rollout cascade with boundary-band and scarcity-pressure escalation triggers. On ten-seed tight and scarce scenarios, the best simple policy retains 91.0% and 86.5% of rollout profit and the standard-library surrogate 94.2% and 89.3%; a cascade at a single escalation band recovers roughly 98% on both at 40-56% of rollout's mean decision latency, and on the tight scenario is statistically indistinguishable from the rollout teacher (paired-bootstrap 95% CI on the profit delta spans zero).

We analyze how four forces restructure the AI industry over 2026-2030: the DRAM/HBM price surge, frontier-capable open-weight models (GLM-5.2), rapid inference-efficiency gains (near-Shannon-limit KV-cache compression, lightweight local runtimes), and the entry of Meta and xAI into compute resale on fleets bought before the memory repricing. Formulating inference economics in dollars per petabyte of bandwidth delivered ($/PB) -- model-agnostic for bandwidth-bound decode -- we show the entrant-incumbent cost gap never closes: a depreciation conveyor delivers newly amortized fleets to incumbents faster than hardware prices normalize (3.2x in 2026, 1.9x in 2027, re-widening to 3-4x by 2029-30). Training bifurcates into a luxury tier ($18-38B per frontier run by 2030) and a mass tier (previous-frontier parity via RL/distillation falling toward $5M). Solvency of the announced buildout is confined to a corridor requiring roughly 2x annual token-demand growth for four years with sticky premium pricing; a measurement critique shows public token trackers overstate monetizable demand, and all pre-Q2-2026 projections predate the industry's shift from token maximization to token minimization. A vintage-breakeven analysis finds 2026 and 2028-29 capacity each fatally exposed to one pricing regime, with only the 2027 vintage robust. A greenfield custom-silicon entrant removes the merchant margin but not the memory premium (central outcome: 25% success/34% mediocre/41% loss, improvable via staged go/no-go gates). China's LineShine LX2 -- domestic HBM on a standard ISA -- decouples its cost curve from the memory crisis. Scenario probabilities: Rotating Landlord Oligopoly 25%, Commoditization Crash 25%, Jevons Absorption 20%, System-Layer Re-differentiation 18%, Geopolitical Bifurcation 12%. Solvency now depends on monetized bandwidth demand, premium stickiness, and vintage ownership.

In this paper, we investigate whether a model-free RL agent can identify and exploit price manipulation opportunities more effectively than a traditional model-based approach that assumes correct specification of the data-generating process but relies on noisy parameter estimates. We consider a single-asset market in which prices evolve according to an Almgren-Chriss framework with non-linear permanent impact and linear temporary impact. We first establish the existence of price-manipulative strategies in discrete time and compute the optimal benchmark strategy using Sequential Least Squares Quadratic Programming under full information. We then compare two finite-sample learning approaches: a model-based procedure that estimates impact parameters from simulated execution data and an agnostic RL approach based on Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient, trained directly on the same amount of data. For intermediate volatility, the RL agent successfully discovers profitable manipulative strategies without explicit knowledge of the underlying model, even when training data are quite limited. More importantly, RL consistently outperforms the model-based approach when parameter estimates are affected by sampling error, despite the latter benefiting from the correct model specification. For large volatility, all methods are unable to identify manipulation opportunities, while for small volatility, the model based approach outperforms RL. These findings highlight both the effectiveness of RL in complex control problems and the risks associated with deploying learning algorithms in financial markets without appropriate safeguards.

Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations. A prevalent yet complex scenario involves a single seller negotiating concurrently with multiple buyers, each possessing heterogeneous, private budgets. In such settings, constrained by a limited number of communication turns, the seller must balance exploring the broader market to discover the highest valuation with concentrating sufficient turns on a single target buyer to secure the best possible outcome. Our analysis reveals a significant gap in standard Large Language Models (LLMs): while these models are linguistically proficient, they fail to act as effective economic decision-makers. Specifically, they exhibit a failure to explore the buyer pool, often fixating on the current highest bid rather than strategically investigating the market to discover latent high valuations. In this paper, we propose a specialized training recipe using Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). By anchoring the reward function to objective economic outcomes, the strategic balance between market discovery and surplus extraction emerges natively through the learning process. Our results demonstrate that the trained seller undergoes a multi-stage strategic evolution, learning to leverage price anchoring and strategic probing to identify more profitable counterparties. The agent extracts a substantially higher surplus than frontier models by both improving its persuasive bargaining skills and consistently closing deals with high-value buyers. Finally, we show that our seller strategies generalize robustly to unseen buyer negotiation styles and budget distributions.

