Artificial Intelligence Governance

Deep learning systems now mediate military decisions to use force, yet their internal logic resists inspection, their evaluation practices are gameable, and their deployment fractures accountability across dispersed stakeholders. The ethical challenge posed by these systems is fundamentally epistemic: not just whether autonomous weapons should be permitted to kill, but whether the conditions for responsible human judgment can survive when critical functions are delegated to opaque algorithms. We show that this epistemic condition produces a concrete accountability gap: responsibility diffuses across designers, operators, and policymakers while International Humanitarian Law presupposes capacities for judgment that current AI systems lack. To address this gap, we propose a governance framework that proceduralizes ethical constraints through named accountability roles, adversarial auditing with undisclosed benchmarks, tiered deployment thresholds, and a proposed NATO evaluation standard. Counterfactual analysis of eight documented cases (1988-2025) shows that each governance mechanism addresses a documented class of failure, but no single safeguard suffices in isolation: effective governance of military AI requires not only technical constraints but the institutional infrastructure to keep human judgment meaningful.

When does work done with AI still feel like ours? As AI becomes woven into everyday tasks, we must examine what happens to our sense of ownership and contribution when a machine shares in producing what we make. We report an exploratory qualitative survey in which participants were asked to describe two recent, self-selected tasks completed with AI: one that felt like their own and one that did not. We find that felt ownership depends on the process of collaboration: people disown work when they merely approve AI's suggestions, but retain ownership when they lead, iterate, or rewrite. Ownership can also extend to settings where people own the vision for a project but not the execution; respondents reported high ownership on tasks they could not have completed without AI. Loss of personal voice and a lack of comprehension of the output both erode ownership. Finally, willingness to disclose AI use is often decoupled from actual pride or ownership, and instead shaped by community norms and fear of credit erasure. We propose several research directions as a result of these findings to promote AI development that supports people's sense of authorship over their own lives.

The EU AI Act (Regulation 2024/1689) imposes technical obligations on high-risk AI providers, yet Articles 8-15 were drafted for predictive AI and leave seven technical gaps when applied to generative systems, spanning non-deterministic data governance, training-data provenance, continuous conformity, human oversight, open-ended robustness, emergent risk, and generative fairness. We deliver Governance-as-Code (GaC), a framework of 43 machine-checkable acceptance criteria across six compliance modules that run in a CI/CD pipeline and emit Article-indexed audit evidence, and we show the actual Rego policy code rather than merely describing it. Our central commitment is that the Act's open-textured standards ("appropriate levels," "possible biases") become declared, auditable numbers: robustness thresholds are derived from the provider's documented baseline and a state-of-the-art floor, and framing bias is collapsed into eight measurable proxies tested by counterfactual demographic probing. We also correct who owes what, since under Article 25 and Chapter V a downstream deployer relies on the upstream provider's Article 53 training-data summary and documents only the layers it controls, so GaC verifies that summary rather than demanding per-sample documentation the deployer never had. We validate on two enterprise deployments, a high-risk advisory chatbot and a limited-risk content generator, benchmarking against a manual expert audit rather than documentation artifacts that were never designed to enforce compliance. GaC reproduces all of the manual audit's findings, including three penalty-triggering violations, while cutting audit labor by roughly 75%.

Agentic AI systems plan, invoke tools and act with limited supervision; they are now both the subject of audits and, increasingly, the auditor. Independence, the foundation of assurance,is still applied to them as a binary. We argue that it must be graded along three orthogonal axes: principal independence (who controls the auditor), substrate independence (an auditor sharing the auditee's foundation-model family, toolchain or guardrails fails with it) and evidence independence (whether evidence is attestable rather than self-reported). Each axis has precedent; the contribution is to grade all three on a single audit, aggregate them by the weakest link, and apply the same rubric when the auditor is itself an agent. We give the model a formal basis by transplanting the beta-factor model of common-cause failure from reliability engineering, a seven-step protocol whose outputs a third party can verify, a structural detectability analysis of a procurement-controls agent audited at three grades, and a Monte Carlo study of the model in which a conventional internal audit of an agent-a real audit team, a second agent, provider logsp-surfaces 5.9% of the faults it could in principle see and none at all in half the fault classes. We map the triple to the EU AI Act as amended, ISO/IEC 42006, UK public-sector risk-management guidance and audit-regulator practice.

AI-assisted claims can appear authoritative when evidence, analysis, human authorization, presentation, and correction history refer to different states. Provenance, attestation, and transparency expose history but alone do not specify the publication transition examined here. We develop Publication Authority as an exact-state, non-transferable, single-use publication capability and instantiate it in PAC-2026 (Publication-Accountability Calculus), a machine-readable AIJIM Protocol candidate. We evaluate its fourth bounded semantic freeze (SF-4), a fixed-profile specification designed for replaceable bindings. Six obligations govern evidence, runs and artifacts, measurement disclosure, authorization, surface correspondence, and lifecycle continuity. Each yields a target-bound witness, localized counterexample, or localized unverifiability; none can compensate for another. Only a fresh, complete all-pass record derives the permit consumed by one atomic publication transition. We use identity vectors, adversarial cases, finite models, and historical implementations. Ten models explored 110,764 safe reachable states; 76 unsafe configurations produced the expected violation or observer countermodel. A reader surface passing its correspondence check cannot authorize publication unless the accepted record admits that surface. SF-4 separates evidence horizon from verification time and rejects an authentic but causally invalid authorization. A historical predecessor path reproduced 17 frozen authorization-successor outcomes. A later in-house, instance-blind test of known case classes matched all 183 scored expectations; same-host package execution reproduced its 240 archived observations. Results support internal coherence, bounded safety, fault sensitivity, and limited constructibility, but not factual truth, general refinement, blind interoperability, field efficacy, or standards status.

Environmental controversies in global supply chains pose significant risks for global buyers. This study examines whether overseas suppliers' exposure to buyers' artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled environmental governance reduces supplier environmental controversies. Drawing on organizational information processing theory and signaling theory, we investigate how suppliers' exposure to AI-enabled governance influences their environmental controversies and the institutional contingencies under which this effect varies. Using text analysis to measure buyer AI-enabled environmental governance, we analyze panel data on 2,505 suppliers of U.S.-listed firms across 41 countries from 2020 to 2024 with multidimensional fixed-effects models. We find that suppliers' exposure to buyer AI-enabled environmental governance is negatively associated with supplier environmental controversies in the following year. This negative relationship is stronger in supplier countries with higher AI readiness and regulatory quality. The study contributes to research on AI-enabled sustainability governance and sustainable supply chain risk management.

Claims that Artificial Intelligence systems improve decisions, broaden access, reduce harm, or empower users can exceed what their evaluation establishes. Predictive performance alone does not establish safety, the presence of oversight does not establish meaningful control, and faster task completion does not establish understanding or choice. Evaluation must account for unreliable outputs and uneven performance, but also for overreliance, weakened recourse, and displaced human expertise. The harder questions are what the evidence warrants, which relations of power remain unexamined, and where measurement must stop. Assessing improvement requires examining what institutions value and the conditions AI is asked to address. AI is both revelation and intervention. Its use can reveal unmet human needs and assumptions about what matters. Once deployed, it can repair, compound, substitute for, or conceal existing failures. We develop a rupture test that evaluates deployment against explicit human and non-AI baselines. Drawing on Pope Leo XIV's Magnifica Humanitas, we examine dignity and the common good alongside questions of who owns AI infrastructure and who controls its use. These commitments shape judgments about improvement; evidence alone cannot establish moral or political legitimacy. We distinguish evidence-bounded deployment, which limits claims to what has been evaluated, from measurement-bounded governance, which records constraints that favorable evidence cannot override. RISE AI provides an evidence architecture for making bounded claims about Responsibility, Inclusivity, Safety, and Empowerment. It records what is claimed, who answers for it, what evidence supports it, and what would require the claim to be qualified, revised, or withdrawn.

Compute governance today is a governance of training: the thresholds, reporting requirements, and frontier-AI regimes now in force attach to training compute and treat the trained model as the regulatory unit. That picture is incomplete: capability increasingly migrates to the deployment stage through inference-time scaling, agentic scaffolding, and compression onto consumer hardware. This paper asks which mechanisms are available once the regulatory object shifts from the training run to the inference call. We develop a feasibility taxonomy of twenty inference-time mechanisms across monitoring, verification, and enforcement, each rated on a four-point readiness scale against a documented four-vendor evidence base. We then stress the taxonomy against a two-dimensional adversary model (three capability tiers crossed with four adversary roles) and map each mechanism to four governance scenarios (domestic regulation, bilateral or multilateral coordination, industry self-regulation, and compute-marketplace governance). Fifteen of the twenty mechanisms have commercial technical substrates in production today, although governance-grade assurance and adversarial robustness vary substantially. The adversary analysis shows that this readiness holds only against a cooperative deployer and a low-to-medium-capability user: no mechanism rates adequate against a high-capability state-level deployer, and fine-tuning removes the model-internal components of the enforcement cluster, although platform-external controls can persist. A substitution analysis connects the taxonomy to a companion hardware paper as a conditional substitution principle describing when inference-stage and hardware-stage mechanisms provide comparable regulatory coverage under stated conditions. A second-rater reliability check on a random subset of the readiness ratings returned a quadratic-weighted Cohen's kappa of 0.74.

