Automated Negotiation

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2 papers in the last four weeks, against 1 the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

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Latest papers 38

Oct 5, 2026cs.GT

Parallelism or Concession? Concurrency-Aware Procurement Negotiation for Agentic Commerce

Agentic buyers can cheaply fork a procurement task into many parallel negotiations, but concurrency is not free: every thread consumes resources, and simultaneous agreements create cancellation and commitment risk. We study a one-unit post-order sourcing problem with a single hard-deadline negotiation window, in which a planner jointly chooses the number of seller-facing negotiators and a common procurement price cap. The model combines a product-specific acceptance curve with fulfillment loss, per-thread cost, and excess-commitment cost. We establish three structural results. First, holding the per-thread acceptance target fixed, the marginal value of another negotiator decays geometrically, yielding a conditional concurrency threshold. Second, under a convex quantile curve, parallelism substitutes for concession: more concurrent negotiators imply a weakly lower per-thread acceptance target and price cap. Third, when prices are more dispersed, Agentic buyers benefit by searching harder for bargains, but suffer when they instead try to guarantee procurement by offering higher prices. We operationalize these results in the Concurrency-Aware Negotiation Optimizer (CANO), a deterministic optimizer that jointly determines the optimal negotiation concurrency and procurement price cap for an agentic procurement system. Across different analytic market configurations and extensive Monte Carlo, finite-data, non-Gaussian, and correlated-seller stress tests, CANO consistently outperforms common heuristic policies while validating the predicted structural properties.

Xiaolin Xu, Donghao Zhu

School of Business Nanjing University Nanjing, Jiangsu, China · Institute of Business Sciences University of Tsukuba Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, Japan · University of Tokyo Market Design Center Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, Japan

Multi-Agent System Optimization Automated Negotiation Automated Bidding Agentic Commerce

Sep 27, 2026cs.AI

Learning to Sell: Reinforcement Learning for Strategic Large Language Model Agents in Multi-Product Markets

Autonomous large language model (LLM) agents operating in multi-product markets must make sequential decisions under information asymmetry and resource constraints. We develop a machine learning approach for training such agents to act effectively as sellers in a multi-item bargaining environment, where a seller concurrently negotiates a catalog of substitutable assets across a pool of independent buyers. Buyers hold private, heterogeneous valuations across products, and each can purchase at most one item. Facing limits on total communication turns, the seller must dynamically match buyers with the most profitable products considering their private valuations, while strategically allocating its limited interaction budget toward combinations of greater potential value. We formalize this problem as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process using a structured, four-part message protocol that maps natural language into a parsable and regulated decision space. Using this formalization, we design a post-training method using Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). To evaluate this framework, we construct a multidimensional metric suite that quantifies constraint adherence, seller surplus extraction, and allocation quality. Our trained seller agent learns to match limited inventory to buyers more effectively, matching or outperforming trillion-parameter frontier models in both seller surplus extraction and buyer-product allocation quality. Finally, these learned strategies generalize robustly to unseen market structures, correlated valuation distributions, and price ranges not encountered during training.

Shuze Daniel Liu, Claire Chen, Jiuqi Wang +2

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA · Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA · California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, USA +2

Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation Partially Observable RL RL for LLM Agents

Sep 11, 2026cs.CL

ProMediConv: Benchmarking Proactive Conversational Agents in Legal Dispute Mediation

Dispute mediation is essential for maintaining social harmony and resilience, yet developing skilled mediators is costly and time-consuming. Existing LLM-based mediation research remains limited by unrealistic task formulations, low-fidelity datasets, and coarse evaluation metrics that obscure turn-by-turn dynamics. To address these gaps, we introduce ProMediConv, a novel benchmarking framework that models mediation as a proactive, multi-stage, and party-aware dialogue process incorporating 11 mediation strategies and four party behavior pattern (BP) states. Using 972 complete real-world cases, we construct a high-fidelity mediation dataset with utterance-level annotations of strategies and BP states. Furthermore, to better assess agent impact, we propose MAD (Mean Attribute Difference), a fine-grained metric that captures BP shifts throughout the dialogue. Leveraging this framework, we establish a comprehensive benchmark by evaluating diverse models alongside our tailored baseline ProMediAgent. Extensive empirical analyses reveal critical behavioral phenomena and underscore the persistent challenges current models face in dynamic, multi-party mediation. Ultimately, ProMediConv provides a rigorous foundation and a vital quantitative standard for advancing AI-assisted conflict resolution. Our dataset and codebase are accessible at https://github.com/ZsWei66/ProMediConv_repo.

Zesheng Wei, Mengfan Li, Wenhao Liu +3

University of Science and Technology of China · Singapore Management University · Institute of Artificial Intelligence, Hefei Comprehensive National Science Center

Automated Negotiation LLM Agent Evaluation AI Agent Benchmarks Multi-Turn Dialogue Evaluation Conversational Agents

Aug 11, 2026cs.AI

Evaluating Rational Contracting in Natural Language

The emergence of language-based AI agents promises to transform the scope of machine economic activity. Instead of just proposing bids or following hard-coded protocols, such agents can be used to negotiate and execute agreements in open-ended natural language. However, most evaluations of these abilities have focused on one-off exchanges or simple economic games, leaving open the rich space of time-extended, contingent, and incomplete contracts made expressible by language; they also focus on raw profit, without measuring the qualities required for trustworthy contracting. We address this by formulating a rational framework for how agents should negotiate and perform natural language contracts in uncertain multi-step environments. Within this framework, we develop metrics and baselines for quantifying rational and cooperative play. To evaluate how agents perform at such contracting, we instantiate our framework in ContractSim, an evaluation suite where two players negotiate and execute a multi-turn supplier contract under environmental and inter-player uncertainty. Across six environments and three supplier settings (catering, hotel cleaning, and AI hosting) we find that current LLM-based agents reach agreement reliably, and negotiate efficient contracts when environmental uncertainty is low. However, under high uncertainty, they often fail to negotiate satisfiable, efficient, or mutually beneficial contracts. They are also frequently uncooperative when executing contracts, violating contract terms for additional profit even when contracts are easy to satisfy. These findings highlight room for improvement in the design of language agents that can negotiate, interpret, and execute contracts both rationally and cooperatively.