We study repeated contextual procurement auctions in which producers have private costs and the platform must learn context-dependent product values from bandit feedback. The objective is welfare rather than revenue or a virtual-cost surrogate: regret is the total surplus loss relative to the full-information efficient procurement rule. We first show that the natural UCB allocation rule attains $\tilde O(\sqrt{ngT})$ welfare regret under truthful bids, but its adaptive bid-dependent learning path does not by itself give a truthfulness guarantee. To obtain exact incentives, we design a bid-independent explore-then-commit mechanism with empirical critical payments; it is dominant-strategy truthful and has $\tilde O((ng)^{1/3}T^{2/3})$ regret. We then introduce frozen-payment UCB, which estimates payments in an initial bid-independent exploration phase, freezes those payment estimates, and continues adaptive UCB allocation learning afterwards. Under a smoothed truthful-path margin condition, this mechanism gives a regret-incentive tradeoff: the near-UCB tuning attains $\tilde O(\sqrt{ngT})$ welfare regret, while the average per-round gain from any fixed deviation is at most $\tilde O(T^{-1/4})$ for fixed $n,g$. A matching lower bound shows that this frozen-payment frontier is unavoidable.

In liberalised railway systems, operators must set prices dynamically in an environment with partial observability, as they retain private information about their objectives and performance, where regulatory constraints prohibit communication or direct information exchange between competitors to prevent explicit collusion. Consequently, agents must learn to infer strategic interactions only from observable market data which presents a significant challenge for multi-agent reinforcement learning, where standard approaches typically treat observations as unstructured vectors, ignoring the underlying market topology that governs strategic interactions. To address this, an entity graph modelling approach is proposed, which represents the environment as a graph of operational units, rather than decision-making agents or static infrastructure, encoding competition, coordination, and connectivity relations between entities. Then, an extension of the multi-agent twin delayed deep deterministic policy gradient algorithm with graph-based representation learning processes the features of the entities through a multi-layer relational graph convolutional network and aggregates them via a learnt attention mechanism. Experimental results in a rail pricing reinforcement learning environment show that this novel framework achieves higher revenue and stability in two different settings of increasing market complexity compared to a representative selection of relational and non-relational baselines. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/Kinrre/RelationalRailPricing-RL

We study a sequential learning problem for stable matchings in two-sided markets where preferences on both sides are initially unknown. We focus on a centralized setting where an algorithm matches agents at each time step and receives noisy rewards that reflect the preferences of the matched agents, following a semi-bandit feedback structure. We adopt a pure exploration perspective, aiming to efficiently identify the optimal stable matching with high probability. Our work extends prior results by handling \emph{two-sided uncertainty} and by exploiting \emph{partial preference} information. A central ingredient is the notion of \textbf{pervasive stable matching}, which enables the identification of optimal stable matchings under partial preferences. We propose elimination-based algorithms whose stopping criteria exploit the structure of the learned partial preferences, and provide a refined sample-complexity analysis. Beyond pure exploration, we extend our approach to regret minimization and establish regret bounds with respect to the \emph{optimal} stable matching that avoid dependence on the minimum reward gap $Δ_{\min}$.

Urban rail fare systems may be non-additive: the fare of a single paid journey from an origin to a destination can differ from the sum of fares over multiple legally separated journey legs. This paper presents LegalFarePlan, a fare-transparent route-planning framework that models legal exit-and-reentry operations as explicit, auditable constraints. Given a transit network, fare function, transfer rules, station-level exit/re-entry costs, an extra-time budget, and a split limit, the planner computes explainable route plans over paid journey segments. The artifact implements Dijkstra shortest-time and direct route-planner baselines, a greedy split heuristic, bounded exact label-setting, and Pareto-frontier search. Evaluation uses controlled synthetic data and a 57-station semi-synthetic benchmark with 360 OD pairs. On the semi-synthetic benchmark, bounded exact search identifies positive modeled fare reductions for 71.11% of OD pairs, with mean reduction 3.78 and maximum reduction 9.0 synthetic fare units under a 45-minute extra-time budget. These results demonstrate method behavior and reproducibility; they are not empirical conclusions about MTR or any transit operator.

