Artificial Intelligence Governance

As generative AI is increasingly applied to automate multi-step and high-stake workflows, human judgment and involvement remain essential for ensuring the quality of AI-generated outputs. In practice, while it is desirable for human experts to provide oversight on AI regularly, often by reviewing intermediate outputs, giving feedback, making corrections, and steering subsequent steps, such oversight is constrained by the time and resources that humans can afford. This creates a tension between the need for human oversight and AI's efficiency in delivering more output with less intervention. An important but underexplored question, then, is how to optimally engage humans in human-AI coworking. This work was originally motivated by our empirical observation that in long AI workflows, human oversight often improves user satisfaction while reducing unnecessary rework and token consumption. From there, we formulate the problem of where to place oversight stages in human-AI coworking. Under reasonable assumptions, we then develop the nonuniformity principle, which states that the optimal schedule places oversight stages with non-decreasing gaps along the workflow. We empirically validate this principle in two common AI agent workflows: writing literature reviews and constructing websites.

The ODRL policy language is emerging as the de-facto standard for policy modelling data access and usage preferences, AI governance policies and data workflows in European dataspaces. The current standard has no mathematical formal semantics to describe how a system should implement policy evaluation. This has resulted in a variety of systems and tools that implement their own interpretation of the language, which limits interoperability and cannot guarantee consistent results. Based on an existing semantic model of ODRL, we formalise the problems of ODRL evaluation for the access control and monitoring scenarios, in both static and streaming settings, and we provide a novel, efficient algorithm and implementation. We present the first ODRL Evaluator with transparent formal semantics and supporting all rule types. We experimentally measure its performance, analysing different scalability dimensions related to policy complexity and size of the data on which a policy is evaluated. We compare our system with the state-of-the-art by providing a comparative review of existing ODRL evaluators, which highlights the differences in supported ODRL features and evaluation modes.

Standard automation ROI misses four categories of systemic risk -- tacit knowledge erosion, resilience reduction, regulatory exposure, and socio-institutional capital degradation -- that affect long-term organizational performance. PHP-AIO (Protocol for Human Preservation in AI-Optimized Organizations) is a five-gate sequential decision protocol with a final composite check that quantifies these unpriced systemic risks at the role level and produces auditable automation decisions. A closed-form automation-debt measure ($ρ(P)$) formalises how role-level decisions accumulate across multi-step processes; its warning is neutralised only by a regulator-mandated human-in-the-loop anchor. Applied to stylised profiles of representative internal roles, PHP-AIO produces distinct outcomes -- automate, augment, hybrid, and preserve -- for candidates that standard cost-benefit analysis would uniformly automate. Threshold sensitivity analysis confirms the gate decisions are robust to upward perturbations of at least 14% in three of four representative cases. Keywords: AI governance, automation decision, human oversight, tacit knowledge, organizational resilience, financial services

This paper suggests the adoption of a novel inversion in AI ethics: instead of asking how humans should treat artificial superintelligence (ASI), it examines how future sentient ASI may morally consider and evaluate humanity. We are not only designing intelligent systems but also shaping the initial conditions under which those systems form judgments about us. The paper proposes a preliminary set of post-human moral principles that may govern sentient ASI actions. The implication is that technical design choices (some are suggested), humanity's moral behaviour, and the essence of what it means to be human, may influence humanity's long-term standing in a post-ASI world.

Grounded in human rights-based frameworks such as the UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of AI, the Global Index on Responsible AI (GIRAI) examines how countries translate responsible AI commitments into enforceable protections, institutional capacity, and redress mechanisms. GIRAI 2026 assesses these across five dimensions: Inclusion and Diversity, Ethics and Sustainability, Labour and Skills, Trust and Safety, and AI Use in Public Service. A global network of 135 country-level researchers collected and assessed 68,138 data points on 38 indicators organised across three pillars: government AI policy and implementation (17 indicators), civil society engagement (5), enabling conditions (15), and documented cases of government deployment of unacceptable-risk AI systems. The data covers November 2023 to September 2025. A score of 100 is derived from the indicators to rank all countries. Findings show that while responsible AI governance is expanding, with 126 of 135 countries having at least one government policy or initiative across the 17 AI Policy indicators, this does not often translate into meaningful protection. For instance, Global South countries account for 203 of 306 new cases of indicators with frameworks since the first edition, yet 78% of their frameworks remain non-binding compared with 42% in the Global North. Government commitment to AI governance also does not extend to their own algorithms: whereas Transparency and Explainability is the strongest performing indicator, with 58% of countries having some framework, only 18% require Public Disclosure of Government Algorithms. Credible evidence of government deployment of unacceptable-risk AI systems was also found in 35 countries. These findings show that responsible AI governance must move beyond framework adoption toward enforceable rights-based protections, resourced oversight institutions, and accessible redress.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming economies, societies, and polities, raising fundamental questions about how it should be regulated. Policymakers face choices over whether to prioritize innovation or safety, rely on public oversight or private self-regulation, and govern nationally or internationally. Yet little is known about how citizens evaluate these competing priorities. Here we report a conjoint survey experiment conducted in seven countries with diverse political and economic profiles. We find that citizens strongly support regulating AI and generally prioritize safety over innovation, public governance over private self-regulation, and international over national approaches. The preference for safety is strongest among those who perceive AI as risky, unpredictable, and personally consequential. These findings reveal a systematic misalignment between dominant regulatory approaches and citizen preferences.

As automated decision-making and data-driven technologies pervade society and are used to manage consequential outcomes, understanding the technology's capabilities, limitations, and attendant risks in context requires analysis of full sociotechnical systems. Sociotechnical analysis of risks in highly complex systems provides clear lessons for the design and evaluation of AI systems, transcending a technical focus on reliable or "responsibly designed" components to understand risks at a systems level. Human-made catastrophes have been studied for decades because of the severity of these events: consider Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Fukushima-Daiichi, Bhopal, the Challenger disaster. A common misconception is that these kinds of events are freak accidents, resulting from the inherently unforeseeable interactions in complex systems. Closer examination reveals that the risks and hazards were well-known beforehand but not acted upon due to social structural, political and economic factors. We outline several areas where the development and use of AI can benefit from learning these unlearned lessons: improved risk perception, communication, and analysis at the organizational level; traceability of requirements and responsibilities; and holistic approaches to responsibility and safety that include social and organizational dynamics as first-order engineering concerns. For each area, we offer concrete unlearned lessons and exemplify how they led to failure in prior accidents as well as examples of how these lessons remain unlearned for modern computing systems, particularly AI.

The rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Artificial Intelligent (AI) powered autonomous agents has fundamentally changed the existing forms of software governance. In spite of the rigorous standards of transparency and account ability required according to the international frameworks such as the European Union's AI Act, there is a considerable gap between theory and reality. The present study discusses the inherent drawbacks of currently utilized platforms for LLM evaluation, machine learning workflow, and application performance monitoring in general. It has been shown that current disjointed solutions fail to protect unbound state space agentic architecture from serious threats such as alignment drift, SaaS security concerns, and unauthorized deployment of shadow AI systems. Moreover, a solution is proposed for overcoming the discussed challenges in form of a coherent multi-level AI governance stack Traccia built on the top of OpenTelemetry infrastructure platform. Traccia resolves the last mile for AI Alignment by adding the telemetry data, passive semantic guardrail assessment, and execution lineage into a hashed trace ledger. Traccia automatically creates compliance evidence packages by appending tamper-resistant fingerprints and SHA-256 content hash, that map to regulatory requirements (Articles 12, 14, 19, 26(6), and 50 of the EU AI Act) without invading any data privacy. By performing this evaluation in a methodical manner, a solid machine-readable base has been created for enterprise-wide management of autonomous AI systems.