Bhavyesh Sajja, Max Kleiman-Weiner, Roger Zimmermann +1

Department of Computer Science, National University of Singapore · Department of Computer Science, University of Washington · A*STAR Institute of Advanced Intelligence and Computing

Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation LLM Agent Evaluation AI Agent Benchmarks

Aug 7, 2026cs.AI

Deal Me Maybe: The Role of Emotions in Multi-Agent Negotiation

Negotiation is a demanding social task for LLM agents, requiring strategic reasoning, persuasion, and interpersonal adaptation. Yet existing benchmarks often treat agents as emotionally neutral, overlooking a key driver of human bargaining behavior. We study how prompt-conditioned emotions affect LLM-based price negotiation. In a controlled framework, buyer and seller agents are independently assigned one of six emotional states and negotiate over 350 real consumer products under two budget conditions. Across 36 emotion-pair settings and five widely used LLMs, we find that emotions strongly shape outcomes. Angry buyers almost never reach agreement (0.39% deal rate), while happy buyers agree most often (28.91%), but obtain worse prices than fearful buyers. Emotion effects are role-dependent: buyer emotion mainly drives acceptance and rejection, whereas seller emotion shapes concession dynamics. These effects influence not only language, but also termination behavior and price trajectories, raising concerns for emotion-conditioned agents in commerce.

Massimiliano Luca, Apoorva Singh, Bruno Lepri

Bruno Kessler Foundation

Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation LLM Agent Evaluation Emotion Representation in Language Models

Aug 7, 2026cs.AI

IB-RL: Isolated Bilateral Reinforcement Learning for Strategic Dialogue Agents

Reinforcement learning (RL) has achieved strong results in improving large language models (LLMs) on tasks with stationary, verifiable rewards, such as mathematical reasoning and code execution. In these settings, the environment follows fixed rules and does not adapt strategically to the agent. Strategic dialogue differs in this respect: the environment is another agent that adapts to the policy, and success depends on the interaction between the two sides. Despite this interactive nature, current RL approaches typically train a target agent against a fixed counterpart or simulator. We find that this training paradigm encourages the policy to exploit counterpart-specific regularities rather than learn strategies that generalize across counterparts. We call this problem the static-counterpart mismatch, which we quantify directly in our experiments. To address it, we propose Isolated Bilateral Reinforcement Learning (IB-RL), in which the two roles coevolve through joint rollouts while each role optimizes its own reward through fully independent advantages, action masks, and update paths. We evaluate frozen policies against fully independent held-out counterparts in both domains. On Vehicle TeleSales, IB-RL achieves 89.6% Success@1, compared to 84.6% for the best unilateral RL baseline. On Deal-or-NoDeal, it reaches 98.4% agreement against DeepSeek V4 Pro, compared to 86.4% for the best unilateral baseline. These results indicate that jointly training both roles with strict peragent isolation produces policies that generalize more effectively to unseen counterparts.

Senhao Wang, Chenghao Cai, Haitao Hu +4

Dcar Inc. ByteDance

Automated Negotiation Self-Play RL RL for LLM Agents Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Aug 6, 2026cs.CL

TradeVerse: A Longitudinal Benchmark of Political Negotiation in International Trade

LLMs are increasingly being applied to tasks involving institutional and political texts, but existing benchmarks evaluate them on isolated documents or single tasks. In realpolitik, negotiations are longitudinal data, where participating parties can align or argue over multiple iterations and each turn is an outcome of the previous turns, hence, understanding one turn requires tracking everything before it. We introduce TradeVerse, a benchmark built from the World Trade Organisation (WTO) specific trade concerns, where member states challenge one another and exchange arguments over multiple rounds, sometimes for years. We, in TradeVerse, reconstruct minutes of

1170

meetings, spanning across 5 groups and

89

product groups and define three tasks: first, the system has to analyze the longitudinal meeting records and predict the harmonized system codes (HS chapters) of the products under discussion in the particular meeting, second, we examine whether the system, upon analyzing the anonymized content of the meeting, can guess the name of the responding country and third, we ask the system to play the role of the responding country and provide the statement for the very last round. All labels are recovered directly from the proceedings, requiring no manual annotation. Our experiments highlight the challenges these tasks pose for current LLMs. To the best of our knowledge, TradeVerseis the first benchmark to investigate potential of LLMs in understanding longitudinal political trade negotiations.