We study the online routing problem in large language model serving, where requests arrive sequentially and must be dispatched to parallel decode workers under tight batch-size and KV-cache constraints. Unlike widely used routing heuristics that are not tied to explicit service-level objectives (SLOs) and offer limited control over latency-throughput trade-offs, we introduce a multi-objective optimization framework that formulates routing as an online linear programming with interpretable decision rewards. We apply an efficient bid-price control policy based on the online linear programming that admits requests when their SLO-weighted benefit exceeds their shadow prices. To meet millisecond decision requirements, we develop a warm-started, projected first-order updates that track the evolving dual shadow prices online with predictable runtime. We integrate our router into the Vidur simulator and demonstrate substantial improvements over standard baselines across multiple SLO regimes, including end-to-end latency, time-to-first-token, throughput, and tail performance. A big picture from our result: a science-based approach outperforms others based on heuristics.

We present a multi-agent system for studying the allocation of discrete, congested resources among heterogeneous strategic agents, motivated by the problem of railway slot allocation under deregulation. Multiple operator-agents, differing in size and capacity, interact through a shared auction mechanism over repeated rounds under time-constrained decision-making. The mechanism combines a congestion-based base price that increases with aggregate demand with an asymmetric corrective adjustment that penalises the agent requesting the most slots and rewards the agent requesting the fewest, and is designed to mitigate strategic dominance by large agents while preserving transparency and congestion sensitivity. We formulate the interaction as a repeated game with incomplete information and implement the system as a real-time, web-based multi-agent environment in which human participants control individual agents and observe live marginal-cost and competitor feedback. We report exploratory observations from two structured sessions with domain experts acting as operator-agents. The congestion mechanism responds to aggregate demand as designed and the corrective incentives are actively triggered, but agents representing large operators persist with high-request strategies despite the penalty, suggesting that corrective pricing is necessary but not sufficient to neutralise strategic dominance in this multi-agent setting. A post-session debrief indicates that participants' decisions were driven by the assumed agent role rather than personal disposition, and provides qualitative support for strategic motives, such as preserving market presence and raising rivals' costs, operating alongside short-term profit maximisation. We discuss implications for multi-agent mechanism design under asymmetric budgets and outline directions for analytical validation and larger-scale multi-agent experiments.

Combinatorial optimization (CO) problems are difficult because certifiable discrete structure induces exponential search. One needs to search over the set exponentially many candidates to certify optimality, however, the structural feasibility of a path, packing, or cover can be verified in polynomial time once supplied. In this study, we introduce Neural Certificate Pricing (NCP) that exploits this asymmetry under an unsupervised learning framework. A neural network is trained to predict certificate-level dual prices, while a structured recovery layer constructs the induced primal marginal. NCP can be viewed as amortized separation: instead of enumerating violated inequalities, it learns the residual prices through which their aggregate effect enters recovery. When the certificate-consistency condition holds, the recovered marginal is globally feasible, and a local theory shows that first-order errors in the predicted price induce only second-order loss in objective value. Across three classes of CO problems, NCP either outperforms state-of-the-art neural baselines by large margins or matches them at a fraction of the computation time, and shows stronger out-of-distribution generalization.

Financial markets evolve in response to real-world events reported in news, yet these drivers often remain implicit in text. To better explain market dynamics, event-market relations must be explicitly modeled through factual, company-centric, and environment-aware knowledge graphs. We present FinKG-News, a framework that automatically constructs such graphs by extracting news events as anchors linked to companies. Using FinKG-News as grounded evidence that integrates events, news, and company data, we develop an in-context learning architecture for credit risk report generation across three core financial dimensions. Automatic and human evaluations show that automated hallucination detection and quality assessment remain unreliable, making expert judgment indispensable. Our approach consistently outperforms baselines, improving quality by 19%-34% while reducing hallucinations. The source code and project resources are publicly available at: https://github.com/ichise-laboratory/FINKG-news.

Niche asset markets, such as Counter-Strike 2 (CS2) weapon skins, are small, volatile, and heavily driven by community discussions and platform rules. These properties make them hard for traditional quantitative models, but provide an ideal testbed for studying how large language models (LLMs) turn unstructured text into trading actions. We present CSTrader, a multi-agent framework for language-grounded trading in the CS2 skin market. The system first integrates heterogeneous signals from various sources, then uses specialized agents for technical analysis, liquidity, events, and (reversed) sentiment, and finally applies risk control, transaction friction, and portfolio management agents to produce buy, sell, or hold decisions under realistic trading frictions. We build a live-like evaluation environment with real CS2 data from a highly volatile period and evaluate several recent LLM backbones. Across models, CSTrader consistently outperforms both a falling market index (-15.62%) and simple single-prompt LLM baselines, achieving up to a 7.58% cumulative return with controlled risk. Ablation studies show that liquidity, reversed sentiment, and transaction friction agents are crucial for turning noisy language signals into stable profits, suggesting that niche, language-driven markets are a useful benchmark for future language-to-action research. Code is available at: https://github.com/IatomicreactorI/CSGOTrading?tab=readme-ov-file#quick-start