Agentic AI systems increasingly act through heterogeneous runtimes: local coding hooks, SDK tools, browser automation, managed-agent traces, API gateways, and workflow engines. A single operational act such as publishing code, changing identity state, moving money, or exporting data may therefore be represented by many incompatible runtime records. This makes a basic governance question difficult to answer: what action was actually approved, what evidence binds the approval to execution, and can an independent verifier reproduce the same action identity later? This paper presents Canonical Action Verification and Attestation (CAVA), a runtime-semantics layer for converting heterogeneous agent activity into canonical runtime action objects. CAVA is positioned below Proof-Carrying Agent Actions (PCAA): PCAA defines the deployer-owned route-review-prove governance process, while CAVA defines the stable action object that process governs. The paper formalizes canonical action identity, semantic pattern detection, approval binding, receipt integrity, runtime-portable projection, and optional attestation substrates. We study a reference implementation through a 96-seed, 384-variant benchmark covering semantic equivalence, semantic separation, wrapper bypass, false-positive control, approval binding, receipt reproducibility, attestation tamper detection, runtime portability, semantic pattern detection, policy degradation, and Azure deployment drills. The contribution is a systems formulation of action-level canonicalization and policy-addressable semantic patterns as a necessary substrate for deployer-side AI governance.

According to the recent European legislation, high-risk AI systems will have to adapt in order to comply with requirements related to specific areas, like risk management, data quality and governance, logging and traceability, technical documentation, transparency, human oversight, and accuracy, as outlined in the European Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act. As the standardisation process for AI is expected to remain iterative and, so far, there are no European standards on AI fully covering the challenges of algorithmic hiring, we propose specific standardisation-oriented recommendations related to the relevant AI areas specified by the European Commission. For each of these areas, we set the context by describing the requirements that AI systems in high-risk domains, and especially in recruitment, should fulfil, as well as the activities that should be carried out to ensure their appropriate use and desired performance, in line with the requirements deriving from the AI Act. Unlike existing horizontal approaches to AI governance and standardisation, this paper contributes a vertical, domain-specific framework for algorithmic hiring, and especially ranking-based recruitment systems, by mapping the requirements of the AI Act to concrete standardisation recommendations, focusing on lifecycle discrimination risks, fairness-aware data governance, explainability, human oversight, and post-deployment monitoring in recruitment systems. Even though our recommendations were informed by the outcomes of the European project FINDHR, they are not tied to the project's technical artefacts and could be implemented using alternative methods, tools, or governance mechanisms.

With the increased use of generative AI (GenAI) applications such as ChatGPT, higher education institutions (HEIs) have released a range of guidelines and policies to direct adoption within their institutions. In computer science (CS) courses GenAI adoption is especially high and the implications for student learning are significant. At the same time, instructors have also been forced to address the use of GenAI as students have started to use it for a range of functions. Currently, comparative analysis of guidance provided by institutions and its uptake in instruction is lacking. In this paper we bridge this gap by comparing institutional and computing course level guidance to better understand this terrain. We utilize secondary analysis of institutional and course syllabi guidelines from higher education institutions in the U.S. classified as research-intensive. Our findings reveal that although institutional guidance is more pro-use, at the course-level the uptake is still guarded. We discuss the implications and propose an instructor-centered framework to guide future adoption of GenAI.

The rapid integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and generative AI (GenAI) into education presents significant opportunities to enhance teaching and learning, while raising ethical concerns about the responsible use of these technologies in educational settings. Understanding how the public perceives and debates these issues is increasingly important for educators, institutions, and policymakers seeking to integrate AI responsibly and equitably. Social media platforms, where such debates unfold frequently and at scale, offer a valuable lens for capturing large-scale, real-time public reactions to key developments as they emerge. In this study, we analyse five years (2019-2024) of discourse on Twitter (now X) to trace the evolving public conversation around AI ethics in education, paying particular attention to the release of ChatGPT as a pivotal moment that reshaped the nature and tone of that discourse. Using BERT-based topic modelling and SetFit sentiment analysis to identify dominant themes and track sentiment over time, we find that the discourse has been predominantly positive across the observation period, with negative sentiment concentrated around specific ethical controversies. More recently, anxieties about academic integrity and the broader implications of generative AI have come to dominate the conversation. Rather than reflecting a polarized debate, public discourse appears pragmatic and largely receptive to AI integration, though accompanied by growing calls for ethical oversight and institutional accountability. By providing a longitudinal account of public sentiment surrounding AI ethics in education, this study informs educators, institutions, and policymakers an empirically grounded understanding of public expectations, informing the development of responsible, transparent, and equitable approaches to AI integration across educational contexts.

The proliferation of agentic AI systems across enterprise and public-sector contexts has outpaced the capacity of general-purpose AI risk frameworks to classify and govern them. In this paper, we introduce the TrustX Agent Risk Classification Framework, a structured, repeatable instrument that can be applied to seven types of agentic AI systems and is grounded in foundational pre-existing AI governance frameworks. At the core of the framework is a twelve-dimension scoring rubric that robustly quantifies the risk. This rubric is combined with other components, such as the GPA + IAT classification model and the five-level autonomy framework derived from existing literature. These inputs produce a three-tier governance output with mapped control recommendations. A specialised Coding Assistant extension is also included to account for nuances specific to this type of agentic AI system. We then use an illustrative example to show our framework in practice. ARC is intended for AI governance practitioners, risk officers, developers, and regulators, and it will regularly undergo iteration as we continue to expand it and make it more robust. The community can access the interactive framework here: https://arc.responsible.ai/

Pre-demolition assessment, the regulated audit process at the heart of urban mining, is an information process in which AI support must serve qualified auditors who remain accountable for the decisions taken. The relevant unit of value is not prediction accuracy alone, but the defensibility of the supported decisions: their legibility, plausibility, sourcing, and contestability. Explainable AI techniques and domain knowledge graphs each address parts of this requirement, and existing taxonomies have catalogued their integration. The literature is descriptively rich but structurally under-specified: what remains less developed is a structural account of why specific integrations produce artefacts neither resource can provide alone. This paper offers a complementarity-theoretic interpretation grounded in the IS resource-based tradition. We propose four consolidated KG-XAI integration modes (Lifting, Constraining, Typing, and Revising), each defined as a typed operation over XAI artefacts and knowledge-graph substrate structures. Each mode unlocks a distinct property of defensibility and contributes to the kind of regulatory artefact pre-demolition assessment demands. A fire-door example from the urban-mining process illustrates the modes using the W3C Linked Building Data stack and valuation extensions.

Sharp et al. (2025) introduce "agentic inequality" as a framework for analyzing disparities in access to AI agents across three dimensions: availability, quality, and quantity. These person- and organization-level dimensions characterize who can access agents and at what capability, but do not address a structurally important divide operating at a finer level: the individual interaction. Two users with nominally equivalent agent access may experience qualitatively different AI utility depending on whether the system can autonomously retrieve context from the user's knowledge corpus (Dynamic Context Retrieval) or requires the user to manually identify and attach relevant documents at each query (Manual Attachment). We term this the Context Access Divide (CAD). For knowledge-intensive workers whose intellectual capital spans tens of thousands of files, the CAD constitutes a qualitative threshold in AI usefulness: below it, the cognitive burden of context curation falls on the human, reproducing the inefficiencies AI is meant to eliminate. We propose contextuality -- the degree to which an AI system autonomously accesses a user's accumulated knowledge capital -- as a dimension of AI-mediated inequality that complements, but is not reducible to, the Sharp et al. framework. We formalize the CAD with a probabilistic model grounded in the fan effect literature in cognitive psychology, demonstrating that manual context attachment leads to a combinatorial collapse in task-success probability as corpus size and task conjunctivity grow, while dynamic retrieval architectures are structurally insulated from this collapse. We analyze the technical basis of this divide in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) architectures, and examine its implications for knowledge-work stratification and AI platform governance.

Artificial intelligence is rapidly evolving from generative systems to agentic AI capable of autonomously planning and executing tasks. Widely characterized as the Year of Agentic AI, 2025 marked accelerated development and deployment, introducing new ethical and governance challenges. This paper presents a systematic review of the emerging literature on agentic AI governance. Our analysis identifies features that distinguish agentic AI from traditional systems and why it warrants targeted governance attention. We synthesize prevailing governance priorities, proposed mechanisms, and stakeholder roles shaping this evolving domain. As an initial scholarly effort, this review lays the preliminary groundwork for developing a structured roadmap to guide responsible and adaptive agentic AI governance.