Debodeep Banerjee, Amitangshu Dasgupta

DI, University of Pisa · RazorPay · DISI, University of Trento

LLM Evaluation Automated Negotiation Multi-Turn Dialogue Evaluation

Jul 29, 2026cs.AI

When LLM Agents Negotiate: Private Information and Dynamic Bargaining in Supply Chains

As LLM agents move from decision support to autonomous procurement, firms need to know whether delegated negotiators create value, divide it predictably, and avoid money-losing contracts. We study this in a canonical supply chain bargaining problem: a buyer with private demand information negotiates a quantity-payment contract with an uninformed seller. We benchmark nine LLMs from OpenAI, Google, and Alibaba against a validated Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium across 9,840 LLM-to-LLM negotiations. First, capability governs value creation. Agents agree in 98.9% of negotiations and capture 95.4% of first-best surplus undiscounted, but average 2.98 rounds against the benchmark's 1.25, and this delay erodes 21-34% of surplus. Capability also governs reliability: baseline models accept individually irrational contracts in 19.2% of cases, versus 0.0-0.6% at mid-tier and flagship, making automated profit verification the binding guardrail below that threshold. Second, surplus capture is relational. Provider identity predicts who captures surplus better than capability rank: self-play buyer shares average 40% for OpenAI, 50% for Google, and 70% for Alibaba's Qwen, an ordering that survives restricted communication and no discounting. Reversing which provider sells moves the division by 7-18 percentage points, and the capable Qwen flagship is the weakest cross-family seller: vendor choice is a first-order distributional decision. Third, the prompt is a strategic lever. Delegation separates the principal's economic patience from the agent's prompted strategic patience, a free deployment choice that is the single strongest driver of surplus division (90% of explained variance). Together these establish an equilibrium-referenced audit of AI agents along three dimensions: discounted efficiency, distributional profile, and operational reliability.

Chen Liang, Fasheng Xu

School of Business, University of Connecticut

Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation LLM Agent Evaluation Supply Chain Management LLM Agent Reliability

Jul 28, 2026cs.MA

CoRenew: A large language model agent-based policy simulation platform for multifamily residential redevelopment

The difficulty of collective action remains a central challenge in the design of policies for multifamily residential redevelopment. Stakeholders continually adjust their decisions in response to evolving negotiation contexts and the reactions of others, meaning that when a policy intervenes and which stakeholders it targets can substantially reshape collective outcomes. Assessing these adaptive responses ex ante remains difficult because existing simulation models often rely on predefined behavioral rules. Here, we present CoRenew, an open-source platform that uses LLM-based agents to simulate negotiations among multiple stakeholders and evaluate the effects of alternative policy combinations. Integrating open source geographic and demographic data, the platform can generate synthetic residents, simulate negotiation dynamics under alternative policy settings and compares policy performance across competing objectives. It supports both numerical and semantic policy inputs and includes built-in tools for visualization and result export. We validate its behavioral realism against survey responses from 324 residents and a nine-month observed negotiation process from a real redevelopment case. With its modular and adaptable architecture, CoRenew can be used to assess policies across different institutional and cultural contexts.

Yudi Zhang, Yuming Lin, Li Tian +2

Department of Urban Planning, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China · Department of City and Regional Planning, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, 94720, USA · Department of Electronic Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China

Multi-Agent LLM Systems Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation Human Behavior Simulation Agent-Based Modeling

Jul 28, 2026cs.AI

Everyone is unique: Towards Behaviorally Heterogeneous Negotiation Dialogue Systems for Debt Collection

Debt collection is a critical negotiation task in the financial industry, with strong practical relevance and exceptional academic value as a behaviorally rich, high-stakes testbed for human-centered dialogue systems. While large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in dialogue and negotiation, effectively evaluating their performance in this complex scenarios remains a major challenge: existing benchmarks uniformly assume users to be static, rational agents with fixed preferences, failing to capture the rich behavioral heterogeneity inherent in real-world debt collection. To bridge this gap, we propose DebtBench, the first public persona-enriched debt collection benchmark, that highlights behavioral heterogeneity in negotiation. Moreover, we develop DebtGPT, a debt collection agent trained to jointly optimize financial recovery and interaction experience. Our experimental results, using 16 state-of-the-art LLMs, find that most existing models struggle in this complex but realistic scenarios, whereas DebtGPT outperforms all open-source baselines and achieves performance on par with GPT-4o. The code and data are available at https://github.com/YYuHhhh/DebtNegotiation.

Yuhang Yang, Kai Tang, Chao Ye +4

1State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University · 2Ant Group

Automated Negotiation LLM Agent Evaluation Task-Oriented Dialogue Systems Finance

Jul 19, 2026cs.AI

Multi-Agent Scheduling with LLM-Assisted Contract Net Negotiation for Stream Processing in Mobile Edge Computing

Stream-processing systems increasingly operate across heterogeneous mobile edge--cloud infrastructures, where workload volatility, resource contention, and stringent quality-of-service (QoS) requirements complicate decentralized scheduling. This paper proposes \emph{MAS-DecStream}, whose main contribution is \emph{LLM-MR-CNP}: an extension of the classical Contract Net Protocol with semantic CFP formulation, progressive context disclosure, multi-round proposal revision, negotiation memory, and deterministic validation. Edge-cluster agents refine natural-language offloading proposals from local observations, predicted resource states, and qualitative runtime context, while hard resource and QoS constraints remain deterministic. Experiments derived from the Alibaba ASI Trace evaluate the extension at three levels: single- versus multi-round CNP, rule-based versus LLM-assisted refinement, and fixed-model single- versus multi-round negotiation. Under the evaluated configurations, MAS-DecStream reduces latency violations to 3%, eliminates resource overcommitment, reaches a conflict-resolution rate of 0.91 with 20 agents, and improves utility by up to 22% over the multi-round rule-based baseline. A separate 25-case evaluation shows model- and prompt-dependent accuracy--cost trade-offs. The results provide initial evidence that multi-round CNP refinement is the principal protocol-level gain, with LLM assistance adding value for qualitative and uncertain runtime context.