In two-sided marketplaces with heterogeneous products, it is important to understand the causal relationship between additional supply and marketplace outcomes, such as the total quantity transacted or transaction value in the marketplace. This paper studies a causal machine learning approach to estimating this relationship across product segments. We use the Airbnb marketplace as an example, focusing on the impact of additional listing supply on total bookings, but the methodology applies to other two-sided marketplaces. Our approach combines double/debiased machine learning with a hierarchical Bayesian framework that leverages pre-existing knowledge as priors. We construct tractable and informative features for the model by leveraging measures of product segment similarity from the geospatial literature. We find that such a model provides plausible estimates of the marketplace returns to additional supply and strong out of sample performance.

Two-sided marketplaces connect distinct user groups whose interests often conflict -- improving outcomes on one side could degrade the other side's experience. To address this challenge, we deploy an integrated framework for personalizing free-value thresholds -- a policy governing the scope of complimentary services for job listings -- across a two-sided job marketplace connecting millions of employers and job seekers. Our personalized policy delivers statistically significant and economically sizable lift in the target metric while respecting engagement guardrail constraints. Direct application of standard uplift methods proves insufficient here for two reasons. First, cross-side externalities demand multi-objective optimization: maximizing employer-side metrics risks harming job seeker engagement, with effects varying substantially across job segments. Second, marketplace interference necessitates cluster-level randomization, limiting us to few discrete treatment levels -- effectively a form of positivity violation that rules out methods designed for continuous treatments. We contribute an integrated framework with three components. Our ensemble-based hybrid ranking models target and guardrail metrics separately, cutting guardrail risk by over 10% for equivalent target gains compared to single-objective approaches. A treatment effect extrapolation method extends our estimates from limited experimental variation to untested policy levels, relying on monotonicity assumptions that we validate empirically. Finally, we present production deployment, where post-launch data confirms both extrapolation accuracy and guardrail compliance. Our deployed system demonstrates that principled methodology can enable meaningful personalization even when experiments are severely constrained and different objectives compete -- common conditions that characterize many real-world marketplaces.

This project introduces the CRISTAL Method (Coherent Reliable Intentional Synthesis of Truthful Analysis Logic), a neurosymbolic framework for automating complex analysis workflows, with fundamental investment analysis as a primary use case. This domain poses major challenges: high structural uncertainty, noisy and subjective data, tight attention budgets, and the need for justified, reproducible decisions. Human analysts often struggle in this domain due to cognitive biases and limitations, suggesting significant value in automation. But while LLM-based agents have been proposed as analytical aids, their limitations -- poor numerical reasoning, unawareness of uncertainty, and lack of reproducibility -- hinder their effectiveness in this context. CRISTAL addresses these gaps through a principled blend of statistical model synthesis, continuous learning, and active learning. Starting from a natural-language prior knowledge curriculum, CRISTAL builds a dynamic, interpretable probabilistic program that enables full Bayesian inference, including uncertainty quantification and budget-aware data acquisition. CRISTAL continually refines its world model during analysis, leveraging LLMs for code synthesis and learning. We validate CRISTAL on a novel benchmark of synthetic equities with rich financial and textual data. On a company classification task, CRISTAL achieves Bayes-optimal accuracy with just 5 examples and a 5-second budget, outperforming state-of-the-art LLMs that plateau around 40% accuracy even with order-of-magnitude more input data and compute.

When two companies bid to buy the same target, no one knows exactly what the target is worth. Each bidder pays for due diligence: costly, imperfect homework that sharpens its own private estimate before it bids. How much of that homework is worth buying? We build a simple computer model of the bidding contest and let it teach itself to bid well by playing against itself, the way a game engine learns chess. The economic question, how much diligence pays for itself, and the computational question, when the contest becomes too complex to solve exactly, are both controlled by a single thing: how many pieces of private information a bidder carries. Our main finding is that the right amount of diligence is modest and finite. It falls as diligence gets more expensive, and it falls further when both sides are doing their homework, because competition erodes the value of knowing more. We also test a recent claim from AI research: that simple, general self-play methods can rival the specialized, expensive algorithms usually built for games like these. Running on an ordinary laptop with no costly frontier AI, we find the simple methods are the best of the self-learning approaches, though purpose-built exact methods still win whenever the game is small enough to solve outright. The simple methods earn their keep only once the game grows too large to solve exactly, which is the regime real deals live in, and there we show they still find strong bidding strategies. The contribution is threefold: a cheap, reproducible way to study deal-making under uncertainty; a concrete, model-based answer to how much due diligence is worth buying; and evidence about when lightweight, general-purpose AI is good enough to replace specialized methods. We release all the games, code, and experiments.