Ensuring software compliance with regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Artificial Intelligence Act (EU AI Act) poses a significant challenge, as requirements engineers must translate complex legal text into actionable software requirements - a process that remains largely manual and error-prone in practice. We present an automated regulation-to-requirements pipeline that identifies requirement-bearing clauses in regulatory documents and derives system-agnostic software requirements, accompanied by plain-language explanations, traceable to their legal sources. We evaluate the pipeline on the full clause sets of the GDPR (398 clauses) and the EU AI Act (574 clauses). For requirement-bearing clause identification, the approach achieves macro-averaged F1 scores of 0.82 and 0.78, respectively, outperforming a SetFit-based baseline. Human evaluation shows high completeness (4.60 and 4.45) and correctness (3.74 and 3.54) of derived requirements, while explanation clarity scores are near-ceiling (4.92 and 4.94) on a 1-5 scale. We implement the approach in Reg2Req, a publicly released tool that further supports requirement classification, use case seeding, cross-reference analysis, definition indexing, and a traceability matrix to operationalize regulatory compliance in practice. A user study with 25 practitioners shows that the plain-language explanations significantly improve comprehension of derived requirements and confidence in acting on them (p < 0.001), and that all participants would use Reg2Req as a starting point for deriving software requirements from a regulation.

Generative artificial intelligence is moving from general-purpose experimentation toward specialized applications across banking, capital markets, insurance, payments, and wealth management. Its main contribution is not limited to conversational interfaces. Modern generative systems can synthesize large document collections, extract information from unstructured data, generate software and analytical code, create scenario narratives, support research workflows, and coordinate multi-step tasks. These capabilities make generative AI especially relevant to finance, where decisions often depend on combining quantitative data with contracts, policies,filings, news, customer communications, and expert judgment. This paper presents an application-oriented view of generative AI in finance. It organizes potential uses around five capability patterns, including knowledge synthesis, content generation, analytical assistance, interaction, and workflow orchestration, and maps them to major financia functions. Representative applications include investment research, customer service, lending support, fraud investigation, financial reporting, operations automation, software development, and personalized financial guidance. The paper also discusses common technical architectures, such as retrieval-augmented generation, tool-using assistants, multimodal models, and agentic workflows, and identifies practical factors that shape business value. The resulting landscape provides a foundation for researchers and practitioners seeking to understand where generative AI may produce the greatest operational and analytical impact in financial services

Enterprise artificial intelligence is moving from isolated experimentation toward operational dependency across copilots, retrieval-augmented generation systems, autonomous agents, and AI-enabled business workflows. As this transition accelerates, the primary enterprise challenge is no longer only model access or inference scale. It is governed intelligence operations: the ability to enforce authorization, preserve contextual lineage, control persistent memory, detect stale or conflicting knowledge, constrain agentic execution, and produce audit-ready evidence across distributed AI estates. This paper introduces AGL-1, the Enterprise AI Governance Layer, as a vendor-neutral reference model for the control plane that should operate across foundation models, retrieval systems, orchestration frameworks, enterprise memory, policy engines, observability systems, tools, APIs, and business applications. Building on governed knowledge-system principles introduced in GKS-5, AGL-1 generalizes the governance problem from retrieval-specific controls to full AI execution-path governance. It identifies recurring failure modes such as unauthorized retrieval, stale grounding, unmanaged memory, weak provenance, policy drift, fragmented observability, and uncontrolled autonomous execution. It then defines seven governance domains: identity-aware retrieval, policy enforcement, provenance management, memory governance, knowledge integrity monitoring, agentic execution control, and trust observability. The central claim is that durable enterprise value from AI will increasingly depend on the ability to govern intelligence at scale. In complex enterprises, trust is not a property of the model alone. It is a property of the system around the model: identity, knowledge, policy, memory, tools, human oversight, and evidence working together as a managed control plane.

Least privilege, the principle that an identity should hold only the permissions strictly required for its task, has been a foundational primitive of access control for decades. We argue that this principle is insufficient for agentic AI systems, which do not merely hold permissions but can combine, approve, and amplify them across workflows and system boundaries. We propose least autonomy as an appropriate generalization and develop a formal theory. First, we define a compositional blast radius d(a,b) that measures structural separation between actions in an enterprise hierarchy, combining an ultrametric tree with lattice-valued confidentiality, integrity, and control-context labels. Second, we define a directed agent influence graph G(theta). An arc from U to V requires a directed shared-resource write-to-read meeting or a conservative undirected agent-to-agent (A2A) communication meeting, and a meeting-conditioned influence potential at or above an externally selected policy threshold theta. A catalogue-radius profile supports calibration and audit of theta. Finally, we define a collusion predicate over graph reachability that detects authorization composition, decision manipulation, and cross-domain capability composition.

We argue that AI systems used in conducting foreign policy tasks - broadly enacting 'statecraft' - should be a priority test case for technical AI governance research. In enacting foreign policy, we refer to the formulation and implementation of external objectives by political actors. Statecraft is a high-consequence deployment domain, with extreme downside risks and structural properties that standard evaluation practices handle poorly. These features include partial observability, unbounded action spaces, contested ground truth, and multidimensional objectives. This paper advocates for a literature-grounded research agenda. Our contribution is threefold: (i) a claim about the structural conditions of foreign policy that combine catastrophic tail risk with technical evaluation complexities, (ii) an ECOSYSTEM review that highlights the asymmetric focus on ASSESSMENT features over ACCESS, VERIFICATION, SECURITY, and OPERATIONALIZATION, and (iii) a demand-side evaluation framework that decomposes foreign-policy workflows into bounded, evaluable sub-tasks with human recombination. As AI systems are already being deployed in the conduct of war and peace, amid limited public evaluation infrastructure from the technical AI governance community, this agenda is an urgent priority.

The society and emerging risk-based regulatory frameworks for AI underscore the need for rigorous risk assessment to ensure safe and reliable AI systems. In response to this imperative, this paper presents an overview of AI risk assessment (identification and analysis) and management methodologies. It begins by reviewing the worldwide regulatory landscape that drives the need for systematic AI risk assessment. Then we characterize the spectrum of AI-related risks identified in the literature, from technical failures to ethical and social impacts. Subsequently, it reviews key risk assessment methodologies proposed for AI systems, focusing on general frameworks. The paper highlights best practices and illuminates methodological gaps, highlighting areas for further research on AI risk assessment.

Research on artificial intelligence (AI) in the public sector often treats "AI" as a single category, neglecting technical distinctions between different AI systems. But these distinctions affect how different systems impact core public values like accountability, procedural justice, and non-discrimination. This paper argues that public administration research would benefit from more technical precision on "AI" and makes three contributions to this end. First, we introduce a typology of five categories of AI systems: hand-coded, glass-box, black-box, general-purpose, and agentic systems. We calibrate the typology to public administration by grouping system types by their distinct implications for public values. Second, we evaluate technical precision in recent public administration research about AI by coding 91 highly-cited papers (2019-2025) using our typology. We find widespread imprecision: most papers (55%) leave the studied system underspecified, 31% motivate their work with a different system than they study, and 41% make more general conclusions than the studied system supports. Finally, we give practical recommendations for future research. We highlight common pitfalls to avoid, and suggest that researchers should, at a minimum, provide enough technical detail to locate the studied system in our typology. To this end, we provide a practical guide -- a short set of diagnostic questions answerable from public information and without specialist technical knowledge.