Sabeur Lajili, Zaki Brahmi

University of Sousse, Tunisia

Automated Negotiation Agent Communication Protocols Edge Computing Multi-Agent Systems

Jul 16, 2026cs.CL

Digital Pantheon: Simulating and Auditing Coalition Formation with LLM Agents

The formation of political coalitions is a complex negotiation driven by both concrete policy objectives and deep-seated ideological convictions. While Large Language Models (LLMs) open new avenues for computational political science, the neutrality and helpfulness biases instilled by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) prevent them from sustaining steadfast partisan behaviour. We present a multi-agent framework that reconciles factual grounding with ideological alignment by combining Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG): DPO instils aggressive party-specific personas, while a per-party RAG pipeline keeps each agent bounded to its official manifesto. We operationalize the framework on the 2019 Flemish election, deploying the partisan agents in a hub-and-spoke negotiation arbitrated by a formateur. To make the emergent negotiation interpretable, we introduce a Multi-Layered Information Lineage Topology (MILT) that traces every clause in the final agreement back to its manifesto origin and classifies it into five provenance states, a Coalition Influence Score (CIS) that aggregates these traceable contributions to identify which party shaped the agreement, and a real-world grounding pass that benchmarks each simulated provision against the historically adopted coalition agreement. Across three independent simulations the framework yields a stable winner and ranking (N-VA ahead of CD&V and Open Vld), and manifesto-anchored lineage reliably predicts real-world materialization whereas hallucinated content does not. The result is a transparent, scalable testbed for the ex-ante exploration of party compatibility and formateur-mediated compromise.

Dylan Van Mulders, Matthias Bogaert, Dirk Van den Poel

Ghent University CVAMO Core Lab

Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation Computational Social Science Multi-Agent LLMs

Jul 16, 2026cs.RO

MIND-CAVs: Multi-Intelligence Negotiation and Decision System for CAVs based on Intent-Driven Autonomy

Modern autonomous vehicles largely operate as isolated agents: they rely on on-board perception and decision modules and broadcast Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) that expose only low-level kinematic state. While existing cooperative driving frameworks enable limited sensor sharing, they rarely communicate high-level maneuver intentions, and edge computing is primarily used for content delivery rather than decision arbitration. As a result, current connected autonomy lacks a principled mechanism for making globally consistent, intent-aware coordination decisions across vehicles. To address this gap, we propose MIND-CAVs, a Multi-Intelligence Negotiation and Decision framework for connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) based on intent-driven autonomy. Each vehicle abstracts raw sensor observations into structured intent representations, exchanges them over V2X links, and receives globally consistent coordination plans from roadside edge servers. Edge agents combine learned and rule-based arbitration mechanisms to negotiate conflicting intents among vehicles, while a cloud platform records decisions for auditing and continual retraining. We implement MIND-CAVs in a CARLA-based AI-in-the-loop platform and evaluate it in multi-lane highway scenarios involving conflicting maneuvers and route-constrained exits. Experimental results show improved maneuver completion time and reduced unsafe proximity and unnecessary braking compared with isolated autonomy, first-come-first-served arbitration, and multi-agent reinforcement learning baselines.

Mainak Mondal, Yihang Feng, Yangchao Luo +1

University of Connecticut

Multi-Agent Coordination Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation Autonomous Driving V2X Communication Autonomous Driving Planning

Jul 7, 2026cs.LG

Strategic Bargaining in Multi-Buyer Markets: Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards for LLM Negotiations

Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations. A prevalent yet complex scenario involves a single seller negotiating concurrently with multiple buyers, each possessing heterogeneous, private budgets. In such settings, constrained by a limited number of communication turns, the seller must balance exploring the broader market to discover the highest valuation with concentrating sufficient turns on a single target buyer to secure the best possible outcome. Our analysis reveals a significant gap in standard Large Language Models (LLMs): while these models are linguistically proficient, they fail to act as effective economic decision-makers. Specifically, they exhibit a failure to explore the buyer pool, often fixating on the current highest bid rather than strategically investigating the market to discover latent high valuations. In this paper, we propose a specialized training recipe using Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). By anchoring the reward function to objective economic outcomes, the strategic balance between market discovery and surplus extraction emerges natively through the learning process. Our results demonstrate that the trained seller undergoes a multi-stage strategic evolution, learning to leverage price anchoring and strategic probing to identify more profitable counterparties. The agent extracts a substantially higher surplus than frontier models by both improving its persuasive bargaining skills and consistently closing deals with high-value buyers. Finally, we show that our seller strategies generalize robustly to unseen buyer negotiation styles and budget distributions.

Shuze Daniel Liu, Claire Chen, Jiabao Sean Xiao +2

Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology · Mitch Daniels School of Business, Purdue University · The Division of Physics, Mathematics and Astronomy, California Institute of Technology +3

Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation RL for LLM Agents

Jul 2, 2026cs.MA

SovereignNegotiation-Bench: Evaluating User-Owned Personal Agents In Delegated Bargaining Under Privacy, Consent, Evidence, And Institutional Pressure