We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $α$ times payment, where $α\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter. The bidder aims to maximize cumulative utility over $T$ rounds subject to a total budget $B$. The problem is challenging even without budgets: the action space is exponential in $M$, the maximum demand of the bidder and the valuation vector (context) varies over time. Exploiting a decomposition of utility across units, we develop polynomial-time learning algorithms based on shortest paths in a directed acyclic graph, obtaining sublinear regret under both full-information and bandit feedback. In the bandit setting, the regret is independent of the number of contexts due to complete cross-learning: observing the utility of the chosen action under the realized context reveals the utility for the same action under all counterfactual contexts. With budget constraints, when the average normalized per-round budget $ρ=\frac{B}{MT}<1$, we design a coupled primal-dual algorithm in which the DAG-based procedure uses dual-adjusted edge weights for primal updates, while online gradient descent updates the dual variable, yielding $ρ$-approximate sublinear regret. Finally, we give implementations whose per-round time and space are independent of the number of contexts, enabling scalability to large or even infinite context spaces.

Vegetable prices in Sri Lanka are highly volatile because the market is largely import-isolated, so supply disruptions quickly drive prices up. This study develops a machine learning framework to forecast such volatility by incorporating supply-chain-aware features and explicitly modelling the country's two cultivation seasons, Maha (October-April) and Yala (May-September). An integrated dataset was constructed by combining retail and farmer-gate prices with origin-aligned weather variables, diesel costs, and exchange rates across 12 vegetable varieties and 14 market centres from 2013 to 2019. A gradient-boosted ensemble model (XGBoost and LightGBM) was trained and optimised using Optuna, and unified and season-specific configurations were compared. Results show that season-specific models improve within-season fit, with the Yala-specific model achieving the highest R2 of 0.9420 (95% CI [0.690, 1.000]), while the unified model delivers the best overall predictive accuracy of 90.84% (95% CI [88.34%, 91.52%]) and an R2 of 0.9281 (95% CI [0.760, 1.000]). Notably, the unified model maintains 85.96% accuracy on a completely unseen 2024 hyperinflationary period without retraining, successfully tracking major price surges. These findings suggest that agricultural price movements in import-constrained markets are meaningfully predictable when models capture supply-chain dynamics, offering practical value for early warning and decision making by farmers, traders, and policymakers. Existing studies on Sri Lankan vegetable prices are confined to Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) and Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) applied to single markets, with no supply-chain features, seasonal segmentation, or cross-regime validation.

Automated alpha mining holds the scoring function fixed and varies the search algorithm over it. A search that converges against a fixed scorer overfits whatever the scorer cannot penalize, a primary cause of the out-of-sample generalization gap. We treat the scoring function as a search artifact alongside the alpha factors and study what conditions make this joint search admissible. Sealed Joint Search (SJS) is a framework: a set of structural conditions on information flow in an autonomous-discovery system that prevent joint search from collapsing into self-confirmation while keeping the evaluator sealed. Conditions cover role decomposition, typed inter-role communication, provenance-sealed reads, versioned stores, and substrate-local promotion. Agora tests SJS empirically: five LLM agent classes communicate via three channels, evolving eight skill libraries, with alpha libraries built on AlphaGen operators. Three evaluators write reports aggregated into one brief, carrying forward disagreement instead of voting. We run Agora for 100 rounds on CSI 1000 and evaluate on a 91-day 2026 holdout sealed from all LLM inputs. Agora achieves holdout Sharpe +1.87; best baseline +1.334 at favorable seed and -0.755 cross-seed mean. Pre-loading Agora's two metrics into a frozen-library ablation recovers only +0.40 of the +2.25 Sharpe gap, and adding PPO without library evolution worsens the gap. The two metrics emerge rather than being designed. Caveats: single-seed run, short-side concentrated signal, intended for long-short.