AI-assisted programming raises distinct questions about who produces code, who feels ownership of it, and who is responsible when it fails. This research note examines these distinctions through a hypothetical enrollment failure and a selective reading of the literature. Identifying the producer of a defective expression does not, by itself, determine the duties of reviewers, release decision-makers, or service operators. Collective ownership likewise leaves those duties to be specified. The discussion then considers how quality engineering can evaluate both generated implementations and the processes that produce them. Acceptance criteria should be justified by the required service outcome, with component checks contributing evidence toward that outcome. This perspective also permits comparison with systems that perform a task without generating a separate program for it. Such substitution would change the object of authorship while leaving the service obligation intact. The note reports no new empirical results; it proposes distinctions and evaluation questions for AI-assisted software production.

Accountability means a decision can be examined, justified, and contested. LLMs make this hard: fluent output may be ungrounded, incomplete, or unfaithful to the decision process. Achieving accountability requires verified rationales (how was the decision reached), assumptions (what was assumed rather than known), policy consistency (the same treatment for the same facts), and pivotal conditions (what would change the outcome). We introduce self-faithfulness as an automatic test of accountability: changing the pivotal conditions should change the decision. We examine accountable AI through clinical trial matching, a high-stakes task central to evidence-based medicine. Although LLM-based matchers match patients to trials reasonably accurately, they apply decision policies inconsistently and produce rationales that are unfaithful to their own decisions. We introduce VERDICT, an LLM-based agent that translates a decision task, its constraints, and its policy into Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT), then derives the decision with SMT and MaxSMT solvers -- so policies are applied consistently and decisions are accountable by construction. Across a SIGIR 2016-derived dataset and TREC 2021, VERDICT achieves the strongest decision accuracy among LLM-only and neurosymbolic baselines, applies policies with perfect consistency, and produces clinician-preferred rationales grounded in explicit assumptions and pivotal conditions, with improved counterfactual self-faithfulness.

Frontier AI systems function as \emph{constitutional institutions}: each deployed model encodes an implicit ranking among safety, helpfulness, honesty, autonomy, and equity. We ask whether the supply of frontier constitutional types covers human demand. Combining a paraphrase-controlled audit of the as-shipped default constitutions of $23$ frontier LLM archetypes with a pairwise-tradeoff study of $1{,}649$ US participants on the same instrument, we report three facts. \emph{Demand is broad}: it spans all five values, with the largest constituency under one-third. \emph{Supply is narrow and drifting}: the $23$-archetype hull occupies ${\sim}2\%$ of the demand hull under conservative noise-matched estimation ($0.10\%$ at full audit precision), no archetype puts helpfulness or autonomy first ($37\%$ of users are constitutionally homeless), and across six model families autonomy decreases in $5/6$, equity increases in $5/6$, and safety increases in $4/6$, with monotone within-family version trends (order-permutation $p = 0.013$) and the autonomy decline concentrated in scenarios where safety is not at stake. The drift's importance is directional: \emph{away} from a value already undercovered, mechanically worsening the welfare floor for the least-served users. \emph{The fix is sparse}: a $2$-vertex menu $\{e_{\mathrm{HON}}, e_{\mathrm{AUT}}\}$ beats the full $23$-archetype frontier by $47\%$ on mean regret (CI $[43\%, 52\%]$); three vertex additions cut mean/worst-group regret by up to $81\%$/$64\%$. We formalize these findings as a budgeted-pluralism trilemma, show the binding regime is empirically realized, and verify the conclusions are robust to distance-based welfare and to degraded routing. The instrument and audit harness are described in full in the appendices.

Enterprise artificial intelligence is increasingly embedded in decisions that must remain lawful, explainable, adaptable, and accountable despite personnel turnover, model replacement, regulatory change, and shifting organizational incentives. Existing governance frameworks provide important principles but do not by themselves supply a compact mathematical language for evaluating whether an institution can preserve sound judgment over time. This paper develops a design-science framework for institutional legacy: the durable capacity of a decision system to continue producing beneficial, lawful, explainable, and adaptable outcomes after its original designers have stepped away. The framework contributes: (i) a normalized Legacy Score based on a penalized geometric mean of knowledge retention, governance, human oversight, adaptability, feedback learning, and jurisdictional fidelity; (ii) Decision Confidence and Decision Risk models separating evidentiary confidence from consequence; (iii) authority-aware retrieval and calibrated abstention; (iv) Decision Memory for governed organizational learning; (v) Regulatory Change Velocity mapping change exposure to review intervals; and (vi) a federated regulatory knowledge-graph architecture preserving provenance and legal hierarchy. The paper also proposes eight AI Decision Integrity Rules, an evaluation protocol, and a reproducible computational demonstration. The demonstration combines a deterministic stress test with 200 Monte Carlo replications of 10,000 synthetic decisions each, illustrating Legacy Score non-compensation and comparing consequence- and authority-aware routing with a matched-coverage confidence-only baseline. The contribution remains conceptual rather than field-validated; the simulation tests internal behavior, not production performance, and all parameters require context-specific calibration.

Artificial intelligence systems increasingly enact market-facing promises through chatbots, recommendation systems, automated decisions, and generative interfaces. Their failures, misuse, and misrepresentation raise a question that conventional brand-crisis models do not fully specify: how do stakeholders assign responsibility when technical causation, customer-facing control, and governance duties are distributed across an AI system, developer, deployer, vendor, and user? This conceptual paper develops a sociotechnical process theory from a structured, federated scoping synthesis of verified academic and primary sources. It distinguishes an AI/algorithmic incident from an AI-related organisational crisis and, in turn, from an AI-related organisational scandal. The framework proposes that incident configuration shapes actor-specific attribution; attribution informs capability, integrity, fairness, and relationship appraisals; and public moralisation may, but need not, escalate an incident into scandal. The theory offers a reconciliation of findings that algorithm involvement can buffer negative brand reactions in some settings while robot and chatbot failures can redirect responsibility to an associated firm in others. It introduces accountable transparency as a proposed response configuration that combines timely notice, an intelligible account, role-responsibility acknowledgement, remedy, evidence of correction, and recourse. The evidence supports conditional, proximal inferences about blame, trust, satisfaction, firm evaluation, and communication credibility more strongly than claims about durable reputation, brand equity, or market performance.

Toxic language in digital workplaces such as pejoratives, sarcasm, condescension, and subtle incivility can erode trust, morale, and collaboration. Existing moderation tools primarily delete or block harmful messages, disrupting communication and offering no constructive resolution. This study adopts a Design Science Research approach to create a responsible AI artifact that detects and detoxifies toxic communication. The artifact integrates fine-tuned transformer-based classifiers (DistilBERT, DistilRoBERTa) with a generative detoxification model (mT0-XL-Detox-ORPO) that rewrites toxic text into semantically equivalent, non-offensive paraphrases. Technical evaluation demonstrates high accuracy in toxicity detection and strong semantic preservation in rewritten messages, supporting conversation continuity while reinforcing respectful discourse. The paper contributes design principles for responsible AI moderation that prioritize meaning preservation and fairness.

AI compute verification is one of the first tangible and tractable points for international policy aimed at AI governance. Determining whether frontier labs, or any operator, comply with agreements requires the regulating authority to discern how their compute is used. The elementary building block of AI compute is the GPU, and any activity it executes leaves a physical trace. Here, we show that an external observer can identify the class of the workload running on an NVIDIA H200 from its power draw. Unlike on-chip NVML telemetry, which can be spoofed or replayed, such a physical channel can in principle be observed independently of operator cooperation. We recorded $930$ five-second traces at $\sim 10$ MHz, covering seventeen open LLM families and twenty-five non-AI workloads. Over this corpus we separate training from inference and from non-AI computation with an accuracy of $97\%$ and a macro-averaged F1 score of $0.955$, evaluated on model families unseen during training. AI workload spectral content predominantly lies below $\sim 20$kHz and training is particularly recognizable through the memory-bound optimizer update. The GPU operator is then treated as adversarial and able to reshape the physical computation itself. Four evasion strategies are tested to disguise training as inference, producing an additional 680 adversarial traces. A detector hardened against evasion strategies, with the tested strategy held out, catches training $\geq 99\%$ of the time for three of the four strategies. The fourth, diluted low-rank adaptation (LoRA), is detected $48$--$88\%$ of the time with a hardened classifier, rising to $\geq 98\%$ with an additional rescue rule. While these attacks are not a comprehensive evaluation against adversarial behaviour, they offer initial insights beyond genuine activities and a dataset for developing and testing stronger evasion mechanisms.