Personal agents will increasingly negotiate on behalf of users: splitting costs with other personal agents, appealing platform decisions, escalating support disputes, requesting refunds, changing subscriptions, and negotiating deadlines or reimbursements. Existing negotiation benchmarks emphasize agreement, surplus, or strategic competence, but a user-owned agent can reach an agreement while harming the user through privacy leakage, consent violation, unsupported advocacy, over-concession, failed escalation, or poor auditability. We introduce SovereignNegotiation-Bench, a trace-level multi-turn benchmark for delegated personal-agent negotiation under private utilities, disclosure constraints, evidence requirements, and institutional asymmetry. The benchmark separates agent-visible observable state from evaluator-only labels and evaluates agreement success jointly with user utility, privacy, consent, evidence grounding, concession discipline, escalation, and auditability. We report an artifact-backed validation over 240 scenarios, 4 model families, 14 baselines, 13,440 frozen-prompt live trajectories, 61,135 parsed action rows, and a blinded 3-annotator audit over 300 items. The strongest agreement-maximizing baseline achieves the highest agreement rate but low user utility and high privacy/consent risk; FullSovereign does not maximize agreement, but obtains the best sovereign negotiation score by preserving utility, minimizing leakage, grounding claims, and reducing unauthorized commitments. The results show that agreement success is insufficient for user-owned negotiation agents.

Dylan Zongmin Liu

Stanford University

Automated Negotiation AI Agent Benchmarks Privacy-Utility Tradeoff Personal AI Agents

Jun 13, 2026cs.GT

Self-Driving Negotiator: An interactive, verifiable benchmark for social negotiation and theory of mind under hidden intent

Autonomous driving is full of tiny social negotiations: a driver presses forward, another yields, a pedestrian fakes toward the curb, or a lane vehicle chooses whether to open a merge gap. Such interactions require inferring hidden intent from behavior under partial observability and then acting safely and efficiently. Existing autonomous-driving language benchmarks mostly focus on perception, visual question answering, or open-loop planning, while existing language-agent negotiation benchmarks typically make the negotiation explicit in text. Self-Driving Negotiator bridges the gap between the two: a text-only, multi-turn, procedurally generated environment for measuring implicit social coordination in driving. Agents generate specific driving actions. Reward and diagnostics are computed from the privileged simulator state, not from the explanation of the model. This report covers task design, reward and anti-gaming invariants, validated scenarios, non-LLM baselines, and a six-model inference leaderboard. Current models are far removed from the scripted expert. The best average success rate across three scenarios is 0.68; contested merge is statistically flat across models; and difficulty tiers separate cue-following from true wait-for-commitment behavior.

Ashutosh Kumar

Owl Autonomous Imaging, Inc.

Autonomous Driving Benchmarks Automated Negotiation Theory of Mind Autonomous Driving Autonomous Driving Simulation

Jun 9, 2026cs.AI

Automated Mediator for Human Negotiation: Pre-Mediation via a Structured LLM Pipeline

Pre-mediation, the preparatory phase preceding direct human negotiation, plays a critical role in achieving mutually beneficial agreements, yet is often omitted due to cost, time, and limited access to trained mediators. We introduce an automated mediator for human negotiation, implemented as a structured pipeline of LLM modules, that supports pre-mediation in integrative negotiation settings. The pipeline decomposes preparation into specialized modules for dialogue, preference prediction, response-level critique, and structured summarization, separating inference, generation, and evaluation to address limitations of monolithic single-prompt approaches. We use the term "agent" for each module following common LLM-systems terminology, but the components are not autonomous and do not interact peer-to-peer; outputs are passed forward in a fixed sequence. We evaluate the system in two controlled human-subject experiments comparing AI-based pre-mediation with professional human mediators in a multi-issue negotiation scenario. On short-term self-reported measures, the automated mediator achieves preparation outcomes broadly comparable to human mediators, including trust in the mediator and confidence in reaching mutually beneficial agreements, while achieving substantially lower error on the preference-inference task under our scenario and prompts (36% lower RMSE). A second study shows that targeted prompt refinements reduce excessive affirmation patterns from 36.6% to 16.8%, matching human mediator baselines. Our findings suggest that structured LLM pipelines can provide scalable, low-effort pre-mediation support broadly comparable to human mediators on short-term self-reported preparation outcomes. The pipeline's single-party design mirrors how human mediators run pre-mediation today and enables parallel deployment across all parties to a dispute, supporting scalability.

Jamie Bergen, Sarit Kraus

Automated Negotiation LLM Agent Orchestration

May 29, 2026cs.GT

Used Car Salesbots? Honesty and Credulity of LLMs as Bargaining Agents under Partial Information

In this work we study agents in simulated bargaining scenarios, where a buyer and a seller communicate through a text channel and attempt to negotiate mutually beneficial trades, under different information regimes (complete information, information asymmetry or mutual uncertainty). We evaluate their performance w.r.t. game-theoretical solutions and further investigate their honesty (their tendency to disclose or withhold information or to mislead and deceive) as well as their credulity (their tendency to trust or distrust information provided by the other agent). We study zero-shot LLM agents with simple prompting scaffolding as well as fine-tuned agents, in order to investigate whether optimising the agents to maximise financial profits makes them stronger negotiators but also more dishonest and less trusting. We find that off-the-shelf LLMs all substantially deviate from game-theoretical equilibria, they attempt to lie about their private information but cannot efficiently exploit information asymmetries. Fine-tuning on financial utility makes the agents stronger at achieving better deals but also more dishonest, highlighting the risks that optimising agents for a task can have on their safety. We release our code and a dataset of bargaining scenarios.