In a changing decision problem, standard dynamic-regret analyses have often equated the cost of non-stationarity to how far loss moves. However, it is simultaneously possible for a loss sequence to travel far and retain the same optimal policy, or for a small movement in loss to force the optimal policy to change completely. Thus, the size of the movement through loss variation, transition variation, or comparator path length describe the adversary's motion, but not the cost of that motion to the control problem. For a more faithful analytic interpretation, this paper develops a normal-fan geometry for finite-horizon adversarial MDPs with fixed transitions. Occupancy measures form a polytope, and each loss vector exposes an optimal face of that polytope. Non-stationarity in rewards is therefore a path through the normal fan, where motion inside one cone leaves the optimal face unchanged, while crossing a wall may carry regret. We pose the notion of a face-crossing price, which is the minimum regret incurred by remaining on the previous optimal face under the new loss. For any learner that tracks the previous face, dynamic regret decomposes exactly into intrinsic priced face motion plus within-face selection error. The resulting theory separates consequential from harmless non-stationarity, where loss variation can be arbitrarily large at zero price, and identical one-coordinate variation can hide horizon-scale differences in regret.

We show that net demand for liquidity by algo strategies is identifiable from its trade and price history alone, with no knowledge of its signal or optimization problem. An exact multi-period regret decomposition implies that the sign of this statistic classifies a linear strategy as a net liquidity consumer or provider, recovering the Kyle (1985) informed-trader/market-maker dichotomy from observables alone. Under an AR(1) cost process, the same statistic equals the product of strategy size and the squared Roll (1984) implied spread, making the correction a direct proxy for prevailing illiquidity. Extending to endogenous price impact and aggregating across N correlated strategies yields a liquidity-balance condition whose violation produces welfare loss scaling as N squared, a closed-form fire-sale externality. We calibrate to CRSP equity data (2016-2025), tracking implied spreads through the COVID-19 and 2022 rate-shock episodes, with an estimator computable in O(Tnd) time.

Learning to bid in repeated multi-unit auctions with bandit feedback poses a fundamental challenge. Existing methods often rely on rigid explore-then-exploit schedules, assume stationary adversaries, and optimize solely for bidder utility, thereby limiting adaptability and strategic robustness. To address these limitations, we introduce the A3M framework, which integrates adaptive deep reinforcement learning (DRL), explicit adversarial reasoning, and principled multi-objective reward design for online auction strategy optimization. A3M employs an actor-critic DRL backbone to dynamically balance exploration and exploitation, an opponent model for fictitious play against non-stationary adversaries, and a composite reward function to jointly maximize utility, auctioneer revenue, and fairness. We provide the first comprehensive empirical evaluation of this integrated approach against established baselines in both discriminatory and uniform price auctions. Results show that A3M reduces final regret by 30--40% in standard settings, maintains robust performance against adversarial strategy shifts, scales favorably with the number of units $K$, and enables tunable multi-objective trade-offs. An extensive ablation study confirms the necessity of each core component. Our work establishes A3M as a powerful and flexible framework for learning in complex auction environments.

Energy trading decisions depend not only on current market prices, but also on expected future market conditions, and operational constraints. This makes the state representation given to a reinforcement learning agent an important design choice. We study this in HydroDam, a pumped-storage arbitrage environment, using a fixed Double DQN agent. The environment, action space, reward function, network, and training protocol are kept fixed; only the market features are changed. We compare absolute price/calendar features, relative features that compare current prices with recent market history, forecast features, and all combinations of these three feature families. Policies are trained and selected using 2007--2011 Belgian day-ahead prices and evaluated on two test settings: a later same-market test set from 2012--2025 and 39 other ENTSO-E market zones. Absolute features only reaches 28.8% on the test set and a median 5.7% across zones. Relative-only and forecast-only states also stay below a rolling price-score heuristic in the cross-zone median. Combining feature families is much stronger: absolute + relative reaches 49.9% on the test set and a 39.8% cross-zone median, while absolute + relative + forecast reaches 55.6% and 47.5%. These results suggest that state representation is not a minor preprocessing choice in storage-trading RL, but a central part of the policy design: robust transfer requires combining price scale, recent relative price context, and short-horizon forecast information, rather than relying on any single feature family.