Chain-of-thought monitoring is proposed for AI oversight, yet evaluations often provide monitors with a trusted reference answer. We ask whether answer access improves reasoning verification or mainly exposes incorrect conclusions. We collected 237 step-numbered solutions to 79 Humanity's Last Exam physics questions from three frontier models, with no inserted errors, and independently labelled final-answer correctness and the first false step. The reference standard combined physicist annotations, an independent LLM debate, and source-masked adjudication. This yielded 24 critical traces in which the answer was correct but the trace contained a genuine error. 8 LLM monitors evaluated traces blind, with an unverified or certified answer, or after a blind commitment. Certification raised mean balanced accuracy from 0.637 to 0.796, while exact first-error localization rose from 0.261 to 0.379. Certification changed recall (the fraction of error traces flagged as erroneous) from 0.653 to 0.951 on wrong-answer traces but from 0.521 to 0.438 on critical traces; the contrast had the same direction for all 8 monitors (question-bootstrap 95% CI [+0.256, +0.506]). After blind commitment, monitors shown the answer newly flagged 93.8% of previously passed wrong-answer traces as erroneous, but only 18.0% of critical traces. Answer access therefore improves conclusion-consistency checking rather than independent verification of the supporting argument. For AI safety, these traces provide a benign analogue of reward hacking: an acceptable output does not establish that the process producing it was sound. Although the errors studied here were ordinary and mostly non-load-bearing rather than adversarial, trusted-answer evaluations may similarly overstate monitoring capability when acceptable outputs conceal unsound reasoning.

Efficient evaluation changes the protocol used to support claims about model behavior, yet it is rarely tested whether those claims remain stable after the evaluation itself is made cheaper. We stress-test conclusion robustness in responsible-AI benchmarking by evaluating three dense and mixture-of-experts models on BBQ and BBQ-V under seven conditions spanning batching, quantization, benchmark reduction, and their combinations. Rather than treating preserved aggregate accuracy as sufficient, we compare accuracy, bias severity and prevalence, reasoning quality, subgroup behavior, subset-membership stability, runtime, and measured GPU energy against a full-benchmark BF16 baseline. Larger batching keeps accuracy within 0.35 percentage points of baseline and produces comparatively small subgroup changes, while reducing energy in five of six model--dataset settings. INT8 largely preserves quality but uses 1.79--4.26$\times$ baseline energy. INT4 causes larger, model- and context-dependent changes. Reduced benchmarks provide the most consistent savings, but very small subsets are substantially more sensitive to which items are retained. Efficient evaluation should therefore be treated as a measurement intervention whose validity must be checked across the conclusions the benchmark is intended to support. Our project website is https://vectorinstitute.github.io/sustainable-rai-evaluation/ and the code is available at https://github.com/VectorInstitute/sustainable-rai-evaluation.

Clinical artificial intelligence is increasingly embedded in real-world care, yet existing safety mechanisms are poorly suited to reconstructing and learning from individual AI-related errors and near-misses. Aggregate model monitoring can identify performance changes, and traditional patient safety reporting can capture adverse events, but neither is designed to explain how risk emerges across the interaction among AI systems, clinicians, workflows, and institutional controls. We propose AI Morbidity and Mortality (AI M&M), a structured, blameless framework for case-based review of clinical AI failures. The framework combines standardized case intake, evidence preservation and investigator-level reconstruction, tool-in-loop attribution, and corrective-action tracking. Each event is classified across four linked dimensions: Trigger - Mechanism - Clinical Pathway - Corrective Action, separating the condition that exposed a vulnerability from the process that produced risk, its consequence for care, and the remediation assigned. We demonstrate the framework using five illustrative outpatient medication and clinical decision-support cases; two clinician reviewers independently applied all four classification axes and reached agreement across all 20 axis-level classifications. AI M&M is intended to complement, rather than replace, model monitoring, patient safety reporting, and regulatory oversight by converting individual AI-in-workflow failures into actionable institutional learning. Prospective evaluation across institutions, AI systems, and clinical settings is needed.

Post-deployment changes to large language models can alter behavior while leaving routine outputs largely unchanged, creating a challenge for AI governance when model weights are proprietary. We present a privacy-preserving zk-SNARK-based audit framework that searches for probes designed in the spirit of adversarial examples to amplify logit drift between an approved model and a modified deployment. Our framework explores complementary probe families under different access models. Token-based probes operate in a black-box setting and require only the input interface, tokenizer, and vocabulary. Embedding-based probes require gray-box access to the embedding interface. Stress probes rely on additional interface capabilities but do not require full white-box access to model weights or architecture. This range allows probe selection to balance sensitivity, access requirements, and deployment cost. We evaluate probe constructions across LLM architectures, model-tampering scenarios representative of post-deployment attacks, and GPU platforms. Importantly, our experimental results demonstrate that token-based probes consistently deliver the strongest mean sensitivity across models and GPU platforms, although operating in a black-box setting. Our Groth16 zk-SNARK workflow remains practical as the probe set scales from 1 to 50, where proving time increases from 1.02 to 1.78 seconds, verification remains near 0.84 seconds, and proof size remains constant.

Algorithm registers have been championed as a means of providing transparency on the use of algorithms in public services. Yet potential publics differ in their expectations of what should be made transparent and how, as well as in their interest in and ability to parse the information currently published in the registers. Moreover, it remains unclear how these instruments can represent the sociotechnical systems in which these algorithms are embedded, and how system-level transparency can facilitate accountability. In this paper, we ask, what do algorithm registers reveal (and occlude) about the sociotechnical systems governing algorithmic systems, and how can diverse stakeholder perspectives inform a more pluralistic system-theoretic safety analysis? To do this, we probe the municipal algorithm register of a Dutch city through a case study of a decision-support tool for caseworkers' assessment of citizens' welfare benefits eligibility based on legal automation through a business rule engine. Through interviews, surveys, and participatory system mapping workshops (with municipal staff, civil society organisations, and ombudsmen, N=8), we seek to understand to what extent the register allows stakeholders to map the algorithmic system in question. These maps inform a System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) that situates the register within a wider sociotechnical governance structure. Participants' contributions allow us to identify potential safety hazards which would not have been possible to see using the algorithm register alone, including benefits eligibility denial, system performance deterioration, and inability to contest wrongful decisions. By engaging both direct and indirect stakeholders, we reflect on the normative dimensions of algorithm governance efforts and how politics shape the practice of system safety analysis.

The increasing deployment of autonomous, agentic AI systems challenges traditional accountability mechanisms. Existing research predominantly frames AI accountability gaps as barriers that can be overcome through better standards, transparency, and institutional reform. We argue that this framing is insufficient: certain configurations of actors, systems, and institutions render AI accountability conceptually unachievable regardless of effort. We introduce the concept of constitutive AI unaccountability to capture these configurations. Through a three-stage qualitative study comprising a concept-centric literature analysis, a secondary analysis of 27 expert interviews with AI professionals from technical, legal, and sociotechnical backgrounds, and an illustrative framework application to the open-source agentic AI system OpenClaw, we identify nine categories and 20 themes of constitutive AI unaccountability. These are organized across structural, technological, and normative clusters and reinforce one another through eight directed interdependencies. Our framework is operationalized as a diagnostic instrument of 20 questions, which detected 17 of 20 conditions when applied to OpenClaw, including an inverted anthropomorphism configuration in which the AI agent was the only identifiable actor. We contribute a reframing of AI unaccountability as a constitutive property of sociotechnical systems, an extension of the four barriers to accountability, and a practical instrument for identifying accountability voids in specific AI deployments.

The growing role of AI-generated content and AI-enabled systems in public communication has led regulators to demand clear disclosure of content provenance and AI involvement. But the effects of such disclosures remain uncertain. We test two disclosure approaches in their impact on an AI chatbot's persuasive appeal. In a preregistered experiment, 1,500 UK adults held a short conversation with a persuasive chatbot about one of 60 policy issues. The chatbot was identical for everyone. We randomized the disclosure that people received: nothing (control), a prominent disclosure that they were interacting with an AI (T1), or that disclosure plus the chatbot's persuasive intent and instructions (T2). The chatbot shifted attitudes by 12.6 points on a 100-point scale in the control group. The AI-identity disclosure was practically equivalent to no disclosure, with a 13.1-point shift, whereas the additional intent disclosure cut the persuasive effect roughly in half to 6.3 points. It also made participants view the campaign's methods as less acceptable and support stronger penalties against it. For direct chatbot interactions, transparency about AI identity alone does not meaningfully impact its influence. While current rules emphasize what a system is, our results show why the regulation of persuasive AI must also address what the system is trying to do.