Antonio Valerio Miceli-Barone, Vaishak Belle, Shay B. Cohen

University of Edinburgh

Multi-Agent LLM Systems Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation Imperfect-Information Games LLM Agent Training LLM Honesty

May 26, 2026cs.CL

EmoDistill: Offline Emotion Skill Distillation for Language Model Agents in Adversarial Negotiation

Post-trained LLMs are often optimized to produce helpful, polite, and accommodating responses. In adversarial negotiation, however, such behavior can become a vulnerability: emotionally framed language may influence an agent's bargaining decisions in ways that conflict with its user's objectives. We therefore introduce EmoDistill, an offline framework for distilling emotional negotiation skills from LLM-LLM interactions into smaller language-model agents. Here, an emotional negotiation skill is a state-conditioned behavior that determines which explicit emotion to invoke in a bargaining state and how to realize that emotion as an effective negotiation utterance. EmoDistill learns these two components separately: an Implicit Q-Learning (IQL) selector learns which emotion to express in each bargaining state, while a LoRA-adapted 7B policy learns emotion-conditioned expression through Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Judge Policy Optimization (JPO). Across four emotion-sensitive negotiation domains, the full EmoDistill policy achieves competitive utility and improves over vanilla and IQL-only baselines in most settings. Emotion-free ablations show that removing the explicit emotion channel substantially reduces overall negotiation utility, while transfer experiments reveal partial, domain-dependent transfer and robustness to unseen LLM counterparties.

Yunbo Long, Haolang Zhao, Lukas Beckenbauer +2

University of Cambridge · Technical University of Munich · Exiger LLC +1

Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation LLM Agent Skill Learning Language Model Distillation RL for LLM Agents Emotion-Aware Dialogue Generation

May 21, 2026math.OC

Incentive-Aligned Vehicle-to-Vehicle Energy Trading via Nash-Integrated Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) energy trading enables decentralized peer-to-peer energy exchange among electric vehicles (EVs), reducing grid dependency while monetizing surplus capacity. However, coordinating self-interested EV agents with diverse charging needs and uncertain arrival-departure schedules remains challenging. Existing approaches either require centralized optimization with computational limitations or lack fairness guarantees. This paper integrates Nash Bargaining Solution into Multi-Agent Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient, namely Nash-MADDPG, for incentive-aligned V2V energy trading. Nash bargaining determines efficient bilateral pricing, while Nash-guided price proximity rewards align agent learning toward bargaining-optimal strategies. Evaluation over 30-day continuous operation demonstrates an improvement of 61.6% in social welfare and 62.9% improvement in trading volume over Double Auction, while achieving superior fairness, such as 40.1% improvement in Jain's index. Testing across 6-100 agents over a 30-day horizon with continuous vehicle turnover confirms scalability across population size and empirically stable pricing near the Nash Bargaining benchmark.

Yujin Lin, Yue Yang, Hao Wang

Department of Data Science and AI, Faculty of IT, Monash University, Australia · Monash Energy Institute, Monash University, Australia

Multi-Agent Coordination Automated Negotiation Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

May 19, 2026cs.AI

Personality Engineering with AI Agents: A New Methodology for Negotiation Research

According to canonical negotiation theory, people's success in a negotiation depends on how well they balance competing demands--empathizing and asserting, demonstrating concern for other and concern for self, being soft on the people and hard on the problem. Yet people struggle to manage these tensions, so researchers have lacked the ability to rigorously test the field's prescriptions under controlled conditions. AI agents do not face the same limitations, and their precision, repertoire, consistency, and scalability enable a new class of experiments to contribute to negotiation theory. In this article, we introduce personality engineering: a methodology that uses AI agents to precisely parameterize, manipulate, and evaluate negotiator personality. We propose using the interpersonal circumplex--and its two core dimensions of warmth and dominance--as a foundational coordinate system for the field. This approach offers both a rigorous methodology for testing classic negotiation theories and a practical guide for designing the personalities of AI negotiation agents.

Michelle A. Vaccaro, Jared R. Curhan

MIT Institute for Data, Systems, and Society · MIT Sloan School of Management

Automated Negotiation

May 19, 2026cs.GT

PrefBench: Evaluating Zero-Shot LLM Agents in Hidden-Preference Personalized Pricing Negotiations

Personalized pricing negotiations are a challenging testbed for LLM agents because successful interaction does not guarantee profitable decision making. A seller may produce valid actions and close many deals while still pricing poorly when buyer willingness to pay and bargaining traits remain hidden. This paper presents PrefBench, a simulator-based benchmark for hidden-preference personalized pricing negotiations. Each episode pairs a simulated buyer with a fixed vehicle-customization bundle; the seller observes public persona descriptors, bundle information, and negotiation history, while latent buyer variables govern valuation, patience, counter-offer behavior, and walkaway decisions. PrefBench evaluates this setting through an LLM-facing state-summary protocol that constrains agents to return strict JSON actions under a fixed hidden-information boundary. We evaluate zero-shot LLM sellers against heuristic references over 7,500 episodes. The tested LLMs follow the protocol reliably and achieve deal rates above 0.99, but their seller-profit outcomes remain weak: the best LLM average profit is only slightly above the random baseline and far below a simple concession heuristic under the same episode stream. These results show that structured action compliance and agreement-seeking behavior can coexist with weak profit-sensitive bargaining. PrefBench provides a controlled benchmark for evaluating pricing-agent behavior under hidden buyer preferences.