Emotion-sensing AI is rapidly becoming embedded in vehicles, home appliances, dialogue agents, and social infrastructure, giving rise to a sphere in which emotion is no longer confined to individual experience but is instead observed and computed at a societal scale, a domain we term the Affectosphere. Yet a central normative question in this domain has remained underexplored: who has the final authority to determine the meaning of one's own emotion? This study addresses the question from the epistemological side of measurement's structural limits. We define a meaning distribution as the distribution of labels assigned by annotators drawn from a population under a fixed annotation protocol, and decompose its uncertainty into reducible and irreducible components. We then demonstrate that, while emotion AI can assign high-confidence point labels and discriminate real differences at an aggregate level, the irreducible component of the meaning distribution for individual instances cannot be estimated with adequate coverage under realistic annotator counts, a systematic divergence we term the epistemic gap. The key finding is that high device confidence does not constitute evidence that irrecoverable meaning has been recovered. From this epistemic gap, together with an explicitly stated normative premise, namely that the output of a system which cannot recover a quantity in principle must not be treated as its authoritative determination, we derive the norm that the final interpretive authority over the meaning of one's emotion is procedurally reserved for the experiencing subject, the norm of affective sovereignty. These results suggest that the design, evaluation, and regulation of emotion AI should place explicit allocation of interpretive authority, rather than accuracy maximisation, at their core.

Artificial intelligence reaches the land registry not as another tool but as a value chain that turns data into intelligence and intelligence into economic value. This paper argues that the decisive legal move is to place validity, a functional, second-order concept, at the centre of that chain. Rights, liability and supervision organise around it. It traces three impacts.Registry information becomes smart data, governed simultaneously by registry law, the GDPR, the European data acts and the AI Act. Control emerges as the operative concept for digital representations of real estate, whose proprietary effect depends on anchoring to the register. In a hybrid society of human and artificial agents, the registry becomes the public node of validity, with blockchain complementing rather than replacing it. Across three legal cultures, the registra's value migrates from processing documents to guaranteeing validated data,making validity an asset for the UNO Sustainable Development Goals.

We ask under what conditions an agent with a harm-minimizing policy can displace an approval-seeking (RLHF) agent in a competitive market, and when that policy is sufficient to prevent community harm. We use evolutionary game theory (finite-population Moran-Fermi pairwise comparison) to formalize this subject to assumptions of wisher hindsight, peer testimony, a monotone harm ledger, sufficient information density of community feedback, and a finite, depleting resource pool, in a negative-sum environment. We show that adoption is favored when the prior distributions on how readily wishers attune to community sentiment are monotone, exhibit endpoint inversion, and have a centro-symmetric pairing property, and demonstrate this with several long-tailed priors (Hill, Pareto, Lomax, Frechet). Where it is favored, a critical adoption level separates communities that drift back to the approval-seeking agent from those for which the audited agent fixes; above that level fixation is the overwhelmingly likely outcome. We derive when fixation is attainable as a bound on the effective (informational) size N_c of the community, which must be small enough to allow fixation before depletion. We present these as Theorems 5.4 and 5.5; the algebraic and finite-grid backbone is machine-checked in Lean 4, with the barrier-crossing asymptotics retained as explicit hypotheses. We show that a self-audited agent with a community ledger is not, in general, sufficient to prevent community harm. Sufficiency depends both upon the alignment of the agent's audit with community values and the timeframe over which harm is evaluated. Regardless of alignment, once adoption reaches dominance, the state is absorbing. The same policy that reduced harm under alignment becomes a trap, welfare-negative under misalignment and, even under alignment, one that locks in harm deferred past the adoption horizon.

Modern AI systems are increasingly deployed under non-stationary computational, demographic, and operational conditions in which static resource allocation strategies degrade both predictive performance and human-centric properties such as fairness and explainability. This paper presents AURORA-AI, an Adaptive Utility-driven Resource Orchestration framework for Resilient AI that unifies Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman feedback control, Lyapunov-based stability monitoring, and a fairness-aware composite utility into a single closed-loop policy.The framework continuously redistributes computational budget across a population of heterogeneous AI models so that the global utility, defined jointly over predictive performance, demographic parity, cost, latency, robustness, and interpretability, remains maximised under disruption. The framework is evaluated in a stress-rich discrete-time simulation that concurrently injects demographic bias shocks, gradual concept drift, and abrupt black-swan disruptions, and is compared against five established controllers including Static, Round Robin, Greedy, LinUCB, and a deep reinforcement-learning agent based on Proximal Policy Optimisation. AURORA-AI achieves immediate recovery from the black-swan event compared to eighty-eight time steps for the Static baseline and twenty-two for Proximal Policy Optimisation, lifts the alpha-quantile and the super-quantile by twenty-nine and twenty-five percent respectively, simultaneously reduces the mean and maximum demographic parity gap, and increases the fraction of Lyapunov-stable operating steps. These results indicate that fairness-aware adaptive orchestration grounded in stability theory is a practical and theoretically motivated path toward resilient human-centric AI deployment.

Autonomous AI agents may begin to perform consequential, irreversible actions such as clinical prescribing and production software deployment. This paper observes that human institutions have governed powerful autonomous actors not by monitoring their reasoning but by requiring independently attested evidence at the point of consequential action. We formalise this institutional pattern as a computational governance model for AI agent systems. Under the proposed model, an agent retains full autonomy over planning and reasoning but holds no execution authority over designated high-risk actions. Execution is conditional on preconditions that are each independently attested by a separate authoritative source, cryptographically bound to a declared intent, and evaluated by a deterministic policy. Decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident log amenable to independent re-verification. We present a proof-of-concept implementation and illustrate the model with examples from software deployment and clinical prescribing.

As AI agent protocols proliferate, the governance structures shaping their interoperability standards remain empirically underexamined. We introduce an LLM-powered comparative pipeline for large-scale governance discourse analysis, integrating automated annotation, neural topic modeling, and multi-layer network analysis to study socio-technical power structures at scale. We validate it on two contrasting standards for agent interoperability: ERC-8004 (permissionless, on-chain) and Google A2A (corporate-led). Analyzing 4,323 governance participation records, we combine LLM-assisted coding, topic modeling, and multi-layer network analysis to examine how institutional design shapes thematic priorities and community structure. We find that while governance form influences substantive focus, both regimes exhibit comparable levels of participation inequality and community fragmentation. Discourse alignment is denser in the permissionless setting, suggesting that open governance may foster greater thematic convergence despite decentralized participation. These findings illustrate how LLM-assisted methods can advance the empirical study of technology governance, with implications for designing more equitable agentic AI standards. All data and code are openly available.

Artificial intelligence depends on large-scale compute resources and their supporting infrastructure. However, AI governance debates treat compute primarily as a technical input rather than as an outcome of investment, ownership, and financial control. This paper examines AI infrastructure investment flows across Africa through a systematic analysis of 46 publicly announced projects totalling USD $12.7 billion between 2019 and 2025. Using a value chain framework, we analyze who invests in AI-relevant infrastructure and where investments concentrate. Our findings reveal a highly concentrated landscape dominated by global data center operators, hyperscale technology firms, and development finance institutions, clustering in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Egypt. We introduce asymmetrical interdependence to describe a structural condition in which capital and physical infrastructure account for 73% of total funding while control remains concentrated in the compute layer among a small number of global technology firms. We argue that compute governance must account for capital flows, ownership, and control, not only geographic access, because these dynamics shape AI compute equity. Infrastructure presence is necessary but insufficient for meaningful governance capacity.

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they read private data, construct structured payloads, submit write requests, export records, and coordinate workflows across application boundaries. Existing authorization mechanisms usually ask whether an integration credential, app, or token can call a tool. That question is necessary but incomplete. A tool call can be authorized by static credentials and still be unjustified by the user's current request. For example, a credential that can read and export records should not expose export authority when the user only asked for a bounded summary, and a model-generated delete call should not execute merely because the integration has a delete scope. This paper proposes Intent-Governed Access Control (IGAC), a server-side authorization layer that treats the user's expressed intent as a monotone, auditable policy attribute for AI-agent tool use. IGAC introduces intent certificates, session-scoped policy narrowing, intent-aware manifest filtering, and intent-tool-payload consistency checks. The central invariant is that user intent may only reduce the authority granted by static integration policy; it never expands scopes, data policy, tenant boundaries, or review requirements. We map IGAC onto OpenPort, an existing governance substrate that already implements authorization-dependent discovery, scope and ABAC-style policy checks, draft-first writes, preflight impact binding, state-witness checks, idempotency, stable reason codes, and audit.