Traditional dynamic pricing models in large-scale e-commerce suffer from limited interpretability, poor utilization of unstructured information, and misalignment with long-term business objectives such as cumulative Gross Merchandise Value (GMV), Return on Investment (ROI) and milestone achievement. We propose AIGP, a novel framework that leverages a Large Language Model (LLM) prompted with domain knowledge, structured data and textual context to make interpretable, knowledge-aware pricing decisions. For efficient deployment while maintaining high-quality outputs, we employ supervised fine-tuning for knowledge distillation. Central to AIGP is the Long-Term Value Estimator (LTVE), trained via offline reinforcement learning on historical data, which serves as a reward model to score candidate pricing actions and select preference pairs for Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), thereby aligning the pricing policy with long-term business objectives. Extensive offline evaluations and large-scale online A/B tests on Tao Factory demonstrate that AIGP achieves significant improvements: +13.21% in GMV, +7.59% in ROI, and +8.20% in milestone achievement rate over 14 days compared to the production baseline, while simultaneously providing interpretable and transparent pricing rationales.

While corporate narrative disclosures provide crucial information to capital markets, comprehensively evaluating their qualitative changes over time remains challenging. Narrative text is inherently multidimensional, meaning that an improvement in one textual dimension often occurs alongside changes in others. To capture these underlying dynamics, we propose a longitudinal text analysis approach combining Japanese-language NLP metric extraction with paired testing, shift function analysis, and inter-metric correlation. Our framework extends prior indicator sets by incorporating a cross-section relevance indicator to measure topical alignment between risk disclosures and management strategies. Applying this approach to evaluate Japan's 2019 disclosure reforms, we analyze 19,770 firm-year observations over a 10-year period (FY2015-FY2024). The joint analysis reveals complex shifts in disclosure patterns that are frequently masked by conventional single-indicator methods. Specifically, we find that while disclosure volume increased substantially, it was accompanied by a decline in readability. Furthermore, although the overall information structure improved, specific descriptive quality stagnated, and the degree of adaptation varied across market segments.

Agentic systems are changing how complex operational tasks are coordinated, introducing a new paradigm for connecting heterogeneous data sources and automating processes. Electric bus fleets provide a relevant test case. Their operation requires continuous coordination between service reliability, battery state-of-charge, charger availability, electricity prices, route-energy uncertainty, and vehicle-to-grid (V2G) opportunities. This paper proposes an agentic aggregator framework that streamlines this decision environment by coupling an optimization-based electric bus scheduling model with supervisory agents for disturbance detection, tariff adaptation, and schedule evaluation. The optimization core enforces physical feasibility across routes, chargers, batteries, and V2G exchanges, while the agentic layer interprets changing operating conditions, triggers real-time re-optimization when needed, and defines how flexibility value is allocated between the aggregator and the public transport operator (PTO). A realistic depot case study evaluates day-ahead and real-time operations under profit-based and operation-based coordination modes, considering service delays, route-energy deviations, electricity price shocks, and combined disturbances. The results show that agentic aggregation can support adaptive fleet-grid coordination by maintaining feasible schedules, activating re-optimization selectively, and improving the use of charging and V2G flexibility. However, they also reveal a critical trade-off: the same agentic capability that reduces operational complexity can extract value from the PTO when configured around profit-oriented pricing. These findings suggest that agentic aggregators can become useful for managing electric bus V2G operations, but their deployment in public-fleet contexts requires transparent coordination modes, auditable tariff-setting, and explicit value-sharing rules.

Commodity futures can be represented hierarchically, with underlying assets at the upper level and individual futures contracts at the lower level. Entities at each level can be connected by edges reflecting inherent correlations, with cross-level edges capturing contract-to-underlying asset connections. Building on our observations of these structures, we propose a hierarchical graph learning approach for calendar spread (CS) strategies in commodity futures markets, addressing two significant gaps in the machine-learning literature: (i) the absence of learning-based methods for CS strategies in futures markets, and (ii) the lack of consideration of maturity-dependent interrelationships across commodity futures. We first establish the efficacy of CS strategies by analytically showing that CS strategies can possess higher risk-adjusted returns, measured by the information ratio, and lower risk, measured by variance and delta, than long-only strategies. We then introduce a method to convert learning-based predictions into CS positions. Next, we develop a hierarchical graph learning method that predicts futures price movements by utilizing the maturity-dependent interrelationships, thereby yielding a CS trading algorithm. Empirical results on commodity futures markets traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group demonstrate that our method outperforms benchmark models in both prediction and trading performance. We find that maturity-dependent interrelationships across commodity futures are instrumental in prediction and that CS trading based on hierarchical graph learning is effective for statistical arbitrage.