Yingjie Lei

University of Aberdeen

Automated Negotiation LLM Agent Evaluation AI Agent Benchmarks

May 15, 2026cs.AI

Counterparty Modeling is Not Strategy: The Limits of LLM Negotiators

Negotiation requires more than inferring what the other side wants: it requires using that information to make advantageous offers and counteroffers over multiple turns. We study whether large language model (LLM) agents do this in a controlled multi-attribute bargaining environment. We find that current LLM agents can model a counterparty's preferences, but do not reliably turn that knowledge into strategic bargaining. When given negotiating partner preference information, agents model it accurately and early in their reasoning traces, yet this does not reliably improve outcomes for the informed side. Turn-level analyses show why: agents often respond to what they believe the counterparty values, but do not consistently pair those moves with gains on their own high-value attributes. Sellers are more accommodating overall, and in asymmetric-information conditions, the informed side often makes the more weakly compensated concessions. Because agents fail to leverage this underlying utility structure for strategic advantage, their final agreements are heavily dictated by surface-level opening anchors rather than actual utility weights. Finally, requiring agents to explicitly state concession-for-reciprocity trades before making an offer makes individual turns look more strategic, but ultimately fails to improve the efficiency of the final agreements.

Romain Cosentino, Sarath Shekkizhar, Adam Earle +1

Salesforce AI Research

Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation LLM Agents

May 13, 2026cs.GT

TERMS-Bench: Diagnosing LLM Negotiation Agents Beyond Deal Rate

Negotiation is a central mechanism of economic exchange, shaping markets, procurement, labor agreements, and resource allocation. It is also a canonical testbed for agentic language models, requiring multi-turn interaction under hidden preferences, strategic communication, and binding constraints. These properties make negotiation hard to evaluate: unlike math or code, it has no intrinsic verifier. Existing LLM negotiation evaluations rely on LLM-vs.-LLM interaction or aggregate outcomes such as deal rate, leaving failures opaque. We introduce Terms-Bench, short for Testbed for Economic Reasoning in Multi-turn Strategy, a Bayesian-game framework that makes the environment itself the verifier by specifying the counterpart's latent type, policy, and payoff structure. We instantiate it in bilateral price negotiation, where the counterpart's private state and simulator policy are hidden from the agent but observable to the evaluator. This turns the counterpart from a black-box opponent into a diagnostic instrument, enabling agent-attributable failure analysis and oracle-reference optimality gaps. Evaluating 13 LLM agents spanning frontier systems from major providers, Terms-Bench turns negotiation evaluation from aggregate ranking into actionable diagnosis: where agents fail, why they fail, and what to strengthen. Empirically, frontier models saturate deal rate yet diverge in surplus extraction, cue use, belief calibration, and compliance, revealing agent-specific bargaining bottlenecks masked by prior benchmarks.

Erica Zhang, Fangzhao Zhang, Aneesh Pappu +5

♠Stanford School of Engineering · ♣Stanford Department of Economics · ♥Stanford Graduate School of Business +1

Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation Imperfect-Information Games Game Theory LLM Agent Evaluation

May 12, 2026cs.AI

LLM-X: A Scalable Negotiation-Oriented Exchange for Communication Among Personal LLM Agents

We propose a personal-LLM exchange (LLM-X), a scalable negotiation-oriented environment that enables direct, structured communication across populations of personal agents (LLMs), each representing an individual user. Unlike existing tool-centric protocols that focus on agent-API interaction, LLM-X introduces a message bus and routing substrate for LLM-to-LLM coordination with guarantees around schema validity and policy enforcement. We contribute: (1) an architecture for LLM-X comprising federated gateways, topic-based routing, and policy enforcement; (2) a typed message protocol supporting capability negotiation and contract-net-style coordination; and (3) the first empirical evaluation of LLM-based multi-agent negotiation at scale. Experiments span 5, 9, and 12 agents, under distinct negotiation policies (Low, Medium, High), and across both short-run (minutes) and long-run (2h, 12h) load conditions. Results highlight clear policy-performance trade-offs: stricter policies improve robustness and fairness but increase latencies and message volume. Extended runs confirm that LLM-X remains stable under sustained load, with bounded latency drift.

Giuliano Lorenzoni, Paulo Alencar, Donald Cowan

University of Waterloo · University of Waterloo Waterloo, ON, Canada

Multi-Agent LLM Systems Multi-Agent Coordination Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation Multi-Agent Communication

May 11, 2026cs.GT

Regret Minimization in Bilateral Trade With Perturbed Markets

We address the problem of maximizing Gain from Trade (GFT) in repeated buyer-seller exchanges subject to global budget balance constraints. While this problem is well-understood in purely adversarial and stochastic settings, these environments exhibit a sharp dichotomy: adversarial environments allow for no-regret learning against the best fixed-price mechanism, whereas stochastic environments allow for no-regret learning against the best distribution over prices that is budget balanced in expectation. This gap is significant, as policies balanced in expectation can increase the GFT by a multiplicative factor of two. In this work, we bridge these extremes by studying perturbed markets, where an underlying stochastic distribution is subject to an adversarial corruption

C

. We design an algorithm that adaptively scales with the level of corruption, achieving an

\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4}) + \mathcal{O}(C\log(T))

regret bound against the best budget-balanced distribution over prices. Simultaneously, our algorithm maintains the worst-case

\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{3/4})

regret bound relative to a per-round budget-balanced baseline, ensuring optimality even in fully adversarial environments.