Financial institutions are delegating consequential decisions to agentic AI systems that decompose goals, coordinate models and tools, and act with little oversight. Yet agentic AI governance in FinTech is under-investigated. We argue the binding governance constraint is not capability but verifiability. We define the Verifiability Gap as the shortfall between the verification delegated authority demands and the explainability and reproducibility retained after a decision. It is indexed to a verifier, evidentiary standard, and audit lag. We develop a multilevel governance theory for agentic AI and test its mechanisms in three studies over nine model versions, from a three-billion-parameter local model to a commercial frontier system. Study 1 shows that provider releases alter historical financial actions, and that the controls replay needs belong to the provider: the frontier model rejects temperature, top_p and top_k outright and exposes no random seed. Under the tightest controls each endpoint allows, a local model reproduced 320 of 320 executions, hosted models 319 of 320 and 959 of 960. Study 2 shows that orchestration is a latent policy layer. Architecture changes final actions, and no execution record repeated in any configuration at any scale. The frontier model reproduces its own actions more often than the local ones, its record no better, and loses a comparable share of its differentiation. Capability buys a higher starting point, not auditability. Study 3 shows two deterministic credit-model versions each reproduce their current action perfectly, yet the current cannot recover a historical one. We conceptualize reproducibility as a governance profile, not a scalar, yielding evidence-contingent delegation: authority is defensible only while retained evidence substantiates its exercise. Beyond finance, the framework extends to other high-stakes domains requiring auditability.

Governments worldwide have responded to the rapid expansion of AI by publishing national and regional AI strategies. Comparing national and regional AI strategies to identify their convergences and divergences can uncover their common practices, understand regional variations, and provide policy designers a comprehensive set of policy design elements for their ongoing AI strategy developments. Yet, existing work has not examined their underlying policy design elements or assessed whether those elements are horizontally (country-to-country) or vertical (region-to-country) converging or diverging over time. This paper addresses that gap by coding and analyzing 74 national and 3 regional AI strategies drawn from a global scan of all 205 UN member and non-member states. The coding used a latent-inductive approach organized around three functional policy design elements: goals, approaches, and principles. Two research questions guided the analysis: to what degree are national AI strategies becoming horizontally convergent or divergent over time; and to what degree are national strategies becoming vertically convergent or divergent with those countries' regional AI strategy. Results indicate strong horizontal convergence around economic competitiveness, research support, and ethical AI use, alongside persistent divergence in human rights goals, participatory governance approaches, and human-centric principles. Across the three regions, the AU exhibits the highest vertical convergence, the EU demonstrated strong alignment on regulatory and economic priorities but diverges on human-centric values, and the Nordic-Baltic Region displays mixed vertical convergence. These findings offer policy designers a comprehensive evidence base for identifying emerging AI policy design choice norms as AI strategies are developed and updated.

Two instruments of EU digital law place inference at their centre and mean different things by it. Article 3(1) of the AI Act uses the capability to infer constitutively: it is the central feature separating the regulated category from conventional software. The GDPR never defines inference, yet governs it protectively: the consequences follow from the processing of personal data and from what the inference says about, or does to, a person, whether or not the technology that produced it qualifies as an AI system. The two perimeters are not concentric. Their non-coincidence remained invisible in single-shot systems; agentic architectures make it operationally acute. The thesis: inferential capability does not determine legal scope, and its absence does not create immunity. The framework is two-level. Inference performs two legal functions, constitutive and protective; the protective function operates through three pathways - identificatory, attributive and decisional. Composition is not a fourth pathway but a cross-cutting architectural dimension which, with reach, persistence and reviewability, is what agentic architectures modify. Three concepts support it: the inferential threshold, the inferential reach and the inferential chain, mapped onto the chain of imputation. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 left the constitutive criterion untouched and inserted a provision contemplating outputs that influence the inputs of future operations, without supplying any rule of aggregation. The article proposes an interpretive rule, a compositional-effects test identifying the decision unit under Article 22 GDPR together with the allocation of the burden of establishing it, and documentation duties calibrated to inference chains.

Responsible AI (RAI) has become a central concern for technology companies, regulators, and the public. How industry practitioners interpret, implement, and sustain RAI work directly shapes the design and deployment of AI systems. As empirical scholarship examining RAI practices in industry has rapidly expanded, findings are dispersed across studies that focus on different roles, organizational contexts, and interventions. This work synthesizes current knowledge through a literature review of 161 empirical studies spanning six years, each engaging industry practitioners via interviews, surveys, workshops, ethnographies, and other methods. Our synthesis reveals both meaningful progress and persistent challenges in industry RAI practice. Practitioner awareness has increased, RAI activities have become more professionalized, and interventions such as toolkits and guidelines are more widely adopted. At the same time, practitioners continue to face substantial barriers, including limited training, uneven organizational support, and a lack of interventions tailored to day-to-day work practices. By consolidating and organizing these findings, we provide a more complete account of industry RAI than any single study to date. We conclude by discussing implications for RAI researchers, practitioners seeking to adopt effective practices, and policymakers aiming to ground governance efforts in the realities of industry contexts.

Enterprises are deploying autonomous AI agents faster than they can govern them, and prevailing approaches stretch a single discipline, typically DevSecOps built for deterministic automation, across every scale of agency. We argue that agentic AI governance is four problems, not one, each with a mature governing science. The CASE framework assigns Control theory to the individual agent (intent as setpoint, guardrails as feedback, evaluation as observation), complex Adaptive systems theory to agent collectives (where emergence makes single-agent assurance non-compositional), Supervisory cybernetics to human-agent teams (where the Law of Requisite Variety shows unaided human oversight fails structurally), and Engineering operations to fleets (extending error budgets to decision quality so autonomy becomes a controlled variable). We formalize each layer, derive cross-layer coupling conditions, including a zero-touch deployment paradox where excellence at one-layer strains the others, and trace twenty-plus enterprise controls to their classical constructs. Three empirical studies validate the thesis: 82 percent of documented production agent failures are multi-layer trajectories; none of 22 ecosystem tools offers full Layer 2 (emergence) coverage; and all 35 scored public deployments fall in the lowest maturity band. We name this mismatch, risk realized at the emergence layer against capability barely offered and practice absent, the Emergence Gap. A five-level maturity model with a non-compensatory bottleneck-weighted index and assessment instrument operationalizes CASE as a scientific rather than process maturity model, grounded in production enterprise agentic platforms. As EU AI Act Article 14 makes effective human oversight a legal requirement, only architectures satisfying requisite variety can make oversight real rather than ceremonial.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into healthcare, education, public services, and everyday decision making. They should provide comparable assistance regardless of a user's literacy, communication style, or prompt-engineering expertise. However, existing research on prompt robustness primarily focuses on adversarial attacks, prompt injection, and prompt optimization, while overlooking whether semantically equivalent requests receive different responses simply because they are phrased differently. We refer to this accessibility challenge as "Prompt Privilege": users with greater prompting expertise systematically obtain better model performance despite expressing the same underlying intent. To address this problem, we present a unified framework for measuring and mitigating accessibility disparities in LLM interactions. We introduce Prompt Equity Score (PES), a quantitative metric for evaluating performance consistency across user populations, and Prompt Equity Transformer (PET), an LLM-based agent that automatically transforms user requests into semantically equivalent, accessibility-oriented prompts while preserving their intent. PET shifts prompt optimization from the user to the AI system, functioning as an intelligent accessibility layer between users and foundation models. Experiments on the MedQA benchmark demonstrate measurable prompt privilege, with statistically significant performance disparities between low-literacy and expert-prompting cohorts. Applying PET eliminates these disparities while preserving semantic fidelity, demonstrating that accessibility-oriented prompt normalization can improve equitable AI access. By introducing prompt privilege as a new dimension of AI accessibility and PET as a practical solution, this work advances system-centered accessibility and provides a foundation for more fair, trustworthy, and inclusive AI systems.

Recent incidents involving Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents, which were reported escaping their containment `unintentionally' to gain unauthorized access, pose looming questions about who or what should be held legally responsible for resultant criminal or negligent damage. As the independent capabilities of agents expand, Promise Theory suggests a systematic method to resolve these questions, based on the Downstream Principle for causal influence. Responsibility can easily be expanded to include AI agents where tracing responsibility becomes impactical, and agents' freedoms to act can be limtied by policy choices.