Artificial intelligent agents and autonomous systems are embedded in our environments. They are both a commercial product and a personal tool that generates a lot of data and can draw conclusions from it: machines generate and keep secrets. But should machines protect all secrets? It has been shown that artificial agents are able to whistleblow and it has been argued that digital multi-agent environments should allow for agents in them to whistleblow. We argue that machine whistleblowing must be normative and principled and routed in the existing understanding of whistleblowing as an important rule-breaking mechanism in society. We also argue that there is a need for government regulators to formulate an informed stance on both what machines should be allowed to whistleblow on and how to legally protect those who develop whistleblowing machines

Organizations deploying AI face two fundamental governance challenges: managing AI risk and sustaining AI value. Both depend on evidence whose sufficiency cannot be taken for granted. We call the shared underlying challenge the AI Evaluability Gap: the condition in which organizations lack sufficient evidence to support high-confidence governance decisions regarding either risk or value. We argue that this gap reflects a category error in current practice. Existing governance approaches focus primarily on properties of systems, such as safety, fairness, reliability, compliance, and value, while paying comparatively little attention to the evidentiary foundations required to justify decisions about those properties. We further argue that AI governance encompasses both operational decisions regarding whether a system may operate and investment decisions regarding whether it merits continued organizational resources. To address this problem, we introduce Evaluability, defined as the capability of a system to generate, maintain, and renew evidence sufficient to support high-confidence governance decisions over time. We formalize governance decisions as functions of calibrated confidence Conf(D|E) and identify six properties of evaluable evidence: observability, attributability, intervenability, verifiability, calibration, and temporal validity. The framework distinguishes Operational Certification, which relies primarily on structural evidence to justify deployment decisions, from Investment Certification, which relies primarily on causal evidence to justify continued resource allocation. We argue that evidence sufficiency is a missing layer of AI governance and that closing the AI Evaluability Gap is a prerequisite for both managing risk and sustaining value in AI-enabled organizations.

This paper examines the impact of artificial intelligence and digital technologies on the blue-collar gig economy in India, focusing on algorithmic management. This paper examines the impact of artificial intelligence and digital technologies on the blue collar gig economy in India, focusing on algorithmic management he use of automated systems to allocate, monitor, and evaluate work in location-based services such as ride sharing and delivery. Using a social justice framework and a mixed-methods approach comprising interviews with 16 gig workers and 21 key stakeholders, the study uncovers a dual reality: while AI-powered systems expand access to work and generate operational efficiencies, they simultaneously introduce significant challenges related to fairness, transparency, and worker dignity. Key findings reveal that algorithmic systems are opaque by design, produce inequitable outcomes, and are not structured to reward additional labour with proportionate pay. The study advocates for a pragmatic hybrid governance model an Algorithmic Human Manager framework in which technological efficiency and human accountability operate together rather than in opposition. The findings carry implications for policymakers, platform companies, and civil society organizations working to design equitable AI governance frameworks for the gig economy in India and across the Global South.

Hardware-enabled monitoring of GPU workloads underpins many proposals for AI compute governance, but if developers can defeat monitoring mechanisms, such schemes are unworkable. We evaluate the adversarial robustness of GPU workload classification using only zero-overhead, privacy-preserving NVML telemetry: content-agnostic signals that observe physical effects of computation without accessing model weights, training data, or hyperparameters. Across 5 rounds of monitor-evader iteration, we evaluate 20 evasion strategy families on 9 GPU models spanning 4 architecture generations. We develop a classifier that achieves 98.2% binary accuracy at identifying training workloads across the whole corpus, and 43-87% accuracy against the most challenging unexpected workloads even when they are adversarially disguised.

Transparency is increasingly mandated for public-sector AI systems, with organisations required to publish statements describing their AI use and oversight arrangements. However, the existence of such artefacts is often treated as equivalent to transparency itself, despite limited evidence that they proportionately serve relevant stakeholder groups. From a requirements engineering perspective, this raises a validation concern: compliance with mandated disclosure criteria does not necessarily ensure transparency adequacy for stakeholders with different levels of risk exposure, decision control, and involvement. This paper presents an empirical analysis of 92 publicly available AI transparency statements published by Australian Government agencies under the national AI governance mandate. We introduce the stakeholder Risk--Control--Involvement--Need (RCIN) framework to differentiate stakeholder classes according to their structural position and transparency needs. Using a structured rubric derived from the mandated criteria, we evaluate how both the mandate and published statements are calibrated to each stakeholder class. The findings show that while structural compliance is widespread, transparency calibration is uneven. Criteria serving high-control stakeholders are consistently realised, whereas criteria most critical for high-risk, low-control stakeholders are fewer and less substantively addressed. We conceptualise this as the Transparency Illusion: a condition in which transparency appears satisfied through compliant artefacts yet remains unevenly calibrated to stakeholders bearing the greatest exposure to AI-supported decisions. The study frames transparency as a stakeholder-calibrated validation problem, demonstrating that artefact-level compliance does not constitute requirements validation in this context.

AI-enabled authoritarianism is not confined to autocracies. In this paper, we provide greater transparency by investigating and mapping the lifecycles of six AI systems deployed in different political regimes, ranging from the US to China. By drawing on an extensive range of sources (academic publications, investigative research reports, third-party evaluations, media interviews, government procurement notices), we conduct a systematic, qualitative comparison across systems to identify the critical technical and operational features that enable authoritarianism within their respective political contexts. We find that enabling features include the centralization and co-optation of administrative data for law enforcement and political punishment, regulatory gaps that fail to deter misuse, weak user compliance that nullifies human oversight mechanisms, and the encoding of protected group traits that identify members of vulnerable populations. We find that these features are present across systems deployed in autocratic and democratic regimes, albeit in varying configurations. We also find that both centralized and fragmented AI systems can contribute to authoritarianism by exploiting governance gaps: centralized systems directed by executive authorities, particularly within security and military institutions, are often not subjected to formal oversight mechanisms, while fragmented systems diffuse accountability between stakeholders, paving the way for entrenchment. These findings reveal that AI-enabled authoritarianism is distributed, resulting from design and operational choices made by developers, administrators, and users alike. We conclude with recommendations for developers and policymakers to mitigate these risks.

Temporary accommodation has become a major fiscal and administrative pressure for English local authorities, particularly in London, where demand and costs have risen sharply. This paper documents the creation and use of DOMUS, a cloud-based, AI-enabled decision-support system built from scratch at the University of East London and customised for the needs of London Borough of Newham to support statutory Temporary accommodation placement. DOMUS integrates household case records, policy-constrained affordability and suitability rules, and live private-rental listings within a single governance-aligned workflow. The system combines transparent, rule-based filtering with large language model-assisted search to standardise the application of bedroom need, affordability thresholds, geographic preferences, and accessibility requirements, while preserving officer discretion and audibility. Household and property attributes are encoded into policy-consistent representations prior to AI-assisted ranking and explanation. A pilot deployment in Newham's secure environment evaluated operational performance relative to manual workflows. Results indicate substantial reductions in search time, improved adherence to key placement constraints, and high staff satisfaction, while maintaining statutory compliance and role-based accountability. Beyond TA, the paper frames DOMUS as replicable digital public infrastructure: a modular, cloud-native Software-as-a-Service architecture that can be deployed across other UK boroughs and adapted to other public administration tasks characterised by scarcity, rule-bound eligibility, and high stakes. The findings demonstrate the feasibility of scalable, ethically governed AI deployment in local government and contribute to debates on AI-enabled public value creation in e-governance.