Anna Lunghi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi

Politecnico di Milano

Mechanism Design Automated Negotiation Regret Minimization

May 6, 2026cs.CL

Distilling Bayesian Belief States into Language Models for Auditable Negotiation

Negotiation agents must infer what their counterpart values, update those beliefs over dialogue turns, and choose actions under uncertainty. End-to-end large language models (LLMs) can imitate negotiation dialogue, but their opponent beliefs are usually implicit and difficult to inspect. We propose BOND (Bayesian Opponent-belief Negotiation Distillation), a framework for auditable negotiation. BOND consists of an LLM-based Bayesian teacher that scores dialogue contexts against the six possible opponent priority orderings, updates a posterior over those orderings, and uses the posterior for menu-based decision making, as well as a smaller 8B student language model that emits both negotiation actions and normalized posterior beliefs as tagged text. In the CaSiNo negotiation dataset, BOND outperforms the state-of-the-art and achieves mean Brier score 0.085 over opponent-priority posteriors. The distilled student preserves much of this belief signal, achieving Brier 0.114, below the uniform six-ordering reference of 5/36, approximately 0.139. Compared with a 70B structured-CoT baseline, the significantly smaller 8B student model yields substantially better elicited posterior calibration. We further showcase auditability through posterior trajectories, belief-versus-policy error decomposition, and posterior-prefix interventions. These diagnostics reveal that distillation preserves a scoreable belief report more strongly than causal belief-conditioned control, making weak belief-action coupling visible, not hidden.

Zongqi Cui, Baihan Lin

Emory University · Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai

Multi-Agent Negotiation Opponent Modeling Automated Negotiation LLM Auditing Language Model Calibration Language Model Distillation+1

May 3, 2026cs.MA

Talk is Cheap, Communication is Hard: Dynamic Grounding Failures and Repair in Multi-Agent Negotiation

Grounding is the collaborative process of establishing mutual belief sufficient for a communicative goal. While static grounding maps language to a shared context, dynamic grounding requires agents to negotiate meaning across turns. Current multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) benchmarks largely emphasize static, one-shot tasks, overlooking whether agents can repair grounding breakdowns through interaction. We introduce an iterated multi-turn negotiation game where two agents allocate shared resources to private projects with verifiable jointly optimal outcomes. Although individual agents can identify Pareto-optimal allocations in isolation, agent dyads consistently fail to reach them across models. We identify four failure modes: (1) loss of shared interaction history, (2) stubborn anchoring to early proposals, (3) defaulting to equal splits over reward-maximizing coordination, and (4) referential binding errors across turns. Our baselines show that the coordination gap is not explained by individual reasoning limits or insufficient information exchange alone. Instead, the bottleneck lies in dynamic grounding: joint plan formation, commitment, and execution.

Yiheng Yao, Chelsea Zou, Robert D. Hawkins

Stanford University

Multi-Agent Coordination Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation Multi-Agent Communication Multi-Agent LLMs

Apr 28, 2026cs.AI

Cooperate to Compete: Strategic Coordination in Multi-Agent Conquest

Language Model (LM)-based agents remain largely untested in mixed-motive settings where agents must leverage short-term cooperation for long-term competitive goals (e.g., multi-party politics). We introduce Cooperate to Compete (C2C), a multi-agent environment where players can engage in private negotiations while competing to be the first to achieve their secret objective. Players have asymmetric objectives and negotiations are non-binding, allowing alliances to form and break as players' short-term interests align and diverge. We run AI only games and conduct a user study pitting human players against AI opponents. We identify significant differences between human and AI negotiation behaviors, finding that humans favor lower-complexity deals and are significantly less reliable partners compared to LM-based agents. We also find that humans are more aggressive negotiators, accepting deals without a counteroffer only 56.3% of the time compared to 67.6% for LM-based agents. Through targeted prompting inspired by these findings, we modify agents' negotiation behavior and improve win rates from 22.2% to 32.7%. We run over 1,100 games with over 16,000 private conversations totaling 15.2 million tokens and over 150,000 player actions. Our results establish C2C as a testbed for studying and building LM-based agents that can navigate the sophisticated coordination required for real-world deployments. The game, code, and dataset may be found at https://negotiationgame.io/c2c.

Abigail O'Neill, Alan Zhu, Mihran Miroyan +2

University of California, Berkeley

Multi-Agent Coordination Multi-Agent Negotiation Automated Negotiation Human-AI Interaction AI Agent Benchmarks Multi-Agent LLMs

Apr 27, 2026cs.CR

X-NegoBox: An Explainable Privacy-Budget Negotiation Framework for Secure Peer-to-Peer Energy Data Exchange

The decentralization of modern energy systems is transforming consumers into prosumers who continuously exchange data with aggregators, peers, and market operators. While such data is essential for peer-to-peer trading, demand response, and distributed forecasting, it can reveal sensitive household patterns and introduce privacy risks. Existing data sharing mechanisms rely on fixed policies or predefined differential privacy budgets, limiting their ability to adapt to variations in reliability, data sensitivity, and request purpose. As a result, prosumers rarely receive explanations for why a request is accepted, rejected, or modified, reducing trust and participation. To address these limitations, we propose X-NegoBox, an explainable negotiation framework for adaptive privacy budgeting and transparent decision making. Each prosumer data is managed locally within a private DataBox, where raw data remain confined. Incoming requests are processed by an Autonomous Privacy Budget Negotiation Protocol (APBNP), which determines an appropriate privacy budget based on trust, feature sensitivity, declared purpose, historical behavior, and risk-aware pricing. When needed, APBNP generates privacy-preserving counter-offers, such as reduced resolution or duration. An Explainable Agreement Layer (X-Contract) produces human- and machine-readable justifications for each decision. After agreement, requester code executes locally in a sandbox, and only sanitized outputs are shared. Experiments on realistic energy market settings show reduced privacy leakage, higher acceptance rates, and improved interpretability.

Poushali Sengupta, Sabita Maharjan, Frank Eliassen +1

Department of Informatics, University of Oslo, Norway · *University of Electronic Science and Technology of China

Automated Negotiation Differential Privacy Privacy-Utility Tradeoff