When a large language model (LLM) answers a question about a company, it grounds the answer in retrieved web sources, and those sources decide what the model says. Most analysis of AI brand visibility looks at the answer text. This study looks one step earlier, at the citations. We merge three Rankfor.AI datasets covering 128 brands across 12 home markets and 13 languages, and analyse 167,551 URL-grounded citations (189,974 total attribution rows). We classify each citation by domain and source type and measure where AI gets its brand information, by language and by market. Four patterns hold. First, AI grounds brand answers overwhelmingly in third-party sources: 85.7% of citations point to sites the brand does not own, against 14.3% owned. Second, the source base is concentrated and long-tailed: 80% of citations come from about 18% of domains, fitting a Zipf law (alpha = 0.86, R^2 = 0.983). Third, one reference site dominates almost everywhere: Wikipedia is the most-cited domain in 11 of 12 languages, the exception being Lithuanian, where the business daily vz.lt edges it (4.38%). Fourth, the source mix is market-specific at the margin: for 46 Polish national brands the most-cited domain is YouTube, and four HR and careers portals supply 637 citations against 297 for Polish Wikipedia, about twice as many.

Commercial NLP treats the shopping chatbot as a recommender or a conversion tool: its job is to match a user to a catalogue entry and close a sale. We argue that the arrival of agent-native micro-payment rails (e.g., x402, AP2) changes what is scarce. When the buyer is an autonomous agent that can investigate exhaustively, the bottleneck is no longer matching products but acquiring trustworthy, decision-relevant information about them. We envision agentic e-commerce as a micro-transaction market for verified information: buyer agents spend fractions of a cent to progressively unlock seller- and reviewer-supplied data -- service histories, third-party test reports, bills of materials, audited sales and support metrics -- paid for a la carte under a freemium model, with reviewer trust scored reputationally. We sketch the architecture of such a market and argue that it rewards genuine product quality and yields truer competition than ranking-based storefronts. We then translate the vision into concrete NLP problems -- cost-optimal information acquisition, data pricing and negotiation, real-time entity resolution, grounded value exchange, and privacy-preserving persona modelling -- and argue that these, not chat fluency, deserve the field's attention.

This paper presents a scalable framework for multi-robot task allocation in complex environments where estimating task execution costs is computationally expensive. While combinatorial auction-based approaches offer reliable solutions, the exponential complexity of bundle generation typically renders them intractable for real-time reactive applications, particularly when accurate path planning is required for cost validation. We address this through a distributed, two-stage multi-fidelity bundle generation approach. Agents utilize a local search tree guided by a low-fidelity heuristic (such as euclidean distance) to rapidly explore the bundle space, applying high-fidelity path planning only to the most promising candidates in a best-first manner. These refined bids are then submitted to a central coordinator that solves a set packing problem to ensure global feasibility and maximize the overall utility. Simulation results in multiple environments demonstrate that the framework is able to improve the performance of reactive auction-based task allocation. Overall, the presented framework is shown to enable reactive task allocation with dynamic bundle sizes in multiple settings without exposing the agents' state and internal cost estimation models.

In multimodal transportation systems, shared mobility services (SMSs) are promoted for their potential to enhance flexibility and reduce congestion. However, SMS demand is often concentrated in high-density areas, which can limit the effectiveness and accessibility for various commuter groups. This uneven integration challenges transportation system efficiency, especially in terms of emissions and spatial equity. Addressing these issues requires coordination among multiple stakeholders whose objectives frequently conflict. Whereas authorities aim to ensure sustainable and equitable mobility, SMS providers focus on revenue maximization, and travelers seek to minimize personal travel costs. This paper proposes a multi-agent deep reinforcement learning framework that captures these interactions through dynamic pricing and incentivization strategies for SMSs and public transport. The framework integrates two reinforcement learning (RL) agents: (i) a public authority that allocates spatio-temporal public transport incentives to improve equity, emissions, and efficiency, and (ii) an SMS provider that dynamically adjusts fares to optimize revenue. The agents interact with the transportation system and adapt strategies in response to evolving demand, congestion, and network conditions. Numerical experiments conducted over a three-hour morning peak period show that dynamic incentivization effectively reduces congestion peaks, lowers commuters' costs by around 20% and emissions by approximately 10%, while nearly doubling public transport profit and supporting a more equitable distribution of benefits. When combined with dynamic SMS pricing, the two RL agents demonstrate the ability to balance conflicting objectives between private providers and public authorities. The proposed approach provides a decision-support tool for sustainable and equitable multimodal mobility planning.