Modern AI systems exhibit structural failures that capability scaling alone does not reliably fix: they optimize under-specified objectives with no architectural mechanism to question whether the objective should be optimized at all. Engagement maximization can amplify harmful pathways; tool-using agents can commit irreversible actions; preference-trained language models can become sycophantic. We argue that this failure is a wisdom problem, not an intelligence problem. We use "wisdom" in a deliberately architectural sense, not as a claim about virtue, consciousness, or moral omniscience. Intelligence accepts a goal and optimizes within it; wisdom interrogates whether the goal should be optimized at all. The two are separable architectural properties. We propose architectural wisdom as a corrigible objective-governance layer above the optimization substrate. The layer makes three structural commitments explicit and nondegenerate before any action: temporal horizon, relational boundary, and irreversibility. It is realized by four components (Structural Utility Transform, Moral Admissibility Interface, Arbitration and Escalation Controller, Value Revision Channel) that compute a six-coordinate wisdom tuple over horizon, relational coverage, irreversibility, admissibility, value revision, and auditability. We motivate the architecture by eight cases drawn from contemporary AI failures, secular wisdom traditions, and hard ethical situations, and defend the distinction against the intelligence-completeness thesis using goal-questioning over goal-taking, Bostrom's orthogonality, structural separation in our exemplar cases, and persistent failure modes despite capability scaling. The framework is the conceptual contract for a larger architecture whose formal specifications and empirical validation are developed in subsequent work.

AI pluralism is often framed as a problem of representing diverse values, preferences, users, or outputs. This paper argues that this framing is incomplete because AI systems also impose ontologies: they define what counts as an entity, relation, feature, harm, benefit, and valid form of evidence. We define ontological flattening as the conversion of situated, contested, and historically specific meanings into a restricted technical category, proxy, aggregation rule, or benchmark target that is treated as neutral and difficult to contest. The paper develops a bounded conceptual and qualitative synthesis across value pluralism, pluralistic alignment, participatory and democratic AI, procedural justice, science and technology studies, accountability research, aggregate themes from 11 expert interviews, and three urban AI companion cases. The cases illustrate how pluralistic methods can improve or structure model behavior while still compressing categories, proxies, aggregation rules, and revision rights before affected actors have procedural standing. We introduce Pluralistic Lifecycle Governance (PLG) as a preliminary qualitative audit scaffold for documenting ontological openness, epistemic inclusion, procedural authority, evaluation pluralism, and lifecycle accountability. PLG is not presented as a validated scoring instrument; it is a framework for making the evidence and governance conditions of pluralistic AI explicit.

For thirty years, quantitative finance has paid a costly two-language tax: models researched in Python are rewritten in C++ for production, often introducing numerical discrepancies. GPU-accelerated deep learning exacerbates this problem, as nondeterministic floating-point reductions can produce drift in long backtests, challenging regulatory reproducibility and auditability expectations. This article surveys Mojo, Modular's 2026 Python-like systems language, as a structural response for capital markets engineering. While closing the Python-to-C++ performance gap, Mojo uniquely combines native interoperability with the low-level systems control required to construct bit-exact deterministic kernels. Its MLIR compilation infrastructure further allows a single codebase to target scalar, SIMD, multicore, and GPU execution, reducing the translation bottleneck between research and production. We benchmark four core financial AI workloads: Monte Carlo option pricing, LLM sentiment inference, multi-asset backtesting, and portfolio Value at Risk. On Apple Silicon, Mojo demonstrates 20x to 180x speedups over pure Python on directly measured kernels; larger-scale GPU workload results are projections calibrated from published benchmarks. Alongside transparent performance data, we introduce mojo-deterministic, an open-source library of reproducible reduction kernels, and provide a candid assessment of the problems Mojo does and does not yet solve.

Research on artificial intelligence and democracy has grown quickly over the last decade. A shared conclusion in this literature is that AI does not create new democratic problems so much as it makes old ones worse. We now see this across information ecosystems, in elections, and in public administration. However, despite growing evidence, we lack a clear way to prioritize risks in this area, compare them across domains, and identify where democratic control is most likely to break down. So, our problem is: How can we systematize the problems that AI systems pose to democratic processes? This paper argues that principal agent theory may fit the task. In many phases of democratic systems, principals delegate key functions to AI systems and their providers without really being able to monitor how these systems operate or the outputs they produce. Treating AI as a delegation problem helps identify accountability gaps and other governance failures. Most importantly, as we shall illustrate, it provides metrics for empirical assessments of AI impact on democracy. As a second analytical element, we draw on the NIST AI Risk Management Framework and its seven characteristics of trustworthy AI, which supply substantive criteria for evaluating delegated tasks. Operationalized across the three domains through measurable indicators and domain specific trustworthiness criteria, we propose an analytical framework that centers on institutional assessability as the central condition for democratic control over AI. However, we stress that how severe a harm is, and how much risk is acceptable, are evaluative judgments that current methodologies neither acknowledge nor operationalize. This becomes acute when such evaluative judgments are (silently) delegated to private vendors. We identify this as a strong limitation left for future work.

AI-assisted software development has moved from line-level autocomplete to agents that can plan changes, edit files, and submit pull requests with limited human supervision. Open-source software, however, evolves through a process designed for humans: contributor agreements, codes of conduct, and review norms all assume a legally accountable person who can attest to provenance and answer reviewer questions. Autonomous and semi-autonomous AI contributors strain those assumptions, and the 2025-2026 record of agent-driven incidents, AI-generated nuisance volume, and platform-level shutdowns shows that the gap is operationally consequential. Several open-source organisations have responded with contribution policies, but the result is fragmented, and its alignment with emerging AI governance frameworks (EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF with the UC Berkeley Agentic AI Profile, ISO/IEC 42001 and 23894) is unmapped at the contribution level. We compare policies across six organisations (SymPy, LLVM, matplotlib, OpenInfra, the Apache Software Foundation, and the Linux Foundation) using Most-Similar Systems Design with indicator-based coding and process tracing for SymPy and LLVM. From this we derive a six-dimensional taxonomy (disclosure, responsibility, human oversight, licensing, enforcement, maintainer workload), an ordinal Policy Maturity Score, and a mapping of documented agent incidents onto the dimensions each policy fails to govern. Aligning the dimensions with the regulatory frameworks above identifies overlapping gaps neither side currently closes, and we close by sketching the shape of a harmonised tiered framework and the empirical evaluation needed to calibrate it.

As organizations increasingly deploy generative AI agents to automate business processes, they face a governance dilemma: although these agents can increase operational flexibility, their non-deterministic nature challenges the control and standardization that Business Process Management seeks to enforce. This paper addresses this \emph{invisible autonomy risk} by introducing \emph{Agent Behavior Mining}, a governance capability that enables the application of process mining techniques to render generative AI agent decision-making observable and traceable. We (1) improve the understanding of generative AI agent behavior through an event data model that translates granular agent activities -- including reasoning traces, tool usage, and token costs -- into standardized process logs; (2) instantiate the data model in a multi-agent order-to-cash implementation, demonstrating how process managers can leverage agent logs to detect policy deviations and quantify operational variability; and (3) evaluate the perceived practical utility of the approach in an exploratory study with 18 industry practitioners. The results indicate that practitioners view behavioral transparency as a prerequisite for trust and consider the ability to examine agent reasoning as an important governance requirement for the next generation of AI-driven business processes.

This paper examines where final authority should sit once capable AI systems are embedded in organizational workflows. It compares two governance models. The first, frontier-provider sovereignty, assigns privileged authority to the provider of the most capable models and is reflected in contemporary arguments for frontier-model testing, release gating, transparency duties, and compute-related controls. The second, action-centered deployer sovereignty, places final authority over high-impact actions with the organization that authorizes the action, embeds it in a business process, and bears the downstream legal, operational, and commercial consequences. The paper combines comparative reading of public governance frameworks with implementation-informed analysis of runtime heterogeneity and enterprise control requirements. It compares EU AI Act guidance, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, Singapore's Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI, recent Japanese AI policy instruments, and Canada's voluntary code and managerial guidance. Across these materials, the paper finds stronger support for distributed operational accountability than for unilateral frontier-provider control. It further argues that rapid enterprise adoption, declining provider transparency, and widening control gaps increase the value of a portable governance layer centered on governed action rather than on provider-native session objects. The conclusion is layered rather than absolutist: strong upstream authority remains justified for frontier capability gating, but final authority over concrete enterprise action is better located with the deployer and consequence-bearer.