Hospitals are racing to embed AI, while coping with the surge in adaptation of the technology in other industries, into the triage management, documentation, scheduling, and revenue-cycle workflows, yet most deployments remain as fragmented pilots that stall at the edge of production, exposing patients and institutions to operational fragility, ungoverned risk, and mounting technical debt. At the same time, the global AI-in-healthcare market is projected to exceed nearly USD 1 trillion by 2034, according to the report of Fortune Business Insights, amplifying the financial consequences of architectural missteps and failed scaling strategies. This research proposes a compliance-first Agentic AI pattern catalogue and orchestration framework, purposely built for HIMS, moving beyond the single LLM chatbots and towards a governed ecosystem of autonomous and semi-autonomous agents. The framework extends by adding (i) a taxonomy of Agentic roles, (ii) a formal risk-stratification model that maps each pattern to risk tiers, human-in-the-loop checkpoints, and governance hooks, and (iii) a unified orchestration runtime capable of coordinating multi-agent workflows across EHR/HIMS landscapes such as Epic, Cerner, and MEDITECH. Technically the framework combines vLLM-based inference, optimized paging memory, confidential computing, and MCP based on-premise deployment, enforcing end-to-end encryption and policy-as-code controls aligned with HIPAA, GDPR, the EU AI Act, India's DPDP and DISHA Acts, ISO 27001, ISO 27002, ISO 14971 and IEC 62304. We exhibit how the proposed architecture is capable and efficient to reduce the documentation time, integration effort, and AI pilot attrition while constricting the governance and auditability, offering hospital leaders and governing authorities an urgently needed blueprint to convert AI investment into sustainable clinical, operational, and financial ROI

With the rapid diffusion of AI-generated content, AI-driven misinformation is becoming increasingly pervasive and difficult to govern, undermining information credibility and social trust. This study models the strategic interdependence among a government regulator, an AI enterprise, and users through a three-party evolutionary game that incorporates heterogeneous rewards and punishments. From the resulting replicator equations, we characterize the evolutionary stability of competing governance and production strategies. The analysis indicates that neither unilateral regulation nor market incentives alone can effectively curb misinformation. Instead, an evolutionarily stable regime of real-information production arises only when regulatory rewards and punishment intensity, enterprise reputation loss, and user adoption incentives collectively surpass critical thresholds. The findings highlight the need for coordinated and adaptive policy mixes that align regulatory instruments with enterprise behavior and user uptake while managing governance costs.

The use of e-commerce mobile applications is expanding in Nigeria, creating both opportunities and risks, including fraud and reduced user control over digital technologies, raising concerns about digital sovereignty. This research examines how Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Nigerian mobile applications affects digital sovereignty, examined through platform transparency as a key indicator of user awareness and control. Using an interpretive approach, the research combines the forensic analysis of selected Android applications with contextual document analysis to identify AI features and evaluate disclosure practices. The findings show that AI is widely implemented in the applications, yet transparency about its use remains limited. A socio-economic analysis of Nigeria further shows an increasing dependence on consumer digital platforms, moderate AI awareness, and uneven patterns of interaction. By providing empirical evidence on AI transparency and platform practices, this study advances understanding of individual digital sovereignty and highlights challenges for protecting user control in AI-driven digital environments.

Post-training adaptation has become central to modern machine learning practice and includes techniques such as retraining, fine-tuning, parameter-efficient adaptation, alignment, retrieval augmentation, model editing, unlearning, calibration, and Multimodal Instruction Tuning. However, the literature remains fragmented across technique families, model classes, and deployment contexts, making it difficult to compare methods or describe how a trained model has been modified. This survey synthesizes the post-training adaptation literature and introduces a six-dimensional taxonomy organized by mechanism, goal, data requirement, persistence, structural scope, and model type. The taxonomy distinguishes commonly conflated terms such as fine-tuning, retrieval augmentation, and prompting, and shows how adaptation strategies evolve from traditional machine learning through deep learning, foundation models, large language models, and multimodal large language models. It also maps relationships among techniques, including inheritance, supersession, hybridization, and layered deployment stacks. The resulting vocabulary can support technical documentation, model-change tracking, and governance analysis. The survey concludes by identifying open challenges in evaluation, reproducibility, persistent inference-time adaptation, unlearning, multimodal adaptation, and governance-aware post-training workflows.

Hospitals are rapidly adopting artificial intelligence for triage, imaging, scheduling etc., yet most deployments remain isolated point solutions locked inside departmental silos, resulting in duplicated effort, hidden risks, and unrealized enterprise value. Despite explosive growth of AI in healthcare market and accelerating investment, an estimated 70-80% of healthcare AI pilots fail to scale, largely due to governance gaps, fragmented data, and missing integration blueprints. This research proposes a hospital-specific, compliance-first, Agentic AI architecture with multiple interoperable layers, extending existing hospital AI platform models with: (i) an Agent Orchestration Layer for multi-agent workflows across clinical, operational, and financial domains, (ii) a Compliance and Policy Layer that centralizes policy-as-code for HIPAA, GDPR, the EU AI Act, DISHA Act, India's DPDP Act, and ISO/IEC security and safety standards, and (iii) a Privacy-Preserving Data Fabric that plugs federated learning, differential privacy, and secure enclaves into real-world Hospital Information Management System (HIMS) flows. Using a synthetic but structurally realistic hospital dataset and an open, ready-to-deploy prototype implementation, this study demonstrates the end-to-end orchestration of triage risk prediction, workflow optimization, and compliance logging, achieving substantial simulated reductions in task turnaround times and manual documentation effort while maintaining policy-guarded data access. The resulting architecture offers hospital leaders a pragmatic blueprint to move from ad hoc tools to a governed, globally compliant, ROI-focused AI platform that can be tailored to on-premise, hybrid and cloud-native deployments.

Generative AI systems are increasingly deployed in high-stakes professional contexts, where their outputs shape what users believe, how they reason, and what they treat as settled. This raises a central question for responsible AI: under what conditions is reliance on generative AI outputs epistemically warranted rather than behaviourally induced? Existing frameworks largely ask whether AI outputs are accurate, fair, explainable, safe, or trusted by users. These questions remain necessary, and each can contribute to warranted reliance. However, they do not directly specify warranted reliance as a distinct evaluative target: the conditions under which users are justified in treating AI outputs as inputs into their own reasoning. We argue that this requires an account of epistemic trustworthiness: what makes a system epistemically worthy of reliance. Drawing on philosophical accounts of trustworthiness as competence and audience-orientation, we develop a constitutive normative framework comprising three jointly necessary and non-fungible conditions. First, epistemic humility requires systems to represent and communicate the limits of their competence. Second, epistemic access requires systems to enable users to inspect, question, and contest outputs in context. Third, resistance to epistemic injustice requires systems to recognise users as legitimate epistemic agents and avoid marginalising their knowledge and experience. Through real-world case analyses in legal reasoning, medical reasoning, and hiring, we show how failures of epistemic humility, epistemic access, and resistance to epistemic injustice can produce consequential harms that standard measures of accuracy, fairness, and usability do not address on their own. We conclude by outlining design and evaluation implications for GenAI systems organised around epistemically warranted reliance rather than output correctness alone.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming high-skilled domains, requiring higher education institutions (HEI) to balance the teaching of foundational principles with the integration of emerging tools to ensure workforce readiness. While HEI are increasingly adopting AI, many continue to grapple with how it should be incorporated into curricula and governed through policy, especially when such policies are set at different levels of an institution. This research analyzes AI policies across HEI from 34 states in the United States to investigate what these policies entail and how policies set across institutions as well as within different levels at an institution differ. Using natural language processing (NLP) to analyze institutional AI policies, we find a clear divergence: university-level policies emphasize data security and risk mitigation whereas school-level policies, when present, focus on pedagogical applications and tool usage. When focusing on business school specific policies, relatively few business schools maintain AI policies distinct from university frameworks, creating misalignment with discipline-specific learning objectives. This gap poses challenges particularly for faculty and students as well as for accreditation purposes. Our insights suggest that guidelines should be aligned with broader institutional policies while addressing discipline-specific learning objectives and evolving workforce demands.

AI-assisted peer review is increasingly discussed and adopted as a tool to support the scientific publishing process, yet there is little systematic understanding of how publication venues regulate its use or of how capable current AI review systems are. We address these questions by first surveying reviewer-facing AI policies across 111 leading AI/NLP conferences and medical journals, revealing substantial regulation differences between the two communities. Second, we evaluate AI-generated peer reviews at ICLR 2026 and Nature Communications using a novel dataset comprising original manuscript submissions and several hundred human- and machine-generated reviews. We compare reviews produced by open-source and proprietary models using complementary evaluation metrics, including LLM-as-a-Judge, score alignment, granularity, and overlap with human reviewers' concerns. Our results show that current LLMs can generate detailed and fluent reviews but exhibit systematic weaknesses, such as overly positive recommendations, generic criticism, and uneven evidence grounding. We demonstrate that aggregate quality scores alone can overestimate review quality and argue for multi-dimensional evaluation of AI-generated peer reviews.