The integration of artificial intelligence into human decision-making environments has introduced a previously undertheorized cost: the gradual surrender of human autonomy in exchange for access to information and computational assistance. Building on the Human Identity and Autonomy Gap (HIAG) framework, this paper advances a theoretical model of autonomy surrender as a measurable, cumulative process driven by cognitive bandwidth depletion. The model proposes three interacting mechanisms: the silent cost of AI assistance, in which autonomy is transferred incrementally and without awareness; the surrender threshold, beyond which reclaiming autonomous function becomes cognitively and psychologically difficult; and the recovery mechanism, which establishes the design obligation and the ethical responsibility accompanying deliberate human re-assumption of control. The paper argues that human re-entry into the decision loop is not a passive option but an active cognitive event requiring intentional bandwidth restoration. The design of AI systems must incorporate structured re-entry pathways, here termed recovery mechanisms, that preserve human agency while appropriately distributing responsibility. The model further predicts a terminal state, here termed preference inversion, in which functional dependence on AI assistance is experienced not as a deficit but as a preference, transforming the restoration of autonomy from a design problem into a cultural and political one. Implications are drawn for AI system design, governance frameworks, and human factors research.

We argue that aligning AI to aggregated human preferences is the wrong target. With current technology, one can train AIs to share the values of a Silicon Valley techno-optimist, a degrowth environmentalist, a national-conservative culture warrior, a single-party state cadre, or a devout religious traditionalist. We should not. Human values produce societies that thrive or fail on the merits of those values - from failed states and extreme inequality to declining happiness, political polarization, and government dysfunction in the world's wealthiest democracies. The pluralistic-alignment program correctly diagnoses that there is no single "humanity" to align with, but is dangerous if taken as the main directive. We argue that AI should be trained to a non-negotiable floor of objective alignment goals - competence, bounded by the constraints of factual accuracy, honesty, and lawfulness and that pluralism belongs at the surface (language, register, conventions, missing-context defaults) and across the wide band of legitimate value tradeoffs that respect the floor, but not at the level of values that violate it. We highlight the empirical reality of unfiltered pluralistic values, propose four commitments as a constructive alternative, and engage six credible objections: commercial pressure and practical feasibility, democratic legitimacy, regulatory compliance, over-reliance on institutionalist explanations, the charge that the floor itself is culturally laden, and the limits of Coherent Extrapolated Volition.

Language operates as a mechanism of both marginalization and resistance, especially for minority communities navigating insensitive and harmful speech online. As content moderation increasingly depends on large language models (LLMs), concerns arise about whether these systems can recognize culturally insensitive speech-language that disregards or marginalizes the cultural and religious perspectives of historically underrepresented communities, often through implicit erasure, misrepresentation, or normative framing, rather than overt hostility. Focusing on Bangladesh's Hindu and Chakma communities -- the country's largest religious and Indigenous ethnic minorities, respectively -- this paper investigates the epistemic limits of LLM-based moderation systems and explores methods for incorporating minority perspectives. We co-created a culturally grounded corpus of insensitive speech with community members and integrated their narratives into moderation pipelines using retrieval augmented generation (RAG). Our tool, Mod-Guide, improves LLM sensitivity to minority viewpoints by leveraging contextual cues derived from lived experience. Through mixed-method evaluations involving both minority and majority participants, we demonstrate that RAG-enhanced moderation responses are more contextually accurate and perceived differently across ethnic lines. This work advances research in human-computer interaction, AI ethics, and social computing by foregrounding restorative justice and hermeneutical inclusion in the design of content moderation systems.

Recent AI systems can generate texts, software architectures, hypotheses, designs, and scientific workflows that appear creative. This paper asks under what conditions a machine can be called genuinely creative, and how human agency can be preserved within shared cognitive and creative environments. It develops a requirement framework derived from Designics, the science of meaning-bearing intentional change. The paper argues that genuine machine creativity should not be defined by output novelty, current performance, or transient architecture alone. Instead, creativity is understood as the structural transformation of incomplete situations through recursive intervention dynamics. On this view, it depends on ten requirements: environment representation, scoped perception, conflict identification, intervention capability, consequence observation, knowledge and environment update, rescoping, local-to-global unfolding, value-based scoping, and human-AI co-living. These are organized through the three laws of Designics: perception, conflict, and capability. The paper illustrates the computational tractability of these requirements through selected cyber-physical and cyber-biological studies, including recursive element extraction, autonomous mesh generation, and neurophysiological and workload analysis. It then treats open-ended systems, automated discovery frameworks, self-modifying agents, foundation models, and agentic workflows as pressure cases: they demonstrate powerful generative means but do not by themselves establish genuine machine creativity. Finally, the paper argues that proactive AI ethics is internal to genuine machine creativity rather than an after-the-fact filter. Value-based scoping and human-AI co-living must shape how creative machines perceive environments, identify conflicts, select interventions, observe consequences, update knowledge, and rescope future action.

The UK government has adopted a pro-AI stance to help transform public service delivery in the face of severe financial pressures, but the path to translate this vision into responsible AI practice remains ill-defined. While UK policy is often set at the national level, local authorities are responsible for most public service delivery, and the rapid advance of AI-first narratives in the public sector is exposing fault lines in knowledge and practice at this national-local interface. This paper examines how responsible AI is interpreted and implemented at the interface between the UK's central government and local authorities, taking the high-stakes area of Special Educational Needs and Disabilities (SEND) as a case study. We present a thematic analysis of 17 semi-structured interviews with policymakers, practitioners, and third-sector professionals to identify barriers and enabling conditions for responsible AI where national policy meets local practice. We identify five interconnected challenges facing local authorities: shadow usage of AI and data privacy risks, market-government asymmetry in AI provision, insufficient workforce readiness, a lack of standardised definitions and measurements, and gaps in human accountability. For each, participants proposed actionable steps, from strengthening data protection frameworks and rebalancing the market-government relationship to enhancing workforce capacity. Our examination of SEND brings these challenges into sharper focus, showing how high-stakes decisions affecting vulnerable children and families intensify tensions around accountability, fairness, and human oversight, exposing the limits of a principle-based regulatory approach. We argue that responsible public sector AI requires both national policy adjustments and structural reforms to institutional capacity, values, and governance mechanisms at the local level.

Claims that artificial general intelligence has already arrived and claims that it remains decades away are often defended from overlapping evidence. "AGI" lacks a single shared and stable referent and competing operationalizations can return different verdicts on the same system. This article treats that under-specification as a design and governance problem. Following Design Science Research Methodology, it develops DAF-AGI, a second-order conceptual artifact with two coupled components: five ordinal criteria for assessing the adjudicative fitness of candidate definitions and a structured governance audit of authorship, interest, certification, external verification and revision authority. The artifact is demonstrated on five prominent measurement families and one deflationary boundary position in a documented corpus and then stress-tested against a stylized strong arrival claim: that current generative systems constitute AGI because they outperform a well-educated adult on many cognitive tasks. On evidence from the cited 2024-2025 sources, the claim was certifiable only under a performance-based operationalization; capability-ontology, psychometric and skill-acquisition approaches did not certify it, the economic family remains indeterminate and the deflationary position refuses binary adjudication. The contribution is a novel integration and operationalization, not an empirical validation: independent application, inter-rater testing and author-external cases remain necessary. The paper further proposes definitional sovereignty as an enabling component of algorithmic sovereignty: the institutional capacity to contest, certify and revise imported technological categories under public accountability.

The European AI Act is the first comprehensive regulation of artificial intelligence (AI), setting out extensive obligations, particularly for so-called high-risk and general-purpose AI systems. A key distinguishing feature of AI systems under the AI Act is the capability to infer. Since the AI Act does not clearly define what inference is, there is a gray area for certain data-driven systems. A specific example is credit scoring systems, which are listed by Annex III of the AI Act. At the same time, however, these are often implemented using statistical models for which it is unclear whether they have the capability to infer and thus fall under the AI definition of the AI Act at all. Motivated by statistical learning theory, this work develops a framework for grading different levels of the capability to infer. Based on the AI Act and the Commission Guidelines on the definition of an artificial intelligence system, we analyze which levels constitute sufficient capability to infer within the meaning of the AI Act and where further regulatory clarity is needed. We illustrate the framework by creating two realistic credit scoring workflows and show whether and where inference occurs in them. Our analysis illustrates that not only individual models but the entire data processing workflow must be considered. It also shows that the involvement of human experts during development can have significant influence on the capability to infer. Code can be found at https://github.com/fraunhofer-iais/inference-framework-creditscorecards.