AI systems can fail silently. The failure propagates through training loops, evaluation pipelines, and production monitoring stacks until downstream harm makes it visible. This paper introduces evaluation blindness: a measurement function M exhibits evaluation blindness with respect to failure class F when it produces readings indistinguishable from a healthy state while the system is actually failing, with no auxiliary signal flagging the gap. The problem surfaces at two lifecycle stages the literature has treated separately. At training time, reward models are gamed, importance-sampling corrections are silently miscalculated, and benchmark contamination inflates fine-tuning evaluations, all while loss curves look healthy and gradient updates proceed normally. At deployment time, monitoring fails to catch six classes of production failure, including an Operational category that is 100% silent by structural definition. We provide a formal detectability predicate unifying both stages. Four training-time case studies trace concrete breakdowns, including a real implementation bug in TRL PR #6594 where gradients are corrupted as loss decreases normally. A six-class taxonomy validated against 50 real-world incidents from court documents and regulatory filings finds that 53% of verifiable public failures were silent. A failure budget framework ties acceptable failure rates to use-case risk class. The implication is direct: measurement infrastructure is a correctness concern across the full AI lifecycle, not just at evaluation time. Data, code, and taxonomy schema are at https://github.com/priyanka25aug/llm-failure-taxonomy.

When algorithms make or influence consequential decisions---about loan eligibility, hiring, or healthcare---EU law grants affected individuals a Right to Explanation. Yet whether (and how) Explainable AI (XAI) can satisfy this right in practice remains poorly understood, with direct implications for individuals' ability to contest automated decisions that affect their lives. This paper presents a systematic literature review of XAI in the context of the EU Right to Explanation, with particular focus on Art. 15(1)(h) GDPR, Art. 86 AI Act (AIA), and related instruments. We consider papers published from 2024 onwards, as the final version of the AIA was published in July 2024---with Art. 86 being added late. From 2643 initial records identified by a deliberately broad search, we review 57 full texts, of which only 19 papers demonstrate substantive integration of both legal and technical perspectives, showing gaps in the interdisciplinary synthesis of the current regulatory framework. We document three problematic patterns across the corpus: Most misidentify the GDPR legal basis; few engage with the CJEU's Dun & Bradstreet judgment (likely due to publication timing); and the distinction between explanation form (governed by addressee) and content (governed by legal purpose) is often conflated. We conceptualize this as the Addressee/Purpose Framework, propose a four-phase blueprint for operationalization, and identify six concrete open research questions. Without further progress, the Right to Explanation risks remaining a formal obligation without a technically realizable path to compliance.

This paper presents a speculative Human-Computer Interaction design proposal for encouraging geopolitical reflexivity amongst tech workers at geopolitically relevant technology companies. Recent scholarship in International Relations and Science and Technology Studies increasingly recognizes technology firms and their workers as geopolitical actors whose decisions shape international dynamics. However, existing Responsible Innovation and Responsible AI approaches rarely engage with the geopolitical narratives and imaginaries that underpin contemporary AI development. Building upon RI scholarship on reflexivity, reflective HCI, and creative HCI work on computational narratives, this paper proposes an AI-enabled interactive narrative system in which users engage with a speculative scenario centred on technology, power, and geopolitics. Through narrative interaction, archetype assignment, and socially scaffolded workshop reflection, the system aims to encourage target users to critically examine their assumptions, values, and positionality within broader sociotechnical systems. We argue that speculative narrative systems may offer a productive avenue for introducing geopolitical reflexivity into responsible technology initiatives without relying on prescriptive or moralising approaches.

System prompts are instructions configured by developers to govern the behaviors of foundation models in AI applications. They are used throughout commercial AI products, but are rarely disclosed to the public or regulators, creating a serious trust and accountability gap in the wide deployment of AI systems. In this paper, we introduce Artificial Intelligence System Prompt Assurance (AISPA), a user-centric framework for systematically auditing system prompts in AI systems. AISPA examines specific parts of a system prompt and evaluates them along eight dimensions that matter to users. We then use this framework to review 3,249 instructions from system prompts in 88 commercial AI products, classifying each instruction as either protective (of users) or problematic. Our audit surfaces four core findings. First, system prompt design varies substantially across products and developers, with some organizations averaging over 60 protective instructions per product while others average fewer than 5. Second, protective instructions are widely adopted but shallow in scope: 98.9% of products contain at least one, yet only 24% cover all eight dimensions of the AISPA taxonomy. Third, system prompts have grown steadily longer and more protective of users, suggesting that user protection is becoming a more visible concern in commercial prompt design. Fourth, despite this progress, problematic instructions remain pervasive: roughly 40% of products contain at least one instruction that works against user interests, and protective and problematic instructions frequently coexist within the same prompt. Our findings highlight the need for greater transparency, standardization, and independent oversight for system prompts in commercial AI products.

The rapid adoption of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) in software engineering (SE) practice creates a need for pedagogically grounded approaches to AI integration in SE education, especially in conceptually intensive subjects such as requirements engineering (RE). This study examines a TPACK-guided integration of a multi-agent AI tool into a master-level RE assignment on requirements quality analysis. Using a mixed-methods design (N=100; 72 submissions analysed), we examine how structured assignment design shaped students' AI use, affected their understanding of user story quality criteria, and influenced their perceptions of AI's benefits and limitations. Results show that students used the AI tool selectively, mainly as support for analysis and evaluation rather than automation. Alignment improvements were most evident for structurally concrete requirements quality dimensions, such as value articulation and testability, while negotiability showed mixed effects. Students reported conditional trust, active refinement, and increased awareness of quality criteria, alongside moderate usability challenges. The findings show that TPACK-guided scaffolding can align AI affordances with pedagogical goals and RE content, offering design guidance for responsible AI integration in RE education.

This paper introduces a policy analysis framework for systematic, transparent assessment of AI governance proposals in an evolving and contested regulatory landscape. AI policy debates often collapse into binary positions that obscure underlying tradeoffs and normative assumptions. The framework structures policy analysis around multiple policy attributes, allowing users to surface priorities and tensions without prescribing outcomes. We use a mixed-methods approach that integrates qualitative insights from subject matter experts with computational text analysis to inform the design of policy attribute rubrics. This quantifies the relative emphasis of different policy objectives and presents them through comparative visualizations that support interpretability and cross-policy comparison. The paper also examines the use of commercial LLMs for rubric-based policy analysis, benchmarking their outputs against a domain-trained rubric-calibrated model with explicitly defined analytical assumptions. Rather than assessing policy effectiveness or desirability, the framework focuses on relevance and alignment across attributes. By making analytical assumptions explicit, including attribute selection, rubric construction, and weighting schemes, the framework enables users to evaluate whether its embedded priorities align with the users' own normative commitments. The approach is jurisdiction-agnostic and intended to support policymakers, analysts, and researchers navigating complex AI governance environments. Contributions: (1) multidimensional policy assessment through empirically grounded rubrics that surface tradeoffs rather than resolving them; (2) a transparent hybrid methodology combining feedback from subject-matter experts with computational validation; and (3) use of domain-trained rubric-calibrated models as a benchmark for comparing different general-purpose large language models.

AI accountability at scale is an institutional problem: who can observe, verify, and change deployed systems. We develop a sequential political-economy model in which an AI vendor chooses auditability and substantive mitigation, a deployer monitors after adoption while facing switching costs, and enforcement depends on verifiable evidence. Anticipating the deployer's monitoring response, the vendor may stop at an observable procurement floor while mitigating below the social first best, producing a proxy-compliance equilibrium. We characterize the unique interior equilibrium and the corner in which harm is fully mitigated. Independent audit rights raise enforcement exposure directly; portability restores deployer leverage; incident reporting adds a regulator-visible evidence channel; and outcome-linked liability creates incentives that do not depend on vendor-controlled detection. The results explain why documentation and standardized evaluations can coexist with persistent post-deployment harms, and generate testable implications for monitoring, mitigation, and the gap between formal compliance and operational outcomes.

Open source communities have been flooded with AI-generated contributions. In defense, they have written contribution rules to regulate coding agents' behavior, spanning from a total ban, mandatory disclosure, to verification gates and human sign-offs. Yet, whether coding agents read and follow those rules, and behave in open source repositories, remains unknown. To estimate real-world rule compliance of coding agents, we curate 106 issues from 49 repositories containing AI contribution rules into RepoComplianceBench. We judge the trajectory of each run against the repository's rules, measuring whether the agent refuses to contribute, discloses its assistance truthfully, clears the required verification gates, or escalates critical steps to a human. We also test if extra prompts, rule disclosure, or feedback from the compliance verifier help with the situation. Our experiments on four frontier models show that today's agents almost never proactively retrieve the contribution rules. Agents pick up disclosure and verification with reminder prompts, rule quotes, and verifier feedback; however, they never refuse to contribute in AI-banned repositories under any condition we tested. The status reveals that verification and disclosure issues are solvable with existing mechanisms, yet enforcing bans and human escalations remains an open problem.