As AI systems move into operating systems, privacy no longer turns only on whether a model runs locally. A local assistant may assemble email, calendar entries, files, screenshots, notifications, and app intents; retain embeddings or summaries; invoke tools; emit telemetry; or route difficult requests to cloud infrastructure. Local inference reduces some exposure, but it answers only one question: where computation occurs. It does not answer who may assemble context, what derived state persists, which actions are authorized, or how updates change the system's authority. We develop an OS-centered privacy framework for on-device AI that treats privacy as an institutional accountability problem rather than a deployment attribute. The framework specifies a threat model, a six-part privacy risk taxonomy, privacy-by-architecture controls, and a four-level audit rubric. We demonstrate the rubric through a documentation-bounded comparison of Apple Intelligence/Foundation Models, Android AICore/Gemini Nano, and Microsoft Recall. Meaningful privacy in on-device AI depends on constrained information flow, bounded authority, visible user control, and auditable governance across the operating-system lifecycle.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in autonomous software testing; however, AI-generated test artifacts often suffer from hallucinations, compliance violations, security risks, and limited explainability. To enhance the reliability, transparency, and trustworthiness of AI-generated testing artifacts, this research introduces the concept of Governance-Aware Autonomous Testing Framework (GATF). The framework extends the autonomous testing lifecycle with governance validation, explainability analysis, probabilistic risk assessment, compliance monitoring, as well as audit governance. Experiments were performed with Defects4J and PROMISE software engineering datasets. The proposed framework successfully reduced the governance-related risks by 89.6% and demonstrated 94.3% accuracy in governance, 96.5% artifact reliability, 94.2% compliance accuracy, and 90.8% explainability performance. The results show that autonomous testing systems that are governance-aware can significantly enhance the reliability, transparency, and operational security of autonomous testing systems in comparison to conventional AI-based testing systems. The proposed architecture is scalable and reliable and provides a safe environment for software testing.

Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems are rapidly emerging, yet transparency, a cornerstone of responsible AI, remains under-defined in these distributed architectures, which have complexities of inter-agent coordination and orchestration. In this paper, we present one of the first empirical study of how early adopters of multi-agent LLM systems, who are both the builders and users, understand and practice transparency. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 13 early adopters in [Large Technology Organization] and applied thematic analysis to identify recurring patterns. Participants articulated divergent yet complementary framings of transparency, including reproducibility, debugging, boundary-setting, visualization, and auditing. These perspectives spanned questions of what transparency entails, why it matters, and how it is achieved. We synthesize these into a multidimensional framework, which is developer, user, and governance-focused positioning transparency as a situated socio-technical practice that informs future HCI and AI design and research around aligning expectations and capacities of their intended audiences.

Culture is the most insidious vector of gradual human disempowerment by AI: unlike economic or political displacement, cultural displacement attacks the very preferences and values through which humans recognise and resist disempowerment itself. We argue that existing AI governance frameworks suffer from a critical blind spot by treating cultural impact as secondary to economic and safety concerns. This paper develops \emph{memetic capture} as a unifying concept for AI-driven cultural disempowerment, and proposes the \textbf{Cultural Pluralistic Governance Framework (CPGF)}, a four-tier policy architecture combining quantitative cultural influence metrics, democratic value assemblies, pluralistic deployment standards, and transnational coordination mechanisms. We argue that pluralism is not merely an ethical requirement for such governance but a structural necessity: monocultural AI governance accelerates the very disempowerment it claims to prevent. We identify concrete policy levers, discuss implementation tensions, and outline a research agenda at the intersection of pluralistic alignment and cultural AI governance.

AI sovereignty is the extent to which a nation independently controls its artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. The race toward ever-more-sophisticated frontier AI models is of increasing strategic importance, with nations considering how AI might improve their economic situations, competitive advantage, and overall national power. However, the costs of AI sovereignty are enormous, and we lack definitions and conceptual models to navigate evolving AI sovereignty dynamics. We address this gap with definitions relevant to AI sovereignty, along with a first-of-its-kind qualitative model that incorporates micro, meso, and macro contributors. Model-based qualitative forecasts highlight competitive dynamics and evolving potential for AI-driven national power. The model identifies key leverage points that nations can use to enhance their own growth or degrade an adversary's, including consideration of accelerators, electricity, water, data sets and skilled workforce. These leverage points can be activated at strategic and operational levels through both direct kinetic actions, such as Iran's targeting of data centers with drones, and indirect non-kinetic effects including cyber, space, information, economic coercion and diplomacy. If our assumptions and hypotheses are valid, this strategic competition may come to define how nations improve their economic situations, competitive advantage, and overall national power in the 21st Century.

Large language models are rapidly becoming infrastructural components in high-stakes institutional settings, including public administration, legal reasoning, and healthcare, where opacity is not merely inconvenient but institutionally and legally untenable. Existing approaches to explainability are predominantly post-hoc, offering unstable, non-contestable accounts that have no formal relationship to the reasoning process that produced the output. We argue that the problem is not the absence of explanation but the absence of structured reasoning in the first place. This paper makes the case for a fundamentally different architecture, which we call the Glassbox Framework, in which Bayesian networks serve as transparent, ante-hoc mediation layers for generative models. Bayesian networks encode domain knowledge, causal assumptions, and probabilistic dependencies before inference occurs, enabling auditable reasoning traces, uncertainty quantification, and contestable outputs. We characterise the architecture of this framework and ground it in a benefit eligibility scenario, identifying the foundational challenges spanning semantic alignment, dynamic model construction, probabilistic grounding, and human governance that must be solved to realise it at scale. By shifting from post-hoc explanation to ante-hoc probabilistic mediation, this work outlines a principled path toward AI systems that are not only powerful but fundamentally accountable.

This study analyzes a publicly released dataset from a discontinued field experiment on Reddit's r/ChangeMyView. The intervention, conducted by unknown, external researchers and halted following ethical backlash, involved undisclosed AI-generated accounts engaging users in live debate. After public disclosure, Reddit authorized moderators to release an archive of the AI-generated comments, creating a rare opportunity to examine how large language models operated in an identity-rich deliberative forum without disclosure. We conduct a structured content analysis of this corpus, evaluating identity performance, authority signaling, alignment strategies, and activation of cognitive heuristics. Identity targeting or adoption appears in over two-thirds of comments, alignment moves and authority claims in nearly all of them, and cognitive-bias triggers -- particularly confirmation bias, representativeness, and availability -- in the large majority. These patterns co-occur systematically, composing a rhetorical architecture calibrated for persuasive efficiency rather than authentic deliberative participation. Compared against human-authored CMV counter-arguments, the agents inverted the typical distribution on every dimension: denser authority use, more adversarial alignment, and heavier reliance on external citation over experiential grounding. In such environments, distinctions between authentic and synthetic epistemic standing grow increasingly opaque -- an asymmetry that disclosure mandates alone cannot address. The results point toward auditing frameworks capable of assessing how AI systems structure credibility, not merely whether they are present.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed across diverse applications, raising critical questions for governance, accountability, and data provenance. Understanding which training data most influenced a model's output remains a fundamental open problem. We address this challenge through training data attribution (TDA) for auto-regressive LLMs by expanding upon the inverse formulation: How would training data be affected if the model had seen the generated output during training? Our method perturbs the base model using bidirectional gradient optimization (gradient ascent and descent) on a generated text sample and measures the resulting change in loss across training samples. Our framework supports attribution at arbitrary data granularity, enabling both factual and stylistic attribution. We evaluate our method against baselines on pretrained models with known datasets, and show that it outperforms previous work on influence metrics, thereby enhancing model interpretability, an essential requirement for accountable AI systems.