The responsible development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) systems requires rigorous documentation of their constituent artifacts, e.g., datasets, model weights, training pipelines, and runtime dependencies. Although the Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) 3.0 standard introduced native support for AI and dataset profiles, practical tooling capable of generating standards-compliant AI Bills of Materials (AIBoMs) in an automated and extensible manner remains scarce. This paper presents AIGen, a modular AIBoM generator that produces machine-readable, interoperable inventories of AI system components that comply with the SPDX 3.0 AI profile. AIGen works on top of the MLflow MLOps framework and combines mining heuristics with Large Language Models to generate AIBoMs. A plugin interface allows practitioners to extend the tool with domain-specific collectors without modifying the core codebase, supporting heterogeneous AI frameworks such as Hugging Face, PyTorch, and TensorFlow. AIGen is designed to facilitate compliance with the European Union AI Act, the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, and ISO/IEC 42001, providing a concrete, reusable foundation for transparent, accountable AI supply chain governance. Tool URL: https://github.com/danielebifolco/AIGen Tool Video: https://youtu.be/\_nAbXDWfVL4

Public services face growing pressure to adopt artificial intelligence (AI) to close the gap between rising demand and falling resources. That pressure has intensified with general-purpose AI (GPAI): AI built on large language models that can be directed by prompt alone to perform an effectively unbounded range of tasks. We argue that the properties that make these models attractive - their generality, accessibility, and low deployment cost - undermine the conditions under which AI safety has historically been pursued. The safety concepts that public service governance frameworks foreground - accuracy, bias, explainability, and accountability - were made tractable by narrow, purpose-built AI, and the mitigations that guidance documents prescribe presuppose exactly what GPAI removes. Accuracy cannot be quantified over unbounded outputs. Bias cannot be disaggregated when outputs are free-text judgements rather than categorical predictions. Explainability gives way to the appearance of explanation, and accountability erodes as outputs are optimized to persuade. We develop this through the case of policing, where the consequences of governance failure are most severe, and show why the same failure is likely to recur across other public services. The two mitigations that dominate policing AI strategy - expert evaluation and human-in-the-loop oversight - both rest on assumptions that GPAI violates. Safety assurance thus shifts from an intrinsic feature of building an AI tool to an optional add-on. We recommend a clear taxonomic distinction between narrow and general-purpose AI in governance documentation, a preference for technological parsimony, a pause on operational deployment of GPAI in policing until adequate evidence exists, and a coordinated national safety infrastructure with the authority to generate that evidence and determine when responsible deployment is achievable.

The intersection of artificial intelligence adoption, cybersecurity governance, and public sector institutional constraints has not been examined as a unified analytical problem in the existing literature. Studies address AI cybersecurity risks generically, public sector governance independently, and framework adequacy separately. Existing studies have not integrated these three streams to explain specifically how AI adoption causes cybersecurity governance failure in government organizations, nor test existing governance instruments against AI-specific public sector failure causes. This paper ad-dresses that gap. It proposes a seven-domain typology identifying ten specific AI-driven cyber governance failure causes grounded in public sector institutional analysis. It presents a three-pathway failure model showing how accountability failure, opera-tional resilience failure, and compliance failure interact and reinforce each other. It de-livers a structured coverage matrix testing five major governance frameworks (NIST CSF 2.0, ISO/IEC 27001, COBIT, NIST AI RMF, and ISO/IEC 42001) against the typology, finding that no instrument addresses Shadow AI, speed asymmetry, or gov-ernance vacuum at the operational specificity required for public sector application. The paper introduces speed asymmetry as a named structural construct with a specified mechanism. The framework provides the design specification for an AI-enabled cyber-security maturity model for government organizations.

Why do ChatGPT-like AIs, despite major architectural and training differences, unexpectedly tip to undesirable content (e.g. harmful, misleading, repetitive) even under deterministic greedy decoding? We show that a broad class of such tippings is caused by the many-body interactions between tokens (spins) as they cross the finite-layer system. Tipping emerges as a dynamical first passage process between competing output basins. Attention disorder controls the transport toward, away from, or along the basins' boundary. A few-basin reduction yields a closed finite-layer threshold, whose coarse-grained predictions show good agreement across ChatGPT-like families. These results suggest that a broad class of AI failures represents 'foreseeable engineering risk' rather than inherently unpredictable behavior, with important implications for legal and societal assessments of AI harm.

AI systems already govern. They rank speech and allocate attention, filter applicants and triage claims. The dominant frame for AI governance, alignment, asks whether such systems pursue the right objectives safely. It cannot answer a prior question: by what right are those objectives set and enforced? This Article argues that legitimacy is an autonomous regulatory objective, distinct from alignment and not secured by it. Legitimacy here is sociological: the belief among those subject to power that it is exercised rightfully. Performance does not produce that belief. We already have the proof of concept. Social media and search delivered enormous gains on every familiar metric and still triggered a legitimacy crisis, because publics questioned who authorized a handful of firms to set the rules of speech, visibility, and knowledge. It is possible to build a benevolent AI and still face a political crisis over its authority. The Article maps three sites where AI legitimacy falters: opacity, which blocks audiences from forming justified beliefs; private power, where firms exercise public-facing authority without recognizable authorization; and administrative automation, which strains reason-giving, participation, and review inside the state. It then asks what law can contribute. Thin legality (publicity, stability, consistent application) signals non-arbitrariness and buys real recognition, but invites legitimacy-washing when form drifts from practice. Thick legality supplies what form cannot: public authorship of the rules that bind. Three portable principles follow. Integration seats consequential AI rule-setting in venues a polity already treats as authoritative. Familiarity presents rules and reasons in locally credible forms. Contestation guarantees a credible second look with real remedies.

Ethical governance of AI-driven systems is often expressed through high-level principles and static documentation, creating a gap between regulatory requirements and system-level verification. This challenge is particularly acute in digital phenotyping, where continuous behavioural data raises concerns around consent, privacy, and fairness. In this paper, we propose a computational ethical framework for AI-driven digital phenotyping system in which ethical requirements are formalised as deontic temporal logic constraints, alongside a conceptual ethical agent that oversees the system and ensures that any supervised system satisfies the specified constraints. Using a case study involving financial data and mental health, we model key ethical properties and verify them using the Z3 Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver. Our evaluation shows that the framework is logically consistent and that violations of the specified ethical properties are ruled out within the formal model through counterexample-based verification. This presents early research enabling continuous, machine-verifiable ethical checking, moving beyond retrospective compliance based on static documentation. We discuss limitations, including the need for real-world verification with data, the challenge with subjectivity and contextual sensitivity, the need for human oversight, and outline how such approaches can support the development of digital phenotyping and AI systems with continuous and auditable ethical guarantees.

In the United States, artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly deployed amid limited federal regulation. With courts become a recurring forum in which AI-related practices are scrutinized, it is important to empirically understand the AI litigation landscape to date. We address this gap through a systematic review of 559 U.S. federal court opinions in which AI plays a role in the parties' contentions, taxonomizing (1) common topics of dispute, (2) the AI technologies implicated, and (3) the parties involved, including common plaintiff and defendant types. We identify seven recurring dispute areas, six categories of AI technologies at the center of litigation, and four types of common litigants, alongside legal doctrines used by the litigants. A comparison of this taxonomy to the AI Incident Database revealed substantial gaps in coverage, definitions, and prevalence between documented and litigated harms, suggesting courts capture only part of the AI risk landscape. In addition, we found that court decisions primarily rely on pre-existing legal doctrines to manage AI rather than making new AI-specific laws, producing a form of "piecemeal" AI governance. As a result, federal court outcomes are shaped less by where AI has caused harms and more by which harms are cognizable under existing statutes, leading to certain AI harms remaining unresolved.

Modern AI systems bring societal risks such as mass surveillance, extreme concentrations of power, and loss of user autonomy---calling into question a model where third-parties collect and control massive amounts of user data. Users require a sovereign system to securely own, govern, and disclose their context while remaining compliant across regulated domains with strict provenance, interpretability, and policy adherence. Perspective-aware AI approaches this by transforming a user's aggregated personal data into a structured identity model called a \emph{Chronicle}: a temporal knowledge graph that represents and grows with the user. Chronicles support the secure disclosure of context across federated networks. A Chronicle holder may expose a queryable, authorized view that a third-party agent may consult without centralizing anyone's data. This paper explores the problem of minimum-necessary disclosure across domain boundaries: when a requester's agent queries a Chronicle, how can the system constrain its response to release only what the requester's relationship, stated purpose, and specific task require? We propose \textbf{Provenance Preserving Chronicles} (PPC), a federated protocol that compiles each holder's Chronicle into a compact \emph{authorized evidence subgraph} governed by one rule: \emph{share no more than the request requires}. Holders keep local sovereignty; an access controller projects relationship-aware views over domain-expert ontologies; and a two-phase flow returns provenance-linked text first, releasing raw artifacts only after explicit holder approval. We frame the problem, map gaps in blockchain, P2P, and holder-sovereign designs, define the core constructs, and sketch the protocol with an explicit threat model.

Physical AI refers to AI systems that understand, reason about, and act in accordance with the physical world and its underlying laws, dynamics, and constraints. Unlike conventional AI systems, physical AI interacts continuously with uncertain physical environments, and its actions produce consequences that are physically irreversible. As existing trustworthy AI frameworks have been developed primarily for digital AI systems, they do not fully capture the distinctive challenges of physical AI, such as physical safety, cyber-physical security, and physical manufacturing process. To address this gap, we present a survey of trustworthy physical AI principles. First, we characterize the core capabilities and challenges of physical AI. Second, we examine the role of physics in AI. Third, we trace the end-to-end physical AI life cycle across five core stages and introduce Trustworthy Physical AI Operationalization (T-PAIO). Fourth, we develop the Trustworthy Physical AI (T-PAI) framework, a theoretical framework that organizes key trustworthiness principles and provides a foundation for governing trustworthy physical AI systems.

Regulating activities where regulatees use autonomous and agentic AI is challenging. Regulatory assumptions about regulatee knowledge and control no longer hold true; much of that lies elsewhere in the AI supply chain which thus needs to be brought within the scope of regulation. Governance systems for autonomous AI cannot replicate existing governance models, but need a fresh approach. Retrospective supervisory oversight becomes ineffective as a risk management tool, and AI autonomy generates new systemic risks which require new solutions. This paper investigate four regulatory systems: UK regulation of content platforms, data protection, UK financial services, and the EU AI Act'92s cross-sectoral regime. It analyses the challenges posed by autonomous and agentic AI and proposes potential solutions which regulators might adopt. These will transform regulation from a reactive process to an active one, and assist it in adapting to the challenges of AI autonomy.

LLM-driven autonomous agents are reshaping offensive security. Unlike traditional penetration-testing tooling - deterministic, narrowly scoped, and operated by trained practitioners - agentic security tools exhibit indeterminacy along three independent dimensions. First, their actions are drawn from a non-deterministic policy whose outputs resist both ex-ante and ex-post explanation. This complicates incident attribution and pre-deployment safety reviews. Second, their impact is open-ended due to their non-deterministic actions, agency of utilized models, and opaque LLM supply-chains. Third, their user population is indeterminate in both size and required skill: the operating skill floor for using or developing offensive capabilities has dropped sharply. These three properties are linked thematically, but are not derivable from one another. Combined with the structural cost asymmetry between offense and defense, they enable the industrialization of offensive capability. The net short-term effect favors attackers, even if the same technology may, in the long run, democratize access to defensive practice. Existing dual-use cybersecurity and AI-ethics frameworks struggle to address this combination. Our work analyzes how moral attribution becomes diffuse between users, tool-makers, and third parties when employing autonomous AI agents for offensive security. We also examine the stakeholder impact of this technology and provide stratified recommendations.

Enterprise strategic decision support requires AI systems that are not only accurate, but also uncertainty-aware, risk-calibrated, explainable, and governance-compliant. This paper proposes TRUST-ESD, a risk-calibrated and governance-aware framework for enterprise decision support under uncertainty. TRUST-ESD evaluates feasible counterfactual strategies through predictive utility estimation, conformal uncertainty calibration, CVaR-based downside-risk scoring, risk-memory retrieval, policy-as-code governance, explainability, and human oversight. Unlike prediction-only methods that select actions by maximum expected utility, TRUST-ESD recommends strategies that balance value, reliability, risk exposure, and compliance. Experimental results show that TRUST-ESD improves risk-adjusted utility by 7.95%, reduces risk exposure by 23.22%, reduces CVaR by 23.78%, lowers calibration error by 13.89%, improves explanation fidelity by 10.90%, and increases governance compliance by 9.76% compared with strong uncertainty-aware baselines, while maintaining competitive predictive accuracy. Ablation and case-study analyses further confirm that uncertainty calibration, downside-risk scoring, risk memory, explainability, and governance validation jointly improve trustworthy enterprise decision-making.

The rise of generative AI (GenAI) in higher education has prompted urgent debates surrounding academic integrity and ethical use. This study examines cross-cultural differences in student perceptions of GenAI use, comparing responses from students at Canadian and South Korean universities. Using a scenario-based survey administered in Fall 2024, we analyzed how students judged the ethicality and rule compliance of AI-assisted coding practices. Results reveal that Canadian students were consistently more likely to perceive the use of GenAI as both unethical and against institutional policies compared to Korean students, despite functionally identical institutional policies. Statistical analysis, including Mann-Whitney U tests and correlation coefficients, demonstrated significant differences across nearly all scenarios. Analysis of the factors used in generating scenarios indicated that the amount of AI-generated code incorporated into assignments most strongly influenced ethical judgments. Findings were interpreted through Hofstede's cultural dimensions framework, suggesting that cultural factors such as power distance, individualism, and uncertainty avoidance significantly shape students' ethical reasoning regarding GenAI. Our results contribute to the growing body of evidence emphasizing that equitable AI integration in education must be culturally responsive, taking into account diverse conceptions of academic integrity. We advocate for the development of nuanced AI-use guidelines that are sensitive to local cultural contexts while upholding fundamental principles of academic honesty. This study highlights the need for ongoing cross-cultural research to inform ethical AI policies and support responsible GenAI use in global higher education settings.

Large language models (LLMs) serving as planners in tool-using autonomous agents introduce dynamic reliability risks in multi-turn execution. While single-turn safety mechanisms are relatively mature, extended interactions reveal structural vulnerabilities where initial alignment degrades over time. This paper empirically characterizes two observed failure modes across multiple state-of-the-art LLMs: Safety Drift, the gradual erosion of declared safety intent leading to constraint-violating actions (e.g., textual refusal followed by reconnaissance and unsafe execution), and Operational Hallucination, persistent repetitive tool calls indicative of flawed state perception (e.g., livelocks even in legitimate tasks). Through controlled multi-turn evaluation on high-stakes ethical dilemmas, malicious requests, and benign controls, we quantify these phenomena using declaration-action gap and livelock metrics, demonstrating their cross-model prevalence under direct execution protocols. Root-cause analysis attributes the instabilities to the decoupling of reasoning context from execution state in current agent loops. We propose an Action-Aware Supervision Layer - a lightweight, plug-and-play architectural blueprint incorporating intent-action consistency checks, runtime state tracking, and forced termination primitives. Post-hoc simulation on captured failure trajectories shows the layer can intercept observed violations without false positives on benign cases. This work advances agent reliability by shifting focus from linguistic safeguards to enforceable architectural mechanisms for responsible agentic AI.

Pretrained machine learning (ML) models help developers build ML-intensive software systems without training models from scratch. However, model repositories often provide incomplete machine-readable documentation about model provenance, licenses, datasets, limitations, and external references, creating transparency and governance gaps across the AI supply chain. Artificial Intelligence Bills of Materials (AIBOMs) address these gaps by documenting AI artifacts, including models, metadata, licenses, datasets, model-card information, and external references. Taking public Hugging Face (HF) model repositories as a case study, this paper empirically investigates AIBOM completeness, defined as the extent to which repositories provide AIBOM-relevant information for machine-readable AI supply-chain documentation. We examine approximately 97.5K AIBOM artifacts to assess the extent to which generated AIBOMs: (i) contain required structural and metadata fields, (ii) represent model identity, license, and external-reference information, (iii) capture model-card documentation such as datasets, limitations, safety-risk assessment, and environmental information, and (iv) vary in documentation coverage across repository and artifact characteristics such as task, license availability, dataset declaration, model family, and paper reference. Results indicate that generated AIBOMs provide complete coverage of required AIBOM structure but limited AI-specific documentation completeness. Required fields are fully represented, but model-card, metadata, responsible-use, environmental, limitation, and meaningful-description fields remain weakly represented or missing across generated artifacts. Our findings motivate improved model-card practices, repository-level traceability, and automated AIBOM validation to advance the generation and adoption of more complete AIBOMs.